Of the use and reconstruction of an ideological reference
Islamism now dates back a hundred years. Concern over members of this political and religious movement1 relates to their putative and potential radical – or even violent – behaviour when confronted with cultural otherness. Such behaviour takes root in their assumed wish to redesign the world in their image. From its inception in the 1920s to its more recent manifestations, the Islamist movement strove to lift Muslim societies out of their alleged civilizational lethargy. In so doing, it has paid substantial attention to the state of international affairs, as well as the potential ways of acting on them. If the state remains undeniably the privileged arena of Islamist movements for action – considerations for the environment of Muslim countries, devising strategies aimed at the completion of a “motherland of believers” (al-Umma) and thoughts on an interstate order within an Islamic frame of reference – remain prominent concerns to them. From its outset, Islamism has always insisted on the duty to serve religion as a whole – and thus everyone identifying with it. Its end goal therefore overrides geographical, historical, cultural, ethnic and political borders – those being perceived as divisive and debilitating to Islam. In addition, Islamists consider the current international order as one consciously designed by non-Muslims. In such views, the latter nurses an ontological enmity towards Islam because of its revisionist potential. The Arab revolutions initiated in 2010 have been experimental fields of the oppositional – even revolutionary – dimensions of Islamist ideology. These events have enabled questions to be raised on the practice and possible evolutions of Islamism. In other words, how do Islamist movements translate fundamental diplomatic and relational principles into practice with other actors of the international system? If Islamist forces are indeed maintaining special relationships with the outside world mainly driven by the wish to expand Islam’s interests, is it analytically relevant to identify a specific Islamist practice of international affairs?
This chapter has two objectives. First, it attempts to shed light on how Islamist activists, leaders and theorists view the world. This is achieved through an analysis of Islamist speeches and intellectual production. Second, it aims to provide an answer to the following question: When Islamist officials had the chance to approach national decision-making arenas – as they have in the countries that have experienced the Arab Spring – how did they manage to put up a foreign policy agenda centred on an Islamic framework? Such is the central question of this contribution – as it allows one to measure the empirical outreach of the Islamist ideology. When uncovered, does the underlying logic at work in Islamist foreign policy reveal inconsistencies between the stated goals of Islamist powers’ and their actual diplomatic practices, or even clear deviations from their original plans? In other words, does one observe the coherence and strength of Islamism’s ideological offer “in action,” or are structural factors impeding Islamist actors – self-declared players that “do not abide by the rules” – from disseminating their worldview on a global scale?
From the analysis of Islamists’ agenda and discourse, final conclusions cannot be drawn regarding their relationship to the world or their strategic and political positioning. Indeed, the inherent principles of Islamist movements, added to their conflicting ties with the authoritarian regimes in place and their historical and geographical diffusion, hardly makes Islamism a centralized movement. Therefore, it does not provide a regular and transparent intellectual output explaining the policies and issues its theorists, executive branch and activists wish to discuss, if not act on. Measuring the consistent and potential evolution of the Islamist ideology relies heavily on highly metaphorical texts provided by key thinkers of the movement. These tend to focus on issues concerning the religious dimension rather than on a foreign policy agenda per se – one that could lead to in-depth internal reforms of Muslim states. A major finding in this respect is the shared usage of a “grammar” (with other actors) that is usually associated with the Realist school of international relations. Political Islam undeniably presents the world in anarchic terms that take root in political differences – themselves stemming from diverging cultural attributes. According to Islamists,2 the Muslim civilization is for obvious reasons subject to enmity, for it is considered a serious competitor for moral and strategic leadership.3 Therefore, in order to adequately grasp what resembles more world perceptions than an ideological system with rigorous scientific ambit, this work will adopt a sociological constructivist approach. This toolkit will allow for close scrutiny of the ideology’s main stakeholders’ views, while systematically being particularly attentive to the group’s internal diversity and to the different contexts that have seen the Islamist movements emerge. For that matter, an important remark needs to be made. Studying these movements’ vision of international affairs demands paying considerable attention to century-old “canonical” proponents of Islamism while embracing the views of contemporary Islamist activists who sometimes distinguish themselves through new frameworks that rupture with the original ideology. These had grown in numbers hand-in-hand with the creation and integration – when they could or would – of Islamist political parties within the electoral rule, and the accession of Islamist parties, on rare occasions, to power. In other words, these are the visions of the world held by Islamists rather than Islamism.
