9
Responses and Objections

One thought kept rising to the surface, as if spoken from somewhere else: “Something is wrong.” I couldn’t figure it out. I couldn’t really articulate the questions properly, but a voice in my mind kept saying, “Something is wrong. Admit it.”

—Dan Barker, Godless1

So where do we go from here? We have discovered two logical inconsistencies in atheistic arguments. As we have seen in two arguments, no sooner does the atheist level his accusation against the Christian God than he invalidates the argument. In the first case, though initially indicting God for not fixing the problem of moral evil, the atheist then indicts God for his attempts to fix it. Somehow, God is immoral for being too permissive and then immoral for being too inhibiting. Why are his interventions seen as too inhibiting? Because they threaten something the atheist greatly values—namely, human autonomy. Thus, the appeal to the problem of moral evil is overturned by appeal to the problem of divine intervention. Then we find a second inconsistency, this one overturning their appeal to the problem of divine intervention. Although denouncing as evil the interventions that God proposes in order to fix moral evil, the atheist then reverses himself by absolving those same types of interventions on a societal level. Apparently, the problem is not the interventions themselves so much as the one wielding them. Why is God condemned as immoral to propose these interventions when they are excused and even appreciated on a societal level?

Let us suggest a proper atheistic response for each of these two inconsistencies before considering some potential objections to these responses. First, what should be the proper response of the atheist to the first inconsistency, wherein the atheist overturns his appeal to the problem of moral evil by appealing to the problem of divine intervention? Well, when you have two opposing propositions, you must let loose of one of them to remain within rationality. The atheist presents two requests to God that cannot both be logically granted. Quite simply, God cannot fix the problem of moral evil without intervening to fix the problem of moral evil. Keep in mind that the atheist’s contradiction, however, is even more absurd, for the atheist is asking God for something no less drastic than A- or B-level interventions and yet denouncing mere C-level interventions as too smothering. If you realize that you cannot hold both complaints without contradiction, then honesty demands that you simply let go of one of the complaints. On the one hand, the atheist can argue with the system of freedom the Christian God set up in the first place and ask, “Why doesn’t God solve the problem of moral evil?” If so, he must drop his objections to God’s C-level interventions, because, of course, those are God’s solution to the problem of moral evil. On the other hand, the atheist can argue with the interventions God offers and ask, “Why does God have to intervene so much?” In so doing, however, he must drop the objection that God does not intervene because, of course, he does. So in light of the first inconsistency, the most natural and rational response would be to let go of either the argument indicting God for not fixing moral evil or the argument indicting God for intervening to fix it.

What would be a rational response to the second inconsistency? Recall that submission and favor, death and faith, guilt and rules, punishment and pardon, hell and heaven are all said to be immoral on the divine level, yet their counterparts on a societal level are vindicated. It would seem that if something is not immoral at the societal level, it should not be condemned at the divine level either. Where exactly do we find the immorality? If God is the subject and his interventions are the verb, suppose the atheist says that the subject God is the immorality. In other words, God is immoral because God is immoral. This would be circular reasoning. Suppose the atheist responds instead that the immorality lies in what God does. But the interventions have already been absolved at the societal level. Clearly, the atheist does not see the verb as immoral in itself. Thus, why indict God for something that is not immoral? Rationality demands consistency. It seems the natural and rational response would be to either condemn these interventions as immoral in themselves, or to concede that God is not, in fact, immoral in employing them.

Thus, we are proposing to the atheist a response for each of the two inconsistencies, responses that would, in fact, resolve the two inconsistencies. In short, they are:

1. Either drop the argument appealing to the problem of moral evil or drop the arguments claiming that God’s interventions to fix the problem of moral evil are immoral.
2. Stop labeling as immoral those interventions that the Christian God proposes while simultaneously claiming that their counterparts on the societal level are not immoral.

Now let us consider some objections the atheist might advance to elude the responses that have been proposed. Objections 1–3 correspond to the first proposed response, while objections 4–5 correspond to the second.

Objection 1: I Maintain That God Should Fix Only the Worst Kinds of Moral Evil

What if, in relation to the argument appealing to the problem of moral evil, an atheist holds to only part of the argument as stated? The atheist could say something like, “Now, I never suggested that God should get rid of all instances of evil. But, if he’s truly a good God, then at the very least he should have thwarted monsters like Hitler. I mean, if he really loves us, he should at least prevent child abuse.” If the atheist softens the demands with regard to the problem of moral evil, can he then rationally hold both arguments at the same time (i.e., it is immoral of God to permit the worst cases of moral evil and likewise immoral of him to propose the interventions to fix moral evil)?

