Reconciling the Ummah and territoriality in contemporary International Relations
The real or perceived presence of a dichotomy between Muslim-majority and non-Muslim societies – or Dar-al-Islam versus Dar-al-Harb – and its potential manifestation in a politics of exclusivity or violent conflict, has become one of the most familiar aspects of public discourse on the role of the Islamic faith in contemporary International Relations (IR) (Hashmi, 1996: 19; Mandaville, 2001: 136–139; Moses, 2006: 499; Simbar, 2008; Burgis, 2009: 68; Turner, 2012: 12). Yet in its core tenets, Islam is understood as boundless, non-territorial and opposed to political representation separate from the divine. The present chapter seeks to reconcile this tension in the Islamic intellectual tradition by examining the gradual redefinition and adaptation of spatial dualism by clerical and political elites that have occurred alongside the evolution of the modern post-colonial state, particularly in North Africa and the Middle East. It draws on two concepts, one introduced by the medieval Muslim geographers regarding the absence of literally defined borders between nations and the degrading of power projection across distances between capital cities and the premise of “geographical buffer spaces” developed by contemporary Iranian scholars of geopolitics, to identify variations in the definition of boundaries within and between Muslim and non-Muslim populations as manifest in physical territory. The first section examines the conceptual foundations of territoriality as historically conceived and defined within Islamic thought. The second section reviews the transformation of this idea across time from the first Muslim conquests to the emergence of Arab statehood in the mid-20th century and how it became manifest in the engagement of Islamic legal theory with the praxis of interstate relations. These definitions are applied in the third section in order to generate a theoretical framework for modern geopolitical analysis that integrates the territorial classification system produced by the Sunni (and, to a lesser extent, Shi’a) schools of Islamic jurisprudence (mad’hahib) with a model outlined by scholars affiliated with the Iranian Association of Geopolitics (IAG). Finally, the conclusion discusses the preliminary findings and considers the prospects for developing an applied geopolitical methodology that is logically compatible with Islamic interpretations of world order.
The contemporary study of Islamic perspectives in IR has often been occupied by an internal contradiction. While the global role of Islam was originally defined by the classical Quranic conception of a borderless community of faith (Ummah) rather than the sovereign territorial state, at the same time the relationship between Muslim-majority and non-Muslim societies has historically been represented by Islamic jurists as a spatial construct or a division between contrasting zones or domains identified as the Abode of Submission or Oneness (Dar-al-Islam/Dar al-Tawhid) and the Abode of War or Unbelief (Dar-al-Harb/Dar-al-Kufr). In a heuristic sense, this premise invokes the mental analogy of a physical separation between two or more populations occupying geographic space, based on territorial boundaries as delimited by incumbent political authorities. This representation is substantiated by the definition of dar in Islamic international legal theory (siyar) as a territory or region or the portion of its constituent states that lie either within or beyond the administrative jurisdiction of the Shari’a (Bsoul, 2007: 74; Ahmad, 2008; Ayoub, 2012: 2). An account of the initial establishment of the Ummah through the forging of tribal alliances on the Arabian Peninsula by the Prophet Mohammed in the early 7th century also describes it as a proto-international system, which imposed a religious legal order (the Constitution of Medina) on a previously anarchic sub-region composed of warring chiefdoms (Moses, 2006: 495–496). In addition, the interpretation subsequently extended by Hanafi jurist Abu Bakr as-Sarakhsi in the 9th century suggests an analogy between these two realms and the opposition between hierarchy and anarchy in contemporary IR theory. This identifies an essential link between territory and security: the laws of God and the protection of both the faithful and non-Muslim minorities (dhimmi) – or, Pax Islamica – within the former and the absence of belief and chaos regardless of its rulers’ religion – or, the Hobbesian “state of nature” – in the latter (Ramadan, 1999: 125–126; Sabet, 2003: 179; Sheikh, 2003: 22; Abo-Kazleh, 2006: 43; Moses, 2006: 499–500; al-Dawoody, 2016: 107). According to classicists of the “First Debate,” the latter condition constituted an existential threat to the Daral-Islam that could only be eliminated through the conquest and conversion of the latter (jihad), which to the present day has been a subject of major contention as well as misrepresentation among scholars and practitioners of Islam alike (Masri, 1998: 156; Turner, 2012; al-Dawoody, 2016). The assumption of perpetual struggle between power-seeking forces comparable with classical realism also reflected the international context of that era, which was characterized by continued territorial challenges from opposing sheikhdoms as well as expansion by the neighbouring land-based (Roman, Persian, Mongol and Byzantine) empires (Abo-Kazleh, 2006; Turner, 2012: 15–16; al-Dawoody, 2016: 108–110). At the same time, the classical Shari’a did not prescribe rules governing relations between Muslim polities, as it forbade the existence of more than one Islamic state (Tadjbakhsh, 2010: 178).
