Christopher C. Joyner
The United Nations' increased reliance on international sanctions raises interest in how political consensus can be fashioned through international legal channels to make sanctions more effective instruments. This is made more difficult when one considers the decentralized nature of the international legal system, which is not endowed with sophisticated lawmaking and law enforcing procedures like those associated with domestic sanctions within states. Other issues are raised as well: What systems and institutions must be fortified to increase the chances that sanctions will be effective? How can the political will of sanctioning countries be maintained to enforce a sanctions regime over time?
It is important to note at the outset that the notion of efficacy is not necessarily synonymous with that of "success." It is entirely possible that sanctions could be effective in terms of breaking commercial relations, imposing economic costs, and fulfilling a punitive role, yet ultimately not be successful in achieving their stated political objectives.1 When considering efficacy, we must consider the goals and objectives of a sanctions operation. If sanctions are used simply as a signal by the imposers that a particular course of action is unacceptable, then it may be unnecessary to examine the actual economic impact of the measures on the target state since the objective has been achieved. If, however, sanctions also seek to bring about an actual policy shift by the target state, such as the withdrawal of troops or the cessation of hostilities, then it becomes vital to consider whether the economic penalties will be sufficient to cause this result.
Several of the following conditions may increase the likelihood of an effective sanctions operation. First, sanctions measures should be imposed quickly, and should be sweeping in scope. Second, international support for the measures must be strong, despite costs inflicted on the sanctioning nations. Third, the sanctioning nations must maintain their determination to achieve their goal over time. Fourth, it must be determined that the target state is actually vulnerable to sanctions. This means that the deviant state must be reliant upon international trade and has little chance of developing self-sufficiency for embargoed goods or successfully undertaking evasion strategies, e.g., by encouraging cheating by sanctioning states.
Efficacy can also be adversely affected by certain unintended events that could occur in the target state. It is possible that sanctions might actually create a stronger sense of internal solidarity in the target state by generating a rally-around-the-flag effect. The extent to which that population is willing to accept lower standards of living will directly influence how much economic punishment is required to produce a successful sanctions effort.2
As instruments of self-help in international law, sanctions can serve several objectives and goals. Sometimes they may be preventive, by seeking to preclude the commission of an illegal act or deny a violator from achieving its objective after committing an illegal act.3 More often, though, sanctions assume a punitive nature by representing the "penalty attached to transgression and breach of international law" in the form of "punitive actions initiated... against one or more states for violating a universally approved charter, as inducements to follow, or refrain from following, that particular course of conduct and conform with international law."4 Thus, punishment is often coupled with the intent of a sanctioning state to inflict sufficient economic harm to compel a change in the behavior of the target state.
While the instrumental objective is implicit in most instances of sanctions, other objectives may also come into play. Perhaps most significant among these is to send a clear signal to the target state that its behavior is unacceptable to the international community. In this manner, notice is served that further illegal action or a continuation of the present illegal action may lead to more serious measures.
Economic sanctions supply a useful function by providing a means to demonstrate disapproval that is stronger than diplomatic protest, but falls short of resort to armed force. In a broader sense, sanctions aim to isolate the target from the rest of the international community and thereby deprive it of the benefits of international intercourse. This function may also satisfy domestic pressures in a sanctioning state, where the population has demanded some action by the leadership.5
The imposition of sanctions is not without costs to sanctioning states, however. Lost trading opportunities, suspended contracts, and elaborate implementation mechanisms can impose significant costs that vary according to a sanctioning state's size and relationship to the target state. The fact that governments are aware of these costs, yet implement sanctions in spite of them, underscores the political determination and will of sanctioning states to show disapproval of an offending state's actions.6
The array of economic measures available to the United Nations Security Council for enhancing the political efficacy of a sanctions operation is impressive.7 First, a boycott can be put into effect against a target state's commerce. A complete prohibition on the import of all commodities and products originating in the target state can be imposed by Security Council resolution,8 or such action could be directed only at halting sales of critical commodities whose trade is needed by the target state to secure foreign exchange earnings. The political efficacy of a sanctions operation can also be reinforced by the imposition of an embargo against all the exports of goods or services to the target state. Although an embargo should be total in scope, provisions can allow for the possibility of exceptions for humanitarian aid or medical supplies, approved by the appropriate sanctions committee in consultation with the Security Council.
