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A DREAM COMES TRUE
‘We have waited for 56 years for this day. It is a dream that has come true!’1 On 9 July 2011, six months after Southern Sudanese had voted overwhelmingly for independence, Salva Kiir Mayardit, chairman of the SPLM and president of the new Republic, proclaimed that freedom had come. Amid the cheering and dancing of at least 100,000 people at the John Garang Mausoleum and in the presence of heads of state and government from around the world, freedom songs brought tears to the eyes of almost everyone present. ‘SPLM Woyee’, a famous cheer of the struggle,2 resounded from the masses.
One celebrant was an old Shilluk chief from a village in Upper Nile State. He wore traditional pink shawl, long bead necklaces and ankle chimes; his sandals seemed to have been marching in the bush for decades. Beneath his wide brimmed straw hat he wore something more striking: huge pink Dolly Parton-style sunglasses. He looked at me and said:
I never thought this day would ever come. I have been active in the struggle ever since the British left. We have been fighting ever since. And now this! I have to pinch my arm.
Salva Kiir was likewise moved:
From today on, we shall have no excuses or scapegoats to blame. It is our responsibility to protect ourselves, our land and our resources […] While the pillars of a house are important, its foundation is even more critical. We must build a strong foundation for our new nation.
This was also the first day on the job for me as SRSG and Head of UNMISS, which came into existence that day, a sign of the international community’s commitment to the new country. South Sudan was welcomed into the United Nations as its 193rd member in record time, and other regional organizations followed suit.
South Sudanese had fought for decades for independence.
The struggle3
Many dated the struggle back to developments in the nineteenth century, when Sudanese merchants (including officials of the Egyptian regime) were prominent among those involved in the slave trade that devastated the South. The rule of the Mahdiyya (1881–98) made conditions worse, as it raided and conquered. Under the ensuing Anglo-Egyptian regime the South was ‘pacified’ and neglected, with minimal investment in infrastructure and services. Christian missionaries helped, but their work was not on a scale that reached the population at large.
A conference in Juba in 1947 is often referred to as sealing the South’s fate; London’s imperial interests in Egypt and elsewhere trumped local British officials’ concern for Southern Sudanese. Although not documented, Southerners insist that a promise of self-determination was made after World War II by the departing colonial rulers, Britain and Egypt, a commitment they claim was later broken by the Northern Sudanese in connivance with Egypt:
The roots of the war run deep. After imperial conquests in the nineteenth century, the peripheries of Sudan were ruled by means of administrative and militarized tribalism, and were grossly underdeveloped; the people of the southern periphery, in particular, were regarded as second-class citizens, and at worst as commodities.4
A mutiny by Southern soldiers in August 1955, and the widespread killing of Northerners that ensued in the South, is often regarded as the beginning of open hostilities. With the coming of Sudan’s independence in 1956, the reins of power passed to a tiny Arab Muslim elite in Khartoum. During the period 1956–62, fighting in the South was sporadic; Southern politicians had failed to win the federal constitution that many thought was the only way to protect Southern rights. After a military coup in 1958, efforts to propagate Islam and spread the use of Arabic were intensified, further alienating the small Southern educated elite, many of whom were Christians. By the early 1960s armed resistance had escalated to the level of civil war.
From the early 1950s ‘federalism’ had already become a core demand for many educated Southerners and a main point of contention between North and South.5 After the 1964 overthrow of the military regime in Khartoum, a ‘round-table’ conference was convened. It failed to bring about a rapprochement because representatives of Northern parties would consider only limited self-rule in the South. A split was now revealed between Southerners calling for federalism and those demanding self-determination. During the period 1966–9 the war was fought with increasing intensity.
Another military junta, under Col Jafar Mohamed Nimeiri, took power in Khartoum in 1969. At about the same time leadership of the resistance movement, the Anya-Nya, consolidated under the ex-army officer Joseph Lagu. Secret contacts eventually led to formal negotiations and in 1971 peace talks took place under the auspices of the All Africa Council of Churches and Ethiopia. A Southern lawyer, Abel Alier, represented Nimeiri in negotiations in Addis Ababa. The demand for secession was shelved; a limited form of self-rule was accepted. Splits within the Anya-Nya were papered over to establish the autonomous Regional Government. Competition within it was fierce, however, with Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu soon becoming bitter rivals.