Response to Objection 1

It will be helpful to recall the three possible levels of intervention into the problem of moral evil presented earlier:

A (“All”)—Forcible prevention of all moral evil

B (“Bad”)—Forcible intervention into the most egregious cases of evil

C (“Conscience”)—Voluntary intervention at the mental/spiritual level

This first objection basically asserts that asking God for merely B-level interventions does not cancel out the repudiation of divine interventions when they come. Recall that B-level interventions would still rob the human of a tremendous treasure of autonomy. If God were to prevent the worst types of evil, this would translate into either constitutional constraints on what humans were capable of or the miraculous thwarting of innumerable actions. Even softening his request for interventions from A to B level, the atheist is still asking for something miraculous and then demanding its removal.

Moreover, the atheist desiring B-level intervention who hopes to elude contradiction overlooks an important fact of logic. The following statements cannot both be true:

1. All moral problems should be fixed by God.
2. No moral problems should be fixed by God (even at the C-level).

Statement 1 represents A-level intervention, and statement 2 represents the atheist’s demand for freedom from mere C-level interventions. Yet does the contradiction resolve itself when the first statement is reduced from A-level to B-level?

1. Some moral problems should be fixed by God.
2. No moral problems should be fixed by God (even at the C-level).

With statement 1 now as B level, it is a fact of logic that the two statements have become direct contradictions. Thus, the atheist who softens the problem of moral evil into demanding that God fix only the worst cases of evil does not elude contradiction at all.

Objection 2: I Maintain That Only Some of These Divine Interventions Are Immoral

The atheists we have consulted have attacked ten divine interventions that God would use to fix the problem of moral evil. What if an atheist holds only certain of these interventions to be immoral? For example, of the ten interventions, what if an atheist holds numbers 1–5 to be immoral, but not numbers 6–10? Is the atheist still contradicting his accusation that God ought to fix the problem of moral evil?

Response to Objection 2

The reason there is a contradiction in the first place is that the atheists we have looked at want freedom from something that God would naturally use to remedy the problem of moral evil. Thus, if the atheist desires freedom from even one intervention that God would use to remedy the problem of moral evil, while at the same time judging God as immoral for not fixing the problem of moral evil, he is contradicting himself. It is inconsequential how many cries for freedom go forth; even one calls into question the seriousness of the atheist’s complaint against moral evil.

It seems clear from the atheists’ writings that these ten interventions are in fact things that the atheist desires freedom from. Of course, there is the possibility of an atheist holding one or more of the ten interventions as immoral and yet not actually desiring freedom from what he is rejecting. For example, it is possible to hold that God’s method of redeeming sinners (the crucifixion of Christ) is immoral because it involves punishment of the innocent but not necessarily to desire freedom from redemption itself. It is possible that an atheist could want God to fix the problem of moral evil, object to his methods (i.e., the ten interventions), and yet not necessarily want freedom from them. Keep in mind the rarity of such an atheist, however; for not only must he not desire freedom from any of the ten interventions, but he must truly desire even more imposing interventions (A or B level) than those attributed to the Christian God (merely C level) if he is to hold that God ought to fix the problem of moral evil. If such an atheist exists, he is exempt from our critique. But thanks to atheists’ commitment to human autonomy, their writings make it seem almost a prerequisite for them to desire at least some freedom from God. After all, even Christians sometimes desire freedom from some of God’s interventions. Are Christians always pleased with his project of making them holy as he is holy? Countless sermons are preached to squirming Christians urging them to trust in his interventions, however it inhibits their autonomy. The difference between the Christian and the atheist is that in our reflective moments we Christians realize that such desires for freedom from God’s interventions indicate our immorality, not God’s.

Objection 3: Even If Not Immoral, God Could Have Done It a Better Way

This objection assumes that, in fact, it is a contradiction to say that God should intervene to fix the problem of moral evil and yet that his interventions are immoral because they threaten human autonomy. God is not necessarily inactive in the face of moral evil, and he is not necessarily inimical to human freedom. However, this objection contends rather that there is a better way God could have set things up, something more godlike. Perhaps we cannot call God immoral, but we could still argue that there is a better way God could have done it. We could imagine a better God.

