The compound āpaddharma —“law during emergencies”—denotes those kinds of activities and occupations that can be legitimately pursued when circumstances conspire to make the normally prescribed activities and occupations difficult or dangerous. In other words, it refers to exceptional rules for exceptional circumstances. Such exceptional rules are typically regarded as legitimate for a limited period, and “normal” rules ought to be resumed once the emergency necessitating recourse to the exceptional rules has passed. For the period of the emergency, the “laws for emergencies” are deemed morally and ethically justified, and, at least in principle, there are no deleterious religious or social consequences for those reasonably deploying āpaddharmas .
The term āpaddharma appears for the first time in the MDh or the MBh , with the historical relationships between these two texts being of some complexity. However, the fundamental problem addressed by the notion of āpaddharma has a history that antecedes the coining of the term itself. The following will describe the core principle of āpaddharma as it is initially expressed in the Dharmasūtra s, the earliest texts to articulate the problem that āpaddharma seeks to address, and then how later śāstras modify or develop this core principle. Some consideration will then be given to how this framework is expanded in the MDh , on the one hand, and the MBh , on the other.
It is commonplace for Dharmaśāstras to establish a number of normative activities (dharmas, karmans ) that members of each varṇa (social class or “caste”) are expected to pursue. While these activities vary in number depending on the Dharmasūtra or Dharmaśāstra, these texts are sufficiently consistent that we can treat them summarily (see also Rocher 1975c ).
The normative activities of a Brahmin usually include the following six (ṣaṭkarmāṇi ), given in three complementary pairs: 1 studying (adhyayana ) and teaching (adhyāpana, pravacana ); offering sacrifices (yajña, ijyā, yājana ) and officiating at sacrifices (yājana ); and giving gifts (dāna ) and receiving gifts (pratigraha ). Of these, the non-remunerative activities of studying, offering sacrifices, and giving gifts were also regarded as obligatory for Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas, while the other remunerative activities were seen as the sole preserve of Brahmins. In place of these, Kṣatriyas were typically expected to earn a living by protecting the people through the bearing of arms, engaging in battle and enforcing justice, and Vaiśyas by engaging in agriculture (kṛṣi ), trade (vāṇijya ), animal husbandry (pāśupālya ), and money lending (kusīda ). For a Śūdra there was only ever one normative occupation, service (śuśrūṣā, paricaryā ) to the other three varṇas . The often implicit division between those activities involving remuneration and those that did not was sometimes made explicit, with the former being referred to as vṛttis or jīvikās , “livelihoods” involving some kind of payment (not necessarily monetary) enabling an individual to sustain himself and his dependents (e.g., ViDh 21.10–21.14; MDh 10.76, 10.79; Rocher 1975c : 140–1). 2 These activities clearly reflect a social hierarchy, where the distinctiveness of social classes is established and maintained through a distinction in normative duties, as codified and promoted by scholastic Brahmins.
These normative activities provide the context in which to understand the “core principle” of legitimate conduct in emergencies—what later is called āpaddharma —as it emerged in the earliest texts attempting a thorough articulation of Brahmanical social norms, the Dharmasūtras. This core principle is simply that, when prevailing circumstances render the pursuit of one’s normal activities impossible, even after certain dictates attending those activities have been relaxed, one may adopt the activities of a lower social class for the duration of the problematic circumstances. A definition of what the Dharmasūtras (and Dharmaśāstras) mean by a “time of crisis” would simply be conditions that make pursuing one’s normal occupations (especially the remunerative ones) impossible. However, the actual circumstances that might render normative livelihoods unviable receive little, if any, attention in these texts.
The most systematic treatment of rules for emergencies in the Dharmasūtras occurs in GDh 7.1–7.26. Consequently, it will provide the basis of an initial analysis (though not in sequence), with variations and developments in the treatment of similar topics in comparable texts noted. GDh 7.4–7.7 contains the core principle, the key feature of the treatment of dharma in emergencies in Dharmasūtra and Dharmaśāstra: 3
yājanādhyāpanapratigrahāḥ sarveṣām | pūrvaḥ pūrvo guruḥ | tadalābhe kṣatravṛttiḥ | tadalābhe vaiśyavṛttiḥ |
A Brahmin 4 may sacrifice for, teach, and receive gifts from people of all classes. In the absence of these, he may adopt the livelihood of the Kṣatriya. And, in its absence, the livelihood of the Vaiśya.
