David E. Reuther1
The UN Security Council's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a unique, post-Cold War event.2 This brief essay will explore the narrow theme that, in turning to economic sanctions, the UN Security Council addressed both its humanitarian concerns and the political goal of seeking Iraqi compliance with the requirements of various Security Council resolutions. Responding to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted in August 1990 to impose economic sanctions.3 In the first weeks the sanctions were symbols of international unanimity designed to encourage Baghdad to release its prize. Years later, economic sanctions sought Iraqi compliance with specific criteria embedded in UN Security Council resolutions, primarily UNSC Resolution 687, which Iraq had accepted as the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire. Economic sanctions against Iraq were not unlimited. UNSC resolutions never embargoed medicines or health supplies and the ban on importation of foodstuffs was lifted with the cease-fire. In the summer of 1991 the Security Council went even further and designed an exemption to the embargo on the sale of Iraqi oil, if Iraq used the proceeds to purchase humanitarian supplies and if they were equitably distributed under UN monitoring. To date Baghdad steadfastly refuses to implement this exemption.
After four years the embaigo remains, raising questions about the efficacy of economic sanctions, particularly because Iraq was seen as uniquely dependent on a single export. Nevertheless, the Baghdad government has fairly successfully avoided compliance in detail with UN resolutions, shunned humanitarian assistance, shifted the burden of sanctions to that sector of the population which rose in revolt in spring 1991, and, through administrative and monetary policies, maintained its supporters. In the face of a ruthless, tenacious Iraqi leadership, economic sanctions have achieved only marginal success and left the world community with a moral, as well as political, dilemma.
The day Iraq invaded Kuwait, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 6004 calling for Iraq to withdraw and for negotiations between the parties. This was the first of 27 resolutions seeking Iraqi compliance with international norms.5 With Resolution 661, passed on August 6,1990, the Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq "to secure [the] compliance of Iraq . . . and restore the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait." The imposition of sanctions in the beginning was primarily an indication of the international community's collective outrage at the Iraqi invasion and a harbinger of future penalties Iraq would suffer if it did not change its course. Resolution 661 called for the international community to bar all exports from Iraq and Kuwait, any activities which would promote such exports, and all trade in arms. The UN specifically exempted "supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs " Paragraph 6 established the UN Sanctions Committee, the membership of which was synonymous with UN Security Council membership. Operating by consensus, the committee approved suppliers' applications for humanitarian supplies other than food and medical supplies. As an illustration of the items which came before the Sanctions Committee—and were routinely approved—in the last quarter of 1992, the committee approved 421 separate applications ranging from baby powder to 117 metric tons of raw materials for the production of medicine, or 4.5 tons of ball bearings for combine harvesters.
Resolution 665, passed on August 25, 1990, called for a maritime interception force to enforce UNSC Resolution 661 sanctions. Resolution 666, passed September 13, 990, called for the Secretary General to study the humanitarian situation in Kuwait and Iraq. Resolution666 set forth the principle that foodstuffs provided to Kuwait and Iraq "should be provided through the United Nations in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries." International aid agencies had reported that the Iraqi government had diverted humanitarian supplies. The Security Council's reaction was to insist that Iraq's performance be monitored and verified. Resolution 670, passed September 25, 1990, confirmed that the embargo strictures of Resolution 661 also applied to aviation and shipping. More resolutions followed until the Gulf War ended with Iraq's defeat and acceptance of the cease-fire resolution.
Resolution 687, the cease-fire resolution, summed the bulk of the UN Security Council's requirements of Iraq. These requirements were designed to redress Baghdad's assault on the international system and forestall Iraqi destabilization of the Persian Gulf in the future. Resolution 687 was adopted on April 3, 991, by 12 votes in favor (Austria, Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, France, India, Romania, USSR, UK, US, Zaire and Zimbabwe), one against (Cuba) and 2 abstentions (Ecuador and Yemen).6 The Resolution:
The Resolution required that the Security Council review Iraqi compliance every 120 days.
Six months after the end of the Gulf War, it became clear that Iraqi policy did not include compliance in detail with the terms of the cease-fire resolution. Iraq, defeated in battle but defiant, resisted compliance with each of Resolution 687's requirements. It refused to account for missing Kuwaiti citizens, return looted property, or recognize the border. Iraqi security agencies harassed the UN teams inspecting Iraqi's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. Initial Iraqi defiance suggested that compliance would come later rather than sooner.
