Alexander Konovalov, Sergey Oznobistchev and Dmitry G. Evstafiev
The increased use of international, political, and economic sanctions has provoked several complicated political and legal conflicts. First, the implementation of economic sanctions has the possibility of influencing the internal politics of different countries and threatening the absolute sovereignty of a nation. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of the United Nations maintains that in the post-Cold War era, the UN may want to redefine national sovereignty, placing more limitations on what was once regarded as inviolable. This idea should be approached with some caution. Although the theory has been widely discussed as an advanced viewpoint, it bears a striking resemblance to the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine issued in the mid 1960s. Put in practice, that policy led to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The idea of limited sovereignty can thus lead to a new imperialism. We need more sharply focused ideas about when sanctions should be used, how they should be enforced, and how decisions should be made to lift them. The most pressing task for the UN is to establish a proper legal basis for the employment of sanctions that would be according to the realpolitik principles of international politics accepted by the leading nations in the developed and developing world.
The second conflict is related to the first, namely the problem of a clear and unquestionable definition of the mandate for sanctions. During the Iraqi crisis many questions were raised about the extent to which the United States and its allies had the right to supersede that mandate in their attempt to influence the internal life of that country. In the future, the UN mandate and the legal basis for economic and political sanctions regimes should be precise and detailed. The limits of UN-related activity must also be clearly defined. Sanctions cannot serve as the sole element of a UN-based international crisis response and management mechanism. Sanctions should be supplemented by other efforts, including effective international peacekeeping mechanisms and the use of positive rather than negative inducements.
Russia is likely to support international economic and political sanctions when there is a clear-cut understanding of their objectives. However, it will not always be possible for Russia to support the call of other nations to impose international sanctions. Russian objections to sanctions might stem from two sources. The first is that sanctions, both economic and political, always involve the use of force, although indirectly. The second is that the nature and geographic character of the conflicts in which sanctions are likely to be implemented in the future might involve situations that would obviously affect the security interests of Russia. Therefore, Russia cannot be expected to unequivocally transfer its decision-making rights to any regional or international body.1 In this regard we must conclude that one of the most dangerous tendencies that can jeopardize the situation is the diversification of the number of bodies that can or do adopt practical decisions about the employment of sanctions. Another important problem for Russia is securing objectivity in using international sanctions. The sanctions regime should not be turned into a tool of "post-Cold War imperialism" in which any group of countries can punish a nation or nations with whom they do not agree.
In Iraq's case, the basic decision to employ sanctions was adopted by the UN Security Council, and several other international organizations followed suit. But when economic and political sanctions were employed against the former Yugoslavia, the leading role was played by the European Community (EC). Germany also put pressure on the United Nations and took the lead in formulating UN policy. In this situation, the EC countries were prepared to employ sanctions despite any decision the United Nations might have made. This tendency could lead to the imposition of economic and political sanctions by a regional or political organization in which Russia has little or no influence. Within the framework of the Security Council, Russia still possesses the right to exercise a veto; it can block activities that contradict its national interests. In other organizations and structures, however, there is no such possibility, even if the sanctions threaten the economic, political, or security interests of Russia. Additionally, participation in a regime of economic and political sanctions may involve the deployment of direct military force to enforce the sanctions. This involves serious and sensitive aspects of national security. The Russian government believes that any sanctions policy that involves military activity, including the deployment of Russian military forces as members of a peacekeeping force, involves serious and sensitive aspects of national security and should only be made by the state body of the Russian Federation, which has the power to declare war.
The Russian Federation needs to establish guidelines for the implementation of sanctions policy, its legislature needs to consider the impact of a decision to participate in a sanctions regime on the internal political situation in Russia, and it must be prepared to defend and argue the case for that decision. When the Soviet Union participated in the initial introduction of economic and political sanctions against Iraq, that action produced neither political turmoil nor any outcry about unbearable economic losses. This was partly because of the nature of the conflict, i.e., unprovoked aggression by Iraq against a sovereign country, Kuwait. Participation was also facilitated because the Soviet Union articulated a clear explanation of its position. Not even the extreme communist opposition argued against the initial introduction of sanctions, although it harshly criticized the use of military force against Iraq and condemned the continuation of sanctions after Baghdad accepted the cease-fire.
