Secret Channel To Berlin

131.	Cuénoud, Section Alliés, Rapport général d’activité, 20 August 1945. BAr E 27/14852.
132.	Cuénoud, Section Alliés, Rapport général d’activité, 20 August 1945.
133.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45. BAr E 27/14850.
134.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45.
135.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45.
136.	At that time army headquarters was located in Worb.
137.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45. However, in order to do justice to other staff on Army Intelligence when assessing their performance, it must be pointed out that, unlike the other staff members, Waibel personally knew his excellent informants and their cover names, so that he was in a better position to trust them. Still, good information is not of much use if it does not reach its recipient. Surprisingly, the information within Army Intelligence was routed so poorly that the Chief of the General Staff annotated the “Latest Nightly News” of 9–10 May 1940 (Intelligence Section no. 225) by writing, “The Intel[ligence] Service did not do its job correctly. I found out [about the German Air Force activities along our border] through the radio, and I had to inquire several times with the Intel[ligence] Service before receiving any information” (see opposite page). BAr E 27/9915. Following that incident, the duty service was improved.
138.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45. BAr E 27/14850>.
139.	Rolf Eberhard, Tätigkeitsbericht der Sektion Achse (7. August 1944–31. Dezember 1944), 29 January 1945. BAr E 27/14851.
140.	In 1938, Army Intelligence actually spent Sfr. 47,942.05; in 1939, Sfr. 189,987; in 1940 an additional 100,000 francs, i.e. Sfr. 286,448.50; in 1941, as much as Sfr. 299,724. In 1943, expenditures increased to Sfr. 588,630, and in 1944 to Sfr. 748,381.90, the maximum level of spending during the war. In 1945, the final year of the war, they dropped to Sfr. 400,000 following politically understandable but short-sighted spending cuts that resulted in the Intelligence Service being virtually abolished. (Bracher to Kobelt, 29 November 1945. BAr E 27/9507).
141.	Eberhard, Tätigkeitsbericht der Sektion Achse, 25 July 1945. BAr E 27/14851.
142.	Eberhard, Tätigkeitsbericht der Sektion Achse (7. August 1944–31. Dezember 1944). BAr E 27/14851.
143.	Eberhard commented, “There is something offensive about this attitude. Moreover, it does not contribute at all to clearing up the ‘cases’.” Eberhard, Tätigkeitsbericht der Sektion Achse (7. August 1944–31. Dezember 1944).
144.	Eberhard, Tätigkeitsbericht der Sektion Achse, 25 July 1945. BAr E 27/14851.
145.	Eberhard, Tätigkeitsbericht der Sektion Achse (7. August 1944–31. Dezember 1944). BAr E 27/14851.
146.	Eberhard, Tätigkeitsbericht der Sektion Achse (7. August 1944–31. Dezember 1944).
147.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45. BAr E 27/14850.
148.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45.
149.	In order not to jeopardize their future careers, the top staff members on Army Intelligence were frequently forced to serve in regular units or teach General Staff courses if they had the status of an instructor. When Masson refused to take over the command of a regiment, arguing that he was indispensable on the Intelligence Service, he was harshly criticized by his superiors (including Labhart). This absurd policy was a serious handicap for Army Intelligence, resulting in some grotesque situations. In 1942, for example, the Head of the French Bureau was absent for 67 days, the Head of procurement from the entire area of the Axis powers was absent for 54 days, the head of the Studies Bureau was absent for 130 days, and the head of the German Bureau, who was mainly responsible for evaluating the procured intelligence, was absent for as many as 157 days! On May 8, 1944, Masson explained to the Chief of the General Staff, “One of the basic requirements for providing timely and thorough information is continuity in the work of the Intelligence Service.” (BAr E27/9508, vol. 15.) Hausamann had criticized this situation at a much earlier point in time, stating:

Someone who is not permanently up to date concerning the course of events will never be able to accurately decide whether a piece of information is important or irrelevant. He will put ‘minor’ pieces of information away because they do not mean anything to him. However, for someone who has a full picture of the context, a seemingly insignificant detail might be the missing clue. In other words, one has to work full-time on the Intelligence Service or not work there at all. Everything else is unserious and amateurish, but an intelligence service cannot accept any unserious approach nor any amateurism. (Hausamann to Masson, 13 August 1941. BAr E27/9838.)