And yet, present-day scholars commonly emphasize that this dichotomous construct has no direct roots either in the Quranic text or in the Sunnah and Hadith that together form the basis of Islamic jurisprudence (usul-al-fiqh) (Masri, 1998: 84,87; Sheikh, 2003: 22; Tadjbakhsh, 2010: 177; Hassan, 2012: 122). Rather, it is observed to have emerged in the centuries following the death of the Prophet, in which jurists (fuqaha) engaged in reasoned interpretation (ijtihad) of the revelations in order to accommodate the military expansion of the successive Rashidun (“Rightly Guided”), Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates beyond the Arabian Peninsula that transpired from 622 to 1050 (Tibi, 1996:177; Masri, 1998:84–85; Rajaee, 1999: 3–4; Tadjbakhsh, 2010: 177–178). A critical case study of the origins of a “personal” versus “territorial” validity principle in siyar concludes that as the Dar al-Islam “is not represented by determined frontiers or clearly shaped territory” because of the challenge posed by Dar-al-Harb, its dimensions are in continual flux, and are therefore not subject to a separate form of international law akin to the Westphalian nation-state (Bouzenita, 2007: 43). Thus, this period was characterized by the increasing need to reconcile the religious sciences with the practical realities of exerting political authority over newly acquired territories, which confronted a larger non-Muslim world as well as emerging divisions – including both sectarian differences (Sunni/Shi’a) and four major episodes of civil strife (fitna) – within the societies in which Islam originated (Burgis, 2009: 66, 70; Tepas, 2009: 684). It was as a result of this altered situation that subsequent modifications of the initial binary vision of “abodes” were introduced. Additional categories were generated during the ensuing centuries as multiple readings of the canon, or “Second Debate” became highly contested among Sunni (Hanafi, Shafi, Hanbali and Maliki) and Shi’a (Zaidi and Jafari) mad’hahib, as well as between individual scholars (mujtahid) within them (Karabatak, 2014).
The Kufa, Iraq-based school led by Imam Abu Hanafa, introduced three essential criteria for the inclusion of a given territory within Dar-al-Islam, which may be usefully analogized with contemporary IR terminology: (1) security provision, or the preservation of peace among Muslim populations; (2) regime type, or rule by governments that provide legal protection for Muslims living within their administrative boundaries; and (3) direct contiguity, or a common frontier shared with another Muslim-majority territory (Abo-Kazleh, 2006: 42). Conversely, a territory originally included within the Dar-al-Islam might pass into the possession of the Dar-al-Harb assuming the presence of three conditions: (1) rule by governments and laws of unbelievers (zuhur ahkam al-kufr), (2) the absence of security guarantees for both Muslims and dhimmi and (3) direct contiguity with non-Muslim lands (Shoukri, 2011: 46; Ayoub, 2012: 4). The identification of security and threat perceptions embedded in a regional or territorial context therefore represents a considerable advance in Islamic juridical definitions during this period.
