As 1963 came to a close, the players in the battle for the South took stock and reached conclusions that would entrench them more deeply in their mutually irreconcilable positions. Saigon was in political turmoil following Diem’s death at the hands of U.S.-backed generals. The NLF seized the chance to expand its influence. Leaders in Hanoi, thinking victory was within their grasp, committed in December to increased support for the insurgency. Kennedy’s assassination just weeks after Diem’s put Lyndon Johnson in the hot seat. He immediately signaled that he would follow an unyielding policy.
Johnson would gradually ratchet up U.S. military involvement. In August 1964, after what appeared to be a pair of attacks on U.S. Navy destroyers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin off the DRV coast, he ordered U.S. aircraft to hit facilities along that coast. He also secured open-ended congressional backing for the use of force. With his presidential reelection secured in a landslide victory in November, the president grew bolder. In February and March 1965, he began bombing the North on a broader, sustained basis and dispatched the first U.S. combat unit to South Vietnam. American patrols were soon moving aggressively into the surrounding countryside. Finally in June, the MACV commander, William Westmoreland, called for a major troop commitment. Close advisers both in the government and in the Democratic Party leadership warned the president of dangers. However doubtful Johnson himself may have been, he finally decided in late July on a major buildup (to climb within several years to half a million men). Americans would now fight the war that the Saigon government was losing.
Under the spur of a growing U.S. commitment, the Communist Party intensified preparations for the looming confrontation. At home the party moved to a war footing, expanding the army and diverting resources from domestic economic development to the military. To bolster NLF forces, Hanoi dispatched additional regroupees and the first People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) combat units. In early 1965 the first PAVN regiments reached the Central Highlands, the sparsely populated mountainous region in the central interior of South Vietnam.
Internationally, Le Duan and his colleagues looked for backing from the two major Communist powers. But their task was complicated by the increasingly virulent dispute between Moscow and Beijing over ideology and ultimately over the leadership of the socialist bloc. The Vietnamese party had already in late 1963 sided in principle with the Chinese, who were calling for confrontation with imperialism and criticizing the “revisionist” Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. But at the same time, Hanoi had argued that ideological disputes should not disrupt common action by the bloc or diminish support for Vietnam as a major front in the international socialist struggle.
This measured stance secured from Chinese leaders renewed pledges of support and finally induced the Soviets to make their own aid commitment. This Soviet commitment, made by the Leonid Brezhnev-led group that had removed Nikita Khrushchev from power in October 1964, was prompted by a determination to defend Moscow’s claim to bloc leadership against Beijing’s challenge. By April 1965 Moscow had formally committed to supply advanced weaponry not in the Chinese arsenal (notably fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles) and to send advisers and support personnel to help with the new high-tech hardware. The allies that Hanoi had recruited even as Johnson was increasing the military pressure would serve to deter an all-out American attack on the North, raise the costs of any U.S. aerial campaign, and provide the resources Hanoi would need to sustain NLF and PAVN units fighting a protracted war in the South.
Over a year and a half, Vietnamese and American leaders made decisions that led to war. The question for historians is how they went about making their fateful commitments.
• When did Johnson effectively opt for war — as early as November 1963 or as late as July 1965?
• How did Communist Party leaders respond to the growing U.S. commitment to South Vietnam? How did they understand U.S. goals and staying power?
• At what point had Washington’s and Hanoi’s deliberations gone so far that they could not turn back from a direct military collision? What kept tipping the balance to the side of war?
The overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem failed to create an effective instrument that the United States could wield against the NLF. Instead the coup introduced a year and a half of instability in Saigon politics. The generals who had toppled Diem vied for power while neglecting the NLF military challenge. These trends cheered Hanoi.
In his first days in office, Johnson confronted the unhappy consequences of the Diem coup and the broader challenges of stabilizing and preserving the Saigon government. He met with U.S. ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., CIA head John McCone, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Under Secretary of State George Ball. The new president demanded that his “country team” in Vietnam begin to turn the situation around. But Robert McNamara, the official who was most deeply involved in Vietnam policy and a man whose judgment Johnson trusted, began warning of looming perils soon after a two-day visit to South Vietnam.
Ambassador Lodge reported that the change in government [Diem’s overthrow] had been an improvement. … Lodge said that we were in no way responsible for the death of Diem and Nhu, that had they followed his advice, they would be alive today. … The tone of Ambassador Lodge’s statements were optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with the impression that we are on the road to victory.