Considering this repeated criticism, the frequent absences of key staff members can hardly be justified. This author agrees with Masson, who told the Commander-in-Chief, on May 20, 1942, “I consider that during wartime duty and under the current circumstances, the General Staff should have priority over training courses when it comes to assigning officers.” (BAr E27/9519.) The individual officers should not be blamed for their frequent absences; the unfortunate situation was due to the fact that the rules concerning the promotion of officers could not be formulated in a way that took into account the special requirements of a unit such as the Intelligence Service.

150.	Cf. Alfred Ernst’s statement: “I am also concerned about the personnel-related difficulties at the Pfalz office (unpleasant situation for the staff members, who are of outstanding merit). The structure that we have been building up with a lot of difficulties since 1939 risks falling to pieces.” Ernst, Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 28 December 1942. BAr J.I.140/4, vol. 4.
151.	Ernst, Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 15 October 1940. BAr J.I. 140/4, vol. 2.
152.	Waibel, Bericht, 26 February 1963. BAr J.I. 137 1974/64, vol. 13.
153.	Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 1 September 1940–31 August 1941. BAr J.I.140/4, vol. 3.
154.	Ernst to Masson, 15 October 1940. BAr J.I.140/4, vol. 2.
155.	“Everything depends on personal connections, which can be created only after months or years of work and cannot be easily transferred [to someone else].” Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 1 September 1940–31 August 1941. BAr J.I. 140/4, vol. 3.
156.	Members of the French 45th Army Corps under General Daille, which was forced to flee to Switzerland during France’s collapse and was interned there. See minutes of Federal Council meeting of 18 June 1940. BAr E 1004.1 1.
157.	Ernst, Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 15 October 1940. BAr J.I. 140/4, vol. 2.
158.	Interrogation of Bernhard Mayr von Baldegg, 8 June 1945. BAr E 5330 1982/1, vol. 205. Mayr acted as chief of staff of N.S.1 and was Waibel’s deputy.
159.	Masson stated: “All of them are officers who continue making themselves available in spite of the dangers. When they travel by car, their information is much more useful to us because they drive on the roads that we have instructed them to take in areas that are of utmost importance for an opponent’s deployment activity at our border.… It should also be pointed out that the large majority of our permanent or temporary agents have not accepted one single penny for their work even though their expenses have been anything but minimal.” Masson to Chief of the General Staff, 30 September 1940. BAr E 27/9508, vol. 6.
160.	Ernst, Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 15 October 1940. BAr J.I. 140/4, vol. 2.
161.	Waibel, Bericht, 26 February 1963. BAr J.I. 137 1974/64, vol. 13.
162.	Waibel had encountered the same experience with the Legation’s attitude as early as the time that he was detailed to the War Academy in Berlin.
163.	Waibel, Bericht, 26 February 1963. BAr J.I. 137 1974/64, vol. 13.
164.	Ernst to Masson, October 15, 1940 (BAr J.I.140/4, vol. 2), quoting from a letter by Frölicher.
165.	As a potential deployment area and an area where German troops could be stationed before they attacked Switzerland. (It was not until 1942 that Ernst managed, with great difficulty, to set up his own network there.)
166.	Ernst, Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 15 October 1940. BAr J.I. 140/4, vol. 2.
167.	Ernst, Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 15 October 1940. Due to their status, consuls were relatively free to move around.
168.	Counselor Karl Stucki was Head of Switzerland’s Consular Service. He later played a part during the meeting between Pilet-Golaz and Schellenberg’s emissary, SS Major Eggen.
169.	Statement quoted by Waibel, Bericht, 26 February 1963. BAr J.I. 137 1974/64, vol. 13.
170.	Ernst to Masson, 27 November 1941. BAr J.I.140/4, vol. 3.
171.	On the case of Ernst Mörgeli, see page 173.
172.	“They should handle administrative issues, defend the interests of certain Swiss citizens, and take advantage of their official travels to make an assessment of the level of occupation by German troops in certain zones.” Masson, Activité politique de la section de renseignements, 9 August 1940. BAr E 5795/327.
173.	See Ernst, Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 15 October 1940. BAr J.I. 140/4, vol. 2.
174.	These consulates were called “reinforced consulates.”
175.	Ernst to Masson, early 1942 (documentation for answering Pilet-Golaz’ letter of 27 December 1941). BAr J.I.140/4, vol. 4.
176.	Ernst to Masson, 15 October 1940. BAr J.I.140/4, vol. 2.
177.	Urs Schwarz commented: “The Military Attaché, Colonel Hans von Werdt, was a weathercock. The son of a Swiss who had served in the Austro-Hungarian Empire took part in World War I as a member of the Austrian Army, but then he became an instructor in the Swiss Army. Nevertheless, he sided with the German brother-in-arms.” (Urs Schwarz, “Schicksalstage in Berlin,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 August 1986, no. 181.) This fact did not remain hidden to the Allies; in late 1940, the aide of the U.S. Military Attaché in Berlin reported to Washington, DC:

November 12 [1940]—Conversation with the Swiss Military Attaché.… The only hope for peace in Europe is a German victory. If Germany wins she will be the only strong power capable of straightening out the European mess.… If England wins the war we may expect another Versailles Treaty more unjust than the last one and another great European war within a quarter of a century. If, by the United States’ help, England is able to continue the war to a stalemate, Russia will win because she will be able to launch her world revolution on a weakened Europe.… American help can only mean misery to Europe and it may even mean disaster. (Lt. Colonel G.S.C. W.D. Hohenthal, Military Attaché Report Germany no. 17,789, “General estimate of the situation as of December 9, 1940.” National Archives, Washington, DC, RG 165, Military Intelligence Division 2656–320/12.)

178.	Ernst, Tätigkeitsbericht Bureau D, 15 October 1940. BAr J.I.140/4, vol. 2.
179.	Commander-in-Chief to Pilet-Golaz, 13 August 1940. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1. (The meeting had taken place on August 3, 1940, whereupon Guisan asked Masson to give his opinion, which he forwarded to the Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs together with his own letter.)
180.	Masson to Commander-in-Chief, 9 August 1940. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
181.	On July 19, 1940, the day Hitler made a last “appeal for peace” to Great Britain at the Reich parliament (which Great Britain rejected on 22 July), Regamey discussed the international situation with Masson. Regamey was depressed about Masson being worried (see Regamey to Masson, 9 August 1940. BAr E 5795/327). The following day, when he noticed that his partner at the law firm, Colonel Victor Perrier of the General Staff, was also very concerned about the international situation, Regamey came up with the idea of using Dr. Monfrini as an intermediary, explaining, “[In September 1939,] Dr. Monfrini had told me about his personal relations with Mussolini, from which Switzerland might benefit whenever the opportunity presented itself.” (Regamey to Masson, 9 August 1940.)
182.	Masson to Commander-in-Chief, 9 August 1940. (BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.) Regamey confirmed, “You replied that the potential mission by Dr. Monfrini fell under the authority of the Department of Foreign Affairs.” (Regamey to Masson, 9 August 1940. BAr E 5795/327.)
183.	On July 22, 1940, Monfrini told Regamey that Pilet-Golaz had just talked to him for a long time over the phone regarding a mission to Mussolini. (See Regamey to Masson, 9 August 1940.)
184.	Explanation by Regamey on the conversation that he was going to have with Monfrini a few days later. (Regamey to Masson, 9 August 1940.)
185.	Regamey to Masson, 9 August 1940.
186.	See Divisional Court 5, session of 26/28 June 1947 in Lucerne, sentence against Hans Wilhelm Otto Eberhard/Hans Schorer (documents in this author’s possession). This Eberhard was of course not Captain Rolf Eberhard, the head of the Axis Section.
187.	Hans Eberhard; regarding the circumstances, see endnote 188 below.
188.	Ketterer arrived in Stuttgart during the first half of November 1939. The consulate told him about a certain Hans Eberhard, who was supposedly working for Swiss Intelligence. Ketterer contacted him, and the two men soon began to work fairly closely together. On December 26, 1939, they met with the Head of the German Bureau, Alfred Ernst, in Bern to discuss the information that they had and talk about the setup for a comprehensive intelligence network in southern Germany. However, Hans Eberhard did not only work for the German Bureau but was at the same time agent no. 636 at the German Military Intelligence regional headquarters in Stuttgart, department III/F (which was in charge of counterespionage against foreign intelligence services, most of all abroad). The Head of the regional headquarters in Stuttgart, Major Ehringer, alias Ackermann, had set Eberhard on to Ketterer in order to obtain regular information about the Swiss 1st lieutenant’s activities.