Yet, perhaps the most significant innovation introduced by the Hanafijurists was a third space initially defined as the Abode of Pledge (Dar-al-Sulh), which relaxed the assumption of imminent warfare to allow for the conclusion of treaties of non-aggression between a non-Muslim territory and the caliphate and were rendered in several variants ranging from temporary to permanent (truce, covenant or treaty). These were developed as a means to address the question of how the Shari’a was to be applied to the diverse inhabitants of bordering territories or marchlands adjacent to the Dar-al-Islam, as well as non-contiguous or physically distant areas that had not been exposed to Islam or had not been engaged in hostilities with the Ummah (Masri, 1998: 108, 367). Such conditions are also captured by the Abode of Disbelief (D ar-al-Kufr), which in the Shi’a Zaidiyyah madhab is defined as those lands in which non-Islamic belief systems predominate, but are not necessarily antagonistic toward the Dar-al-Islam (Hassan, 2012: 121–122). These new dimensions also relied upon the premise of proximity, in that migration and habitation of Muslims beyond the Dar-al-Islam might be justified as long as it was feasible for them to return in the event that security conditions in the outlying lands deteriorated (Olsson, 2016). More important, it recognized that in contrast with the rigid conception of the Ummah as a singular or unitary space, Muslim societies could be disaggregated into enclaves that exist partly or entirely within the confines of non-Muslim lands or vice versa. The latter is exemplified historically by the establishment of the Byzantine/Rum and Frankish Crusader States on the boundaries of major Muslim cities in what is now Syria from the late 10th to mid-11th centuries and their alternation between periodic warfare and the negotiation of economic agreements during temporary truces (Takeo, 2000: 102–103). In the parlance of modern political geography, this might constitute a periphery or subregion of a unitary or federal state in which an ethnoreligious minority group is concentrated and shares a territorial boundary with a kin state that also affects its relationship with the central government.
The geopolitical significance of these advances is demonstrated by an early attempt to design a simple model of Islamic territoriality, which posits a correlation between the degree of change in boundaries between Muslim and non-Muslim domains and the presence or absence of dyadic conflicts. These include three conditions: (1) in which the attempted pursuit of territorial expansion by non-Muslim or secular forces reduces the area of the Dar-al-Islam by provoking the out-migration of its Muslim population (hijra), (2) the accretion of Muslim-majority territory through unopposed expansion of the Dar-al-Islam into non-Muslim or secular lands (jihad) and (3) an equilibrium state in which existing boundaries are preserved through a classical balance of power established by a formal peace treaty between Muslim and non-Muslim domains (known variously as muwada’ah/mu’ahadah/mu’ahada due to differing transliterations) (Parvin and Sommer, 1980: 5–7). However, this tripartite definition at the same time does not capture the more sophisticated taxonomy of territories eventually developed by jurists or the more complex configurations of Muslim and non-Muslim polities that evolved in the surrounding region during the medieval period. A particularly significant contribution to this process was the juridical opinion (fatwa) issued by Hanbali adherent Ibn Taymiyya at Mardin near what is now the Turkish–Syrian border, following the Mongol invasion and conquest of the Abbassid caliphate in 1258. The ambiguous political conditions fostered by the rule of a Muslim population by a secular but nominally Islamic occupying force necessitated the creation of a new territorial category: a city that was neither Muslim nor non-Muslim, described as the Abode of Compound (Dar Murakkab) (Hasan, 2015: 8, 23). Most significantly, this definition introduced the standard of identifying the characteristics of the inhabitants of a given geographic area as a criterion for the classification of territory in fiqh.
