As the Third Reich began to collapse, it became more difficult to recruit and keep suitable agents. In the second half of 1944, the Axis Section of Swiss Army Intelligence had to realize “that sooner or later several of the people whom [it] used were looking for backing among Allied intelligence organizations.”¹³⁹ In a number of cases, after initially working for Swiss Intelligence, agents started supplying their information to additional bodies. Rolf Eberhard considered that this was bound to happen under the prevailing circumstances: “Considering the limited means that Swiss Intelligence had available—even if these means were substantially greater than before the war,¹⁴⁰ they were far smaller than those of foreign intelligence services—it was inevitable that really useful agents could be made to work for us only if their own interests ran parallel to ours.”¹⁴¹

At times Counterintelligence and the Federal Police showed little understanding of those circumstances when investigating the cases of agents in whom Swiss Intelligence had a lively interest.¹⁴² On several occasions, the Axis Section gained the impression that it was Army Intelligence, not the agent under investigation, that was accused of playing a double game and acting with ill intent.¹⁴³ Rolf Eberhard, the head of the Axis Section, noted:

[A] statement that Army Intelligence made in its final report on the First World War has to be reiterated [in the final report on World War II]: “It was virtually impossible to protect our agents from the clutches of Swiss police authorities (cantonal and federal police), which had to be considered as a serious impediment. Some of our agents were continually bothered when they crossed the border or were accused of playing a double game by failing to supply their results exclusively to our own procurement bodies.”¹⁴⁴

Similar to the Allied Section, albeit for different reasons, from summer 1944 onward it became increasingly difficult above all for Procurement Office 1 and Bureau Ha to procure intelligence from the Axis powers. In early 1945, the head of the Axis Section remarked, “Contrary to what one might have expected, the fact that life in Germany is becoming more and more disorganized has not contributed to making it easier to procure intelligence; in fact, it has become more difficult to do so.”¹⁴⁵ Connections were continuously interrupted and networks were destroyed through the damage caused by Allied bombing and the subsequent movements of the population. When Germany mobilized its entire adult male population, informants and agents were called up who had previously been believed ineligible for service. Moreover, it became almost impossible to travel inside Germany. Also, due to the continuous depreciation of currencies, Swiss Intelligence was not able to achieve anything anymore with money; it had to pay in kind or grant privileges such as residence permits. However, in this realm, difficulties had to be surmounted in dealing with the responsible Swiss authorities, who frequently failed to show the necessary understanding for Army Intelligence’s concerns.¹⁴⁶

In addition to the problems mentioned above, there was constant internal turmoil that could have been avoided. For both Procurement Office 1 and the outposts, Waibel considered a major difficulty the fact “that no trained personnel were available when the army was mobilized, nor were any trained personnel assigned to us in the course of wartime duty.”¹⁴⁷ The same was true for the French Bureau. Waibel, Cuénoud, and the heads of the sub-offices whom they had appointed had to rely entirely on themselves for recruiting and training their personnel. Due to the fact that Waibel had some extraordinarily capable personalities available as heads of sub-offices, a number of mishaps could be prevented. As heads of Cantonal Political Intelligence sections, four commanders of outposts had the necessary experience and expertise for accomplishing their task in the military. In retrospect, Waibel remarked, “The only positive aspect about this procedure [was] the fact that only very familiar people were recruited for the structure of N.S.1; for that reason… we all became close friends.”¹⁴⁸ The friendships among the staff survived numerous, frequently inevitable frictions and lasted beyond the five and a half years of wartime duty. However, the improvised recruitment procedure worked to the disadvantage of the staff members, who usually served on a unit and were detailed to the Army Staff only on a temporary basis or for the duration of wartime duty; their chances of making a career in the military were limited,¹⁴⁹ and their troop commanders often created insurmountable difficulties for them. Hence, to a certain extent, motivated and capable staff members who had been willing to work for Army Intelligence in the country’s interest (and who frequently agreed to serve longer than the troops) were “punished” because their useful activity was not considered as valuable as that of the troops.¹⁵⁰

Couriers and Consular Agents

The German Bureau could not have worked effectively without Procurement Office 1 and its outposts.¹⁵¹ Waibel noted: “Obviously [our activities] focused mainly on the Third Reich’s intentions toward Switzerland. Our main task during wartime duty consisted of recognizing in time Germany’s preparations for a war against our country and studying the [Nazi] party’s and the Wehrmacht’s combat methods in order to be able to prepare our own defense accordingly.”¹⁵²

Based on the example of the outposts of Procurement Office 1, in the winter of 1940-1941, a sub-office called Mutz was established in Bern. For matters of expediency, it reported directly to the Head of the German Bureau.¹⁵³

The German Bureau deliberately did not strictly separate the procurement process from the evaluation process. Ernst explained, “The Head of the German Bureau occasionally has to conduct interviews and establish connections, otherwise he turns into a scholar and loses touch with the work in the field.”¹⁵⁴ Ernst interviewed acquaintances,¹⁵⁵ foreign military attachés, Swiss diplomats, and employees of the federal administration. The German Bureau gathered a large amount of valuable material on Germany when it interrogated the Polish and French officers who arrived as internees in Switzerland on June 17, 1940.¹⁵⁶ In one of its reports it commented, “We were pleased to see that in spite of their huge infrastructure the French were generally not better informed than we were.”¹⁵⁷