At this point McCone stated that our [CIA] estimate of the situation was somewhat more serious. We had noted a continuing increase in Viet Cong activity since the first of November as evidenced by a larger number of Viet Cong attacks. … Furthermore I [McCone] stated that the military [who had seized power from Diem] were having considerable trouble in completing the political organization of the government. …
The President then stated that he approached the situation with some misgivings. He noted that a great many people throughout the country questioned our course of action in supporting the overthrow of the Diem regime. He also noted that strong voices in the Congress felt we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these facts give the President considerable concern. He stated that he was not at all sure we took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime. …
The President then stated he has never been happy with our operations in Vietnam. He said there had been serious dissension and divisions within the American community [U.S. agencies in Saigon] and he told the Ambassador that he was in total charge and he wanted the situation cleaned up. He wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more bickering and any person that did not conform to policy should be removed. …
The President then said that … he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had to reform every Asian into our own image. He said that he felt all too often when we engaged in the affairs of a foreign country we wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this, in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to get along, win the war — he didn’t want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms.
The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2–3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.
The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. …
The [U.S.] Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. … Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. … [H]e has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now. …
Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. …
Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the [Mekong] Delta. The best guess is that 1000–1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials. …
Plans for Covert Action into North Vietnam were prepared as we had requested and were an excellent job....
… We should watch the situation very carefully, running scared, hoping for the best, but preparing for more forceful moves if the situation does not show early signs of improvement.
What was worrisome to Washington was a great opportunity for the Hanoi-backed NLF. It had gained wide rural influence and created an effective armed force, and it could now better than ever exploit the confusion in Saigon. In a major meeting in December 1963, the party leadership engaged in a spirited debate that ended with a secret statement expressing optimism about victory and eagerness to press ahead militarily, even in the face of the troubling prospect of a direct U.S. combat role.
We have sufficient conditions to quickly change the balance of forces in our favor. And whether the U.S. maintains its combat strength at the present level or increases it, she must still use her henchmen’s army [ARVN] as a main force. However, this army becomes weaker day by day due to the serious decline of its quality, the demoralization of its troops and the disgust of the latter for the Americans and their lackeys. …
As for us, we become more confident in the victory of our armed forces. …
If the U.S. imperialists send more troops to Viet-Nam to save the situation after suffering a series of failures, the Revolution in Viet-Nam will meet more difficulties, the struggle will be stronger and harder but it will certainly succeed in attaining the final victory. … [T]he U.S. imperialists cannot win over 14 million Vietnamese people in the South who have taken arms to fight the imperialists for almost 20 years, and who, with all the compatriots throughout the country, have defeated the hundreds of thousands [of] troops of the French expeditionary force. …
Our people’s revolutionary war in SVN [South Vietnam] is still a war in which our people use a small force to counter a large force. Our people must destroy and wear down the enemy’s force while developing our force. We must fight the enemy in all fields in order to weaken his forces and demoralize his troops. …
The general guideline for our people’s revolutionary war in SVN is to conduct a protracted war, relying mainly on our own forces, and to combine political struggle and armed struggle in accordance with each area and time. …
… [W]e are preparing for the General Offensive and Uprising by using military and political forces to disintegrate the pro-U.S. government’s troops and provoke uprisings in the rural area and cities still under enemy occupation. …
Mountainous area: South Viet-Nam’s mountainous area occupies an important strategic position. It offers many favorable conditions for us to conduct a protracted struggle even in the most difficult situations. This is the area where we can build up a large armed force and annihilate many enemy troops in large-scale attacks. We can also use the mountainous area as a stepping stone to expand our activities to the lowlands and, when the situation allows, to attack the key positions of the enemy. In case the enemy expands the war to a larger scale, the mountainous area together with the lowland will enable us to fight a protracted war against him. We should make every effort to control the mountainous areas and have the determination to build these areas into a solid base. …
The lowland and the rural area: These are rich and heavily populated areas. There, our revolutionary movement is active and our revolutionary base-level organizations are relatively widespread. … If we succeed in gaining control over the lowlands and rural areas, we will save the mountainous area from isolation. In doing so, we can also develop our forces in these areas and create an advantageous position for our troops to attack enemy key positions. …
Urban area: This is the area where leading agencies of the enemy, including organs of his central government, are located, where the enemy is concentrating his strong repressive forces and facilities. But this is also the area where the people live in great number and they have a high political enlightenment; they have risen up several times to struggle against the enemy. When the situation is favorable for us to conduct a General Offensive and Uprising, there is the possibility that the people in urban areas will also rise up and coordinate with the revolutionary troops coming from outside to overthrow the enemy’s central government. Our principal guideline for operations in the urban areas consists of conducting political struggle, setting up a reserve force, and waiting for favorable conditions. … [I]f the situation develops to a point where the balance of forces between us and the enemy changes to our advantage, we can deal the enemy decisive blows right in the urban area. …
Though our armed forces are maturing and our regular forces are developing day after day, the type of war waged by our three forces [main, regional, and local] remains one of guerrilla warfare for a long time to come. The main purpose of our campaigns and combat activities is to destroy the enemy’s forces. It is necessary for us to attack where the enemy is most vulnerable. Therefore, at present, we must attack the enemy troops while they are out of their fortifications, or moving on roads, waterways, or in the air. Our major combat tactics to be adopted are to lay ambushes, conduct raids, or gradually advance toward mobile warfare, when conditions permit. …
We must strive to consolidate and broaden the Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam based on the workers-peasants alliance and led by the Party, so as to give it the ability to motivate the people on a wider scale, to accomplish its new political missions prescribed by the Party, and to assume part of the responsibilities as a revolutionary administration in the liberated areas. …
The Mission of North Viet-Nam:
… [I]t is time for the North to increase aid to the South, the North must bring into fuller play its role as the revolutionary base for the whole nation. …
We should plan to aid the South to meet the requirements of the Revolution, and because of this aid, we must revise properly our plan for building North Viet-Nam.
