Claudette Antoine Werleigh
The case of sanctions against Haiti provides an opportunity to reflect deeply, to analyze and to question the use of economic sanctions as a means to resolve political problems. Often we were asked whether the embargo imposed on Haiti should be lifted or reinforced. As if the question was simple, the media usually expected a one-minute answer. Readers and viewers were led to such dichotomies as "one was either in favor of or against the embargo." The reality was far more complex than this. When questions about the embargo were raised in such a simplistic way, one tended to forget the reason economic sanctions were imposed in the first place. Also, one did not have the opportunity to evaluate the impact of the embargo in different parts of the country or its evolution over time. Most important, one could not explain such paradoxes as seeing the poor in Haiti, although hurt and deeply affected by the embargo, stand by it and exert pressure for strengthening its enforcement, while other groups in the Haitian society who were well-off and far less hurt by its impact press for its end.
When analyzing the embargo in Haiti, we must remember that the original sanctions underwent several permutations, most of which weakened the ability to exert sufficient leverage to persuade the coup leaders in Haiti to give up power. It was not until 1994, following the refusal of the military authorities to relinquish power, that full sanctions mandated by the UN Security Council were put in place, including a full naval blockade on all shipping and commerce save that of humanitarian aid. By this time, however, many felt that even these stronger measures would amount to little, since previous sanctions measures had fallen far short of their goal.
It might be helpful to think of the embargo as possessing three distinct moments. When the original sanctions were mandated there was great enthusiasm expressed by most Haitian people, who thought that the sanctions would hasten the departure of the coup leaders. The Haitian people were well aware of their own limitations, which rendered them defenseless against the repression unleashed by the Haitian armed forces and their paramilitary allies. During the second moment, while sanctions were not welcomed with particular enthusiasm, they were nevertheless accepted by most of the population because the coup leaders opposed them. The sanctions were also perceived as an act of solidarity from the international community. Although the sanctions hurt economically, they nevertheless seemed to succeed politically in isolating the coup leaders. The third moment arrived when it became clear to the Haitian people that not only had the embargo failed to achieve its stated goals, but new financial gains were being made by precisely those whom the sanctions were supposed to target.
Although it was the first black republic in the new world and the first country where a slave revolt was successful, Haiti never fully became a nation. Haitian society has always been extremely divided. For many different reasons, internal as much as external, the economic structure of the country has remained the same since colonial rule. Coffee replaced sugar as the main export, and a new group of rulers, this time Haitians, replaced the former colonial masters. Even though it had become independent, Haiti's economic dependence on foreign countries continued to increase. When the U.S. Marines departed in 1934 after 19 years of total occupation of Haiti's national territory, they left behind the so-called "Garde d'Haiti" (Haitian Military Guard) which later became known as the "Forces Armées d'Haiti" to protect U.S. interests and to serve as the safeguard of the status quo.1
Well-to-do Haitians do not invest much in Haiti. For reasons that can be related to unstable political conditions, they prefer to transfer most of their money to private accounts in the United States or in Europe. Most Haitian people live in subhuman conditions: they have no water supply, little access to health services, and scarcely any food. As a traveler put it some years ago, "never was heaven on earth (the lifestyle of the rich) so close to hell (the living conditions of the poor)." The country has been mismanaged since the early days of its founding. While a tiny minority has been exporting wealth and living the dolce vita, Haitian peasants have been struggling hard to provide food for the local market, to maintain their families at a subsistence level of existence, and to produce goods for export. The conditions in which the Haitian peasant works—on tiny pieces of land, often on mountainous terrain, with obsolete tools and no access to credit; with no technical assistance or access to better seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers—have caused agricultural production to decline year after year. Meanwhile, the population has grown. The resulting heavy pressure on the land, added to all the above factors, could not but generate a profound crisis in the Haitian economy.2
During the 1980s, an attempt was made to diversify the economy. Appealing incentives were offered to foreign capital to encourage investments in light industry. But the lack of infrastructure (roads, electricity, and water) did not allow enough significant and meaningful investments to reverse the state of the economy. In addition, incentives mentioned above included a ten-year tax holiday, so the new factories did not significantly increase Haiti's internal revenue. International aid could have made a difference since a variety of projects were undertaken under bilateral and multilateral agreements. But a lack of vision and political will, combined with corruption among leaders, made it very difficult to obtain steady and tangible results. Growing discontent within the population brought political unrest to the country. As strikes multiplied, several factories closed their doors and moved quietly to the Dominican Republic or to Central America. This was easy since most of them did not make any investment in infrastructure. Primary materials were shipped to them from the United States and could easily be directed elsewhere. Investors had come to Haiti to take advantage of cheap labor and the so-called "stability" provided by dictatorial regimes. As these factors changed, so did their willingness to stay in Haiti.3