Important terms of the Agreement were never honoured. Nimeiri could not resist the temptation to interfere, helped by internal tensions among Southern politicians. Promised economic development did not take place. Advantage was eventually taken of rivalries within the South to ‘re-divide’ the region into the old provincial units, the better to control them all from Khartoum. These divisions continue to play into heated discussions about federalism today.
Although successive regimes in Khartoum differed in degree, the common denominator was the exclusion of Southern Sudanese from most influential roles in the civil service, the private sector and in public life overall. The lack of investment in South Sudan remained systematic, whether in infrastructure or services to the people.
Khartoum governments also, with varying intensity, used religion to discriminate. While most Southern Sudanese were either Christians or practised their traditional religion, the Northern part of the country was Muslim. Islam was the country’s official religion, and several prominent movements aimed to Islamize the whole country and Arabicize the South. The balance was finally tipped when Nimeiri, as a sop to growing opposition from the Northern religious right, declared Sharia the law of the land – including in the South.
This happened despite Southern Sudan’s rich religious and ethnic diversity. The region had multiple ethnicities, dominated by pastoralist and semi-pastoralist communities in its northern, eastern and western regions, and more traditional subsistence farming communities in the south. The largest ethnic community was by far the Dinka, divided by sub-groups, with the Nuer ranking second. Other communities, such as the Zande, the Bari and the Shilluk were much smaller. In total, there were 64 ethnic groups in Southern Sudan.
The freedom fighters – the SPLM/A
The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 was, in many Southerners’ opinion, too weak, granting self-government but not self-determination. Furthermore, it was a sketchy document with no international guarantors or mechanisms to ensure implementation. These flaws led to its collapse, and contributed to resumption of civil war. When Commander John Garang de Mabior was sent to suppress the so-called Bor Mutiny in 1983, little did the authorities know he had been engaged in planning it. With other defectors he headed for Ethiopia. Together they formed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A).
Deliberations on its Manifesto revealed difficulty in uniting the Movement’s leadership. Two power centres emerged, which eventually resorted to armed conflict, first primarily in the Upper Nile region. One comprised veterans of the first civil war who had been absorbed into the Sudanese Army and became members of an underground military syndicate; the most prominent were John Garang and Salva Kiir, Kerubino Kuanyin and William Nyuon. The second centre comprised veterans who had become politicians after 1972. After two prominent commanders died, this group negotiated a deal with Khartoum, making it easier for the regime to exploit divisions.
Within the SPLM/A, John Garang pursued his vision of justice and equality for all Sudanese. Although often accused of separatism, ‘Dr John’, as he was popularly known, advocated a ‘New Sudan’, in which marginalized peoples would have a rightful share in governing a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country, respecting diversity rather than privileging an elite.
At the same time, Southerners’ right to self-determination became a cornerstone in his thinking. The South should, through a referendum, decide whether to remain part of a united Sudan or be independent. Areas under SPLM/A control were therefore experimentally a nucleus of the ‘New Sudan’. In this way, Garang aimed to reconcile those demanding independence immediately and those advocating justice for all marginalized Sudanese.
The second civil war differed from the first. It was much deadlier, had a greater impact on civilians, and engulfed a larger territory. Neighbouring countries were more actively involved. After Nimeiri was overthrown in 1985, Khartoum relied on local militias to attack the SPLA and harass civilians. In 1988, sections of the rebel Anya-Nya II, largely Nuer from Upper Nile, were absorbed into the SPLA, whose main factions thereafter consisted of Dinka from the Bahr el Ghazal, Dinka on the east bank of the Nile and a constellation of Nuer groups. Backed into a corner by military failure and a collapsing national economy, the Khartoum government was on the verge of signing a preliminary peace deal with the SPLM/A when it was overthrown by a military coup in 1989.
The new regime under Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir and the spiritual guidance of Hasan al-Turabi adopted a radical Islamist policy. Terrorizing domestic opponents and associating with the world’s most notorious regimes and non-state groups, the government acquired pariah status. From a struggle for pre-eminence the more ‘pragmatic’ President Bashir eventually emerged victorious, but skirmishing with Turabi became a permanent feature.