… [W]e must increase our economic and defensive strength in North Viet-Nam. We should increase our vigilance at all times and be ready to face the enemy[’s] new schemes. At the same time, we should be prepared to cope with the eventuality of the expansion of the war into North Viet-Nam. …
… [W]e will certainly win the final victory. The most important thing at the present time is that the entire Party, the entire people from North to South must have full determination and make outstanding efforts to bring success to the revolution of our Southern compatriots and achieve peace and unification of the country, to win total victory, to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous and strong Viet-Nam.
This PAVN officer, a veteran of the French war and a party member, provides insight on the role of the first purely North Vietnamese units to go south. He had been wounded in action in mid-1964, captured by ARVN forces, and interviewed by employees of the Rand Corporation. The resulting transcript, in which the prisoner is not identified by name, has been reordered along chronological lines to make it easier to follow.
The aim of my unit was to form, together with already existing units in Central Vietnam, a Main Force Regional unit to liberate the plains region, and to enlarge the liberated area, so that the rear could supply manpower and materiel. If this could be achieved, it would end to a large extent the reliance of Front units in the area on supplies from the North … each company received 30,000 piasters to buy rice from the people in case we were ambushed or got lost on our way South. …
My first combat experience in the South was an ambush near the route leading from Tam Ky to Duc Phu. We destroyed two ARVN companies; we captured 24 ARVN soldiers; the rest fled in the mountains or were killed in the fighting. After this attack we rested and consolidated our ranks. … We were told that we would have to behave nicely toward the people, that we would have to observe the “three togetherness rules”: help the people, educate, and indoctrinate them, and that we should not threaten them. … Through my experiences I observed that the morale of the ARVN was rather low and that their fighting capability was not good. … When we captured 24 ARVN, we tied them and brought them back to our area to interrogate them. … When we were through with our interrogation we gathered the people for a meeting and then released them. … We didn’t mistreat them. They ate the same food as we. We tore our hammocks in half to give to them. …
The people were very happy over our victory, because from then on they could work in peace. After the attack they gave us eggs, and chickens, and milk to the wounded. … Six fighters were killed and eleven were wounded. … Since our first combat experience was a success, we were all very enthusiastic. …
… To replace the losses we recruit the youths in the areas which we liberate. … We only recruit the people who volunteer to join our ranks. After we liberate an area, we explain to the people the aim of our struggle. Those who want to join are accepted into our ranks. …
At first the people in the countryside didn’t understand our policy and they were very afraid of us. But as we stayed in their villages they got to understand us more through our daily activities, and their fear disappeared. They became closer to us, and confided in us. … Even if Hanoi stopped sending arms, supplies, and men to the Front, the Front would still be able to win because the Front responds to the aspirations of the people. I admit that the GVN is stronger than the Front militarily, but the GVN doesn’t have the support of the people. …
… We are confident that we will win. No matter how rich and powerful the Americans are, they will not be able to defeat the Revolution because we will drag out this war. We are not going to fall in their trap and conduct a big and swift offensive.
The military advisory mission of which James Lincoln was an important part had taken shape in the late 1950s with the objective of creating a South Vietnamese army that could contain the DRV. Despite a dramatic increase in the advisory effort during the Kennedy years, the ARVN had not become an effective fighting force. Here Captain Lincoln sums up his impressions based on six months of on-the-job experience. He remained an adviser until October 1966.
