Sonja Licht
After observing the impact of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, one can formulate many questions concerning sanctions that should be answered before trying to evaluate their impact. Why did the international community allow violations of the Helsinki Accords to change existing international borders? Why did it need such a long time to impose an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, since it was well known that all the sides in the conflict were importing weapons even before the actual fighting started? Why was there no deliberate action after the Milosevic regime annulled the autonomy of Kosovo, which was accompanied by a very strong repression of the human rights of Albanians? Why were no sanctions imposed against Croatia, but only against Serbia and Montenegro, when it was well known that the regular army of Croatia has been consistently present in Bosnia-Herzegovina and involved in the ethnic cleansing of both Serbs and Muslims in western Herzegovina and central Bosnia?
Another set of questions is related to whether the sanctions were really working in a more narrow sense of the word. Were they weakening the regime in the new Yugoslavia, or just destroying the economic potential of the country? Were they targeted against the regime or the whole society? Were the sanctions imposed to punish Milosevic's nationalist, aggressive politics, or were they seen as a mechanism to punish the people of Serbia and Montenegro? Was there a real chance that the sanctions might help the people of the new Yugoslavia put an end to Milosevic's rule and finally start the process of transition toward democracy?
It is necessary first to define the sanctions imposed by the United Nations. This is essential because even in well-informed international political circles, there are sometimes different explanations of the objectives and the nature of these measures. The United Nations, when imposing sanctions, made several assumptions, which may or may not have been completely accurate. First, it presumed that the Milosevic regime in Serbia was helping Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina fight for their political and military goals. Second, it presumed that if there was no help from Belgrade, the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina would soon be defeated and the war would be over. Third, it presumed that the pressure on Serbia would be transferred to Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, as a side effect of the sanctions, the UN presumed that the dissatisfied people of Serbia would defeat the Milosevic regime (and thereby the primary causes of the war), and the possible danger of the conflict spreading would disappear.
The first presumption was partially correct, but one needs to consider two additional facts as well. First, Bosnia-Herzegovina was full of military storage facilities and military industries due to Tito's doctrine that guerilla war was to be fought in this region. Second, Croatia was also helping the Bosnian Croats, and some regular military units from Croatia had been fighting alongside them from the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The second presumption was not correct because the Serbian nation was separated into two different bodies. Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro achieved the establishment of their nation-states in the nineteenth century, but Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina believed that their moment to do the same was upon them. They would continue their struggle even if there was no help from Serbia at all. This was a simple fact that could be verified through discussion with Bosnian Serbs. When Yugoslavia disbanded it became almost certain that Bosnia-Herzegovina would follow the same example. Bosnia-Herzegovina, which consists of ethnic Serbs, Croats and Muslims, had almost no chance of survival if the principle of self-determination was put above the principle of multiethnicity and democratic citizenship. Unfortunately, this happened in the former Yugoslavia, and has been wholeheartedly supported by many, including not only the nation-states of Europe and North America, but also transnational organizations and even several progressive peace and civic activists.
Through the conflict the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina believed that their right to self-determination took precedence over all other rights. Most of these people did not believe in a civic Bosnian state, in part because it is hard to believe that Bosnia-Herzegovina could be the only exception when surrounded with authoritarian nationalist ethnic states. While the war was still going on, while feelings of fear and revenge were driving most of these people in a nationalist stampede, it seemed impossible to believe they would have the will and the energy to rid themselves of their nationalist leaders. As long as the war was going on, they would fight whether they received direct help from Serbia, Croatia, or anyone else, it is possible to wonder whether the Bosnian Serbs would have achieved less in the war without material and ideological help from Serbia. At this point, however, it is important to realize that what happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a civil war in which machine guns and mortars played a decisive role, and as long as there was ammunition for these weapons, the war. raged on.1 Of course, food and medical supplies were also essential, but even with very serious shortages, the fighting units usually continued. Most of the partisan units in World War II consisted of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, and they were successfully fighting against a modern, much stronger German army for more than four years. Those of us who were convinced that the times have radically changed were forced to understand that most of those who are in the battlefields believe they are currently not only creating their own nation-states, but also ending the civil war that started in 1941.
