Iran’s leader on diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations
This chapter presents and discusses the international thought of arguably the most remarkable Muslim political figure of the last four decades: the former president (1981–1989) and current leader (1989–onwards) of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In terms of methodology and scope, it follows into the footsteps of the International Relations and Islamic Studies Research Cohort (Co-IRIS) project of advancing interdisciplinary research between International Relations (IR) and Islamic Studies with the aim to develop and sustain inter-cultural knowledge that addresses the theories and practices of the Islamic civilization and of Muslim societies as regards international affairs and the discipline of IR (Abdelkader, Adiong and Mauriello 2016). In this respect, the chapter’s basic premise is that non-Western (Islamic) thought must be considered as a source through which it is possible to construct legitimate (modern) knowledge, in our case as regards international affairs.2
Ayatollah Khamenei has received sporadic and exclusively scathing attention by the Western media and academia.3 His profile on the BBC website describes him as “Iran’s ‘unremarkable’ supreme leader” (Reynolds 2011), and in the same vein, S. Zubaida described Khamenei as someone who “lacks charisma and religious authority and is an ordinary politician” (Zubaida 2009: xiii). Moreover, in 2009 K. Sadjadpour affirmed that under Khamenei’s leadership, “a fundamental shift in Iranian domestic and foreign policy is unlikely” (Sadjadpour 2009: 30). However, a political and religious life at the head of the IRI spanning more than three decades in addition to the agreement reached between Iran and the 5+1 in July 2015 – from which the US withdrew in May 2018 – together with Khamenei’s capacity to lead the Islamic Republic out from international isolation and onto centre stage at the regional and international level indicate that these assumptions were at best misplaced, if not misconceived. This chapter looks beyond this narrow perspective offering a more scholarly account on the international thinking of Ayatollah Khamenei. It presents and discusses his views on diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations through the analysis of the political language used in his speeches, and in this respect, the analysis offered in this chapter follows the approach put forward by Bernard Lewis (1988). The basic assumption of the chapter is to present an accurate reflection of his views on the aims and actions of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this last respect, even harsh critics of Iranian politics and foreign affairs have pointed out that Khamenei has always spoken with conviction and that “he believes in what he says” (Sadjadpour 2009: 23).
The main source for the speeches and statements delivered by Ayatollah Khamenei is the leader’s website (leader.ir) and publications by the Mu’assase-yi Pajuhishi-Farhangi-yi Inqilab-i Islami (Research-Cultural Institute of the Islamic Revolution), the institute officially entrusted with the collection and publication of the current leader’s speeches and works.4
Seyed5 Ali Khamenei was born in Mashhad on 16 July 1939, the second of eight children. Together with two of his brothers he followed the career of his father, studying as a religious scholar (‘alim or ruhani) in the local hawza ‘ilmiyya, the centre for religious learning. In 1957, he went to Najaf, where he stayed for some months, attending the classes of the most-renowned local scholars. In 1958 he then moved to Qom, one of the main centres of Islamic learning in the world, to study with some of the foremost scholars of his time. There, in 1962, he joined the opposition movement to the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi led by his mentor, Ayatollah Seyed Ruhollah Khomeini. In 1964, he left Qom and went back to Mashhad to take care of his ailing father. Nevertheless, he continued to play an active role in the political opposition to the shah and was consequently jailed six times. Khamenei was to play an important role in the 1979 revolution that resulted in the exile of the shah, the end of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran. During the early years of the Islamic Republic, he served in the assembly that drafted the new constitution of the country, was elected to the first parliament formed under this constitution and to the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership (Majlis-i Khubrigan-i Rahbari), was appointed leader of the Friday prayer in Tehran and member of the Council of the Islamic Revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini. In addition, he served as deputy defence minister, acting chair of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Khomeini’s representative in the Supreme Defense Council. Then, in 1981 Khamenei was elected Iran’s president, a post he held from 1981 to 1989. On 4 June 1989, following the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini, he was elected leader (Rahbar) of the country, a position he still holds today. Khomeini is fluent in Farsi, Azeri, Arabic and English.
In Ayatollah Khamenei’s view, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic must be based on three general principles: wisdom (hikmat), dignity (‘izzat) and expediency (maslahat). The leader particularly emphasized the central role of these principles on 28 December 2011, within the framework of a long message addressed to senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.6 There we read,
The fact that people imagine that if we [use our] spiritual values as a criterion [for conducting our foreign policy] [then our] diplomatic work will reach a dead end is an error; it won’t reach a dead end. It is possible to enter the diplomatic arena, to be active [in it], [and] to make efforts [in it] while preserving these very values, insisting on these very principles; and [it is possible to] let logic (mantiq) rule and [therefore] bring our different counterparts little by little and gradually close to our own positions. When I said “dignity (‘izzat), wisdom (hikmat), expediency (maslahat),” by wisdom (hikmat) I meant [precisely] this. Wisdom (hikmat) is the fact that you can, acting with wisdom (hakimane), [let] the positions of the counterpart approach your own positions; these [three principles] are not in contrast with one another. Wisdom (hikmat), dignity (‘izzat) and expediency (maslahat) complement one another. You must follow the orientation of [our] national interests and this must, in the first place, go hand in hand with the preservation of [our] national dignity (‘izzat) and of the dignity of [our] identity. That is to say that surrender and the acceptance of oppression should not take place either as regards the beliefs of your heart or as regards [your] activities and agreements (qarardad); this would not be compatible with wisdom (hikmat). Sometimes it is possible to dispute, to be embittered and to be vehement; and this can sometimes be useful. However, this is not the general pattern. The general pattern is wisdom (hikmat). Wisdom (hikmat) means entering the diplomatic arena with logic (mantiq) and dignity (matin).