The large [ARVN] combat operation … is a very common occurrence. I would say that less than 1/3 of all planned operations made any contact with the VC [Viet Cong]. There are various reasons — first, the VC have their own very effcient intelligence nets. There are probably VC sympathizers in every major Hq. of the Vietnam Army. … Next, the VC are extremely good at slipping out of an area, or hiding in an area where there is an operation. An example — near my area four Battalions entered an area to look for a VC company that was reported in the area. There was not a shot fired, and nobody could figure out how the VC slipped out of the area, all escape routes were covered with blocking positions. About a week later they went back into the same area and found out why. The VC had a fantastic underground network of caves to hit [hide] the entire Company, and all the entrances were next to impossible to find. … Every where is vulnerable — if the VC want to make an attack, they have the upper hand. We can only fight them as best we can and wait for help to arrive. However, they always plan and execute very carefully. There is usually only one or two roads or entrances into an area they plan to attack. Quite often they will drop a few mortar rounds into a location, with no intention of making a ground attack. They realize, however, that the camp under attack will call for reinforcements, and they will come by truck since it will be nighttime. The main VC force simply waits along the road into the area and ambushes the relief force — it’s all very simple. As soon as you think you have them figured out, they will make a ground attack, but so sorry you told the relief forces not to come because of suspected ambush. Another thing that has amazed me is the accuracy of the mortar. It is very difficult for them to carry the ammo., so it is precious and every round [must count]. In almost all cases where they have mortared a location, all rounds hit right on target, including the first round. I guess they have one of their boys pace off the distance beforehand. …
… The [ARVN] soldiers themselves are good fighters, but they are very underpaid, and poorly led. … Their morale is poor, and this brings about the biggest problem in the Army — AWOLS [soldiers absent without leave] and deserters. … The Gov. just doesn’t look after their soldiers well enough to keep them happy. All soldiers’ housing is terrible, dependents are not thought of in the least — they have no provisions for getting pay home when the husband is off on a big operation, maybe for over a month. … Next — poor leadership. The commanders of the Army units are usually inexperienced, and only worried about staying alive, and getting a soft job back in Saigon somewhere. The high level commanders are more worried about political things than military considerations. District chiefs are the same way — they usually plan and go out on as few operations as possible, mostly worried about keeping the province chief happy from a political viewpoint. … Nobody is really sure who to support — maybe tomorrow there will be another coup and the guy they supported will be thrown out. It’s all highly confusing, but one thing is sure — it really hurts the military effort.
The steady erosion of Saigon’s political authority and military effectiveness presented the Johnson administration with a choice between accepting defeat and raising the U.S. commitment. Johnson’s own can-do spirit and the preferences of his advisers (all Kennedy holdovers) prevailed.
Johnson sought to delay any major decision on Vietnam until after the November 1964 presidential election, which would make him president in his own right. But reports of attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin disrupted that plan. Considerable confusion long surrounded this incident. As it turns out, the first attack (on 2 August) did occur, apparently on the decision of a local commander alarmed by a U.S.-supported coastal raid by South Vietnamese forces. The second attack appears to have been the figment of overanxious U.S. sonar operators during poor weather. Johnson in any case ordered retaliatory air strikes against DRV coastal facilities and then asked Congress for support in the form of a resolution drafted in the White House giving the president broad powers to act in Southeast Asia. This measure, which in effect substituted for the constitutionally mandated declaration of war, passed the Senate by a vote of 98–2 and the House unanimously.
Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and
Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these people should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
With the election over and Congress formally behind him, Johnson seemed disposed to raise the pressure on Hanoi. An attack on U.S. bases in the South in early 1965 prompted McGeorge Bundy, then in Vietnam, to call for retaliation in the form of a bombing campaign against the DRV. One of the influential Kennedy holdovers, Bundy argued on his return to Washington that gradual escalation could intimidate Hanoi and buoy flagging spirits in Saigon.
[T]he best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of sustained reprisal against North Vietnam — a policy in which air and naval action against the North is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the South.
While we believe that the risks of such a policy are acceptable, we emphasize that its costs are real. It implies significant U.S. air losses even if no full air war is joined, and it seems likely that it would eventually require an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam. U.S. casualties would be higher — and more visible to American feelings — than those sustained in the struggle in South Vietnam. …
… We must keep it clear at every stage both to Hanoi and to the world, that our reprisals will be reduced or stopped when outrages in the South are reduced or stopped — and that we are not attempting to destroy or conquer North Vietnam....
We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in South Vietnam. …
The [anti-Communist] Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government.
We think it plausible that effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. …
… [I]t is of great importance that the level of reprisal be adjusted rapidly and visibly to both upward and downward shifts in the level of Viet Cong offenses. We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of the force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come.
… At a minimum [a policy of sustained reprisal] will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy — to the extent that it demonstrates U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency — will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam.
The president agreed to the bombing campaign (which would become known as Rolling Thunder) and quickly followed by dispatching the first U.S. combat units to secure the Da Nang air base from which the bombing was conducted. In a major speech in April, which Johnson had helped to write, he sought to explain decisions that left the United States and the DRV just short of war.
Why must this Nation hazard its ease, and its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?
We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure. …
… North Viet-Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest.
Of course, some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in [an] attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from north to south.
This support is the heartbeat of the war.
And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities. …
Over this war — and all Asia — is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.
Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam?
We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. …
We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America’s word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.
We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. …
In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.
We do this in order to slow down aggression.
We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.
And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam — and all who seek to share their conquest — of a very simple fact:
We will not be defeated. [applause]
We will not grow tired.
We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement. …
… We have no desire to see thousands die in battle — Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.
But we will use it. …
… [O]ur generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.
For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so. [applause]
For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.
For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so. [applause] …
This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand.
We can do all these things on a scale that’s never [been] dreamed of before.
Well, we will choose life. And so doing we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.
