NOTES

Preface

1Hilde F. Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations that Ended Africa’s Longest Civil War (Eastbourne, 2011).

2On 27 May 2014, the Security Council authorized a different UNMISS mandate (SCR 2155 (2014)). With this change and my three-year-long tenure, it was time to hand over the leadership of the Mission to someone else.

Chapter 1: A Dream Comes True

1Independence Day speech, 9 July 2011.

2‘SPLA Woyee!’ has no translation; it signifies praise for the SPLA, battle or victory, and became a slogan for the SPLM as a party.

3For a more detailed account see Hilde F. Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations that Ended Africa’s Longest Civil War (Eastbourne, 2011).

4Alex de Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, African Affairs, cxiii/452 (2014), p. 350.

5Douglas Johnson, ‘Federalism in the History of South Sudanese Political Thought’, Rift Valley Institute Research Paper 1 (London, 2014), p. 5.

6United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan’, S/2005/57, 31 January 2005, p. 1, para. 3. See also http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/background.shtml.

7For this process and other ‘people-to-people’ processes see John Ashworth, The Voice of the Voiceless: The Role of the Church in the Sudanese Civil War, 1983–2005 (Nairobi, 2014), pp. 151–67.

8The phrase is Abel Alier’s, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 2nd edn (Exeter, 2003).

9African Union, ‘Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan: Final Report of the African Union Mission of Inquiry on South Sudan’ (Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014), pp. 20–1.

10Breaking the tradition of taking time to mourn, Kuol Manyang and ‘uncle’ Elijah Malok, both Dinka Bor, immediately proposed Kiir. Interview 34, 21 April 2015, Interview 8, 29 January 2015; Interview 48, 24 June 2015.

11Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, p.  215.

12De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, p. 354.

13Interview with then SPLM Representative to the US, Ezekiel Gatkuoth, February 2015.

14Statements by President Obama; President Obama in Ministerial Meeting on Sudan, ‘The Fate of Millions’, 24 September 2010. Available online: https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/24/president-obama-ministerial-meeting-sudan-fate-millions.

15Reported in the Guardian on 4 January 2011. Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/04/bashir-south-sudan-independence-vote.

Chapter 2: A Country without a State

1A more common comparison is with France, which is roughly the same size but has thrice the population.

2A census was conducted in 2008 in Sudan as a whole. It was controversial and not seen as legitimate in Southern Sudan, claiming a population in the semi-autonomous region of 8.26 million people.

3Jok Madut Jok, quoted in Francis Deng (ed.), New Sudan in the Making? (Trenton, 2009), p. 458.

4For example Ramciel, located where the three greater regions, Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal meet.

5Edward Thomas, South Sudan: A Slow Liberation (London, 2015), pp. 60–1.

6‘Report from a Special Mission on the Economic Development of Southern Sudan’, IBRD Report No. 119a-SU (1 June 1973), p. 5 (para 1.15) cited ‘forcible spread of Arabization and Islam, the neglect of secondary education, curbs placed on Christian missionary activities, and, finally the expulsion of all missionaries in the South in 1964’.

7Christopher Clapham, ‘From Liberation Movement to Government: Past Legacies and the Challenge of Transition in Africa’, The Brenthurst Foundation, Discussion Paper 8/12 (Johannesburg, 2012).

8Ibid., pp. 5–6.

9Ibid., p. 6

10Ibid., p. 8.

11‘The “curse” of Liberation’, Sudan Tribune, 16 February 2013, 15.02. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45547.

12Cherri Leonardi, ‘“Liberation” or capture: Youth in between “Hakuma” and “Home” during civil war and its aftermath in Southern Sudan’, African Affairs cvi/424 (2007), pp. 391–412. Siri Torjesen emphasizes ‘state capture’ in post-conflict societies in ‘Transition from War to Peace’ in Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum (eds), Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power after Peace (London, 2013), pp. 48–62.

13Øystein Rolandsen, Guerilla Government: Political Changes in Southern Sudan during the 1990s (Oslo, 2005).

14SPLM, ‘Peace through Development: Perspectives and Prospects in the Sudan’, February 2000.

15‘SPLM Strategic Framework: For War-to-Peace Transition’, SPLM Economic Commission, August 2004.

16Ibid., p. 66.

17This definition builds on John R. Common’s Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy (New Brunswick, 1990).

18‘SPLM Strategic Framework: For War-to-Peace Transition’, p. 62.

19Consequently, the country would be also denied the service of able citizens from numerically smaller ethnicities, see Thomas, South Sudan, pp. 278–9.

20Clapham, ‘From Liberation Movement to Government’, p. 12.

21Dan Smith (PRIO), ‘Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together’, Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, Evaluation Report 1/2004, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, together with the Evaluation departments of UK DFID, the Netherlands and Germany, April 2004, p. 10; Dina Esposito and Batsheba Crocker, ‘To Guarantee the Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Sudan’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Washington, DC, January 2004), p. 8.

22Barney Jopson, ‘Fury at unspent funds for Sudan’, Financial Times, 16 February 2010.

23Lise Grande, ‘Rescuing the Peace in Southern Sudan’. Presentation at an international donor forum in Brussels, 10 January 2010, p. 24.

24It’s Our Turn to Eat is the title of Michaela Wrong’s book (London, 2009) about John Githongo, the Kenyan anti-corruption tsar.

25Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) was established in Southern Sudan in 2006.

26Sources inform me that at least $30 million was pocketed by a number of SPLM leaders. After the suspension of Secretary General Pagan Amum Okiech in July 2013, this specific case was not investigated in detail. Amum sued journalists who accused him of corruption for defamation of character, and he won the case.

27‘Sudan Public Expenditure Review’, Synthesis Report No. 41840-SD, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, the World Bank, December 2007, Executive Summary, para. 13.

28One could, for example, have opted for an externally administered trust fund, with a governance framework which was nationally owned, as an interim solution until capacity was built.

29SPLM leaders privately admitted this in, e.g. Interview 39, 24 April 2015.

30Ibid.

31Peter Adwok Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View (Nairobi, 1996).

32‘Liberating Areas, Exploiting People: The “Old” SPLA’, in Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism, African Rights, London, 15 July 1997, pp. 89–97; Alex de Waal, principal investigator.

33Ibid., pp. 73–5.

34John Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa (Boulder, 1996), p. 23.

35Sudan Tribune, ‘Text: Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004’, Section: Confidential Report on the Rumbek Meeting 2004, 12 March 2014. Available online: http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26320. The Rapporteur, Telar Deng Riing has verified the minutes.

36Ibid.

37Ibid.

38Ibid.

39James Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn in our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan’s Bitter and Incomplete Divorce (London, 2014), p. 61.

40Thomas, South Sudan, p. 139.

41Audit Chamber, ‘Presentation of the Report of the Auditor General on the Financial Statements of the Government of the Southern Sudan’ (Juba, 2008), p. 7. The figure is 1.293 billion Sudanese pounds (SDG). I have used an exchange rate of 3 to the dollar.

42OECD, Aid Statistics, Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD-DAC), International Development Statistics (IDS), CRS dataset, Paris, 2014. Available online: www.oecd.org/development/stats/idsonline.htm.

43Information provided by Manuel da Silva, a former trade minister in Mozambique and subsequently a UN official, including in Sudan for many years, was particularly helpful: several thousand civil servants from Portuguese and Spanish-speaking countries were seconded to Mozambique to work under FRELIMO cadres and provide on-the-job training.

44Seconded experts are imbedded in a national institution for a longer period, reporting to local authorities, and where the ‘sending’ institution takes responsibility for all costs related to the secondment.

45Author’s notes from conversations with Cabinet ministers.

46For further details see numerous World Bank reports, including http://www-ds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/01/16/000020953_20080116104133/Rendered/PDF/418400SD.pdf.

47Interview 39, April 2015.

48Report 41840-SD ‘Sudan Public Expenditure Review’, Synthesis Report December 2007, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Africa Region.

49GoSS paper for High Level Meeting in Brussels on Core Functions, September 2010.

50Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 132, uses the term ‘federal government’. The Transitional Constitution does not provide a ‘federal’ system, so I use the term national government.

512012 statistics from the GRSS Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, including Presentation for the Washington Conference, 31 October 2012. Even at independence about 83 per cent of the population lived in rural areas, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, http://ssnbs.org/.

52World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, ‘Sudan Public Expenditure Review’, Synthesis Report No. 41840-SD, December 2007, Executive Summary, pp. iv, vi.

53Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 113.

54World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, ‘Sudan Public Expenditure Review’, Synthesis Report No. 41840-SD, Executive Summary, para. 13 (from an annual revenue of about $120,000 in 2005 to $1.7 billion in 2006).

55Available online: http://farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/20130304-Transnational-land-acquisitions-10.pdf.

56World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, ‘Sudan Public Expenditure Review’, p. 67.

57Ibid., p. 71.

58Interview 39, April 2015, and eyewitness reports of cash handouts by Southern Sudanese security officials.

59Interview 17, February 2015, verified by others, referring to kickbacks by senior officials, including a $50 million deal in May–June 2011, just prior to independence.

60Interview 17, February 2015; Interview 40, March 2015; Interview 43, April 2015; Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 135. Some say the selling price was $300 million, others $185 million (of which $135 million in cash), and some claim that some of the money was transferred to the government.

61Interview 17, February 2015; Interview 43, April 2015.

62Telecom companies such as Zain and MTN had to pay tax; controversially, there was no income to the government from the sale of – or revenues from – Gemtel or Vivacell.

63Interview 17, February 2015; Interview 43 April 2015.

64In late July 2013 investigations were launched into this and other issues (management of the party and party finances), focusing on Secretary General (SG) Pagan Amum who was suspended from his position. The outcome was presented at the National Liberation Council-meeting of the SPLM on 14–15 December 2013, leading to the release of the Secretary General from his position.

65Interview 17, February 2015; Interview 40, March 2015; Interview 43, April 2015.

66Audits for 2005–6, 2007 and 2008, published from November 2011 onwards, show a clear pattern.

67Interview 38, October 2014.

68Interview 39, April 2115, states on the authority of several sources that a very senior official in Sudan handed out $11.5 million in cash every month.

69Interviews 16 and 17, February 2015.

70Interview 38, October 2014.

71The Government of South Sudan’s oil revenue is estimated at $8.66 billion in 2008–2011 (siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSUDAN/Resources/GoSS_Financing_Requirement.ppt+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us). Even with less annual oil revenue than average during this period, the total figure from 2005–2011 would likely be beyond $12 billion.

72Available online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/04/us-southsudan-corruption-idUSBRE8530QI20120604, Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 137.

73Audit Chamber, ‘The Report of the Auditor General on the Financial Statements of the Government of Southern Sudan for Financial Year Ended 31 December 2005’; equivalent – ‘Ended 31 December 2006’, equivalent – ‘Ended 31 December 2007’, equivalent – ‘Ended 31 December 2008’.

74Ibid., 2005, 2006.

75This figure ($288 million) has been corroborated in Interview 15, February 2015; Interview 18, February 2015; and Interview 11, February 2015 without being reflected in the budget.

76‘Presentation of the Auditor General to the South Sudan National Assembly of the Audit Reports on the Accounts of the Government of Southern Sudan For the Years 2005 and 2006’, 1 November 2011, p. 20. Hereinafter PAGSSNA.

77Ibid., pp. 11–12, 21–2.

78PAGSSNA, For the Year Ended 31 December 2007, March 2012, p. 16.

79Ibid., p. 15; a ‘weekend allowance’ meant to simply give civil servants extra pay, on top of the normal salary, before the weekend.

80PAGSSNA, For the Years 2005 and 2006, 1 November 2011, p. 10.

81PAGSSNA, For the Year Ended 31 December 2007, March 2012, p. 15.

82Ibid., p. 8.

83PAGSSNA, For the Year Ended 31 December 2008, p. 8.

84Payroll documentation provided by a senior official in Juba, 2012.

85PAGSSNA, For the Year Ended 31 December 2008, pp. 5–6. The reports show overspending in most ministries: see 2007, pp. 8–9; 2008, pp. 5–6.

86PAGSSNA, For the Year Ended 31 December 2008, p. 13.

87Ibid., p. 13 states that the contracts awarded amounted to SDG 7 billion, against a budget of SDG 2.6 billion. The Finance Ministry later reported that the government signed 1,738 contracts for delivery of 50 million bags of dura and maize valued at SDG 6.2 billion. Later investigations also revealed various amounts of undelivered grain; and insufficient storage facilities for delivered grain, some of which was of poor quality.

88After investigations conducted by the STAR-programme of the World Bank/UNODC, the actual amount reported as fraudulent (on the so-called black list) was approximately $250 million. A summary of the outcome of these investigations is with the author.

89Laws of the Republic of South Sudan, ‘The Transitional Constitution’, 2011, Article 144, (1) b: ‘Without the prejudice to the powers of the Ministry of Justice in public prosecution, the Commission shall […] investigate and prosecute only cases of corruption.’

90Interview 39, 24 April 2015.

91Donors would not provide budget support or direct assistance to the GoSS. Aid-funded programmes implemented by others, contractors or multilateral agencies, or channelled through trust funds administered by UNDP and the World Bank. The Compact did not change this.

92Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), ‘Juba Compact between the Development Partners and the Government of Southern Sudan’, Juba, 30 June 2009.

93Ben French and Nicholas Travis, ‘South Sudan: The Juba Compact’, ODI Budget Strengthening Initiative. Country Learning Notes, July 2012, p. 4.

94Interview 12, February 2015; Interview 28, March 2015; Interview 40, February 2015; Interview 39, 24 April 2015.

95Interview 12, February 2015; Interview 28, March 2015. The author has had access to, or seen copies of, documents proving the accuracy of information in this paragraph.

96Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 136.

97Sudan Tribune, 18 November 2014.

98Manibe failed to stop remittance of $8 million requisitioned by a prominent minister, Deng Alor, reportedly payable to the account of a relative in Nairobi for procurement of storage safes.

99Recently the government started instructing ministers to move out of hotels, Sudan Tribune, 18 November 2014.

100‘Edward Lino: There was no Coup in Juba, Part I’, PaanLuel Wel blog, 9 February 2014. Available online: http://paanluelwel.com/2014/02/09/edward-lino-there-was-no-coup-in-juba/ 2014.

101Author’s notes 2012–2013; Interview 40, February 2015.

102Interview 40, February 2015. For the Chinese loan see https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2014/dsacr14345.pdf 38 country.eiu.com/article.aspx%3Farticleid%3D922349476%26Country%.

103Interview 40, February 2015.

104Available online: https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/special-investigation-no-open-bidding-juba-roadworks; https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/roads-built-abmc-never-handed-over-central-equatoria-govt.

105Interview 4, 7 January 2015.

106Transparency International, Anti-corruption Resource Centre, ‘Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in South Sudan’, U4 Expert Answer 371, 4 March 2013.

107Interview 17, February 2015.

108Interview 17, February 2015.

109Interview 42, April 2015; Interview 17, February 2015.

110De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy become insolvent’, p. 347.

111‘Public Expenditures in South Sudan: Are they delivering?’, South Sudan Economic Brief, Issue no. 2, February, pp. 1–2. All figures from this report.

112World Bank, ‘Sudan – Strengthening Good Governance for Development Outcomes in Southern Sudan: Issues and Options’, WB Report no. 48997_SD, April 2010, p. 102.