The word hikmat (hikma in Arabic) comes from a root with a very high occurrence in the Quran,7 Muslims’ holy book and their foremost reference and source for meaning in every aspect of life, where the origins of Islamic political language must be sought (Lewis 1988: 6). As a noun (hikma), it appears in Quran 4: 113, where we read,
And God has sent down upon you the Book and the Wisdom (al-hikma), and taught you that which you did not know.
(Badawi and Abdel Haleem 2008: 228; parenthesis added)
This word occurs repeatedly in Khamenei’s speeches. On different occasions, he has also given a detailed delineation of his personal understanding of it, as in the following statement:
Wisdom (hikmat) means work based upon logical calculations, the establishment of strong foundations, walking in level playing fields, and the avoidance of any form of imprudence, ignorance, and vainglory.
(Khamenei 1992)
Khamenei considers hikmat – wisdom – as a way of reaching one’s goals through the use of knowledge and reason and thus it should be assumed that, in applying it, diplomats and policy-makers must also take into account the issues of faith (iman), spirituality (ma‘naviyat) and justice (‘idalat) (Khamenei 2015). In this respect, in one of his speeches he stated that
[t]he Islam we support and encourage is based on the three principles of spirituality, reason, and justice and it is completely different from reactionary Islam or liberalism.
(Quoted in Marandi 2011; speech given on 16 August 2000)
The word ‘izzat (‘izza in Arabic) comes from a root with a very high occurrence in the Quran.9 As a noun (‘izza), it appears eleven times with the meaning of “feeling proud of,” “power, support” and “glory, exaltation.” More generally, in Persian ‘izzat can have both the positive meaning of “respect,” “dignity” and “self-esteem” as well as the negative meaning of “pride” (Aryanpur Kashani 1391/2012–2013). Khamenei seems to undoubtedly privilege the former over the latter, pointing out that in his view, ‘izzat (dignity) comes not through pride and arrogance but from having faith in God, being kind to God’s creations and people and serving them (Marandi 2011). In a speech given on 6 August 1996, he affirmed that
[i]f the Islamic Republic wants to safeguard its dignity (‘izzat) and life it is necessary [for us] to show firmness in response to their [i.e. our counterparts] increasing demands and excessive requests. Therefore, side-by-side with diplomacy, there is this fundamental principle; and this is precisely the thing that if it happens becomes the source of discomfort [for our counterparts].
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 36)
Moreover, Ayatollah Khamenei has clearly stated how the principle of dignity (‘izzat) is by its very nature opposed to allowing oppression to take place and, in terms of foreign policy, to being oppressive to other nations or peoples. According to this view, the very identity of a nation or a people is determined by how they act in relation to the struggle between dignity (‘izzat) and oppression. In effect, the struggle between dignity (‘izzat) and oppression, or between oppressed and oppressors, is a key component of IRI foreign policy and international relations outlook (Mauriello and Marandi 2016: 50–71).
The word maslahat (maslaha in Arabic) comes from a root with a very high occur-rence in the Quran, with meanings that fall into the semantic field of “good” and “virtuous”; “to be fit, or, suitable”; and “reconciliation.”10 The word maslahat itself, however, never occurs in the Quran. Moreover, the very principle of expediency (maslahat), in particular as elaborated in the constitution and jurisprudential praxis of the IRI, is to a significant extent new to Shi‘i politics and governance.11 We find the word maslahat in art. 110 of the Constitution of the IRI within the name of the institution that is entrusted with providing support to the leader in determining the general policies of the country, the Council for the Discernment of the Interest of the System12 (Majma-i Tashkhis-i Maslahat-i Nizam). The understanding of the word maslahat as regards the Islamic Republic comes directly from the words of the late founder of the republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, in connection with the formal integration of maslahat (expediency, interest) within the legislative mechanism of the state – and the subsequent establishment of the Council for the Discernment of the Interest of the System (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2008: 144–150). In a letter sent by Khomeini (at that time leader of the IRI) to Khamenei (at that time president) as regards the possibility of suspending Islamic ordinances (ahkam-i far‘iye) on the basis of the principle of interest/expediency (maslahat), the former affirmed that the Islamic state is
a branch of the absolute trusteeship of the Prophet… and constitutes one of the primary ordinances of Islam [which] has precedence over all other derived ordinances, such as prayer, fasting and pilgrimage.
(Quoted in Shirazi 1998: 213; parenthesis in the original)
This means that, in Ayatollah Khomeini’s view, the Islamic state can go beyond the strict and limited provisions historically elaborated by Muslim scholars and found in classical Islamic law and basically introduce any law that it deems of interest/expediency (maslahat) for the (Islamic) state. Ayatollah Khamenei has underlined the important role of the principle of interest/expediency (maslahat) since the time of his early tenure as president of the Islamic Republic. In a speech given on 3 November 1984, he affirmed that
[i]n [our] relations with other countries we have to thoroughly observe the interests (masale, pl. of maslahat) of [our] country. Sometimes it is possible that these relations are against the sentiments that a person can feel within himself. [However,] it is necessary to ignore these sentiments and stick to the path of logic (mantiq) and correct wisdom (hakimane).