UN sanctions against a deviant state might also include financial restrictions. To intensify economic isolation, a complete ban could be imposed on all financial transactions and transfers of funds to the target government or to any other entity in that state.9 Another means for enhancing the political efficacy of international sanctions involves the imposition of contract restrictions on presanctions commercial arrangements with the target state. Such obligations may undermine the sanctions regime. An order by the UN Security Council could stipulate that its provisions must be upheld by all states irrespective of any contract entered into or license granted before sanctions were implemented.10
Imposition of a multinational naval interdiction, if needed, should be approved by the Security Council to carry out the sanctions operation. In an effort to tighten the enforcement of the sanctions, cargoes and destinations must be verified to ensure strict compliance with sanctions provisions contained in the appropriate Security Council resolution.11 Authorization can also be given for the detention of vessels belonging to the target state implicated in violations of the sanctions order, but which have entered foreign ports.12 To complement the naval interdiction, an air embargo might also be imposed. Under the terms of a sanctions order, states should be prohibited from permitting the takeoff of any aircraft from their territory that might carry cargo to or from the target state, unless it is a specially designated shipment approved as part of authorized humanitarian or medical efforts. States should also deny overflight permission to any aircraft bound for the target state, unless inspection of its caigo at a designated airfield determines that such caigo does not violate sanctions prohibitions. Supervision of the air embargo should be entrusted to the Sanctions Committee, which would be authorized to receive reports of implementation measures taken by participating states.53
Still another facet of enhancing the political efficacy of a sanctions operation involves travel restrictions. As a matter of course, travel restrictions to and from the target state should be imposed on an individual basis by governments in support of the broader aims of the sanctions program. Notable exceptions might be made in the cases of diplomatic initiatives and evacuations of third-country nationals.
Imposition and strict enforcement of an embargo on arms remains critical to any international sanctions effort. The appropriate embargo provision on commodities and products should include weapons or any other military equipment as prohibited items." Depending on the special circumstances of the target state, this dimension of the operation might be expanded to include a more detailed listing of prohibited items, including conventional arms, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and services related to technical support and training.
The Sanctions Committee. The political efficacy of a UN sanctions regime is activated by the Security Council's creation of a special committee on sanctions, the composition of which includes all members of the Security Council. Its mandate should include review of the responses from states concerning measures taken in support of the sanctions resolution and acquisition of further information about the implementation process as required.15 Observations and recommendations based on the Sanctions Committee's findings can then be conveyed to the Security Council. The scope of activity of the Sanctions Committee can be broadened in subsequent resolutions to include regular briefings by the Secretary General on matters related to humanitarian assistance.16 Authority can also be granted to the committee to examine and recommend appropriate action regarding requests made by states under Article 50,17 and responsibility can be assigned for monitoring and approving flights by aircraft to or from the target state.18 The committee might also be charged with the responsibility of approving exceptions to sanctions in cases of humanitarian assistance.19 The work of a sanctions committee in facilitating implementation by states is made effective largely through the reporting requirement20 and the possibility of inflicting negative publicity on states whose efforts fall short of the requirements.
Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is a body created by the UN Charter to advise the Security Council on military matters, with special attention to the command and deployment of military forces under council control Article 47(2) specifies that the committee is comprised of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council, or their representatives. Chairmanship is to rotate monthly. Paralysis of the Security Council during the Cold War decades and failure to develop the military arm of the council as envisaged in Articles 43-48 of the charter has rendered the Military Staff Committee (MSC) moribund since its creation. It meets only occasionally without any pressing mandate, and its personnel are at the junior level. The recent UN sanctions operations have prompted agreement by the United States and Russia to re-examine the MSC considering the military-related provisions of Security Council resolutions.21 Yet no new sanctions role has been assigned to the MSC and its precise usefulness for UN sanctions efforts remains undefined.
The Sanctions Committee and the Military Staff Committee are both intended as mechanisms to coordinate and facilitate the implementation of sanctions measures by states in the hope of achieving a more unified response. As with any international body, however, the power of the Sanctions and Military Staff Committees lies solely in the political willingness of governments to delegate authority to them and thereby to accept their decisions and guidance. As one might have expected, that power has been noticeably limited in recent UN sanctions efforts, as national governments have preferred to retain control of sanctions operations through their own domestic laws and regulations.