Moving back and forth between the fundamental texts of Political Islam to the visions of activists of Islamist movements that take root in societies that they wish to rule according to their own understanding of these principles – which they defend once in power – is crucial. Since we cannot be exhaustive when it comes to highlighting the whole of the Islamist writings that deal with international affairs, we focus only on the declarations and texts of main Islamists. This overview helps facilitate the understanding of the major ideological changes that are observable in the Islamist field. That is why we have opted for terms of International Relations theory, specifically, the interpretative constructivist approach. The constructivist analyses, which state that the interest of an agent is determined by the inter-representational configurations in which he or she is in, gives a central position to the speeches and public statements. This sheds light on the ideational structure referring to ideas, images and representations echoing to “subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions.”4
Many reasons prevent the activists’ positioning from being understood as either tangible or objective: scarce are Islamist sources related to foreign policy, strong is the view often held that Islamists may have a hidden agenda (such as the suspicion that their end goal is to subdue the social body to an extremist norm) or, again, constraining is the insufficient historical hindsight allowing strong conclusions (should that be even possible5) to be drawn. Although speeches or reactions to changes in Islamists’ environment are readily available, it remains difficult to clearly define the national interests that they wish to pursue. If references to common themes such as Muslim unity in the world, the defence of “Palestinian brothers” or the unavoidable mistrust in “Western arrogance” are repeatedly made in Islamist discourses. However, once it has been agreed that Islamism must be translated into a foreign policy agenda, space is left for debate, interpretations and adjustments. This space constrains Islamists, who inherit unwillingly the stage on which they act. In addition, on top of espousing religious rhetoric, Islamists also then become first and foremost responsible for a state’s position in the world.
Consequently, a constructivist framework of analysis is used in order to pin down the logic and contours motivating Islamist views on the specific space(s) allocated to Islam and Muslims in the contemporary era. The constructivist approach6 focuses on the subjectivity of Islamist international interests, making use of its sociology and analysing its contradictions, evolutionary possibilities as well as its relationship to society and to ideology instead of using the putative “objective” and predefined concept of interest as evident in other approaches. The social construction at the basis of their speeches and actions should be understood in light of a constant interaction with the local, national, regional and global spheres. Starting out with the assumption that the world is a social construct, internal and external factors affecting the Islamist Weltanschauung, as well as the rationales that determine foreign policy discourses and practice are analysed.7 Because Islamist activists and politicians are both principals and agents of a religious – but not solely – “system of perceptions,” they produce and promote views, action schemes and particular definitions of their state’s and Muslim counterparts’ interests. This is fundamental in that identity structures of Islamists are a constructed perception of reality that can potentially change. This identity designs a social being that, in turn, determines diplomatic practices. The relationship with the world promoted by representatives of the Islamist ideology and the changes they wish to operate can therefore only be accurately understood through a range of analyses from different angles: that of their self-image (the self), that of their relationship with their environment and, finally, that of the difference they perceive between themselves and other units that form part of the international realm.8 Therefore, would it be possible to outline with a certain degree of precision and coherence the perception of the relationship to the global environment held by theorists of Political Islam? If that is the case, is it possible to uncover the underlying drivers of this perception? If they do exist, have these theological drivers been well understood and adequately put into practice by followers of Islamist movements? What lessons can then be learnt in sociological terms of the translation of ideologies into practice and, more generally, on certain societies’ conceptions of international relations?
Most researchers agree on dating Islamism back to Hassan al-Banna’s (1906–1949) initiative in Egypt that had lent to the founding of the first Islamist mass movement. The movement had taken shape as a social institution, whose aim slowly shifted away from mere charity work to serving a political agenda. The latter’s aim was clear: calling the social body back to an “authentic” practice of Islam.
