“If the enemy assumes the offensive and attacks, it is the intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long … to withdraw the army from its present position and form line of battle, with the left resting on Middleburg and the right at Manchester, with the general direction being that of Pipe Creek.” – The Pipe Creek Circular
In the early hours of July 1, General George Meade’s staff had finally completed making all the required copies of the 20-paragraph Pipe Creek Circular that was to be sent to all his corps commanders. Meade was incensed that it took so long and was heard to grumble that getting it out took so long – the better part of a day – that it “was now useless.” The document outlined in detail what may have been General Meade’s preferred battle scheme – a defensive engagement along Pipe Creek. Almost certainly, the most important person in this plan was that of Major General John Reynolds, who as the left wing commander would be directing the three corps – the First, the Third, and the Eleventh – that would most likely be the first units to meet the advancing Confederates now known to be heading toward Gettysburg. As events unfolded, Reynolds, being true to his combative nature, would pitch into the Confederates as far forward as possible and would delay their advance long enough to define Gettysburg as the place where the battle would be fought. However, somewhere in northern Maryland or southern Pennsylvania, the courier carrying Reynolds’ copy of the Pipe Creek Circular was hopelessly lost, and consequently Reynolds would never see Meade’s concept of operation, which had his three-corps “wing” holding the critical left flank of the Pipe Creek Line. Had that courier actually found Reynolds and made him aware of Meade’s preferred defensive option, Reynolds might not have pushed his forces that far forward and instead may have fought a delaying action at Gettysburg, in anticipation of Meade issuing the execution order for the Army to concentrate along Pipe Creek as most of the other generals expected him to. This is the basis for this campaign scenario: Reynolds does receive his copy of the Pipe Creek Circular, Meade gives the implementation order, and events take a different turn.
The Confederates arrive at the new Union position and deploy overlooking Pipe Creek. (Patrick LeBeau & Chris Ward)
By late morning, it had become obvious to General A. P. Hill that the Union defense north of Gettysburg had been a skilful delaying action by Federal cavalry and a few of brigades of infantry. Although the fighting had left General Henry Heth somewhat confused, it was now apparent that the lead elements of the Army of the Potomac were falling back to a different defensive position. The fight would not be here. Though the Army of Northern Virginia was not fully concentrated, his leading III Corps – particularly with Johnson’s II Corps division in the middle of it – was probably strong enough to continue to press the Federals before they could become concentrated on a battlefield of their choice. Sending Johnson’s division into the middle of his line march had been a mistake, but that mistake could perhaps be turned into an opportunity, as it now gave Hill’s III corps substantial additional offensive power. He quickly wrote out a message for Lee, advising that the Federals were retreating and that an aggressive pursuit might defeat a large element of the Federal Army before it could concentrate. As Pegram’s Battalion relimbered its guns and Heth’s Division reformed into march columns, Hill received Lee’s reply, “By all means, push those people. Longstreet and Ewell will follow. You may use Johnson’s Division until Ewell is up. Any word from Stuart?”
The Pipe Creek Circular defined the intended final dispositions as shown. For this mini-campaign scenario, it is assumed that the execution order has the III Corps moving first through Taneytown and eventually joining the II Corps as a reserve around Unionville. After the III Corps cleared Taneytown, the XI and I Corps would move to the Bruceville-Middleburg area. Historically, there was a cavalry clash at Hanover on June 30, and it is assumed that Buford’s 1st Cavalry Division would be ordered to that area in case that cavalry battle escalated. The probable left wing deployment would have the XI Corps on the left and the I Corps on the right, with the III Corps at Unionville in a position to assist Reynolds on the left or Slocum in the center, depending on where the pursuing Confederates might make their main attack.
It will be assumed that the first elements of A. P. Hill’s III Corps would have started arriving in the area sometime after 11 a.m. and could have been deployed for the attack by 1 p.m. with the bulk of the III corps in the Zentville area, but only one division could have made it all the way over to the his east flank per the deployment area map. It is assumed that Lee would have allowed A. P. Hill to temporarily retain Johnson’s division for the attack, but the II Corps Artillery Reserve would probably be held back at Gettysburg until it could re-join the II Corps divisions coming down from Carlisle and York.