Hans Eberhard had grown up in Zürich; in 1934 he co-founded and then temporarily headed the local “National Front” organization in Aarau. In November 1938, the Attorney General’s Office opened a preliminary investigation against him and had his home searched because of his right-wing extremist activities. His employer subsequently dismissed him without notice, and the military suspended him based on article 51 of the military law. At the end of 1938, he emigrated to Germany. Around the time that the war began, Eberhard, who had not been in touch with any Swiss living in Germany, nor with the Swiss Consulate in Stuttgart until then, contacted Consul Suter, allegedly in order to take the necessary steps for being readmitted to the Swiss Army. A short time later, in October 1939, Eberhard traveled to Switzerland and presented the same request to Major General Eugen Bircher, the commander of the 5th Division. At the same time, he offered to procure information from southern Germany. Eberhard tried in vain to also establish a connection with Hausamann in Teufen. Bircher knew Eberhard; in fall 1935, he had admonished him to be more moderate in his extremist writings. Eberhard promised to heed his warning and henceforth signed his articles by using a pseudonym. Due to Bircher’s mediation, in fall 1939 Eberhard was recruited by Swiss Army Intelligence in order to procure information in Stuttgart.

The Ketterer affair was a flop for the Germans insofar as the 1st lieutenant had become mistrustful, so that they could not prove anything against him when they arrested him. Nevertheless, because of his “merits” in connection with disbanding the Ketterer circle, as a sign of recognition Eberhard was introduced to Admiral Canaris. Eberhard’s importance to German Intelligence was due to the position for which he was slated once the war was won and which was prepared for him in October 1940. At that time, he was ordered to move to Paris and open a reputable business with the financial support of the German Military Intelligence regional headquarters. (For that purpose, the regional Intelligence headquarters set up a pharmaceutical laboratory for him.) Once the German occupation was over, he was supposed to continue working for German Counterintelligence, camouflaging his activity by pretending to be a successful Swiss businessman.

In 1947, Switzerland’s Divisional Court 5 considered that Eberhard had acted with cool deliberation, taking advantage of the fact that Swiss Intelligence was in a state of improvisation at the time. At the end of June 1947, it sentenced him to 12 years in prison. Eberhard got away with this relatively mild sentence because a number of his crimes had fallen outside the statute of limitations. (Documents in the author’s possession.)

189.	However, his fellow Swiss staff members from Stuttgart who were also arrested (some 12 to 18 men) were interned at concentration camps for up to five months and then expelled from Germany. Some of them were exchanged with German nationals who had been detained in Switzerland. Several of Ketterer’s informants suffered permanent physical disabilities because they had worked for Swiss Intelligence. (Documents in the author’s possession.)
190.	Masson to Commander-in-Chief, 9 August 1940. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
191.	Chief of the General Staff Huber to Pilet-Golaz, 28 May 1940. BAr E 5795/327.
192.	Huber to Pilet-Golaz, 28 May 1940.
193.	Huber to Pilet-Golaz, 28 May 1940.
194.	Huber to Pilet-Golaz, 28 May 1940.
195.	It is known today that these were inverted signals and the German troop movements were part of a cunning ploy; this does not speak against the reconnaissance mission with which Ritter was entrusted.
196.	Cf. the letter by the Chief of Intelligence to the Foreign Service at the Department of Foreign Affairs dated 16 March 1940 (written by Schafroth):