The basic rule, then, is that once the capacity for proper occupations to provide a livelihood has been exhausted, then a Brahmin can seek a livelihood pursuing occupations normally reserved for the next varṇa down, that of the Kṣatriya, and, failing that, then those normally reserved for Vaiśyas. A version of this rule appears in almost all of the literature that concerns us (BDh 2.4.16–2.4.19; ViDh 2.15; MDh 10.81–10.82; YDh 3.35; MBh 12.79.1–12.79.2, 12.283.2; NSm 1.52; BṛSm 1.7.14 5 ), which justifies it being referred to as the core principle. The argument that one should adopt the next contiguous (anantara ) occupation is often explicitly extended to Kṣatriyas (GDh 7.25; MDh 10.83–10.85) and Vaiśyas (MDh 10.98), or stated as a general rule, so that it is clear that it applies to all twice-born varṇas (VaDh 2.22; ViDh 2.15). The case for Śūdras, a separate and more complicated matter, is discussed later.
A Brahmin’s downward progression through permissible occupations generally stops short of those associated with the Śūdra, it being sometimes explicitly stated that the Brahmin should never adopt such a livelihood (GDh 7.22; MBh 12.283.2; NSm 1.53; BṛSm 1.7.15). However, GDh 7.23 suggests that some hold this to be permissible when the Brahmin’s life is in peril (prāṇasaṃśaya ), as long as the Brahmin neither mixes with Śūdras nor eats forbidden food. ĀpDh 1.18.6–1.18.8 and 1.18.13–1.18.15, and MDh 10.104, are more lenient in this regard, allowing a Brahmin to receive food in certain conditions even from Śūdras and others of lower social status. The MDh then follows with four examples of Brahmin sages who not only accepted food from such people, but ate forbidden food too, without incurring sin.
That occupational mobility must follow a downward progression through occupations associated with contiguous social classes is sometimes explicitly stated. VaDh 2.23, for example, asserts that one must never resort to a superior (jyāyasī ) occupation. MDh 10.95 stipulates a similar rule in regard to the Kṣatriya, a point emphasized in the following stanza (10.96) in respect to people “low by birth” (adhamo jātyā ) who adopt superior occupations out of greed (see also NSm 1.53; BṛSm 1.7.15; Vij on YDh 3.35; Mask on GDh 7.7). Nevertheless, though this is a key component of the core principle (Rocher 1975c ), there are complicating factors. For example, the opening of the GDh passage concerning āpatkalpas suggests one context in which Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas are allowed to pursue the occupation of the Brahmin (7.1–7.3):
āpatkalpo brāhmanasyābrāhmaṇād vidyopayogaḥ | anugamanaṃ śuśrūṣā | samāpte brāhmaṇo guruḥ
These are the rules for emergencies. A Brahmin may acquire knowledge from a non-Brahmin. He should follow behind him and serve him. At the conclusion of the study, the Brahmin is the superior.
Similar rules are stated at ĀpDh 2.4.25–2.4.27; BDh 1.3.41–1.3.43; and MDh 2.241, all of which, however, use adhyayana for vidyopayoga . As noted already, adhyayana , one of the non-remunerative occupations shared by all the twice-born varṇas , has a remunerative pair, adhyāpana (“teaching”), which is supposed to be the exclusive preserve of Brahmins. However, it logically follows from the above rulings that in an emergency 6 at least Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas are permitted to assume this occupation, though it is ostensibly superior to their own normative occupations. Commentators frequently emphasize that instruction must only come from Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas (see, e.g., Har-G, Mask, Medh, and Kul) since, unlike Śūdras, they have received the necessary Vedic instruction. According to Har-G on GDh 7.1 and Medh on MDh 2.241, a Vaiśya may teach a Kṣatriya as well. The texts, however, do not make a special point of this reversal of the normal direction of occupational mobility. Nor do they do so in the case where the Vaiśya (like the Brahmin) is allowed to take up arms “out of concern for the law” (BDh 2.4.18, dharmavyapekṣā ), to save his own life or when the social classes become confused (VaDh 3.24), or for a number of similar reasons (MDh 8.348–8.349). As with the same stipulation for Brahmins, it is not necessarily the case that this ruling was concerned with Vaiśyas pursuing such occupations for monetary gain, since it may merely reflect the demand for maximizing the size of the army in prosecuting war, or the contingencies of self-defense. In other words, such rulings may reflect the unlikely monopolizing of certain types of violence by the Kṣatriya, as expressed in normative texts. Whatever the case, it is apparent that the texts either did not construe these injunctions as inverting the core principle, or did not want to draw attention to what seems to be their logical outcome, that upward-occupational mobility was in fact permissible in some cases.