The third presumption by the UN was only partially correct. Milosevic had a strong influence on Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia, but this influence was, most probably, not great enough to make them end their struggle for their nation-state which, after the disappearance of Yugoslavia, they considered vital for the protection of their people. The fourth presumption was totally incorrect. The traditional Serbian response to foreign pressure was to gather around their leaders and to resist. Actually, UN sanctions hurt Serbian democratic forces (which were quite strong and willing to challenge Milosevic's regime) more than the regime itself. The UN Security Council decided to impose sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro just one day before the people of these two republics were to go to the ballots to vote for the first Federal Parliament of the rump Yugoslavia. The democratic opposition in Serbia had long before decided to boycott these elections because it did not agree with the process by which this new Yugoslavia was established. The turnout was low but enough for Milosevic and his supporters to win. One main reason why more than 50 percent of the population took part in these elections was because of the shock of the UN decision to impose sanctions, which was very well manipulated by the state-controlled media. In less than a month after the UN Security Council decision, the democratic opposition organized a huge demonstration in Belgrade (starting on June 28,1992) which lasted a total of eight days. There were from 50,000 to 300,000 people in the streets demanding the removal of Milosevic and other warmongers.2 Simultaneously, students started a protest movement that lasted for 42 days at all the universities in Serbia. This was probably one of the first mass protests without national symbols in the whole of Eastern Europe since 1989, a movement that embraced peace rather than resurgent nationalism and authoritarianism.
The economic consequences of the war and of sanctions have been terrible. Inflation skyrocketed.3 Necessary agricultural supplies and fertilizers virtually disappeared, as did fuel, spare parts, and supplies for all industry. Production fell sharply while unemployment jumped.4 Average salaries plummeted, although prices remained close to those in the European Community. By 1993 dose to 80 percent of the population had fallen below the poverty line.5
There are hundreds of thousands of refugees, including Muslims, in Serbia and Montenegro without jobs and regular incomes. This situation became an enormous burden for the country.6 The regime might have used them as a reserve army for breaking down social or political unrest or movements. The chances of a democratic alternative developing in Serbia and Montenegro depended strongly on the fate of refugees. This was even more important if one realized that at least half of these refugees would never be able to return to their homes, and that new refugees might have been expected from both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Most of these refugees found temporary residence in the most underdeveloped areas, Sandzak and Montenegro, Because of the sanctions and because Serbia and Montenegro were not internationally recognized, there are no bilateral agreements between the new Yugoslavia and other individual countries. Consequently, the amount of humanitarian aid arriving in the country has been more limited than that for Slovenia and Croatia. Thus, one paradox of the sanctions was that even the refugees, who were the direct victims of the war and had the bad luck of finding temporary residence in Serbia or Montenegro (such as the Muslims from Bosnia), were seriously hurt by the sanctions. According to the basic documents of the United Nations, all refugees should be protected, regardless of their race, nationality, or religion. For the democratic forces within the new Yugoslavia, it has been difficult to struggle against violations of UN principles when the UN sanctions themselves violate these principles.
The refugee problem particularly illustrates the basic problem with the UN sanctions. They were totally undifferentiated. Undifferentiated repression is an approach that should be avoided, not only by international organizations such as the UN, the European Community, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), but also by anyone who seriously considers the principles of emancipation, human rights, and democracy. For pragmatists seeking to end the war in the former Yugoslavia and to get rid of present and future Milosevic, it was extremely difficult to fight against the advocates of militant nationalism and right wing ideology when repression was perpetuated against everyone living in Serbia.
By 1993 in the new Yugoslavia there was no medicine; no food for babies; no spare parts for medical equipment; and no oil for heating hospitals, schools, kindergartens, or refugee camps. Some 90-95 percent of refugees were being sheltered in private homes7 which, while a good way to prevent them from isolation within the society, also created many problems, especially when the vast majority of the population was living below the poverty line. International humanitarian organizations, such as the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), provided food for the refugees in collective centers, but there were many cases outside these centers where refugees did not receive any aid. This could lead to rising tensions and conflicts between these two populations. Elderly homes were without food, heating oil, and special equipment parts. Emergency health service, fire department, and humanitarian aid cars lacked gasoline. The disastrous situation in the health services might have a long-term effect on the health of the population, especially children. The incidence of diseases such as tuberculosis caused by poverty, malnutrition, and poor hygienic circumstances has already risen in some regions of the country. In parts of central Bosnia almost all the patients who were on dialysis have already died.
Culture, art, education, and the media were also seriously affected by the UN sanctions. There was simply no paper for books and newspapers, no cassettes, compact disks, video cassettes, films, art supplies, foreign books and newspapers, movies, and videos. Funding for science, art, education, and culture has declined, primarily because the national economy cannot provide for these activities. If the average salary was low, it was even less in the cultural field. Many young professionals have left the country, which means a terrible loss for the future. There was much debate on whether the UN sanctions required a complete severing of cultural and scientific cooperation. Many countries, including the U.S. and France, interpreted the sanctions in this way. Thus, individual artists and scholars very rarely succeeded in making a visit abroad. This will have a long-lasting negative effect on both cultural and scientific developments and on political life as well. In this way, the self-isolationist politics of the Milosevic regime were given new strength, as the potential and real forces of an open society were increasingly marginalized. As a result it has become more difficult to fight against the xenophobic nationalist rhetoric that declares: "We are endangered by everyone else," and "We are better than anyone else."
