Conflicts between Army Intelligence and the Department of Foreign Affairs

In early 1943, relations with the Swiss military representative in Berlin improved when Colonel von Werdt was finally replaced by Major Peter Burckhardt, a capable future divisional commander. Army Intelligence’s differences with the Department of Foreign Affairs, however, developed into a lasting conflict. The controversies, some of which were fierce, transpired in extensive exchanges of letters between Foreign Minister Pilet-Golaz, Chief of Intelligence Masson, General Guisan, and Defense Minister Kobelt. Luckily for scholars, a number of these documents survived, making it possible to identify the different opinions and views. They clearly show how difficult it was for Masson to put his concept of strategic intelligence into practice.

The conflict erupted in early August 1940 in a meeting that Foreign Minister Pilet-Golaz held with General Guisan and Federal Councillor Minger during which he accused Army Intelligence “of interfering in foreign policy issues.”¹⁷⁹ In his reply,¹⁸⁰ Masson fundamentally contradicted Pilet-Golaz, arguing that it was “impossible to clearly distinguish between specific military matters and political matters,” because they were two aspects of the same issue. He added: “When we have certain political information, it is up to us to regularly inform our Foreign Minister about it through his service. For that reason, we have never failed to maintain contact with the Department of Foreign Affairs. By the way, the Department of Foreign Affairs for its part has been sharing its own information with us.” Masson considered this routine of exchanging information between Foreign Affairs and Army Intelligence a necessity, explaining: “We consider that it is simply our job to procure and utilize, through our network of specialized agents, information—including on political matters—that is normally not accessible to our ministers abroad and then transmit it to the concerned Department. That is what we have been doing. An intelligence service cannot limit its investigations to strictly military information.”

Pilet-Golaz supported his accusations with specific examples, but Masson was able to refute them with convincing arguments. The complaints that Pilet-Golaz voiced show in what style the conflict was carried out; at the same time they make clear that the Foreign Minister quite deliberately obstructed the work of Army Intelligence.

One of the accusations that kept surfacing concerned the case of Dr. Monfrini. According to Pilet-Golaz, Masson came up with the idea of sending Dr. Monfrini, of whom he had heard through Marcel Regamey, a lawyer in Lausanne, and who supposedly entertained friendly relations with Mussolini, on a mission to the Duce “in order to tell him that the Swiss Army was very worried about the international situation and to ask him to protect [Switzerland] or intervene on our behalf in one way or another.” It was true that during a private conversation Regamey had told Masson about the possibility of a connection between Monfrini and Mussolini;¹⁸¹ however, Masson made clear to Regamey right away “that it was the Department of Foreign Affairs that handled such missions; it could be informed about Mr. Monfrini’s presence in Lausanne and do with this information whatever it might find useful.”¹⁸² Masson had never met Monfrini, nor had he ever entrusted him with any mission. However, Monfrini had already been in contact with the Federal President about a possible mission to Rome.¹⁸³ Once Masson had explained that any mission of that kind fell under the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Monfrini once again addressed Pilet-Golaz. In the meantime, however, Pilet-Golaz had changed his mind. Regamey stated, “The Federal President considered that the situation was much less serious than the military believed, that it was not necessary to travel to Rome, and that the army should mind its own business instead of infringing on the civilian authorities.”¹⁸⁴ Regamey commented to Masson, “ I was surprised and troubled by [Pilet-Golaz’] judgment. The public knows that the Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs is tired of seeing that the Commander of the Armed Forces is so popular; however, the top official should keep from expressing this human feeling through an unfounded observation.”¹⁸⁵

Masson was able to refute in a similar manner the three other accusations voiced by Pilet-Golaz against Army Intelligence, or he was able to show that in the interest of the country, Army Intelligence had to act the way it did.