Though most of the texts recommend that a Brahmin first pursue the occupation of a Kṣatriya, they do not discuss this at length. Many texts allow a Brahmin (like a Vaiśya) to take up weapons when his life is in danger, or in other similar emergencies (GDh 7.25; BDh 2.4.18; VaDh 3.24; MDh 8.348; MBh 12.79.27–12.79.33). But these situations should probably be seen as distinct from his adopting a Kṣatriya occupation for remunerative purposes. BDh 2.4.17 quotes a Gautama, 7 who says a Brahmin should not adopt a Kṣatriya lifestyle because it is too harsh, a reference most likely to the violence involved in the Kṣatriya’s normative occupations.
The implications of a Brahmin adopting a Vaiśya’s livelihood drew much more attention. This may reflect socioeconomic realities, since it is likely that the normative occupations typically prescribed for Vaiśyas—kṛṣi (agriculture), pāśupālya or gorakṣa (animal husbandry), vāṇijya (trade), and kusīda or vārdhuṣa (money lending)—incorporate the most common remunerative occupations in the predominately agrarian societies from which the texts arose. Even so, the ensuing discussions primarily either focus on problems associated with Brahmins adopting these livelihoods or specify restrictions under which their adoption is permissible. Animal husbandry is fleetingly mentioned (MDh 10.82, 10.116; MBh 12.79.2, 12.283.3), but otherwise ignored. Money lending for interest (kusīda, vṛddhi, vārdhuṣa ) is generally barred for a Brahmin (“even in severe emergencies,” NSm 1.98; VaDh 2.40–2.43; BDh 1.10.21–1.10.25; MDh 10.117). Agriculture receives somewhat more attention, and attitudes toward it appear to have progressively shifted. BDh 2.4.20–2.40.21 permits it, but says that a Brahmin should plow the land before breakfast—perhaps because it might impede Vedic study (cf. BDh 1.10.30)—using two uncastrated bulls with unpierced nostrils. Further, they should not be beaten. VaDh 2.32–2.33 advocates a similar approach, permitting agriculture (VaDh 2.32–2.36) because it provides grain that can then be sold to raise wealth for other purchases. It is not clear whether these texts are simply offering advice on good agricultural practice, or whether there is a concern with the very nature of agricultural activity. 8 The MDh suggests the latter. MDh 10.83 says that a Brahmin, “or even a Kṣatriya,” should avoid agriculture (kṛṣi ), since it “abounds in injury” (hiṃsāprāya ) 9 and involves “dependence on others” (parādhīna ). The subsequent stanza (10.84) further explains the former assertion, the “iron-pointed plough destroys the earth and those living in the earth” (bhūmiṃ bhūmiśayāṃś caiva hanti kāṣṭham ayomukham ), a view similarly found in the MBh (3.199.19, 12.254.44; cf. Harīta on agriculture in Lakṣmīdhara, Gṛhasthakāṇḍa, p. 191).
But for a Brahmin adopting a Vaiśya’s occupation, the texts on dharma are mostly preoccupied with trade. Again, the primary focus is to restrict the items a Brahmin may sell. GDh 7.8–7.21 demonstrates the basic thrust:
tasyāpaṇyam | gandharasakṛtānnatilaśāṇakṣaumājināni | raktanirṇikte vāsasī | kṣīraṃ savikāram | mūlaphalapuṣpauṣadhamadhumāṃsatṛṇodakāpathyāni | paśavaś ca hiṃsāsaṃyoge | puruśavaśākumārīvehataś ca nityam | bhūmivrīhiyavājāvyaśvaṛṣabhadhenvanaḍuhaś caike | niyamas tu | rasānāṃ rasaiḥ | paśūnāṃ ca | na lavaṇakṛtānnayoḥ | tilānāṃ ca | samenāmena tu pakvasya saṃpratyarthe |
These are not fit for him to sell: perfume, seasonings, prepared food, sesame seeds, hemp, linen, skins, garments died red or washed, milk and milk products, roots, fruits, flowers, medicines, honey, meat, grass, water, poison, animals intended for slaughter, and never humans, barren cows, heifers and miscarrying cows. And some say land, rice, barley, goats, sheep, horses, bulls, milk-cows and oxen. But he is restricted to barter 10 spices for spices and animals for animals, though not salt or prepared food or sesame. One may, however, exchange uncooked food for an equal amount of cooked food for immediate use.
