Abraham Lincoln began his tenure as Commander in Chief with several advantages that Jefferson Davis did not have. He inherited a functioning government and a standing military. This was a huge advantage for him, and allowed him to concentrate his efforts on his strategy to restore the Union.
Lincoln initially changed nothing in the executive branch or high command of the military. He appointed Gideon Welles as Secretary of the Navy, and Simon Cameron as Secretary of War. In a remarkable parallel to Davis, Welles would serve him well the entire war, while Cameron proved to be a disappointment and was relieved within a year. Lincoln had better luck with the Secretary of War position than Davis however, and appointed Edwin Stanton as Cameron's relief. Stanton proved to be extremely capable and aggressive, and served well for the remainder of the war. Lincoln also appointed generals to various administrative departments, such as Quartermaster General and Surgeon General. As in the Confederacy, these men served in primarily administrative roles, and except for a short period in 1862, provided limited strategic advice.
Lincoln's main initial advantage was his General in Chief, Winfield Scott. Scott had served over fifty years in the military, and although he was physically incapable of field command, he was still able to provide Lincoln good strategic advice. He provided Lincoln the best advice and most accurate assessments he would receive during his first months in office.
Lincoln's goal throughout the war was to restore the Union. Lincoln and Scott mistakenly believed there was considerable pro-Union sentiment in the South, and this would quickly prevail if they could contain the rebellion quickly. There were initially two strategies proposed to accomplish this. Scott provided the first, his famous "Anaconda Plan." He proposed a blockade of Confederate seaports, combined with a naval force on the Mississippi supported by 80,000 infantry in unequal columns. These would move abreast as practicable for mutual support, taking Confederate river fortifications as they went. This plan would seal the Confederacy from any outside trade, eventually strangling it. The problem with this plan was the amount of time required to execute it and allow it to take effect. Scott's estimate was four and a half months to train the men, then wait for the rivers to rise and first frost to kill off the "malignant forces below Memphis." Scott himself realized this plan would require a long time to work, and that people in the North would be too impatient.{99}
Lincoln received similar, although considerably less realistic advice from his Secretary of War. At a Cabinet meeting the day Fort Sumter was attacked, Lincoln asked Cameron what he proposed to do. Cameron suggested Lincoln call up 500,000 militia and build a line of forts from Charleston to the Mississippi to "hermetically seal the South."{100} Needless to say, Lincoln disregarded that piece of advice.
Scott also discussed the possibility of invasion, but advised against it. He estimated an invasion would require 300,000 men and take two to three years to accomplish. While this turned out to be optimistic, it was amazingly accurate considering he proposed it in early 1861. No one else in Washington expected anything close to what Scott predicted, and the fact that he came as close as he did indicates the quality of strategic advice he was giving Lincoln.{101} Lincoln settled on his own strategy, combining Scott's suggestion to blockade the seaports with an advance toward Richmond. He called up 75,000 militia for ninety days on 15 April 1861, and proclaimed a blockade on 19 April.
There is very little discussion of Lincoln's plans for the first Battle of Bull Run in his papers prior to the battle, and no correspondence between him and his field commanders in the Official Records until after the battle. However, Lincoln was the one of the few people in the Union high command discussing an advance in June 1861, and on 29 June, he held a cabinet meeting to discuss military options. Scott tried one last time to push his Anaconda Plan, but Lincoln wanted an immediate advance. General McDowell, commander of the Army of the Potomac, presented a plan to move on Manassas, Virginia and turn the Confederates out of their prepared defenses. McDowell himself was not confident of the plan, citing the short amount of time he had for training his troops. Lincoln assured him that the Confederates were no better trained and approved the plan.{102}
Lincoln had good reason to chance an offensive besides the public outcry to press "On to Richmond." The term of the ninety-day militia he had called up was about to expire, and if the Union was to accomplish anything with them, it would have to be quickly.{103} Additionally, the Confederate Congress was scheduled to meet on 20 July in Richmond, and preventing them from convening would be a major blow to the Confederacy as well as politically popular in the North.{104} Finally, Lincoln mistakenly believed a quick Union victory and occupation of Richmond would quickly end the war.{105}
Whatever Lincoln hoped to achieve, the First Battle of Bull Run turned to be a complete disaster for the Union. General Beauregard knew exactly when McDowell moved out of Washington, and General Johnston was able to withdraw in front of Union troops under General Patterson to join Beauregard and defeat McDowell. The battle was an incalculable boost to Confederate morale, and a wake-up call to the Union that this was not going to be an easy, quick war.
From documentation in the Official Records and Lincoln's papers, he evidently adopted a "hands off" approach to the operation once ordering it in June. There is no record of communication between him and McDowell or Scott concerning the battle. This was also the case with the War department; no correspondence is recorded between the War department and McDowell or Scott. All communications from McDowell to Washington went through Army Headquarters, and most of that through Lieutenant Colonel E. D. Townsend, the Assistant Adjutant General rather than General Scott. This suggests the initial confidence Lincoln had in the military high command and points out the confidence the Union commanders had in the ultimate success of the operation. Never again would Lincoln be so uninvolved in the execution of a campaign.