For more than 20 years, the SPLM/A fought the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). There was no ‘front’: the SAF usually held most of the towns, while the SPLM/A held most of the countryside. Neither side was able to deliver a decisive blow. The consequences for civilians were devastating. Estimates of the number killed reach as high as 2 million.6
Throughout this period, Garang was the most prominent leader of the liberation movement. In 1991 he was challenged by Riek Machar and Lam Akol, commanders from Unity and Upper Nile states respectively. They justified rebellion on political grounds, openly favouring secession from Sudan and confronting what they saw as dictatorial tendencies within the Movement. Machar’s followers carried out a wave of massacres in Twic East, Garang’s home area, and around Bor, killing an estimated 2,000 people in November 1991. A period of fierce factional fighting ensued. In 1997 Machar, under increasing pressure, signed a separate peace with Khartoum.
Regarding both the first split of the SPLM/A in 1983, and the second, in 1991, differences have been depicted in political and ideological terms. Some analysts contend that initial infighting was misrepresented as between unionists and separatists, and that differences masked a power struggle. In fact, many other factors contributed to the split, including the capacity to mobilize along ethnic lines, shifting external relations, and the Anya-Nya II merger. In any case, Khartoum exploited the differences, divided and ruled – and used the factions in counter-insurgency tactics.
Efforts were made during the 1990s to reunite the SPLM/A and end the war, but it was only with the 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA that change became possible. The US Government confronted ‘rogue regimes’ assumed to be harbouring or supporting terrorists, leading Khartoum to show willingness to cooperate against terrorism and to engage with the South. The SPLM/A was stronger and better positioned than in the 1990s, and had every interest in serious talks under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and with the support of the US, UK, Norway and the IGAD Partners Forum.
Meanwhile Garang worked to consolidate Southern factions. In January 2002 Riek Machar and other Nuer political and military leaders ended their long and damaging split with the SPLM/A and strengthened the call for Southern self-determination. Further agreements followed with other disaffected commanders.
Peace from within
These developments were important precursors to negotiation of the CPA of 2005. Local peace processes also played a role. Traditional systems of arbitration, formalized and structured under British rule, had survived and successfully applied customary law. In 1999 the New Sudan Council of Churches initiated the Wunlit conference, which resolved differences in the border region, with what proved to be lasting effect.7
Efforts related to local, regional and even cross-border migration also exemplified sub-national peace and reconciliation processes. Along the border between the South and Kordofan this was particularly important, involving agreements between the Malual Dinka and Misseriya and Rizigat, and between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka.
Other ‘people-to-people’ initiatives took place among cattle-herding communities in Greater Bahr al-Ghazal, Greater Upper Nile and in Eastern Equatoria. These attempts at reconciliation were sometimes mediated by outsiders or through homegrown local practices. They tended to be more successful when supported by civil society, religious leaders and other stakeholders, and when government authorities facilitated implementation of agreements.
The SPLM/A’s leaders knew that negotiating peace without a united South would be impossible. Unity involved agreement and integration of militia groups, and peace between communities affected by the war. The churches had continuously tried to reconcile communities, often creating tension between church leaders and the SPLM/A. It was widely acknowledged, however, that these efforts provided an important basis for negotiation of the CPA.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005
The peace negotiations would not have succeeded without support from the IGAD Partners’ Forum (the ‘Friends’ group, renamed), with the US, UK and Norway (the ‘Troika’) as the driving force. This involved funding the negotiation secretariat, the team of experts assisting the talks, and the chief negotiator, the IGAD Special Envoy, General Lazarus Sumbeiywo. Politically, senior officials and ministers of the Troika countries played a significant role, as did their envoys at the talks. As Norway’s minister of international development, I chaired the support group at the centre of these efforts. Having engaged with the Sudanese parties early on and been party to the peace efforts in 1997–9, I knew both sides quite well.
Most observers did not give the talks much of a chance until the breakthrough Machakos Protocol of July 2002. This granted Southern Sudan the right to exercise self-determination while Sudan was guaranteed an Islamist character under Sharia law. The deal implied that the SPLM/A’s goal of a secular and reformed Sudanese state was less important than a Southern Sudanese option of secession.
