Notes

1. Standard Equipment

Page

6 Robot’s-eye view: Poggio, 1984.

6 Building a visual system: Marr, 1982; Poggio, 1984; Aloimonos & Rosenfeld, 1991; Wandell, 1995; Papathomas, et al., 1995.

7 Chicken-and-egg problems in vision: Adelson & Pentland, 1996; Sinha & Adelson, 1993a, b.

8 Multi-sized afterimage (“Emmert’s Law”): Rock, 1983.

9 Template matching: Neisser, 1967; figure adapted from Lindsay & Norman, 1972, pp. 2–6.

10 Legged locomotion: Raibert & Sutherland, 1983; Raibert, 1990.

11 Walking disaster: French, 1994.

12 Arms and architect’s lamps: Hollerbach, 1990; Bizzi & Mussa-Ivaldi, 1990.

12 Galen on the hand: Quoted in Williams, 1992, p. 192.

12 Grips: Trinkaus, 1992.

13 Bachelors: Winograd, 1976.

14 Not-so-common sense: Lenat & Guha, 1990.

14 Sensible inferences: Cherniak, 1983; Dennett, 1987.

14 Frame problem: Dennett, 1987; Pylyshyn, 1987.

15 Rules of robotics: Asimov, 1950.

17 Engineering aggression: Maynard Smith, 1982; Tooby & Cosmides, 1988.

18 Logic of love: Symons, 1979; Buss, 1994; Frank, 1988; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996; Fisher, 1992; Hatfield & Rapson, 1993.

19 Neglect of left visual space: Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978. Achromatopsia (cortical color-blindness): Sacks & Wasserman, 1987. Motion-blindness: Hess, Baker, & Zihl, 1989.

20 Agnosia (difficulty recognizing objects): Farah, 1990. Prosopagnosia (difficulty recognizing faces): Etcoff, Freeman, & Cave, 1991. Capgras syndrome (lack of familiarity despite recognition): Alexander, Stuss, & Benson, 1979.

20 Multiple brain areas for vision: Van Essen & DeYoe, 1995.

21 Separated at birth: Lykken et al., 1992; Bouchard et al., 1990; Bouchard, 1994; Plomin, 1989; Plomin, Owen, & McGuffin, 1994; L. Wright, 1995.

22 Reverse-engineering: Dennett, 1995. Psychology as reverse-engineering: Tooby & Cosmides, 1992.

22 Biology as reverse-engineering: Williams, 1966, 1992; Mayr, 1983.

22 Psychology on a new foundation: Darwin, 1859/1964.

23 Evolutionary psychology: Symons, 1979, 1992; Tooby, 1985; Cosmides, 1985; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Wright, 1994a; Buss, 1995; Allman, 1994.

23 Cognitive revolution: Gardner, 1985; Jackendoff, 1987; Dennett, 1978a. Evolution revolution: Williams, 1966; Hamilton, 1996; Dawkins, 1976/1989, 1986; Maynard Smith, 1975/1993, 1982; Tooby, 1988; Wright, 1994a.

24 What is information?: Dretske, 1981.

24 Computational theory of mind: Turing, 1950; Putnam, 1960; Simon & Newell, 1964; Newell & Simon, 1981; Haugeland, 1981a, b, c; Fbdor, 1968a, 1975, 1994; Pylyshyn, 1984.

26 Humans that speak, ants that farm: Cosmides & Tooby, 1994.

28 Specialization all the way down: Gallistel, 1995.

28 Vision as inverse optics: Poggio, 1984.

29 Visual assumptions: Marr, 1982; Hoffman, 1983.

31 Modules according to Fodor: Fodor, 1983, 1985.

31 Chomsky on mental organs: Chomsky, 1988, 1991, 1993.

32 Specialization of artificial intelligence systems: Marr, 1982; Minsky, 1985; Minsky & Papert, 1988b; Pinker & Prince, 1988.

32 Precocious children: Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994a, b; Sperber, Premack, & Premack, 1995. Human universals: Brown, 1991.

33 Mind not a mixture of biology and culture: Tooby & Cosmides, 1992. Learning requires innate learning mechanism: Fodor, 1975, 1981; Chomsky, 1975; Pinker, 1984, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992.

36 Brain assembly: Stryker, 1994; Cramer & Sur, 1995; Rakic, 1995a, b.

37 Non-selectionist evolutionary forces: Williams, 1966; Gould & Lewontin, 1979. Natural selection as engineer: Darwin, 1859/1964; Dawkins, 1983, 1986, 1995; Williams, 1966, 1992; Dennett, 1995.

37 The eye as Cartesian bridge: Tooby & Cosmides, 1992.

38 Criteria for adaptation: Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1986; Dennett, 1995.

39 Pregnancy sickness: Profet, 1992.

41 Evolution as innovator: Tooby & Cosmides, 1989.

41 Sociobiology versus evolutionary psychology: Symons, 1979, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a.

42 Behavior is not now adaptive; the mind used to be adaptive: Symons, 1979, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a.

43 You can’t take it with you: Gould, 1992. Gene’s-eye view: Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976/1989, 1983, 1995; Sterelny & Kitcher, 1988; Kitcher, 1992; Cronin, 1992; Dennett, 1995. Against the gene’s-eye view: Gould, 1980b, 1983b.

44 The Standard Social Science Model: Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Symons, 1979; Daly & Wilson, 1988.

45 Hysteria over sociobiology: Wright, 1988, 1994a; Wilson, 1994. Innuendo: Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984, p. 260. Not in his book: compare Dawkins, 1976/1989, p. 20, with Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984, p. 287, and with Levins & Lewontin, 1985, pp. 88, 128. Smears in Scientific American: Horgan, 1993, 1995a. Too dangerous to teach: Hrdy, 1994.

46 Freeman, Mead, and Samoa: Freeman, 1983, 1992.

46 Seville Statement: The Seville Statement on Violence, 1990.

48 Inauthentic preferences: Sommers, 1994.

49 Universal human nature: Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b.

50 Difference feminism: Sommers, 1994; Patai & Koertge, 1994.

51 Not so noble: Daly & Wilson, 1988; Chagnon, 1992; Keely, 1996.

51 Religion and modularity: Wright, 1994a.

52 The defining quality of being a woman: Gordon, 1996.

52 Blameless philandering mates: Rose, 1978.

53 The Abuse Excuse and other dubious extenuating factors: Dershowitz, 1994.

54 Creeping exculpation: Dennett, 1984; R. Wright, 1994a, 1995.

55 Moral responsibility compatible with neurophysiological and evolutionary causation: Dennett, 1984; Nozick, 1981, pp. 317–362.

56 Gay gene brouhaha: Hamer & Copeland, 1994.

57 Deconstructing gender: Lorber, 1994. Deconstructing binaries: Katz, 1995. Deconstructing deconstructionism: Carroll, 1995; Sommers, 1994; Paglia, 1992; Searle, 1983, 1993; Lehman, 1992.

2. Thinking Machines

59 Twilight Zone: Zicree, 1989.

60 Louis Armstrong on consciousness: Quoted in Block, 1978.

61 Good aliens: Interview by D. C. Denison, Boston Globe Magazine, June 18, 1995.

62 Idiotic filings versus intelligent lovers: James, 1890/1950.

62 What is intelligence?: Dennett, 1978b; Newell & Simon, 1972, 1981; Pollard, 1993.

63 Skinner skinned: Chomsky, 1959; Fodor, 1968a, 1986; Dennett, 1978c.

64 Beliefs and desires: Fodor, 1968a, b, 1975, 1986, 1994; Dennett, 1978d; Newell & Simon, 1981; Pylyshyn, 1980, 1984; Marr, 1982; Haugeland, 1981a, b, c; Johnson-Laird, 1988.

65 What is information?: Dretske, 1981.

67 Turing machines: Moore, 1964.

69 Production systems: Newell & Simon, 1972, 1981; Newell, 1990; Anderson, 1983, 1993.

77 Broad definition of computation: Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Fodor, 1994.

77 The Ghost in the Machine: Ryle, 1949. Ghosts in the Mind’s Machine: Kosslyn, 1983.

79 Stupid homunculi: Fodor, 1968b; Dennett, 1978d, pp. 123–124.

80 Meaning in mind: Loewer & Rey, 1991; McGinn, 1989a; Block, 1986; Fodor, 1994; Dietrich, 1994.

81 Biology of meaning: Millikan, 1984; Block, 1986; Pinker, 1995; Dennett, 1995; Field, 1977.

82 Everyday AI: Crevier, 1993; Hendler, 1994.

82 What computers can’t do: Dreyfus, 1979; Weizenbaum, 1976; Crevier, 1993.

82 The experts speak: Cerf & Navasky, 1984.

83 Natural computation: Coined by Whitman Richards.

83 The computational brain: Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992.

86 Representation and generalization: Pylyshyn, 1984; Jackendoff, 1987; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker, 1984a; Pinker & Prince, 1988.