The Ketterer case concerned a consular agent working for the German Bureau. Lieutenant Colonel James Ketterer was one of three officers who had been detailed from Army Intelligence to the Department of Foreign Affairs; he was assigned to the Swiss Consulate in Stuttgart as an “expert on economic affairs” and had orders to collect military information concerning southern Germany and transmit it to Army Intelligence. For that purpose, he contacted Swiss citizens whom the Consul or his secretary had rated as reliable, asking them to procure information pertaining to the military.¹⁸⁶ However, Ketterer was betrayed to German Counterintelligence by a double agent.¹⁸⁷ On January 13, 1940, the Gestapo arrested him as he was crossing the German-Swiss border in Singen.¹⁸⁸ Since it could not prove anything against Ketterer, it had to set him free after four days.¹⁸⁹

Masson emphasized that this mishap did not speak against the principle of using consular agents. He added that Pilet-Golaz had no reason to have a negative attitude toward officers who were detailed to his Department because “the issue of the consular agents (officers) was handled in agreement with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; hence, in this domain, we should not be accused of interfering in political matters.”¹⁹⁰

In the Ritter case, Pilet-Golaz raked up an allegation that he had made earlier, accusing Army Intelligence of unilaterally ordering Swiss Consul Ritter in Munich to travel to Procurement Office 1 in Lucerne. Masson referred to a letter that the Chief of the General Staff had written to Pilet-Golaz at the time, which stated, “Indeed Mr. Ritter and Army Intelligence have agreed that in the event of any danger, Mr. Ritter would travel from Munich to Switzerland, which would allow him to observe certain concentrations of troops that might interest our Intelligence Service.”¹⁹¹ Huber had pointed out, “Ritter, who is friends with Captain Waibel, declared that he would work for us as a volunteer.”¹⁹² For Army Intelligence, this was the only way to receive up-to-date information. It was agreed that this scheme should be used only in exceptional cases.

During the critical days of May 1940, a large number of German troops were concentrated in the Black Forest, at Switzerland’s doorstep, making the Swiss fear the worst. In this tense situation, “as the border between Switzerland and Germany was sealed for [its] other investigating bodies,”¹⁹³ Army Intelligence considered that it was indispensable to use the services of Consul Ritter. Chief of the General Staff Huber and Masson acknowledged that consuls reported exclusively to the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Army Staff was not authorized to issue orders to them; nevertheless, they stressed that it was “important for some consuls to be authorized, if necessary, to procure information for us that no one else could supply in time.”¹⁹⁴ During the time around May 10, 1940, when Germany attacked France and the Low Countries, Consul Ritter was the only person who could provide Army Intelligence with precise information on the important strategic area between Munich and Lake Constance.¹⁹⁵

Even though Army Intelligence made clear that it had called on Consul Ritter’s services in the country’s interest, in retrospect one has to ask oneself if for tactical reasons it would not have been better for Masson or Waibel to communicate with Consul Ritter via the Department of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, previous experiences¹⁹⁶ probably made Masson fear that Pilet-Golaz would not authorize Ritter to go on a mission for Army Intelligence.¹⁹⁷ Army Intelligence, which depended on the Consul’s assistance, was therefore facing the question whether it could afford to deprive itself of its valuable source by communicating through official channels.

In October 1941, the dispute between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Army Intelligence flared up again in reaction to a letter by Minister Paul Ruegger to the Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, in which the Swiss Envoy in Rome reported that there were rumors about Swiss Intelligence being active in Italy.¹⁹⁸ Ruegger explained that the Swiss Legation in Rome was suspected “of spying, particularly on the movements of troops in Italy. The information [was said to be] communicated to Bern, some of which [was supposedly] transmitted to the British authorities.”¹⁹⁹ Once again, however, upon close examination the criticism turned out to be unfounded.²⁰⁰ Pilet-Golaz addressed two letters to Kobelt,²⁰¹ who in turn asked General Guisan²⁰² and Masson²⁰³ to comment on the matter.