If so, the Security Council would have to maintain the international consensus against Iraq. With Iraqi overseas assets blocked and sanctions forbidding the sale of oil, there was concern that Iraq would not have the financial resources to purchase approvable humanitarian provisions. Therefore, on August 15, 991, the Security Council passed Resolution 706 which would allow states to import a total of $1.6 billion worth of Iraqi oil for a six-month period.7 The resolution would also allow substantial deductions from that $1.6 billion total to (1) operate UN humanitarian programs in Iraq, (2) contribute to the UN Compensation Fund which would pay victims of Iraq's aggression, (3) pay the costs of eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, (4) cover the full costs of facilitating the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, and (5) fund the Iraqi half of the costs of the UN Boundary Commission. The remainder, estimated at approximately $993 million, would be available for the purchase of humanitarian supplies. The resolutions required that the Secretary General submit a report to the Security Council on the modalities of implementing the resolution's program. The resolution noted the Council's desire that humanitarian relief be equitably distributed "to all segments of the Iraqi civilian population through effective monitoring and transparency." It also reminded Iraq of its responsibility under Resolution 688 to allow "unhindered access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq —" The Security Council felt this admonition necessary because Iraq's physical intimidation of NGO and UN workers, especially in the South, was beginning to reach the point where there were concerns for the aid workers' safety.
Resolution 712, passed September 18, 991, accepted a report from the Secretary General, created an escrow account for the expected oil revenues, established a subaccount for voluntary contributions to purchase humanitarian assistance for Iraq, and reiterated the requirement that distribution of assistance be equitable. The Secretary General's report outlined the specifics of a plan which called for Iraqi export of oil using the pipeline through Turkey. The report went into considerable detail about the mechanics of monitoring the sale of Iraqi oil, assuring the deposit of the resulting revenue in the escrow account, and guaranteeing that supplies would be equitably distributed. In the intervening months Iraq held discussions with the UN Secretariat from time to time on the modalities of the oil-for-food plan but ultimately refused to implement Resolutions 706 and 712. Baghdad objected to the requirement for UN monitoring.8 Baghdad was also opposed because acceptance would have required it to lift its embargo against the 3.1 million people, primarily Kurds, who live in its three northern governates.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait stimulated an unprecedented international consensus to hold Baghdad accountable and to cooperate in the broad application of sanctions. Sanctions have contributed significantly to preventing Iraq from rebuilding its war industries and replacing the material losses to its military machine. The economic costs to Iraq have been substantial. The suddenness of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait left much of Iraq's aviation and marine fleets outside the country, where they have remained. There are Iraqi-flagged commercial aircraft in Tunisia and Jordan, and ships in Yemen, Jordan, Mauritania, Egypt, Germany, Kuwait, Singapore, and Greece.
Each UN member has the responsibility to uphold the sanctions on Iraq. The United States has played a leading role in sharing information with other countries on possible sanctions violations by their nationals. U.S. policy on exports to Iraq has been more strict than the policies of some other countries. Overseeing U.S. suppliers' adherence to the sanctions has been the responsibility of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). U.S. policy has been to issue Treasury licenses when the commodity is purchased by or donated to a UN agency or reputable humanitarian NGO which will oversee the equitable distribution of the commodity.
Part of the international community's enforcement of the embargo has been through the provision of naval vessels to the Multinational Intercept Force (MIF) stationed in the upper reaches of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf (although the Iran/Iraq war-damaged Gulf ports are beyond use). The MIF has the responsibility of inspecting all vessels for cargo consigned to Iraq, most of which passes through the Jordanian port of Aqaba. The MIF applied stringent rules concerning documentation of cargo. Ships were diverted if MIF vessels could not gain access to the cargo. The MIF in the Red Sea was dissolved in August 1994 and moved on land.
Major land transportation lines to Iraq are via Jordan and Turkey, both of which have an extra responsibility to enforce sanctions. There has been a steady volume of traffic over these borders since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The vast bulk of this traffic has been supplies approved by the Sanctions Committee, In fulfilling their responsibilities to enforce sanctions, local authorities have uncovered fraud and other circumvention schemes. Airtight sanctions have been elusive and their effectiveness has been influenced by several variables, including the resolve of sanctioning nations to maintain superior monitoring and enforcement capabilities. This task is all the more difficult because a country under sanctions can be expected to use its full authority and resources to resist those sanctions. As Hufbauer, Elliott, and Schott point out in their study, behavior modification comes slowly, if at all.9
From the beginning the Iraqi leadership decided that it would, only minimally, if at all, comply with UN Security Council resolutions, and wait out the international community's enforcement of sanctions. The leadership's desire to stay in power has translated into the propitiation of the Iraqi security, intelligence, military, and party circles which insulate it from the Iraqi population. After the spring 1991 uprisings in the North and South were repressed, the Iraqi leadership rewarded outstanding cadres with gifts and various financial awards, some consisting of loot from Kuwait. To restore a sense of normalcy, the government quickly repaired Gulf War-damaged structures, but only in the Baghdad area. This was easily accomplished with the materials at hand. Restoration of power and other facilities was accomplished by cannibalizing equipment. Each completed project was inaugurated with fanfare and propaganda. Repairs were not undertaken in those areas of the country which experienced the spring uprisings. All water treatment facilities in the Baghdad area and the facility connected to the phosphate plant in Western Iraq were repaired and functioning before the first water treatment plant was repaired in the South. Only in recent months has Baghdad restored power and telecommunications to Basra in the South.