88 Vastness of language: Pinker, 1994a; Miller, 1967.

88 Mill melancholy about melodies: Cited in Sowell, 1995.

89 Mental representations in the lab: Posner, 1978.

90 Multiple representations: Anderson, 1983. Visual images: Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; Pinker, 1984b, c. Short-term memory loops: Baddeley, 1986. Chunks: Miller, 1956; Newell & Simon, 1972. Grammar in the head: Chomsky, 1991; Jackendoff, 1987, 1994; Pinker, 1994.

90 Mentalese: Anderson & Bower, 1973; Fodor, 1975; Jackendoff, 1987, 1990, 1994; Pinker, 1989, 1994.

90 “Processed” inputs to the hippocampus: Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992, p. 286. “Processed” inputs to the frontal lobe: Crick & Koch, 1995.

90 Programming style: Kernighan & Plauger, 1978.

92 Architecture of complexity: Simon, 1969.

92 Hora and Tempus: Simon, 1969, p. 188.

93 The Chinese Room: Block, 1978; Searle, 1980.

94 Chinese Room commentary: Searle, 1980; Dietrich, 1994. Chinese Room update: Searle, 1992.

94 Chinese Room refutations: Churchland & Churchland, 1994; Chomsky, 1993; Dennett, 1995.

96 They’re made out of meat: Bisson, 1991.

97 The emperor’s new mind: Penrose, 1989, 1990. Update: Penrose, 1994.

97 The emperor’s new book: Penrose, 1989; Wilczek, 1994; Putnam, 1994; Crick, 1994; Dennett, 1995.

98 Tortoise and Achilles: Carroll, 1895/1956.

99 Neuro-logical networks: McCulloch & Pitts, 1943.

101 Neural networks: Hinton & Anderson, 1981; Feldman & Ballard, 1982; Rumelhart, McClelland, & the PDP Research Group, 1986; Grossberg, 1988; Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Quinlan, 1992.

106 Necker network: Feldman & Ballard, 1982.

107 Pattern associators: Hinton, McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986b.

109 Problems with perceptrons: Minsky & Papert, 1988a; Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986.

111 Hidden-layer networks as function approximators: Poggio & Girosi, 1990.

112 Connectionism: Rumelhart, McClelland, & the PDP Research Group, 1986; McClelland, Rumelhart, & the PDP Research Group, 1986; Smolensky, 1988; Morris, 1989. Why humans are smarter than rats: Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986a, p. 143.

112 Past-tense debate: Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986b; Pinker & Prince, 1988, 1994; Prince & Pinker, 1988; Pinker, 1991; Prasada & Pinker, 1993; Marcus, Brinkmann, Clahsen, Wiese, & Pinker, 1995.

113 Problems with connectoplasm: Pinker & Mehler, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988; Prince & Pinker, 1988; Prasada & Pinker, 1993; Marcus, 1997a, b, in preparation; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Fodor & McClaughlin, 1990; Minsky & Papert, 1988b; Lachter & Bever, 1988; Anderson, 1990, 1993; Newell, 1990; Ling & Marinov, 1993;Hadley, 1994a, b.

113 Hume on contiguity and similarity: Hume, 1748/1955.

115 Vanishing cherry: Berkeley, 1713/1929, p. 324.

116 Identifying individuals: Bloom, 1996a.

117 Loving a twin: L. Wright, 1995.

117 Which Blick bit?: Boston Globe, 1990.

118 Wildebeests and zebras versus lions and hyenas: Personal communication from Daniel Dennett.

120 Systematicity of thoughts: Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988.

121 Problems with representing propositions: Hinton, 1981.

122 Propositions in networks: Hinton, 1981; McClelland & Kawamoto, 1986; Shastri & Ajjanagadde, 1993; Smolensky, 1990, 1995; Pollack, 1990; Hadley & Hayward, 1994.

123 Amnesic networks: McCloskey & Cohen, 1989; Ratcliff, 1990. Bat-wielding bat: McClelland & Kawamoto, 1986.

124 Multiple memories: Sherry and Schacter, 1987. Multiple connectionist memories: McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995.

125 Recursive transition networks for sentence understanding: Pinker, 1994, chap. 7.

125 Recurrent networks: Jordan, 1989; Elman, 1990; Giles et al., 1990. Failure of recurrent networks to handle propositions: Marcus, 1997a, in preparation. Connectionist proposition-crunchers: Pollack, 1990; Berg, 1991; Chalmers, 1990.

126 Fuzzy categories: Rosch, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981. Fuzzy categories in connectoplasm: Whittlesea, 1989; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985.

127 Problems with fuzzy categories: Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983; Rey, 1983; Pinker & Prince, 1996; Marcus, 1997b; Medin, 1989; Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992; Keil, 1989.

127 Gorillas and onions: Hinton, Rumelhart, & McClelland, 1986, p. 82.

128 Ape diets: Glander, 1992.

128 Explanation-based generalization: Pazzani, 1987, 1993; Pazzani & Dyer, 1987; Pazzani & Kibler, 1993; de Jong & Mooney, 1986.

129 Sorites: Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Poundstone, 1988. Universality of long reasoning chains: Brown, 1991; Boyd & Silk, 1996.

130 Connectionist family tree: Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986.

132 Johnson on mind and matter: Quoted in Minsky, 1985. Huxley on the Djin: Quoted in Humphrey, 1992. Water into wine: McGinn, 1989b.

133 Consciousness boom: Humphrey, 1992; Dennett, 1991; Crick, 1994; Penrose, 1994; Jackendoff, 1987; Searle, 1992, 1995; Marcel & Bisiach, 1988; Baars, 1988.

133 Gould on inventing consciousness: Gould, 1993, pp. 294–295.

133 Mirror, mirror: Gallup, 1991; Parker, Mitchell, & Boccia, 1994. Mirrors and mon keys revisited: Hauser et al., 1995. Unconscious ancients: Jaynes, 1976. Contagious consciousness: Dennett, 1991.

134 Sorting out the consciousness mess: Jackendoff, 1987; Block, 1995.

136 Consciousness among the neurons: Crick, 1994; Crick & Koch, 1995.

137 Bulletin board systems: Jagannathan, Dodhiawala, & Baum, 1989. Consciousness as bulletin board: Baars, 1988; Newell & Simon, 1972; Navon, 1989; Fehling, Baars, & Fisher, 1990.

137 Costs of computation: Minsky & Papert, 1988b; Ullman, 1984; Navon, 1985; Fehling, Baars, & Fisher, 1990; Anderson, 1990, 1991.

139 Intermediate-level consciousness: Jackendoff, 1987.

140 Visual attention: Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman, 1988.

142 Floating letters: Mozer, 1991.

142 Memories of shocking news: Brown & Kulik, 1977; McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988; Schacter, 1996.

142 Optimality of memory: Anderson, 1990, 1991.

143 Function of emotional coloring: Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, b.

144 Society of mind: Minsky, 1985. Multiple drafts: Dennett, 1991.

144 Will center discovered: Damasio, 1994; Crick, 1994.

144 Frontal lobes: Luria, 1966; Duncan, 1995.

145 Sentience versus access: Block, 1995.

146 Paradoxes of sentience: Nagel, 1974; Poundstone, 1988; Dennett, 1991; McGinn, 1989b, 1993; Block, 1995.

147 Debunking qualia: Dennett, 1991.

3. Revenge of the Nerds

149 Earth’s greatest hits: Sullivan, 1993.

150 Little green men: Kerr, 1992. Evolutionary skeptics: Mayr, 1993.

150 Number of extraterrestrial civilizations: Sullivan, 1993.

151 We’re only the first: Drake, 1993.

153 Human chauvinism: Gould, 1989, 1996.

153 Costs and benefits in evolution: Maynard Smith, 1984.

154 Costs and benefits of big brains: Tooby & DeVore, 1987.

155 Darwin and the universe: Dawkins, 1983, 1986; Williams, 1966, 1992; Maynard Smith, 1975/1993; Reeve & Sherman, 1993.

159 Photons don’t wash an eye clear: Dawkins, 1986.

159 Macromutations cannot explain complex design: Dawkins, 1986. “Punctuated equilibria” are not the same as macromutations: Dawkins, 1986; Gould, 1987, p. 234.