Similar (though not identical) lists occur at ĀpDh 1.20.11–1.21.4; BDh 2.2.26–2.2.29; VaDh 2.24–2.31; MDh 10.85–10.94; YDh 3.36–3.40; MBh 12.79.3–12.79.8; NSm 1.57–1.59 (see also Kane II: 126–8).
The reasons for these constraints are unclear. As with the restrictions on agriculture, activities potentially harming living things appear to be problematic (cf. MDh 4.2; 4.162–4.169), hence the prohibitions on trading such things as skins, meat, humans, animals, and red-dyed garments. 11 Derrett (1979 ) proposed a Jain influence on these prohibitions, because Jains typically occupied similar social positions to Vaiśyas while theoretically abiding by ethical standards strict in their prohibitions on harming living things. But one could equally explain such features through the increasing influence of ethical norms associated with the rise of renunciate traditions more generally (of which Jainism was a part), and the increasing propensity for Brahmins to monopolize these ethical norms in Brahmanical traditions. Even so, this would not explain all items in the lists. Some things might well be prohibited from being sold because of their ritual function. For example, as Kane notes (II: 127), sesame seed (tila ), which appears on all lists, is a key component in the ritual offering to the ancestors in the śrāddha rites (e.g. MDh 3.255, 3.267). Presumably, it is for this reason that BDh 2.2.27 says that a man who sells sesame sells his own ancestors. On other occasions the selling of sesame is permitted in restricted circumstances precisely to ensure that ritual procedures can take place (VaDh 2.31; MDh 10.90; YDh 3.39; NSm 1.62; Bhār and Medh on MDh 10.90; Vij on YDh 3.39), or for medicinal purposes (NSm 1.62). The sometime preference for bartering equal measures of goods might suggest controls on exploitative trade or price inflation in relation to commodities of significant cultural import. Indeed, both Medh and Bhār, when commenting on the provision in MDh 10.90 allowing a cultivator to sell sesame for ritual purposes (dharmārtha ) as long as it has not been stored long (acirasthita ), suggest this prevents stockpiling artificially inflating prices by restricting supply.
While the āpaddharmas enable the maintenance of dharma , they also potentially invite its abrogation, since the very strategy of āpaddharma is to allow, in a qualified way, the mingling of dharmas and varṇas (i.e., dharmasaṃkara and varṇasaṃkara ), conditions otherwise seen to mark societal decay. Consequently, the laws for emergencies provoked anxieties over the maintenance of prescribed ritual and social roles, the strict maintenance of distinctions between social classes, and control over the interactions between these social classes. The extent of the restrictions placed on Brahmins adopting the occupations of Vaiśyas underscores the undesirability of the recourse to āpaddharmas in the normative texts. This is further reflected in their regular reminders that such occupations must only be adopted for a restricted period of time, and only when the circumstances absolutely justify it. For example, ĀpDh 1.21.3–1.21.4, after allowing a Brahmin to engage in trade, urges that he “shouldn’t want it excessively” (nātyantam anvavasyet ) and cease to pursue it once he can resume his normal occupation. To a similar injunction that occupational mobility be temporary, later Dharmaśāstras add that the Brahmin must undergo expiation once the emergency has passed. YDh 3.35, for example, says that, “Having passed over that emergency, then, having purified himself, he should give up [that occupation]” (nistīrya tām athātmānaṃ pāvayitvā nyaset pathi ; see also NSm 1.55; BSm 1.7.17; Par 7.38). In the MBh , the dog-eating Brahmin Viśvāmitra, cited in MDh 10.108 as sanction for eating in emergencies normally taboo food given by normally avoided donors, purifies himself through austerities (MBh 12.139.91; cf. Par 11.5, 20). This might in part explain the tendency for sections on remedies for crises to be positioned in close proximity to sections on expiations (prāyaścitta ) (Bowles 2007 : 370–2; see also BŚr 29.8). Thus the BDh’s restrictions on Brahmin’s trading fall within its sections on prāyaścitta , as does the āpaddharmaprakaraṇam in the YDh ; a chapter on prāyaścitta follows the section on āpaddharma in the MDh , and the MBh’s Āpaddharmaparvan incorporates a chapter on prāyaścitta (MBh 12.159; Bowles 2007 : 360–72). Similarly, there are serious repercussions for those that invoke āpaddharmas for the wrong reasons, or who disobey the restrictions imposed on occupations legitimately pursued in emergencies. VaDh 2.27 and MDh 10.92 assert that a Brahmin, though permitted to trade as an emergency occupation, immediately falls from his varṇa if he sells meat, lac, or salt, and becomes a Śūdra in three days by selling milk. YDh 3.40 contains a similar injunction with additional restrictions. MDh 10.93 says that a Brahmin selling commodities out of desire alone (kāmataḥ ) becomes a Vaiśya in seven nights. NSm 1.56 describes the Brahmin who continues in a Kṣatriya’s occupation out of fondness for it an “arrow back” (kāṇḍapṛṣṭha ) rejected from caste (apāṅkteya ). Similarly, MDh 11.28 and 11.30 strongly denounce those who apply the occupational mobility rules intended for emergencies when there is no emergency (see also MDh 12.70–12.72).