Two days after the defeat at Bull Run, Lincoln drafted a "Memorandum of Military Policy Suggested by the Bull Run Defeat." In it, he recommended the military take eleven steps. The first step was to "Let the plan for making the blockade effective be pushed forward with all possible dispatch." After this, he recommended more drilling for the forces at Fort Monroe, then said: "Let Baltimore be held as now, with a gentle but firm and certain hand." He continued, consolidating command in Western Virginia under General McClellan and discharging the militia who declined to reenlist as well reorganizing those remaining. He also emphasized his concern for the Western theater, telling General Fremont to "push forward his organization and operations in the West as rapidly as possible, giving rather special attention to Missouri." Four days later, he added the taking of Manassas and Strasburg and the railroads near them, and a joint movement on Memphis and East Tennessee by Union forces in the West.{106} Lincoln realized early on he was going to need a major change in the military, and he wrote down the direction he wanted that change to take.
Within days of the defeat at Bull Run, Lincoln called General McClellan to Washington to command the Army of the Potomac. McClellan and Scott did not get along at all, and in October, Scott asked to be retired. Lincoln allowed Scott to leave, and appointed McClellan General in Chief, as well as Commander of the Army of the Potomac, on 1 November 1861. If Lincoln was looking for a man of action, he was disappointed in McClellan. McClellan began habits here that he continued throughout his service. Throughout the good weather of that fall, McClellan remained inactive. He drilled his troops and organized the Army well, but hesitated to take them into battle.
Lincoln remained patient for a while, perhaps remembering that he had ordered McDowell into action when he was not yet ready. By December 1861, however, Lincoln's patience was wearing thin. McClellan grew ill late in the month, and Lincoln began corresponding directly to his generals in the west. During January 1862, Lincoln sent numerous telegrams to both Generals Halleck and Buell, asking about their operations and making recommendations. On 31 December, he recommended to Halleck that he move on Columbus when Buell advanced on Bowling Green. At the end of this telegram he asked Halleck if he and Buell were "in concert." The following day, he told Buell that he had "better get in concert with General Halleck at once."{107}
Things were evidently very confused in Washington. Judging from the correspondence, Lincoln believed an offensive in the West was imminent. This was news to his generals, however. A series of telegrams between Lincoln, McClellan, Halleck, and Buell from 4 – 6 January shows clearly the poor coordination in the Union high command. It began with Lincoln wiring Buell, asking "Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee?"; to which Buell replied they had not. McClellan, well enough to resume his duties, contacted Buell next to tell him that he could not move in the East until East Tennessee was occupied. Halleck finished this round of messages by telling Lincoln and McClellan that he was not ready for any advance, did not know Buell's plan, and reminding them that two columns operating on exterior lines fails ninety-nine out of one hundred times.{108} Lincoln tried to get his generals to commit to a date when they would be ready to move, but none would. In an endorsement to Halleck's reply, Lincoln said "It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done."{109}
By the end of the month, Lincoln had had enough. On 27 January, he published General War Order Number One:
Ordered that the 22nd day of February 1862, be the day for a general movement of the Land and Naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially - The Army at and about Fortress Monroe, The Army of the Potomac, The Army of Western Virginia . . . and a Naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready for a movement on that day.{110}
He gave no objective or plan, just called for a general movement. Four days later, he issued Special War Order Number One to the Army of the Potomac, specifically tasking McClellan:
Ordered that all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition, for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point on the Rail Road South Westward of what is known of Manassas Junction.{111}
This was also to occur on or before 22 February. Not a master plan of simultaneous movements, this was an expression of Lincoln's frustration with his generals and their excuses for not moving. Two years later, in his first meeting with General Grant, Lincoln said he never wanted to interfere in campaign plans, but procrastination by his commanders and pressure from the people and the Congress caused him to issue these and several other war orders later in the war. Lincoln admitted to Grant, "He did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were."{112}
Lincoln finally got his advance from General Grant, who moved in early February and seized Forts Henry and Donelson. Lincoln received word of the fall of Fort Donelson on 16 February, and wired Halleck the same day. Showing a grasp of operations not evidenced in his General Orders, Lincoln expressed his gratitude, but also warned Halleck to be vigilant. He told him that Fort Donelson was safe, "unless Grant should be overwhelmed from the outside." He told Halleck that he and Buell must act in "full co-operation to prevent this." He then urged Halleck to send some cavalry to cut off railroads and use gunboats to destroy bridges the Confederates could use to concentrate on Grant.{113}
Written almost two months before Shiloh, this was an amazingly accurate forecast of the exact strategy used by the Confederates to attack Grant. Lincoln was becoming more confident advising his generals, and would retain almost exclusive control over all military operations for the next several months. This was also where Lincoln began to notice Grant and Halleck, two generals who would rise to prominence during the war. At a time when his patience had worn thin, they gave him a victory.
Things were looking good in the West, but Lincoln was having problems with his General in Chief in the East. Lincoln and McClellan disagreed on the campaign plan for McClellan's spring campaign. McClellan proposed his plan to conduct a seaborne movement to the Chesapeake Bay; Lincoln preferred a direct march to Richmond. Lincoln wrote McClellan on 3 February 1862, asking a series of questions concerning the relative advantages of the two plans. McClellan had anticipated most of these, and had written Secretary of War Stanton earlier, on 31 January, to explain the advantages of his plan.{114}
On 11 March 1862, tired of numerous delays and concerned that McClellan would not be able to function as General in Chief while in the field, Lincoln relieved him as General in Chief. In doing so, he and Secretary of War Stanton assumed direct command of the military. In the telegram relieving McClellan as General in Chief, Lincoln ordered a restructuring of the departments in the West. He split the theater into two departments, and placed Halleck and General Fremont in command of them. He also informed the Generals to make all reports directly to the Secretary of War.{115}
Lincoln and Stanton tried a new command system for the next three months. Calling retired General Hitchcock back to active duty, they appointed him as personal advisor to Stanton, and also placed him at the head of a "War Board." Hitchcock was an 1817 graduate of West Point, and had served under Scott in the Mexican War, where he was brevetted a colonel and brigadier general. The other members of the War Board were Stanton and the Staff Generals such as the Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, etc. The War Board was an idea of Stanton's, originally meant to provide him with military advice. With no General in Chief, the War Board also assumed the duties of that position.{116} The War Board was the closest thing either side had to a modern staff, and although it served Stanton's purpose well for the war, it was a poor substitute for a General in Chief. To his credit, Lincoln would recognize this after three months.