By late 1991, commodity shortages began to appear. Cannibalized equipment was breaking down. Inflation began in earnest. The appearance of counterfeit Iraqi and U.S. currency accelerated the pace of inflation. To counter the effects of inflation on regime supporters, the government initiated bonuses and other financial rewards, but only for the bureaucracies which kept it in power. A year and a half into the sanctions, the Iraqi government resorted to administrative means to overcome economic shortages. In a move to conserve stocks on hand, the government announced in April 1992 a long list of materials which could not be taken out of the country. In July 1992 the government accused 42 merchants of hoarding goods and then executed them. In November 1992, Baghdad announced a ban on the sale of 146 luxury items, ranging from cheese and perfume to videos and personal computers. Merchants had to dispose of their stocks and were ordered to use their capital to import foodstuffs. Administrative detentions and harassment followed.
The Iraqi economy has suffered severely from the impact of sanctions. Economic decisions have been made which may have long-term detrimental effects. For example, the government reportedly has ordered a level of oil production sufficient to maintain domestic consumption of gasoline. After refining the gasoline, the stock is pumped back into the underground oU field. All measures of economic activity have significantly declined, while inflation has soared. In 1993, the unofficial inflation rate was running about4,000 percent over prices in August 1990. Iraqi society has also paid a heavy price as crime, black marketing, and corruption have eaten away at personal ties, public confidence, and societal allegiances.10 There have been rumors of coup plots. Apparently Saddam can no longer even trust his clansmen.11
To conserve food supplies, reduce financial expenses, and punish the Kurds for their post-Gulf War insurrection, Baghdad pulled all government personnel, including health workers and teachers, out of the three governates of northern Iraq in October 1991. In contrast to the UN embargo, which allowed humanitarian supplies into Iraq, Baghdad applied an airtight embargo north of the military's security lines. The 3.1 million people of the North were severed from the Iraqi economy.12 The international community now feeds these people. Since Operation Provide Comfort in 1991,13 the U.S. alone has spent $250 million to feed the Kurds.14
The Baghdad government has followed similar policies in the southern part of the country, including cutting off all food, medicine, and fuel,15 while draining the ecologically sensitive marshes.16
Four years of stern economic sanctions on Iraq have only had mixed results in terms of Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. Amore in-depth study would show that Iraqi compliance with the individual requirements of Resolution 687 alone has been grudging and halfhearted. Iraq has refused UN arrangements to organize reparations payments for the thousands of East and South Asian workers whose jobs evaporated with Iraq's invasion. It is not Iraqi policy to accept the offer in Resolutions 706/ 712 to feed the Iraqi people. In fact, Iraq deliberately withheld humanitarian supplies from the populations of the North and South to create the impression that international sanctions were imperilling these people. Most looted Kuwaiti military equipment has been smashed beyond repair just before its return. Iraq did not offer the required guarantees concerning the UN-guaranteed border with Kuwait until October 1994. Its security forces have kidnapped foreigners from the Kuwait side of the border, and Baghdad has sent civilian demonstrators across it.17
Iraqi intransigence caused the Security Council to pass an additional post-cease-fire resolution reiterating Baghdad's responsibility to respect the border. Other post-cease-fire resolutions were also passed restating Baghdad's responsibility to cooperate in the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction programs (see below). These additional resolutions were part of a dialogue with Iraq in which the Security Council outlined its requirements of Iraq, and Baghdad took the position that the UN resolutions, such as 687, conferred no obligation on Baghdad. Then Baghdad would offer to comply with some part of a resolution if other obligations were waved. This diplomacy was designed to break the international consensus, or at minimum, make the UN pay twice for the same results. This Iraqi diplomatic strategy strikes at the very authority of the Security Council.