As stated in a famous text titled “To What Do We Call For?” found in within the Epistles (1936) of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood,
[o]ur people, we call you with Quran in one hand, and Sunna in the other, and the acts of our Pious Ancestors to this Community are our ideals. We call you to Islam, to the teachings of Islam, to the precepts of Islam, and to the path of Islam. If this has to do with politics in your eyes, so this is politics, and if anyone is calling to these principles is something political, so we are the ones who are the most involved into politics.
Religion is intended to impose itself on all those that sincerely call themselves Muslims. This understanding consciously considers the national era as temporal, its end supposedly taking effect once the mass preaching like those carried out by the Muslim Brotherhood can convince the Umma.9 The international environment – more specifically the perception that forces are working against Islam – was central and co-constitutive of the emergence of Islamism as an ideology towards the end of the 1920s. The development of a conscious need for a political and symbolic structure to represent the Muslim world therefore cannot be understood without reference to the then quasi-total hegemony of Europe over the globe, as it was considered an absolute necessity for Muslims to be able to invert the relationship of domination favouring Europe. This goal was accomplished through the restitution of the original caliphate, an intellectual contribution taken from the writings of Hassan al-Banna.
Three different but interwoven underlying rationales are present in the original Islamist perception of the international arena. First, it is conceived as a challenging sphere where Muslim decline is the most visible and where sources of pride for Muslims have been absent. World War I had floored the Ottoman Empire and removed the caliphate. The latter were, until then, still perceived by many Muslims as the most substantial remnants of their expansionist and glorious past. Through the mirror held to them by international actors, first-generation Islamists fathom the extent of the tragic fate Islam had been experiencing for the past centuries. For them, current times represent a period of alienation. Second, if believers can find inspiration in the early ages of Islam, they would find a way to return creed to the forefront, and rebalance power towards their favour. First-generation Islamists thus compare themselves to the first generation of Muslims, with faith and an authentic understanding of their religion as their only weapons. Following their line of thought, they view Muslim primacy over national borders as a reward. The historical evolution of Muslims is understood through the lens of religion – understood both as dogma and as a social practice. Therefore, assimilating such thought leads to the projection of oneself in a favourable light when confrontation arises. The dialectics that play out between Islamists and the rest of the world are born out of this point of view. The global sphere is the widest and most prestigious battle for which the Islamist project must prepare.10 Third, this explains why Islamists would avoid immediately constructing a political and religious entity engaging directly with the international relations realm. If the world is the goal, it is then more urgent for Islamists to consolidate the inferior levels of identification and activism before competing in an arena where the rivals of Islam are deemed the most problematic. In the eyes of Islamists, the global sphere therefore becomes somewhat of a truth test for Islam. The main goal and motivation of such movements are thus to defend Muslim identity and to bring glory to their religion in the realm of nation-states.
The written work of Hassan Al-Banna pales in comparison to the number of activist, educational, social and intellectual operations in which he had taken part. For this reason, he cannot be considered as a theorist of Islam. Being an advocate of a practice-based morality, he can be singled out as undertaking measures of social transformation that would shift the social order in a direction that complied to a stronger degree to his own understanding of religious norms. To be sure, his written works are, on a number of topics, more spiritual than political in content. However, more often than not, a reference to religion conceals a lack of clear political goals supporting his actions as well as the means to be used to achieve them. Instead, he depicts the ambitions and aspirations of the movement. Although he sometimes sketches out ways to realize the grand pan-Islamic project, his arguments appeal to morality and are seldom about laying out concrete plans. As such, he seeks more to inspire than to theorize. His success in uncovering alternative paths to his contemporaries relies for its most part on his charismatic authority. His point of view on the true place of Islam and the relationship it should have with the world – carried out by a supranational political entity – is, to a large extent, mechanical. The greatness of Islam is understood to result automatically from Muslim consciousness and from a project that would incite people to action. This project would aim at pushing forward the sacred norm in every aspect of social life (the family, the school, the state, labour unions, the media, the relationship to other religions, etc.). Moreover, Hassan al-Banna clearly links the future accomplishment of “Islamic civilization” to the parallel decline of the West, whose domination and achievements are said to soon collapse. Muslim spirituality will eventually triumph over those that have dominated over Muslim peoples until now. Hence, the founder of the Brotherhood is intrinsically a thinker of the Muslim world’s history. It is in his “Letter to the Young”11 that he is most explicit to express his curative intent to his religious community:
Most certainly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s programme follows several sequences, and each step is clear. We do know exactly what we are doing and we know how to realize our objectives.