National Enforcement. The measures described previously consist largely of decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council under the mandate and authority of relevant sections of the UN Charter. These measures are binding upon members and carry the full force of law. Their effects, however, cannot be appreciated without noting that actual implementation of such measures must take place at the national level. It is at the national level that enforcement and decisions of compliance become critical considerations.
Each national government has developed its own particular means for implementing international sanctions. As a leading advocate in recent years for imposing sanctions against deviant states, the United States government finds its legislative basis for taking implementing actions in four principal acts: the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (ΝΕΑ), the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA), and the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA). The International Emergency Economic Powers Act22 authorizes the president to investigate, regulate, or prohibit transactions with a particular country if a situation exists which threatens American national interests. To invoke these powers, a national emergency must be declared through the issuance of an executive order in accordance with the National Emergencies Act.23 Authorization to impose sanctions in accordance with a mandatory decision by the UN Security Council is also granted to the president by virtue of the United Nations Participation Act.24 Although not invoked during recent UN sanctions episodes, additional basis for the regulation of economic relations is provided by the Trading with the Enemy Act,25 which is operable only after a formal declaration of war by the Congress.
While each state retains the sovereign right to implement international sanctions however it sees fit, the fact remains that participating governments must legislate the means to enforce sanctions regulations. Whether by executive decree or legislative fiat, this facet of an international sanctions operations remains critical for ensuring its enforcement. The importance of international coordination should not be undervalued. Administration and oversight remain pivotal to the effectiveness of the sanctions regime, especially in light of inherent differences in existing national legislation, individual legislative processes, and bureaucratic capabilities to adjust to complex implementation measures.
Having set forth the scope, authority, and implementation of international sanctions, it is useful to consider how political efficacy and enforcement work. Why do governments comply with a Security Council order for sanctions against a certain state? What combination of political, legal, and economic factors can enhance the political efficacy for an international sanctions mandate, and how might those factors be translated into viable policy preferences in the future?
Several factors must be weighed by a government in its calculus to decide whether to support international legal principles or to seek greater benefit by ignoring or violating such principles. These include:
Several factors help to explain why compliance is most often the preferred choice. These factors become salient considerations of political efficacy.
Self-interest. Independent sovereign states would have little incentive to accept obligations to a system of international law unless certain tangible benefits were perceived as derived in the process. Perhaps chief among the benefits of complying is that of the predictability of relations that adherence to international legal rules conveys. International law establishes a framework for conducting orderly relations with other states that facilitates important activities such as trade, diplomatic exchanges, and travel. This creates expectations by states that others will comply with international norms as well. Economic concerns weigh heavily upon a state's compliance decision. In most cases, the growing interdependence of the world economy creates a common desire among states for friendly and cooperative relations to foster productive economic intercourse. In contemporary UN sanctions, self-interest plays a preeminent role. Governments perceive that a fundamental norm of international order, namely Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, has been violated and a legal remedy is required. Some states may be concerned about becoming the target of punitive measures themselves, and are thus persuaded to uphold the sanctions, thereby validating the legal rules involved.
Peer Pressure and Public Opinion. The political efficacy of sanctions may also be enhanced because of peer pressure and public opinion at both the domestic and international levels. States are concerned with national honor and prestige, and may be afraid of opposing world public opinion. Thus, they often opt to take the particular course of action perceived as best benefiting their standing in the world community. Public opinion on the domestic level may demand a response by the nation's leadership to a brutal or repulsive international act, resulting in sanctions measures. Fear of opposing world public opinion may also produce a similar effect. As a prime example, the international effort against Saddam Hussein gained considerable momentum when prisoners of war were paraded before television cameras as the world watched in horror and outrage.