Lincoln's main concerns were the defense of Washington and safety of the Army. He formally agreed to McClellan's Peninsula campaign plan in a telegram on 13 March 1862, but added three conditions: enough troops must be left at Manassas to prevent the enemy from recapturing it, Washington must be left secure, and the rest of the force must be moved at once "in pursuit of the enemy by some route."{117}
Lincoln's concern for the safety of Washington was the cause of the first serious disagreement between he and McClellan. McClellan left Washington for the Peninsula without fully discussing the number of troops remaining and their disposition with Lincoln. Lincoln felt his order had not been complied with, so ordered Stanton to retain one of the two corps waiting to join McClellan.{118} McDowell's corps was ordered to remain in Washington, much to McClellan's dismay. He began asking for reinforcements immediately, citing a strong enemy in front of him.{119}
This was the first of many messages McClellan would send to Lincoln, asking for troops because of superior numbers in front of him. Lincoln answered this first round on 9 April, asking McClellan if he really thought that he (Lincoln) should allow the line between Richmond and Washington to be left entirely open. He then pointed out a discrepancy of 23,000 troops in McClellan's own figures, asking why he had so many less than he reported just three days earlier. Finally, he told him that his delays would only allow the enemy to fortify and make his advance that much more difficult. He closed by telling McClellan that he would sustain and support him, but he must "strike a blow."{120}
Most Generals would have accepted this mild rebuke and acted on it, but not McClellan. Lincoln was still waiting on 1 May, when McClellan sent a request for parrot guns. Lincoln replied that the request indicated "indefinite procrastination", and closed by asking "Is anything to be done?"{121} McClellan began moving toward Richmond on 5 May.
There was considerable correspondence between Lincoln and McClellan over the next two months as McClellan moved to the outskirts of Richmond and besieged the city. A large portion dealt with McClellan's continual requests for more troops, and Lincoln's refusal to remove troops from the line between Washington and Richmond. Of particular interest for comparison to Davis is Lincoln's telegram of 9 May, telling McClellan he must stop writing angry letters to Congressmen. McClellan was having trouble with three of his generals, and was writing letters to their political backers in Congress. Lincoln told McClellan that Senators and Representatives spoke of him (Lincoln) in their places as they pleased and that "officers of the Army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them."{122} Lincoln's attitude toward attacks on him in the Congress contrasted sharply with Davis's petty quarreling with his generals over charges made in the Confederate Congress after First Bull Run.
Beginning 29 May, Lincoln expressed concern over Stonewall Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. Part of a Confederate plan to keep reinforcements from McClellan, it worked brilliantly. Lincoln kept McClellan updated on intelligence he received, all the while urging him to attack. On 18 June, he told McClellan he had a report corroborating a rumor that Jackson had been reinforced from Richmond. He told McClellan he believed this was as good as an equal number of reinforcements to him, and told him he could "better dispose of things if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to be informed."{123} The following day Lincoln wired that he was no longer certain about the reinforcements, and asked McClellan if he thought it might be a deception. He followed the next day by telling McClellan that he could not send any more troops until he was certain about the number of Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley.{124}
All during the time of these telegrams to McClellan, Lincoln was corresponding almost daily with Generals McDowell and Fremont, who were defending Washington. Using the War Board to advise him, Lincoln was attempting to stop the Confederates moving north through the Shenandoah. He was directing the movements of the two generals, attempting to trap Jackson before he could withdraw. On 30 May, he thought he had been successful. With both Fremont and McDowell converging on Strasburg, Virginia, he telegraphed them both: "It seems you have the game before you."{125} Jackson was there, but not long enough for Fremont and McDowell to press the attack. In rainy weather, Jackson slipped away southward to reinforce Lee at Richmond. Lincoln continued to order his generals after Jackson until finally, on 9 June, he ordered Fremont to halt at Harrisonburg and guard against a movement of the enemy back towards Strasburg.{126}
If Lincoln was disappointed at missing Jackson, it was minor compared to the disaster that was about to occur on the Peninsula. Lee attacked McClellan on 25 June, unsuccessfully at first, but then receiving reinforcements when Jackson arrived a day late from the Shenandoah Valley. McClellan began wiring Lincoln of a great victory against great odds on 25 June, repeating this several times and all the while asking for more men. He changed his tone considerably by 28 June, however, when he wrote to Stanton that the government had failed to sustain his Army, and if he saved it he owed no one in Washington any thanks. The last line was deleted by telegraph operators in Washington who refused to show Stanton such an insubordinate communication.{127}
Lincoln answered him immediately, saying that he must save his Army. He went on to explain that the enemy concentrated on him because Washington was protected. If they had not left troops in the Capitol, the attack would have come there instead of at Richmond. Lincoln said it was "the nature of the case" and no one was to blame.{128} Even without the last line, the telegraph from McClellan was insubordinate and inexcusable. The patience Lincoln showed in his reply was another example of the contrast between he and Davis in handling their generals.