The agreement surprised the international community; only a few Troika officials had been aware of developments. While Sudanese negotiators thought peace was near, leaders of the SPLM/A faced internal criticism. The Movement’s national agenda had attracted marginalized peoples and movements outside the South; in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and eastern Sudan, armed opposition had become an integral part of the SPLM/A. Now the Machakos Protocol was widely interpreted as abandoning the vision of a New Sudan, leading to difficulties within the Movement and the negotiations. The SPLM/A demanded separate protocols for the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei. Khartoum charged bad faith.
On 1 September 2002 the SPLA stormed Torit, taking control of this most important town in Eastern Equatoria. Pretending that Khartoum attacked first, the SPLM leadership shocked friends, allies and international stakeholders. It was only through an agreement on cessation of hostilities, brokered by the Troika in cooperation with Abel Alier and General Sumbeiywo, and signed on 15 October, that the parties were brought back to the table.
Negotiations almost collapsed in July 2003. Then, Khartoum walked out over a proposed solution to all remaining issues, the so-called Nakuru draft, and started ‘forum shopping’ to avoid the IGAD process. This was unsuccessful, however, and in September the Sudanese first vice president, Ali Osman Taha, took charge of the negotiations. On 31 August he had asked me to persuade Chairman Garang to come to Nairobi and negotiate directly. Several of us intervened, and a reluctant Garang finally agreed. Thus began almost 18 months of intense negotiation, mainly between the two leaders, alone and behind closed doors.
Uniquely during the long period of peace talks, this crucial stage was conducted mostly without mediation; the importance of personal commitment can hardly be exaggerated. General Sumbeiywo provided strong leadership in coordinating the process; the Troika and individuals including myself contributed significantly on the phone and by numerous visits to Naivasha, where the talks took place. Without international pressure, and the clear timeline set by the Security Council, the negotiations might still have foundered.
The highly detailed Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi, in the presence of a number of heads of state and government. The SPLM/A had insisted on negotiating every single element, including an implementation matrix with timelines. Southerners’ experience of ‘too many disagreements dishonoured’ proved that implementation would be fraught.8 International guarantees and strong security arrangements were intended to make it difficult for Khartoum, as they saw it, to renege.
The CPA incorporated the Machakos Protocol, protocols on security arrangements, wealth sharing and power sharing, and the so-called Protocol for the Three Areas (the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei). An Implementation Protocol contained timelines for the agreements. The document provided for a reformed national government and the exercise of Southern self-determination through a referendum.
There has been criticism that the CPA negotiations were monopolized by the Sudanese ruling party, the NCP, and the SPLM/A, and that they should have addressed also internal tensions in the North and South.9 The parties themselves took full ownership of the talks, however, both format and content, rejecting proposals for more inclusive arrangements. The negotiations were extremely complex. Attempts by external actors to dictate a different arrangement would probably have led to their collapse.
As the agreement was signed, a dark cloud on the horizon was the burgeoning catastrophe in Darfur. This had already drawn worldwide attention, but hardly deflected the joy of the Southern Sudanese, for whom a half-century of struggle was over. They celebrated in their millions, locally and abroad, young and old, from all walks of life.
But for many Southerners, and particularly SPLA officers whose objective had always been independence, the CPA was little more than a ceasefire: final victory – and peace – would come only with independence. An interim period of six years was stipulated before a referendum, so there was much room for doubt.
Orphaned
On 9 July 2005 John Garang flew to Khartoum to become first vice president of Sudan. That he was greeted by enormous crowds, and that, the next day, when he was inaugurated, millions of people celebrated all over the country seemed to shock senior Sudanese officials who had belittled his support outside the South. Garang took seriously the embryonic Government of National Unity, the reforms needed in Khartoum, and his role in making sure the CPA was fully implemented. This evident determination, combined with popular support he now seemed to command, led the political elite to wonder whether he had ambitions to take on the top job in the country, the presidency.
That question is unlikely ever to be answered. Only three weeks later, on 30 July Garang was killed when his helicopter crashed in the Imatong Mountains. The circumstances have never been fully clarified; foul play has inevitably been suspected. Theories abound.