The point to be made is that in accepting the cease-fire resolution, Iraq accepted the border with Kuwait. An obligation was created. Four years later, in October 1994, Iraq made a military feint toward the border as though it had no obligation, i.e., as though the previous UN resolutions had no authority. The Russians became tangled into negotiating Iraqi acceptance of an obligation Baghdad incurred in 1991. Iraq has been maneuvering the world community into paying twice for its adherence to its obligations, and undermining the UN in the process.
About the only area where, after four years, progress has been made in obtaining Iraqi compliance with Resolution 687 and other resolutions is the success of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Association Weapons Inspections Teams in destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. However, starting with the very first declarations and inspections, it became evident that Iraq was not acting in good faith, would use every possible pretext to reinterpret UNSCOM's inspection rights and occasionally use harassment tactics to make inspections as difficult as possible.18 In September 1991 Iraqi officials detained the sixth nuclear inspection team in a parking lot for four days. In July 1992 Iraqi officials blocked access to a Ministry of Agriculture building which reportedly held part of the archives for one of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs.19 Iraqi recalcitrance led the Security Council to pass Resolutions 707 (August 15, 1991) and 715 (October 11, 1991).20 Both resolutions reiterated UNSCOM duties, listed Iraq's responsibilities, and admonished Baghdad for obstructing UNSCOM's work. In November 1993 Baghdad officially informed the Security Council that it accepted the requirements of Resolution 715.21 After four years, the economic sanctions, repeated demonstration of international solidarity communicated via additional resolutions, and the "the threat of resumed hostilities by the coalition"22 have moved Iraq to a discernible measure of compliance with the requirement that it divest itself of weapons of mass destruction.23
An additional factor encouraging Iraqi compliance with the disarmament section of Resolution 687 may be its paragraph 22:
22. Decides that . . . upon (Security) Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 0,1,12 and 13 (note: destruction and long-term monitoring of weapons of mass destruction) above, the prohibitions against the importation of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in Resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect.
Unwilling to fulfill the terms of the cease-fire resolution, Iraq may be looking for a shortcut. A successful noncompliance policy, however, requires that the international consensus on the totality of Iraqi responsibilities must be broken.
The ability of economic sanctions to produce policy change varies with a number of factors. There are factors which argue that sanctions would be particularly effective in the case of Iraq. Other factors suggest Iraqi resilience in the face of sanctions. A review of these variables makes direct comparisons with other case studies of economic sanctions difficult. A brief listing quickly illustrates the complexity of predicting the effectiveness of sanctions in any given situation. Political scientists and economic analysts will need to develop further tools before policymakers and the public will know with any certainty what will work.
Diplomatie Environment.Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was recognized as an unmistakable threat to world order and the nation-state system. There was universal condemnation and an extraordinarily high degree of unanimity in passing UN resolutions and compliance with UN sanctions requirements.
Economic. Oil exports accounted for 95 percent of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings, suggesting that they were particularly vulnerable. Medical and other advanced services were operated by large numbers of expatriates who would depart in the face of international sanctions.
Psychological. The Iraqi people were aware that Iraq lost the Gulf War. The sanctions, war casualties, and nonreturning POWs left that message with many families. The military and security organizations also were aware of the material and human losses. This should have weakened the leadership's power.
Economic. The Iraqi economy was broad based, though not highly sophisticated, and was not dependent on imports. There was sufficient domestic production to meet the minimum needs of the population. Furthermore, because of its experience in the eight-year Iran/Iraq War, Iraqi procurement practices had long included overbuying spare parts and coping with patchwork repairs.
Iraq stripped Kuwait during its occupation of the emirate. This booty was available to the Iraqi leadership to use as rewards or as production inputs. To conserve resources, Baghdad severed large parts of the population from government services and the economy. Reconstruction was concentrated in the Baghdad area (population approximately 4 million). Basra and the South were neglected. The 3.1 million people in the North have been subjected to a total internal embaigo. Some 750,000 people who fled Kirkuk and other cities during the spring 1991 uprisings have not been allowed to return to their homes.24 By tapping private overseas monies to purchase humanitarian supplies, the Iraqi government found it could hold out even longer against sanctions.
Psychological. The Iraqi population viewed its rulers as totally ruthless. The leadership confirmed this perception in the indiscriminate way in which it put down the spring 1991 uprisings. Experience with the Iraqi police state has been shocking.
On the other hand, the Iraqi government has used nationalism to spur its core supporters to continued sacrifice. The leadership worked diligently to direct resources to core supporters in the Tikriti tribe, the multiple security agencies, and the military leadership.
The Iraqi people have become inured to economic hardship. For eight long years during the Iran/Iraq War, they confronted daunting economic and military sacrifice.