Ethics and Morality. While it remains difficult to speak of a single international code of ethics, there nonetheless exists some notion of international standards widely accepted by states as a guide to their international actions. In a real sense, these standards are linked to world public opinion, which is said to reflect the conscience of mankind. These values—peaceful relations, nonintervention, human rights, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for national sovereignty, and so forth—are embodied in international law in treaties, customs, and general principles of law. In this context, the brutal invasion of a tiny state by an aggressive neighbor led by a man portrayed as a murderous dictator became a real factor in fostering international compliance with the sanctions effort against Iraq. Similarly, widespread reports of murder, torture, rape, mass executions, and other brutalities by Serbians against Bosnian Muslims during 1992 persuaded governments to use the Security Council to enact international sanctions against Serbia.
Legitimacy of Authority. Sanctions have often been employed as a tool of foreign policy by an individual state seeking to achieve its own ends. A marked distinction must be drawn between such cases, which fall under techniques of economic warfare, and mandatory enforcement actions taken by the Security Council according to the UN Charter. The latter claims an authoritative basis in a multilateral treaty that is binding upon most of the world community, and thereby conveys an extraordinary degree of legitimacy in the international system. This concept is associated with pacta sunt servanda, that is, the principle that treaties agreed to in good faith are legally binding on the parties.27 When weighing the question of compliance with sanctions, governments clearly are mindful of the duty under international law to uphold their treaty obligations, lest their national credibility is damaged regarding the fulfillment of other obligations. The Security Council reminds states of this principle in each sanctions resolution, which calls for the participation of all member states in the sanctions effort and specifically implies that violators could be subjected to Security Council action.
The variety of self-interest factors, the pressure of peers, domestic and world public opinion, the notion of international "justice," and the lawful basis of authority all combine to enhance the political efficacy of sanctions.
Intimidation Through Enforcement Means. The actual means by which international sanctions can be enforced by sanctioning states take a variety of forms. At the international level, perhaps the most visible means of enforcement will be the naval interdiction. Comprised of warships from various governments, naval forces should be authorized to use the minimum force necessary to halt any shipments of cargo that violate the UN resolutions. Signals would first be given by radio, loudspeaker, flags, or other means, including warning shots across the bow. Suspicious ships could then be boarded to inspect the cargo.28 Vessels found violating the sanctions can either be turned away or impounded. An international sanctions effort can also be assisted by reconnaissance technology. Observation aircraft and satellites can be used to monitor aircraft, ships, and vehicles attempting to break the embargo. By publicly announcing suspected violations, enforcing states aim to embarrass a derelict government so it will enact tighter national enforcement measures.
There are instances when a government might conclude, based upon its appraisal of the cost/benefit question, that violation of international law produces greater advantage than does compliance. Factors that may particularly appeal to a decision not to comply include excessive economic costs, lack of political will, lack of clarity of norms allegedly violated and insufficient commitment among those comprising the international consensus to impose sanctions. The cost dimension is a particularly salient consideration. It is not unusual for international sanctions to impose very high costs on sanctioning states, which can exact weighty repercussions on their national economies.
Furthermore, if costs are high, and the sanctions effort continues over a prolonged period, the likelihood increases that a sanctioning state's resolve will weaken. Such a situation also may occur if the burden of sanctions is distributed disproportionately among the sanctioning states.29
The importance of the cost consideration is addressed by Article 50 of the UN Charter, which allows states to request assistance if they are adversely affected by mandatory enforcement measures. Such requests are reviewed by the appropriate sanctions committee,30 and liability for damages is likely to be assessed against the target state. The Security Council is also likely to create a compensation fund and establish procedures for lodging claims.31 Other measures taken by states to lessen costs to enjoining states include increased economic opportunities to offset displaced goods and low-cost lending by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.32
A second factor that may induce violation concerns the political will of a particular government. Even if a state has the necessary implementation mechanisms in place in its domestic law, the degree to which such measures are enforced depends mainly on the earnest commitment of the leaders of that government. Reluctance to enforce regulations might not be expressed in public statements supporting the sanctions, but can become evident by a government's lengthy delays in implementing sanctions regulations.33 A third factor, sometimes problematic for political efficacy, relates to the strength of international consensus supporting the goals, objectives, and means of the sanctions effort. The absence of clearly defined intentions in any of these areas may weaken the effort by creating a situation in which states are asked to expend great time and expense in support of an ill-conceived enforcement action.
Analysis of contemporary UN sanctions operations points out particular lessons from those episodes and general trends for the broader notions of security regimes and compliance enforcement.