After decades of dictatorship, the Haitian people sought to reverse their fate through nonviolent struggle. The elections of 1990 were recognized internationally as fair and democratic. With a massive participation of the population (90 percent of the electorate) Jean-Bertrand Aristide won with 67 percent of the vote.4 The choice of Jean-Bertrand Aristide was first of all a vibrant no to the old order, with its macoutes, repression, extortion, and lack of accountability. It was a deliberate call for a new order, including rights such as equal opportunity for all to find employment, to send their children to school, and to have access to health facilities and justice. During the initial seven months of Jean-Bertrand Aristide's presidency, he did not have the time, nor could he have been able, to make these dreams of the Haitian people a reality. However, under his government, people regained their sense of dignity and confidence. The majority of the population felt that they had become active members of their society. Hope flourished anew. But while the elections of 1990 inspired hope for Haiti's impoverished majority, fear of losing their traditional privileges and power struck the nation's economic elite. For the first time they found that it was not they who influenced the choice of the new government, nor the new president who had long advocated on behalf of the poor. The rich were exhorted by President Aristide to share their wealth and to pay their fair share of taxes. Even this call was met with fear by a class long accustomed to evading any fiscal responsibility. Close oversight and the elimination of rampant corruption had for the first time made the state-owned enterprises profitable, bringing in much needed revenue to the Haitian state. The military coup d'état of 1991 brought this process to a halt.
As he went into exile, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide made a call for help to the Organization of American States (OAS). He made it clear that he did not want any military intervention in Haiti. Ameeting of the foreign ministers of the hemispheric nations was held in early October of 1991. The parties agreed to impose economic sanctions and to refrain from intervening militarily. The OAS message was directed as much to the armed forces of other countries in the region as to the Haitian army. The message was that in this new era of democracy, no military coup to overthrow a duly-elected government would stand.
Because the Haitian economy was very dependent on the outside world for fuel, industrialized products, and even for food, it was believed that the embargo on imported goods would force the coup leaders to agree to negotiations. The argument made sense in theory, but the OAS did not have the structure to implement and control the embargo. It had to rely on each member to respect it. Did all the countries really agree on the embargo? In principle they did, but political and economical groups in the respective countries were not all ready to sacrifice economic gain for the ideal of freedom and democracy in Haiti. Moreover, the Haitian military and their puppet governments used bribery and corruption to maintain the influx of goods.5 It was enough for a boat to fly a Nigerian flag to be free to enter Haitian ports. Fuel was imported from the Dutch Antilles. Planes were landing every night at the international airport, and ordinary citizens would not, and in fact could not, risk their lives to identify either the planes' contents or countries of origin. Finally, products were channeled constantly to Haiti through the Dominican border.
In February 1992 the United States, yielding to pressure from the Haitian and American private sectors, partially lifted the embargo for goods related to the assembly industry (American-owned plants that assemble clothing, electronics, sporting goods, etc.). Countries in Europe, which of course were not members of the OAS, were not bound by the embargo. Some argued that the embargo contradicted some legal or technical aspects of the Lomé Convention between Haiti and the European Economic Community. Even countries that were full members of the OAS openly violated the embargo.6
At the outset of Haiti's political crisis, the government of the Dominican Republic turned a blind eye toward those violating the embargo. Indeed certain sectors in the Dominican business community began to profit handsomely from the illegal trade. Because the Dominican Republic is at a higher stage of development than Haiti, basic products are imported daily from Haiti's island neighbor. Politically speaking, the two governments have traditionally maintained very good relations, and the same is true for relations between the two military institutions. The Dominican government has constantly opposed the sanctions, citing humanitarian concerns. The freewheeling commercial traffic between the Dominican Republic and Haiti came to a halt only when Venezuela threatened to cut the discounted rate for petroleum sold to Santo Domingo.
Other political considerations came into play following the May 1994 general elections in the Dominican Republic, in which widespread allegations of fraud were made by a significant number of Dominicans and international observers. In its quest for international support amid these allegations, and in an attempt to defuse internal and external pressure, the Balaguer government (against whom the fraud charges were leveled) hastily complied with the OAS and UN sanctions by deploying more than 10,000 troops along the border with Haiti, enabling the Dominican authorities to call on the UN to provide technical support. The entire operation was mise en scène—pure theater. Trade continued to be carried out under cover of darkness at newly created trading points along the border, which provided a financial windfall to unscrupulous individuals in both countries.