In order to gather material for his report to the Commander-in-Chief, Masson held a briefing in Interlaken with Müller, Schafroth, Cuénoud, Waibel, Ernst, Daniel, and Hausamann. The minutes²⁰⁴ that Alfred Ernst kept of the briefing reflect the mood among the top Intelligence officials. Masson opened the meeting by declaring, “In this report, our view will be expressed in unambiguous language.” Then he read the complaint by the Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs to Federal Councillor Kobelt and General Guisan and pointed out that he considered the complaint as completely unfounded, and was ready “to fight for the needs of the Intelligence Service, [adding] unfortunately the Department of Foreign Affairs does not show any understanding at all toward Army Intelligence even though we tried everything to improve relations. Of course the behavior of the Department of Foreign Affairs must not prevent us from accomplishing our task in the army’s interest.”

The participants at the briefing remarked that Swiss Intelligence did not have any structure in Rome and that its courier did not make any reconnaissance apart from traveling on his assigned route. Schafroth was the only participant who used two informants in and around Rome, but they were not connected to the Legation; on exceptional occasions, they met with the courier. The minutes stated, “The totally unjustified accusation that we communicate with the English Intelligence Service may be due to the fact that Minister Paravicini, Colonel v[on] W[attenwyl’s]²⁰⁵ brother-in-law, had good relations with England and is suspected by the Italian Legation in Bern [of spying on behalf of England].”²⁰⁶ Several heads of bureau strongly defended the concept of the reinforced consulates that Pilet-Golaz criticized, arguing, “We cannot do without this source of information. These officers do not spy; they merely observe what everyone is allowed to observe. They have not set up any organization.”²⁰⁷ Cuénoud, Waibel, and Ernst pointed out:

All neighboring states [of Switzerland] maintain an extensive intelligence service at their consulates here. The German Consulates have actual “military attachés.” All other states also have a courier service; unlike our service, they do not only use professional couriers but constantly change their personnel in order to allow as many informants as possible to get to know Switzerland. This courier service primarily serves spying purposes. Hence, Federal Councillor Pilet’s attack is absolutely unjustified.²⁰⁸

All participants at the briefing agreed that without couriers or outposts at the consulates Intelligence would miss out on some major events. They explained:

The legations promise to supply us with reports. However, in most cases, the most interesting information from the consulates is withheld [from us]. There is no cooperation with our representatives abroad, nor can it be established now. That would have had to be done during times of peace, but back then the Department of Foreign Affairs was against cooperating with us. The only legal means for procuring intelligence is through our own bodies at the legations and consulates.²⁰⁹

The extensive report²¹⁰ that Masson wrote after the briefing with his top aides is a key document because the Chief of Intelligence did not simply refute Pilet’s accusations but used the opportunity to explain why it was necessary for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Army Intelligence to work closely together. He argued that the main task of every intelligence service was to supply the Army Command with the basic information that it required to make decisions, adding, “[This] is a fierce, relentless battle against the risk of a strategic surprise.” Masson explained that this task was all the more difficult because nowadays armed conflicts erupted without preliminary diplomatic skirmishing (exchange of notes or ultimatums) and that “any country—whether it [was] neutral or not—[could] be in a state of war from one day to another without war being declared on it with more or less ceremony.”

Masson also argued that the Army Command had to constantly take into account the requirements of the national economy (industry and agriculture); the Federal Council had urged the Commander-in-Chief “to agree that the bulk of our major units go off duty” as soon as the general situation permitted. Masson said that consequently it was the task of Army Intelligence to warn the Commander-in-Chief in time “in order for him to take, as quickly as possible, the steps that serve to get the army prepared again to go to combat and face the decisive test with united forces.” Masson remarked that in theory the concentration of [German] troops that Swiss Intelligence had noticed near Switzerland’s border would justify keeping a large part of the Swiss Army under arms, as “any military situation [had] to be assessed based on the immediate capabilities of a presumed opponent, not its intentions, which [could] be kept secret until the last moment.” He said that the Swiss Army had been mobilized from September 1939 to June 1940 because war operations were being conducted close to Switzerland’s borders, making a threat possible. The Chief of Intelligence argued that by the fall of 1941, the situation had changed insofar as the strategic threat of a southward move by the German or French Army to bypass the enemy’s defense line was gone as a result of the German-French armistice, adding, “Today there is a danger above all on the political level.²¹¹ It would manifest itself as an armed conflict only at a later time.” He explained that therefore it was Army Intelligence’s duty to be in regular contact with the Department of Foreign Affairs “in order to exchange political and military information and verify information that [came] from different sources.”