Party leaders met in August and September — in the immediate wake of the Gulf of Tonkin incident — to decide on countermeasures to what seemed a U.S. escalation of the conflict. Le Duan, as Communist Party head and the leading voice on policy toward the South, presided over this effort. Aiding him was Pham Van Dong. From a gentry family in central Vietnam, Dong had embraced communism in the mid-1920s and had, for his party activities, done time in a French prison (1931–1937). He helped Ho organize the Viet Minh and went on to become a mainstay in the government of the DRV, serving as premier from 1955 to 1986.
On one key front, the party leadership proceeded confident of continued Chinese support. The Tonkin Gulf incident had caused Mao Zedong, the chair of China’s Communist Party, to reiterate his commitment to resist a U.S. invasion and convinced him to beef up air defenses along the DRV border and base some aircraft in the DRV itself. By December China had agreed to a major troop commitment, mainly engineer and antiaircraft units to be stationed in the northern provinces of the DRV to free PAVN forces to go south. The first of these Chinese deployments arrived in June 1965. Together senior Vietnamese and Chinese representatives worked out this program of assistance while also trying to gauge the Johnson administration’s likely course. In this Chinese record of two meetings, Pham Van Dong and Le Duan spoke for the Vietnamese side. They addressed Mao and Liu Shaoqi, the number two figure in the party.
[MAO ZEDONG:] Whether or not the United States will attack the North, it has not yet made the decision. Now, it [the United States] is not even in a position to resolve the problem in South Vietnam. If it attacks the North, [it may need to] fight for one hundred years, and its legs will be trapped there. Therefore, it needs to consider carefully. The Americans have made all kinds of scary statements. …
PHAM VAN DONG: This is also our thinking. The United States is facing many difficulties, and it is not easy for it to expand the war. Therefore, our consideration is that we should try to restrict the war in South Vietnam to the sphere of special war [directed against the U.S.-backed ARVN], and should try to defeat the enemy within the sphere of special war. We should try our best not to let the U.S. imperialists turn the war in South Vietnam into a limited war [involving a substantial and direct U.S. role in the fighting], and try our best not to let the war be expanded to North Vietnam. We must adopt a very skillful strategy, and should not provoke it [the United States]. Our Politburo has made a decision on this matter, and today I am reporting it to Chairman Mao. We believe that this is workable.
MAO ZEDONG: Yes.
PHAM VAN DONG: If the United States dares to start a limited war, we will fight it, and will win it.
MAO ZEDONG: Yes, you can win it.
LE DUAN: We want some volunteer pilots, volunteer soldiers … and other volunteers, including road and bridge engineering units.
LIU SHAOQI: It is our policy that we will do our best to support you. We will offer whatever you are in need of and we are in a position to offer. … If you do not invite us, we will not come; and if you invite one unit of our troops, we will send that unit to you. The initiative will be completely yours.
Hanoi’s second front was public diplomacy, offering to reactivate the 1954 Geneva accords, including notably its provision for a nonaligned South Vietnam (document 2.2). This carefully constructed offer, made publicly by the DRV’s premier, was meant to give the Americans a way out with a minimum loss of face while also impressing on the international community the reasonableness of Hanoi’s position.
1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. government must withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, [and] cancel its “military alliance” with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, [and] completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones[,] the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel in their respective territory.
3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation without any foreign interference.
4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.
Hanoi’s third front was military, as rising U.S. troop levels threatened to turn special war in the South into a local or limited war. Here Le Duan urged his COSVN colleagues to try to head off deeper American involvement. But even in the worst case, southern forces could, he argued, directly confront and ultimately overcome the world’s most potent military power by exploiting its many vulnerabilities.
To prevent the US from turning the “special war” into a “local war” in the South or carrying the land war to the North, the best counter-measure is for us to strike harder and more accurately in the South, causing the rapid disintegration of the puppet army, the US mainstay. We must step up military and political struggles and rapidly create the opportunity to move toward generalized attacks and general insurrection, catching the Americans napping, and preventing them from plunging into new military adventures. …
… From 1,000 armed people [before 1959], today we have tens of thousands of troops capable of mounting attacks to destroy enemy troops by the thousands. If the Americans switch over to “local war” in the South with from 250,000 to 300,000 troops, they will be confronted with our protracted war of resistance. To have to fight a long-drawn-out war is the US Achilles’ heel. …
… [S]ince the US was bogged down in the Vietnam war, its economy has been in a critical state with its gold reserve diminishing rapidly.
Taking this opportunity, the Japanese, West German, British and French capitalists began to scramble for lucrative US-controlled markets in the world. Thus judging from its economic interests, the US is also afraid of fighting a prolonged war.