113The rationale was to provide food-for-work programmes and deliver food aid by road rather than (more expensively) by air. Also see Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 128.

114While disaggregated (pre-independence) Southern Sudanese data are difficult to obtain, some are available. See e.g. World Bank Report, ‘Public Expenditures in South Sudan: Are They Delivering?’, South Sudan Economic Brief, Issue No. 2, February 2013, pp. 10–11.

115Ibid., p. 10.

116GoSS, MOFEP, ‘South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013’. The figure for Kenya: xv; figures also from UNICEF – www.unicef.org/southsudan/education.html.

117World Bank, ‘Public Expenditures in South Sudan: Are They Delivering?’, p. 14.

118Ibid., pp. 13–15.

119‘South Sudan Development Plan 2011–13’, p. xv.

120UNICEF statistics. Available online: http://www.unicef.org/southsudan/reallives_13025.html.

121Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, ‘Key Indicators for Southern Sudan’. Available online: http://ssnbs.org/storage/key-indicators-for-southern-sudan/Key%20Indicators_A5_final.pdf.

122Thomas, South Sudan, p. 88.

123Ibid., pp. 127–33.

124Ibid., p. 143.

125Ibid., p. 129.

126SPLM Economic Commission, ‘SPLM Strategic Framework: For War-to-Peace Transition’, August 2004.

127‘GOSS Priority Core Governance Functions: An Action Plan for Rapidly Building Capacity’, Presentation to Brussels High Level Meeting, 17 September 2010.

128‘South Sudan Development Plan 2011–2013: Realizing Freedom, Equality, Justice, Peace and Prosperity for All’, Juba, August 2011.

129International Republican Institute (IRI), ‘Survey of South Sudan. Public Opinion 6–11 September 2011’.

130The Guardian, 4 January 2011. Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/04/bashir-south-sudan-independence-vote.

131Interview 41, 27 June 2015.

132Transparency International, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, ‘Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in South Sudan’, U4 Expert Answer 371, 4 March 2013.

133As of late 2015 many companies hired to work on the celebration had not been paid.

134Information from GOSS delegation at World Bank/IMF Spring meetings, 15–17 April 2011; the conversation took place on 14 April.

135Author’s notes.

136See also Andrew Ssemwanga, ‘South Sudanese Pound, Managed under Floating Exchange Rate Regime’, in Samson S. Wassara and Al-Tayib Zain Al-Abdin (eds), Post-Referendum Sudan, National and Regional Questions (Senegal, 2014), pp. 189–91, 201–4.

137Between 18 July and 1 September 2011, the Bank of South Sudan converted approximately 1,771 billion of the estimated 2.1 billion Sudanese pounds in circulation in South Sudan at a one-to-one exchange rate.

138Available online: http://www.oanda.com/currency/iso-currency-codes/SDG.

139The UN Country Team had helped identify projects that realistically could be completed within this time frame. The new Minister of Presidential Affairs never helped to sell this achievement, and the government was criticized in the Assembly, incorrectly, for failing to deliver.

140In possession of the author.

141The Treasury Account is the current account used by ministries of finance or treasury departments around the world, and is normally held in the respective central bank.

142UNMISS’ Senior Advisor on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding.

143This followed a brief period of auctioning, letting demand for foreign exchange allow the currency to ‘find its level’.

144IMF Country Report 14/345: ‘Republic of South Sudan 2014 Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation’, 7 December 2014. Available online: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14345.pdf.

145Ibid.

146Confidential memorandum from some donors to the Government of South Sudan, in possession of the author.

147Available online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15000900; Statement from President’s Office dated 19 September 2011 (copy in author’s possession).

148There followed Presidential Order 30/11, ‘Declaration of Assets and the Prohibition of Private Business’, 9 December 2011; and Presidential Order 32/11, ‘Operationalization and Implementation of Five Points Measures for Accountability and Transparency’, 12 December 2011.

149Letters were sent to Heads of State and Government, as appropriate, in countries where banks were presumed to hold stolen assets, followed by contacts with the countries’ authorities. Little progress was made.

150Quoted in Victor Lugala, Vomiting Stolen Food (Nairobi, 2010), p. 2.

151This forced the UN Security Council to cancel its planned visit to Abyei.

152Ted Dagne, Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and the North-South Relationship, Congressional Research Service, 15 June 2011, p. 2.

153A Security Council Resolution was passed at the end of June, mandating establishment of a United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), SCR 1990, 27 June 2011.

154Related to a multilayered complex of conflicts over land, and tensions from the Kokora period in Juba (1982–3), when a redivision into sub-regions resulted in exclusion of Dinka, ethnic clashes and killings (Rens Willems and David Deng, ‘The legacy of Kokora in South Sudan’, Briefing Paper, Intersections of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan, November 2015, pp. 13–16).

155The coordinator of these efforts was our Senior Advisor on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding seconded to the presidency.

156Security Council Resolution 1996 S/RES/1996 (2011), 8 July 2011, OP 18.

157The first cabinet discussion of the Peacebuilding Support Plan (PBSO) was in mid November 2011.

158The Peacebuilding Support Plan was largely based on the SSDP, and support programmes by UNMISS, the UN Country team and relevant bilateral and multilateral donors; submitted in early March 2012 and considered by the Security Council in their meeting that same month.

159See numerous references in Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, 2011.

160Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 226

161AUHIP report to the AU Peace and Security Council, November 30 2011, p. 8, para. 24.

162‘Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion’, International Republican Institute, 6-27 September 2011, p. 9

163‘Building a Nation: South Sudanese Share Their Thoughts on the Creation of a Successful State’, November 23, 2011; ‘Governing South Sudan, Opinions of South Sudanese on a Government that Can Meet Citizen Expectations: Findings from Focus Groups with Men and Women in South Sudan’, 22 March 2012, p. 5.

Chapter 3: An Incomplete Divorce

1Available online: http://www.rssnegotiationteam.org/past-agreements.html.

2‘Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Situation in Abyei’, 26 July 2011, S/2011/451, p. 2.

3‘Report on the Human Rights Situation during the Violence in Southern Kordofan, Sudan’, UNMIS, June 2011.

4Interview 17, 4 February 2015.

5Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 150; Interview 17, 4 February 2015.

6Interview 16, 5 February 2015.

7Kiir to Obama, letter dated 12 October 2011, copy seen by author.

8On 15 October 2011 the GRSS proposed to forgive debt by Sudan of $2.84 billion and provide transitional financial assistance of $2.04 billion for three years, totalling together $4.89 billion (or 94 per cent of Sudan’s projected budget deficit).

9Author’s notes of conversations with GRSS delegation and mediators.

10The meeting in Khartoum, 29 February 2012, was cleared by UNHQ in New York, as critical border issues related to the UN’s operations could only be resolved at the presidential level.

11Evidence submitted by UNMISS to the Security Council, November 2011, in possession of the author.

12The GRSS preferred to call the package ‘financial assistance’, Khartoum preferred ‘financial arrangements’, a terminological dispute that became a major sticking point.

13South Sudan stated a commitment to resolve all outstanding issues. Its conditions were that implementation of the transitional financial arrangements would be consistent with Guiding Principle 9 for the negotiations (8 February 2011) and: (i) Immediate, unconditional withdrawal of SAF troops from Abyei and agreement on a clear, time-bound process for resolving determination of the final status of Abyei; and (ii) Final agreement on a time-bound process for demarcation of the agreed borders and agreement on an arbitration process for the disputed areas. The final monthly payment schedule would be organized so that higher payments were made after demarcation of border areas was completed.

14At this time, these demands were related to Khartoum’s unilaterally stipulated user fee of $ 35 per barrel. Reportedly, Sudan intended to use the oil as payment ‘in kind’ in lieu of receiving $25 per barrel transfers from South Sudan.

15See Chapter 6.

16Interview 38, 24 October 2014.

17Ibid.

18Also see Statement by the President to the National Legislative Assembly, 23 January 2012.

19Briefing by Kalonzo Musyoka in Nairobi, 5–6 March 2012.

20Ibid.

21Tweet by Reuters journalist Hez Holland, 31 January 2012.

22AUHIP to Kiir (‘Proposed Roadmap for Final Agreement on Oil’), 20 January 2012, in possession of the author; Kiir to AUHIP, 21 January 2012.

23The meeting between the parties under the auspices of the Ethiopian Prime Minister took place prior to the main plenary meeting of the IGAD Heads of State on 27 January 2012.

24De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, pp. 363–4.

25Meeting with Meles Zenawi, 30 January 2012.

26De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, pp. 363–4

27De Waal claims that Pagan Amum ‘overruled and humiliated his President’ (ibid., pp. 363–4).

28Interview 46, April 2015.

29Author’s notes of meeting of AUHIP leaders and UN officials, 30 January 2012.

30Some ships were literally at sea for months with a cargo that no one wanted to buy for fear of litigation.

31Available online: https://www.skadden.com/professionals/david-herlihy.

32De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, p. 364; Author’s notes from meetings with World Bank officials.

33The impact of these combined economic shocks could imply a projected increase in the poverty rate to 83 per cent in 2013 (from 50 per cent in 2009).

34Budget support or loans could not be provided, given the GRSS’ weak macro-economic performance and problems with transparent financial management.

35If various instruments in the World Bank, African Development Bank and IMF were used to the maximum, they could provide no more than $100 million. Macro-economic performance is decisive for loans to be provided.

36The loan, which was obtained towards the end of 2012 was in the order of $250 million per quarter, a total of $1 billion per annum (Interview 35, 23 April 2015).

37In a letter from the chief negotiator of South Sudan, Pagan Amum to the Security Council, ambassadors and representatives in Addis Ababa on 12 March 2012, he substantiated in detail the basis for the statement that ‘the GoS [had] established that their oil fee demands were not based on cost or necessarily state practice or international law, but simply a government decision to secure no less than $9–10 billion from the RSS – whatever the source and configuration’. Copy in author’s possession.

38Available online: http://www.rssnegotiationteam.org/uploads/1/2/8/8/12889608/10_agreement_on_the_demarcation_of_the_boundary_13_march_2012.pdf and http://www.rssnegotiationteam.org/uploads/1/2/8/8/12889608/11._nationality_agreement_13_march_2012.pdf.

39Author’s notes of conversations; Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 238.

40Interview 9, December 2014; Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 239.

41It turned out that the SPLA had not ‘taken Heglig’. They had approached, but not as far as capturing the oilfields or town proper.

42Statement at public rally 4 March 2012. Available online: http://panafricannews.blogspot.no/2012/03/sudan-president-bashir-orders.html.

43‘Sudan suspends Summit with the South after border clashes’, Agence France-Presse (AFP), 27 March 2012.

44UNMISS’s Matrix over reported and verified bombing incidents, reporting eight bombs in total in November 2011 and 1 in February 2012: ‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan’ S/212/140, p. 8.

45According to UNMISS figures, by 18 April 2012, 13 civilians had been killed and 23 injured from bomb attacks on South Sudanese territory.

46The Dinka name had always been ‘Panthou’, while ‘Heglig’ had been used by the Khartoum government since 1978. See Douglas Johnson, ‘Note on Panthou/Heglig’, 2 May 2012, published on ‘Gurtong Net’, 5 May 2012. Available online: http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/6915/Dr-Douglas-H-Johnson-Note-on-PanthouHeglig.aspx, and in summary form in the Sudan Tribune, 5 May 2012. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article42499.

47Author’s notes. See also Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 230.

48Johnson, ‘Note on Panthou/Heglig’, 2–4, unpublished note, shared with the AUHIP negotiation team.

49Ibid., p. 4.

50Even in this revised map, the status of Heglig is not clear: Johnson, ‘Note on Panthou/Heglig’, p. 4.

51Available online: http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1306.

52Reuters Industries, ‘UPDATE 2-Sudan says Heglig oilfield repaired, pumping oil’, 2 May 2012.

53The National Legislature in the Republic of South Sudan consists of two chambers, the National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States.

54Available online: http://www.newsudanvision.com/sudan/2574-south-sudan-president-addresses-national-legislature-on-sudan-attacks.

55The term ‘co-president’ had been invented in September 2011 by government hardliners unhappy with the mandate of UNMISS and determined to undermine it.

56Government statement, 12 April 2012.

57Numerous statements, 11–14 April, in the archive of the author.

58Available online: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2012/12.

59In possession of the author.

60Government of South Sudan to Security Council, 14 April 2012.

61Border disputes between Sudan and South Sudan were not in the mandate of UNMISS. But discreet good offices on behalf of the Secretary General were part of any Special Representative’s job.

62UNMISS statement about the bombing in Unity and Warrap States, 16 April 2012.

63According to UNMISS statistics 16 were killed and 34 wounded during the period 11–21 April.

64Press Statement by UN Secretary General and UNMISS, 17 April 2012.

65Available online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17727624.

66Speech recorded by Al Jazeera, published on 19 April 2012, and referenced in http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot422.

67Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, pp. 230–1.

68Ibid., p. 232.

69UNMISS statement on the bombing in Bentiu, Unity State, 23 April 2012; UN Secretary General: ‘Secretary General Condemns Aerial Bombardment on South Sudan by Sudanese Armed Forces’, SG/SM/14248-AFR/2380, 23 April 2012.

70De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, p. 364.

71AUPSC statement, 24 April 2012. Available online: http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-319-com-soudan-south-sudan-24-04-2012.pdf.

72The agreement to establish the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone would demilitarize an area of 10 km on both sides of the so-called median line between the two countries. A border monitoring mission was supposed to oversee implementation.

73SCR 2046 used the term ‘additional measures under Article 41 of the Charter’, which is code for sanctions.

74To avoid accusations that the UN was predetermining the border, it abided by the map used by the former UNMIS, constituting our Area of Operations. The South Sudanese saw this as approximating Khartoum’s position, and it was a constant irritant in our relations.

75Riek Machar to Security Council, 3 May 2012.

76Statement on Radio Miraya, 23 May 2012.

77Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44006.

78Available online: http://www.rssnegotiationteam.org/historic-september-27-peace-agreements.html.

79Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 227.

80Author’s notes from conversations with senior officials, Juba, September 2012.

81I was at Deng Alor’s house when I got news about the final decision. The Security Council was meeting in just an hour, so we made sure that phone calls were placed for the latest government positions to be conveyed.

82Available online: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD-SS_130312_ImplementationMatrix.pdf, Section 5.4, pp. 11–12.

83This was related to pipeline-differences.

84Available online: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD-SS_130312_ImplementationMatrix.pdf.

85Available online: http://www.rssnegotiationteam.org/modalities-for-security-arrangements.html.

86Oil exports from South Sudan through Sudan restarted on 5 May 2013.

87It has not been possible to corroborate this quotation from an eyewitness.

88Interview 33, 21 March 2015.

89Available online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/27/us-sudan-south-oil-idUSBRE94Q0IL20130527.

90Ibid.

91Ibid.

92Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn, p. 219.

93Sudan Tribune, 5 May 2013, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot2815.

94The visit took place on 30 June–2 July 2013.

95The Guardian, 4 July 2013.

96‘Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA)’, South Sudan Crisis Timeline 27 June 2014, p. 3, www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/documents/HSBA-South-Sudan-Crisis-Timeline.pdf.