Dominican officials and others who advocated a lifting of the sanctions argued that the embargo hurt the poor, and that it was destroying the economy of the poorest country in the hemisphere. It was true that the poor in Haiti had been deeply hurt. Clearly the economy of the country deteriorated further. But was the embargo really the cause of this situation? First, the embargo expressly excluded the very necessities of life, such as food or medicines. Second, as pointed out earlier, structural and conjunctural factors were the cause of the decline of the Haitian economy. Third, the greed to make money by any means, whether legal or illegal, combined with the lack of any price control or mechanism for protecting consumers, led to a skyrocketing of prices. Fourth, the embargo was an economic sanction in response to the perturbation of a democratic order. Thus, the coup d'état and not the embargo was the root cause of any suffering. Fifth, the repression that prevailed since the coup d'état caused hundreds of thousands of people to leave their homes and working places. As a result, peasants could not work on their land, and many technicians could not develop and use their skills and knowledge properly. Sixth, to pay bribes to the military to avoid mistreatment or going to jail, peasants were often forced to sell everything they owned (cattle, land, etc.) at very low prices. The return after the coup of local section chiefs, able to terrorize and extort money from the population, wiped away any incentives to invest in economic activities.
Shortly after the embargo was first imposed in November of 1991, the country experienced an apparent scarcity of fuel. This "shortage" may actually have been the effect of hoarding or rationing by the major fuel distributors. Excepting this period, fuel and other goods were plentiful. For all practical purposes, there was no real embargo—it was a porous embargo. Even Augusto Ramirez-Ocampo, the first OAS special envoy to Haiti, echoing Aristide, noted that the embaigo, which he had previously called the "major weapon" in the effort to restore democracy, was "violated systematically, evoking mockery and undermining the credibility and effectiveness of the measures" to return Aristide to power.
The embargo itself was a consequence of a coup d'état and therefore a component of a broader crisis. It would be inaccurate to attribute all the economic disruption to the embargo. An analysis of the crisis requires a very careful examination of the effects of the coup d'état and the real causes of the resulting economic disruption.
A few weeks after the military coup d'état, a scarcity of fuel had a strong and immediate impact on the flow of traffic. Prices of transportation doubled or tripled, causing some small farmers to keep their goods. This induced scarcity in Port-au-Prince, which is the main consumer of these goods, but it created a relative and very localized artificial surplus in some rural areas. For a short time, when the embargo was more strictly applied, people in the countryside had more food for their consumption than was usual. This phenomenon could have had a positive impact on the health conditions of the rural poor, but the surplus did not last long, in part because repression in Port-au-Prince and the major cities caused people to migrate to the countryside. While people in the countryside could not sell some of their products and therefore had to consume them, their access to manufactured goods (soap, oil, kerosene, etc.) became more difficult both because of the high price of transportation and because their revenues had diminished. The duration of the crisis exacerbated the state of an already fractured economy. The longer the crisis, the heavier was the toll on the economy, on the already vulnerable ecology, and on the country's infrastructure.
The coup d'état affected social groups in different ways. Most immediately affected were the industrial workers. More than 30,000 lost their jobs.7 Even more workers belonging to the "informal" sector (shoe repairs, street vendors, etc.) had to cease or slow their activities. Shortages of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides had a negative impact on farmers. In many places, the situation reached the point where peasants resorted to eating the seeds intended for use in the fields. For political reasons, the number of employees in the public sector increased from the September 1991 level. In the private sector, some businesses were negatively affected by the economic sanctions, with scarcity of fuel being the most crucial problem. The crisis caused a distortion of the Haitian economy.
The embargo was the pretext used by some businesses to increase their prices in anticipation of possible shortages. Price changes were made for products already in stock long before the economic sanctions were imposed. Even without shortages, prices rose considerably. The prices of products not included in the embargo, such as food and medicine, also increased.8 Artificial shortages were created, and rumors about the unavailability of some products (mainly fuel) caused people to panic, buying and storing them at almost any price. All of the above phenomena decreased production (both agricultural and industrial) and caused the further deterioration of the local currency, the gourde. In September 1991, U.S. $1.00 equaled 7.65 gourdes. In July 1994 U.S. $1.00 equaled 14.50 gourdes.