McClellan had regained some of his composure by 2 July, and again started asking for reinforcements. In response to a request for 50,000 men, Lincoln replied that McClellan's own plan for the defense of Washington called for 75,000 and Lincoln did not even have that. He told McClellan that he did not blame him for not doing more, McClellan should not ask him for "impossibilities."{129} McClellan persisted, and Lincoln tried to find replacements for him, even asking Halleck for 10,000 infantry.{130} By 13 July, Lincoln had tired of McClellan's constant badgering and questionable muster records. Comparing McClellan's reported numbers with his own records, Lincoln pointed out that McClellan had at least 45,000 troops unaccounted for. Lincoln asked "How can they be got to you, and how can we keep such large numbers from getting away again?"{131}
Lincoln's patience was at an end. He consulted retired General Scott at West Point for recommendations for a new General in Chief. On 11 July, tired of complaints from McClellan and weary of the extra duties of directing the movement of armies in the field, he ordered General Halleck to Washington to report for duty as the new General in Chief of the Union Army. He had experimented with the War Board for four months, and realized he needed a General in Washington.
The Peninsula Campaign was the height of Lincoln's direct control of military operations. The disaster of First Bull Run caused him to reconsider his "hands off" approach, and during this campaign he directed nearly all movements. He found, as did Jefferson Davis, that the workload was too much in addition to attending to the normal duties of the President. With Halleck in Washington as General in Chief, he would begin to regain some of the confidence in his General in Chief he had earlier. Although he would still occasionally communicate directly with his field commanders, Lincoln began to release some of his direct control of military operations.
Halleck's first assignment from Lincoln was to visit McClellan on the Peninsula. He went with Quartermaster General Meigs to get a first-hand look at the situation and condition of the Army and McClellan. He recommended to Lincoln that McClellan's Army be recalled. Lincoln agreed, and McClellan was ordered back to Washington.
Between Halleck's arrival in July and mid-September, Lincoln once again discontinued direct correspondence with his field commanders. There is considerable correspondence between Halleck, McClellan, and Pope during this period. Lincoln appeared to be trying to remove himself from the high degree of involvement he had exercised earlier. He began more frequent communication, mainly to McClellan, after Pope's defeat at Second Bull Run.
As discussed earlier, Lee began his advance into Maryland in August 1862. McClellan was still on the Peninsula, withdrawing his troops as slowly as he did most everything else. Facing Lee was General Pope, who was in command of all forces in northern Virginia. Pope had moved south, not expecting to meet a force as large as the Confederates had. Halleck was extremely concerned; the two Union armies were separated with an enemy force between them. He cautioned Pope against exposing himself to disaster and warned him that Lee might try to turn his right flank{132}. This was exactly what happened however, and Pope was soundly defeated by Lee on 29–30 August at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Halleck wired McClellan on 31 August, asking him to come to Washington to help him, declaring he was "utterly tired out."{133}
Lincoln's concern was growing also. He had not been in direct contact with his field commanders concerning operations until 21 August. After this date, he began telegraphing both Generals Burnside and McClellan for information from the front. While his confidence in Halleck was not strong enough that he would remain completely out of military operations, he twice referred McClellan to Halleck when he wrote with suggestions. On 29 August, Lincoln told McClellan that he agreed with a suggestion to concentrate forces to restore Pope's communications, but he left those decisions to General Halleck. One week later, he again responded to recommendations from McClellan by repeating that "General Halleck must control these questions."{134}
Lincoln was clearly trying to force all correspondence from the field through Halleck; but at the same time was demonstrating a lack of confidence in him by directly contacting those same field commanders. This was a problem that would remain throughout the campaign. Lincoln was also clearly concerned for the safety of Washington. On 3 September, four days after Pope's defeat, he ordered Halleck to immediately organize an Army for field operations, but again stressed this was to be independent of forces required for the defense of Washington.
Fearing for the safety of Washington, Lincoln placed McClellan in command of the troops in and around Washington within days of Pope's defeat. The troops around the Capitol were demoralized and badly in need of organization and discipline. Although McClellan was a poor field commander, there were few generals who could match his skill at organizing an army and preparing it to fight. Lincoln knew this, and placed him in command of the defenses of Washington. He never intended to leave him there, he merely needed someone to restore organization to the forces around Washington. Although McClellan had been stubborn and insubordinate, Lincoln selected him because he was the best man for that job.
Halleck was receiving severe criticism from Lincoln's Cabinet for calling on McClellan for help, but Lincoln publicly stood by him.{135} Lincoln was, however, severely disappointed with Halleck, saying:
after Pope's defeat, when he broke down - all nerve and pluck gone -and has ever since evaded all possible responsibility - little more than a first rate clerk.{136}
Lincoln began more frequent visits to the telegraph office; sending one line telegrams to McClellan, "How does it look now?"{137} By 12 September, Lincoln seemed more confident of the safety of Washington. In a telegram to McClellan, he asked for confirmation that Lee was recrossing the Potomac. He closed telling McClellan not to let Lee "get off without being hurt."{138} This was the first time Lincoln mentioned Lee's Army as an objective. Up to this time, he appears to have been primarily concerned with protecting Washington. This last telegram shows either a renewed confidence in the defenses around Washington, or recognition that Washington was not Lee's objective.