On the other hand, the economic sanctions imposed against the two republics remaining in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, produced internal political turmoil and highlighted the split in opinion among Russian leaders. Although it is popular in the West to attribute the depth of negative feelings about the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia to procommunist groups or to the historical and religious ties between Russia and Serbia, it is a mistake to do so. While the Yeltsin administration may feel comfortable labeling the opposition procommunist and antidemocratic, in this case at least, that description is not accurate. It could have been partially true regarding former Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, who at the time of the debate was already shifting his allegiance to the opposition. But such an approach is completely incorrect regarding other political figures who expressed doubts about Russia's position regarding the sanctions against Yugoslavia. For example, one of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's fiercest critics was the chairman of the Committee on the Foreign Economic Relations of the former Russian Supreme Soviet (disbanded in September 1993), Evgeny Ambartsumov, who now is a participant in the Yabloko faction in the State Duma.2
The Russian Foreign Ministry has also been widely criticized by opposition groups for its participation in the continued regime of sanctions against Iraq. It should be noted, however, that the criticism is much weaker than that regarding Serbia and relates to the Russian role in the decision-making process. The focal point of political discussions has become the question of the authority of implementation. The U.S. Air Force bombing of the Iraqi air defense batteries in January 1993 produced turmoil among the Russian political and military elites. The reason for such a nervous reaction was not the bombing itself, (no one expressed doubts about the necessity for doing so) but two interrelated aspects of the problem. First, Russia was not consulted before the bombing, and the U.S. thereby demonstrated that it was ready to act independently. The Russian Ministry of Defense newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, in its initial response to the U.S. actions argued that the UN had not granted the U.S. and allied forces the right to use immediate military actions.3 Second, the mandate for sanctions and related military arrangements (including the "no-fly zone") was poorly defined. From the Russian politicians' point of view, there was not a proper legal formula for the action that occurred. Krasnaya Zvezda published an editorial with the title, "Is the Legal Formula for Intervention Needed?" criticizing U.S. actions for their "selectivity" and the absence of legal grounds for action.4
The subject of sanctions is generally used in connection with the growing activity of influential conservative groups as a basis for challenging the course of the democratic government in the sphere of foreign policy. Among these groups are the Congress of Russian Communities, the Zemstvo Movement, and the Union of the Orthodox Christian Brotherhoods. This opposition is beyond the hysterical criticism of the procommunist and extreme nationalist political groups that reject the very foundations of Russian foreign policy. The question of Russian participation in the future of sanctions is becoming more of a domestic policy problem and less of a foreign policy issue. Certain changes in Russian policy toward sanctions in the former Yugoslavia, particularly the proposal to widen the scope of sanctions beyond Serbia, are the first steps toward a more conservative foreign policy approach that considers Russian ethnic and religious sympathies. Russia may again become a difficult partner in cooperative security matters. The domestic opposition stemming from Russia's participation in these controversial sanctions regimes is a result, at least in part, of mistakes made by the executive branch. Sanctions were adopted without a proper understanding and articulation of the Russian Federation's position in each conflict. Further, the policies were adopted without being discussed or approved in the legislative branch, and the conditions for the ending of the sanctions regimes were never outlined.
The adoption of sanctions against Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent against Iraq, was perceived by many political elites, including some pro-Yeltsin figures, as conciliation to the policy of the West, without regard for independent Russian national interests.5 The situation was aggravated when the Foreign Ministry refused to discuss the matter, while referring to the "interests of the world community"6 and labeling its opponents "red-browns."7 As a result, the policy not only gave ammunition to the procommunist opposition, it also radicalized moderates. Thus, Mr. Kozyrev was acting in isolation on these matters, supported only by Yeltsin himself and the Choice of Russia faction in the State Duma. At the same time, Russian foreign policymakers were trying to broaden support through the slogans of the national patriotic opposition. Russian political discourse has been rife with "great imperial" motives and appeals to the national interest of Russia.