The final collapse of the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt in the early 16th century and the partition of former Arab lands between the Ottoman and Persian dynasties confirmed the separation of foreign relations from religious doctrine, thus allowing for the existence of more than one Islamic state as well as recognition of a non-Islamic world order (Khadduri, 1959: 50; Parvin and Sommer, 1980: 14). However, it is further necessary to demonstrate the applicability of these seemingly anachronistic definitions to modern international politics. Such need is underscored by the prevalence of secularism and the absence of a literal basis in religion in the foreign relations of most Muslim-majority states, even among those that implement the Shari’a (Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran) in their domestic systems (al-Dawoody, 2016: 106). One appraisal of attempts to develop a relevant Islamic theory of IR suggests that despite the lack of distinction in the external behaviour of Muslim and non-Muslim states because of a prevailing anarchic or “self-help” system consisting of “like units,” the concept of group solidarity (assabiya), as represented by collective recognition of the five pillars of religious practice (witness, prayer, alms, fasting and pilgrimage), produces greater cohesion between Islamic societies than is assumed by realpolitik, thus constituting a subsystem within the larger international order (Moses, 2006: 498–499; Akram, 2007; Turner, 2009). In this view, Islam continues to be signified by an independently defined organizing principle of IR composed of an “inside,” or domestic space in which Islamic order predominates, versus “outside,” or the external non-Muslim international realm (Masri, 1998: 84,155; Sabet, 2003: 179; Turner, 2012: 15–16). However, the composition and location of the boundary between these constructs remain subjects of considerable dispute among a wide range of different actors, from clerics to national governments to terrorist organizations. Thus, the potential to draw empirical conclusions regarding the perceived role of geographic space in Islam necessarily lies in examining their patterns of confrontation and interface with the realities of the post-colonial state, particularly in Arab North Africa and the Middle East.
The contemporary relevance of the spatial problematique in Islam is therefore attested to by several conditions. First, the subdivided rendering of world order proposed by the mujtahid further contradicted the cosmopolitan conception of the Ummah, or the foundation of the Muslim polity in a community of faith rather than the territorial state governed by secular laws. Ultimately, the need to accommodate this inconsistency would emerge in 20th-century Islamic political thought as articulated by reformist Salafi intellectuals such as Maulana Maududi and Sayeed Qutb with the concept of governance (al-hakimiyyah), which posits that sovereignty is retained exclusively by God (Allah) but a political agency or viceregent (khalifa) should be established in order to administer the Shari’a within the territories inhabited by Muslims, outside of which rule by unbelievers or “ignorance of divine guidance” (al-jahiliyyah) prevails (Khan, 1995: 52–53; Khatab, 2002). According to this perspective, the paradigm of the European nation-state was superimposed over a religious collectivity, which did not recognize the basis of authority in popularly sanctioned national governments (Kelidar, 1993: 318–319; al-Barghouti, 2008). Thus, beginning with the withdrawal of the British and French Mandates from Mesopotamia (Iraq) and the Levant (Syria and Lebanon) from 1932 to 1946, followed by the Egyptian Revolution of 23 July 1952, this ostensibly produced an unresolved tension where the norm of territoriality was adopted by secular autocracies and radical nationalist regimes while at the same time often maintaining allegiances to indigenous sub-state bases of influence in order to buttress their rule. This contradictory pattern presumably introduced a current of endemic instability into Arab societies, in which traditional and/or Islamic identities have continually challenged the legitimacy of largely imported institutional forms (Joffe, 1994: 10). In recent decades, this dynamic has been regarded by various scholars as a prelude to popular mobilizations in which political Islam serves as a foundation for democratic transitions, as initially occurred in the 2010 Arab Awakening (ar-Rabi al-Arabi) in Tunisia and Egypt. Second, beginning with the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, it has paradoxically manifest itself in a proliferation of protracted territorial disputes among Muslim-majority states throughout the Middle East and North Africa, which has become a common characteristic of regional international politics since the mid-20th century. Third, the immediate significance of this puzzle is undeniably confirmed by the emergence of the profoundly revisionist Islamic State (ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah) movement, which despite its origins in sub-national insurgent and terrorist networks extant to the 2003– 2011 Iraq War and the subsequent Syrian civil conflict, has surpassed its predecessors by seizing on the conquest of territory through conventional warfare – including the appropriation of preexisting administrative units (waliyah) in both its “caliphate” and “overseas provinces” – as the fulcrum of its challenge to the international system (Jabareen, 2015; Zelin, 2016). Last, it speaks to ongoing controversies regarding rights, representation and integration of Muslim minorities, whether citizens, labour migrants or refugees, in geographies far removed from the “Islamic heartland” or classical Ummah, such as Russia, Western Europe and North AmericaShoukri, 2011; Olsson, 2016).