Although it appears difficult to precisely list the recurring assumptions of Islamists that act as pillars of their world visions, Islamists’ supporters, fully in line with Hassan al-Banna’s teachings, originally identify with five axiomatic principles. This was valid at least until the 1980s – a decade during which theoretical reflexivity was applied to this ideology. Although these structuring ideas have experienced numerous rewordings – even amendments – there are nevertheless resilient building blocks of a certain ethos.
First, Islam and its followers are oppressed. Political Islam was born as a function. In times when “unbelievers” violate moral and historical rights by not only managing their civilizational space but also the world’s corrupted affairs, it is the self-conscious believers’ task to give their faith – and the Umma – the means to counter and to act on the world, through reactive policies. The international system being delimitated and structured according to cultural and religious logic, certain groups suffer ontologically from the “evil designs” of domineering powers, impersonated by the West. One of Islam’s self-acclaimed successes – the erection of a consolidated empire, as a forerunner to multiethnic endeavours, is a posteriori the reason why iniquitous actors have meddled with its religious and spiritual heritage. There would hence exist a plot against this heritage. The international rules of the game are thus based on power and deceit. Consequently, a realist grammar has developed within Islamist ideology since anarchy is at the heart of international relations. Differences in religious and cultural identity lead to political and perhaps military conflicts. As a reaction to the oppression that “Islam” (understood as a religion as well as a political nation deserving one single source of leadership), Islamism is seen as legitimate in its desire to reverse the world power struggles. However, the source of anarchy in this conception of international affairs does not necessarily stem from the desire to optimize the security inherent to the states within the international system.12 In this vision, states are unquestionably the main acting powers of international relations, but their foreign policies are first and foremost based on their cultural and religious identity (although they do not recognize it). Thus, the kind of anarchy that Islamists desire to react against has to do with identity and not the fact that every state within the international realm could act like any other one when its security is seen as threatened. The very primus movens of international relations deals with differences between cultures and religions and, more specifically, between “Islam” (seen as under threat because of the “un-Islamic Western imperialism”) and its enemies. States are units following an ideological matrix founded on religion, culture and, thereby, morality. Therefore, Muslim states have to unite so as to challenge a global power struggle that is said to be working at their detriment by giving birth to a new (actually old in the Islamist views) entity (the caliphate) which is supposedly the only one likely to rise to the global geopolitical challenge.
Second, this conception considers the “otherness,” a role impersonated first and foremost by the “West,” as commanding and operating against Islam’s principles and interests rather than providing humankind with alternative paths. Resentment for the “West” – a reified conception similar to what is considered as the “Muslim world” – underpins Islamists’ relation to that region, as it acts against Islam. A conspiracy might even be at stake, as understood in the context of the World War I, which was designed to destroy the Ottoman Empire, to ensure the creation of the state of Israel and pave the way for the colonization of “Islam’s territories.” This conspiracy lives on, as illustrated by general and ongoing prejudice against Muslim countries. Throughout these events, “the West” is aware of Islam’s potentially fatal rivalry, in particular, if Muslims were to unite as they choose. Muslims then have not been outperformed fairly and honestly.