We are perfectly aware of the risks involved in procuring intelligence.… We do not think that reports by a diplomatic representative can easily replace information supplied by interested individuals who have been trained by the military, know the country, know various groups of people, and have a variety of sources of information available. On the other hand, this is not espionage per se but reporting on issues of rather general interest that we and our informants, who have received specific instructions for a particular mission, assess in a completely different manner than an official representative. During the current difficult times, it seems advisable to us to utilize every available source of information.… It is a real pleasure for us to see how much patriotism and understanding the Swiss living abroad have been showing for the needs of the Intelligence Service. An unexpectedly large number of them have volunteered to offer their services to us. We consider that these gentlemen, who act out of patriotism and are certainly aware of the implications of their actions, should not be prevented by the Swiss government representatives in the host country from carrying out their endeavor, which is absolutely commendable from the military’s perspective.… It seemed very awkward, for example, that a Swiss Consul General (Milan) right-out forbade a volunteer of our Service, who is liable to serve in the army, to work for us.… Unfortunately we are not able to consider this Consul’s motives…as a sign of the kind understanding that your Department usually shows for the importance of Swiss Army Intelligence. (BAr E27/9483, vol. 1.)

197.	Minister Paul Ruegger, who was Switzerland’s Envoy in Rome and London during the war, confirmed to this author that he had been able to assist the Intelligence Service only behind Pilet’s back. (Verbal communication, September 1987.)
198.	Minister Paul Ruegger to Pilet-Golaz, 29 September 1941. (Quoted in Masson’s report of 24 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.) Ruegger had a very positive attitude toward the efforts of Army Intelligence; in his letter of September 29, 1941 to Minister Bonna, he wrote:

[This claim is] all the more surprising as my entire staff strictly abides by the instructions that I have been giving it all along, i.e. to take a very prudent and objective approach and limit itself to the tasks of the Swiss legation in Italy. The information on which the circular in question is based undoubtedly comes from Bern.… In addition, I would like to reiterate that I have boundless confidence in the actions of our military attaché, Colonel von Wattenwyl; his services are extremely valuable for the Legation, and at the same time he fulfills in an exemplary manner the task of representing our army. Of course one could say that other states actually do what our country is insultingly accused of doing. (BAr E 5795/327.)

199.	Ruegger to Pilet-Golaz, 29 September 1941. BAr E 5795/327.
200.	In his extensive report of October 24, 1941, Masson pointed out that, after a careful analysis, Minister Ruegger’s letter to Pilet-Golaz (who had triggered the new controversy) had turned out to be “absolutely gratuitous.” In a letter dated October 17, 1941, Colonel von Wattenwyl had reported, “Minister Ruegger is perfectly reassured following the explanations that we have given him about our bodies’ activities at the consulates.” (Letter quoted in Masson’s report of Oct. 24, 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.)
201.	Cf. Pilet-Golaz’ statement: “Let me state once again—my sense of responsibility forces me to insist until I obtain satisfaction—that the procedures that have been applied until now have to be urgently modified, our representation abroad has to be exonerated, and the interests of the Swiss abroad have to be taken care of.” Pilet-Golaz to Kobelt, 5 and 17 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
202.	Commander-in-Chief to Kobelt, 25 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
203.	Masson, “Relations entre le Département politique fédéral et le Service des renseignements,” 24 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
204.	Alfred Ernst, minutes of briefing on 13 Oct. 1941 in Interlaken, 13 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
205.	Colonel Karl von Wattenwyl of the General Staff (born 1884, died 1965) was military attaché in Rome as of 1938. His father, Joh. Ludwig Eduard von Wattenwyl, had served in the British Navy. The military attaché’s brother-inlaw, Minister Paravicini, had been Switzerland’s envoy to England for many years. Colonel von Wattenwyl usually went to see him when he was on visit in Bern. Of course the Italian Envoy in Bern, Attilio Tamaro, did not fail to notice that fact.
206.	Ernst, minutes of briefing, 13 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
207.	Ernst, minutes of briefing, 13 October 1941.
208.	Ernst, minutes of briefing, 13 October 1941.
209.	Ernst, minutes of briefing, 13 October 1941.
210.	Masson, “Relations,” 24 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
211.	Cf. Major General Peter Burckhardt’s statement: “What was essential was…that National Socialism was a revolutionary, new attitude that wanted to force its opinion on other countries.… From the perspective of intelligence, this meant that strictly military aspects could not be the only decisive criteria for assessing and evaluating information [because] from a strictly military point of view…after the campaign in France, Switzerland [was] not under any military threat anymore.… Logically speaking, it was obvious that if Germany had been victorious and as a consequence the so-called Third Reich had ruled over Europe, throwing Switzerland back on its own resources, our country would have had to adapt in one way or another.” Burckhardt, note to the attention of this author, 2 March 1988.
212.	Masson, “Relations,” 24 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
213.	Allusion to Arthur Fonjallaz, a former training officer who was a member of Masson’s personal information network but turned out to be a double agent. (See page 263ff.)
214.	On October 14, 1941, N.S.1 had received a document mentioning increased surveillance activities to which Swiss were subject in Germany. The document stated, among other things:

The responsible German authorities have not failed to notice that many Swiss living in Germany who used to be loyal toward Germany have changed their attitude toward the Reich. The Secret State Police has noticed that Swiss who used to be considered reliable now openly express their anti-German, and especially their anti-regime, attitude; some of them actually express this attitude with unsurpassed vehemence. The authorities of the German Reich know exactly what the daily reports that are sent to Switzerland say about the mood in the Reich, the economic difficulties (shortages and lack of supplies), the war economy, the situation concerning raw materials, the political situation, etc. Moreover, the authorities of the German Reich also know exactly what is written in the reports by the Swiss diplomatic representation in Germany, which are sent to Switzerland. The responsible authorities in Berlin have ordered the Swiss diplomatic representations as well as their entire personnel in Germany and in the occupied countries to be kept under strict surveillance! (Document attached to Pilet’s letter to Kobelt, 17 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.)

Because this document dealt primarily with political issues, Masson decided to forward it to the Department of Foreign Affairs. For that purpose, he sent Lieutenant Colonel Schafroth to Peter Anton Feldscher, a head of section at the Foreign Service. Three days later—in the process, committing an injustice against the Intelligence Service—Pilet-Golaz expressly based his new complaint about Army Intelligence on that document (see Pilet-Golaz to Kobelt, 17 October 1941).

215.	Cf. General Guisan’s statement to Kobelt, 25 October 1941: “It seems to me that [Masson’s] conclusions speak for themselves. I do not need to add anything to them.” Masson remarked: “It is Intelligence’s task to alert the [Army] Command early enough so that the steps that need to be taken in order to get the army ready for action can be taken in time and the army is ready to stand the decisive test with all its means. It is the Commander-in-Chief’s responsibility to alert the Federal Council so that this can be accomplished. Hence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army can only fulfill this responsibility if he is given the essential means that allow him to be vigilant.” (BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.)
216.	However, it is not difficult to find evidence showing that the opposite was true. See for instance Commander-in-Chief to Federal President Pilet-Golaz, 21 May 1940, in which General Guisan refutes Pilet’s criticism of Masson. BAr E 27/9502.
217.	Pilet-Golaz was very proud of that for the rest of his life. Information supplied by Jacques Pilet to this author, 9 March 1988.
218.	Pilet-Golaz to Kobelt, 27 December 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
219.	On January 18, 1942, Werner Müller wrote to Masson:

The officers whom Federal Councillor Pilet-Golaz called “elements” did not interfere in any foreign or domestic policy issue. [The investigation files show] that the Army Command had absolutely no reason to remove Majors Waibel and Ernst and Captain Hausamann from the Army Staff. The officers’ meeting in Lucerne was above all a reaction to the unfortunate radio address that Federal Councillor Pilet-Golaz had made on June 25, 1940, an address that all Swiss were appalled to hear. The three suspected officers should be credited in large part for the fact that the domestic political consequences that were beginning to become apparent for some time [as a result of this speech] did not take on larger proportions. Together with other people, these officers instilled new confidence in the population, taking great pains outside their work hours to convince it that Switzerland would resolutely be defended in the event of an attack. Its confidence had been shaken in an alarming manner because of Federal Councillor Pilet-Golaz’ speech. I may say without exaggerating that the effects of this speech can still be felt today.

Müller explained that other incidents such as Pilet receiving representatives of the National Movement of Switzerland, a right-wing extremist front group, caused the population to mistrust Pilet as a politician, adding:

I would like to point out that the people know what Federal Councillor Pilet-Golaz told the wife of a U.S. diplomat about democracy.… It is not surprising that officers of the army were deliberating how the spirit of defeatism that had been sowed in 1940 could be opposed. In any event, I take exception to officers of our unit who have shown right-out excellent performances being subject to comments such as the ones that Federal Councillor Pilet-Golaz likes to make about them. These officers deserve to be treated differently by a member of the Federal Council, even if they made some formal mistakes and were subject to disciplinary sanctions because of that. What matters most is that the officers who have been called “elements” are certainly at least as good Swiss as Mr. Pilet-Golaz. (BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.)