Despite its persistence, the normative and definitional tension discussed earlier has seldom if ever been analysed from the perspective of contemporary geopolitics or the interaction of space, place and boundaries with the practical conduct of foreign relations. A vast body of previous literature, particularly in the post-9/11 context has focused upon the linkage between the Muslim/non-Muslim dualism, traditionalist versus modern interpretations of “lesser” versus “greater” struggle (al-jihad alasghar/al-jihad al-akbar), and doctrinal justifications for the use of force in Islam (Abo-Kazleh, 2006; Rehmen, 2011: 32–43). In contrast, the present study seeks to move beyond the confines of existing debates by developing an analytical framework that bridges the subfields of Islamic and Middle East history with current approaches to geopolitical modelling. Thus, in contrast with a recent study that rejects geographical definitions of Dar-al-Islam/Dar-al-Harb in favour of the extent of freedom of Islamic legal practice al-Dawoody, 2016: 106), the present approach seeks to specify the structure and function of spaces and populations identified in the Sunni fiqh as an explanatory variable to be mapped to historical cases.
The main task that remains is to organize the assumptions regarding territoriality derived from Islamic and Middle East studies into a logically consistent template for geopoltical analysis. A preliminary basis for this interdisciplinary effort is presented by the writings of the medieval Muslim geographers, in particular the Baghdad-based Balkhi school of cartography and terrestrial mapping that emerged in the 8th century. The maps of the surrounding region displayed in prominent atlases composed during this period, such as Ibn Hawqal al-Baghdadi’s Image of the Earth (Surat al-Ardh), the anonymously authored Limits of the World (Hudud al-’Alam) and Muhammed al-Muqaddasi’s Best Divisions in the Knowledge of the Regions (Aḥsan al-taqasim fi ma‘rifat al-aqalim) are demonstrative of the absence of demarcated political boundaries that separate states in early Islamic conceptions of world order (Parvin and Sommer, 1980:11–12; Brauer, 1995: 3; Eger, 2005: 5). The designation of the neighbouring lands (buldan) of Iraq, Syria and Fars, with parallel lines and boxes in these maps, suggests that the limits of sovereignty and national identity were not represented by explicitly drawn borders (Eger, 2015: 10). Rather, spaces between states were perhaps understood as “transition zones,” in which the ability to project sovereign power into peripheral areas as represented by instruments such as tax collection, postage or deployment of military forces declined gradually as physical distance increased from the urban core until it was replaced by a foreign sphere of influence (Brauer, 1995: 5–6). At most, spaces in between were designated by natural features such as mountains or trade routes marked with singular boundary posts. This condition is especially significant for its link to jurisprudence, as the lack of formal demarcation made it additionally difficult to determine the territorial limits of the Dar-al-Islam, and therefore, the legal status of mixed populations, as well as where the jurisdiction of the Shari’a terminated (Masri, 1998: 102). Such understandings of centre and periphery in the medieval Middle East are therefore analogous to the “loss-of-strength gradient,” or the impact of spatial proximity between states in Western IR and conflict studies (Boulding, 1962: 262; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981). With heed to more recent scholarship that warns against essentialist conclusions regarding a religiously based absence of boundary-making in early Arab societies (Brandell, 2006: 10), this is here understood as a standard of measurement for analysing the formation of buffer spaces, or zones of autonomy and accommodation between Muslim-majority and non-Muslim polities, as applied to the historical record.
An empirical extension of this view is provided by evidence from archaeological surveys conducted since the 1990s that challenge the traditional notion of the frontier as an empty hinterland or wilderness area, as initially conceived by late 19th-century American geographers, such as Frederick J. Turner. In particular, socio-economic interactions such as mixed settlement patterns, shared architectural designs and pastoral transhumance between the caliphates and the Byzantine Empire from the 7th to 10th centuries serve to challenge the popular notion of the Islamic frontier (thughur) as a front line of raids, military campaigns (offensive jihad) and captured fortresses that sought to extend Muslim civilization into depopulated Christian lands (Eger, 2005, 2015: 1–22).