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 31)
Finally, it should be born in mind that, in the current leader’s view, expediency (maslahat) is part of the overall path based on wisdom (hikmat) and dignity (‘izzat) followed by the Islamic Republic and not a principle to be valued per se.
When analysing Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches, we find the delineation of a set of general policies that he sees as underlying IRI foreign policy: non-alignment, pursuit of national interest, détente and rejection of weapons of mass destruction.
Since the beginning of its existence, the IRI has been strongly committed to what students of IR call “balancing.”13 Ayatollah Khamenei sustained the centrality of this principle during his tenure as president (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 49; speech given on 4 October 1983) and upheld it soon afterward taking office as the leader, as exemplified by the following speech delivered on 22 August 1989:
The political principle and foundation “Neither East nor West” (Nah sharqi va na gharbi) is safeguarded. On the basis of this principle, our policy will not be subjected to any group, neither eastern nor western, and this is part of our principles and foundations; and in this respect there isn’t any doubt or change. This is not simply a policy, but the basis of our system (nizam), which is moreover not in contradiction with [having foreign] relations. Gentlemen, do follow this orientation and consolidate [our foreign] relations on the basis of Islamic thinking, belief and way.
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 35)
According to F. Leverett and H. Mann Leverett (2013: 30), this position was developed in relation to two factors: the opposition between two highly antagonistic blocs during the Cold War and the decision made by the Iranian government to balance against the US instead of jumping on the bandwagon with it, following its rise as the only world power.
Ayatollah Khamenei has pointed out how the national interest (manafi‘-i milli) of Iran must be assessed on the basis of the changing needs of the country and not necessarily stick to those necessities defined during the early days of a post-revolutionary and freshly established state. In a speech given on 18 August 2002, he pointed out that
[t]he determination of our priorities on the basis of [our] national interest must change regularly. The priorities that we determined at the beginning of the Revolution as regards our [foreign] relations were in accordance with the national interest (manafi‘-i milli) of those days. It is possible that today our national interest (manafi‘-i milli) requires something else. We should not bind ourselves hand and foot asserting that, [because] at a certain time we for example stated that our relations with Africa were part of our priorities on the basis of our national interest (manafi‘-i milli), today we have to stand by it; no, this can be re-evaluated and examined. The priorities of [our] foreign policy and of [our] diplomatic relations have to be described on the basis of our national interest (manafi‘-i milli). Of course, [this should happen] within the parameters of our system of values, and not outside of it.
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 43)
It is interesting to notice how, on one hand, Khamenei has always reiterated that the foreign relations of the IRI are underpinned by intellectual, revolutionary and Islamic bases, and on the other, he has also stressed that these bases do not represent an impediment to the pursuit of the essential goals aimed at by any state through its diplomatic means, that is the satisfaction of the basic needs of the country – be they economic, political, technical or scientific. This behaviour is, in the Ayatollah’s view, linked to the fact that countries (and people) cannot live by themselves but are instead naturally inclined to establish relations (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 30–31; speech given on 6 August 1984).
The leader has stated on different occasions that the IRI should pursue a foreign policy based on détente (tashannuj-zudai’i). He has, however, also pointed out that there are some exceptions as regards this attitude. In a speech given on 16 August 1999, he stated that
[a]s regards the issue of détente (tashannuj-zudai’i), we announced it as part of our general policies. We are convinced of [the necessity of] détente (tashannuj-zudai’i). However, détente (tashannuj-zudai’i) with whom? Not with the Zionist country, the basis of whose existence we do not accept. Certainly, it was not us who created tension. More than by us, it was [created] on their part. They are [those who] threaten the existence of an Islamic power, they [are those who threaten a country] whose policy has been based on retrieving Islamic power. This is a perennial threat [for them]; that is, our [very] existence threatens them not our behaviour. On the other hand, détente (tashannuj-zudai’i) is not towards the US either, because the issue between the US and us is not an issue of détente (tashannuj-zudai’i).
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 38)
Moreover, the leader has pointed out that the pursuit of a détente-oriented foreign policy should not be in breach of well-argued rational dignified policies developed by the IRI (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 39; speech given on 16 August 1999).
Several international affairs observers have noticed how Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly and consistently denied that the IRI has been pursuing the development or possession of a nuclear bomb.14 He has actually emphasized that he rejects the development of WMD in general. In a message to the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament held in Tehran on 17 April 2010, he stated,
We believe that besides nuclear weapons, other types of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons also pose a serious threat to humanity. The Iranian nation which has been itself a victim of chemical weapons feels more than any other nation the danger that is caused by the production and stockpiling of such weapons and is prepared to make use of all its facilities to counter such threats. We consider the use of such weapons as forbidden by Islamic law (haram) and believe that it is everyone’s duty to make efforts to safeguard humanity against this great disaster.
(Khamenei 2010)15
This clear and unquestionable condemnation of WMD, be they nuclear or chemical, is of particular relevance because it is not simply an impromptu statement but is considered by Khamenei as a veritable fatwa in his function as a religious scholar qualified to derive legal norms from the sources of law (mujtahid) and therefore duly inserted in the section of his official website containing his other fatwas (istifta’at).