In contrast, our economy basically remains an agricultural economy, with major industrial centres still non-existent and with 80% of consumer goods being supplied by handicrafts. Therefore, with sufficient rice and sweet potatoes to eat, we can fight the Americans five, ten years or longer. … Moreover, we enjoy the assistance of fraternal socialist countries and thus are more confident in waging a long war of resistance. …
Within the US ruling circles, the “doves” and the “hawks” are at loggerheads with one another. … Contradictions between the US and its client regimes and those among the different groups of US lackeys … also are growing acute. The enemy is being divided. Thus, militarily, we are not yet in a position to prevail over the enemy, but politically we can get the upper hand and capitalize on the enemy’s inner contradictions to split his ranks and weaken him to the point of disintegration.
… We believe in our final victory because we firmly hold the following points in our favour:
a) The will to fight and to win of our entire people from South to North, from Party members to the popular masses. This will stems from our nation’s tradition of dauntlessness in its history of protracted struggle against foreign aggression [from defeating the Mongol invaders to driving out the French]. …
b) The leadership of our Party, a party experienced in revolutionary struggle and firmly grasping the laws governing people’s war. …
c) The approval, support and assistance of brothers and friends all over the world. …
Although in our camp there are [Sino-Soviet] divergencies over many issues, yet in our people’s struggle against US aggression, for national salvation, the fraternal countries in the main approve our line and give us whole-hearted assistance. The national liberation movement and the international communist and workers’ movement are on our side. Peace-and justice-loving people in the world support our just cause. …
… [I]f the US is still rash enough to make a test of strength with the Vietnamese nation in a protracted war, then it will find us combat-ready and determined to fight and defeat the US aggressors in whatever type of war.
Here, in the North, we already are prepared for the worst, the fraternal countries are ready to give us aid. If the US is foolish enough to move land forces to the North, here we will also fight and win. Even if we have to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of lives, even if Hanoi is reduced to rubble, the North will always join the South in its determination to figh[t] and defeat the US aggressors, to save the nation and reunify the country.
Johnson finally had to face the choice that he and his predecessors had sought to avoid. In early June General William Westmoreland reported that only a major U.S. combat commitment could save the ARVN from defeat, “successfully take the fight to the VC,” and convince the enemy that “they cannot win.”1 The president now had to act decisively or face the loss of South Vietnam.
Remarkably Johnson himself harbored deep doubts about a large-scale U.S. military intervention. The following selection, taken from a telephone conversation that Johnson had secretly recorded, enumerates most of the weaknesses in the U.S. position that historians today would list.
I think that in time it’s going to be like the Yale professor [antiwar historian Staughton Lynd] said — that it’s going to be difficult for us to very long prosecute effectively a war that far away from home with the divisions that we have here, particularly the potential divisions. And it’s really had me concerned for a month, and I’m very depressed about it ’cause I see no program from either [the Department of] Defense or State that gives me much hope of doing anything except just prayin’ and gasping to hold on during the monsoon [season of heavy rains] and hope they’ll quit. I don’t believe they [are] ever goin’ to quit. I don’t see how, that we have any way of either a plan for victory militarily or diplomatically. And I think that’s something that you and [Secretary of State] Dean [Rusk] got to sit down and try to see if there’s any people that we have in those departments that can give us any program or plan or hope; or, if not, we got to see if we have you go out there or somebody else go out there and take one good look at it and say to these new people [the newly installed government headed by Generals Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu], “Now, you’ve changed your government about the last time and this is it.” Call the Buddhists and the Catholics and the generals and everybody together and say, “We’re going to do our best.” And be sure they’re willing to let new troops come in and be sure they’re not gonna resent us. “If not, why y’all can run over us and have a government of your own choosing. But we just can’t take these changes all the time.” That’s the Russell plan. [Richard] Russell [a Democratic senator from Georgia, the influential conservative chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and a former Johnson mentor] thinks we ought to take one of these changes [in the Saigon government] to get out of there. I don’t think we can get out of there with our treaty [under SEATO?] like it is and with what all we’ve said. And I think it would just lose us face in the world, and I shudder to think what all of ’em would say.
Of those in the Johnson inner circle, this senior State Department official argued most persistently against the expanded U.S. military role. On the one hand, Ball offered a rationale for disengagement, and on the other, he drew on his understanding of the troubled French war to suggest that the long odds against military success made a diplomatic settlement the wiser course. His reference in the second document to “ white foreign (U.S.) troops” raises the interesting question of whether he was warning about cultural differences, about possible racial antagonism, or about the dangers of assuming the French imperial role.
It should by now be apparent that we have to a large extent created our own predicament. In our determination to rally support, we have tended to give the South Vietnamese struggle an exaggerated and symbolic significance (Mea culpa, since I personally participated in this effort).