Thus, the delineation of Muslim/non-Muslim boundaries is perhaps more fruitfully understood as a process of gradual redefinition that has occurred in tandem with the evolution of the modern territorial state. An example is provided by recent theoretical contributions of Iranian scholars of geopolitics that seek to extend the established literature on “buffer states” by introducing a more systematic definition of geographic spaces located between two or more rival regional or global powers (Hafeznia et al., 2013). A buffer space is here defined as a territory that possesses both an independent or autonomous status and a neutral orientation, which is recognized by a unilateral or bilateral diplomatic agreement that physically separates these powers by making their borders mutually inaccessible. Referencing the significant finding in previous IR research that contiguity fosters “interaction opportunities” increasing the probability of interstate disputes, their median situation counteracts the power projection capabilities of rival states, therefore forcing accommodation and reducing the likelihood or intensity of conflict (Hafeznia et al., 2013: 6–7; Starr, 2013: 40–50). The resulting model is divided into four main components: (1) the structure of buffer spaces as indicated by location and content; (2) the functional characteristics of buffer spaces in both external (international) and internal (domestic) dimensions, the latter of which is subdivided into government and societal levels; (3) the process through which buffer spaces are formed or collapse, as indicated by driving forces and manner; and (4) factors that precipitate change in the condition of buffer spaces in relation to surrounding powers. While at first glance the assumption of inherent rivalry and competition between powers within the model may seem to reproduce a primitive “zero-sum” logic (in which a buffer serves to delay rather than prevent conflict) as found in both classical realism and early Islam, it is here assumed that the development of buffer spaces subsumes both the traditionalist notion of continual jihad between Muslim and non-Muslim states and the subsequent adaptation of this dualism by Islamic jurists discussed earlier.
However, while the empirical interrogations pursued by Sunni legal scholars (mujtahid) produced an additional four-part typology of buffer spaces or intermediate zones, the definitions of these categories are essentially descriptive and are thus often conflated or used interchangeably in the secondary literature. Therefore, in order to move beyond descriptive taxonomies towards the construction of explanatory frameworks, it is necessary to identify causal relationships that link the designated function of territory in Islam, on the left hand, and the nature of interaction between spatial units, on the right.
The typologies displayed in Tables 12.1 and 12.2 rank each territorial type according to the associated level of accommodation established between Muslim
Table 12.1 Typology of territory and international Muslrm/non-Muslim relations
| Type of Territory | External Function of Buffer Space (International Level) | Level of Accommodation |
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| Abode of Mutual Peace (Dar-al-Muwada’ah) | Non-Muslim territory that has concluded a formal treaty of alliance establishing a balance of power with Muslim governors | 5 |
| Abode of Covenant (Dar-al-Adh) | Non-Muslim territory that has concluded a diplomatic agreement with Muslim governors for protection of its Muslim inhabitants | 4 |
| Abode of Pledge (Dar-al-Sulh) | Non-Muslim territory that has concluded a diplomatic agreement or treaty that ordains reparations with Muslim governors | 3 |
| Abode of Calm (Dar-al-Hudna) | Non-Muslim territory that has concluded a temporary truce due to stalemate that delays warfare for a specified period (ten years) and requires payment of tribute to Muslim governors | 2 |
| Abode of Pillaged Land (Dor al-Maslubah) | Territory formerly inhabited by Muslims and governed by the Shari’a that has become occupied or colonized by non-Muslim forces | 1 |
| Abode of Subjugation and Overpowering (Dar-al-Qahr wa Ghalabd) | Muslim territory that has been invaded and conquered by a non-Muslim power in which Islam is suppressed | 0 |
Table 12.2 Typology of territory and domestic Muslim/non-Muslim relations
| Type of Territory | Internal Function of Buffer Space (Government Level) | Level of Accommodation |
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| Abode of Protection (Dar-al-Dhimmah) | Territory in which a majority non-Muslim population is governed by Muslim authorities | 5 |