160 “Adaptive mutation”: Cairns, Overbaugh, & Miller, 1988; Shapiro, 1995. Problems with adaptive mutation: Lenski & Mittler, 1993; Lenski & Sniegowski; Shapiro, 1995.

160 Complexity theory: Kauffman, 1991; Gell-Mann, 1994.

161 Take a hike, Darwin: James Barham, New York Times Book Review, June 4, 1995; also Davies, 1995.

161 Limitations of complexity theory: Maynard Smith, 1995; Horgan, 1995b; Dennett, 1995.

162 Evidence for natural selection: Dawkins, 1986, 1995; Berra, 1990; Kitcher, 1982; Endler, 1986; Weiner, 1994.

163 Ascent of man: Bronowski, 1973, pp. 417–421.

164 Simulated evolving eye: Nilsson & Pelger, 1994; described in Dawkins, 1995.

165 Darwin-hating academics: Dawkins, 1982; Pinker & Bloom, 1990 (see commentaries and reply); Dennett, 1995.

165 Straw adaptationist: Lewontin, 1979.

166 Snagged seminal ducts: Williams, 1992.

166 Adaptationist advances: Mayr, 1983, p. 328.

167 Animal engineering excellence: Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Dawkins, 1982, 1986; Williams, 1992; Griffin, 1974; Tributsch, 1982; French, 1994; Dennett, 1995; Cain, 1964.

168 The splendid camel: French, 1994, p. 239.

168 Howlers: Author’s reply in Pinker & Bloom, 1990. Symmetry: Corballis & Beale, 1976. Sexy symmetry: Ridley, 1993.

170 Birds on the wing: Wilford, 1985.

170 Bugs on the wing: Kingsolver & Koehl, 1985.

171 Misunderstanding exaptation: Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989, p. 1.

171 Exaptation: Gould & Vrba, 1981. Problems with exaptation: Reeve & Sherman, 1993; Dennett, 1995. Housefly acrobatics: Wootton, 1990.

172 Debating design: Pinker & Bloom, 1990, including commentaries and reply; Williams, 1966, 1992; Mayr, 1983; Dennett, 1995; Reeve & Sherman, 1993; Dawkins, 1982, 1986; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, b, 1992; Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Sober, 1984a, b; Cummins, 1984; Lewontin, 1984.

172 Chomsky on natural selection: Personal communication, November 1989.

175 Value of information: Raiffa, 1968.

176 Tweaking the brain in evolution: Killackey, 1995; Rakic, 1995b; Stryker, 1994; Deacon, 1994.

177 Genetic algorithms: Mitchell, 1996.

177 Genetic algorithms and neural networks: Belew, 1990; Belew, Mclnerney, & Schraudolph, 1990; Nolfi, Elman, & Parisi, 1994; Miller & Todd, 1990.

178 Simultaneous evolution and learning: Hinton & Nowlan, 1987.

179 Baldwin effect: Dawkins, 1982; Maynard Smith, 1987.

179 Navigating ants: Wehner & Srinivasan, 1981. Dead reckoning: Gallistel, 1995, p. 1258.

180 Those amazing animals: Gallistel, 1990, 1995; J. Gould, 1982; Rozin, 1976; Hauser, 1996; Gaulin, 1995; Dawkins, 1986.

182 Conditioning as time-series analysis and other feats of animals: Gallistel, 1990, 1995.

183 Mammals’ brains are not all the same: Preuss, 1993, 1995; Gaulin, 1995; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Deacon, 1992a; Hauser, 1996.

183 Re-engineering the human brain: Deacon, 1992b; Holloway, 1995; Hauser, 1996; Killackey, 1995.

185 Broody hen: James, 1892/1920, pp. 393–394.

186 Zoologically unique or extreme human traits: Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Pilbeam, 1992.

188 Evolutionary arms race: Dawkins, 1982, 1986; Ridley, 1993. Cognitive niche: Tooby & DeVore, 1987.

189 Universal scientific and logical concepts: Brown, 1991.

189 Spoor analysis: Liebenberg, 1990, p. 80, quoted in Boyd & Silk, 1996.

189 High-tech hunter-gatherers: Brown, 1991; Kingdon, 1993.

190 Megafauna extinctions: Martin & Klein, 1984; Diamond, 1992.

190 Zoological uniqueness and the cognitive niche: Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Kingdon, 1993.

191 Primate vision: Deacon, 1992a; Van Essen & DeYoe, 1995; Preuss, 1995.

191 Vision co-opted by abstract concepts: Jackendoff, 1983, 1987, 1990; Lakoff, 1987; Talmy, 1988; Pinker, 1989.

192 Flatland: Gardner, 1991.

192 Madding crowd: Jones, Martin, & Pilbeam, 1992, part 4; Boyd & Silk, 1996.

193 Primate liars: Hauser, 1992; Lee, 1992; Boyd & Silk, 1996; Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Premack & Woodruff, 1978.

193 Primate yentas: Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990.

193 Cognitive arms race: Trivers, 1971; Humphrey, 1976; Alexander, 1987b, 1990; Rose, 1980; Miller, 1993. Problems with the cognitive arms race: Ridley, 1993.

194 Leisurely brain inflation: Williams, 1992.

194 Ape hands and posture: Jones, Martin, & Pilbeam, 1992, part 2; Boyd & Silk, 1996; Kingdon, 1993. Importance of hands: Tooby & DeVore, 1987.

195 Rehabilitating Man the Hunter: Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Boyd & Silk, 1996.

197 Carnal for carnal in apes and humans: Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Ridley, 1993; Symons, 1979; Harris, 1985; Shostak, 1981.

199 Hominid ancestors: Jones, Martin, & Pilbeam, 1992; Boyd & Silk, 1996; Kingdon, 1993; Klein, 1989; Leakey et al., 1995; Fischman, 1994; Swisher et al., 1996.

200 Fossils and the cognitive niche: Tooby & DeVore, 1987.

201 Australopithecine hands: L. Aiello, 1994. Australopithecine brains and tools: Holloway, 1995; Coppens, 1995. Vertically challenged habilines: Lewin, 1987.

202 African Eve refuses to die: Gibbons, 1994, 1995a.

202 Great leap forward: Diamond, 1992; Marschack, 1989; White, 1989; Boyd & Silk, 1996.

203 Anatomically not-so-modern humans: Boyd & Silk, 1996; Stringer, 1992.

204 Pontiac in Leonardo’s attic: Shreeve, 1992; Yellen et al., 1995; Gutin, 1995.

204 Logic of Eve: Dawkins, 1995; Dennett, 1995; Ayala, 1995. Fantastic misunderstandings: Pinker, 1992.

204 Mixed-sex versus all-female line ancestors: Dawkins, 1995.

205 Recent bottlenecks: Gibbons, 1995b, c; Harpending, 1994; Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, & Piazza, 1993. Speed of evolution: Jones, 1992.

205 End of evolution: Jones, 1992; Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, & Piazza, 1993.

206 Darwinian social science: Turke & Betzig, 1985, p. 79; Alexander, 1987a; Betzig et al., 1988.

206 Functionalism: Bates & MacWhinney, 1990, p. 728; Bates & MacWhinney, 1982.

206 Lamarck on felt need: quoted in Mayr, 1982, p. 355.

207 Rats: Personal communication from B. F. Skinner, 1978. Chimps: Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello, 1993.

207 Adaptation a thing of the past: Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a; Symons, 1979, 1992.

208 Cultural evolution: Dawkins, 1976/1989; Durham, 1982; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Diamond, 1992; Dennett, 1995. Problems with cultural evolution: Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, 1992; Symons, 1992; Daly, 1982; Maynard Smith & Warren, 1988; Sperber, 1985.

208 Genes and memes: Dawkins, 1976/1989.

210 Culture as disease: Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Sperber, 1985.

4. The Mind’s Eye

211 Autostereograms: N.E. Thing Enterprises, 1994; Stereogram, 1994; Superstereogram, 1994.

211 Birth of the autostereogram: Tyler, 1983.

212 Perception as an ill-posed problem; illusions as violations of assumptions: Gregory, 1970; Marr, 1982; Poggio, 1984; Hoffman, 1983.

213 Perception as description: Marr, 1982; Pinker, 1984c; Tarr & Black, 1994a, b.

215 Pictures, perspective, and perception: Gregory, 1970; Kubovy, 1986; Solso, 1994; Pirenne, 1970. Pictures in New Guinea: Ekman & Friesen, 1975.