The problem for us now — if we determine not to broaden and deepen our commitments — is to re-educate the American people and our friends and allies that:
(a) The phasing out of American power in South Vietnam should not be regarded as a major defeat — either military or political — but a tactical redeployment to more favorable terrain in the overall cold war struggle;
(b) The loss of South Vietnam does not mean the loss of all of Southeast Asia to the Communist power …;
(c) We have more than met our commitments to the South Vietnamese people. We have poured men and equipment into the area, and run risks and taken casualties, and have been prepared to continue the struggle provided the South Vietnamese leaders met even the most rudimentary standards of political performance;
(d) The Viet Cong — while supported and guided from the North — is largely an indigenous movement. Although we have emphasized its cold war aspects, the conflict in South Vietnam is essentially a civil war within that country;
(e) Our commitment to the South Vietnamese people is of a wholly different order from our major commitments elsewhere. … We have never had a treaty commitment obligating us to the South Vietnamese people or to a South Vietnamese government. Our only treaty commitment in that area is to our SEATO partners, and they have — without exception — viewed the situation in South Vietnam as not calling a treaty into play. To be sure, we did make a promise to the South Vietnamese people. But that promise is conditioned on their own performance, and they have not performed.
The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms no matter how many hundred thousand white foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy.
No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war — which is at the same time a civil war between Asians — in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the SVN [ese]) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. Three recent incidents vividly illustrate this point:
(a) The sneak attack on the Danang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense perimeter guarded by 9,000 Marines. This raid was possible only because of the cooperation of the local inhabitants.
(b) The B-52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped off.
(c) The search-and-destroy mission of the 173rd Airborne Brigade which spent three days looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment. …
… So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the United States and a large part of the population of South Viet-Nam, organized and directed from North Viet-Nam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping.
The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of US troops are committed to direct combat they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.
Once we suffer large casualties we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot — without national humiliation — stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives — even after we had paid terrible costs.
… Should we commit US manpower and prestige to a terrain so unfavorable as to give a very large advantage to the enemy — or should we seek a compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cut our losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so?
… In my judgment, if we act before we commit substantial US forces to combat in South Viet-Nam we can, by accepting some short-term costs, avoid what may well be a long-term catastrophe.
In response to Westmoreland’s request for more troops, the influential secretary of defense made one of his hurried visits to Vietnam. On his return he gave his formal endorsement as well as a grim appraisal of the U.S. prospects.
The situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. A hard VC push is now on to dismember the nation and to maul the army. The VC main and local forces, reinforced by militia and guerrillas, have the initiative and, with large attacks (some in regimental strength), are hurting ARVN forces badly. … The central highlands could well be lost to the National Liberation Front during this monsoon season. … [The Saigon] government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and less territory as terrorism increases. …
… Nor have our air attacks in North Vietnam produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that South Vietnam is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than a complete take-over. …
… There are now 15 US (and 1 Australian) combat battalions in Vietnam; they, together with other combat personnel and non-combat personnel, bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 75,000.
I recommend that the deployment of US ground troops in Vietnam be increased by October to 34 maneuver battalions. … The battalions — together with increases in helicopter lift, air squadrons, naval units, air defense, combat support and miscellaneous log[istical] support and advisory personnel which I also recommend — would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 175,000. … It should be understood that the deployment of more men (an additional perhaps 100,000) may be necessary in early 1966, and that the deployment of additional forces thereafter is possible but will depend on developments. …
… The DRV, on the other hand, may well send up to several divisions of regular forces in South Vietnam to assist the VC if they see the tide turning and victory, once so near, being snatched away. This possible DRV action is the most ominous one, since it would lead to increased pressures on us to “counter-invade” North Vietnam and to extend air strikes to population targets in the North; acceding to these pressures could bring the Soviets and the Chinese in. The Viet Cong, especially if they continue to take high losses, can be expected to depend increasingly upon the PAVN forces as the war moves into a more conventional phase; but they may find ways to continue almost indefinitely their present intensive military, guerrilla and terror activities, particularly if reinforced by some regular PAVN units.
In late July the president discussed with his chief advisers a large increase in U.S. forces. His first two meetings, held on 21 and 22 July, were formal, and each lasted over three hours. A third, informal gathering took place on 25 July at the presidential retreat at Camp David. Clark Clifford, Robert McNamara, and the ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, were present. Clifford, a senior statesman in the Democratic Party, was one of a number of party leaders who were warning Johnson of the difficulty of sustaining public support for war over the long term. Was the point of all this talk in late July to help the president make a decision or to confirm a decision he had already made?
BALL: Isn’t it possible that the VC will do what they did against the French — stay away from confrontation and not accommodate us?
[Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (jcs) EARLE G.] WHEELER: Yes, but by constantly harassing them, they will have to fight somewhere.
MCNAMARA: If vc doesn’t fight in large units, it will give ARVN a chance to re-secure hostile areas. …
PRESIDENT [to Wheeler]: What makes you think if we put in 100,000 men Ho Chi Minh won’t put in another 100,000?
WHEELER: This means greater bodies of men — which will allow us to cream them. …
BALL: I think we have all underestimated the seriousness of this situation. Like giving cobalt treatment to a terminal cancer case. I think a long protracted war will disclose our weakness, not our strength.