For political reasons, the coup leaders expanded the public administration, creating new jobs for members of the political parties opposed to Jean-Bertrand Aristide. At the same time the Office National des Impots (Internal Revenue Service) collected fewer taxes from the wealthy. These simultaneous actions resulted in a deepening of the budget deficit. A common practice in the countryside was extortion by the local "chefs de section."9 Arbitrary taxes were imposed on the rural population at vending posts, mills, and on the roads to market.
Political repression against grassroots organizations and local leaders forced skilled, farmers to move. It is estimated that between 400,000 and 500,000 people were displaced, causing the further deterioration of agricultural production.10 The military and its allies systematically destroyed or stole silos, tools, and equipment. Technicians were prevented from offering their services to the unskilled, and cooperatives were closed. Political repression significantly reduced agricultural production and earnings.11
The smuggling, bribery, and corruption that slowed during the seven months of Jean-Bertrand Aristide's presidency came back openly as a normal way of life.12 Despite the embargo, new tanks, weapons, ammunition, military uniforms, and other imported products found their way to the military in Haiti. There was also a significant increase in drug trafficking.
While it lies beyond the purview of this discussion to fully assess the influence of international drug cartels within the global economy and on international politics, we would be mistaken not to consider the nature of these powerful actors whose activities exacerbated and contributed to the inefficacy of the international sanctions. The agreement by governments in the region to isolate the coup leaders was undermined by a shadowy network of narcotics traffickers that made Haiti one of eight major drug transshipment points in the world. An estimated four tons of drugs were channeled monthly through Haiti by sea and air, much of it cocaine. This earned the Haitian military over $100 million a year.13
Within such a context, it can be easily seen that the economic sanctions failed to reach their target because illicit income served asa cushion to ease the crunch of sanctions. Indeed, the military authorities who controlled all access to ports and airstrips increased their strength in three ways: politically by openly defying the international community, namely the OAS and the UN; militarily by acquiring more weapons and ammunition; and economically by consolidating their wealth.
In early 1993 the newly inaugurated Clinton administration, motivated by embarrassment over Clinton's reversal on the issue of Haitian refugees, put new emphasis on the restoration of democracy in Haiti. This led to a UN oil and arms embargo of Haiti being imposed on June 16 of that year. The imposition of a worldwide arms and oil embargo quickly brought the military to the negotiation table, which resulted in the Governors Island Accord being signed on July 3. The agreement called for the departure of the coup leaders, and President Aristi de's retimi on October 30. Tragically it also allowed for the sanctions to be lifted before President Aristide's return. This set the stage for the military to break their commitments once the embargo was lifted and prevent a return to democracy.
Repression by the Haitian military spiraled in the wake of the dissolution of the Governors IslandAccord. The Haitian military not only reneged on the agreement, but launched a renewed reign of terror against political opponents. In September 1993 Antione Izmery, a Haitian businessman close to President Aristide, was shot dead in broad daylight outside a Portau-Prince church. In October, Justice Minister Guy Malary of the new constitutional government was assassinated. The arrival of military trainers agreed to in the July 3 accord was met by a crowd of unruly demonstrators—numbering around 150—who were amazingly successful in getting the U.S.S. Harlan County to reverse course and steam back to its U.S. port. Soon after that, the United Nations International Civilian Mission in Haiti (UNICMIH) was withdrawn, further contributing to the perception that the international community was unable to counter the intransigence of the coup leaders.
At the same time a concerted campaign to tarnish the exiled Haitian president began in earnest within the U.S. media. A widely circulated CIA report alleged that President Aristide was "mentally unstable," an assessment that the Miami Herald later disproved.14 The New York Times reported that the CIA had relied upon information supplied by Haitian officers on the agency's payroll, including General Cédras himself, who was regularly depicted as urbane, well-mannered, and professional.15 The perception of waning support for Aristide in Washington, combined with the junta's brazen success in flouting the Governors Island Accord, contributed to a growing sense of isolation and even betrayal within Haiti. For its part, the military was emboldened by its success. The character assassination against President Aristide, in particular, convinced the coup leaders that they had powerful friends in Washington who did not want the exiled president to return. Each new atrocity the coup leaders committed was met with a retreat by the international community. This added to the sense of the third moment, described above, in which international sanctions were seen as weak and ineffectual.