97Available online: http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/12789/South-Sudans-Kiir-In-Khartoum-To-Avert-Oil-Shutdown.aspx.

98HSBA, ‘Small Arms Survey’, 2014, 4; Interview 17, 4 February 2015.

99Available online: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27–4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_627.pdf. Author’s notes from conversations with Sudanese officials.

100HBSA Small Arms Survey, 2014, p. 4.

101‘The referendum in Abyei is an ongoing challenge for the African Union’, 2 December 2013. Available online: http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-referendum-in-abyei-is-an-ongoing-challenge-for-the-african-union.

102Sudan Tribune, 28 October 2013. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48606.

103De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, pp. 347–69.

104Ibid., p. 349.

105‘Statement of H. E Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan to the South Sudanese People on Transparency and Accountability’, 21 September 2011, Juba, in possession of the author. ‘South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir to Fight Corruption’, BBC News, 21 September 2011. Available online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15000900; Press release ‘Republic of South Sudan, The Office of the President. Anti-Corruption Measures’, 1 June 2011, Juba, available in PDF-format on https://paanluelwel2011.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/anti-corruption.pdf; UN Security Council Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan S/2011/678, 2 November 2011, p. 3, para. 11.

106Presidential Order 32/2011, 22 December 2011.

107Presidential Order 31/2011, 9 December 2011, on the Declaration of Assets and the Prohibition of Private Business. While this had been part of the Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2009, it had never been enforced.

108Letter from The Republic of South Sudan, The Office of the President, signed by President Salva Kiir Mayardit, 3 May 2012, available in PDF-format on http://paanluelwel.com/2012/06/01/letter-from-president-kiir-on-corruption-4-billion-dollars-stolen.

109Interview 47, 25 June 2015.

110The President sent letters to eight Heads of State and Government, as appropriate, requesting repatriation of funds.

111Informed sources confirm that there was a basis for dismissal in several cases, and information provided that would merit further investigation. According to Interview 28, 24 June 2015, the President was presented with the findings, and the proposed course of action, but did nothing. Press release ‘Republic of South Sudan, The Office of the President. Anti-Corruption Measures’, 1 June 2011, Juba.

112‘Letter from The Republic of South Sudan, The Office of the President, signed by President Salva Kiir Mayardit’, 3 May 2012, available in PDF-format on http://paanluelwel.com/2012/06/01/letter-from-president-kiir-on-corruption-4-billion-dollars-stolen.

113The letter was dated 4 May 2012, but hand-delivered to ministers and a few others at the beginning of June. The story hit the headlines on 5 June. Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/05/south-sudan-president-accuses-officials-stealing.

114‘The Report of the Auditor General on the Financial Statements of the Government of Southern Sudan for Financial Year Ended 31 December 2005; equivalent – Ended 31 December 2006’.

115‘Letter from The Republic of South Sudan, The Office of the President, signed by President Salva Kiir Mayardit’, 3 May 2012, available in PDF-format on http://paanluelwel.com/2012/06/01/letter-from-president-kiir-on-corruption-4-billion-dollars-stolen.

116Available online: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/06/201265233043136384.html.

117Sudan Tribune (available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46984) reported on 17 June 2013 that the President’s Office had been robbed twice in March. The President formed a committee under the chief of the anti-corruption commission, Justice John Gatwech Lul, to investigate. Several officials were suspended. The committee recommended only administrative measures against them, not prosecution. In June 2015 one of these same officials was arrested and the other two suspended for using the Presidential seal, letterhead and forged signature to authorize transfers of money from the government to their private accounts.

118‘South Sudan Presidency seeks to resolve corruption case out of court’. Radio Tamazuj, 22 November 2015, reporting that National Security Director Akol Kuor approached the Chief Justice on the matter. Available online: https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/south-sudan-presidency-seeks-resolve-corruption-case-out-court.

119Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudanese court prosecutes senior presidential officials over money’, 23 February 2016, http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58090.

120Republican Order No. 30/2011 of December 2011 prohibited government officials, civil servants and constitutional office holders, from conducting any commercial activity or receiving remuneration from any activity other than government salary.

121IMF Country Report 14/345: ‘Republic of South Sudan 2014 Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation’, December 2014, p. 9. Available online: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14345.pdf.

122IMF Country Report 14/345: ‘Republic of South Sudan 2014 Article iv Consultation’, December 2014, p. 7. Available online: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14345.pdf. The report refers to 79 forex houses in South Sudan, almost as many as in Kenya, whose economy is five times larger.

123The US State Department reported that of $1.3 million to be disbursed weekly from the Central Bank to commercial banks, only about $450,000 was delivered: the rest went to the parallel market. See ‘Tracking Progress, Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in East Africa and the Greater Horn of Africa’, Global Center of Corporate Security, March 2015, p. 47. Available online: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tracking-Progress-low-res.pdf.

124IMF Country Report 14/345: ‘Republic of South Sudan 2014 Article iv Consultation’, December 2014, p. 7. Available online: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14345.pdf, The Sentry, ‘The Nexus of Corruption and Conflict in South Sudan’, Washington, July 2015, pp. 9–10, www.TheSentry.org. Only imports of food, medicine, fuel and construction materials benefit from the official exchange rate.

125Christopher Adam and Lee Crawfurd, Exchange Rate Options for South Sudan (Oxford, 2012), pp. 19, 25. The Ministry of Justice declined access to information on the owners of forex bureaus, citing confidentiality. According to one (uncorroborated) source (Interview 41, 25 June 2015), the Central Bank allocated funds to forex bureaus at the fixed rate, which sold them at the parallel rate.

126Adam and Crawfurd, Exchange Rate Options for South Sudan, p. 3.

127Radio Tamazuj, 18 June 2015, see https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/list-south-sudanese-companies-accessing-dollars-preferential-rate-1.

128Information from a source with personal knowledge. All details, including the criminal’s name and the amount of money have been provided.

129Available online: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=177799. Two refineries were constructed during this period: at Bentiu, Unity State, in part by Safinat; and Thiangrial refinery in Upper Nile State, contracted to a Hong-Kong registered company, Frontier Resources Group. Neither was fully operationalized.

130International Republican Institute, ‘Survey of South Sudan. Public Opinion 24 April–22 May 2013’, presented in November 2013.

131Rumours of $4.5 billion in loans at commercial rates, reported in the Sudan Tribune on 4 May 2013, seemed to have less credibility.

132The Government cut spending in half, although military expenditure remained at approximately the same level: Kosti Manibe, ‘South Sudan, challenges, reforms and a new partnership’, presentation to the World Bank, Washington DC, 16 April 2013, p. 5.

133For the New Deal Compact see http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document.

134The president sent it back to the Assembly twice, objecting to the audit clause in what can only be seen as an attempt to continue mismanagement of the oil income. He finally signed a revised text in November 2014 (not 2013, as the Act as published states).

135The rate on the black market at the time was 4.5 pounds to the US dollar.

136Interview 35, 23 April 2015; Interview 40, 20 February 2015.

137De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, p. 366.

138Austerity Budget, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, March 2012; Budget for the Fiscal Year 2012/13, June 2012; and Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, June 2012.

139De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, pp. 363–4.

140Ibid., p. 353.

141Ibid., p. 129.

142Author’s notes from several meetings in 2012. See also Thomas, South Sudan, p. 139.

143President Kiir claimed not to have been fully consulted.

144Cf. Thomas, South Sudan, p. 160.

145According to the Local Government Act of 2009, Section 48, (2), the county commissioner should be elected by universal suffrage in the county.

146GRSS Transitional Constitution 2011, Article 101 (r) and (s).

147UNMISS Press Statement, 7 December 2012. Numerous condemnations and protests and massive funeral gatherings followed.

148UNMISS Press Statement, 11 February 2013.

149See ‘Report of the UN Secretary General on South Sudan S/2013/140’, 8 March 2013, paras 52–5; Amnesty International, ‘South Sudan: Civil Unrest and State Repression, Human Rights Violations in Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal State’, February 2013.

150UNMISS Press Statement, 13 December 2012. Available online: http://unmiss.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=eB_3VM0zatQ%3d&tabid=4041&mid=6878&language=en-US.

151Information Minister Michael Makuei, press conference, 6 November 2013. Available online: https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/transcript-south-sudan-information-minister-warns-press.

152‘Report of the UN Secretary General on South Sudan S/2013/366’, 20 June 2013, paras 52–3

153‘Report of the UN Secretary General on South Sudan S/2013/140’, 8 March 2013, para. 55; ‘Report of the UN Secretary General on South Sudan S/2012/140’, 7. March 2012, para. 63, ‘Report of the UN Secretary General on South Sudan S/2012/820’, para. 56, 8 November 2012.

154‘Report of the UN Secretary General on South Sudan S/2013/366’, 20 June 2013, para. 57.

155Available online: http://civicus.org/index.php/en/media-centre-129/press-releases/1939-south-sudan-s-ngo-bill-is-needlessly repressive-civicus. While the NGO-bill was held up in parliament for a long time, it was finally approved and signed into law by the president in early February 2016, Sudan Tribune, 11 February 2016, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57988.

156Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan: Abusive Security Bill’, 15 October 2014; Radio Tamazuj, 10 October 2014. Available online: https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/document-south-sudan%E2%80%99s-revised-national-security-bill.

157A revised version was passed in October 2014 amid a walk-out of protesting MPs: ‘S. Sudan parliament passes security bill amid protests’, Sudan Tribune, 8 October 2014. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article52674.

Chapter 4: Jonglei: The UN – Between a Rock and a Hard Place

1‘Speech of the Rt. Hon. Speaker/Lt Gen Wani Igga before the National Legislature of the Republic of South Sudan’, p. 4.

2In hindsight, it is a rather entertaining read: ‘Millions of mabrukat [congratulations] to H. E Madam Hilde Johnson, the Norwegian Iron Lady who stood firm as a loyal servant of sisterly Norway behind the Naivasha-negotiations […] She is in this hall as Special Representative of the Secretary General […] I just wish the world has [sic] just ten solid ladies like Hilde’ (ibid.).

3Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011) Op para. 3 (a) (v).

4The mandated level was 7,000 military personnel, of which more than 2,000 were enablers (engineers, administrative staff and others). The number of infantry was initially no more than 3,600, increasing to 4,600 in 2013.

5The Anglo-Egyptian condominium that ruled Sudan (1899–1955) was headed by a British governor-general.

6Thomas, South Sudan, p. 2.

7See UNMISS, ‘Human Rights Report Jonglei’, June 2011, pp. 11–12.

8International Crisis Group, ‘Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan’, 23 December 2009, p. 1.

9Ibid., p. 3.

10UNMISS, ‘Human Rights Report on Jonglei’, June 2012, p. 6.

11Ibid., p. 11.

12South Sudan Bureau for Community Safety and Small Arms Control, ‘Reports’, p. 2012.

13Jonathan E. Arensen, ‘Murle Political Age Sets and Systems’, Houghton College research paper, 2012, p. 5; Thomas, South Sudan, p. 292.

14Thomas, South Sudan, pp. 223, 225.

15Arensen, ‘Murle Political Age Sets and Systems’, 4; Thomas, South Sudan, p. 217.

16‘The History of the Murle Migrations’, Houghton College research paper, 2012, p. 11.

17Øystein Rolandsen and Ingrid Marie Breidlid, ‘What is Youth Violence in Jonglei’, PRIO Paper 2013, pp. 6, 9; Eddie Thomas, South Sudan, pp. 224–5.

18Ibid.

19Arensen, ‘Murle Political Age Sets and Systems’.

20Sharon Hutchinson, ‘Nuer Ethnicity Militarized’, Anthropology Today xvi/3 (2000), p. 8.

21Ibid., pp. 10–11.

22Thomas, South Sudan, p. 223. The scale of attacks originated from a modern version of the traditional mobilization of whole age sets (when the whole community was threatened, in conflict with other communities).

23UNMISS, ‘Human Rights report on Jonglei’, June 2011; Thomas, South Sudan, p. 3.

24These comprised a total of 288 long-duration, short-duration and integrated ground patrols during the period, as well as 243 special flights to specific destinations or dynamic air patrols.

25These were regarded to be Pibor and Likuangole (both Murle) and Akobo and Walgak (both Lou Nuer).

26Prophets have an important role to play in the Nuer culture. When a prophet emerges, owing to qualities of divination, he or she can lead the community on issues of security and protection. Prophets do not take on administrative functions, however, roles normally of chiefs.

27This account is based on the UNMISS Human Rights Investigation Report on Jonglei issued in June 2012.

28UNMISS Statement: Available online: http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/6161/Hilde-F-Johnson-Condemns-Jalle-Incident.aspx.

29See ‘SPLA repulses Lou Nuer-attack on Pibor-barracks’, Sudan Tribune, 2 January 2012.

30UNMISS Press Statements, 16 December and 26 December 2011; ‘UN urges South Sudan to Help Avert Possible Attack’, Bloomberg News, 27 December 2011. Available online: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-27/united-nations-urges-south-sudan-to-help-avert-possible-attack.

31A battalion usually has 850 soldiers.

32The UNMISS Human Rights Investigation Report on Jonglei, p. 15, reports that 31 vulnerable civilians were evacuated by air by UNMISS helicopters.

33Ibid. The last message was referring to Likuongole as the headquarters of the payam, which is the administrative level below county. The threat implied that the Murle were requested to depopulate the area, and hence, the headquarters of the local payam would no longer be there.

34Ibid., p. 16.

35The number of infantry had by March 2013 still reached only 4,931.

36‘Accounts Emerge in South Sudan of 3000 deaths’, New York Times, 5 January 2012. Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/world/africa/in-south-sudan-massacre-of-3000-is-reported.html.

37According to the UNMISS ‘Human Rights Investigation Report on Jonglei’, 12, approximately 370 civilians were unaccounted for.

38‘Born in Unity, South Sudan is Torn Again’, New York Times, 12 January 2012, by Jeffrey Gettleman. Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/africa/south-sudan-massacres-follow-independence.html.

39The visit took place on 7 January 2011, a week after the attacks. They went to both Pibor town and Fertait, one of the villages rumoured to have experienced a massacre.

40Hilde F. Johnson, in the International Herald Tribune, ‘South Sudan: Old Enmities Test New Nationhood’, February 2012, responing to the New York Times story of 12 January.

41UNMISS Press Statement on civilian disarmament, 12 March 2012.

42Some were unhappy about exclusion from the process, and the way the archbishop ran it. UNMISS was in continuous dialogue with all community leaders and politicians, but as a Mission we had to support the peace process organized by the government.

43For the Peace Agreement of 5 May 2012, see http://paanluelwel.com/2012/05/06/jonglei-peace-conference-resolutions-held-in-bor-1st-5th-may-2012.

44President Kiir had criticized the role of politicians in Juba as prime drivers of the violence. Author’s notes from president’s speech on 5 May 2012 and several meetings.

45Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article42491, 4 May 2012.

46General Kuol Diem Kuol led the disarmament campaign in Jonglei. Appointment of General Peter Gadet to lead Division 8 in Bor led to erroneous assumptions that he was in charge.

47‘The Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, the Security Council, S/2012/486’, pp. 8–9 referred to 63 cases of reported human rights violations between March and June, 43 were in Pibor. These included six killings and 13 rapes, although the latter was presumably underreported.