Over the years Ayatollah Khamenei has been very consistent in condemning all kinds of WMD, as shown by the following statement which he made earlier in his tenure as leader:
Contrary to the enemy’s propaganda and racket, we are not seeking nuclear weapons. And we are fundamentally and morally opposed to WMD – in the same way that we considered chemical and biological weapons as forbidden, even at the time of the imposed war (referring to the 8-year Iran-Iraq war).
(Quoted in Lotfian 2008: 165; emphasis added, parentheses in the original)
He more recently reiterated this legal-religious judgement by affirming that
[f]rom an ideological and legal (fiqhi) perspective, we consider developing nuclear weapons as unlawful. We consider using such weapons as a big sin.
(Khamenei 2012)16
The influence and importance of his position in terms of foreign policy are clearly illustrated by the decision of the Iranian negotiation team to include his “nuclear fatwa” among the core legal documents related to the country’s civil nuclear programme.17
In order to offer a more concrete grasp of Ayatollah Khamenei’s views on the IRI foreign policy orientation, in this section we present case-by-case samples of important statements made by the leader as regards key players, regions and issues in world politics: Europe, the US, Asia, Africa, the Arab uprisings and Palestine.
Ayatollah Khamenei’s interest in enhancing Iran’s relations with Europe has been consistent over the years. In a speech given on 18 November 1997/27 Aban 1376, the leader affirmed that
[w]e have to deepen [our] relations with Europe; [although] in the form and at the price that is right for us, and not at any price. [However] if they want to abuse [our] fundamental values and words, in that case [the strengthening of relations] would not satisfy us, but someone else.
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 37)
In another speech delivered three years later, on 15 August 2000/25 Mordad 1379, he added that
[w]e have to make [people] understand that the West is not equivalent to the US. [In this respect,] we have to strengthen our relations with Europe.
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 37)
It is worth mentioning that in this, as in other cases, he, however, cautioned Iran’s diplomats pointing out that
[o]f course, [our] [diplomatic] relations with Europe should be [carried out] taking into account their diplomatic manoeuvres. As I have already pointed out, they use threats, bribes, intimidation, and sometimes they [even] commit acts of duplicity. We have to be aware of them. This means that we have to be vigilant when dealing with them.
The leader’s will to build strong relations with Europe is particularly directed at a number of European countries that have a historical and consolidated relation with Iran, such as Italy, France, England and Germany. This relationship even predates the establishment of the Islamic Republic and is seen by Khamenei as being as important as those established with the European Union. In this respect, on 18 August 2002/27 Mordad 1381, he stated,
I am convinced that if we can, apart from the European Union, establish closer relations with influential European countries, this improvement would be to our [own] advantage. Now the European Union is also a reality, […]. However, this is not an impediment to establishing closer relations with those European countries that are able to have more relations with us. We can find common points [of interest] with France that we do not find with England. We can find common points [of interest] with Italy that we do not find with any other European country. Why shouldn’t we use these possibilities? This is also the case with some other European countries, smaller countries such as Austria, Spain and others. Therefore, engaging with Europe and Asia is definitely one of our priorities. Needless to say, also those countries that have the power of influence in the international arena are one of our priorities.
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 29)
A fundamental document regarding Khamenei’s position towards the US is represented by the speech he delivered in New York in 1987 in a session of the UN General Assembly.20 At that time he was Iran’s president, and this is his only trip to date to the US. The ayatollah addressed at length the relationship between his country and the US. Of particular relevance is a passage where Khamenei listed some of his country’s grievances towards the US:
A big chapter of our history, a very bitter, bloody and evil chapter, is saturated with American enmities and grudging hostilities towards our nation; some 25 years of support for the Pahlavi butcher and dictator, complicity with the Shah in all his crimes against our people, participation in plundering the wealth of the nation, serious confrontation with our revolution in the month of the Shah’s régime [sic], persuading the dictator to suppress the millions-strong demonstrations of our people, employing all sorts of means and devices to obstruct the path of revolution in the first years of our victory, the constant, provocative contacts of the United States embassy in Tehran with counter-revolutionary elements, continuous help and assistance to terrorists and counter-revolutionaries outside Iran, freezing of the people’s assets and property, non-deliverance of commodities that had been already paid for, non-payment of assets taken from the public treasury by the Shah and deposited in his own name in American banks, efforts for an economic blockade of Iran and the formation of a united Western front against our people, flagrant and affective support of Iraq in its war against us and now the bullying of illogical tactic of throwing an American armada into the Persian Gulf and seriously endangering peace and tranquillity of the region. These are parts of our nation’s indictment against the United States administration […].21
Over the years the leader has time and time again made reference to his strongly critical position as regards the US, describing its government – but not its people – in the most negative terms, with the use of words such as taghut (idolatry/disobeying the rule of God/Satan/illegitimate ruler),22 istikbar-i jahani (world or global arrogance/imperialism) and sulte-yi jahani (world hegemon) and letting the motto “death to America” (marg bar Amrica) thrive both during his presidency and leadership. In this last respect, however, in a speech given on 16 August 1999/25 Mordad 1378, he interestingly mentioned that the reason for US enmity vis-à-vis Iran lies not in this motto – or more generally in the strong language used by most of Iran’s politicians towards America – but in the economic success of the Islamic Republic and its being a role model for other countries (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 38–39), implying that this motto has no value per se and perhaps hinting at the possibility of avoiding its use once US hostile policies against the IRI are redressed.