Third, Muslims must unite, for they have been deceived by actors that are again deceiving them today. Divisions must end and Muslims must organize under the optimal configuration of the double-sided “Umma -caliphate.” The first element references to the sum of all those who recognize Islam as their religion. The second should be understood in a rather historical perspective. If nothing in Hassan al-Banna’s work describes in-depth what the “caliphate” means, it nonetheless considers any entity unifying all believers and exercising sovereignty vested in it by God to legislate and regulate social order. Thus, several forms of political organizations, at least in theory, may fall under the category of the caliphate (kingdoms, empires, modern states, etc.) as long as their allegiance to norms and values are made explicit.
Fourth, Islam is not only under attack because it competes for influence in other regions of the world – Islam is under threat for what it stands for. Conflict is, in a sense, cosmic – that is taking birth in transcending and meta-narratives. Muslims resist entities that they denounce not for what they are but what they do. In that respect, Muslims are not “looking for a fight.” They seek to re-establish the civilization’s scorned historical rights.
Fifth, and consequently, Political Islam’s defenders are to convoke and lead a revisionist agenda in international relations. They present the state as temporary. Then, assumed believers will realize the activist and doctrinal implications of their creed and complete their symbolic and political unification. This should then lead to a worldwide transformative project of the prejudiced and unjust international system. Islamism thus seeks to terminate existing power relations. For that reason, Islamist parties referring to this ideological grid can amend their foreign policies as see fit. For national interest that is to be built it must, before anything, be thought in relation to Islam and the Muslims.
Historical analyses of Islamist movements and parties, heirs to the Brotherhood matrix, have systematically centred on the Muslim nation’s fortune. The latter must face two adverse dimensions. First, putative Muslim regimes that do not defend it. Second, the international system itself and its prejudicial actors (the Western world and the Soviet empire during the Cold War, the former alone as of today) carry out the unstated objective of gaining control over the Islamist side. Such key ideas have endured the rise of Political Islam until the 1980s at the very least. At that time, in particular, young generations of Islamists – a significant number of which are under the influence of Sayyed Qutb’s revolutionary legacy – had already conducted violent actions back in the 1970s – thought of ways to engage in the national-political game in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Morocco and elsewhere. Although national politics were undeniably closed and devoted to reproducing autocratic forms of power, several student experiences – followed by others within trade unions – led Islamist leaders to revise their understanding of the struggle to come, and to put the religious norm at centre stage of the socio-political organization. To this, one must add that these movements’ theorists and leaders were forced into exile – after condemnation in their home country – mostly to Europe. The experience of exile was to be relevant to the major developments that were then to take place.
With regards to foreign policy, the antagonistic relation to the West and the critique of regimes governing Muslim-majoritarian countries remain present, although attenuated with respect to alternative revolutionary readings of Hassan al-Banna’s work. Islamist principles are reformulated – though no Political Islam Bad Godesberg13 is observable as evident after the Second World War. New circumstances have played a huge role in the ideological reformation of some European communist parties (starting with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) that turned down the Marxist legacy and introduced new sources of morality such as Christian ethics, classical philosophy and humanism). International issues traditionally structuring their international political agenda – Palestine first and foremost – are systematically related to the religious dimension.
The construction of world-related representations is aligned with civilizational thinking, according to which Muslims are oppressed because of what they are. Nevertheless, the Islamic toolkit is not exclusive. Theorists such as Rached Ghannouchi (Ennahda) and Mahfoud Nahnah (Algerian Hamas) have changed Islamist perspectives on international relations by incorporating into the Islamist matrix a democratic one. From this, emerged conceptions of foreign policies based on cooperation, under the condition that Western powers abandon deceptive moves to offer diplomatic solutions to crises, tensions and conflicts characterizing the Muslim world and its relations with other parts of the world. Even if Islamists are inherently suspicious, some are still able to conceive of a positive-sum game through which appeased relations would be attained with the West.
International legal norms, the multilateral agenda or the fundamental human rights applied to Muslim populations are all items that Islamists mobilize to suggest an ongoing process of doctrinal adjustments and conversion to democratic values. Interestingly, the emergence of violent and revolutionary radical forms of Islamism since the Afghan war (the “Jihadist” tendency) enables these then “moderate” and “reasonable” actors to appear as partners for world powers. Indeed, disregarding their claims could then lead to more opposition and violence from and within the Muslim world.