The United Nations Security Council made a conscious effort to weave humanitarian concerns into its design of the economic sanctions levied against Iraq. The Security Council recognized that these humanitarian concerns were part of maintaining the international consensus against Iraq. For its part, the Iraqi leadership over the last four years has demonstrated the qualities which have left it a pariah among nations. The Iraqi leadership's challenge to the moral conscience25 and political unity of the world community remains. It has shown defiant resilience and a callous disregard for the well-being of its own people. As the international community ponders techniques of modifying the behavior of nation-states, the Iraqi example should be studied in further detail.
1.The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Government.
2. The Security Council's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was virtually without precedent. Cameron Hume argues in his book The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacemaking Changed (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) that only in the late 1980s did the Security Council begin to act as a central authority for peacemaking, first to end the Iran/Iraq War and then as it progressively followed the steps laid down in Chapter VÏI of the charter after the invasion of Kuwait. See pp. 187-216.
3. UN Security Council membership in August 1990 comprised the five permanent members (China, France, USSR, UK, and USA) and Canada,* Colombia,* Cote de'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia,* Finland,* Malaysia, Romania, Yemen, and Zaire. In January 1991 Austria, Belgium, Ecuador, India, and Zimbabwe replaced the above countries marked with *. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly (Advance Version) A/46/2, November 29,1991, p. 251. Further rotations occurred in January 1992, 1993, and 1994. Thus, a statistically significant number of nations have judged Iraqi compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.
4. One source for the text of the Security Council resolutions can be found in K. Matsuura, J. Muller, and K. Sauvant, ed., Annual Review of United Nations Affairs (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, published annually).
5. For an excellent study of the international law issues raised by each Security Council resolution, see Christopher Joyner, "Sanctions, Compliance, and International Law: Reflections on the United Nations Experience against Iraq," Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 32:1, Fall 1991, pp. 1-46.
6. Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1991, p. 210.
7. Department of State Dispatch, September 23,1991, Vol. 2, No. 38, P. 696-97,
8. 'Talks Fail at UN on Limited Oil Sales by Iraq," New York Times, October 7, 1993, p. A 14.
9. As discussed in Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990).
10. Paul Lewis, "In Iraq, Hunger Wins," New York Times, July 21, 993, p. A 7.
11. "Looking for Trouble," Newsxwk, October 17, 1994, pp. 24-27.
12. John Waterbury, "Strangling the Kurds: Saddam Hussein's Economic War Against Northern Iraq," Middle East Insight, July/August 1993, pp. 31-38.
13. See for example, 'The Future of Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq," Hearings before the International Task Force of the Select Committee on Hunger, House of Representatives, March 18, 1992, pp. 192.
14. This figure is the current figure compiled by the Department of State and used in Department of State briefing materials for congressional appearances.
15. "Saddam's Other Victim," New York Times, June 26,19 3, sec. 1, p. 19. See also "Iraq: Background on Human Rights Conditions, 1984-1992," Human Rights Watch, August 1993 (Vol. 5, Issue 5).
16. See Chris Hedges, "A Firefight in the Reeds and An Escape into the Darkness," New York Times, November 16,199, p. A10; or "Iraqi Regime Fights to Kill a Way of Life," New York Times, November 28, 1993, sec. 4, p. 12.
17. Kuwait Boundary Stirs Iraqi March," New York Times, November 21,1993 p. 12.
18. Tim Trevan, "UNSCOM Faces Entirely New Verification Challenges in Iraq," Arms Control Today, April 1993, p. 11.
19. Ibid., p. 11.
20. Paul Lewis, "Iraq Agrees to Allow the UN to Monitor Weapons Industries," New York Times, July 20, 1993, sec. A, p. 1.
21. Paul Lewis, "Bowing to UN, Iraq Will Permit Arms Monitors," New York Times, November 27,1993, sec. 1, p. 1. See also Tim Trevan, "Ongoing Monitoring and Verification in Iraq," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 4, May 1994, pp. 11-13.
22. Trevan, "UNSCOM Faces New Verification Challenges," p. 11.
23. Rolf Ekeus, "The Iraqi Experience and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn, 1992, p. 73.
24. Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Melinda Kimble, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, March 23, 1992, Vol. 3, No. 12, p. 223.
25. The moral transgressions of the Iraqi leadership have been fully described elsewhere, but Kanan Makiya's book, Cruelty and Silence: Qar, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York W.W. Norton, 1993), is a particularly thoughtful probing of the moral and ethical issues raised by Baghdad's behavior.