Whatever the profound differences between the US and the IRI, it is worth keeping in mind that, when it comes to the US, Khamenei has said that his views are based on a concrete political assessment of the former open enmity towards his country and that, despite being explicitly sceptical, he is ready to reconsider bilateral relations once the US has sincerely and concretely changed its discriminatory policies vis-à-vis Iran. In his own words delivered at a gathering of students in the city of Yazd on 4 December 2007,
[c]utting relations with the US is among our fundamental policies. Of course, we have never said that these relations will be cut forever, rather the conditions of the US government are so that the establishment of such relations at present are harmful to [our] country and, naturally, we do not pursue them. First of all, these relations do not decrease the risk [posed by] the US because the US attacked Iraq while having political relations with that country. Secondly, the establishment of relations would provide the possibility for Americans’ infiltration and the terrain for moving around freely for their intelligence and spies in Iran. […] Be certain that the day when relations with the US should be good for [our] country, I will be the first one to endorse them.
(Khamenei 2007)
It is interesting to observe that Ayatollah Khamenei pointed out the need for the IRI to pivot towards Asia a few years before this became a focal point of the Obama administration in the US, in particular, under the tenure of Hillary Clinton as secretary of state. In his case, in a speech given on 16 August 1999/25 Mordad 1378, the leader described the need for Iran to take its relations with Asia more seriously in these terms:
I think that also strengthening our relations with Asia represents an important chapter [in our foreign policy]. I told those working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs many times that we have to look at Asia seriously. Unfortunately, there are still those who do not take seriously our deals with Russia, with Malaysia, [and] with India; they don’t like [them]. The inclination of their heart is always [towards] a European country, even when that country is of a third level – for example Holland or Denmark – they prefer to deal with it rather than with Russia or China. This is a mistake.
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 28–29)
Under Ayatollah Khamenei’s tenure as leader, the IRI has shown a sustained attention to the economies of the so-called global South, in particular Africa. This relates to the South–South approach within the foreign policy of the country. The current leader has argued for this policy since the early years of the Islamic Republic. In this respect, back in 1984 and as president of the Islamic Republic, he stated,
Economic relations should be used to ameliorate political relations […]. For example, [in the case of] Africa and [of] African countries and the likes, the overall policy of the government has been to connect and be linked [economically] with them to the extent possible. However, if we can give to these economic relations the quality of political relations [and] of affective relations between our two governments and between the two nations, we should use these [possibilities] to the greatest extent possible.
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 30; speech given on 19–10–1362/09–01–1984)
The leader has dedicated a great deal of attention to the popular uprisings that have flared up across most of Southwest Asia and North Africa since December 2010 (Khamenei 1391/2012–2013). He has gone beyond the mainstream understanding of these events in Euro-American intellectual and political circles, where they are seen as “uprisings,” by describing them as true popular revolutions; revolutions based on what he calls “an Islamic awakening” (bidari-yi islami). In a speech given on 15 August 2004/25 Mordad 1383, he has offered a balanced and cautious explanation of these popular movements in relation to the Islamic Republic:
The Islamic awakening (bidari-yi islami) does not mean that all the countries and individuals that partake in this awakening have acknowledged in a logical and rational form the intellectual foundations of an Islamic system, but it means that, among [these] Muslim crowds, the sentiment of an Islamic identity has appeared.
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 45–46)
Moreover, in the previously mentioned message addressed to senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 87–88), he shows a keen awareness of political sensitiveness when he points out how
[d]uring our meeting on the Islamic awakening (bidari-yi islami) I said that, at the beginning of the revolution, among the things we imagined [would occur] there was the realization of the reverberation of our revolutionary movement across different Muslim countries and, in the first place, in Egypt. [At that time] not a [single] voice [of protest] was heard from Egypt. […] However now this same Egypt, the Egypt of Hosni Mubarak, the Egypt of Anwar al-Sadat, the Egypt that gave refuge to Muhammad Reza Shah who was being shunned everywhere, even by the US, is in the hands of people that chant the motto “God is Great” (Allahu Akbar), perform group prayers (namaz), chant Islamic slogans, [and] raise the issue of an Islamic government (hukumat-i islami). […] We do not have any need to say from whom they learned; it is [in fact] better not to touch on these sensitivities at all. What is the necessity to say from whom they receive their inspiration? No, here the issue in not about receiving inspiration [from us]; the issue is that the words that we have been uttering for thirty years have now flourished in North Africa, in the Middle East, [and] in the Persian Gulf.
Overall, Ayatollah Khamenei has stated that he supports those uprisings that are based upon three foundations: Islam, popular support and independence from Western interference (Khamenei 2011).
The leader has repeatedly and consistently described Palestine as the most signifi-cant international issue. In his own words,
[t]he issue of Palestine is the most important issue of the Islamic world. No other international issue in the Islamic world is more important than the issue of Palestine because the domination of the occupiers of Palestine and Quds over this part of the Islamic Umma is the source of many of the weaknesses and problems in the Islamic world.
(Khamenei n.d.: 11)
He has also remained firm in reiterating that in his view, Israel is an illegitimate and illegal entity in the international arena. In this respect, he refers to Israel as the Zionist state (doulat-i sahiunisti) or the state occupying Palestine (doulat-i
ishkalgar-i filistin), thus refusing to recognize it even by name.
Overall, since he took office, Ayatollah Khamenei has, time and time again, sustained that he and the Islamic Republic are ready to engage in diplomatic activity with any country in the world. To this there are extremely few exceptions, notably the state of Israel (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 27; speech given on 31–05– 1368/22–08–1989) which is not recognized as legitimate by the Islamic Republic because of what Iran sees as colonization and institutionalized apartheid.