215 AdelbertAmes: Ittelson, 1968.

218 Binocular parallax and stereo vision: Gregory, 1970;Julesz, 1971, 1995; Tyler, 1991, 1995; Marr, 1982; Hubel, 1988; Wandell, 1995.

219 Wheatstone: From Wandell, 1995, p. 367.

223 Stereoscopes: Gardner, 1989.

230 Random-dot stereograms: Julesz, 1960, 1971, 1995; Tyler, 1991, 1995.

233 Lemurs and leaf rooms: Tyler, 1991. Penetrating camouflage: Julesz, 1995.

234 Modeling the cyclopean eye: Marr, 1982; Tyler, 1995; Weinshall & Malik, 1995; Anderson & Nakayama, 1994.

235 Stereo networks that cooperate and relax: Marr & Poggio, 1976. Diagram adapted from Johnson-Laird, 1988.

236 Da Vinci stereo: Nakayama, He, & Shimojo, 1995; Anderson & Nakayama, 1994.

237 Stereoblindness and stereodeficiency: Richards, 1971. Binocular neurons: Poggio, 1995. Update on stereo pools: Cormack, Stevenson, & Schor, 1993.

238 Binocular babies: Shimojo, 1993; Birch, 1993; Held, 1993; Thorn et al., 1994.

238 Prewired stereo circuitry: Birch, 1993; Freeman & Ohzawa, 1992.

239 Monocular monkeys: Hubel, 1988; Stryker, 1993. Sharpening neurons: Stryker, 1994; Miller, Keller, & Stryker, 1989.

240 Crossed eyes, lazy eyes: Birch, 1993; Held, 1993; Thorn et al., 1994.

240 Neural sensitivity and growing skulls: Timney, 1990; Pettigrew, 1972, 1974.

242 Shading, shape, and lighting: Adelson & Pentland, 1996.

243 Perception as playing the odds: Knill & Richards, 1996. Nonaccidental properties: Lowe, 1987; Biederman, 1995.

244 Betting on a regular world: Attneave, 1982; Jepson, Richards, & Knill, 1996; Knill & Richards, 1996.

245 Straight lines in nature: Sanford, 1994; Montello, 1995.

245 Lightness, brightness, and illumination: Marr, 1982; Adelson & Pentland, 1996.

247 Retinex theory: Land & McCann, 1971; Marr, 1982; Brainard & Wandell, 1986. Newer models: Brainard & Wandell, 1991; Maloney & Wandell, 1986.

248 Shape from shading: Marr, 1982; Pentland, 1990; Ramachandran, 1988; Nayar & Oren, 1995.

249 Moonstruck: Nayar & Oren, 1995.

249 Seeing the simplest world: Adelson & Pentland, 1996; Attneave, 1972, 1981, 1982; Beck, 1982; Kubovy & Pomerantz, 1981; Jepson, Knill, & Richards, 1996.

255 Flipped shape, flipped light source: Ramachandran, 1988.

256 Sandbox in the head: Attneave, 1972. Problems with the sandbox: Pinker, 1979, 1980, 1984c, 1988; Pinker & Finke, 1980.

257 Eye movements: Rayner, 1992; Kowler, 1995; Marr, 1982.

258 Two-dimensionality of vision: French, 1987.

258 Objects versus surfaces: Marr, 1982, p. 270; Nakayama, He, & Shimojo, 1995.

260 2½-D sketch: Marr, 1982; Pinker, 1984c, 1988. Visible surface representation: Jackendoff, 1987; Nakayama, He, & Shimojo, 1995.

262 Compensating for eye movements: Rayner, 1992.

264 The visual field and the visual world: Gibson, 1950, 1952; Boring, 1952; Attneave, 1972, 1982; Hinton & Parsons, 1981; Pinker, 1979, 1988.

264 Gravity and vision: Rock, 1973, 1983; Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Pinker, 1984c.

264 Heave ho!: Mazel, 1992.

265 Space sickness: Oman, 1982; Oman et al., 1986; Young et al., 1984.

265 Motion sickness and neurotoxins: Treisman, 1977.

266 What’s up in shape perception?: Rock, 1973; Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Corballis, 1988.

267 Dancing triangles: Attneave, 1968.

269 Shape recognition as matching object-centered descriptions: Marr & Nishihara, 1978; Marr, 1982; Corballis, 1988; Biederman, 1995; Pinker, 1984c; Hinton & Parsons, 1981; Dickinson, Pentland, & Rosenfeld, 1992.

270 Geons: Biederman, 1995.

271 Shapes in the left and right hemispheres: Kosslyn, 1994; Farah, 1990. Fragmented inner vision: Farah, 1990.

271 Finding parts in the 2½-D sketch: Hoffman & Richards, 1984; Lowe, 1987; Dickinson, Pentland, & Rosenfeld, 1992.

272 Psychology of clothing: Bell, 1992, pp. 50–51.

272 Faces: Etcoff, Freeman, & Cave, 1991; Landau, 1989; Young & Bruce, 1991; Bruce, 1988; Farah, 1995. Babies and faces: Morton & Johnson, 1991.

272 Man who could not recognize faces: Etcoff, Freeman, & Cave, 1990; Farah, 1995.

273 Man who could recognize only faces: Behrmann, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 1992; Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, in press.

274 Sphere with a toy shows we need all views: Thanks to Jacob Feldman.

274 Multiple views: Poggio & Edelman, 1991; Bülthoff & Edelman, 1992.

275 Recognizing shapes by mentally rotating them: Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Tarr & Pinker, 1989, 1990; Tarr, 1995; Ullman, 1989.

275 Mental rotation: Cooper & Shepard, 1973; Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Tarr & Pinker, 1989, 1990; Corballis, 1988.

276 Handedness and the universe: Gardner, 1990. The psychology of left and right: Corballis & Beale, 1976.

277 Obliviousness to left and right: Corballis & Beale, 1976; Corballis, 1988; Hinton & Parsons, 1981; Tarr & Pinker, 1989.

279 How people recognize shapes: Tarr & Pinker, 1989, 1990; Tarr, 1995; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995; Biederman, 1995; Bülthoff & Edelman, 1992; Sinha, 1995.

284 Mental imagery: Kosslyn, 1980, 1983, 1994; Paivio, 1971; Finke, 1989; Block, 1981; Pinker, 1984c, 1988; Tye, 1991; Logie, 1995; Denis, Engelkamp, & Richardson, 1988; Hebb, 1968.

284 Yanomamö imagery: Chagnon, 1992.

285 Creativity and imagery: Finke, 1990; Shepard, 1978; Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Kosslyn, 1983.

285 Corrugator muscle: Buss, 1994, p. 128.

286 Pictures versus propositions: Pylyshyn, 1973, 1984; Block, 1981; Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; Tye, 1991; Pinker, 1984; Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Shwartz, 1979. Imagery in computers: Funt, 1980; Glasgow & Papadias, 1992; Stenning & Oberlander, 1995; Ioerger, 1994.

287 Cortical maps: Van Essen & DeYoe, 1995.

288 Cloying hunger by imagining a feast: Richard II, act 1, scene 3.

288 Perky effect: Perky, 1910; Segal & Fusella, 1970; Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 1992; Farah, 1989.

288 Imagery and coordination: Brooks, 1968; Logie, 1995.

288 Imagery and illusions: Wallace, 1984. Imagery and alignment: Freyd & Finke, 1984.

288 Confusing images and reality: Johnson & Raye, 1981.

289 Neglect of imaginary space: Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978.

289 Imagery lights up the visual cortex: Kosslyn et al., 1993; Kosslyn, 1994.

289 Images with and without both halves of visual cortex: Farah, Soso, & Dasheiff, 1992.

289 Dreams and images: Symons, 1993. Reality monitoring: Johnson & Raye, 1981.

290 Medium underlying imagery: Pinker, 1984c, 1988; Cave, Pinker, et al., 1994; Kosslyn, 1980, 1994.

291 Computing with imagery: Funt, 1980; Glasgow & Papadias, 1992; Stenning & Oberlander, 1995; Ioerger, 1994.

292 Mental animation: Ullman, 1984; Jolicoeur, Ullman, & MacKay, 1991.

292 Answering questions using imagery: Kosslyn, 1980.

293 Flipping duck-rabbits in imagery: Chambers & Reisberg, 1985; Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989; Peterson et al., 1992; Hyman & Neisser, 1991.