In the wake of Garang’s death, a much-feared power struggle did not take place. Through what seemed a premonition, Dr John had in early July clarified the issue of succession, reaffirming the pre-eminence of his deputy, Salva Kiir. Upon learning of Garang’s death, the Leadership Council of the SPLM/A gathered at New Site and by consensus elected Kiir the new chairman.10
Garang’s death had significant political implications for Khartoum and the SPLM/A. At the funeral in Juba on 7 August, President Bashir praised Garang as the peacemaker. As we proceeded to the gravesite, the arrangements were in the hands of both armies, the SAF and SPLA – which just days before had been at war with each other. Powerfully symbolic of the New Sudan, their soldiers lined the streets of Juba as the coffin was transported to its final destination, and a team of young soldiers drawn from each army carried it, wrapped in the SPLA and Sudanese flags, to the grave.
After John Garang’s death, ominous political developments took place in Khartoum. Ali Osman Taha, his partner in peace, was sidelined. The CPA was subjected to renewed criticism. And although the government – or Bashir himself – had approved every detail in the CPA, Taha was scapegoated for giving too much away. Compromises are difficult to defend in contexts such as this; hardliners always have the easy way. In Khartoum, they soon had the upper hand. Many who had negotiated the CPA and knew its provisions were sidelined, too. And on the Southern side the centre of gravity also shifted from the negotiating team to others preferred by Salva Kiir. As first vice president of Sudan and, now, president of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), he would appoint ministers in Khartoum and the South, selections influenced by tensions within the SPLM/A. Hence the Government of National Unity consisted largely of ministers less committed to the CPA. This had an impact on implementation.
The next five years would test Salva Kiir’s authority. On 12 August, less than two weeks after assuming the chairmanship, he met for the first time in years the disaffected Nuer militia leader Paulino Matip. While Garang had reached out to several militia bosses, Salva Kiir’s ‘Big Tent’ approach went much further, resulting in the Juba Conference of January 2006, representing most Southern Sudanese factions. The Agreement reached then became the basis for Southern unity throughout the CPA period, consolidated Salva Kiir’s and the SPLM’s leading position, and prevented destabilizing competition for power.
In implementing the CPA the challenges were immense. A first crisis occurred on 9 January 2006, when President Bashir visited Juba for the anniversary of the Agreement. A heated argument with Kiir occurred at the stadium, and violence was only with difficulty averted. The ceasefire largely held thereafter, until midway through the interim period. But the CPA’s security arrangements were never implemented as intended. For the GoSS a separate army meant insurance for the referendum; defence would account for 40 per cent of the autonomous Southern Government’s budget.
In October 2007 dissatisfaction with implementation of the CPA led to the SPLM’s suspending participation in the Government of National Unity. Tensions ran so high that both sides deployed additional troops to border areas. The crisis was defused, however, and the forces pulled back. After new commitments, the SPLM returned to government.
A serious violation of the ceasefire occurred in May 2008 near the town of Abyei. Within hours tanks were involved; within days, fighting had intensified: SAF forces burnt the whole town to the ground, sparing only the mosques. Ninety thousand people fled. Abyei had long been one of the most contentious North–South issues, and the area would suffer similar incidents twice again, with the Sudanese Army moving in. In all of the ‘Three Areas’ there were severe tensions.
Broken promises
Predictably, the political process in Sudan proved challenging. Implementation of the CPA lagged. In some cases, delays were caused by lack of capacity, in others an apparent lack of commitment. There was continuous tension surrounding transfer of oil revenue and the transparency of oil-production data; payments were late, and sometimes in local currency, contravening the CPA. The Petroleum Commission and Joint Defence Board never functioned properly; decisions related to the referendum were deferred. These included border demarcation and the Referendum Act itself. Even in 2009 important national security legislation was still pending.
On 19 October 2009 the SPLM withdrew its legislators from the national parliament to protest against the lack of progress. They returned only when the delayed laws were enacted at the end of the year. The key to change at the centre, however, was control over the levers of power. This remained the main challenge in Khartoum.
Meanwhile the international community turned its attention to Darfur and other crises. Despite the presence of a UN mission, high-level leadership in monitoring implementation of the CPA was missing, and there was little pressure to ‘make unity attractive’ to the South. This had serious consequences; inattention to the CPA allowed the two parties to resume a cycle of tension and conflict. But as long as they kept the peace, most stakeholders seemed unconcerned. Even the Troika went dormant. As detailed in my book on this period,11 intense shuttle diplomacy started in late 2009, just a few months before scheduled elections.