Khamenei declares himself to be an advocate of qualitative versus quantitative diplomacy (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 23; speech given on 09–12–1388/28–02– 2010). He describes diplomacy as both an art (hunar)23 (Khamenei 1390/2011– 2012: 17–18; speech given on 27–08–1376/18–11–1997) and similar to a war (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 36–37; speech given on 27–08–1376/18–11–1997) in that there are tactics, retreats, attacks, shifts and military deception (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 15; speech given on 31–05–1368/22–08–1989). He considers the diplomat as an artist, in particular concerning his communicative skills since he must sometimes be able to convey meanings beyond the use of normal language, namely through a language that can be theatrical, pictorial or poetical (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 17; speech given on 27–08–1376/18–11–1997). The leader also affirms that, in addition to art, diplomats must apply wisdom and experience in their activity. He points out that these three components need to be working at the same time and at the same level, in a way that does not lead the art of diplomacy to overwhelm the other two or go against expediency (maslahat) (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 17; speech given on 27–08–1376/18–11–1997). In the Ayatollah’s view, the appropriate path of diplomacy for the Islamic Republic, which he describes as both Islamic and revolutionary, is represented by an Islamic orientation (jahatgiri). This orientation is described as being characterized by audacity (gustakhi) and courage (shuja‘at) in facing the enemy and by the rule of reason (‘aql) and logic (mantiq) over both decision-making and actions. In his own words,
[i]f we, for a society [that is] Islamic and revolutionary, believe in a diplomacy [that is] revolutionary and Islamic, [then we have] first of all to maintain an Islamic orientation (jahatgiri-yi islami) and to be audacious (gustakhi) and courageous (shuja‘at) in facing the intimidations of [our] enemies and of the big powers. Moreover, we have to [let] reason (‘aql) and logic (mantiq) rule over [our] decisions and actions. This is the right path of diplomacy.
(Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 15; speech given on 31–05–1368/22–08–1989)
As should be expected from a leader drawing on legitimacy from Islamic bases, Ayatollah Khamenei believes that Iran’s diplomats should dedicate the necessary time to preserving their personal relationship with the Quran and performing their daily ritual prayers (namaz). Moreover, this activity should ideally be strengthened by the performance of devotional prayers (du‘a) taken from Sahifi-yi Sajjadiyi – the most important and well-known collection of devotional prayers (du‘a) in Iran (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 20–21; speech given on 27–05–1381/18–08– 2002).
Khamenei has time and again stressed that the strategic foreign policy objectives of the Islamic Republic are the same as those pursued from the very first days of the Revolution (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 22; speech given on 27–05–1383/17–08–2004).
Over the years, Khamenei has always reiterated that an important element in the strength of the Islamic Republic and its diplomats when dealing with their counterparts is their (Islamic) beliefs and principles.24 This also applies to those practical issues that from a Western perspective might seem to be of little importance, such as not to shake the hand of someone from the opposite sex, not to take part in meetings where alcohol is served or not to be dressed in accordance with Western-defined dress codes. This covers the use of bow ties or for that matter of any type of tie whatsoever (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 23; speech given on 28 February 2010).25 This also partly applies to traditions such as the exchange of presents between diplomats, in which case the leader stresses the necessity to exchange objects that are not expensive but, rather, are appropriate and to take into account that the presents received by diplomats should not be considered their personal belongings but, rather, as pertaining to the state (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 20. Speech given on 18 August 2002).
According to the constitution of the IRI, the general policies of the country must be determined, or at least endorsed, by the leader. In this respect, art. 110, which lists ten main duties and prerogatives entrusted to the leader, states that the first is
[t]he determination of the general policies of the system (nizam) of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Council for the Discernment of the Interest of the System (Majma-i Tashkhis-i Maslahat-i Nizam).
Moreover, according to art. 57,
[i]n the Islamic Republic the powers of government are vested in the Legislative, the Judiciary and the Executive, which [all] function under the supervision of the absolute authority of the Leadership of the Ummah (vilayat-i mutlaqi-yi amr va imamat-i ummat), […].
These and other articles invest the leader with an unparalleled power to determine the general policies of the country, particularly those closely related to its foreign policy. It is perhaps on account of this that A. Ganji described Ayatollah Khamenei as “Iran’s head of state, commander in chief, and top ideologue.” (Ganji 2013: 24). Therefore, a better knowledge and assessment of Khamenei’s international relations outlook and how he sees the role of diplomacy and foreign policy in shaping the place of the IRI in the world are essential to the analysis of current international affairs. Moreover, as leader of one of the most important Muslim countries – and the largest Shi‘i-majority country – in the world, the analysis of his political language and international philosophy is important to understand and evaluate current developments in Muslim intellectual history as regards world politics.
Early in his political life, at a time when he was president of the country – a country dragged into a long and deadly “imposed” war with Iraq under Saddam Hussein – Ayatollah Khamenei interestingly affirmed that the foreign policy of Iran is not expansionistic (tousi‘i-talabani) or aggressive (tajavuz-karani), nor is it aimed at a world where everyone becomes Muslim, with a single world government headed by the leader of the Islamic Republic. On the contrary, this foreign policy assumes that the world polity is characterized by a plurality of states (hukumat-ha) with different and conflicting interests (Khamenei 1390/2011– 2012: 24; speech given on 27 July 1985). This position is reflected in the overall international relations outlook of the IRI, which acts fully within – and hence accepts – the established reality of a Westphalian international order composed of sovereign nation-states.26 Some regional analysts have pointed out that the difference between Khamenei’s political philosophy and Western-defined political theory lies not in the acceptance or refusal of modern nation-states but in the definition of legitimacy in terms of political representation and governance (Leverett and Leverett 2013: 166).