McClellan obliged Lincoln this time, aided considerably by a set of Lee's orders which were discovered by some of McClellan's men. McClellan attacked Lee, and the morning of 15 September, prematurely reported to Halleck that the enemy was panicked and whipped. Lincoln read these dispatches and urged McClellan: "Destroy the rebel army, if possible."{139}
McClellan was unable to destroy Lee's Army, and after the Battle of Antietam, failed to pursue him across the Potomac. Lincoln urged him to pursue Lee all through the fall, writing some of the most caustic telegrams he would address to anyone in the war. In one of these, he discussed possible operations with McClellan, pointing out the many advantages he had over Lee. After proposing several options, he reminded him that Lee's troops had already done everything McClellan said was too difficult.{140} McClellan performed at his usual pace, and Lee remained safe south of the Potomac River. Lincoln showed his frustration on 24 October, responding to a request from McClellan to Halleck for horses to replace those of his because they were fatigued. Lincoln asked him, "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?"{141} On 7 November, days after the mid-term elections, Lincoln replaced McClellan with General Burnside.
Burnside was not a good choice for command of an army, but Lincoln had reason to believe he would be successful. T. Harry Williams said Lincoln tended to choose generals who had successful in independent command when looking for a new commanding general for the Army of the Potomac.{142} Earlier that year, Burnside had conducted a highly successful water-borne operation in North Carolina. Pope had also experienced success in the West with a small independent command. After Burnside, Lincoln broke from this pattern, and elevated corps commanders to head the Army of the Potomac.
The Battle of Antietam on 17 September was actually more a draw than a Union victory, but Lincoln's focus was clearly shifting. He urged McClellan to destroy Lee's army, the first time in the war he had specifically discussed an army as an objective. He would continue to urge his commanders to destroy Lee's army for the rest of the war, changing the focus of the campaigns from attacking or defending capitals to the more Napoleonic strategy of destruction of the enemy's main army. Lincoln realized earlier than his generals that Lee and his army were the true center of gravity of the Confederacy, not Richmond.
He was also using the political tools available to him, releasing the "Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation" shortly after the Battle of Antietam. This was distributed along with a circular from the Secretary of State to Diplomats and Consul Officers.{143} In his annual message to Congress on 1 December 1862, Lincoln stated that earlier in the year (June), there had been a strong possibility that the "maritime powers" would reverse their recognition of the Confederacy as a beligerent rather than insurgents. He told Congress this had been delayed by "temporary reverses which afterwards befell the national arms."{144} The timing of the release and distribution leaves little doubt the main intention of the document was to discourage formal recognition of the Confederacy by France and England by formally declaring the war was being fought against slavery.
The Vicksburg campaign got off to a poor start, and Lincoln was responsible for considerable confusion in the planning stages. Approached directly by General McClernand, an Illinois Democrat, Lincoln approved his plan in October 1862 for the assault of Vicksburg over the late objections of Halleck. Again, Lincoln was allowing Halleck to be bypassed. Halleck did convince Lincoln to allow him to remain in charge of all troops raised by McClernand for this venture. As troops became available, Halleck sent them to Grant, who had full control of all troops in the West and who shared Halleck's distrust of McClernand,
Grant and Sherman hurried preparations and moved out on 20 December 1862, four days early and with McClernand's troops. McClernand arrived in Memphis to find that his Army had left without him. McClernand protested strongly to Lincoln, who sided with Halleck and Grant. In any event, the expedition never really developed due to Confederate raids on Grant's stores and communications.{145}
Lincoln's approval of McClernand's plan seemed to be a mistake, and showed his tendency to allow Halleck to be bypassed or to bypass him himself. He would not do this with every General, and would in fact point out the proper chain of command to some as demonstrated above with McClellan. This seems to point to ulterior motives, especially in this case. Lincoln may have approved this plan with an eye towards more Democratic support in the upcoming midterm elections.{146} By approving the plan in October, then siding with Halleck and Grant after the elections, Lincoln showed that he had no strong commitment to McClernand or his plan. McClernand went along as a subordinate to Grant, and served the entire campaign until the fall of Vicksburg in July 1863.
Although Lincoln was very interested in seeing Vicksburg fall and the Mississippi opened, he used little direct influence in the campaign other than that discussed above. Correspondence between Washington and the West went exclusively through Halleck. This was probably because of Lincoln's opinion of General Grant, who was winning victories and not constantly asking for reinforcements or supplies. Lincoln stood by him after his near defeat at Shiloh, and seemed satisfied with his generalship.
The Army of the Potomac was another matter entirely. Lincoln replaced McClellan with General Burnside, who commanded just long enough to have his Army crushed at Fredericksburg. He was replaced in January by General Hooker, a Commander in Burnside's Army with a reputation as a fighter. Lincoln did not fully trust Hooker; he had made allegations against Burnside while a corps commander and made comments about the need for a dictator for the government and the Army. Lincoln believed him to be a skilled general, however, and put him at the head of the Army of the Potomac. On doing so, he wrote him a personal letter, telling him bluntly that he was not satisfied with him on several counts. He told him he thought he had:
taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him [Burnside] as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer.
Referring to Hooker's remarks about the need for a dictator, he said: "Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship." After assuring Hooker he would support him completely, Lincoln closed, saying "Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories."{147}
Hooker started badly, attacking Lee in April at Chancellorsville, but falling back across the Rappahannock River with heavy casualties. Lincoln allowed him more time, unlike Burnside who never wanted the command anyway. Hooker corresponded directly with Lincoln as often as he did with Halleck. Although Lincoln habitually referred Hooker's questions concerning troop movements or operations to Halleck, this was an awkward arrangement. Lincoln passed along occasional advice, telling Hooker once not to let Lee catch him during a crossing of the Rappahannock. Lincoln warned him not to get stuck "like an ox jumped half over a fence."{148} He also corrected Hooker when he proposed a march on Richmond, telling him; "Lee's army, not Richmond is your sure objective point."{149} Lincoln no longer discussed Richmond as a goal.