The MDh and MBh offer the most expansive treatments of laws for emergencies. In the case of the MDh , much of this expansion treats in greater detail themes already described. The MBh is a slightly different case. It shows some developments similar to those found in the MDh but also evinces a relationship to the tradition of literature dealing with governance and policy (arthaśāstra or nītiśāstra ). Unlike the other great Sanskrit epic, the Rāmāyaṇa , which rarely uses the word āpad , and never āpaddharma , the MBh uses āpaddharma as a key narrative device and explanatory principle.
Though the main section describing the āpaddharmas in the MDh (10.81–10.130) is long in comparison with the literature on dharma that preceded and followed it, it largely keeps to already-established principles. To the standard rules that a Brahmin may adopt either a Kṣatriya’s or a Vaiśya’s livelihood with the usual restrictions (MDh 10.81–10.94), the MDh adds some further rules for a Brahmin who, “remaining on his own path” (sve pathi sthitaḥ ), does not want to pursue a Vaiśya’s occupations. These rules (10.101–10.111) expand upon GDh 7.4–7.5, which allow Brahmins to perform their remunerative occupations “for all.” The MDh , however, focuses mostly on receiving gifts, which can be done even from “contemptible” (garhita ) people (10.103–10.108; YDh 3.41; cf. VaDh 27.9). Nevertheless, the MDh then points out the problems with receiving gifts relative to teaching and officiating at sacrifices. A Brahmin may only engage in the latter two occupations for those who have been “consecrated” (saṃskṛta ), whereas they can receive gifts from even a lowborn Śūdra. Receiving gifts is therefore regarded as inherently more dangerous, and gleaning (uñcha ) or picking up (śila ) ears of corn is considered a better option (MDh 10.112).
This section of the MDh also contains specific injunctions for non-Brahmin varṇas . In the case of the Vaiśya, MDh 10.98 merely says that he can live by the livelihood of the Śūdra. The Kṣatriya can live by all the means outlined for a Brahmin in an emergency, but never a Brahmin’s normal occupations (10.95–10.97). A little later, a Kṣatriya is permitted to raise taxes in an emergency, as long as he pursues his ordinary occupation of protecting the people (10.118–10.120). MDh 10.99–10.100 stipulates rules for Śūdras, who are otherwise rarely mentioned in descriptions of āpaddharma . In this case, Śūdras who cannot live by service (śuśrūṣā ) to the twice-born varṇas can live by the occupations of artisans (kārukarman ). MDh 10.100 clarifies this to mean that these occupations (and the śilpas , “handicrafts”) must also be in the service of the twice-born. Both Bhār and Medh, presumably under the influence of the core principle, infer from MDh 10.99 that such occupations are socially lower than a Śūdra’s ordinary occupations. But their relative status is unclear. GDh 10.60 and ViDh 2.14 include the “crafts” (śilpas ) under the normal occupations of the Śūdra, and AŚ 1.3.8 the occupations of artisans (kāru ). Given the tendency for Śūdras, kārus , and śilpins to be grouped together (e.g., MDh 7.38, 10.120; AŚ 2.4.13), which suggests the approximate equivalence of their social standing, coupled with the insistence in MDh 10.100 that Śūdras perform such works in service of the twice-born, it seems reasonable to conclude that little allowance was given to the Śūdra to deviate in an emergency from his normal occupation. This impression is reinforced by the description of the Śūdra’s occupations in MDh 10.121–10.129, the closing verses of its treatment of āpaddharma , which differ little from the Śūdra’s ordinary occupations as described elsewhere (e.g. GDh 10.56–10.61).