Revolutionary dynamics at work in the Arab world since 2010, notably incarnated by representatives of Political Islam’s coming to office, provides the observer with an interesting sequence – though short-lived – to measure Political Islam’s workability and capacity for evolving within the realm of foreign policy. From the original premises to the contemporary era, supporters of an activist and politically organized Islam have realized the necessary translation of their offer into national frameworks – their successes being first and foremost the result of internal considerations. This implies that references to the international climate are not decisive to explain mobilizations around Islamism – though references to oppressed and victimized Muslims under an unfair system are still present in its discourses so far.
Different election outcomes resulting from the political transitions that took place in some Arab countries since 2010 confirm this state of affairs. From a constructivist perspective, Tunisia is a case in point. If Ennahda were to come to power, its discourses on foreign policy could then be interpreted in either two ways. On one hand, the declarations of this party’s representative strongly insist on their commitment to democratic principles and their wish to protect and strengthen the gains of the revolution. In turn, these statements have a strong international outreach as they tend to reassure other states and international organizations at a time when the country experiences important social and economic problems. On the other hand, although quite rare, the party’s appeal to the need for the Muslim identity to grow stronger under the banner of Political Islam aims at showing to some electoral segments that this objective will not vanish into thin air. If it is – at all – possible to differentiate an actor’s intentions from the strategy it lays out, a phenomenon of isomorphism14 is undeniably at play here. The norm that is appealed to, however, does not belong to the usual ideological realm of Islamist parties. In this case, the legal channels, as well as the institutional or social pressures, have put constraints on the form and social practices of the party. The longing for democracy and legal order uncovered by the Tunisian revolution have compelled the Islamist sphere to rethink its relationship to the world within a pluralist framework. The paradigm shift that led to the political transition15 in Tunisia has forced Islamists to reposition themselves in the new political arena. In order to uphold and promote their worldview, they must respect the modus operandi of their new field of action. The same kind of phenomena can be observed at the level of activists, the only difference being that it is rather their biographical trajectories that explain the reflexiveness of the structure’s tie to the wider world. Different profiles under study show that forced exile in the 1990s because of the Ben Ali regime, added to the experience of migration, have completely transformed these actors’ perception of the international distribution of power and inequality. These experiences have led them to see the “West” as a complex and non-essentialized actor. Indeed, a great number of activists explain that the interaction they had with some parts of foreign civil societies as well as their political socialization through human rights forums, have led them to believe that the main source of deadlock in Arab and Muslim countries was internal – the autocratic and despotic natures of the regimes in place. Their perception of the world’s summa divisio is not anymore necessarily that of “Muslims” against “non-Muslims.”16 In fact, the emergence of a moderate Islamist discourse and practice of foreign policy must be understood as a dynamic rather than a permanent condition. The remaining symbolically charged issues – such as the Palestinian cause – and the persistent ambition to withdraw the “Islamic nation” from any pagan civilizational influence keep the anti-Western rhetoric going. However, the discourse on the West is more focused on its “hypocrisy” since it brands universal values of “Muslims” when a discord appears while Western countries merrily disrespect them. In this respect, the evolution of Ennahda’s programmatic documents shows how far Islamist parties have come in the transformation of the “Islamist perception of the world.” For example, Ennahda’s objective among other main political orientations was to
[r]estore Tunisia’s place as the basis of the Islamic civilization in order to put an end to the latter’s alienation and bewilderment by promoting Tunisia’s Islamic personality. Renew Islamic thought in the light of the founding principles of Islam by taking into account the requirements of progress while getting rid of the remains of times of decadence and the influence of the West.17
By now, the construction of a new Islamist identity disregards modes of allegiance should they be, for example, national or religious. Indifference also implies means required to achieve worldwide Muslim solidarity. Indeed, although this objective is not dropped, Islamist parties focus more on its symbolic dimension. These ideological realignments have a clear impact on foreign policy discourses. The 9th Congress of Ennahda, held in 2012, uses a very different tone when it comes to the international agenda than in the 1980s.