220.	Pilet-Golaz stated, “The most serious difficulties have been created in connection with the famous bureau in Lucerne.” Pilet-Golaz to Kobelt, 17 October 1941. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
221.	Werner Müller to Masson, 18 January 1942. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
222.	A more recent example where this happened was the war over the Falkland Islands in 1982; cf. Lawrence Freedman’s statement: “Many of the problems reflect not only long-standing institutional problems—Foreign Office versus military intelligence and inter-service rivalry…” Lawrence Freedman, “Intelligence Operations in the Falklands,” Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 3 (September 1986), 310.
223.	As a typical example, in mid-November 1943, in connection with the so-called Pétain Crisis, lack of coordination resulted in a bothersome overlapping of activities. (The Germans thwarted Pétain’s attempt to proclaim, on November 13, 1943, Vichy France’s return to a parliamentary system. Pétain consequently threatened to resign. Germany reacted by stepping up its occupation policy and giving up its efforts to make it look as if France had some sovereignty left. On this matter, see Nerin E. Gun, Les secrets des archives américaines: Pétain, Laval, De Gaulle [Paris, 1979], 188ff.) On January 14, 1944, Minister Stucki, the Swiss Envoy in Vichy, wrote to the Commander-in-Chief:

On 24 November, Colonel de Blonay [the Military Attaché] informed me that the General Staff had ordered him to supply additional information on the “Pétain Crisis.” He consequently asked me to tell him about the confidential information that I had received through top authorities. Since the Department of Foreign Affairs had already been informed in detail about this purely political issue, to me this new request seemed to be unwarranted and unnecessary. Nevertheless, I granted [Colonel de Blonay’s] request. However, I believed that if the occasion arose I should inform the Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs…that I had been under the impression at other occasions that the General Staff was asking its representative in France to report on issues that I considered to be my business rather than theirs. However, since I know that the army intends to work exclusively in the country’s interest, just as we do, I have never attached too much importance to the issue and have worked together smoothly with Colonel de Blonay for almost six years. (BAr E 27/14132.)

After Stucki had informed Pilet-Golaz about his impression, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Army Intelligence were at odds for some time. Such incidents could have been avoided if the two parties had held regular meetings to discuss common issues.

224.	Hermann Böschenstein, for example, remembers Pilet’s “tendency to show off in front of [parliament] committees by making unnecessary, bold forecasts about the end of the war. Even when speaking with foreign diplomats he acted as if he was very well informed, and toward Swiss heads of mission who were on home leave he bragged how knowledgeable he was.” Hermann Böschenstein, Vor unsern Augen. Aufzeichnungen über das Jahrzehnt 1935–1945 (Bern, 1978), 259.
225.	Cf. Masson’s statement: “We acknowledge that Federal Councillor Pilet-Golaz as well as his predecessor accepted the principle of this cooperation; however, unfortunately we noticed later on that in reality attempts were made to invalidate this principle by neutralizing our investigations, especially in connection with the couriers and the attachés at the consulates.” Masson, “Relations,” 29 January 1942. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
226.	Bureau D, Jahresbericht 1942. BAr J.I. 140/4, vol. 4.
227.	Commander-in-Chief to Kobelt, 6 May 1943. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
228.	Bracher noted, “Major Daniel sets great store in reassuring Federal Councillor Pilet that the consular agents will under no circumstances have to enter in contact with any agents. Their activity will consist exclusively of driving along some routes on which the Intelligence Service would like to have some information, the way it used to be done until recently.” Bracher, note, 19 May 1943. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
229.	Kobelt to Pilet-Golaz, 20 May 1943. (Personal and secret. Via messenger.) BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
230.	Pilet-Golaz to Kobelt, 15 June 1943. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
231.	Kobelt to Pilet-Golaz, 22 September 1943. The letter was identical to a draft by Major Daniel dated 21 September 1943. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
232.	Chief of the General Staff to Commander-in-Chief, 8 October 1943. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
233.	The secretary of the Military Department annotated the letter by scribbling, “The Dept. of For[eign Affairs] is silent!” (14 October 1943.)
234.	Kobelt to Pilet-Golaz, 19 October 1943. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
235.	Bracher, note for Kobelt, 12 November 1943. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
236.	Kobelt, note for Secretary of the Department Burgunder [12 November 1943, handwritten]. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
237.	Kobelt to Commander-in-Chief, 23 November 1943. BAr E 27/9483, vol. 1.
238.	At the end of the war, Chief of the General Staff Huber painted a vivid picture of the lack of cooperation between the various authorities, stating:

[It is regrettable] that it was impossible to establish a normal working relationship between the Intelligence Service and the bodies of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the police dealing with foreign nationals, and the Attorney General’s office, which should all have been pulling in the same direction. Masson blamed the others for that shortcoming. In my opinion, both sides are to blame because they were both over-ambitious, touchy, and self-opinionated. Each side wanted to be the only savior of the country. It is not easy to get adults to stop being vain and craving for recognition; many people actually turn that way when they get older. However, I noticed that these traits of character were more predominant in the Intelligence Service than in any other branch of the military. The situation reminded me of English detective stories in which the Scotland Yard officer, the private detective, and the newspaper reporter try to beat each other to the clue that resolves the case and, much to the criminal’s delight, unintentionally put a number of obstacles in each other’s way. That is about the way things were between the bodies of the army and the Departments, and that was the way things were between several officers within the Intelligence Service. (Huber to Commander-in-Chief, 26 July 1945. [Personal and secret.] BAr E 5330 1982/1, vol. 205.)

239.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45. BAr E 27/14850.
240.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45.
241.	In connection with the disbanding of Alexander Rado’s network, in 1944 Mayr von Baldegg was arrested and detained for 9 days by the Federal Police because of his official contacts with Rudolf Roessler. Not least objectionable was the fact that Werner Müller had personally given the Federal Police the go-ahead to arrest Mayr. Later on, Mayr was granted a compensation because his imprisonment had obviously been unwarranted.
242.	Once again, however, there were some absurd exceptions. Jakob Leonhard, whom Swiss Intelligence had infiltrated into the Gestapo as a double agent, recalls: “There was a strange catch about my trips to [my German contact person in] Basel; concerning my work for Swiss Intelligence, I had to report to the Zürich police, who did not want to miss the chance of making a big killing. As a consequence, the police in Basel were not informed about my mission! Hence, I had to be on my guard not only against the German spies but also against our own police.” Jakob Leonhard, Als Gestapo-Agent im Dienste der schweizerischen Gegenspionage (Zürich/New York, 1945), 20–21.
243.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45. BAr E 27/14850.
244.	Assistant Head of the Police Section at the Federal Justice and Police Department.
245.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45. BAr E 27/14850.
246.	Waibel, Bericht 1939/45.
247.	As of January 1, 1944, Group Id was renamed Group Ib. See page 41ff.
248.	Ernst, Jahresbericht 1942 (1 September 1941–31 August 1942), 28 December 1942. BAr E 27/14851.
249.	Ernst, Jahresbericht 1942.
250.	In a personal letter to Kobelt, Hausamann complained about the difficult atmosphere within the Intelligence Service, writing:

You have to know about the situation in Group Id.… For the last two years, Colonel Müller has kept the morale up among the Group, being accessible and available for anyone at any time. He has managed to keep the Group together. The first year of the war was terrible for anyone whom Messrs. Cuénoud, Schafroth, and Daniel did not like. Instead of being happy about a good performance, one did everything to disparage it. Work was made unbelievably difficult. The following example, which concerned me personally, will show you what the situation was like back then. For almost one year, Lieutenant Colonel Schafroth, who acted as an intermediary between yours truly and the Chief of Intelligence at the beginning of the war, swept my reports under the carpet because they did not fit into his political concept. In August 1940, this was discovered through a coincidence, and it was Colonel Müller who took drastic action by sidelining Lieutenant Colonel Schafroth through official channels. (Hausamann to Kobelt, 6 November 1942. BAr E 5800/1, vol. 1. See the letter on page 332.)