Later Dharmaśāstras, however, appear to take a different view. YDh 1.120 stipulates that in an emergency a Śūdra, besides being able to live by various crafts (śilpa ), may become a merchant (vaṇij ), an occupation normally reserved for a Vaiśya. This would seem to be another case permitting upward-occupational mobility. Similarly, both NSm and BSm , while forbidding a Brahmin to do a Śūdra’s work, or a Śūdra a Brahmin’s, nevertheless allowed both to do the work of the middle two varṇas , since these are common to all (sarvasādhāraṇa, NSm 1.53–1.54 and BSm 1.7.15–1.7.16). In commenting on YDh 3.35, Vij cites both the BSm passage and YS 1.120 to affirm that a Śūdra may live by the livelihood of a Vaiśya when overcome by adversity.
The MDh and the MBh are the first texts to describe leviratic union (niyoga )—where a wife whose husband is incapable of having children may be “appointed” for that purpose to a related male, usually her husband’s brother—with the language of the laws for emergencies. This is not the case in the earlier Dharmasūtras, though they all provide some discussion of niyoga (ĀpDh 2.27.2–2.27.7; GDh 18.4–18.8; BDh 2.4.7–2.4.10; VaDh 17.55–17.66; Kane II: 599–607). In 9.56 Manu proclaims he will explain “the law for women in an emergency” (yoṣitāṃ dharmam āpadi ; cf. MDh 9.103), an emergency defined in 9.59 as “when the family line is about to disappear” (saṃtānasya parikṣaye ). Fourteen stanzas on levirate follow (9.57–9.70), in which it is clear that the union is for procreation alone (not sexual enjoyment).
In his commentary on MDh 9.60, Bhāruci illustrates two rules of niyoga with the MBh , in which leviratic union is a key narrative device. In the first, the case of a woman who, though not a widow, is “appointed” because her husband is unable to father children, is exemplified with Pāṇḍu’s “non-widow” (avidhavā ) Kuntī. The second illustrates the requirement that the “appointed” woman be approached during the night with Vyāsa’s manner of approaching Vicitravīrya’s widows. In the MBh episode of the latter case, Satyavatī, whose son Vicitravīrya has died childless, demands that her other son Bhīṣma “look to the law of emergencies” (āpaddharmam avekṣasva ; MBh 1.97.21) and father children with Vicitravīrya’s widows, since the very continuation (saṃtāna ) of the family line is at stake. Bhīṣma avers owing to a vow of celibacy he had previously taken. Eventually Vyāsa is given the task to beget children in the “fields” (kṣetra ) of Vicitravīrya (1.99.17), and the brothers Pāṇḍu, Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Vidura result. Though the dynastic crisis has seemingly been averted, it emerges again in the next generation, when Pāṇḍu, cursed to die if he has sex, is fearful of the consequences of being childless. He calls on Kuntī to deploy a “means for engendering children in a crisis” (apatyotpādane yogam āpadi ; 1.111.22) and, in due course, she utilizes a magical mantra given to her previously by a grateful Brahmin “in view of the laws for emergencies” (āpaddharmānvavekṣayā ; 1.104.6) to call upon the gods to father children with her (and her co-wife Mādrī). The result is, of course, the Pāṇḍavas.
The MBh has an entire section, known as the Āpaddharmaparvan (ĀpDhP ), dedicated to āpaddharma . This collection of twenty-seven texts running over thirty-nine chapters (MBh 12.129–12.167) does not contain much of the typical Dharmaśāstra material on āpaddharma , though this is sometimes found elsewhere in the MBh . Rather, it explores the ways in which kings ought to act in emergencies to ensure the health of their realms and in such circumstances, how kings ought to behave toward their subjects, especially Brahmins (Bowles 2007 ). The most famous case of the latter is the story of Viśvāmitra eating the dog haunch in a drought (MBh 12.139; cf. 12.130), which is cited in MDh 10.108. In the case of the former, the ĀpDhP demonstrates a close affiliation with the AŚ , and with nītiśāstras , such as the Pañcatantra , which use fables to demonstrate political strategies. In accordance with these political traditions, the ĀpDhP conceptualizes its problems in terms of the relations between weak kings and strong kings, and in terms of restoring a state’s declining fortunes, as is evident from the opening questions that Yudhiṣṭhira puts to Bhīṣma in MBh 12.129.1–12.129.3 (see also, 12.128.1–12.128.4).