Response to Objection 3

Regarding moral freedom and divine interventions, what are the logically possible ways God could have set things up better? There appear to be two ways. Perhaps, on the one hand, God could have intervened more so that the problem of moral evil would be less of a problem. Or, on the other hand, perhaps God could have given humanity even greater autonomy. Given the alleged problems with the way God set things up, these seem to be the two possible ways God could have improved. Notice what happens, however, with each potential tweak. The more God intervenes into the problem of moral evil, the less potential autonomy humanity has. Conversely, the more autonomy humanity is granted, the fewer the interventions that are permitted. Such a trade is only logical. What we find here is nothing profound but is nonetheless something that should not be forgotten—namely, that freedom and intervention are on opposite ends of the seesaw. When one goes up, the other goes down. It would be absurd to propose that God be more forceful in fixing the problem of moral evil while at the same time proposing that he increase freedom. As C. S. Lewis says, “You may attribute miracles to him, but not nonsense.”2

To put a picture above this caption, imagine that the atheist who advances this objection decides that a better God would give humanity more freedom (and thus less intervention). It would appear then that the Christian God, though not exactly immoral, is not a palatable God to that particular atheist. Rather, the atheist now finds himself before a new God, one that produces interventions less fatefully, and thus encourages a freedom less uptight. John Hick, for example, has proposed a divinely structured system of multiple lives that advance oneself, in the end, to moral and spiritual fulfillment without resorting to anything as drastic as a final judgment.3 Or perhaps certain more modern renditions of Judaism, according to which God is far more concerned with everyday ethics than with afterlives, might be more amenable to the atheist.

So the atheist finds himself window-shopping for another religion, which is completely permissible but lies outside the scope of this work. The atheist then obligates himself to argue against the new God in order to retain his atheism, but this should prove difficult since he has just stumbled upon a God that eludes his critique. If he goes ahead and buys into the new religion, he is obviously no longer an atheist. If he does not, he still has to reckon with a Christianity that has yet to be disproved. Whatever the case, the atheist who values a moral humanity as well as a free humanity would have trouble finding a God more uncompromisingly committed to the same goals than the Christian God.

Objection 4: These Interventions Are Necessary on a Societal but Not Divine Level

Whereas on a societal level these types of interventions are necessary, they are unnecessary on the divine level. If God were really all-wise and all-powerful, he would not have to resort to such unnecessary methods to fix the problem of moral evil. It was never claimed that humanity was infinitely wise or powerful; thus, such interventions are not immoral on the societal level. But God should be able to come up with better ways to fix the problem of immorality that are not themselves immoral.

Response to Objection 4

Two assertions are being made here. First, these interventions are basically immoral, but necessary on a societal level. Second, since they are not necessary on the divine level, God is immoral to employ them. However, we assert that these interventions do follow naturally, even necessarily, from the very nature of the Christian God. As we shall see, perfectly moral interventions flow from the nature of a perfectly moral God.

According to the atheists we have consulted, it is immoral of God to permit moral evil and then to propose the following interventions to fix moral evil:

1. Demand submission
2. Bestow favor
3. Authorize death
4. Require faith
5. Attach guilt
6. Prescribe rules
7. Administer punishment
8. Grant pardon
9. Send to hell
10. Bring to heaven

The truth is that every action attacked here not only aligns with God’s essential character but also follows naturally, even inevitably, from it. Take just five foundational doctrines, which the atheist, though not holding to them as fact, would nonetheless see no problem with their morality:

1. God alone is all-loving.
2. God alone is all-knowing.
3. God alone is all-powerful.
4. God alone is all-holy.
5. Man alone of all creatures is free.

From these five fundamentals all eleven actions under dispute (eleven because this includes the initial immorality of God’s permitting moral evil in the first place) are naturally derived:

Man’s Freedom →	Moral Evil
God’s Love + Man’s Freedom →	Favor
God’s Knowledge + Man’s Limited Knowledge →	Faith
God’s Power + Man’s Limited Power →	Submission
God’s Holiness + Man’s Limited Holiness →	Rules
Rules + Moral Evil →	Guilt
Faith + Moral Evil →	Death (i.e., exile from Eden)
Guilt + Death →	Punishment
Punishment + Favor →	Pardon
Pardon + Freedom →	Heaven and Hell
→ means “leads to”

The atheist might still question the morality of certain details (e.g., the extent of hell’s punishments, the innocence of certain Canaanites under punishment, etc.), but it must be admitted that broadly these actions flow naturally from a moral God as described in the five doctrines listed above. It is simply not true that these interventions belong in a societal but not a divine context. They are not only appropriate coming from a moral God but they flow naturally, even necessarily, from a moral God.

Objection 5: These Interventions Are Too Restricting Coming from a God of Love

These types of interventions end up being necessary on a societal level, and no one can call immoral that which is necessary. But the Christian God claims to be a God of love. You cannot truly love someone and then impose all these types of restrictions on them. God should be able to come up with a way to fix moral evil that is far less restricting. An infinitely loving God would not want to resort to such restricting methods.