The least harmful way to cut losses in SVN is to let the government decide it doesn’t want us to stay there. Therefore, put such proposals to SVN government that they can’t accept, then it would move into a neutralist position — and I have no illusions that after we were asked to leave, SVN would be under Hanoi control. …
PRESIDENT: … [W]ouldn’t we lose credibility breaking the word of three presidents[?]...
BALL: The worse blow would be that the mightiest power in the world is unable to defeat guerrillas.
PRESIDENT: Then you are not basically troubled by what the world would say about pulling out?
BALL: If we were actively helping a country with a stable, viable government, it would be a vastly different story. Western Europeans look at us as if we got ourselves into an imprudent [situation].
PRESIDENT: But I believe that these people [the Vietnamese] are trying to fight. They’re like Republicans who try to stay in power, but don’t stay there long.
(aside — amid laughter — “excuse me, [Henry] Cabot [Lodge]”) …
PRESIDENT: Two basic troublings:
1. That Westerners can ever win in Asia.
2. Don’t see how you can fight a war under direction of other people whose government changes every month. …
RUSK: If the Communist world finds out we will not pursue our commitment to the end, I don’t know where they will stay their hand.
I am more optimistic than some of my colleagues. I don’t believe the vc have made large advances among the VN [Vietnamese] people.
… I don’t see great casualties unless the Chinese come in.
LODGE: There is a greater threat to [bringing on] World War III if we don’t go in. Similarity to our indolence at Munich [referring to the appeasement of Hitler in a failed attempt to avert World War II].
I can’t be as pessimistic as Ball. We have great seaports in Vietnam. We don’t need to fight on roads. We have the sea. Visualize our meeting VC on our own terms. We don’t have to spend all our time in the jungles.
PRESIDENT: Doesn’t it really mean if we follow Westmoreland’s requests [for more troops] we are in a new war — this is going off the diving board[?]
MCNAMARA: This is a major change in US policy. We have relied on SVN to carry the brunt. Now we would be responsible for satisfactory military outcome. …
MCNAMARA [on dominoes to fall as a result of abandoning Vietnam]: Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, surely affect Malaysia. In 2–3 years Communist domination would stop there, but ripple effect would be great — Japan, India. We would have to give up some bases. [Pakistani president] Ayub [Khan] would move closer to China. Greece, Turkey would move to neutralist position. Communist agitation would increase in Africa. …
PRESIDENT: If we come in with hundreds of thousands of men and billions of dollars, won’t this cause them to come in (China and Russia)?
[Army Chief of Staff General HAROLD] JOHNSON: No, I don’t think they will.
PRESIDENT: MacArthur [U.S. commander during the Korean War who was caught off guard by Chinese intervention] didn’t think they would come in either.
[General] JOHNSON: Yes, but this is not comparable to Korea. …
PRESIDENT: But China has plenty of divisions to move in, don’t they?
[General] JOHNSON: Yes, they do.
PRESIDENT: Then what would we do?
[General] JOHNSON: (long silence) If so, we have another ball game.
PRESIDENT: But I have to take into account they will. …
PRESIDENT: Do all of you think the Congress and the people will go along with 600,000 people and billions of dollars 10,000 miles away?
[Army Secretary STANLEY] RESOR: Gallup Poll shows people are basically behind our commitment.
PRESIDENT: But if you make a commitment to jump off a building, and you find out how high it is, you may withdraw the commitment.
PRESIDENT: I judge though that the big problem is one of national security. Is that right?
(murmured assent)
Don’t believe we can win in SVN. If we send in 100,000 more, the [DRV] will meet us. If the [DRV] run[s] out of men, the Chinese will send in volunteers. Russia and China don’t intend for us to win the war. If we don’t win, it is a catastrophe. If we lose 50,000+ it will ruin us. Five years, billions of dollars, 50,000 men, it is not for us.
At end of monsoon, quietly probe and search out with other countries — by moderating our position — to allow us to get out. Can’t see anything but catastrophe for my country. …
Setting aside doubts, Johnson announced at a low-key White House press conference that he was sending 50,000 fresh troops to Vietnam. Like his Johns Hopkins speech almost four months earlier (document 3.7), this announcement mingled Cold War platitudes with deeply personal reflections and with deep regret. The war was for Americans now on in earnest but not with enthusiasm.
We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.
Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of history.
Moreover, we are in Viet-Nam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents — President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President — over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.
Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Viet-Nam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow. …
Let me also add now a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. … I have seen them in a thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every State in this Union — working and laughing and building, and filled with hope and life. I think I know, too, how their mothers weep, and how their families sorrow.
This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President.
… I have now been in public life 35 years, more than three decades, and in each of those 35 years I have seen good men, and wise leaders, struggle to bring the blessings of this land to all of our people. …
But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy, we must have the courage to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom — all, all will be swept away on the flood of conquest.
So, too, this shall not happen. We will stand in Viet-Nam.
1. William Westmoreland, telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 June 1965, in U.S.Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, vol. 2 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 735.