As we have shown in this chapter – and as should be expected from a leader asserting Islamic legitimacy – for Ayatollah Khamenei legitimacy is formulated in terms of upholding a set of principles and values characterized by their “Islamicity.” Put directly and simply by the leader himself, “the results of our political and diplomatic moves and efforts must not contravene our Islamic ideals” (quoted in Marandi 2011; speech given 12 December 1982).
All in all, we can describe Khamenei’s international political philosophy as both principalist (i.e. based on principled policies) and rational. In the leader’s view, it is legitimate for Iran to pursue its national interest,27 and this should be determined on the basis of dignity (‘izzat), wisdom (hikmat) and expediency (maslahat). Moreover, the IRI’s foreign policy and political principles must be presented and defended on the international scene through argumentation (istidlal) (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 28; speech given on 16 August 1999). Argumentation (istidlal) is closely interconnected with one of the main means for acquiring knowledge and forming intellectual judgement in Islam: reason (‘aql). In his compendium of Shi‘i beliefs and practices, Ayatollah Ja‘far Sobhani, a prominent senior Muslim religious scholar based in Qom, underlined how Islam uses three main ways of acquiring knowledge of the world: the senses, intellect and reason and revelation (Sobhani 2001: 1). In this respect, in a speech given on 21 March 2009 as an indirect response to the first video message directed by President Obama two days earlier to the “people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran” on the occasion of the Persian New Year (Nowruz) the leader stated,
We don’t know who in the US is the real decision maker: the President, the Congress or [some] agents behind the scenes; but, in any case, I [want to] stress [the fact] that the Iranian nation as regards issues related to itself is a people of calculation (ahl-i muhasibe) and logic (ahl-i mantiq) and does not become emotional.
(Khamenei 2009)
We have seen how Khamenei argued for an Islamic orientation (jahatgiri) in pursuing the foreign policy of the IRI, and described this orientation as characterized, on one hand, by audacity (gustukhi) and courage (shuja‘at) and, on the other hand, by reason (‘aql) and logic (mantiq). Moreover, we have also seen how, in describing Islam, he underlined that his understanding of Islam is a rational (‘aqlani) Islam and that reason (‘aql) should be widely used in determining the goals of the IRI.
In this framework, F. Leverett and H. Mann Leverett have argued that the introduction of the principle of maslahat (expediency) into the political discourse of the IRI clearly signals the distinct rationality and realism of post-revolutionary Iran (Leverett and Leverett 2013: 61–62). Moreover, what has been described in this chapter challenges what these scholars define as two of the three pillars of the mythology about the Islamic Republic and its leader: “the irrationality myth” and the “illegitimacy myth.”28 In the first case, it is evident that the political language and international political philosophy put forward by Ayatollah Khamenei is centred on the use of the intellect (‘aql) and on a conscious use of political pragmatism (maslahat) in observance of Iran’s material national interest. In the second case, in a Muslim country, legitimacy is not necessarily based on (or at least limited to) Western-defined principles and paradigms but on principles of Islamic governance (hikmat, ‘izzat, maslahat, ‘idalat, iman, ma‘naviyat and so on) and the use of a political vocabulary and discourse that makes reference to the rich political culture developed by the Islamic civilization during its fifteen-century-long history; this is certainly the view of the current leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
While in the last decade in Western academe there have been some sporadic but solid attempts at developing a better understanding of Islamic political thought (Crone 2004; Black 2011; Bowering 2013), scholars of International Relations have so far given little if no attention to Islamic international thought (Mauriello 2016: 1–6). Indeed, as shown Achraya and Buzan, this, in fact, is the case of any non-Western international thought (Achraya and Buzan 2010). This chapter aimed at filling the gap in the available literature on the subject by presenting a first articulated delineation of the international outlook of one of the most remarkable figures in recent history on the international scene, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It did so through the presentation and analysis of his political language as regards world affairs. This analysis indicates that in the last four decades the current leader of the IRI has been consistent and coherent in developing and presenting his own worldview. This is based on a lexicon that has a deep and established tradition in the Islamic civilization.
1 Raffaele Mauriello conducted the research for this essay as part of a two-year postdoctoral fellowship at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran (2015–2017).
2 In this respect it can be considered a contribution – as regards the Muslim world – to addressing the problematic raised by Shilliam (2011) and Achraya and Buzan (2010). Moreover, being authored by two scholars working in a non-Western geocultural site and studying a distinct geo-epistemological perspective, the present article fulfils the necessity of “worlding beyond the West” raised by Tickner and Wæver (2009), Tickner and Blaney (2011) and Tickner and Blaney (2012).
3 A partial exception to this are Hovsepian-Bearce (2016) and Morewedge (2015). However, in the first case, the work follows in the established pattern of addressing the Muslim world in terms of either geopolitics or political science limited to the study of politics on the internal or domestic sphere or within the state and therefore does not cover the international relations perspective offered in this article. The second work is, on the other hand, aimed at the “political enlightenment” of the educated US public (see “Editor’s Introduction”), covering general aspects of political philosophy. In both cases, moreover, the interdisciplinary approach based on both IR and Islamic Studies is manifestly absent. A last exception is Sadjadpour (2009).