Like the German Bureau, N.S.1 did not focus exclusively on one activity. As a procurement organization, it reported to the German Bureau (as of 1942 to the Axis Section), which received its information and defined the requirements for Intelligence (i.e., it issued orders concerning the procurement of intelligence). However, N.S.1 sometimes also evaluated intelligence. The Chief of Staff of Rigi explained, “In principle, as far as possible every staff member made use of the sources of information that were available to him.”¹⁵⁸ Hence, it is understandable that, in addition to taking care of the evaluation process, Alfred Ernst also actively procured intelligence. His main activity in that area consisted of organizing and managing the courier service. Before the war, he had set up teams that collected valuable information in Germany by going on preestablished tours. Once the war had begun, however, the system of the tours had to be given up because it was no longer possible to travel around without having a valid reason. Instead, the German Bureau started sending officers as diplomatic couriers to Germany.¹⁵⁹ Of course, these couriers not only liaised with the staff at Swiss consulates and the military attachés, but also had orders to observe movements and concentrations of troops and develop impressions about the political situation in Germany. Ernst explained:

The couriers initially traveled by car. Some went all the way to the Rhineland, the North Sea, and Hungary. Above all, however, they permanently and systematically monitored the important operational area of southern Germany. They returned from their trips with very good results. As long as they could travel by car, we hardly missed any major movement of troops in southern Germany. The main advantage of the courier service is that it allows us to have questionable information verified on the spot by trained, absolutely reliable individuals. The courier service cannot be replaced by any other means.¹⁶⁰

The Swiss Legation was extremely annoyed by Army Intelligence’s courier service. In October 1939, Max Waibel returned to Berlin for two weeks “in order to secure some important connections.”¹⁶¹ He was worried when he got back to Switzerland, stating, “Based on the experience that I had in Berlin with our legation,¹⁶² Swiss Intelligence could not expect any support from that end; in fact, it had to fear that it might be drawn into a war on two fronts.”¹⁶³

The number of difficulties increased in January 1940, when Federal Councillor Marcel Pilet-Golaz was put in charge of the Department of Foreign Affairs. After the collapse of France, Envoy Frölicher considered that it was useless for Swiss couriers to continue monitoring Germany.¹⁶⁴ Hence, when Germany banned the use of cars, Army Intelligence could not expect any support from Switzerland’s top representative in Berlin. From that moment on, the couriers had to travel by train. The German Bureau reported: “Understandably the results were no longer satisfactory. Nevertheless, a few skillful couriers managed to look around in some important areas. However, since then the Black Forest, which is particularly interesting for us,¹⁶⁵ has been almost completely sealed off from us.”¹⁶⁶

As Waibel had predicted, Frölicher and his staff not only failed to support Army Intelligence but also put obstacles in its way whenever they could. Among other things, the Envoy forbade the consuls to travel on behalf of Swiss Intelligence, “even though they had agreed to do so, and even though the trips were absolutely necessary.”¹⁶⁷ At that time, the Swiss living in Berlin used a pun to describe their Envoy’s attitude, stating, “Wenn Frölicher nicht ein trauriger Schweizer wäre, wären die Schweizer fröhlicher” (If Frölicher were not such a pathetic Swiss, the Swiss would be more cheerful). When the Head of the German Bureau complained about the Department of Foreign Affairs’ lack of support in military matters, Karl Stucki,¹⁶⁸ a close aide of Pilet-Golaz, dismissed the criticism, replying, “Apparently you do not yet understand that we have to learn to think differently. Times have changed, and we have to adapt accordingly.”¹⁶⁹

The criticism about lack of understanding on the part of the Department of Foreign Affairs continued throughout the war. In late fall 1941, during an assessment of the situation, the Head of the German Bureau had to admit to Masson:

If Germany lines up troops against us, possibly by camouflaging the operation, I cannot guarantee that we will be able to recognize the maneuver in time. Major Waibel of the General Staff did his utmost to set up an illegal network of agents. However, the numerous difficulties that the Germans as well as our own authorities (above all the Department of Foreign Affairs) create for us make it very hard for us to get a clear picture [of Germany’s preparations]; in fact, we are not sure at all whether we will be able to recognize a threat in time.¹⁷⁰

In addition to the couriers, Alfred Ernst had some Swiss officers in Germany who were stationed in Munich, Stuttgart,¹⁷¹ and Mannheim as consular agents and who supplied very good information.¹⁷² Moreover, in spite of the difficulties that Frölicher created for them, a few consuls were willing to support Swiss Intelligence on their own initiative.¹⁷³ Another task of the German Bureau consisted of communicating with Switzerland’s military attaché in Berlin. Like the military observers at the consulates,¹⁷⁴ the military attaché did not have any orders to spy on Germany; in fact, he had been explicitly forbidden to undertake any spying activities. Ernst stated about the tasks of the military attachés:

Our military attachés have been assigned to the legations as official observers. We only expect them to forward to us the information that is accessible to them. They should not expose themselves. However, one has to realize that in belligerent countries any information that has to do with the military, military-political matters, or the defense economy is considered as secret. If one abided strictly by the laws of the respective country, the military attaché would have to be recalled from Germany. Leaving him in Berlin is justified only in view of the information that he occasionally receives through personal contacts in spite of all the bans that are in place.¹⁷⁵

The performance of the military attaché in Berlin, which was poor at the beginning of the war, improved slightly in March 1940 after he had established “closer contact”¹⁷⁶ with the German Bureau; nevertheless, it remained below the expectations that Army Intelligence had for the person occupying that post. Cooperation with the German Bureau was hampered because of Colonel von Werdt’s lack of expertise as well as due to differences of opinion. In fall 1940, Ernst described the difficult situation by stating: “In accordance with the Minister, [the military attaché] believes that Switzerland now has to humble itself [before Germany] and adjust [to the New Europe];¹⁷⁷ however, we are more and more convinced that the only way to keep from perishing is by remaining firm and proud. We wonder if Swiss who basically have such an un-Swiss attitude actually defend our interests in Germany.”¹⁷⁸