486 April.

49Akobo and Pibor counties were never disarmed: ‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, the Security Council, S/2012/820’, p. 7.

50‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, the Security Council, S/2012/486’, p. 9.

51Ibid., reports eight arrests, with detentions and one court martial.

52Ibid., pp. 8–9.

53UNMISS, ‘Statement on Situation in Jonglei’, 26 June 2013. Available online: http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4041&currentpage=2&language=en-US.

54‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, the Security Council, S/2012/820’, pp. 11–12, reporting human rights violations between 15 July and 20 August, 27 involving torture or ill-treatment, 12 rapes, six attempted rapes, and eight unlawful arrests.

55During 10–13 August ten abuses were reportedly committed in another place, including rape, torture, beatings and looting. In mid August, another killing was reported.

56UNMISS Press Statement, 24 August 2012, ‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, the Security Council, S/2012/820’, pp. 7–8.

57‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, the Security Council, S/2012/820’, p. 5.

58Human Rights Watch, ‘Open letter to President Salva Kiir’, 23 August 2012, often referred to as ‘the Human Rights Watch report’.

5921 September 2012. Available online: http://sudaneseonline.org/cs/blogs/english/archive/2012/09/20/south-sudan-police-graduates-first-cadets.aspx.

6013 September 2012.

61The UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy applies to all mission settings.

62Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Office of the Deputy Minister for International Cooperation, 19 October 2012, signed by the acting minister, Elias Nyamlell Wakoson.

63The minister was clear that a full reversal of the decision for both officers was not going to happen.

64In another letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 24 October 2012, and signed by the Undersecretary, Charles Manyang D’Awol, the decision on Richard Bennett was suspended.

65UNMISS Statement, 4 November 2012.

66Thomas, South Sudan, p. 230; Jonathan E. Arensen, ‘Human Ecology of the Murle’, Houghton College research paper, 2012, p. 7.

67See ‘Thousands of children to be gradually released from armed group in South Sudan’, UNICEF, 27 January 2015. Available online: http://www.unicef.org/media/media_78936.html.

68The small UNMISS contingent was attacked by David Yau Yau’s forces; there were no casualties. The SPLA helped defend the base. The civilians departed Likuongole, and it became clear that it would take time before the environment was perceived secure enough for them to return. Several threats against the UNMISS-base made it difficult to redeploy the contingent to other locations; otherwise setting a precedent that UN forces could be ‘chased out’ of Pibor and Jonglei, thus undermining the protection of civilians mandate of the Mission.

69A Murle Red Chief, 24–25 September 2012.

70As many as 17 were reportedly killed in the vicinity of Manyabol and Gumuruk in November/December 2012. For other incidents, see Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan to the Security Council (8 March 2013, S/2013/140, 12) and Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan (8 November, S/2013/651, 10).

71Øystein H. Rolandsen and Ingrid Marie Breidlid, ‘What is Youth Violence in Jonglei?’, PRIO Paper, Oslo 2013, p. 8.

72The investigation report on the incident of 25 December 2012 recommended replacing the Commander of the SPLA in Pibor and accountability for the soldiers involved.

73UNMISS called for accountability and the removal of the commanding officers from the area. Our investigators were blocked from doing their work, and an Investigation Committee appointed by parliament was impeded and unable to complete its report.

74During the civil war the Tomm El Nur militia recruiting from these communities had been used by Khartoum as a proxy.

75The UNMISS territory to soldier ratio was 98 square kms:1 soldier in late 2012 (including all forces); in 2011–2012, the figure had been even lower. For the UN African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) the ratio was 29:1, and for the UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) it was 35:1. For the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), using its primary area of operations as comparator, Eastern DRC, the ratio was 17:1. If UNMISS were to move most of its forces to Jonglei, the ratio would be 19:1. All statistics from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO, 2012, reflected in several UNMISS presentations, 2012–13.

76Military helicopters usually have more flexibility in their operations than civilian aircraft. The civilian aviation companies offered voluntarily to enter into a special agreement with UNMISS, enabling them to take on most of the operations that the military helicopters had been conducting. An agreement was signed after this initiative.

77‘South Sudan admits it downed UN helicopter, killing four’, Reuters, 22 December 2012. Available online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/22/us-southsudan-un-idUSBRE8BK0V720121222.

78Without additional landing sites, the contingent could be ‘trapped’. Its continued presence in Likuongole was based on military assessments and consultations with UN HQ. For further background on this, see footnote 72.

79A source with close connections to Khartoum’s military intelligence told me in January 2013 how the supplies were provided and dropped; the same source has been interviewed on other issues (Interview 17, 4 February 2015).

80UN DPKO Aviation Safety Manual, Section V, Chapter 10.

81The flight hours we had at our disposal also made continuous testing very difficult, so that many otherwise suitable sites could not be used.

82‘Uniting Our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People’, Report of the High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, p. 59, para. 213.

83‘Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnerships and People’, Report of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations, which was made public on 16 June 2015; The Panel proposed changing the rules to remove constraints on military aircraft: available online: http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf.

84On 25–7 August 2012 UNMISS helped prevent thousands of Nuer youth from crossing the Warrap-Unity State border in the vicinity of Mayandit to attack Dinka communities.

85UNMISS Human Rights Investigation Report, ‘Attack on Lou Nuer pastoralists in Akobo, West Sub-County’, April 2013, p. 7. Goi Yol had requested a UNMISS flight to Walgak to warn the community, but delays in flight procedures prevented this.

86UNMISS Human Rights Investigation Report, ‘Attack on Lou Nuer pastoralists in Akobo, West Sub-County’, p. 10.

87UNMISS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), ‘Movement of Casualties and Medical Patients (CASEVAC and MEDEVAC)’, 2013.01., 26 April 2013; following UN standards globally.

88UNMISS Press Statement on the Situation in Jonglei, 5 March 2013. In possession of the author.

89‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan to the Security Council’, 8 November 2013, S/2013/651, p. 10.

90Office of the President, ‘End Violence against Civilians’, 17 May 2013.

91UNMISS, ‘Statement on the Situation in Jonglei’, 26 June 2013.

92Statistics from the UNMISS Military Justice Unit, working with the SPLA Legal Counsel show by mid November 2013 accountability cases against 115. Of these, 39 related to murder and rape (at least 32 to murder), while 53 were disciplinary cases (disobedience, mishandling of weapons, intoxication). Overall, there had been 92 convictions and 23 acquittals.

93See Thomas, South Sudan, pp. 263–77; and Jonathan Arensen, ‘Contemporary Issues Facing the Murle’, Houghton College research paper, 2012, pp. 1–2.

94Thomas, South Sudan, pp. 263–77, refers to several studies on health and demographics.

95Arensen, ‘Contemporary Issues Facing the Murle’, pp. 2–3; Thomas, South Sudan, Chapters 6 and 8.

96The Mission had legal freedom of movement anywhere in South Sudan according to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Flight assurances were not requests for approval but giving notice of movement. Some of our military still sought approval, despite clear instruction not to do so. Asking for permission undermined the SOFA.

97In possession of the author; for a shorter version see http://www.msf.org/article243/south-sudan-120000-people-pibor-county-cut-aid, 13 June 2013.

98Eddie Thomas (the author of South Sudan: A Slow Liberation, 2015), produced a series of research papers for UNMISS on Jonglei and on dynamics among the three communities.

99Arensen, ‘Human Ecology of the Murle’, p. 2.

100Thomas, South Sudan, pp. 35–7.

101Ibid., pp. 255–7 notes how Jonglei’s food economy has changed, particularly among communities that became more dependent on relief supplies and trade in goods. Such trends might have increased also in later years, affecting survival and coping mechanisms.

102The lengthy time was due to dependence on helicopters (and the need for flight assurances), as well as logistical hurdles: all supplies had to be flown in. UNMISS contingents had almost no mobile equipment. Their massive tents and kitchen equipment had to be transported by truck, which was not possible in the rainy season. There were no mobile command office systems or sanitation facilities.

103Stories were rife – but never corroborated – about the SPLA dropping arms in the bush from helicopters.

104Copy in possession of the author.

105September 2013.

106‘South Sudan Army Faces Accusations of Civilian Abuse’, New York Times, 28 September 2013. Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/world/africa/south-sudans-army-faces-accusations-of-civilian-abuse.html?_r=0.

107The Humanitarian Coordinator, Toby Lanzer and the OCHA team (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) added registered recipients of food in Pibor (75,000 by November 2013) and registered Murle refugees abroad (20,000). Murle who had fled to Juba and other towns had not yet been counted.

108Arensen, ‘Human Ecology of the Murle’, p. 7.

109My deputy SRSG for political affairs, Ray Zenenga, had the main responsibility to make sure that these instructions were followed through.

110‘Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in Jonglei State Between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and The South Sudan Democratic Movement/South Sudan Defence Army (SSDM/SSDA-Cobra Faction)’, Addis Ababa, 9 May 2014.

111Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan’s New War, Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces’, New York, 7 August 2014, p. 76.

Chapter 5: The Leadership

1The notion of John Garang as Moses was common. A former child soldier in Rumbek said in 2004: ‘We consider John Garang to be like Moses, who took his people away from Egypt’ (NDI/SCSE-report December 2004: ‘On the Threshold of Peace’, p. 18).

2Interview 50, 23 March 2015.

3Interview 47, 25 June 2005. In South Sudan, The State We Aspire To, np, 2011, 170, Peter Adwok Nyaba describes this habit: ‘It was generally known that Gen Salva Kiir would make or be instigated to make a decision from which he would immediately distance himself.’

4Information from Kjell Hødnebø, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (1998–2005), 26 January 2015.

5Machar and the SPDF had also been weakened militarily; an SPLA unit encountered Riek in the bush in 2002 with around 70 soldiers; they had run out of ammunition (Interview 34, 21 April 2015).

6Interview 26, 7 February 2015; Interview 48, 14 February 2015; Interview 31, 18 March 2015; Interview 30, 18 March 2015.

7James Wani Igga, a junior officer in the Political Bureau, had been promoted as an Equatorian alternative to Alfred Lado Gore. He, Kuol Manyang, Daniel Awet and Samuel Abu John sided with Salva on this issue; John Kuong (a Nuer), with Deng Alor and Nhial Deng favoured accommodating Riek. Wani Igga’s concession spoiled the strategy, reportedly agreed in advance, of preventing Riek’s ascendancy by reserving the position for an Equatorian.

8Laws of the Republic of South Sudan, The Transitional Constitution, 2011, Article 102 (2), p. 56.

9Sudan Tribune, 4 April 2012.

10The Guardian, 4 July 2013; BBC, ‘Focus on Africa’, 9 July 2013.

11Interview 48, 14 February 2015.

12This group is now comfortable with the term being used, including for this book.

13Paul Mayom Akec

14Interview 48, 14 February 2015.

15Lam parted ways with Riek in 1994 and started his own parties, SPLM-United and, later, SPLM/Democratic Change.

16With Riek’s departure in 1991, ‘Elders of the Bahr el Ghazal region’ formed (in London), with Bona Malwal at the centre, to build an alternative power base to Garang’s. Similar groups, of youth, were formed elsewhere. The motive seemed to be to strengthen the position of the Greater Bahr el Ghazal within the movement.

17These included Dominic Dim, Alieu Ayenyi Alieu, Telar Deng, Harun Ruun and later Dr Justin Yak.

18Bona Malwal had never been ‘core’ SPLM, partly due to his failure to get along with Garang. In 2005 he was even a Senior Advisor to President Bashir, seen as operating very closely with the ruling party in Khartoum. The role of Dominic Dim was confirmed by Khartoum sources. After his death, $4.7 million was found in a bank account under his name in London. Bank officials provided the documents in Juba and inquired whether there were any rightful owners to the money. Two interviewees (Interview 12, 3 February 2015; Interview 9, 30 January 2015) claim the account held twice as much, $8–10 million.

19Alieu as minister of interior and Telar Deng as senior advisor for Legal Affairs to the President.

20Private conversations in Juba; author’s notes. See also Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, pp. 163–5. Almost all members of the leadership interviewed confirmed Salva Kiir’s intention not to stage a coup.

21According to several witnesses, Dominic Dim told arriving colleagues that Salva would confront the chairman, in a bid for the leadership. They now had to choose. These are probably those Kiir referred to as ‘hardliners’.

22In addition to Paul Malong and Pieng Deng, the decisive role in convincing Kiir to go to Rumbek was played by three delegations to Yei, including (i) Kuol Manyang and Deng Alor, (ii) Oyay Deng Ajak, and (iii) Riek Machar and Malik Agar. Corroborated by Interview 31, 18 March 2015; Interview 9, 30 January 2015; Interview 18, 6 February 2015; Interview 34, 21 April 2015.

23Oyay Deng Ayak connected Salva Kiir and John Garang by satellite phone after gatekeepers on both sides had prevented conversation. While the other delegations went ahead, Paul Malong, Pieng Deng and Oyay Deng accompanied Salva to Rumbek. Deng Alor, at Salva’s request, escorted him, without weapons and bodyguards, to the chairman’s house.

24A high-level NCP contact within the presidency in Khartoum confirmed this: ‘Dominic Dim was working with us under [sic] the Yei crisis in 2004’. Another key South Sudanese operative says that money changed hands. The individual, seen as instrumental in causing the crisis, also recently confirmed that ‘Khartoum was involved,’ and that money was paid. In Khartoum in 2007 General Bakry Hassan Saleh, minister of presidential affairs, referred twice to working with Dominic Dim. Interview 47, 25 June 2015; Interview 13, 2 February 2015.

25After his dismissal as head of National Security in Khartoum in 2010, Salah Gosh reportedly expressed disappointment that Khartoum’s strategy with the SPLM from 2004 onwards had failed. Those cadres I have been able to reach deny such links. Interview 13, 2 February 2015; interview 47, 25 June 2015.

26Some claim that money changed hands in this context, and indications of collaboration with the NCP are strong.

27In April 2004 Bona Malwal returned to Khartoum, publicly affirmed the importance of the Machakos Protocol, and committed to work for the unity of Sudan. See http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article2546. See Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, pp. 43–57.

28Interview 31, 18 March 2015; Interview 9, 30 January 2015.

29Dr John had ‘appointed’ Salva to succeed him in a public rally in Rumbek prior to his death; Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan, pp. 197–8.

30This has been confirmed by both ‘camps’: Interview 47, 25 June 2015; Interview 34, 21 April 2015, Interview 48, 14 February 2015.

31Nyaba, South Sudan, p. 29.

32As one said, ‘I am against the New Sudan; I didn’t care what happened in Sudan, as long as we got our independence.’ Interview 47, 25 June 2015.

33Nyaba, South Sudan, p. 156; Johnson: Waging Peace in Sudan, pp. 203–5. Garang and Ali Osman Taha had a gentleman’s agreement that key ministries would be evenly shared between the parties. This did not happen. The NCP got all of them except the Foreign Ministry.

34They complained that the SPLM was being managed by people who seemed only to want a Southern party, for the referendum only. See Nyaba, South Sudan, p. 32; Interview 29, 19 March 2015; Interview 30, 18 March 2015.

35Including Nhial Deng Nhial, Abdel-Aziz Al-Hilu and Yasir Arman.