Response to Objection 5

Are these interventions really so restricting? The atheist who says God ought to fix the problem of moral evil is clearly asking for more interventions than God has already given. In other words, the atheist is requesting A- or B-level interventions, whereas these “restricting” interventions in question are merely C-level interventions. As we saw in the response to the previous objection, these interventions are not forced by a cantankerous God but instead flow naturally from a moral God. Coming from a God who is infinitely loving, knowledgeable, powerful, and holy, these interventions are simply not problematic; if there remains a problem, then it must somehow be with there being a God who is infinitely loving, knowledgeable, powerful, and holy.

There is, however, yet another reason that the accusation of restrictiveness is unfair, when it is made plain just what the atheist is forbidding God to do. Before viewing these creature-to-Creator commandments, recall that these are God-in-the-Dock (GITD) arguments. God is being placed on trial for having contradicted his own perfect nature. Thus the indictment must reckon with the entirety of the Christian system. If, for example, God did not exist, then of course these interventions might seem a bit silly or even immoral. However, note that the atheists construct their argument this way: “If God were truly moral, he wouldn’t . . .” The prior assumption is that he does exist and that the action compromises his morality so that his existence as the most moral being is called into question. It is unfair to attack God’s interventions while caricaturing them in an absurd way as if God did not exist. If God really exists, would not the following commandments seem absurdly restricting?

1. You shall not produce in your creatures feelings of inferiority (against submission).
2. You shall not produce a religion in which adherents feel special (against favor).
3. You shall not withhold immortality from your creatures (against death).
4. You shall not withhold any knowledge from your creatures (against faith).
5. You shall not make your creatures feel guilty for disobeying your commandments (against guilt).
6. You shall not prescribe any commandments your creatures feel to be unnecessary or restricting (against rules).
7. You shall not make any creature serve punishment for his crimes (against punishment).
8. No member of the Godhead shall volunteer to take your creature’s punishment for his crimes (against pardon).
9. You shall not send humanity into eternity without you (against hell).
10. You shall not bring humanity into eternity with you (against heaven).

Those are only the commandments pertaining to the interventions. Keep in mind that all the while the atheist is demanding obedience to the following commandment as well:

You shall not give your creatures moral freedom (against moral evil).

Some of the above commandments are actually logically impossible as stated. For example, to say “It is immoral of you to give us moral freedom” is to use moral freedom (a moral judgment) to negate moral freedom. Likewise, “Thou shalt not produce a religion in which adherents feel special” is impossible, for how could a religion made by God and imparted to a particular group of adherents possibly fail to make them feel special? Furthermore, how could a God in any traditional sense of the term possibly interact with creatures without producing in them feelings of inferiority?

Other statements may not be self-refuting, but they definitely seem far too stringent. For example, to command the removal of faith is to essentially demand omniscience, while to command the removal of death is to demand immortality, both of which are demands for a share in divinity. The commandment against commandments amounts to a creature commanding the Creator not to give him commandments he does not like. How ironic! Or take the commandment against guilt; presumably the point of this is to heap guilt upon God for disobeying our commandment not to heap guilt upon us for disobeying his commandments (which, of course, disobey our commandment against his commandments).

All this should at least introduce into the discussion a little humility. If the atheist is considering the possibility that God exists and is measuring his actions by his supposed goodness and power, surely there should be a measure of humility recognizing that if such a God exists, he might possibly do things a bit differently than the atheist would have done. The above demands seem to hold God down in an absurdly subordinate posture, while stretching human authority well beyond its boundaries, a stretch that merely a touch of humility should break. Perhaps God is not as restrictive toward atheists as atheists are toward God. And the atheist thinks God is hard to please!

In Summary

Thus the atheist has dealt significant blows against his own arguments. Holding and accepting contradictory beliefs simultaneously, the atheist is guilty of doublethink. First, we saw that God should fix the problem of moral evil, yet in so doing he should not touch anything. Ever the zealot for human autonomy, the atheist demands freedom from the very interventions the Christian God proposes to fix the problem of moral evil. Second, we saw that the interventions the Christian God proposes in order to fix moral evil are considered immoral by the atheist but are not in themselves immoral. On the societal level, these very types of interventions are said to be necessary and thus not immoral in the least. Therefore, we find that the first inconsistency overturns the argument appealing to the problem of moral evil. Likewise, until the atheist can mount a plausible rationale behind his double standard, the second inconsistency overturns the argument appealing to the problem of divine intervention. The thinking atheist should reconsider the contradictory and impossible demands he makes of God and demand of himself a resolution of these inconsistencies.