Much to his surprise, Lincoln found himself again prodding the Commander of the Army of the Potomac to fight. After Chancellorsville, Hooker never lived up to the nickname of "Fightin' Joe." Lincoln tried to press him. In June, with Lee's army back on the move, Lincoln described the situation to Hooker as they saw it in Washington. With the cities of Martinsburg and Winchester in Western Virginia surrounded, Lincoln explained that Lee's army must be stretched thin, and asked why Hooker could not break him. Hooker replied that he did not have Halleck's confidence, and if the situation was allowed to continue "we may look in vain for success." Lincoln told Hooker that he apparently was under a mistaken impression about his chain of command, and put Hooker in "the strict military relation" of a General to the General in Chief. He closed reminding Hooker that General Halleck gave the orders, and Hooker obeyed them,{150}
This finally fixed Lincoln's problem of multiple lines of correspondence from the field to Washington. He allowed it to go on longer than it should have, but from this point, the bypassing of General Halleck stopped. There was no more direct correspondence between Lincoln and Hooker until he asked to be relieved on 27 June. Lincoln obliged him, and appointed General Meade to command the Army of the Potomac. Meade would remain in command until the end of the war.
Meade received orders and directed all his requests and plans to Halleck. Meade believed he could best strike Lee and defend Washington by choosing a strong position and receiving Lee's attack. He chose a town called Pipe Creek just south of the Pennsylvania-Maryland border to make his stand.{151} As he began to move, Lee grew alarmed and began concentrating his scattered troops. Some of Lee's men came through the town of Gettysburg, and told Lee it was the hub of the good local roads. Lee began to concentrate his troops on Gettysburg, where they found Union cavalry under General Buford. Buford advised Meade that the Confederates were massing on Gettysburg, and that it was a better place to defend than Pipe Creek. Meade agreed, and on 1 July, only four days after taking command of the Army of the Potomac, Meade fought the greatest battle of the Civil War.
After the battle, Meade sent a telegram to Halleck, saying he would pursue Lee along the flanks if Lee retreated.{152} Lincoln was receiving no reports from Meade, but was again spending time in the telegraph office reading messages. He wrote to Halleck on 6 July that he was unhappy that Lee was being allowed to get away.{153} This set off a flurry of telegrams to Meade from Halleck, all urging him to attack Lee before he crossed the Potomac. Halleck sent three on 7 July, and two more on 8 July, the last telling Meade that "the President is urgent and anxious."{154}
Meade was in no hurry to comply and did not answer Halleck until 12 July, when he said he planned to attack the following day. When he did not, he told Halleck the reason was five of his six corps commanders were against it.{155} Meade finally advanced on 14 July, but Lee had retreated and slipped away. Halleck wired Meade that Lee's escape "created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President."{156} On hearing this, Meade tendered his resignation, but Halleck refused to accept it.
Lincoln was beside himself in Washington. While he fully appreciated the magnitude of the victory at Gettysburg, he also realized the opportunity that had been lost. Although refraining from direct correspondence with Meade during the weeks after, he did write a personal letter that he never sent. In it, he told Meade how grateful he was for his "magnificent success" and was sorry to learn that he was responsible for any pain to Meade. He told him he did not believe Meade realized the magnitude of Lee's escape. Lincoln said that Lee's destruction, combined with the other recent successes, most notably at Vicksburg, would have ended the war. He ended by saying that this was not a "prosecution or persecution" to him, but the opportunity was lost and he was "distressed immeasurably." Lincoln filed the letter without ever signing or sending it.{157}
Lincoln was again in the position of watching one of his generals refusing to fight the enemy. Apparently giving up on Meade, he turned his attentions to the West. Although generally pleased with the progress in the West, Lincoln saw an opportunity to use some of Meade's troops in another theater. He wrote Halleck on 19 September, saying that since Lee's 60,000 troops could defend against Meade's 90,000, why not let Meade send 50,000 elsewhere. He pointed out that if Lee could defend with those numbers, Meade should be able to hold with 40,000.{158}
These reinforcements were meant for General Rosecrans, who at that moment was facing a concentration of Confederate troops in Tennessee. At a Cabinet meeting on 24 September, four days after Rosecrans' defeat at Chickamauga, Lincoln ordered troops taken from Meade and sent West to Rosecrans. Rosecrans wired Lincoln in early October, saying that merely holding Chattanooga and East Tennessee would help end the war by influencing elections, but Lincoln was lukewarm to the idea. In his reply, he told Rosecrans the same thing he had been telling Meade, that damaging or destroying the enemy army was a "greater objective."{159} Apparently unhappy with having to coax another General into action, Lincoln consolidated the Departments of Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee under Grant. Grant arrived in Chattanooga on 23 October, and attacked and drove out Confederate forces under General Bragg in November.