294 Piecemeal fading images: Kosslyn, 1980.

294 Imagery and vantage point: Pinker, 1980, 1984c, 1988.

294 Multiple perspective in paintings: Kubovy, 1986; Pirenne, 1970. Cro-Magnon perspective: Boyd & Silk, 1996.

294 Filing images: Pylyshyn, 1973; Kosslyn, 1980.

295 Visual memory in chess masters: Chase & Simon, 1973.

295 Memory for a penny: Nickerson & Adams, 1979.

295 Mental map distortions: Stevens & Coupe, 1978.

296 Images aren’t concepts: Pylyshyn, 1973; Fodor, 1975; Kosslyn, 1980; Tye, 1991.

297 Imagery gone mad: Titchener, 1909, p. 22.

5. Good Ideas

299 Darwin vs. Wallace: Gould, 1980c; Wright, 1994a.

300 Brain as overkill: Davies, 1995, pp. 85–87.

301 Exapted computer: Gould, 1980c, p. 57.

301 Cerebral savages: Brown, 1991; Kingdon, 1993.

303 Cane juice syllogism: Cole et al., 1971, pp. 187–188; Neisser, 1976.

303 Logic and lame puppies: Carroll, 1896/1977.

304 Ecological rationality: Tooby & Cosmides, 1997. Dissimilarities between thinking and science: Harris, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1997; Neisser, 1976.

305 Flimflam shamans: Harris, 1989, pp. 410–412.

305 Caste-society know-nothings: Brown, 1988.

307 Concepts as predictors: Rosch, 1978; Shepard, 1987; Bobick, 1987; Anderson, 1990, 1991; Pinker & Prince, 1996.

308 Fuzziness and similarity versus rules and theories: Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983; Pinker & Prince, 1996; Murphy, 1993; Medin, 1989; Kelly, 1992; Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992; Rey, 1983; Pazzani, 1987, 1993; Pazzani & Dyer, 1987; Pazzani & Kibler, 1993; Rips, 1989.

310 Species according to biologists: Mayr, 1982; Ruse, 1986.

311 Piss-poor reptile: Quoted in Konner, 1982. Fuzzy fish: Dawkins, 1986; Gould, 1983c; Ridley, 1986; Pennisi, 1996. Shoehorning extinct animals: Gould, 1989.

311 All is fuzzy: Lakoff, 1987.

312 Crisp idealizations: Pinker & Prince, 1996.

313 Nonsense stereotypes of outsiders: Brown, 1985.

313 Statistically accurate negative stereotypes: McCauley & Stitt, 1978; Brown, 1985.

314 Ways of explaining: Dennett, 1978b, 1995, 1990; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994a, b; Sperber, Premack, & Premack, 1995; Carey, 1985; Carey & Spelke, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1994; Schwartz, 1979; Keil, 1979.

314 Dead bird, live bird: Dawkins, 1986, pp. 10–11.

316 Innate AI systems: Lenat & Guha, 1990.

317 Babies as physicists: Spelke, 1995; Spelke et al., 1992; Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995; Spelke, Vishton, & Hofsten, 1995; Baillargeon, 1995; Baillargeon, Kotovsky, & Needham, 1995.

320 Intuitive impetus theory: McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980; McCloskey, 1983. Intuitive physics: Proffitt & Gilden, 1989.

320 College students’ understanding of force: Redish, 1994.

322 Dot drama: Heider & Simmel, 1944; Michotte, 1963; Premack, 1990.

322 Infants and oomph: Premack, 1990; Leslie, 1994, 1995a; Mandler, 1992; Gelman, Durgin, & Kaufman, 1995; Gergely et al., 1995.

323 Universality of folk biology: Konner, 1982; Brown, 1991;Atran, 1990, 1995; Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973.

323 Lions, tigers, and other natural kinds: Quine, 1969; Schwartz, 1979; Putnam, 1975; Keil, 1989.

324 Darwin and natural kinds: Kelly, 1992; Dawkins, 1986.

325 Essentialism and resistance to evolution: Mayr, 1982.

326 Children as essentialists: Keil, 1989, 1994, 1995; Gelman, Coley, & Gottfried, 1994; Gelman & Markman, 1987. Skepticism on children as essentialists: Carey, 1995.

327 Children distinguishing psychology from biology: Hatano & Inagaki, 1995; Carey, 1995.

327 Babies and artifacts: Brown, 1990.

327 Artifacts and natural kinds stored separately in the brain: Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Farah, 1990.

328 What is an artifact?: Keil, 1979, 1989; Dennett, 1990; Schwartz, 1979; Putnam, 1975; Chomsky, 1992, 1993; Bloom, 1996b.

329 Folk psychology and the intentional stance: Fodor, 1968a, 1986; Dennett, 1978b, c; Baron-Cohen, 1995.

330 Theory of mind module: Leslie, 1994, 1995a, b; Premack & Premack, 1995; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994b; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1995.

330 Young children and false beliefs: Leslie, 1994, 1995b.

331 Noisy skin-bags: Gopnik, 1993.

331 Autism: Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Frith, 1995; Gopnik, 1993.

331 Iceboxes, toilets, and autism: Bettelheim, 1959.

332 False photographs: Zaitchik, 1990.

333 Brain creates world: Miller, 1981.

334 Illogical undergraduates: Johnson-Laird, 1988.

334 Logic and thought: Macnamara, 1986, 1994; Macnamara & Reyes, 1994.

334 Defending the mind’s logic: Macnamara, 1986; Braine, 1994; Bonatti, 1995; Rips, 1994; Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992.

336 Falsification by card selection: Wason, 1966; Manktelow & Over, 1987.

337 Reasoning and cheater-detection: Cosmides, 1985, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992. Employer/employee problem: Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992. Other effects and alternative interpretations: Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995.

338 Psychology of number: Geary, 1994, 1995; Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Gallistel, 1990; Dehaene, 1992; Wynn, 1990. Counting by babies: Wynn, 1992. Counting by monkeys: Hauser, MacNeilage, & Ware, 1996.

339 Math and basic human activities: Mac Lane, 1981; Lakoff, 1987. Blind toddlers take shortcuts: Landau, Spelke, & Gleitman, 1984.

341 American dunces: Geary, 1994, 1995.

342 Why Johnny still can’t add: Geary, 1995.

342 Why Johnny still can’t read: Levine, 1994; McGuinness, 1997.

343 Informavore: Coined by George Miller.

343 Innumeracy: Coined by John Allen Paulos.

343 Probability-blindness: Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sutherland, 1992; Gilovich, 1991; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994; Lewis, 1990.

345 People as intuitive statisticians: Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996a; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Lopes & Oden, 1991; Koehler, 1996. Reply: Kahneman & Tversky, 1996. Bees as intuitive statisticians: Staddon, 1988.

347 History of probability and statistics: Gigerenzer et al., 1989. Probabilities gathered from experience: Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Gigerenzer, 1997; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Kleiter, 1994.

348 People are good statisticians with frequency information: Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Fiedler, 1988; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996b, 1997; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1997.

349 Von Mises and the probability of a single event: Example adapted by Cosmides & Tooby, 1996.

350 O.J., wife-battering, and murder: Good, 1995.

351 “Conjunction fallacy” (feminist bankteller) is not a fallacy: Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1997.

352 Spatial metaphor: Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994; Pinker, 1989.

353 Communication as giving: Pinker, 1989.

354 Force dynamics in language and thought: Talmy, 1988; Pinker, 1989.

355 Space and force in language and thought: Jackendoff, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994; Pinker, 1989; Levin & Pinker, 1992; Wierzbicka, 1994; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Schanck & Riesbeck, 1981; Pustejovsky, 1995. Universality of space and force: Talmy, 1985; Pinker, 1989.

355 Leibniz’s remarkable thought: Leibniz, 1956.

356 Spatial metaphor as cognitive vestige: Pinker, 1989.

356 Chimps and causation: Premack, 1976.

356 Universality of space and force metaphors: Talmy, 1985; Pinker, 1989.

356 Children’s spatial metaphors: Bowerman, 1983; Pinker, 1989.

357 Basic metaphors in language versus poeacmetaphors: Jackendoff and Aaron, 1991.

357 Metaphors we live by: Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987.

359 Graphs: Pinker, 1990.

359 Mathematization of physics intuitions: Carey & Spelke, 1994; Carey, 1986; Proffitt &Gilden, 1989.

361 But is it dental work?: Allen, 1983.

361 Genius and creativity: Weisberg, 1986; Perkins, 1981.

6. Hotheads

364 Running amok: B. B. Burton-Bradley, quoted in Daly & Wilson, 1988, p. 281.

365 Universality of emotions: Brown, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Ekman, 1993, 1994; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Etcoff, 1986. Controversies on universality: Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Russell, 1994.