| Abode of Justice (Dar-al-Adl) | Non-Muslim territory in which existing laws provide security for Muslims, making it desirable for emisration | 4 |
| Abode of Safety (Dar-al-Amn) | Non-Muslim territory in which resident Muslims are afforded legal rights to practice their faith despite absence of Shari'a | 3 |
| Abode of Misguided Innovation or Heresy (DarAl-Bid’ah) | Territory in which Muslim authorities engage in alteration or fabrication of the Sunnah or Hadith for expedient political purposes | 2 |
| Abode of False Worship (Dar-al-Shirk) | Territory in which superficial trappings of Islam are promoted by authorities alongside non-Islamic culture and practices | 1 |
| Abode of Disbelief (Dar-al-Kufr) | Territory in which non-Muslim belief systems predominate, but are not hostile towards the Dar-al-Islam | 0 |
| Type of Territory | Internal Function of Buffer Space (Government Level) | Level of Accommodation |
| Abode of Emigrants (Dar-cd-Muhajirin) | Non-Muslim territory to which Muslims have migrated in order to engage in economic activities | 5 |
| Abode of Migration (Dar-al-Hijrah) | Territory in which Muslim population has migrated from non-Muslim lands | 4 |
| Abode of Apostasy (Dar al-Riddah) | Territory in which a Muslim population has converted from Islam to another religion or established an authority hostile towards Islam | 3 |
| Abode of Usurpation (Dar al-Baghy) | Territory that has experienced rebellion against legitimate Muslim authority and its replacement by heretical forces | 2 |
| Abode of Call to Islam (Dar-al-Daw ’ah) | Territory in which population has newly converted to Islam or Islamic practice has recently been introduced | 1 |
| Abode of Ignorance (Dar-al-Jalalat) | Territory in which population has not been exposed to or is unaware of Islam | a |
and non-Muslim polities, thus converting them into ordinal-level indexes. This is intended to generate the equivalent of dyads or pairs of states as a unit of analysis in data collections used in contemporary international conflict studies, such as the University of Michigan Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes project. Together these tables capture the external and internal dimensions in the second component of the buffer space model defined previously.
The data in each table are organized in three columns: the first contains the type of territory in English and Modern Standard Arabic as traditionally identified in the Islamic legal literature, the second details its practical function as a buffer space in relations between Muslim and non-Muslim territories and the third assigns a numeral denoting the estimated level of accommodation resulting from this relationship. The logical justification for the rankings of each category is explicated as follows.
At the international level of analysis, the Abode of Subjugation and Overpowering (Dar-al-Qahr wa Ghalaba) represents the military conquest of Muslim-majority lands by secular or non-Muslim forces and direct suppression of Islamic practice and therefore the complete absence of interaction. Yet, the next level, Abode of Pillaged Land (Dar Al-Maslubah), denotes an incrementally different condition, or a territory formerly inhabited by Muslims living under the Shari’a that has been colonized by a non-Muslim power, which increases the likelihood of highly contested relations, (such as an anti-colonial movement or insurgency). The possibility of bargaining behaviour is introduced within the Abode of Calm (Daral-Hudna), or disputed lands designated by a truce (rather than a “cease-fire”) because of a mutually hurting stalemate, which includes a negotiated date of expiration until which defrayal is paid to the Muslim combatant. As the primary transition point from the classical to the medieval period of Sunni scholarship, the Abode of Pledge (Dar-al-Sulh), constitutes a far more advanced degree of engagement, resulting in the conclusion of a diplomatic agreement or treaty that mandates reparations or compensation for wartime damages to Muslim rulers. The qualitative distinction between this arrangement and the Abode of Covenant (Dar-al-Adh) lies in the formal proviso for protection of Muslim populations within a non-Muslim territory. Finally, the highest level of negotiated settlement is constituted in the Abode of Mutual Peace (Dar al-Muwada’ah), or a non-Muslim territory that has concluded a treaty of alliance with Muslims that is afforded permanent legal status, which seeks to establish parity in capabilities between its signatories.