Sanctions approved by the United Nations have not, in and of themselves, been successful in radically altering the domestic conduct or foreign policy behavior of target states. The pressure imposed has been insufficient, and the will asserted and the means adopted by the UN membership to repress a target state have been less than steadfast. Sanctions by the United Nations must therefore be viewed as achieving only halfhearted success. Sanctions might make life more difficult for a target state by extracting a cost for its deviant behavior, but often that cost is not high enough to convince that state to change its policies. UN sanctions thus remain much like a primitive tax on a state for its illicit conduct, rather than a compelling measure to coerce compliance with international norms.
Nonetheless, no state is impervious to the effects of economic sanctions, although those effects may only be minimal. All states depend on foreign trade for securing foreign exchange, obtaining needed imports, acquiring markets for exports, and attracting foreign investment. To the extent that sanctions imposed by the United Nations successfully disrupt those activities, the impact will be felt by a target state. In the end, the political efficacy of sanctions imposed by the United Nations will be only as strong as member states permit. That is the essence of political effectiveness: States must work together to make sanctions work well. Members of the United Nations must exercise sufficient political will, national determination, and sometimes economic sacrifice to make international sanctions work. Otherwise, they will remain more symbol than substance—a failure that will undoubtedly long delay attainment of anything approaching a just New World Order governed by the rule of law.
1. Christopher Joyner, "The Transnational Boycott as Economic Coercion in International Law: Policy, Place, and Practice," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 17, 1984, pp. 205, 225-27.
2. Maarten Smeets, "Economic Sanctions Against Iraq: The Ideal Case?" Journal of World Trade, Vol. 24, Dec. 1990, p. 115.
3. Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Sanctions (London: Oxford University Press, 1938) p. 14.
4. M.S. Daoudi and M.S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Meals and Experience (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 8.
5. When used to satisfy domestic pressures, there is a danger that the national government may present overinflated goals to the population. In doing so, the domestic situation may be worsened if the sanctions measures are unable to achieve such goals. David Leyton-Brown, ed., The Utility of International Economic Sanctions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 306.
6. Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Center for International Affairs, 1981), p. 86; and Leyton-Brown, Utility of Economic Sanctions, p. 305.
7. See James Ngobi's chapter in the present volume.
8. See e.g., Security Council Resolution 661, paragraph 3(a) (1990) for the case of Iraq. In the case of Libya, Security Council Resolution 748 (1992) aims mainly to deny permission to Libyan aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly states' territory, as well as prohibit the supply and servicing of aircraft and components to Libya (Security Council Resolution 748, paragraph 4). For Serbia, air restrictions are contained in Security Council Resolution 757, paragraph 4.
9. As, for example, the measures authorized against Iraq in Security Council Resolution 661, paragraph 4.
10. This was done in the case of Iraq by Security Council Resolution 661, paragraph 5 and for Serbia in Security Council Resolution 757, paragraph 11.
11. This was accomplished in the case of Iraq by UN Security Council Resolution 665 (1990), paragraph 1. For Serbia, see Security Council Resolution 757, paragraph 12.
12. In the case of Iraq, see UN Security Council Resolution 670 (1990). For Serbia, see Security Council Resolution 787, paragraphs 12 and 13.
13. In the case of Iraq, an air embargo was imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 670. Similarly, such an air embargo entails the main sanction directed in Security Council Resolution 748 against Libya and by Security Council Resolution 757, paragraph 7(a) against Serbia.
14. For Iraq, an arms embargo is mandated by Security Council Resolution 661. in paragraph 3. For Libya, an arms embargo is affirmed in Security Council Resolution 748, paragraph 5. For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia), an arms embargo is mandated by Security Council Resolution 713, paragraph 6.
15. Separate Sanctions Committees have been formed to deal with each particular sanctions operation. For Iraq, see Security Council Resolution 661, paragraph 6. For Libya, see Security Council Resolution 748, paragraph 9. For Serbia, see Security Council Resolutions 724, paragraph 5(b) and 757, paragraph 13.
16. For example, this was done for Iraq through UN Security Council Resolution 666 (1990), paragraph 3.
17. See UN Security Council Resolution 669 (1990), Preamble paragraph 5.
18. For Iraq, see UN Security Council Resolution 670 (1990), paragraph 3; for Serbia, see Security Council Resolution 757, paragraph 13.