36Interviewees point to the meeting of the SPLM Leadership Council in April 2006 as decisive. Pagan Amum was appointed Secretary General. The leadership resolved again to confront the NCP about implementing the CPA in full. The first sign was a press conference Salva Kiir held not long afterwards, when he publicly criticized the NCP for undermining the CPA. Interview 29, 19 March 2015; Interview 43, 25 April 2015. Interview 30, 18 March 2015.

37Attempts to get access to the documents leading to their expulsion have been unsuccessful. Most interviewees point to ‘aggressive behaviour’ and public statements undermining the SPLM as the main issues.

38The expulsions took place in early 2007. Deng Alor was appointed foreign minister. It has not been possible to get access to the SPLM-documents on the investigations, and accounts differ: Lam Akol was accused of having deviated from SPLM policy as foreign minister. Telar had kept Salva Kiir in the dark about decisions in the Palace where he was state minister, Aleu was accused of implicating the Ugandan government in the death of Dr John Garang, as recounted in Nyaba (a minister in the GoNU at the time), in South Sudan, p. 166.

39Nyaba, South Sudan, pp. 140–2.

40The vice president was a statutory and not an elected position. For the Garang Boys it mattered that Riek Machar had no leadership position at the time of Garang’s death. The Leadership Council had been dissolved, and Machar was not guaranteed a leading position.

41Interview 18, 6 February 2015; Interview 19, 6 February 2015.

42At this time, Taban Deng Gai had not even been nominated as a delegate to the SPLM Convention. He was a member of the SPLM Political Bureau and was nominated as a delegate by the chairman.

43Interview with Angelina Teny, Addis Ababa, February 2015, corroborated by other sources.

44Nyaba, South Sudan, pp. 143–5.

45‘Report of the EU Observer Mission’. Available online: http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/missions/2010/sudan/index_en.htm; ‘Report of the Observation Mission of the Carter Center’, Atlanta, April 2010. Available online: https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/FinalReportSudan-Apr2010.pdf.

46All political parties participated. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article36802.

47Author’s notes on conversations with members of the leadership in 2011 and 2012.

48Interview 4, 7 January 2015.

49Interview 31, 18 March 2015; interview 10, 1 February 2015; interview 12, 2 February 2015; author’s notes on conversation with member of SPLM leadership, Juba, March 2014.

50All ministers present have been interviewed and confirmed this account.

51Sharing this information with potential competitors made some people around Kiir question Alor’s motives.

52Salva later also denied that the conversation had taken place.

53Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/05/south-sudan-president-accuses-officials-stealing.

54Available online: http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2012/South_Sudan_Anniversary_FAQ.pdf.

55The Convention should take place five years after the previous one in 2008, according to party rules.

56Multiple interviews; confirmed by Pagan Amum.

57See footnotes 162 and 163, Chapter 2 and footnote 130, Chapter 3.

58No arm of government was tasked with monitoring implementation systematically. The Minister of Cabinet Affairs had some responsibility, but ended up merely preparing cabinet meetings. The presidency had no monitoring capacity. This critical gap was an issue intended for discussion at the retreat.

59The agenda included the economic crisis, corruption, security sector reform, preparations for the SPLM party process and Convention, and government reform following the GoSS evaluation.

60On 17 December 2012, the President agreed to hold a SPLM retreat of the five highest-ranking members in mid January; in mid January he agreed to late January, and later suggested mid February. Political Bureau members would be invited to join the second day of deliberations.

61A surprising choice of contact, and a possible indication that Salva Kiir did not take this process seriously.

62Meeting in October–November 2012. Riek said he was not planning to contest for the Chairmanship, but could not pre-empt the party; Salva responded that the leadership-question was up to the SPLM. Author’s notes from conversations in Juba.

63The informal group consisted of Taban Deng Gai and Ezekiel Gatkuoth Lul, at Riek’s request; and Nhial Deng Nhial on Salva’s behalf. James Hoth Mai was less active.

64They were often joined by James Kok. Also others engaged, often meeting in Deng Alor’s house, including John Luk, Oyay Deng, Paul Mayom, Cirino Hiteng and Kosti Manibe.

65Riek later maintained that he had listed seven points, called ‘The Seven Points’, while other interviewees (December 2013–June 2015) – and I noted six.

66Author’s notes of conversations with committee members after they met Machar.

67Interview, James Wani Igga, The New Nation, 25 April 2014. Available online: http://www.newnationsouthsudan.com/interviews/you-cannot-force-a-president-to-step-down-at-gunpoint-%E2%80%93-vp.html.

68According to one of Salva Kiir’s closest advisers, who referred to the meeting as ‘very bad’. ‘After this’, he said, ‘the President felt that there was lack of respect for his leadership, and he turned to the High Command.’

69The delegation of powers had been formally anchored in a letter from the President to the Vice President, since Salva Kiir was also First Vice President of Sudan and expected to spend much time in Khartoum. I have not had access to the letter, but the Vice President chaired the most important government clusters (the economic cluster and the governance cluster, among others), and was perceived as the one de facto managing day-to-day affairs of the government. Military and security affairs, as well as foreign affairs, were never delegated.

70Deng Alor repeatedly asked for a private audience with the President, but this was put on hold for unknown reasons.

71Four of them were Political Bureau members, but the group had no mandate from the SPLM.

72These included Deng Alor, James Hoth Mai, Taban Deng, Nhial Deng, James Kok and John Luk, focusing on possible transition arrangements.

73Presidential decree 03/2013.

74Interview 47, 25 June 2015.

75Interview 4, 7 January 2015. Even capacity building funded via Norwegian People’s Aid to strengthen the party yielded very limited results.

76Republican Orders 12/2013 on suspension of the two ministers in accordance with Article 117(3) of the Transitional Constitution of 2011, and 13/2013 on the formation of the Investigations Committee into the case.

77The report of the Investigations Committee was handed to the President on 5 September 2013. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48210.

78Kosti Manibe was one of very few ministers generally perceived as uninvolved in serious corruption.

79Interview in the Guardian, 4 July 2013. Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/04/riek-machar-south-sudan-ambitions.

80Sudan Tribune, 7 July 2013.

81The Presidential decree was issued despite the Transitional Constitution, 2011, article 101 (r), which refers to removal of state Governors (only) in ‘a crisis in the state that threatens national security and territorial integrity’. Unity State was not in crisis.

82Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47212.

83Presidential Decree 06/2013, 21 January 2013. He was replaced by Matur Chut Dhuol a retired general expected to improve security. But after a lull, fighting among Dinka clans increased. Yet he remained at his post. Matur proved a hardliner. Chol Tong Mayay was arrested during the 2013 crisis.

84Taban was also an in-law of Angelina Teny, Riek’s wife.

85Machar’s letter to President Kiir, stating that Taban’s removal was unconstitutional, 7 July 2013, Sudan Tribune, 7 July 2013.

86BBC ‘Focus on Africa’, reported in Sudan Tribune, 9 July 2013.

87Thabo Mbeki conveyed to me that Machar had responded that he was willing to reconcile with the President if a win-win solution could be found. Mbeki had also agreed with Salva Kiir that he would participate as observer at the PB-meeting. Author’s notes.

88This was in May, prior to the sacking of Riek Machar.

89His visit was also prompted by one of the ‘friends of South Sudan’ who had urged Ethiopian intervention in the leadership crisis. Author’s notes.

90Personal records; interview with Tedros Adhanom, 13 February 2015.

91Interview with Tedros Adhanom, 13 February 2015.

92Republican Decree 49/2013, 50/2013 and 51/2013.

93Chairperson’s Order 01/2013.

94Interview 47, 25 June 2015.

95Interview 48, 14 February 2015; author’s notes on conversations with Sudanese officials August–September 2015. This is confirmed by a document from a national security meeting in Khartoum, received from sources of various states, which includes a statement by President Bashir that ‘South Sudan was a great threat to Sudan … [but] currently, the danger has gone to zero due to the conflict and the balance of power in in [sic] their [Sudan’s] favor.’ The document is ‘Ministry of Defense, Chieftancy [sic] of Joint Forces, Department of Intelligence and Security, Minutes if [sic] the Meeting chaired by Commander-in-Chief, which took place at his office at the Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2014’, Attendance: President Bashir, the Minister of Defence Abdurrahim Muhammad Muhammad Hussein, and the Military high command (in English translation from Arabic).

96Bashir visited Juba three times during this period, likely to cement agreements that included the progressive pay-as-you-go disbursement of the $3 billion special compensation fund.

97Among them were James Hoth Mai, the army’s Chief of General Staff, Major General Mac Paul Kuol, chief of military intelligence, and the acting Secretary General of the SPLM, Anne Itto.

98Interview 9, 30 January 2015; Interview 10, 1 February 2015; Interview 13, 3 February 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015. Those present were reportedly Oyay Deng, Paul Mayom Akec, Madut Bier, Gier Choung Aloung, David Deng Athorbei and possibly Taban Deng Gai. Salva Kiir wanted Pieng Deng to be there, too.

99Interview 39, 7 March 2014.

100I had warned the President against this language several times; it was not befitting a head of state, and was noted in Washington DC and at the Security Council.

101Some versions have ‘scratch the faces’. The speech was almost entirely in Dinka, was first reported to me by a source with a transcript (author’s notes), and was later confirmed in at least seven interviews.

102He referred to two particularly bad attacks in 1994 and 1996.

103Republican Order 17/2013, 7 October 2013.

104Frequent contact with Riek from my end would be regarded with suspicion, whatever was said. There seemed to be little more I could do to help mend relations.

105Sudan Tribune, 15 November 2013.

106Media statement, Minister of Information Michael Makuei, 18 November 2013. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48843.

107Unconfirmed reports that the acting Secretary General of the SPLM had been instructed to prepare for back-to-back meetings of the Political Bureau and the National Leadership Council gave reason to believe that the crisis could still be overcome, influencing the Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan (S/2013/651, 8 November 2013). At the Security Council meeting such an arrangement was less likely, but could not be ruled out.

108The focus was on what could happen if one side was marginalized in the context of the SPLM Convention in the first quarter of 2014. The process at the NLC was prior to this; there would still be possibilities to mobilize politically before the Convention. Fear of violence was linked to the SPLM Convention itself, to a possible fall-out from the Convention (one side being marginalized, feeling forced to either form their own party, or if this was not seen as viable resorting to arms) or to elections – if the plans for elections in 2015 went ahead.

109One uncorroborated source indicates that Riek made two statements in Nuer of this nature, one on 2 December 2013 and another later the same week, allegedly saying he would ‘fight’.

110Akol Kuor was Director of internal security (the other Director was responsible for external security), both reporting to the Minister of National Security in the presidency.

111These included James Hoth Mai, Pieng Deng and, in Paris, Mac Paul Kuol. It was through the efforts of all of us that the situation was contained.

112As the President was abroad when the press conference was held, James Wani Igga later called it the first ‘coup attempt’.

113Rumours had it that Salva Kiir had intended the dissidents’ arrest while he was abroad, but that members of his entourage had persuaded him otherwise.

114Those present included seven leading members of the Political Bureau, Riek Machar, former ministers, two sacked governors, the suspended Secretary General of the SPLM and Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior. Many more had reportedly participated in preparatory meetings, but had pulled out at the last minute.

115Press Statement, 6 December 2013, in author’s possession, does not list the authors; all SPLM-cadres present were co-signatories. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49087.

116Ibid.

117Ibid.

118Øystein Rolandsen, ‘Another Civil War in South Sudan: The Failure of Guerilla Government?’, Journal of Eastern African Studies xli/1 (2015), p. 171.

119Press Statement, 6 December 2013.

120Interview 7, 9 December 2014; Interview 8, 29 January 2015; Interview 16, 5 February 2015; Interview 10, 1 February 2015; Interview 30, 18 March 2015; Interview 31, 18 March 2015.

121Interviewees among the signatories are divided about whether they expected widespread popular support for them or not. The assumption that the President would ‘cave in’ to pressure was misguided; Salva Kiir characteristically responded to humiliating attacks by digging in his heels.

122Press conference statement, 8 December 2013, Author’s copy.

123Interview 34, 21 April 2015.

124According to Pagan Amum, Government security representatives advised him not come, and Pieng Deng, inspector general of police had conveyed the same message to him. Author’s notes.

125They included Archbishop Paulino Lukudo, Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, Moderator Peter Gai Lual Marrow, Bishop Paride Taban and Imam Juma Said Ali.

126Minutes from SPLM/A meeting, Rumbek.

127YouTube. Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5y3bp6Oehis.

Chapter 6: The Nightmare

1The teleconference in the morning was with Undersecretary General Herve Ladsous, the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

2See Sudan Tribune, 16 December 2013. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49200.

3UNMISS Press Statement, ‘Ms Hilde Johnson Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for South Sudan Calls for Calm in in [sic] Juba’, 16 December 2013.

4Televised statement on 16 December 2013, available on You Tube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=boLU20O5JDI.

5I knew both leaders also on the Kenyan side, Uhuru Kenyatta and Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed.

6There were stories about reassignment of Nuer Presidential Guards, who reportedly refused to redeploy without their weapons. Others referred to an order not to give assignments to Nuer officers on 13–14 December 2013. In both versions attempts to take control of the ammunition store at GHQ ensued, with fighting then spreading.

7See, inter alia, Sudan Tribune, 16 December 2013. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49200.

8SPLA officials denied attempts to disarm soldiers of the Presidential Guard, stating that fighting began after a Nuer Presidential Guard shot and killed a Dinka major, Akuol Reach, and attacked the ammunition store in the GHQ: Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan’s New War: Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces’, New York, August 2014.

9Use of force in a situation of active combat between two belligerent forces would also have presupposed a new mandate from the Security Council.

10Some 250 Rwandan soldiers protected UN headquarters and the two large bases and another company (150 soldiers) had guard and commando-post functions, transport, logistics and administrative tasks.

11Adrian Foster from NYHQ remained at the Mission and made three recommendations: (i) political engagement, (ii) documentation of human rights violations, and (iii) protection of people seeking refuge. Our resources were too limited to intervene militarily.

12The neighbourhoods of New Site, Manga, Mangaten, Mia Saba and Eden were all attacked by government forces: UNMISS, ‘UNMISS: Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report’, 8 May 2014; Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan’s New War’, August 2014, pp. 24–36.

13Separate areas were cordoned off within the UNMSS bases, called ‘Protection of Civilians’ sites’ (PoC-sites). It was also within these sites that humanitarian agencies, both UN-agencies and NGOs, would begin operating, delivering food, water, health services, etc.

14UNMISS, ‘Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report’ (Juba, 2014).

15Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan’s New War’ (New York, 2014), p. 37.

16According to uncorroborated accounts, some forces from National Security opposed forces attacking civilians in an attempt at stopping the violence on 16–17 December.

17Interview 33, 23 March 2015.

18Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015.

19‘SRSG Johnson warns against ethnic violence,’ 17 December 2013.

20South Sudan Council of Churches, ‘Message of Peace and Reconciliation from the Church Leaders’, 17 December 2013; Statement by South Sudan Human Rights Commission, 17 December 2013.

21AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan: ‘Final Report of the …’, Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014, p. 182.

22Author’s notes of reports from several credible sources.

23Security Council Presidency Press Statement, 17 December, SC/11221. Available online: http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11221.doc.htm.