The Haitian people, with their keen political wit, made a pun from the sanctions experience. Instead of talking about the anbago (Creole for embargo), they said anba gwo, which meant "under the heel of the rich and powerful." Although it was perfectly clear that the historical exclusion and marginalization of the majority of the population led to the present poverty, it was far easier to blame the economic crisis on the embargo. Raising arguments about structured inequality was perceived to be "political" or "partisan," while blaming the embargo was considered "more scientific." In fact, politics and economics were intrinsically interrelated. The line between the two is hard to draw.
In Haiti's case, it is not possible to evaluate precisely what was due to structural factors and what was the effect of the political crisis; what was due to the unprecedented repression and what could be related to corruption and mismanagement. Another complicating factor is the lack of reliable data because, at the end, there were no longer local people who could monitor the effects of sanctions. Further, the embargo is a sensitive issue where personal, political, emotional, and class factors interfere with cold judgment. Also, there were firms paid to lobby and influence policy makers in the U.S. to advance their personal interests and deliberately spread disinformation about the sanctions. Equally important is the fact that economic sanctions had not been implemented seriously.
The key factor in resolving any problem is strong determination. In Haiti's case, this essential ingredient was consistently missing. The government of the U.S. in particular had little political will to apply economic sanctions for the goal of restoring democracy and returning Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. The U.S. administration sent mixed signals to the coup leaders, unduly prolonging the crisis and contributing to the worsening of social, political, environmental, and economic conditions in Haiti.
Regarding Haiti, clearly the combination of economic and diplomatic measures could have been effective. Freezing the assets of the coup leaders, revoking their visas, and truly isolating the de facto government would have brought the military and coup leaders to the negotiating table in a matter of weeks, leading to a quick resolution of the crisis. All these developments contributed to a perception—correctly interpreted by both the Haitian people and the military—that the political will necessary to pressure the military to step down or to assist in returning Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency did not exist.
Significant lessons may be learned from the ineffectual economic sanctions applied against Haiti. First, all parties responsible for implementing sanctions must clearly demonstrate a strong and decisive political will. Second, there must be a clear and common objective. In Haiti's case, the restoration of democracy and the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the ostensible goals of sanctions, stood in contrast to the concerns of other regional powers, namely the prevention of boat people reaching their shores. Third, there must be complete cooperation from neighboring countries. Otherwise, any embargo will remain porous and the sanctions will fail to bring about their intended results.
1. Georges A. Fauriol, "Haiti: National Security", in Dominican Republic and Haiti, Country Studies, Library of Congress Federal Research Division Area Handbook Series, ed. Richard A. Haggerty (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 353-55.
2. United Nations Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 46, 1992 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), pp. 236-37.
3. Michael S. Hooper, "How U.S. Policies Contribute to Haiti's Misery," Utne Reader, May/June 1987, pp. 58-59.
4. Washington Office on Haiti, Report on the Elections of December 16, 1990, (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Haiti, March 1991), p. 25.
5. Ambassador Jean Casimir, "Haiti after the Coup," World Policy Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 572.
6. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Evidence Regarding Non-Compliance with the OAS Embargo, GAO/NSIAD B-248S28, (Washington, D.C.: GAO, May 27, 1992).
7. Linda Robinson and Mike Tarr, "Striking out against Neighborhood Bullies," U.S. News and World Report, February 17,1992, p. 32.
8. Yearbook of the United Nations, p. 236-37.
9. Mats Lundahl, "Commentary, Underdevelopment in Haiti: Some Recent Contributions," journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 23, 1991, pp. 416-17.
10. La Commission Permanente Sur L'Aide D'Urgence (CPAU), "Agriculture, Environment, and Rural Infrastructure, Situation before September 30,1991," in Aide D'Urgence: Diagnostic Lignes Stratégiques Axes D'Intervention, Regroupement Inter-OPD (Port-au-Prince: CP AU, Août 1992), p. 8.
11. Lundahl, "Commentary," pp. 426-28. See also "Fugitives from Injustice: The Crisis of Internal Displacement in Haiti," a report published by Human Rights Watch (formerly Americas Watch), in conjunction with Jesuit Refugee Service/U.S.A., and National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Volume VI, Number 10, August 1994, p. 26-28.
12 Haiti: A Country in Chaos (Washington, D.C.: ACCESS Resource Brief, November 1992), p. 1.
13. David Corn, "Déjà Voodoo," The Nation, Vol. 257, No. 16, November 15, 1993, p. 559.
14. Chris Marquis, "CIA Report on Aristide was False," Miami Herald, December 2, 1990.
15. Tim Wiener, "CIA Formed Haitians' Unit, Later Tied to Narcotics Trade," New York Times, November 14, 1993, p. 1.