The framing of such topoi in terms of āpaddharma , made explicit at MBh 12.151.34 and in the MBh’s two chapter summaries at 1.2.64 and 1.2.198, distinguishes the MBh’s approach from that of the AŚ . While the AŚ is expansive on how a king should respond to crises in his kingdom (Bowles 2007 : 54–80), unlike the MBh and Dharmaśāstra it is not concerned with “laws” in emergencies and their transcendent implications. An āpaddharma is so-called because it attends precisely to the transcendent consequences of a person behaving in particular ways. For not following a dharma on account of environmental or social (or otherwise) crises does not merely have “this-worldly” implications (starvation, poverty, etc.), but also affects the future course of an individual’s very soul. Following dharma brings with it certain “otherworldly” benefits, namely heaven (e.g. GDh 28.52) or a better birth on one’s return to earth (e.g. ĀpDh 2.2.3). Consequently, it is sometimes said that dharma should not be pursued for “worldly” (laukika ) benefits (ĀpDh 1.20.1), or that it has (in Olivelle’s translation) “no tangible motive” (agṛhyamāṇakāraṇa ; ĀpDh 1.12.8, VaDh 1.7). At least in principle, dharma ought to be pursued for reasons that are “unseen” (adṛṣṭa ). The conclusion to the MDh’s section on laws for emergencies claims (10.130) that those who properly follow the āpaddharmas attain the “highest state” (paramaṃ gatiṃ ). While it is tempting to regard this as conventional and formulaic, MDh 11.128 asserts that the twice-born who follows the laws for emergencies when not in an emergency (anāpadi ) does not gain its fruit, and, similarly in 11.130, nor does one substituting the secondary rule for the primary rule (see also MBh 12.159.16). In other words, the dharmas for emergencies, when properly pursued, are subject to the same rewards as the dharmas observed in normal times. One’s spiritual fortunes are thereby preserved from the ravages of the contingencies of emergencies. An āpaddharma , therefore, retains the transcendental aspect of following a righteously prescribed practice, while also allowing for a breach of the normative code when circumstances abrogate it.
The MBh , unlike the AŚ , explores the problems of kingship not merely in terms of the restitution of the realm, but also in terms of the otherworldly consequences for the royal actor in light of the actions he has had to perform to bring about this restitution. The principal cipher for such concerns is King Yudhiṣṭhira, who repeatedly raises anxieties about the violence both inherent to the warrior’s duties and ensuing from the Mahābhārata war (see e.g. Fitzgerald 2004a: 86–142; Bowles 2007 : 133–54). In response, Vyāsa promises Yudhiṣṭhira he will be cleansed of stains resulting from the war by performing an aśvamedha as a prāyaścitta (MBh 12.32.23–12.32.24, 12.34.26), reflecting recommendations following periods of abiding by āpaddharmas . The MBh ’s fifth book, the Udyogaparvan (“Book of the Effort”), in which the two sides prepare for battle, frames the conflict itself in terms of the language of āpaddharma . Yudhiṣṭhira, in response to Saṃjaya’s recourse to dharma to dissuade him from war, suggests he learn something about the “laws for emergencies” (MBh 5.28.3). Subsequently, the various embassies sent to Dhṛtarāṣṭra’s court to sue for peace are sprinkled with remarks on avoiding and overcoming emergencies. Finally, with the battle now inevitable, Vaiśaṃpāyana describes Yudhiṣṭhira, “skilled in the meaning of the laws of emergencies” (āpaddharmārthakuśala ), calling together his allies to share their plans. The “laws for emergencies” in such cases clearly pertain to the violence of warfare.
The idea underpinning āpaddharma , “law during emergencies,” first appears in the Dharmasūtras as a way to ameliorate problems arising when circumstances render normative occupations unviable, especially in the case of Brahmins. The prescribed solution is to permit conditional occupational mobility. The MDh and the MBh introduce the term āpaddharma and broaden the basic thrust of the Dharmasūtras. The MDh applies the core principle to all social groups, as is sometimes the case with post-MDh Dharmaśāstra. Further, both the MDh and MBh apply the idea of “law during emergencies” to the practice of leviratic union, the emergency in this case being the lack of a child. And, finally, the MBh extends the same notion to problems associated with political violence.