If the Russian Federation is to prevent such negative domestic fallout in the future, it should adopt a special legislative procedure to address the issues raised when Russia participates in sanctions regimes. Such legislation should consider the following principles. First, the procedure for decision making should be clearly delineated. This should obviously include some means of reconciling any differences in the positions of the executive and legislative branches, and it should provide for open discussion of the issues with representatives of different political groups and parties. Second, Russian policy on sanctions should be specifically defined by legislation and regulation. The articulation of Russian policy should be independent of the position of the world community or of any international organization. Nonetheless, it is in the interests of Russia to further promote the consolidation of international decision making within the UN Security Council. This will prevent both fragmentation of the world community and an increase in political ambitions of newly appeared regional subsuperpowers. Additionally, this would prevent the possibility of unlawful use of sanctions to achieve the egoistic objectives of a particular country or group of countries. A process should be initiated within the UN Security Council framework to reconcile different national laws on sanctions, with the goal of developing a universally accepted and codified mechanism for economic and political sanctions.
Many remaining questions need to be answered regarding internationally imposed and enforced sanctions. Because of the long Cold War and the ineffectiveness of UN mechanisms, the international community lacks experience in the field of joint efforts to influence the foreign and domestic policies of other nations. Recent attempts to impose sanctions should be considered only the first steps toward the creation of a set of internationally recognized peacemaking mechanisms. In neither the case of Iraq nor Yugoslavia did the introduction of sanctions lead to the fulfillment of the goals articulated by the international community, though the sanctions did undermine vital areas of the target countries' economies. The indiscriminate introduction of sanctions may help consolidate or even strengthen the power of the targeted nation's leader. Additionally, an embargo on certain types of deliveries may help prevent the escalation of conflict. In the Yugoslavian case, the position of leader may have been solidified, but the sanctions did succeed in decreasing the intensity of the conflict.
A study of the present record of sanctions, with all its successes and failures, could yield extremely neh material for improving interstate Cooperation in peacekeeping. Although more study and discussion of the record are necessary, some preliminary conclusions are possible. First, internationally imposed economic and political sanctions have proven to be a highly complex problem for all participants in the process; they can have unexpected effects on both international and domestic politics. Sanctions should not be regarded as an instrument of routine political interaction between nations, but as an extraordinary instrument to be adopted only after careful study of all the circumstances. Secondly, UN sanctions cannot be effective without regional cooperation. In practical terms, a military blockade can only be effectively introduced under conditions of regional consensus. For example, the inability of regional powers, the United States and its Western allies, to seal the Iraqi/ Jordanian border lessened the effectiveness of the sanctions regime in Iraq. If any other neighboring country had violated the sanctions in an open or tacit way, the whole regime would have become useless. Clearly the proper implementation of the sanctions regime demands active regional cooperation both political and economic.
1. Andrei Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, May/June 1994, p. 61.
2. On numerous occasions, Mr. Ambartsumov expressed his dissatisfaction with Mr. Kozyrev's policy towards the former Yugoslavia. For the most severe criticism see his interview, "Evgeny Ambartsumov: Pragmatism is What We Need Now," Krasnaya Zvezda, (The Red Star), February 11,1993.
3. Krasnaya Zvezda, January 15,1993.
4. Krasnaya Zvezda, January 16,1993.
5. In addition to Mr. Evgeny Ambartsumov, we could name Mr. Sergei Stankevitch, former political adviser for Yeltsin; Mr. Oleg Soskovets, First Vice-Premier; Mr. Sergei Glaziev, former minister for foreign economic relations; and other figures.
6. For the classic example of this approach see: Andrei Kozyrev, "Renewal of the Kafkian Metamorphoses," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (The Independent Newspaper), August 20,1992. Also see his interview, Andrei Kozyrev, "There are More Internal Enemies than External Ones," in Kuranti, April 16,1993.
7. The de facto alliance of hardline communists and fascist elements in post-Soviet Russian politics.