The construction of a new Islamist identity which acknowledges the plurality of customs of allegiance (both national and religious), on one hand; and the possibility of enhancing Muslim solidarity on a global scale (according to modalities yet to be defined, as unification first starts with at the symbolic level), on the other, has clear implications on foreign policy discourses. As displayed in the work of the movement’s 12th Congress held in 2012, the tone adopted with respect to the international relations’ agenda has evolved significantly:
Contributing to the establishment of a foreign policy based on the principle of states’ sovereignty, unity and independence vis-à-vis any power, establishing international relations supported by mutual respect, cooperation, justice, equality and peoples’ right to self-determination; and act to support weakened peoples and their just cases, among which the Palestinian cause is the first priority.18
The non-exhaustive study of the foundations and origins of Islamist actors’ visions of the world brings to light two key elements.
The first concerns the revisionist potential that iterations of this ideology might unleash. Because it can be read radically, and because it conceptualizes a specific relation to the “other” as well as to the global environment, the Islamist ideology can be potentially “deviant.” This holds true, in particular, if one has a “realist” interpretation of the world in which units of the international system are supposed to behave in predictable ways according to logic of power. There is, in addition, a more structural explanation to Islamist-prone leaders’ attraction to more rigid forms of diplomacy. Indeed, once one puts aside Islamism’s views on international relations and the religious mind-set of its actors, one can identify recurrent thematic patterns within the rhetoric of countless movements in the Muslim world. This is particularly true for Arab nationalists, who target a Western stance that is said to be “imperialist” and aggressive towards formerly colonized populations; added to violent criticisms against pro-Israeli stands, both aspects present political issues that are not exclusively those of Political Islam. If its representatives’ current success is not attributable to their foreign policy agenda (if such an agenda is indeed identifiable), one still has to acknowledge the strong resemblance with historically influential ideas in wide segments of the political spectrum that are still present in some Arab and Muslim societies. The cultural and religious side to an intellectual structure stemming from populations’ sense of oppression, Islamism impersonates – in sacred guise – aspirations for change in the international system. Such change should be in favour of peoples and states that too often perceive themselves as “tricked” in world affairs. This would then not fall under an explanation that has little do with Islamism’s bases as presented by its leaders and activists: the inclination towards independence and politico-religious unity.19
However, ideology can evolve. In the case of Islamism, this occurs both because of sociological changes that have operated within Islamists’ ranks for the past decades, and as well as their accession to power, which had little to do with geo-politics. Certain Islamists’ reflexivity, added to the high costs imposed by the international order on any desire to remain loyal to their theoretical and moral assumptions, have led the Islamist ideology to evolve. This does not mean that final amendments have been brought to Islamism. However, where Islamists have had a diplomatic practice, and where such a practice could have evolved, one observes that they have not attempted to change the rules of the game. If discourses have systematically alluded to the necessary unification of the Muslim peoples and defence of fellow believers, one can hardly see here more than a symbolic horizon. In short, these are evident signals sent by Political Islam testifying to its uniqueness, when, in fact, it has been normalized when in touch with power.
The task of envisaging possible and future evolutions of this originally radical and revisionist offer however still remains. We can imagine the coming of an all-amended Islamism. A Bad Godesberg for Political Islam is possible according to contemporary theorists, whose main interest lies in coping with societies’ diversities while rooting in it their religious legacy. That which is neither a centralized nor homogeneous movement should only concern part of the Islamist spectrum. Moreover, a clear-cut break from the past would unlikely find a formalized form. The daily decision-making of a “normalized” Islamism within states’ internal political games makes the case for Islamism’s ideological evolution without a magnified critical juncture.