24Transcript of Salva Kiir’s press conference, 18 December 2013.

25Agence France-Presse, ‘South Sudan President offers talks with rival accused of coup’, 18 December 2013; www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49238.

26‘Update 2. Political Background. Juba’, 16 December 2013: ‘They claimed that the operation was a coordinated ‘attempted coup’, and stressed that change of leadership in South Sudan would only happen through a democratic process …’. Nothing else in any way referred to Riek Machar.

27‘South Sudan: Pillay warns against rapidly deteriorating security situation and risk of ethnic clashes,’ Geneva, 19 December 2013; the Secretary General’s spokesman, and the deputy secretary general, Jan Eliasson, expressed grave concern in New York the same day.

28Security Council Press Statement on the Situation in South Sudan, 20 December 2013.

29Security Council Resolution S/RES/2132 (2013), 24 December 2013. The resolution increased UNMISS’s mandated force to 12,500 troops.

30The names of the senior government officials are kept in the author’s archives. Should criminal investigations be pursued in this case, the names will be handed over to the relevant authority for further corroboration.

31Press reports, 17 December 2013, including http://africajournalismtheworld.com/2013/12/17/south-sudan-arrests-followed-failed-coup.

32This was reported also to the AU Commission, and the fire was returned (‘Final Report of the African Union Mission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, African Union, Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014, p. 123).

33For more details see Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan’s New War’, pp. 1–44.

34BBC report at 17.55 hrs 16 December 2015, author’s notes. Not available on www.bbc.com.

35Sudan Tribune, 16 December 2013.

36The others were Gier Choung Aloung, Cirino Hiteng, Majak D’Agoot, Madut Bier, Koul Tong Mayai and Ezekiel Gatkuoth Lul.

37By then, President Kenyatta and Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn had also seen them, as had the American Envoy Donald Booth.

38Several media outlets, including AFP, available online: http://www.africareview.com/News/Riek-Machar-denies-South-Sudan-coup-attempt/-/979180/2116956/-/8n35tg/-/index.html. Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/18/south-sudan-sacked-vp-denies-plotting-coup.

39In an interview with Radio France International reported by Agence France Press and other media, 19 December 2013.

40I met Salva Kiir on 18, 23 and 28 December 2013, 2, 9 and 24 January and 11 February. After I reached Riek Machar on 21 December, I called him on the 23rd and 28th, on 2 and 9 January, and later. In February and March, meetings and calls were less frequent, as tensions increased along with accusations of ‘support for the rebels’.

41Al Jazeera, 19 December 2013. Available online: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/south-sudan-machar-speaks-al-jazeera-2013121961331646865.html.

42According to eye witnesses, local incidents exacerbated the news from Juba: two students from Twic East had been killed, followed by three police officers, which led to fighting between Dinka and Nuer police. Nuer youths then broke into the police armoury, took guns, and engaged in the fighting.

43According to an eyewitness, the attackers were Dinka prison and police officers.

44The UN commander at Akobo, with 43 peacekeepers, reported that 32 Dinkas had sought shelter. Six police advisers and two civilian UN staff were also there.

45The delay was due to the distance, which required a stop in Bor. The late hour meant that evacuation could only be done the following day.

46Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan’s New War’, p. 56.

47Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49541.

48Small Arms Survey – Timeline, 2014, p. 6.

49Ibid., pp. 6–7.

50As a trio of US light aircraft flew in to conduct the evacuation, they were fired upon by Gadet’s forces, who assumed a coordinated attack by foreign aircraft. A USAF V-22 Osprey was hit. A communication glitch with our people on the ground led to the very unfortunate injuring of four US Navy Seals.

51This included the villages of Pariak, Malek and Goy.

52Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War, p. 52.

53Office of the President, Press Statement, ‘President Salva Kiir Mayardit calls for an end to all ethnic violence’, 24 December 2014. In possession of the author.

54Republic of South Sudan, Ministry of Interior, South Sudan National Police Service, Office of the Inspector General, ‘Committee to investigate into the allegations labelled as the involvement of some elements of Joint Patrol and other organized forces in human violations and abuses during the failed coup attempt,’ including Terms of Reference, 28 December 2013 (Author’s copy).

55SPLA Office of the Chief of General Staff: ‘Convening Order forming a Committee to investigate the cause of the shoot out within the Republican Guard Division on 15 December 2013’, 31 December 2013 (Author’s copy). This Committee was complemented with another focusing on the killings in Juba. Available online: http://eyeradio.org/govt-forms-committees-investigate-reported-targeted-killings/. The police and the SPLA had completed their reports by the time I departed South Sudan, but did not know whether those responsible would face justice; a decision by the President.

56Small Arms Survey, ‘Timeline, 2014’, p. 5.

57UNMISS staff notes of a statement by President Salva Kiir at the National Liberation Council meeting, 23 December 2013.

58The Bentiu base would eventually hold the highest numbers of IDPs, almost 50,000.

59Confidential sources; satellite imagery and information gathered through other sources by UNMISS personnel. The number of 25,000 originated from the Minister of Information, Michael Makuei: Available online: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/12/28/south-sudan-white-army-militia/4231213.

60Interview 5, 29 January 2015; Interview 6, 5 February 2015.

61These numbers refer to registration conducted in January-February 2014.

62Available online: http://unmiss.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=cbblcMFMNEY%3D&tabid=3465&mid=9396&language=en-US; http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46787#.VZJ-tvmqqko; http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11227.doc.htm.

63Information from SPLA eyewitnesses, May 2014.

64Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49659.

65Interview 43, 25 April 2015.

66In the Al Jazeera interview on 22 January 2014 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=5p4a5MtVV8g), the President repeated other false allegations: ‘Rebels ran into UN camps. The UN gave rebels their vehicles. They mounted them with machine guns. The system stayed quiet. Why did they keep quiet? They showed double standards.’ On 20 January 2014 I had given Michael Makuei a full set of UNMISS press statements with the facts. The same was given to Ateny Wek Ateny, the Presidential press secretary on the same day. In a press conference on the 22nd, however, Ateny repeated the same accusations, and added (in Arabic), ‘we will ask them to leave the country’.

67Transcript of President Salva Kiir’s remarks to the media, 24 January 2014.

68This issue had been discussed at the High Level Security Committee Meeting of 16 January 2014. On 7 February a ‘List of firearms, uniforms, ammunition, [and] traditional weapons stored at UNMISS compounds’, as of 4 February, was attached to a letter to Defence Minister Kuol Manyang and copied to other officials. A matrix showed that the amount of firearms held was modest in comparison to speculation.

69The provisions in the Status of Forces Agreement also provided a legal basis for this view.

70The Security Council had requested additional resources through ‘borrowing’ from other UN missions (inter-mission cooperation) and not new deployments. This led to significant delays.

71The UNMISS transcript of Minister Michael Makuei Lueth’s statement at the press gathering on 8 March records that the blame was put not on UNMISS, but on ‘the people running it’. Transcript in possession of the author.

72The Juba demonstration was on 10 March; others took place on 11 and 12 March.

73See e.g., www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26520091.

74One petition handed to UNMISS at Rumbek on 11 March stated: ‘Ms Hilde Johnson’s role in supporting the rebels is crystal clear … in harboring rebels in UN compounds, giving UN vehicles to rebels in Bor and Bentiu … [and] the UN smuggling weapons of destruction … [T]he irresponsible girl Hilde has meddled herself into our internal affairs in disrepairable [sic] way. We call on the Arab world, the AU, the IGAD and all countries … to condemn such scandalous action … and to support our call to immediately dismiss Ms Hilde from South Sudan. This must come to an end or else we the people of this state and indeed of South Sudan are capable of teaching her an unforgettable lesson.’

75An eyewitness confirms that Michael Makuei persuaded Kiir not to say anything, despite general support for a statement among senior officials present.

76The government subsequently released the cargo it had been holding since 8 March.

77‘Facts on UNMISS Related to the December/February Crisis’, 3 April 2014, in possession of the author. Available online: www.sudantribune.com/spip.php.?article50528.

78Media interview with Defence Minister, 14 February 2014. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49963.

79President Kiir confirmed this to the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, referring to the assistance of Misseriya and militias from Darfur and thatthey were promised funds per death and per injury. See ‘Final Report of the African Union Mission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, African Union, Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014, p. 120, para. 394.

80UNMISS, ‘Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report’, 8 May 2014, p. 45.

81‘S Sudan rebel leader rejects massacre claims’, Al Jazeera, 22 April 2014. He responded from the first Consultative Conference of the SPLM/IO in Nasir, Upper Nile State, 15–18 April, which passed several resolutions and a Communiqué, but with no commitment to hold their own forces to account.

82The investigations conducted by UNMISS showed a delayed reaction among some of our troops. This was very regrettable, and led to changes in the UN force to help ensure more robust and decisive action.

83Available online: http://www.newnationsouthsudan.com/national-news/kiir-condemns-killing-of-58-people-at-un-base-in-bor.html.

84Both met Riek Machar. The statement by High Commissioner Pillay at a press conference in Juba on 30 April, and that of Special Advisor Adama Dieng, made an impact.

85The UNMISS mandate did not provide authority to compel production of evidence, to call and interview witnesses, and to secure or even visit scenes of alleged violations. Nor has any UN Mission ever been provided with a mandate to undertake criminal investigations. For this reason, forensic capacity is normally not available.

86AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan ‘Final Report …’, Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014, p. 118.

87UNMISS, ‘Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report’ (Juba, 2014), pp. 56, 60.

88Available online: http://eyeradio.org/kiir-dissolves-crisis-management-committee.

89Interview 47, 25 June 2015.

90Ibid.

91The figures obtained from several sources were in the order of at least 200–50 million USD, at an exchange rate of 1:3. While the scale has been corroborated, the exact figure has not been verified.

92The Sentry, ‘Country Brief South Sudan, Dismantling the Financing of Africa’s Deadliest Conflicts,’ Washington, July 2015, 4, www.TheSentry.org.

93Available online: http://eyeradio.org/kiir-dissolves-crisis-management-committee. On 2 May 2014, the presidential press secretary, Ateny Wek Ateny stated on Radio Miraya that there would be an internal audit of the CMC.

94Author’s notes of conversations in Juba, January–July 2014.

95The land that UNMISS had been allocated in Juba, and in all three states, was swampy during the rainy season. It was very difficult to keep bases operational, even without refugees.

96The White House, Office of the Press Secretary: ‘Executive Order: Blocking property of certain persons with respect to South Sudan’, 3 April 2014, evoking relevant acts. On 6 May 2014, two commanders were sanctioned, Peter Gadet, a commander of rebel forces, and Marial Chanuong, commander of the government’s Presidential Guard; see online: http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/US-sanctions-two-South-Sudanese-leaders-in-first-step/-/2558/2306772/-/j2b6h5/-/index.html. Others would follow.

97The EU sanctioned two commanders, Peter Gadet on the opposition side and Santino Deng on the government side on 10 July 2014, ‘EU Imposes Sanctions on South Sudanese military leaders’, Reuters, 10 July 2014.

98Stansi Kalyvas, 2006: 5 defines civil war as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities. See also Themnér L. and Wallensteen P., ‘Armed conflicts 1946–2013’, Journal of Peace Research li/4 (2014), pp. 541–54.

Chapter 7: The Heart of the Matter: Security

1John Snowden, ‘Small Arms Survey, HSBA Working Paper 27’, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2012, p. 19.

2Ibid.

3This included the position of deputy commander-in-chief of the SPLA, a new position.

4The Eastern Equatorian Defence Force (EDF) was, for example, integrated prior to 2005 (militia groups had also operated both in East and Central Equatoria).

5Interview 9, 30 January 2015; Interview 30, 18 March 2015; Interview 8, 29 January 2015; Interview 29, 19 March 2015.

6Many followed: Yohannes Yual, Samuel Both, Saddam Shayot Manyang, Timothy Taban Juuc, and others. Al Fursan and Abdel Bagi forces came in after the Juba Declaration, the former with Peter Gadet. Clement Wani’s Mandari militia in Central Equatoria joined at this time, too. See Richard Rands, ‘In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond’, Small Arms Survey, HBSA paper 23, Geneva, November 2010, pp. 16–18.

7The source had seen Khartoum’s documents on the SSDF, South Sudan Defence Forces, Interview 9, 30 January 2015.

8Peter Gadet rebelled again in 2010 for six months, was reintegrated again, and defected in December 2013. After the 2010 elections, some who had lost in the nomination process, such as George Athor, or lost the election, such as David Yau Yau and Gwang Roberto rebelled. George Athor was later killed in unknown circumstances, as was James Gatwic Gai, another militia leader.

9These brought in Gabriel Tanginye (Gabriel Gatwich Chan) and David Yau Yau, as well as the Shilluk militia leader Johnson Olony; and Gordon Kong. During the run-up to independence in 2011, some 18 militia or armed groups had reportedly been integrated into the SPLA. (See Jeremy Astill-Brown, ‘South Sudan’s Slide into Conflict: Revisiting the Past and Reassessing Partnerships,’ Chatham House, Africa Programme, December 2014.)

10De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, pp. 113, 358, 452; Interview 8, 29 January 2015.

11Edward Lino, ‘There was no coup in Juba’, 9 February 2014. Available online: http://paanluel.com/2014/02/09edward-lino-there-was-no-coup-in-juba/.

12Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 8, 29 January 2015; Interview 9, 30 January 2015.

13Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 5, 28 January 2015.

14According to Interview 9, 31 January 2015, Paul Malong and Salva Mathok in 2005 brought in forces from Aweil and Warrap respectively as the President’s bodyguards.

15From 2006 onwards there were 3,000 Presidential Guards in Juba, of whom at least 1800 were Nuer, the great majority belonging to Paulino Matip. James Wani Igga brought in a few. The rest were from Bahr el Ghazal. Salva Kiir brought in soldiers from Aweil and Gogrial, and made sure that only his own people protected him at the Presidential Residence.

16Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 9, 30 January 2015.

17Interview 32, 21 March 2015.

18E.g. George Athor, Peter Gadet, David Yau Yau and Alfred Ladu Gore.

19Rands, ‘In Need of Review’, pp. 33, 38.

20For a while a unit of 30 or 40 SPLA officers and instructors travelled from unit to unit to conduct training, and after a couple of years an advanced training centre had been built with American funds, but this was far too little too late.

21Clemence Pinaud, ‘South Sudan, civil war, predation and the making of military aristocracy’, African Affairs cxiii/452 (2014), pp. 192–211.

22Interview 6, 8 February 2015; Interview 29, 19 March 2015; Interview 9, 31 January 2015.

23John Snowden, ‘Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012’, HSBA Working Paper 27, 18, 20. While a number of militia were deployed to JIUs, and constituted an increase in the Army, the SPLA lost the 9th and 10 Divisions located in Sudan and hence, left with the SPLM-N. Still, there was a net increase.

24Interview 1, 24 October 2014; Interview 2, 5 December 2014; Interview 3, 9 January 2015.

25We received a total figure of 150,000 from the government, which comprised all security forces, while other sources indicated 120,000, with the SPLA comprising 80,000.

26Rands, ‘In Need of Review’.

27De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, p. 361.

28Mike Lewis, ‘Skirting the Law: Sudan’s Post-CPA Arms Flows’, Small Arms Survey, HSBA Working Paper 18, 2009. Interviewees deny that such deals were made in relation to these particular contracts (Interview 32, 21 March 2015).