19. As exemplified against Iraq by UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1990), paragraphs 20 and 23 and against Serbia by Security Council Resolution 757, paragraph 13.
20. For Iraq, see Resolution 687, paragraph 6; for Libya, see Resolution 748, paragraphs 8 and 9. For Serbia, see Resolution 757, paragraphs 12 and 13.
21. Paul Lewis, "Soviets Seek Meeting of UN Military Panel," New York Times, October 11, 1990, sec. A, p. 19; and Paul Lewis, "U.S. Seeks to Revive Panel that Enforces UN Decrees," New York Times, September 19,1990, sec. A, p. 11. 22.50 United States Code (U.S.C.) Sections 1701-06 (1982).
23. 50 U.S.C. Sections 1601-51.
24. 22 U.S.C. Sections 287-287(e).
25. 50 U.S.C. App. 6(b) (1982).
26. Margaret Doxey, 'International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa," International Organization, Vol. 26,1972, pp. 532-35.
27. This is also related to the 'law abiding habit" of nations. A. Pearce Higgins, The Binding Force of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), p. 36; and Oran Young, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979), p. 24,
28. Michael R. Gordon, "Navy Begins Blockade Enforcing Iraq Embargo," New York Times, August 17,1990, sec. A, p. 10.
29. These negative costs were apparent in Romania's response to the Iraqi sanctions. Although Romania did in fact join the sanctions effort, its government, in detailing national implementation measures to the Sanctions Committee, stressed the extreme difficulties earned by the UN enforcement action to its economic reform program. In particular, Romania cited losses and expenses of $2.9 billion, broken down as follows:
$1.7 million — Iraqi debt to Romania, to have been paid by the oil shipments;
$46.1 million — Goods specially designed for Iraq and Kuwait with no other export market;
$142.6 million — Value of interrupted construction projects and technical assistance in Iraq;
$64.7 million — Value of abandoned equipment and material in Iraq;
$200.6 million - Bank guarantees and blocked assets;
$746 million - Increased price of crude oil from August to December 1990 as compared to pre-crisis level.
Given these costs, government officials forecast a negative impact of 14 percent on the GNP of Romania. Clearly, when states face costs of this magnitude, the decision to comply will be far more problematic. See "Security Council Committee Established by Resolution 661 (1990) Concerning the Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, UN Doc S/AC.25/53 (1990)," (reply of the Romanian Government to a Security Council questionnaire concerning the implementation of Security Council Resolution 661).
30. "Remarks of Gilberto Schlittler," in American Society of International Law 85th Annual Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1991), pp. 175-81,
31. Security Council Resolution 687, paragraphs 18 and 19.
32. Ved Nanda, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: The UN Response," Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Vol. 15,1991, p. 431. Also see Yossef M. Ibrahim, "OPEC to Increase Oil Output to Offset Losses from Iraq," New York Times, August 30,1990, sec. A, p. 1.
33. Examples of this situation in the case of Iraq were the actions of Jordan and Germany. Jordan, a border state and major trading partner of Iraq, found itself in a difficult position due to its economic ties and the intense domestic pressures from its large Palestinian community which favored Iraq. The result was a delay in implementing Resolution 661 in order to "study" it more closely. Joseph B. Treaster, "Goods Reach Iraq Through Jordanian 'Back Door/" New York Times, August 15,1991, sec. A, p. 19. Germany, on the other hand, was accused of permitting its nationals through lax enforcement to conduct trade with Iraq after the imposition of sanctions. Press reports claimed that at least 12 firms had broken the embargo, but that the German government's resolve was not sufficient to tighten enforcement of the restrictions, Miriam Widman, "German Business Groups Calling for Tighter Controls on Exports," Journal of Commerce and Commercial, January 30, 1991, p. 5A. Recent reports indicate that Iran may be importing oil from Iraq in violation of the sanctions regulations. R. Jeffery Smith, "Iraq Shipped Oil to Iran, U.S. Alleges," Washington Post, March 31, 1993, sec. A, p. 1.
34. "Statement of Jeremy Carver," in American Society of International Law 85th Annual Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1991), pp. 181-83.