365 Darwin and emotional expression: Darwin, 1872/1965, pp. 15–17.

366 Anthropological correctness: Ekman, 1987. Emotion in blind and deaf children: Lazarus, 1991.

367 Mad pain: Lewis, 1980, p. 216.

368 Cow urine: Shweder, 1994, p. 36.

368 Mellow Inuits: Lazarus, 1991, p. 193. Mellow Samoans: Freeman, 1983.

368 Ethnography and etiquette: Quoted in Asimov & Shulman, 1986.

370 Triune brain: MacLean, 1990. Refutation: Reiner, 1990.

371 The emotional brain: Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1991, 1996; Gazzaniga, 1992.

372 Indispensability of emotion: Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a; Nesse & Williams, 1994; Nesse, 1991; Minsky, 1985.

374 Emotional robots: Minsky, 1985; Pfeiffer, 1988; Picard, 1995; Crevier, 1993.

374 Fight or flight: Marks & Nesse, 1994.

375 Habitat selection and environmental aesthetics: Orians & Heerwagen, 1992; Kaplan, 1992; Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992.

375 Lifelong camping trip: Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992, p. 552.

376 Native Americans and ersatz savannas: Christopher, 1995. Australian aborigines and ersatz savannas: Harris, 1992.

377 Reference frames in large terrains: Subbiah et al., 1996.

378 Disgust: Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, 1996.

379 Eating insects: Harris, 1985, p. 159.

380 Grossing out the Yanomamo: Chagnon, 1992.

381 Learning what is good to eat: Cashdan, 1994.

381 Mom and Dad as food tasters: Cashdan, 1994.

383 Contamination by contact: Tooby & Cosmides, personal communication.

383 Animalitos and optimal foraging: Harris, 1985.

384 Ecology and food taboos: Harris, 1985.

386 Phobophobia: Coined by Richard Lederer.

386 Fears and phobias: Brown, 1991; Marks & Nesse, 1994; Nesse & Williams, 1994; Rachman, 1978; Seligman, 1971; Marks, 1987; Davey, 1995.

387 Lion phobia in Chicago: Maurer, 1965.

388 Relative rarity of screaming meemies: Rachman, 1978; Myers & Diener, 1995.

388 Monkeys learning snake phobias: Mineka & Cook, 1993.

389 Conquering fear: Rachman, 1978.

390 Happiness and social comparisons: Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Brown, 1985. Violence and inequality: Daly & Wilson, 1988, p. 288.

391 Who is happy?: Myers & Diener, 1995. Heritability of happiness baseline: Lykken & Tellegen, 1996.

392 Gains versus losses: Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Ketelaar, 1995, 1997.

393 Hedonic treadmill: Brickman & Campbell, 1971; Campbell, 1975.

394 Murray and Esther: From Arthur Naiman’s Every Gay’s Guide to Yiddish.

395 Crime and discounting the future: Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985; Daly & Wilson, 1994; Rogers, 1994.

395 Myopic discounting: Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995.

395 Self-control and rational consumers: Schelling, 1984, p. 59

396 Two selves: Schelling, 1984, p. 58.

397 The selfish replicator: Williams, 1966, 1992; Dawkins, 1976/1989, 1982; Dennett, 1995; Sterelny & Kitcher, 1988; Maynard Smith, 1982; Trivers, 1981, 1985; Cosmides & Tooby, 1981; Cronin, 1992.

397 Selection of replicators, groups, and branches: Gould, 1980b; Wilson & Sober, 1994; Dennett, 1995; Williams, 1992; Dawkins, 1976/1989, 1982.

400 Kin selection: Williams & Williams, 1957; Hamilton, 1963, 1964; Maynard Smith, 1964; Dawkins, 1976/1989; Trivers, 1985.

402 Reciprocal altruism: Williams, 1966; Trivers, 1971, 1985; Dawkins, 1976/1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Brown, 1985, p. 93.

404 Reciprocal altruism and the emotions: Trivers, 1971, 1985; Alexander, 1987a; Axelrod, 1984; Wright, 1994a. The moral sense: Wilson, 1993.

404 Reciprocal altruism and social psychology research: Trivers, 1971, 1981.

406 Within-group amity = between-group enmity: Dawkins, 1976/1989; Alexander, 1987.

408 Dr. Strangelove: from Peter George, Dr. Strangelove, Boston: G. K. Hall, 1963/1979, pp. 98–99.

409 Thinking the unthinkable: Poundstone, 1992.

409 Paradoxical tactics: Schelling, 1960.

412 The emotions as doomsday machines and other paradoxical tactics: Schelling, 1960; Trivers, 1971, 1985; Frank, 1988; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Hirshleifer, 1987.

413 Fairness and the Falklands: Frank, 1988. Vengeance: Daly & Wilson, 1988. Honor: Nisbett & Cohen, 1996.

414 Facial expressions: Darwin, 1872/1965; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Fridlund, 1991, 1995. Darwin’s anti-Darwinism: Fridlund, 1992.

415 Voluntary and involuntary facial expressions, method acting, and the brain: Damasio, 1994.

415 Honest signaling in animals: Dawkins, 1976/1989; Trivers, 1981; Cronin, 1992; Hauser, 1996; Hamilton, 1996.

416 Emotions and the body: Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Lazarus, 1991; Etcoff, 1986.

417 Theory of mad love: Frank, 1988.

417 Marriage market: Buss, 1994; Fisher, 1992; Hatfield & Rapson, 1993.

419 Tactics for controlling self and others: Schelling, 1984.

420 Grief as a deterrent: Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a.

421 Self-deception: Trivers, 1985; Alexander, 1987a; Wright, 1994a; Lockard & Paulhaus, 1988. Self-deception and Freudian defense mechanisms: Nesse & Lloyd, 1992.

422 Split brains: Gazzaniga, 1992.

422 Lake Wobegon effect: Gilovich, 1991.

422 Beneffectance: Greenwald, 1988; Brown, 1985. Cognitive dissonance: Festinger, 1957. Cognitive dissonance as self-presentation: Aronson, 1980; Baumeister & Tice, 1984. Beneffectance and cognitive dissonance as self-deception: Wright, 1994a.

424 Argument between husband and wife: Trivers, 1985, p. 420.

424 Explaining Hitler: Rosenbaum, 1995.

7. Family Values

426 Greening of America controversy: Nobile, 1971.

426 Nineteenth-century Utopias: Klaw, 1993.

427 Human universals: Brown, 1991.

427 The thirty-six dramatic situations: Polti, 1921/1977.

427 Darwinian competitors: Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976/1989, 1995.

428 Homicide rates: Daly & Wilson, 1988. Universal conflict resolution: Brown, 1991.

430 Biology of kinship: Hamilton, 1964; Wilson, 1975; Dawkins, 1976/1989. Psychology of kinship: Daly & Wilson, 1988; Daly, Salmon, & Wilson, in press; Alexander, 1987a; Fox, 1984; van den Berghe, 1974; Wright, 1994a.

431 Frost’s definition of “home”: From “The Death of the Hired Man,” in North of Boston.

432 Kinship nonsense: Daly, Salmon, & Wilson, in press; Mount, 1992; Shoumatoff, 1985; Fox, 1984.

433 Stepparents, stepchildren: Daly & Wilson, 1988, 1995.

434 Cinderella stories: Daly & Wilson, 1988, p. 85.

435 Homicide as conflict resolution: Daly & Wilson, 1988, p. ix.

435 Nepotism: Shoumatoff, 1985; Alexander, 1987a; Daly, Salmon, & Wilson, in press. Yanomamö kinship: Chagnon, 1988, 1992.

437 Cousin marriages: Thornhill, 1991.

437 The reality of romantic love: Symons, 1978; Fisher, 1992; Buss, 1994; Ridley, 1993; H. Harris, 1995.

438 Fictive kin: Daly, Salmon, & Wilson, in press.

439 The subversive family: Shoumatoff, 1985; Mount, 1992.

440 Royalty versus families: Thornhill, 1991. Church versus families: Betzig, 1992.

441 Parent-offspring conflict: Trivers, 1985; Dawkins, 1976/1989; Wright, 1994a; Daly & Wilson, 1988, 1995; Haig, 1992, 1993.