Despite apparent good intentions, those elections, in 2010, were tarnished by many irregularities. The result was not a broadening of the two governments, but clean sweeps by the ruling parties – which won almost every governorship and 422 of 446 seats in the National Assembly.12 Worse, almost all timelines in the CPA had been violated and the six-year interim period would soon be over. It was clear that the parties were looking toward the bottom line: the referendum on unity versus separation.
There had always been a strong bipartisan constituency for South Sudan in the US. Salva Kiir had a good relationship with President George W. Bush.13 President Obama’s administration also included several top officials of long-standing engagement with South Sudan, most prominently Susan Rice, Permanent Representative to the UN and later National Security Advisor. The US had a strong interest in the success of the CPA and ultimately of South Sudan, as did the UK, the former colonial power, and Norway – a country with decades-long engagement with the South. The three governments knew that any attempt to delay the referendum and independence would lead to a resumption of civil war.
Second thoughts
Among other stakeholders there had long been resistance to secession. This continued during the CPA negotiations and interim period. Among some members of the UN Security Council and the African Union, independence for South Sudan was seen to threaten stability and security on a continent replete with movements that could be tempted to do the same.
Regarding the current (2013–15) conflict in independent South Sudan, many observers make incorrect assumptions: the CPA was intended to give unity a chance. (For most international observers, the slogan was ‘making unity attractive’.) Khartoum was given six years to prove seriousness about the CPA and a better future for all marginalized peoples. The referendum would test that seriousness. Stakeholders were aware of the overwhelming popular sentiment for independence, but with John Garang at the helm, a number of observers had thought a unified Sudan was still possible. It was his death that made this entirely unrealistic.
The interim period failed to ‘make unity attractive’. Southerners would never be convinced by words, only deeds, and there was not much of the latter. While all relevant international bodies had signed the CPA as witnesses, or supported it through resolutions or statements, there was continuing strong resistance to the referendum and possible secession. Many argued for delay, saying the South was unready. A few African leaders quietly advised more time. Others made public pronouncements and proposals; many were looking for a way out. Elements in Khartoum similarly argued for longer timelines, hoping that the referendum – one likely result of which would be loss of significant oil income – could be avoided altogether. This only added to the SPLM’s conviction that any delay would threaten the whole CPA and their right to self-determination.
Through intense diplomatic efforts, Southern Sudanese leaders managed to change the international atmosphere. The critical turning point was the roundtable held in the margins of the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2010. President Barack Obama and other world leaders participated; Salva Kiir and Ali Osman Taha represented the two parties. (President Bashir, subject to arrest for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide under warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, did not travel to the US.) The American President set the tone: the referenda must take place on time.14 Significant work behind the scenes prior to the meeting, resulted in unanimous public commitment to full implementation of the CPA, including the timelines for the referendum.
There was no going back.
From a Southern Sudanese perspective, the referendum was the ‘red line’. Private conversations with SPLM leaders confirmed this. Some observers later forgot that the alternative to Southern independence was not the status quo, or peace, but resumption of the civil war.
Indeed, even when it became clear that they had overwhelming international support for the referendum, many SPLM leaders thought Khartoum would prevent it. Only when President Bashir visited Juba on 4 January 2011, less than a week before the referendum, did they believe the vote would go ahead. His statement that day surprised not only Southern Sudanese, but the world: he promised he would ‘congratulate and celebrate with you’ should they choose secession, and help to build a secure, stable and ‘brotherly’ state.15
On 9 January 2011 Southern Sudanese went to the polls; 98.8 per cent of the population voted in favour of secession and independence.
Time was short. During the next six months, to 9 July 2011, former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, his colleagues in the AU High Level Panel; UNMIS; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Haile Menkerios; the Troika; and others worked closely with the two parties, but progress was slow. Fundamental interests were at stake: border demarcation, oil and the tariffs for use of the Sudanese pipeline, transitional financial arrangements, citizenship, currency and other issues.
Some observers mooted delaying the date of independence. But again the Southern Sudanese were firm: the date was enshrined in the CPA. Terms of separation would have to be negotiated between the two countries afterwards.
Nothing could stop the dream from coming true. Salva Kiir, now as president, stood on the podium and declared:
Today is the most important day for the people of South Sudan, the proclamation of whose birth and emergence as a member on the community of world nations you have just witnessed. It is a day which will be forever engraved in our hearts and minds.
But dreams can turn into nightmares.