One can also single out the thread of the “Islamo-national” synthesis, which would go hand-in-hand with strong dogmatic specificities yet which would try to express itself within democratized political spaces or within platforms ruled by powers aware of the impossibility to repress Islamism’s supporters. Ideal types of breaking away from “traitor” regimes and supranational endeavours would endure. This, however, would introduce a more cooperative agenda through which working for religion’s benefit in a given country would be considered a step forward in the direction of a global plan. Discourses could still then mention the “caliphate” or a “Union of Muslim States” based on the European model. Fundamentally, Political Islam’s revisionist stance would not disappear – and the wider horizon of Islamism’s project would remain the transformation of political representation in Muslim-majoritarian spaces.
Last, one cannot exclude the possible reshaping of this “ideology on offer” in countries where recent events seem to have rejected it under the pressure of counter-revolutionary forces (e.g. Egypt) – in ways more radical than past trends would’ve suggested. This may appear as an unlikely outcome given that Islamists have taken note of the high social expectations raised in these countries. Nonetheless, because each grave crisis contains the seeds for actors’ radicalization – one can also expect some Islamist senior members and activists to be supported in their views that regimes to which they are opposed cannot be defeated by the bearers of religious genuineness. In a constructivist approach to the global space, such phenomena can only occur if a radicalized social identity impacts the international practice and conception of a political movement. More than ever, and for all these reasons, final conclusions on Islamism cannot be provided today.
1 Roy, O. (1998) The Failure of Political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
2 We are here principally referring to the Muslim activists and militants seeking to establish an Islamic political, social and identity order based (at least originally) on a fundamentalist understanding of religion, by using the modern tools of politicization (creation of a political party to run for power, use of modern media, etc.). We are thus interested in movements such Ennahda in Tunisia, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In doing so, we do not engage any discussion on the “Jihadist” movements whose politicization does not involve a “classical” politicization at the profit of a transnational insurrection.
3 For in-depth study see Adraoui, M. (ed.). (2018). The Foreign Policy of Islamist Political Parties: Ideology in Practise, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, in press.
4 Parsons, C. (2002) “Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union”, International Organization, Volume 56, n°1: 47–84, 48.
5 Indeed, the army’s coup in Egypt in July 2013 against the Islamist government in order to re-establish the army’s predominance over national affairs shows that Islamism may well also be overthrown.
6 Onuf, N. (2013). Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations, Routledge.
7 “People do use the language […] to influence other people. Thus, no matter they are aware of it or not, their representation of the world contributes to its construction,” Kubalkova, V. (ed.). (2001). Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, Armonk, p. 63.
8 Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (2007). International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9 Brynjar, L. (1998). The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942. Reading, England: Ithaca Press.
10 Hallaq, W. (2012) The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament, New York: Columbia University Press.
11 Mitchell, R., (1993). The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12 Waltz, K. (2010). Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press.
13 The Bad Godesberg has represented the party programme outline of the political course of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Germany. It was ratified on November 15, 1959, at an SPD party convention in the town of Bad Godesberg (which is today a part of Bonn). It rejected the goal of replacing capitalism and abandonned Marxist theories of materialism and class struggle. For in-depth study see Orlow, D. (2016) A History of Modern Germany: 1871 to Present, Routledge.
14 On institutional isomorphism, see Di Maggio P. and Powell. W. (1983). “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Sociological Review 48, no. 2: 147–160. Isomorphism takes place when an actor tries to redefine itself through action or discourse by appealing to a common social norm.
15 It is important to note here that social change – that is the revolutionary and transitional processes – act as “social facts” as understood by Emile Durkheim. The latter explains that social facts are “[a] social fact is any way of acting, whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint; which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations.” (chapter 1), Durkheim, E. (1982). The Rules of Sociological Method. New York: Free Press, 50–59.
16 Ben Salem, M. (2015) “Ennahda’s Foreign Policy: Permanent features and Changes.” in Islamists and the World. Political Islam and International Relations, Adraoui, M. (ed.), Paris: L’Harmattan 2015: 67–90.
17 The Movement of the Islamic Tendency, Constitutive platform, June 1981.
18 Ben Salem, M. (2015) “Ennahda’s Foreign Policy: Permanent features and Changes.” in Islamists and the World. Political Islam and International Relations, Adraoui, M. (ed.), Paris: L’Harmattan 2015: 67–90.
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