441 Sibling rivalry: Dawkins, 1976/1989; Trivers, 1985; Sulloway, 1996; Mock & Parker, in press.

443 Raised voices in the womb: Haig, 1993.

443 Infanticide: Daly & Wilson, 1988, 1995.

444 Postpartum depression: Daly & Wilson, 1988.

444 Bonding: Daly & Wilson, 1988.

444 Cuteness: Gould, 1980d; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Konner, 1982; Daly & Wilson, 1988.

445 Children’s psychological tactics: Trivers, 1985; Schelling, 1960.

446 Oedipus revisited: Daly & Wilson, 1988.

447 Controlling daughters: Wilson & Daly, 1992.

447 Socializing children against themselves: Trivers, 1985.

448 Nature, nurture, and none of the above in personality: Plomin, 1989; Plomin & Daniels, 1987; Bouchard, 1994; Bouchard et al., 1990; J. Harris, 1995; Sulloway, 1995, 1996.

449 Switching parents around: J. Harris, 1995.

449 Clique leaders first to date: Dunphy, 1963.

449 Socialization by peers: J. Harris, 1995.

451 Mothers’ ambivalence: Interview with Shari Thurer by D. C. Denison, The Boston Globe Magazine, May 14, 1995; Eyer, 1996.

451 Sex ed: Whitehead, 1994.

452 Sibling rivalry: Trivers, 1985; Sulloway, 1995, 1996; Dawkins, 1976/1989; Wright, 1994a.

452 Expected grandchildren: Daly & Wilson, 1988; Sulloway, 1996; Wright, 1994a. Filicide: Daly & Wilson, 1988. Grief: Wright, 1994a.

453 Family dynamics: Sulloway, 1995, 1996.

455 The girl next door: Fisher, 1992; Hatfield & Rapson, 1993; Buss, 1994.

456 Incest avoidance and incest taboos: Tooby, 1976a, b; Brown, 1991; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Thornhill, 1991.

456 Costs of inbreeding in mammals: Rails, Ballou, & Templeton, 1988.

457 Costing out incest: Tooby, 1976a, b.

458 Incest statistics: Buss, 1994; Brown, 1991; Daly & Wilson, 1988.

459 Incest between people who have not grown up together: Brown, 1991.

461 The battle between the sexes: Symons, 1979; Dawkins, 1976/1989; Trivers, 1985. The psychology of sexuality: Symons, 1979; Ridley, 1993; Wright, 1994a, b; Buss, 1994.

461 Reality of some gender stereotypes: Eagly, 1995.

461 Why sex?: Tooby, 1982, 1988; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b; Hamilton, Axelrod, and Tanese, 1990; Ridley, 1993.

462 Why sexes?: Cosmides & Tooby, 1981; Hurst & Hamilton, 1992; Anderson, 1992.

463 Why so few animal hermaphrodites?: Cosmides & Tooby, 1981.

463 Sexual selection and differences in parental investment: Trivers, 1985; Cronin, 1992; Dawkins, 1976/1989; Symons, 1979; Ridley, 1993; Wright, 1994a, b.

465 Apes and sex: Trivers, 1985; Ridley, 1993; Boyd & Silk, 1996; Mace, 1992; Dunbar, 1992. Primate infanticide: Hrdy, 1981.

465 Sperm competition: Baker & Bellis, 1996.

467 Adulterous birds: Ridley, 1993.

468 Humans and sex: Ridley, 1993; Wright, 1994a; Mace, 1992; Dunbar, 1992; Boyd & Silk, 1996; Buss, 1994.

468 Environment in which the mind evolved: Symons, 1979.

469 Fatherless children in foraging societies: Hill & Kaplan, 1988.

469 Male desire for variety: Symons, 1979; Buss, 1994; Ridley, 1993; Wright, 1994a.

470 Voulez-vous coucher avec moi ce soir?: Clark & Hatfield, 1989.

470 Coolidge effect in roosters and men: Symons, 1979; Buss, 1994.

472 Pornography more popular than movies or sports: Anthony Flint in the Boston Globe, December 1, 1996.

472 Pornography and bodice-rippers: Symons, 1979; Ridley, 1993; Buss, 1994.

473 Homosexuality as a window on heterosexuality: Symons, 1979, p. 300. Number of homosexual partners: Symons, 1980.

474 Sexual economics: Symons, 1979. Dworkin: Quoted in Wright, 1994b.

475 Monogamy and the mensch: Symons, 1979, p. 250.

476 Men’s sexual tastes modulated by their attractiveness: Waller, 1994.

476 Polygyny: Symons, 1979; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Shoumatoff, 1985; Altman & Ginat, 1996; Ridley, 1993; Chagnon, 1992.

476 Despots and harems: Betzig, 1986.

477 Polyandry: Symons, 1979; Ridley, 1993.

477 Co-wives: Shoumatoff, 1985. Betzig on Bozo: Cited in Ridley, 1993. Monogamy as a cartel: Landsburg, 1993, p. 170; Wright, 1994a.

478 Monogamy and male competition: Betzig, 1986; Wright, 1994a; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Ridley, 1993.

479 Adulteresses: Buss, 1994; Ridley, 1993; Baker & Bellis, 1996.

479 Meat for sex: Harris, 1985; Symons, 1979; Hill & Kaplan, 1988. Women’s tastes in short-term lovers: Buss, 1994.

480 High-status lovers: Baker & Bellis, 1996; Buss, 1994; Symons, 1979.

480 Virgin birth in the Trobriand Islands: Symons, 1979.

480 Short-term versus long-term men: Buss, 1994; Ellis, 1992. Madonna-whore dichotomy: Wright, 1994a.

480 Tastes in husbands and wives: Buss, 1992a, 1994; Ellis, 1992.

482 Mate preferences: Buss, 1992a, 1994. Age preferences in mates: Kenrick & Keefe, 1992.

482 Personal ads, dating services, marriages: Ellis, 1992; Buss, 1992a, 1994.

482 Moko dudei: Chagnon, 1992; Symons, 1995.

482 Husband’s wealth and wife’s looks: Buss, 1994. Schroeder on animal magnetism: Quoted in Wright, 1995, p. 72.

482 Prestigious women want prestigious men: Buss, 1994. Feminist leaders want prestigious men: Ellis, 1992.

483 Lebowitz: Quoted in J. Winokur, 1987, The portable curmudgeon. New York: New American Library.

483 Decorating bodies for beauty versus other reasons: Etcoff, 1998. Universality of beauty: Brown, 1991; Etcoff, 1998; Symons, 1979, 1995; Ridley, 1993; Perrett, May, &Yoshikawa, 1994.

483 Ingredients of beauty: Etcoff, 1998; Symons, 1979, 1995.

484 Average faces are attractive: Symons, 1979; Langlois & Roggman, 1990.

485 Youth and beauty: Symons, 1979, 1995; Etcoff, 1998.

485 Waist-to-hip ratio: Singh, 1993, 1994, 1995. Hourglass figures in the Upper Paleolithic: Unpublished research by Singh & R. Kruszynski.

486 Size versus shape: Singh, 1993, 1994, 1995; Symons, 1995; Etcoff, 1998.

487 Beauty and power: Bell, 1992; Wilson & Daly, 1992; Ellis, 1992; Etcoff, 1998; Paglia, 1990, 1992, 1994.

487 Virtual beauty and real life: Buss, 1994.

488 Universality of sexual jealousy: Brown, 1991.

488 Sex differences in sexual jealousy: Symons, 1979; Buss, 1994; Buunk et al., 1996. Debate on the sex differences: Harris & Christenfeld, 1996; DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Buss, Larson, & Westen, 1996; Buss et al., 1997.

489 Violence and male sexual jealousy: Daly & Wilson, 1988; Wilson & Daly, 1992; Symons, 1979. Myth of sexual symmetry in marital violence: Dobash et al., 1992.

490 Bride-wealth and dowries: Daly & Wilson, 1988.

491 Boswell, Johnson, and the double standard: Daly & Wilson, 1988, pp. 192–193.

492 Feminism without orthodox social science: Sommers, 1994; Patai & Koertge, 1994; Paglia, 1992; Eagly, 1995; Wright, 1994b; Ridley, 1993; Denfeld, 1995.

493 Status as a spiritual need: Veblen, 1899/1994. Sartorial morality: Bell, 1992.

493 Animal signals: Zahavi, 1975; Dawkins, 1976/1989, 1983; Hauser, 1996; Cronin, 1992.

494 Aggressive strategies and dominance hierarchies: Maynard Smith, 1982; Dawkins, 1976/1989; Trivers, 1985.

495 Dominance in humans: Ellis, 1992; Buss, 1994; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989. Height and salary: Frieze, Olson, & Good, 1990. Height and presidential elections: Ellis, 1992; Mathews, 1996. Beards and Brezhnev: Kingdon, 1993. Height and dating: Kenrick & Keefe, 1992.