The domestic dimension of Muslim/non-Muslim interactions begins at the governmental level. A nominal condition exists within the Abode of Disbelief (Daral-Kufr), in which non-Islamic legal systems predominate but are not necessarily antagonistic towards the Dar-al-Islam. The Abode of False Worship (Dar-al-Shirk) designates a territory in which a government adopts and promotes the imagery or symbols of Islam while maintaining non-Islamic culture and practices (a strategy historically pursued by various secular Arab nationalist regimes to promote popular legitimacy), which may increase opportunities for hostile interactions with non-Muslim states. In the Abode of Misguided Innovation or Heresy (Dar Al-Bid’ah), while Muslim rulers remain incumbent, they engage in alteration or reform of Islamic laws and practices for expedient political purposes, which may elicit a greater degree of bargaining with non-Muslim powers despite hostilities. A significantly different condition exists within the Abode of Safety (Dar-al-Amn), where Muslims already residing within a non-Muslim territory are granted legal rights of religious practice despite a lack of official recognition of the Shari’a. However, the Abode of Justice (Dar-al-Adl) describes a higher stage of accommodation, in which existing laws provide security guarantees for Muslims, therefore making it desirable for permanent emigration from beyond its borders. The greatest potential for cooperative interaction is produced by the Abode of Protection (Dar-al-Dhimmah), or a territory where a non-Muslim majority population is administered by a Muslim political elite that enjoys popular legitimacy due to the successful civil integration of its inhabitants.
Finally, at the societal level, changes in the religious characteristics of a population, or population exchanges between territories of differing confessional compositions are also assumed to impact the level of accommodation between polities. At the bottom of the index, the absence of knowledge of Islam within a territory determines that interactions are not based on religious difference, producing a null effect. The rapid introduction of or mass conversion to the Muslim faith within the Abode of Call to Islam (Dar-al-Daw’ah) may result in possible tensions with a non-Muslim power. However, the Abode of Apostasy (Dar al-Riddah), in which a Muslim population has converted from Islam to another religion or established an authority hostile towards Islam, may foster increased opportunities for cooperation with non-Muslim polities with which it had previous disputes. In contrast, in the Abode of Usurpation (Dar Al-Baghy) in which an armed revolt has replaced established authorities with “heretical” governors, the legitimacy of Muslim rule is inherently contested between displaced leaders and the new regime, thus linking civil conflict in one state with potential changes in the intensity of interstate disputes. The Abode of Emigrants (Dar-al-Muhajirin) in which Muslim populations are motivated by attractive economic conditions to relocate temporarily for purposes of labour activity, may evolve into a hub of trade and commerce between non-Muslim and Muslim-majority states. Finally, the Abode of Migration (Dar-al-Hijrah) in which beneficent societal conditions in non-Muslim lands serve as an attractant to Muslim populations to seek permanent residence or citizenship, represents the highest degree of mutual accommodation between religiously heterogeneous states.
The conversion of these categorical definitions into gradated indexes thus addresses the conceptual tension between Islamic religious tenets and political practice discussed earlier. Rather than resting upon the assumption of a fundamental incongruity between Islam and the projection of political authority over territory, it posits that buffer spaces are often consciously constructed by elites for the purposes of administering and managing religious conflict and cooperation within and between states.
The question of reconciling opposing conceptions of space and territory in Islamic studies and Middle East history remains underexamined within the evolving research agenda in Islamic IR theory. The present chapter has sought to contribute to this innovation by proposing a tentative foundation for an Islamic method of geopolitical analysis, which reconciles the competing interpretations regarding territoriality within and between the Sunni and Shi’a mad’hahib with contemporary theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of international conflict. This research agenda sets two primary tasks for future endeavours in developing an Islamic geopolitics. First, while it presents an initial effort to integrate the logic and practice of ijtihad in the Islamic religious sciences with the empiricism of modern social science, more intensive research using primary sources in the Islamic literature is needed to ensure the accuracy of interpretation, particularly in anticipating criticism by traditionalist scholars, and to refine interdisciplinary efforts. Second, it is necessary to further test and demonstrate the validity and explanatory power of the model and its measures through application to a larger number of historical cases, in order to accumulate novel evidence and findings. Finally, it is imperative to present to both scholarly and non-academic audiences how an Islamic geopolitical method can usefully address present-day policy issues and controversies in interactions between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, as well as classical historical questions.
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