Avery special problem concerns the fate of the independent media. In Serbia and Montenegro, despite the purges the regime conducted within official television and the universities, there were still several independent television and radio stations, one daily newspaper, and a few weekly journals. These outlets were very badly hurt by the sanctions, and it took almost half a year before they were exempted. Although they were the principal critics of the regime and of the politics of war, they could not receive any help from international organizations and private foundations until December 1992.
Life under sanctions forced a significant portion of society to live on the fringes of legality. The black market became a way of life. Of course, the war promoted criminal activity as well. Arms dealers and criminals were presented as patriots, which simply serves to increase their war profit. Although this grim picture has primarily resulted from the sanctions, it is also due to a catastrophic economic policy enacted by the Milosevic regime and its predecessors. The sanctions just deepened the already existing hardships, and most often were used as a cover-up for the inability and corruption of the government. With the sanctions in place, Milosevic was, in fact, provided with the best possible excuse, as all the misery and criminal activity could be attributed to the sanctions.
The character of the Milosevic regime was a mixture of communist heritage and a nationalist mafia that monopolized the still-existing resources. Only pro-regime newspapers had printing paper and ink, only official television had all its needed production materials, and only Milosevic's Socialist Party had sufficient facilities, money, organization, and the means of propaganda. Only banks that collaborated with the regime received fresh supplies of domestic currency out of the printing house to exchange for the hard currency exchanged on the black market. The political elite bought hard currency from people for worthless money, then deposited the real money in foreign private accounts. The sanctions, in reality, did very little damage to the Milosevic regime. The scarcity of resources resulting from the sanctions enabled his regime to thrive on the poverty of the people and to tighten its grip on power. It is difficult to say whether Milosevic and the politics that he represented would have collapsed without the imposition and maintenance of UN sanctions. However, it is certain that the sanctions did not help either to weaken Milosevic or to end the war.
The author of this chapter wants to make it clear that she is not unequivocally opposed to sanctions. On the contrary, they could and should be used more frequently, in all of those circumstances where states are violating international law and perpetrating aggressive actions against their own citizens and citizens of other countries. But sanctions should be differentiated and should always have clear objectives. If the UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro were intended to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they should have been imposed against all of the sides of the conflict and especially against Croatia, whose soldiers were fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If sanctions were a response to major violations of human rights, they should have been imposed against the Milosevic regime much earlier, and against all others who were involved in serious violations of these rights.
The experience of sanctions in Serbia and Montenegro proves that sanctions must be applied more discriminately to hit the intended target. They must affect the government and not the people. They should be aimed at war politics and military production, not the overall economic potential of the country and its prospects for development. They should target the political forces in power and not the genuine opposition, the media used for perpetrating the ideology of hatred and not the voices espousing democratic change. For example, when it became clear that Milan Panic, the first prime minister of the new federal Yugoslavia, was becoming a serious promoter of peace politics in the region and that he had turned against Milosevic and the warmongers, the UN and other international political organizations did nothing substantial to help him. This was a decisive moment of lost opportunity of the war in the Balkans.
A sanctions regime is a much better mechanism for conflict resolution than military intervention. This is true not only because sanctions are nonviolent and conducive to peace politics and common security, but because they could be an appropriate way to teach people democracy and tolerance in cases where positive incentives are not sufficient. Unfortunately, however, this is not how sanctions work today or how they were used in the former Yugoslavia. The international community was neither able nor willing to provide real positive incentives to those who were ready for a transition toward democracy and civic emancipation and promoted the values of a democratic political culture and tolerance. The international community used negative sanctioning as an instrument of undifferentiated punishment for all. In doing so, it strengthened the very power structures that it sought to challenge, and weakened or even destroyed the civil society and political opposition that were the only force capable of removing the regime and its war politics.
1. During a visit of a Helsinki Citizens' Assembly delegation to the Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia in Geneva in January 1993, we were told by a number of international participants that they are aware of the fact that aircraft did not play an important role in this war, and that there were not too many flights during the last few months (most of them probably being Croatian aircraft). They stated that the no-fly zone has much more of a symbolic role than a real role to play in ending the war.
2. Borba, independent daily of Belgrade, discussed this in length on June 29, 1992, pp. 1-3. Coverage of this issue continued in Borba throughout July, 1992.
3. Peter Maass, "As Sanctions Bite, Serbs Look Warily Toward Winter," The Washington Post, August 18,1992, sec. A, p. 1.
4. Stephen Kinzer, "Sanctions Driving Yugoslav Economy into Deep Decline," New York Times, August 31,1992, International edition, sec. A, pp. 1, 5.
5. UN General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, Effects of Sanctions on the Yugoslav Economy and the Humanitarian Situation, Agenda Item: Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations, 1993, p. 2.
6. UN General Assembly, Effects of Sanctions, p. 2.
7. Ibid., p. 3.