496 Killing over insults: Daly & Wilson, 1988; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996.

496 Men’s reputations: Daly & Wilson, 1988, p. 128.

498 Reckless youth: Rogers, 1994.

498 Argumentation as coercion: Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Nozick, 1981.

499 What is status?: Buss, 1992b; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996; Veblen, 1899/1994; Bell, 1992; Frank, 1985; Harris, 1989; Symons, 1979.

500 Potlatch: Harris, 1989.

500 Handicap principle: Zahavi, 1975; Dawkins, 1976/1989; Cronin, 1992; Hauser, 1996.

501 What is fashion?: Bell, 1992; Etcoff, 1998.

501 Mimicry in butterflies: Dawkins, 1976/1989; Cronin, 1992; Hauser, 1996.

502 Logic of reciprocation and exchange: Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Axelrod, 1984. Reciprocal altruism: Trivers, 1985; Dawkins, 1976/1989; Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981.

503 Prisoner’s Dilemma: Poundstone, 1992; Schelling, 1960; Rapoport, 1964.

503 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and tit-for-tat: Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984.

504 Reciprocation in everyday life: Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Fiske, 1992.

504 Primitive communism within kin groups: Fiske, 1992.

505 Variance and food sharing among foragers: Cashdan, 1989; Kaplan, Hill, & Hurtado, 1990.

505 Luck versus laziness: Cosmides & Tooby, 1992.

506 Enforcing the sharing ethic through gossip: Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989, pp. 525–526. Selfish !Kung: Konner, 1982, pp. 375–376.

507 Friendship versus reciprocation: Fiske, 1992. Happy marriage versus reciprocation: Frank, 1988.

507 Logic of friendship and the Banker’s Paradox: Tooby & Cosmides, 1996.

509 War among foragers and human evolution: Chagnon, 1988, 1992, 1996; Keeley, 1996; Diamond, 1992; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Alexander, 1987a, b.

510 Blood feuds: Daly & Wilson, 1988.

511 Fighting over diamonds, gold, meat, and sex: Chagnon, 1992, p. 115. Crowded or malnourished tribes not more warlike: Chagnon, 1992; Keeley, 1996.

511 Women as the spoils of war in the Bible: Hartung, 1992, 1995.

512 Hot and forcing violation: Henry V, act 2, scene 3.

512 Rape and war: Brownmiller, 1975.

513 Reproductive success of war leaders: Betzig, 1986.

513 Logic of war: Tooby & Cosmides, 1988.

513 The Kandinsky fans hate the Klee fans: Tajfel, 1981. Ethnocentrism from a coin flip: Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980. Boys wage war at summer camp: Sherif, 1966. Ethnic conflict: Brown, 1985.

515 Richer groups go to war more: Chagnon, 1992; Keeley, 1996.

516 Fighting under a veil of ignorance: Tooby & Cosmides, 1993. World War II example: Rapoport, 1964, pp. 88–89.

518 Declining homicide rates: Daly & Wilson, 1988.

519 The Dalai Lama: Interview by Claudia Dreifus in New York Times Magazine, November 28, 1993.

8. The Meaning of Life

521 Universality of art, literature, music, humor, religion, philosophy: Brown, 1991;Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989.

521 Living for music, selling blood to buy movie tickets: Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a.

522 The arts as status-seeking: Wolfe, 1975; Bell, 1992.

522 Art, science, and the elite: Brockman, 1994. Honorable futility: From Bell, 1992.

526 Art and illusion: Gombrich, 1960; Gregory, 1970; Kubovy, 1986. Adaptation and visual aesthetics: Shepard, 1990; Orians & Heerwagen, 1992; Kaplan, 1992.

526 Geometric patterning, evolution, and aesthetics: Shepard, 1990.

528 Music and the mind: Sloboda, 1985; Storr, 1992; R. Aiello, 1994.

529 Universal musical grammar: Bernstein, 1976; Jackendoff, 1977, 1987, 1992; Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983.

531 Overtones and scales: Bernstein, 1976; Cooke, 1959; Sloboda, 1985. Dissenters: Jackendoff, 1977; Storr, 1992.

531 Intervals and emotions: Bernstein, 1976; Cooke, 1959. Infant music appreciation: Zentner & Kagan, 1996; Schellenberg & Trehub, 1996.

534 Flow and ebb of grief: Cooke, 1959, pp. 137–138.

534 Emotional semantics of music: Cooke, 1959.

534 Music and language: Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983; Jackendoff, 1987.

535 Auditory scene analysis: Bregman & Pinker, 1978; Bregman, 1990; McAdams & Bigand, 1993.

536 The aesthetics of regular patterns in art and music: Shepard, 1990.

536 Music and auditory unsettledness: Bernstein, 1976; Cooke, 1959.

536 Darwin on music: Darwin, 1874. Melody of emotional calls: Fernald, 1992; Hauser, 1996.

537 Habitat selection: Orians & Heerwagen, 1992; Kaplan, 1992.

537 Music and movement: Jackendoff, 1992; Epstein, 1994; Clynes & Walker, 1982.

539 Horace: From Hobbs, 1990, p. 5. Dryden: From Carroll, 1995, p. 170.

539 Illusions of fiction and cinema: Hobbs, 1990; Tan, 1996.

540 The economics of happy endings: Landsburg, 1993.

540 Benign masochism: Rozin, 1996.

540 Evolution of the yenta: Barkow, 1992.

541 Fiction as experiment: Hobbs, 1990. Literature and cognition: Hobbs, 1990; Turner, 1991.

541 Plots as goal-seeking: Hobbs, 1990. The goals in fiction are the goals in natural selection: Carroll, 1995.

542 Tabloid headlines: Native Son by Richard Wright; The Scarlet Letter by Nathaniel Hawthorne; Romeo and Juliet by William Shakespeare; Crime and Punishment by Fyodor Dostoevsky; The Great Gatsby by F. Scott Fitzgerald; Jane Eyre by Charlotte Bronte; A Streetcar Named Desire by Tennessee Williams; Eumenides by Aeschylus. All from Lederer & Gilleland, 1994.

543 Case-based reasoning: Schanck, 1982.

543 Answers to life’s conundrums: Hamlet; The Godfather; Fatal Attraction; Madame Bovary; Shane.

544 Repleteness of art: Goodman, 1976; Koestler, 1964.

545 Koestler on humor: Koestler, 1964, p. 31.

546 Evolution of humor: Provine, 1996; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Weisfeld, 1993. Studies of humor: Provine, 1996; Chapman & Foot, 1977; McGhee, 1979; Weisfeld, 1993.

546 Laughter: Provine, 1991, 1993, 1996.

546 Laughter as a mobbing call: Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989. Laughter in chimpanzees: Provine, 1996; Weisfeld, 1993. Tickling and play: Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Weisfeld, 1993. Play as practice fighting: Symons, 1978; Boulton & Smith, 1992.

547 Humor in 1984: Orwell, 1949/1983, p. 11.

548 The Rabelaisian Yanomamo: Chagnon, 1992, pp. 24–25.

550 Mountain climber joke: Thanks to Henry Gleitman. W. C. Fields: Thanks to Thomas Shultz.

550 Studies of incongruity resolution in humor: Shultz, 1977; Rothbart, 1977; McGhee, 1979.

551 Humor as puncturing dominance: Schutz, 1977.

552 Mental interpolation in conversation: Pinker, 1994, chap. 7; Sperber & Wilson, 1986. Psychology of conversation and humor: Attardo, 1994.

553 Banality of banter: Provine, 1993, p. 296.

553 Logic of friendship: Tooby & Cosmides, 1996.

554 Beliefs in the untrue: witches, ghosts, the devil: New York Times, July 26, 1992. Genesis: Dennett, 1995. Angels: Time poll cited by Diane White, Boston Globe, October 24, 1994. Jesus: cited by Kenneth Woodward, Newsweek, April 8, 1996. God or spirit: Harris, 1989.

556 Anthropology of religion: Harris, 1989.

556 Cognitive psychology of religion: Sperber, 1982; Boyer, 1994a, b; Atran, 1995.

557 Empirical grounds for religious beliefs: Harris, 1989.

558 Philosophical bafflement: McGinn, 1993. Paradoxes of consciousness, self, will, meaning, and knowledge: Poundstone, 1988.

559 Cycles of philosophy: McGinn, 1993.

561 Philosophical bewilderment as a limitation of human conceptual equipment: Chomsky, 1975, 1988; McGinn, 1993.

565 Mismatch between the combinatorial mind and the problems of philosophy: McGinn, 1993.