Lincoln was beginning to see the end of the war, and started to plan for it. On 8 December 1863, Lincoln sent his annual address to Congress and included his "Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction." Lincoln took this step to settle the policy of reconstruction in Louisiana, where he hoped to appeal to loyal Unionists and take support away from rebel sympathizers. Louisiana was the first state taken back by the Union, and setting the reconstruction policy there was especially important for the states just coming under Union control, notably Tennessee and Arkansas.{160} This was designed to make it easy for Confederate states to rejoin the Union. It required only ten percent of voters who participated in the 1860 election to swear an oath of allegiance to the United States. Once this was done, the state would be allowed to re-establish a state government and rejoin the Union. By taking the oath, people would be guaranteed a full pardon, and would receive any property except slaves confiscated during the war. Lincoln had no desire to punish the South after the war, and this would accomplish this goal as well as encourage Southern states to quit fighting.{161} Although victory was still far off, Lincoln was planning for it already.
On 10 March, Lincoln promoted General Grant to the rank of Lieutenant General, a rank recently authorized by Congress. On 12 March 1864, he made the final change in the Union high command. Issuing General Order No. 98, he appointed Grant as General in Chief and Halleck as Chief of Staff of the Army. This was the final change in the Union high command.
Lincoln and Halleck had sounded out Grant's opinions for campaign plans earlier in the year. Grant originally proposed a campaign of raids, but Lincoln and Halleck wanted Lee's Army destroyed. Grant's final plan for 1864 involved four simultaneous advances with different objectives.
Meade was to attack and follow Lee's Army; General Butler was to conduct a seaborne attack on Richmond similar to McClellan's peninsula Campaign; General Banks was to attack Mobile from New Orleans, and Sherman was to break up Johnston's Army in Georgia and destroy Confederate resources. All advances were planned to aid each other by not allowing the Confederates to move troops from one theater to another. Coordinated advances would tie down Confederate troops and not allow the Confederate high command to weaken one area to strengthen another.
The plan for 1864 was entirely Grant's. In his first meeting with Lincoln, Grant said: "the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed to do." Grant said he never revealed his plan to Lincoln, Halleck, or Stanton. Lincoln told his new General in Chief what he wanted from him, and had wanted from his generals all through the war:
All he wanted or had ever wanted was someone who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance.{162}
Grant took the field with the Army of the Potomac, although Meade remained in command. While this appears to be the same mistake made by Davis, Halleck's presence in Washington allowed Grant to stay well informed in the field. All field commanders reported to Halleck, who condensed the information and passed it to Grant.{163} In addition, Halleck and Lincoln had already established a good working relationship, and Halleck could advise or answer any questions Lincoln might have.
Lincoln was finally completely confident in his commanders, and expressed this in a letter to Grant before he left for the Spring campaign of 1864. He told Grant that he wished to express his satisfaction with all he had done, and that Grant should let him know if he needed anything. He also told Grant "The particulars of your plans I neither know, or seek to know." He assured Grant that he did not wish to "obtrude any constraints or restraints" on him.{164}
This was a considerable change from the same man who directed troop movements and argued over plans with McClellan two years earlier. Lincoln finally had men he trusted in place at the head of his Army, and he showed his trust and confidence in his correspondence. Although he did not usually communicate directly with Grant, he did read all messages between Grant and Halleck. He personally wrote nothing to Grant until 15 June, and then only to comment on a message from Grant to Halleck. In it, Grant said he thought he could get to Petersburg before Lee. Lincoln replied "I begin to see it. You will succeed."{165}
There were times when Lincoln was concerned, but he did not bother Grant with questions. During the Battle of the Wilderness, Grant was out of communications for two days. Desperate for news, Stanton heard that a nineteen year old reporter from the New York Times had arrived from the battle at a military telegraph office, and was trying to wire his story back to New York. He refused to tell Stanton or anyone else anything until he sent his story. Stanton threatened to arrest him, but Lincoln agreed to one hundred words if he came to the White House to tell them first. The reporter brought a message from Grant: "There will be no turning back." When he heard this, Lincoln grabbed the reporter and kissed him!{166}
Lincoln temporarily lost this confidence in July 1864, when the Confederates sent General Early on a raid through the Shenandoah Valley to threaten Washington. With Grant locked in a siege of Petersburg and Sherman unable to take Atlanta, some of the initial euphoria of the Spring had worn off and Lincoln feared for the safety of Washington. Lincoln wired Grant, asking him to leave whatever troops were necessary for the siege, and return to Washington with the rest to destroy the enemy. He closed by saying this was not an order, just what he thought best.
Grant replied the same day that he felt it would have a "bad effect" if he left Petersburg, then described the forces he detached to handle Early. Lincoln agreed with him, telling Grant he found his answer "very satisfactory."{167} Grant sent General Sheridan to Washington to take command of the forces in the field there and drive Early out of the Shenandoah Valley. He sent orders that Sheridan should position himself south of Early and follow him to the death.{168} Lincoln agreed with this plan, but told Grant that unless watched it "every day, and hour and force it," it would not be done.{169} Grant returned to Washington for one day to confer with General Hunter, the overall commander of the forces in Washington. Lincoln remained concerned for the safety of the Capitol until Sheridan drove Early out in October, perhaps fearing that the victory he was beginning to see would be snatched away at the last minute.
Later in July, Lincoln again wired Grant concerning a message from Grant to Sherman. Grant told Sherman he would make a "desperate attempt" to hold the enemy at Petersburg; Lincoln read the message and was concerned about Grant's intentions. Lincoln told Grant:
Pressed as we are, by lapse of time, I am glad to hear you say this and yet I do hope you may find a way that the effort shall not be desperate in the sense of great loss of life.{170}
This telegram shows that Lincoln, while mostly avoiding direct interference with his General in Chief, was still keeping very close tabs on the war effort. He did not restrict himself to reading only correspondence to and from Halleck, but closely followed the developments in the West.