Masson pointed out that before the beginning of the war the Department of Foreign Affairs had in principle agreed to establish regular contacts with Army Intelligence, and that “these contacts [had] always yielded positive results.” He added that both Federal Councillor Motta and his successor Pilet-Golaz had always had “a clear vision of the needs of [the] two services.” He explained that the contacts, which were maintained through a liaison officer who communicated with the responsible officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs, had soon resulted in a certain “interpenetration of common interests,” which was almost bound to manifest itself in a “more active cooperation” because in reality it was often difficult “to make a clear distinction between strictly military issues and political issues.”

Masson stated that since 1940 the borders between Switzerland and the Axis powers had become increasingly impermeable for political, military, and economic reasons; in order to ensure that it could continue to procure information in foreign countries, Army Intelligence had suggested that the Department of Foreign Affairs send consular agents and couriers to Swiss representations abroad. He pointed out that the Department of Foreign Affairs had gladly accepted that idea and approved the creation of the new posts without delay because that was a legal means for procuring intelligence, which all foreign representations used in Switzerland. Masson formally declared, “Army Intelligence did not take any initiative without the approval, and even the active cooperation, of the Department of Foreign Affairs.”

In fact, consulates and legations had been cooperating with Army Intelligence for many years. As early as the beginning of 1923, in agreement with the Military Department and the Department of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff Unit had sent the Swiss legations and consulates instructions from the Intelligence Section titled “Matters That Interest the General Staff at Any Time.” In 1937, the envoys and consuls were reminded of that document. Because Switzerland did not have any military attachés yet at that time, the General Staff Unit gathered information on foreign armies through the legations and consulates. Hence, the two institutions had been working together for almost two decades. Commonly, an aide of the Envoy or Consul was in charge of evaluating the foreign military literature (magazines, publications) and regularly transmitting to the Intelligence Section the information that was worth knowing. Masson commented, “This procedure was so free from suspicion from foreign governments that in some countries the Attaché who was in charge of the issues that were of interest to us was sometimes actually considered as a military attaché and was often invited to the army’s exercises.”²¹² That was true above all for Max Grässli in Berlin and Louis H. Micheli in Rome.

Masson explained that Army Intelligence had not changed that traditional procedure. At legations that did not have an actual military attaché, the Envoy continued to supply the Intelligence Service with specific information via the Department of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, he made it clear that Army Intelligence did not misuse legations and consulates for spying activities, adding that even the Intelligence staff at the consulates had orders to keep their hands off espionage. He asserted that Swiss Intelligence was not in contact with any foreign intelligence service.

Masson also stated that the system of the immigration forms and the interrogations could not spoil Switzerland’s relations with its neighboring states; instead, he claimed, “The fact is that these relations have been compromised by the attitude of some of the Swiss press.” He said that, like the Swiss populace, the press did not always abide by the strict neutrality policy that the Federal Council tried to uphold; however, Pilet-Golaz should not make Army Intelligence responsible for that fact. Masson continued:

I am surprised and pained by the apparent hostility that the Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs shows toward Army Intelligence and that he has just expressed once again (following some other interventions that I know about, particularly on the subject of the Fonjallaz affair)²¹³ through his serious accusations.… For over two years, our service has been the only body among the Army Staff that operated day and night as in a state of war. In this constant struggle that entails serious responsibilities for us, we have the right to ask others to help us accomplish our task. In particular, we have the right to demand that we not constantly be suspected of machinations with which we have nothing to do.