29De Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent’, p. 356; Lewis, ‘Skirting the Law’, pp. 39–44; available online: http://paanluelwel.com/2011/09/09/wikileak-cable-on-vp-machar-on-nhial-deng-and-on-cleaning-corruption-in-the-spla/. Interviewees deny that such deals were made in relation to these particular contracts (Interview 32, 21 March 2015).

30At independence, the SPLA had eight transport helicopters, but it is not clear whether they were all purchased in 2010.

31Interview 1, 24 October 2014; Interview 2, 5 December 2014; Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 29, 19 March, 2015; Interview 16, 5 February 2015; Interview 17, 11 February 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 33 23 March 2015.

32Interview 16, 5 February 2015; Interview 16, 11 February 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015.

33Sources say that acquisition of the Air Defence System was primarily motivated by graft: Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 29, 19 March, 2015; Interview 16, 5 February 2015; Interview 17, 11 February 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015.

34Parts of the system are still in Uganda, some in Juba: Interview 16, 5 February 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 29, 19 March, 2015; Interview 43, 25 April 2015.

35Almost no results were achieved despite a large programme under the auspices of UNMIS and the UNDP.

36‘The Report of the Auditor General on the Financial Statements of the Government of Southern Sudan for the Financial Year Ended 31 December 2008 … June 2012’. Available online: http://www.auditchamber-ss.org/reports/nac-ag-report-financial-statements-2008.pdf.

37HSBA, ‘Small Arms Survey, Issue Brief 22’, 2013.

38Interview 5, 31 January 2015; others confirmed the same: Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015.

39The SPLA Commandos were multi-ethnic, and efforts were made in some divisions, e.g. Division 4. The plans for mainstreaming this approach faltered, however, as did the efforts to create an integrated multi-ethnic Presidential Guard.

40Thomas, South Sudan, p. 164.

41Snowden, ‘Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012’, HSBA Working Paper 27, June 2012, p. 18.

42Author’s notes on conversations with senior officials, January–February 2014.

43Interview 1, 24 October 2014.

44Interview 2, 5 December 2014.

45Rands, ‘In Need of Review’, p. 33.

46Ibid., p. 31.

47Interview 1, 24 October 2014.

48Sanctions against such support no longer applied after South Sudan’s independence.

49Snowden, ‘Work in Progress’, p. 23.

50Author’s notes. Conversations with security ministers and leading figures of the SPLA in 2013, as well as assessments by the majority of donors, as reflected in donor meetings in 2012–13.

51‘Objective Force 2017’, adopted at the end of 2011; a more detailed defence transformation programme followed (see John Snowden, ‘Work in Progress’, p. 21).

52Herbert Wulf, Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries (Berlin, 2004), p. 5.

53Snowden, ‘Work in Progress’, p. 9.

54Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Confidential paper for the SPLM/A Chairman 2005 in possession of the author.

55South Sudan used a military ranking system in the National Police Service, with the same titles. There were plans to change this to internationally comparable police ranking when the crisis erupted in December 2013.

56Snowden, ‘Work in Progress’, p. 28.

57Ibid.

58Prior to independence, the name was Southern Sudan Police Service; after independence the name changed to South Sudan National Police Service.

59Interview 1, 24 October 2014; Interview 2, 5 December 2014.

60Snowden, ‘Work in Progress’, p. 27.

61The UNMIS Human Rights Investigation Report on violations at the Rajaf Police training centre in 2010 was not made public. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, criticized the grave violations in a Press Statement, Juba 7 June 2011.

62Snowden, ‘Work in Progress’, p. 27.

63The Citizen (Juba), 27 October 2011.

65This was the opinion of African Union security experts and UNMISS’s National Security Advisor, Kellie Conteh.

66Interviews with eyewitnesses who visited the training camp; one reviewed the full list of those recruited; Interview 7, 9 December 2014; Interview 8, 29 January 2015; Interview 11, 1 February 2014; Interview 32, 21 March 2014; Interview 34, 15 April 2015.

67The Dinka name literally means ‘a brownish cat that predates on rats’; Latin name not available; Interview 11, 1 February 2014; confirmed by other informants later.

68Paul Malong was wealthy, not least from the border trade in Northern Bahr el Gahzal state, and reportedly helped fund the forces. Fundraising took place also among business and community leaders from his state and Warrap. But the forces in Pantiit at times lacked food and basic services (Interview 11, 1 February 2014; confirmed by other informants).

69Presidential Decree 25/2013. An earlier reshuffle had promoted new officers into senior positions; Available online: http://hornaffairs.com/en/2013/02/26/south-sudan-retires-army-generals. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45558.

70AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan: ‘Final Report …’, 15 October 2014, p. 10.

71Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015.

72Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 6, 8 February 2015; Interview 7, 9 December 2015; Interview 8, 29 January 2015.

73Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 7, 9 December 2014; Interview 8, 29 January 2015; Interview 11, 1 February 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015.

74Interview 9, 30 January 2015. Recruitment was primarily from Warrap and Gogrial, the President’s home state and county, and from Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

75According to the AU Commission of Inquiry, ‘President Kiir confirmed his recruitment of 7500 troops’, ‘Final Report’, Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014, p. 121.

76Interview 11, 1 February 2015; Interview 7, 9 December 2015.

77Author’s notes on conversations in May–June 2013. This meant approximately 2,250 soldiers. The majority of interviewees estimated the total to be 2,000–3,000 in 2012–13.

78Interview 22, 21 March 2015: the source says that only some 350 graduated to become Presidential Guards.

79Interview 47, 24 June 2015. According to the AU Commission of Inquiry, officials reported that between 330 and 700 soldiers were integrated into the Presidential Guard following a commissioning ceremony attended by the President: ‘Final Report’, p. 22. The total number trained at Luri may still have been larger.

80A number of forces were allegedly deployed as street cleaners in Juba in December: AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, ‘Final Report’, p. 22.

81Interview 1, 24 October 2014; Interview 2, 5 December 2015; Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 11, 1 February 2015; Interview 48, 14 February 2015.

82The President’s National Security spending in 2014 was more than the entire infrastructure budget of South Sudan: available online: http://www.grss-mof.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Q1-Macro-Fiscal-Report.pdf.

83Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 6, 8 February 2015, claiming that resources were diverted from SPLA Division 5, where funds equal to one month of payroll were transferred to the Pandiit/Luri force. SPLA Division 8 in Bor (Pibor) had salary delayed for the same reason.

84Interview 30, 18 March 2015.

85Interview 34, 21 April 2015.

86Author’s notes on conversations with senior security officials in Juba, October-December 2013;Interview 34, 21 April 2015; Interview 48, 14 February 2015.

87Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 7, 9 December 2014; Interview 8, 29 January 2015; Interview 11, 1 February 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015.

88Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 11, 1 February 2015.

89Interview 32, 21 March 2015.

90According to a well-placed source, the Council consisted of two representatives per county in the Bahr el Gazhal region. Others say it included, or worked with, Aleu Ateny Aleu (interior minister until 2015); Salva Mathok Gengdit (a former deputy chief of staff in the SPLA, and a relative of the President); Bol Akot and Garang Mabil (former generals); and Augustino Atem Kuol Dit (a former SPLA commander and official in the Ministry of Defence), among others. Paul Malong’s relations with the Council ran hot and cold, as did those of Major General Marial, commander of the Presidential Guards and Tiger Battalion.

91Interview 47, 14 February 2015; Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015.

92Interview 47, 14 February 2015.

93Interview 3, 9 January 2015; Interview 11, 1 February 2015. Several sources say that the new uniforms came from ‘National Security’, and the arms and ammunition were ‘Galil’, from Israel, also through National Security. Others say the supplies came from China.

94The consignor was NORINCO, China’s state-run defence contractor. Some weapons reportedly went also to the Presidential Guards at Luri.

95Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 7, 9 December 2014; Interview 8, 29 January 2015; Interview 11, 1 February 2015. Witnesses interviewed by the UNMISS Human Rights Section also reported this.

96Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan’s New War’, p. 83; interviews conducted by UNMISS Human Rights Section, December 2013–March 2014.

97Interview 5, 28 January 2015.

98Interview 1, 24 October; Interview 2, 5 December 2014; Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015.

99The information was shared with the author in the first quarter of 2014; the corroborated four names are on the files of the author and will be handed over to the appropriate investigation body, in the event of criminal investigations. Interview 1, 24 October; Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 11, 1 February 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015.

100AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan: ‘Final Report’, p. 225; Interview 21 July 2014.

101Interview 1, 24 October 2014; Interview 5, 28 January 2015.

102Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 7, 9 December 2014; Interview 8, 29 January 2015; Interview 11, 1 February 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015. The names are on the files of the author and will be handed over to the appropriate investigation body, in the event of criminal investigations.

103Republican Decree 103/2013; HSBA, ‘Small Arms Survey, Timeline of Recent Intra-South Sudan Conflict’, Geneva, June 2014, p. 6.

104Due to insecurity and crime in Juba, the town had a year before been divided in subsectors, with the establishment of joint operations centres for the SSNPS, the SPLA and National Security combined. This structure therefore was not part of a ‘plan’, but probably came in handy in December 2013.

105Interview 9, 31 January 2015. Corroboration with others present was not possible (interviewees not accessible).

106Interview with Oyay Deng Ajak, January 2015.

107UNMISS, ‘Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report’ (Juba, 2014), p. 4.

108AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan: ‘Final Report of the African Union Mission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, p. 225.

109Human Rights Watch, ‘South Sudan’s New War’, p. 83.

110‘Operating’ indicates political rallying, but not mobilizing – in more military terms. Author’s notes of conversations with senior officials, Juba.

111Confirmed in interviews with each of those referred to.

112Author’s notes on conversations with senior officials, November–December 2013.

113Interview 10, 1 February 2015.

114Interview 37, 8 July 2015; Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015.

115Interview 16, 5 February 2015; Interview 17, 11 February 2015. Others mention Taban Deng as a frequent visitor to the house of Oyay Deng, the former minister of national security.

116Interview 16, 5 February 2015; Interview 17, 11 February 2015.

117Author’s notes from conversations with senior Sudanese officials in Juba and Khartoum January and June 2014; Interview 29, 19 March 2015; Interview 43, 25 April 2015.

118Interview 9, 31 January 2015; Interview 10, 1 February 2015; Interview16, 5 February 2015; Interview 17, 11 February 2015.

119Interview 6, 8 February 2015; Interview 47, 25 June 2015.

120Interview 16, 5 February 2015; Interview 17, 11 February 2015.

121Interview 5, 29 January 2015.

122Interview 6, 8 February 2015; Interview 43, 25 April 2015. According to this source, they thought they could control 65 per cent of the force, but miscalculated badly.

123Interview 4, 7 January 2015.

124Interview 34, 21 April 2015.

125Ibid.

126Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 6, 8 February 2015. Such terminology could easily be meant to signal military resistance.

127Interview 9, 31 January 2015; Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015. One source heard him say this on the phone several times.

128Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 6, 8 February 2015, Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015.

129It is likely that these forces were enforcements coming from the Presidential Guards trained at Luri.

130Interview 9, 31 January 2015.

131I have obtained such purported summaries – not transcripts – of phone conversations between Taban and members of the Presidential Guards. While the summaries include references to ‘plans’, without the audio it is impossible to determine authenticity.

132AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan: ‘Final Report’, p. 27.

133Interview 29, 19 March 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015.

134For its part, the AU Commission of Inquiry says: ‘We were led to conclude that the initial fighting within the Presidential Guard arose out of disagreement and confusion over the alleged order to disarm Nuer members. The Commission notes further, that there are also suggestions of a mutiny within the Presidential Guards, and the ensuing violence spiralled out of control, spilling out into the general population.’ See ‘Final Report’, 15 October 2014, p. 27.

135Interview 5, 28 January 2015.

136Within the Presidential Guards there were soldiers and officers who were loyal to Riek Machar. While remaining in their positions after Machar left office as vice president, he could still instruct them in a situation like this. Interview 9, 31 January 2015; Interview 18, 6 February 2015.

137At this time, according to this source, in the Giyada barracks of the Presidential Guards there were 1,500 Nuer Guards and 900 Dinka.

138Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 6, 8 February 2015.

139Interview 21, 7 February 2015; Interview 22, 7 February 2015; Interview 23, 7 February 2015; Interview 24, 7 February 2015, all commanders of the SPLM/IO. A Dinka eyewitness from Bor, monitoring Peter Gadet’s movements and communications during 14–18 December has also provided useful information (Interview 25, 7 February 2015).

140In December and January the mobile phone network was down in areas of Greater Upper Nile, and it was only later that a number of the commanders could communicate regularly with the leadership.

141Interview 5, 28 January 2015; Interview 32, 21 March 2015; Interview 33, 23 March 2015, Interview 21, 7 February 2015; Interview 22, 7 February 2015, Interview 23, 7 February 2015, Interview 24, 7 February 2015.

142Interview 16, 5 February 2015.

143Interview 49, 31 November 2014; Interview 20, 7 February 2015.

144Interview 43, 25 April 2015.

145AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan: ‘Final Report’, p. 229.

146Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50511; Mac Paul said that Taban Deng called him on 13 December about the arrest of a junior officer who had attempted to snatch the keys to the armoury. Available online: http://www.equatoriasun.com/south-sudan-conflict-2/key-witness-declines-to-link-splm-four-to-alleged-coup.

147HSBA, ‘Small Arms Survey – Timeline 2014’, 16. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50511.

148Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis, Introduction, in Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Martlesham, 1994), pp. 4–6.

149Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, Introduction, in Greed and Grievances: Economy Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, 2000), pp. 5, 8.

150Interview 4, 7 January 2015.

151Barry R. Posen, ‘The security dilemma and ethnic conflict’, Survival xxxv/1 (1993), p. 28.

152Ibid., pp. 28–43.

153Interview 8, 29 January 2015.

154Author’s notes.

155Posen, ‘The security dilemma’, p. 28.

156Interview 4, 7 January 2015.

157Interview 49, 31 November 2014.

158Interview 1, 24 October 2014, Interview 2, 5 December 2014.

159Interview 2, 7 December 2014; Interview 49, 31 November 2014; Interview 3, 9 January 2015; Interview 18, 6 February 2015; Interview 19, 6 February 2015.

160Interview 49, 31 November 2014; Interview 18, 6 February 2015; Interview 19, 6 February 2015.

161This famous commander had integrated, rebelled, and in 2012 come back to the SPLM/A, allegedly in return for command of the 8 Division at Bor. Uncorroborated rumour also had it that he had been paid a lump sum too, enough to buy a house in Nairobi.

162Interview 34, 21 April 2015.

163Ibid.

164Interview 1, 24 October 2014; Interview 2, 7 December 2014.

165Interview 2, 7 December 2014. This was public knowledge, both through visible strains in their relationship during 2014–2015, and Machar’s dismissal of Gadet in July 2015.

166Interview 1, 24 October 2014.

167Interview 6, 8 February 2015.

168Interview 25, 11 February 2015.

169Interview 1, 24 October 2014; Interview 2, 5 December 2014; Interview 25, 11 February 2015.