It also shows his growing concern over the effect of the military stalemate on the upcoming election. As the Presidential election approached, Lincoln's hopes for re-election dimmed. He himself believed he would not be re-elected in November, issuing a memorandum on 23 August 1864. Lincoln said that since it was "exceedingly probable" that he would not be re-elected, he would cooperate with the President elect to end the war between the election and inauguration. He believed that his opponent would win on the grounds that the Union could not be saved, so Lincoln felt he must try to win before leaving office. This was written before McClellan was nominated by the Democrats; and his declaration that there would be no peace without Union destroyed any hopes the Confederacy had about prevailing until a new President was elected.
Within weeks of this memorandum, Sherman was able to take Atlanta. This victory came at a critical time for Union fortunes, and almost certainly helped Lincoln win a second term. After Sheridan's victory in the Shenandoah Valley, Lincoln returned to minimal correspondence with Grant. He was sure of victory now, and again let his General in Chief conduct his plans without recommendations from the White House. His telegram to Sherman after the fall of Savannah showed the return of the confidence he displayed in May. He admitted to Sherman he was "fearful" when Sherman left Atlanta on his way to the coast, but thought it best not to interfere. He told him now that the glory was all Sherman's, saying, "I believe that none of us went farther than to acquiesce." In closing, Lincoln asked: "But what next? I suppose it will be safer if I leave Gen. Grant and yourself to decide."{171}
Lincoln turned his attention fully to the aftermath of the war from this point. The only correspondence concerning military operations was a telegram from Stanton to Grant referring to the three man peace delegation from Richmond. Stanton told Grant the President wanted him to know that nothing transpired that should cause him to change his plans or operations.{172} He also asked if his son, recently graduated from Harvard, could serve with Grant with "some nominal rank." He told Grant to answer as though he were not the President, only a friend.{173} Grant agreed and Lincoln's son Robert was commissioned a Captain. Lincoln's telegrams to Grant mainly concerned parole or case reviews for soldiers sentenced to death. He also pardoned all deserters who turned themselves in to a Provost Marshall by 10 May. With the war drawing to an end, Lincoln began working in earnest to start the long process of dealing with the scars of the long and bitter war. Lincoln underscored his conciliatory approach to post war problems in his second Inaugural Address on 4 March 1865. He prayed the "mighty scourge of war" would pass quickly and closed with:
With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan - to do all which may achieve and cherish a just, and lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.{174}
Lincoln's command structure and personal command style went through definite phases during the Civil War. He began with confidence in his military commanders and advisers, but the debacle at First Bull Run destroyed this confidence. He felt let down by his field commanders, and realized the need for a new General in Chief. He attempted a similar system with McClellan, first placing him in command of the Army of the Potomac, then also promoting him to General in Chief. Again, he was disappointed, this time by McClellan's lack of action.
Leaving McClellan in field command, he tried to assume the role of General in Chief himself. He attempted this in the summer of 1862, one of the worst for Union fortunes. Lincoln realized he needed a General in Chief in Washington. The demands of the Presidency as well as General in Chief were too great to perform either job well, and Lincoln could not afford to give them both his full attention.
He ordered General Halleck to Washington as General in Chief, and seemed satisfied with his performance despite a rough start. However, Lincoln still did not have complete confidence in Halleck. He went around Halleck to his field commanders on others, while correcting others on the proper chain of command on others. He also allowed some of them, most notably McClernand, to bypass Halleck. This was not an efficient arrangement, and one which Lincoln should not have allowed.
By the Battle of Gettysburg, he solved the problem of dual chains of command, telling Hooker that Halleck gave the orders and he obeyed them. He still apparently harbored some doubts about Halleck, and in March 1864 brought General Grant to Washington to replace Halleck as General in Chief. Although Grant was in the field, he was not in command of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln did not repeat the mistake of placing his General in Chief in command of an Army in addition to his other duties, even for a temporary basis. With Grant as General in Chief and Halleck as Chief of Staff, Lincoln had men he trusted in positions authority and influence. Except for a brief lapse in the summer of 1864, Lincoln displayed the confidence in his military command that he evidenced before First Bull Run. He also had an organization remarkably like that we use today.
Lincoln handled a variety of personalities well, and displayed remarkable patience in dealing with his generals. This was most evident with McClellan, but also with Hooker and Meade. He displayed this especially when trying repeatedly to get these generals to focus on Lee's army as their objective. Lincoln was ahead of his commanders in realizing the true center of gravity of the Confederacy.
Lincoln was a master politician, and used political tools as well as military to influence the war. His timing of the release of the Emancipation Proclamation and the Reconstruction and Amnesty Policy were motivated by the effect they would have on the military campaign.
Lincoln saw beyond the immediate battles, and kept his focus on his ultimate goal of restoring the Union. He used his political skills as well as his developing military skill throughout the war, never losing sight of his strategic goal. He learned from his mistakes, never repeating them. By the end of 1863, he began focussing on Reconstruction, gradually backing out of the day to day operations of the military. By late 1864, he turned over the operations to Grant; and devoted his efforts to "bind up the nation's wounds." To the end, he did not let himself get caught up in either the immediate frustrations or celebrations of the war. Lincoln never forgot there would be a time when the war would end. Gordon A. Craig, Professor of Humanities Emeritus at Stanford University, said "wars create as many problems as they solve and that the art of grand strategy is to foresee the outline of the future and be prepared to deal with it."{175} Lincoln realized this from the start.