This scenario should be a moderated mini-campaign game, as the battle space is far too big for any one gameboard. It is recommended that this be a team game, with each side “deploying” and recording their forces on a copy of the entire battle space. These copies are then turned over to the moderator, who will decide how to set up the actual gaming table based on their recorded deployments and any special orders that the respective commanders may have for their units. At that point, the moderator has control of the game. He can decide if and when any Union III Corps units are brought in from their reserve position at Uniontown and whether General Lee lets A. P. Hill use the II Corps reserve artillery or not. Though the map does not show fences or walls, they would certainly be integral to the farm areas and will be placed by the moderator. The moderator also has the option of deciding who will have the initiative, and modifying any of the terrain or the network of farm roads as period maps were usually incomplete and often inaccurate. The battle is considered to be over by 6 p.m. or as late as 8 p.m. depending on the moderator’s decision. Victory in this mini-campaign game is determined by occupying critical “point value” locations by the end of the game, with victory going to the side with the most points. If both sides have equal points, the game is a draw.
(For brigade, regiment and battery details see Army List)
I Corps: Major General John Reynolds (14,000 men, 28 guns)
I Corps: 1st Division (James Wadsworth)
• Meredith’s Brigade
• Cutler’s Brigade
I Corps: 2nd Division (John Robinson)
• Paul’s Brigade
• Baxter’s Brigade
I Corps: 3rd Division (Thomas Rowley)
• Biddle’s Brigade
• Stone’s Brigade
• Stannard’s Brigade
I Corps Artillery Brigade (Charles Wainwright)
XI Corps: Major General Oliver Otis Howard (10,800 men, 26 guns)
XI Corps: 1st Division (Francis Barlow)
• Von Gilsa’s Brigade
• Ames’ Brigade
XI Corps: 2nd Division (Adolph von Steinwehr)
• Coster’s Brigade
• Smith’s Brigade
XI Corps: 3rd Division (Carl Schurz)
• Schimmelfennig’s Brigade
• Krzyzanowski’s Brigade
XI Corps Artillery Brigade (Thomas Osborne)
III Corps: Major General Daniel Sickles (13,000 men, 30 guns)
Moderator Option: Late Arrival – either entire corps or by individual divisions.
III Corps: 1st Division (David Birney)
• Graham’s Brigade
• Ward’s Brigade
• Regis de Trobriand’s Brigade
III Corps: 2nd Division (Andrew Humphreys)
• Carr’s Brigade
• Brewster’s Brigade
• Burling’s Brigade
III Corps Artillery Brigade (George Randolph)
III Corps: Major General A. P. Hill (23,000 men, 84 guns)
Heth’s Division (Henry Heth)
• Archer’s Brigade
• Davis’ Brigade
• Pettigrew’s Brigade
• Brockenbrough’s Brigade
• Garnett’s Artillery Battalion
Pender’s Division (W. D. Pender)
• McGowan’s Brigade
• Lane’s Brigade
• Scales’ Brigade
• Thomas’ Brigade
• Pogue’s Artillery Battalion
Anderson’s Division (Richard Anderson)
• Wilcox’s Brigade
• Perry’s Brigade
• Wright’s Brigade
• Posey’s Brigade
• Mahone’s Brigade
• Lane’s Artillery Battalion
III Corps Reserve Artillery (R. L. Walker)
• Pegram’s Artillery Battalion
• McIntosh’s Artillery Battalion
Temporarily Attached (6,400 men, 16 guns)
II Corps, Johnson’s Division (E. Johnson)
• Steuart’s Brigade
• Nichols’ Brigade
• Walker’s Brigade
• Jones’ Brigade
• Snowden’s Artillery Battalion
II Corps Reserve Artillery (T. T. Brown) (31 guns)
Moderator Option
• Dance’s Artillery Battalion
• Nelsen’s Artillery Battalion
This version of the Battle at Pipe Creek, which does not require a moderator, uses some slightly different assumptions. For the Confederates, it assumes that Lee decides to hold Johnson’s Division and the II Corps back at Gettysburg so that they can reunite with the rest of Ewell’s II Corps. For the Union, it assumes that III Corps departed from Emmitsburg as before and continued to go into reserve at Unionville. Meanwhile, XI Corps under Howard was slow off the mark in pulling back – claiming that he was held up by the III Corps trains – and by the time he would was ready to turn towards Taneytown, the Confederates were already approaching it. So, after some confusion, Howard will bring the XI Corps to the Pipe Creek position by a longer but safer back route. His XI Corps will begin arriving in one long march column as indicated on the west edge at the start of the 12.30 p.m. turn.
This scenario starts at 12 noon and goes to the end of the 5 p.m. turn. As in the larger scenario, the side holding the terrain with the most victory points at the end of the scenario wins, but note that for this scenario, the terrain victory points are somewhat different.
Since the Confederates are on the offensive, it is assumed that they have the initiative throughout the scenario. However, if the III Corps commander Major General A. P. Hill is killed, then the initiative shifts to the Union beginning with the next turn. If the Union commander Major General John Reynolds is killed, then the initiative is permanently with the Confederates regardless of whether A.P. Hill is alive or dead.