4 In this respect, Khamenei (1390/2011–2012) appears to be particularly useful in that it collects recommendations and advice given by Ayatollah Khamenei on a regular basis directly to Iran’s diplomats to provide them with guidance and general principles of foreign policy. It can therefore be considered partly at a removal from, or rather, not just limited to tackling the skirmishes of day-to-day national and international politics.
5 The title “seyed” is used among the Shi‘as to designate those claiming a direct genealogical descent from the prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and her husband, Ali ibn Abi Talib.
6 The entire text of the message is reproduced in Khamenei (1391/2012–2013: 83–96).
7 Its derivative words occur 209 times in the Quran. See Badawi and Abdel Haleem (2008: 226).
8 On ‘izzat-dignity, see also the speech given on 25–8–2000/25–5–1379 (Khamenei 1391/2012–2013: 19).
9 Its derivative words occur 120 times. See Badawi and Abdel Haleem (2008: 617).
10 Its derivative words occur 240 times. See Badawi and Abdel Haleem (2008: 531).
11 At least according to Shirazi (1998: 233–244). On the other hand, Izadhi (1393/2014– 2015: 18) argues that maslahat has a very long past in Shi‘a fiqh. Complicating things even further, Hallaq (1997: 112–113; 2009: 504–508) points out that maslahat was controversial also among pre-modern Sunni legal theoreticians and was appropriated by Muhammad Rashid Rida (and via him by Islamic reformers) in the late 19th century as a pillar of his rationalization of the materialist exigencies of modernity. On the other hand, Afsaruddin (2013), claims that, as a socio-political principle, maslahat existed from the onset of Islam, both Shi‘a and Sunni. In addition to “expediency,” maslahat is also usually translated as “public interest” and “utility.”
12 Also known as Expediency Discernment Council of the System or simply Expediency Council.
13 In effect, this is a policy that Iran – decades before Khomeini and Khamenei – also tried to pursue in the early 1950s under the brief and unfortunate leadership of Dr. M. Mosaddeq. Within his larger foreign policy of non-alignment, he tried, and failed, to cooperate with the US to balance not only against British and Soviet influence in both worlds but also internal (Iranian) affairs. In this respect, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that Mosaddeq was naïve in his trust in the US.
14 For example, see Porter (2014). Moreover, and in terms of concrete foreign policy initiatives, in his part study, part memoir, Mousavian (2014: 127–132) has described the IRI’s long-standing commitment to the elimination and non-proliferation of WDMs in the Gulf and more broadly in the Near East elaborated and put forward since at least the early years of Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership of the country and under the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997), in particular within the wider framework of enhancing the IRI collaboration with the European Union on fostering regional security.
15 The translation offered earlier has been slightly changed by the authors as regards the translation of the term haram, which has not been translated in the English text provided on the website of the Leader (www.khamenei.ir). This has a dedicated page that gives a list of his statements on the nuclear issue from 2006 up to 2015. See http://english.khamenei.ir/Opinions/tnuclear.
16 The translation offered earlier has been changed by the authors as regards the term fiqhi, untranslated in the official translation.
17 See www.nuclearenergy.ir/legal-aspects/#Fatwa_against_Nuclear_Weapons.
18 Despite its long history and importance, foreign policy relations between Europe and Iran have not received the necessary attention by the critics and the literature is scanty. Of use can be Mousavian (2008) and Hanau-Santini, Mauriello and Trombetta (2009).
19 There is a vast literature addressing the relations between the IRI and US. Particularly well researched are Leverett and Leverett (2013), Mousavian (2014) and Fayazmanesh (2008).
20 President Khamenei spoke in Persian. Iran’s delegation furnished an English text of the speech, available online in the UN Dag Digital Library here: http://hdl.handle.net/11176/151815.
21 A different translation in English of this passage is available in Ganji (2013: 32).
22 In this respect, he referred to the US as “the world’s greatest devil” (taghut-i a‘zam-i dunya). (Khamenei 1391/2012–2013: 61).
23 In other occasions, he also uses the term fann, “art” but also “craft” (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 23; 09/12/1388).
24 For example, see the speeches given on 28 February 2010 (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 23) and on 18 August 2003, (Khamenei 1390/2011–2012: 29–30, 44), and the message addressed to senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Khamenei 1390/2011– 2012: 95–96).
25 To understand how serious these issues are for Iran’s diplomats, we can mention the recent cancellation of an official dinner between president F. Hollande of France and Hasan Rouhani due precisely to the Iranians’ request not to have alcohol at the dinner table. See “France-Iran: l’alcool au cœur de l’annulation d’un repas officiel,” Zaman France, 10 November 2015, available online here: www.zamanfrance.fr/article/france-iran-lalcool-coeur-lannulation-dun-repas-officiel-18478.html.
26 E. Abrahamian has argued that the founding father of the IRI, Ayatollah Khomeini, also accepted the existence of territorial nation-states. See Abrahamian (1993: 15).
27 It is important to mention that this challenges common held assumptions about the essentially idealistic character of IRI’s foreign policy orientation. For example, see Ahmadi (2008).
28 The third is the “isolation myth” (Leverett and Leverett 2013: 8).
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