170Interview 1, 24 October 2014; Interview 2, 5 December 2014; Interview 3, 9 January 2015; Interview 21, 7 February 2015; Interview 22, 7 February 2015; Interview 24, 7 February 2015.

171Meetings in Addis Ababa, June 2014; Interview 31, 31 November 2014; Interview 20, 7 February 2015; Interview 18, 6 February 2015.

172Mathiang would later be totally destroyed by opposition forces, and a large number of people killed. Kuol Manyang himself was said to have lost some 20 relatives.

173Interview 18, 6 February 2015; Interview 19, 6 February 2015; Interview 20, 7 February 2015; Interview 18, 6 February 2015.

174Interview 48, 14 February 2015. The source added that it was irrelevant whether these atrocities were committed before or after the commanders’ meeting took place in late April. Machar publicly declared his leadership over the forces, including the White Army, and must remain responsible for their actions.

175Interview 49, 31 November 2014; Interview 7, 9 December 2014; Interview 3, January 2015; Interview 20, 7 February 2015.

176Interview 49, 31 November 2014; Interview 7, 9 December 2014.

177Telephone conversation with Riek Machar, 28 December 2013 (reported to the Security Council the same evening), confirmed by eyewitness (Interview 49, 31 November 2014).

178There were significant tensions between Gadet and the White Army.

179Interview 49, 31 November 2014; Interview 20, 7 February 2015; Interview 3, 9 January 2015.

180Interview 1, 24 October 2014.

181Author’s notes on telephone conversations with Machar, 21, 23 December 2014.

182Author’s conversations in Juba.

183Interview 3, 9 January 2015.

184Available online: http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups/southern-dissident-militias/ssdma-upper-nile.html.

185On the government side, 1991 rhetoric dominated, while the SPLM/IO focused on ‘tribalization of Government’, ‘neglect’ of the Nuer, etc. (Interview 21, 7 February 2015; Interview 22 7 February 2015; 24, 7 February 2015).

186Salva Kiir Mayardit’s Independence Day speech, 9 July 2011.

187Figures from the ‘Food Security and Livelihoods cluster’ under the Humanitarian Coordinator/OCHA in South Sudan, following the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification’ (IPC) in 2014.

Chapter 8: Waging Peace in South Sudan

1Kofi Annan, Foreword to Johnson, Waging Peace in Sudan.

2Communiqué of the 23rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the situation in South Sudan, 27 December 2013.

3As an executive director in the civil service, he had not had any political role. Somehow, he had still been arrested during the turmoil on 16–17 December.

4Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (in Opposition) (SPLM/A in Opposition), 23 January 2014.

5‘South Sudan Releases Seven Political Detainees’, Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49767, 30 January 2014.

6Communiqué of the 24th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the situation in South Sudan, 31 January 2014.

7That the parties preferred a delayed mechanism was as expected.

8IGAD Communiqué of the 25th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Heads of State and Government on the situation in South Sudan, para. 10–11, 2014.

9Verified through several sources.

10Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth later joined the SPLM/A-IO, making the group G10.

11Available online: http://www.voanews.com/content/treason-trial-south-sudan-political-detainees/1868977.html.

12Available online: http://www.equatoriasun.com/south-sudan-conflict-2/key-witness-declines-to-link-splm-four-to-alleged-coup/ 27 March 2014.

13Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan, 9 May 2014: available online: http://southsudan.igad.int/index.php/2014-08-07-10-47-57/249-agreement-to-resolve-the-crisis-in-s-sudan-9-may-14.

14UNMISS Transcript of President Salva Kiir’s speech, 10 May 2014 (author’s copy); transcripts of both leaders’ speeches are available at Radio Tamazuj, 12 May, 2014. Available online: https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/transcript-kiir-and-machar-speeches-south-sudan-ceasefire-signing. Both statements were seen as undermining what had been agreed between the parties.

15Communiqué of the 26th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the situation in South Sudan, 10 June 2014.

16The IGAD Summit took place on 8–9 June, while an inclusive, multi-stakeholder Symposium on 6–7 June in Addis Ababa drew over 200 South Sudanese participants from a broad range of sectors and regions, and provided a platform to engage constructively on key issues toward political transition and peaceful resolution of the crisis.

17Lucy Poni, 20 June 2014. Available online: http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-peace-process-stalls.

18IGAD Press Release: ‘Multi-stakeholder peace talks adjourn for further consultations’, 23 June 2014.

19IGAD Single Negotiating Text Arising From Draft II Framework for Political and Security Negotiations towards a Resolution of the Crisis in South Sudan.

20The Security Council Resolution was passed on 29 May 2014, SCRS/RES/2156 (2014).

21Communiqué of the 27th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the situation in South Sudan, 25 August 2014.

22IGAD Protocol on Agreed Principles on Transitional Arrangements towards a Resolution of the Crisis, Addis Ababa, 25 August 2014.

23In early July 2014 Seyoum Mesfin gave a statement to the Security Council, a briefing which created some waves among IGAD member states.

24Communiqué of the 23rd Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the situation in South Sudan, 27 December 2013.

25Statement by Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende, ‘Norway says time for Uganda to reduce troops in South Sudan’, Reuters, 29 January 2014.

26Douglas Johnson, ‘Briefing: The crisis in South Sudan’, African Affairs cxiii/451(2014), p. 309.

27Meeting on 14 May 2014 with senior official involved in the purchase. Author’s notes.

28At least two shipments of arms from NORINCO, the Chinese defence conglomerate, reached Juba in May–June 2014.

29Credible confidential sources, May–June 2014, September–October 2014 – March 2015.

30Credible confidential sources, September–October 2014, March 2015.

31Conflict Armament Research, Dispatch from the Field, Weapons and Ammunition Air-dropped to SPLA-IO Forces in South Sudan: Equipment Captured by the SPLA in Jonglei State, November 2014 (London, 2015).

32Conflict Armament Research, The Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa (London, 2012), pp. 20–1, confirms earlier transfer of Iranian weapons via Sudan to ‘rebels’ in South Sudan.

33Minutes from Meeting of the Joint Military and Security Committee held in the National Defense College in Khartoum on 31 August 2014. Chief of Joint General Staff, Lt. Gen Hashim Abdalla Mohammed is quoted as saying: ‘We must change the balance of forces in South Sudan. Riak, Taban and Dhieu Mathok came and requested support in the areas of training in MI and especially in tanks and artillery. They requested armament also. They want to be given advanced weapons. Our reply was that we have no objection, provided that we agree on a common objective. Then we train and supply with the required weapons.’ The minutes have been provided by credible confidential sources.

34Ibid., Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein is quoted as saying: ‘I met Riak, Dhieu and Taban and they are regretting the decision to separate the South and we decided to return his house to him. He requested us to assist him and that he has shortage in the MI-personnel, operations command and tank technicians. We must use as many cards we have against the South in order to give them unforgettable lesson.’

35Interview 27, 16 February 2015; Interview 26, 7 February 2015; Interview 31, 18 March 2015; Interview 30, 18 March 2015.

36UNHCR statistics, 30 March 2014. Available online: http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/country.php?id=65.

37Changes along the Ethiopian-South Sudan border were influencing international relations. Ethnic groups previously in the lead now felt marginalized, politically and economically. For the first time, in Gambella State in Ethiopia there was now a Nuer Governor. Ethiopian Nuers were calling for intervention to rescue their brothers in South Sudan, and for a change of government in Juba.

38The East African, 14–20 March 2015.

39South Sudan’s share of total Ugandan exports was 16 per cent in 2012–13, not including the service sector.

40BBC Focus on Africa, 30 September 2014.

41‘Executive Order – Blocking Property of Certain Persons in South Sudan’, 3 April 2014. Available online: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/03/executive-order-blocking-property-certain-persons-respect-south-sudan.

42UN Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015). Available online: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11805.doc.htm.

43Øystein H. Rolandsen, Helene Molteberg Glomnes, et al., ‘A year of South Sudan’s third civil war’, International Area Studies Review xviii/1(2015), pp. 87–104. Available online: DOI:10.1177/2233865915573797.

44Abel Alier’s account of Khartoum’s policies in Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 2nd edn (Exeter, 2003), now seemed to apply to South Sudanese leaders, as well.

45In the CPA process the Khartoum government and SPLM/A rejected participation by others. Although this likely would have complicated the talks, inclusion could have been arranged sequentially. The IGAD-process faced the same challenge, but also showed the challenges with such an approach.

46‘South Sudan and the Risks of Unrest’, The Sudd Institute Weekly Review, 3 December 2013, p. 13.

47Some efforts were made to establish national institutions with an amalgamating perspective, focusing on unity in diversity, with the Ministry of Culture in the lead. In the absence of support from the top, however, they were not given the prominence they deserved, and were not followed up by other unifying initiatives.

48Transitional Constitution, articles 202 and 203.

49Zacharia Ding Akol, ‘A Nation in Transition: South Sudan’s Constitutional Review Process’, The Sudd Institute Policy Brief No. 3, 17 February 2013, p. 6.

50Despite numerous offers of support from international donors and UNMISS, and a framework coordinating the support of all partners, it was not possible to move the process forward. According to the Transitional Constitution, Article 202, sections 6, 7, and 8, national consultations had to be held.

51Zacharia Ding Akol, ‘A Nation in Transition’, p. 6.

52According to IRI polls in 2011 and 2013, ‘Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion’, IRI 2013, 51–65 and NDI focus group discussions all over the country (‘From a Transitional to a Permanent Constitution: Views of Men and Women on Constitutionmaking [sic], NDI, June 2013’), illiterate citizens had clear views on a number of constitutional issues, including the powers of the president and legislature, the role of political parties, freedom of speech, whether elected governors could be dismissed by the president, and the death penalty.

53The government tended to equate federalism with a weakened role for the President. See Douglas Johnson, ‘Federalism in the History of South Sudanese Political Thought’, Rift Valley Institute Research Paper 1 (London, 2014), pp. 26ff.

54Ibid., p. 5.

55Ibid., p. 27.

56Ibid., p. 21.

57In polls conducted in 2011 (Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion, IRI, 2011, p. 68) two-thirds of the population considered themselves as ‘only South Sudanese’ or ‘more South Sudanese than tribe’. A very small minority felt ‘more tribe than South Sudanese’. After the current conflict, polls may show different results.

58Gurtong, 12 July 2015.

59AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan calls this ‘the official policy of amnesia’, see ‘Final Report’, p. 235.

60See footnote 154, Chapter 2.

61In March 2013 the Core Group, an advisory body to UNMISS consisting of religious leaders, civil society leaders, elders from South Sudanese communities, women’s groups and youth groups, warned Vice President Riek Machar, as chairman of the National Reconciliation Committee, against a process which was not seen as independent from the government.

62Jok Madut Jok, ‘National Reconciliation in South Sudan: How to Translate Political Settlements into Peace in the Country’, Sudd Institute Policy Brief, 31 January 2015, p. 13.

63Ibid., pp. 13–15.

64IGAD ‘Single Negotiating Text’, August 2014.

65Jok, M. J, ‘National Reconciliation in South Sudan’, p. 6. HFJ: Jok Madut Jok’s surname is Jok, and not Madut Jok.

66Communiqué of AU Peace and Security Council, 411th meeting, PSC/AHG/COMM1. (CDXI), Rev 1, p. 2, para. 8.

67African Union, Terms of Reference for the ‘African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, 12 March 2014. Available online: http://www.au.int/en/content/south-sudan-commission-inquiry-sworn.

68UNMISS, ‘Human Rights Investigation Report’, 8 May 2014, p. 61.

69In my discussions with President Salva Kiir, I made sure that the concept of a Special/Hybrid Court was well understood, with South Sudanese and international judicial experts working together.

70Statement of Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to the 7172nd meeting of the Security Council, ‘South Sudan Leaders Must Allow Humanitarian Access, Work Together to Heal Wounds, Secretary General Tells Security Council’, SC/11391, 12 May 2014.

Epilogue

1These represented ‘Faith Based Leaders’, ‘Civil Society’, ‘the Women’s Bloc’ and ‘Eminent Personalities’. The representative of ‘Other Political Parties’, Lam Akol, was prohibited from traveling to Addis Ababa, so no one signed on their behalf.

2See also ‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, covering the period 14 April – 18 August 2015’, S/2015/655, 21 August 2015, p. 4, para. 20. Peter Gadet was back as a militia leader, allegedly having received support from both the GRSS and Khartoum, sequentially or simultaneously (Interview 49, 20 November 2015).

3Republic of South Sudan, ‘Establishment Order 26/2015 for the Creation of 28 States in the Decentralized Governance System of the Republic of South Sudan’, 2 October 2015. The National Legislative Assembly agreed that the number of states would increase, but did not specify the number. Despite this, the President later proceeded, appointing new Governors for the 28 states on 28 December 2015.

4‘The Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan’, the Security Council, S/2015/902, 23 November 2015, p. 10.

5Decision of the National Liberation Council 16 October 2015, perceived as a violation of the Arusha Agreement 23 January 2015, see the ‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan’, the Security Council S/2015/902, 23 November 2015, pp. 3, 16.

6Radio Tamazuj, 16 August 2015. Available online: https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/kiir-sacks-two-equatorian-governors.

7The ‘last’ IGAD deadline had been 5 March 2015.

8Information from a UN colleague.

9There was speculation that I had been forced to leave. In fact I had remained longer than normal: SRSGs usually serve for two years in the more challenging environments. With the change of mandate on 29 May 2014, through SCRS/RES/2156 (2014), it made sense to pass the torch to a new Head of Mission.

10UNMISS, ‘Statement by SRSG Hilde F. Johnson’, Press Conference, 8 July 2014.

11Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015) of 3 March 2015 laid the groundwork for ‘Targeted Sanctions in South Sudan Should a Peace Deal Fail’. On 19 December 2015 the US circulated a resolution proposing an arms embargo against South Sudanese parties. See Al Jazeera, ‘US proposes UN arms embargo on South Sudan’, 20 August 2015. China joined hands with Russia in opposing sanctions.

12‘Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, established pursuant to SCR 2206 (2015)’, S/2015/656, 21 August 2015, p. 10; UNMISS, ‘Flash Human Rights Report on the Escalation of Fighting in Greater Upper Nile Region, April/May 2015’, 29 June 2015, pp. 3–5; ‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, covering the period 14 April – 18 August 2015’, S/2015/655, 21 August 2015, pp. 4–5.

13OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin, Bi-weekly Update on South Sudan (30 June 2015). Available online: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/filedocuments/files/ocha_south-Sudan-biweekly_30 _june_2015.pdf.

14‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, established pursuant to SCR 2206 (2015)’, 22 January 2016, p. 37, para. 110.

15UNMISS, ‘Flash Human Rights Report’, 15 June 2015, pp. 5–6. The UNMISS site in Bentiu had by the end of June registered and verified over 28,000 arrivals between 29 April and 15 June, chiefly women and children.

16The United Nations Panel of Experts was established pursuant to SCR 2206 (2015) in support of the Sanctions Committee’s work on assessing the need for, inter alia, targeted sanctions, a travel ban and asset freeze.

17United Nations, ‘Interim Report of the Panel of Experts’, p. 15, paras 50 and 51. The panel attributed these acts to armed forces aimed at ‘depriving SPLM/A in Opposition of a support base at all costs’ – in other words indicating government responsibility.

18UNMISS, ‘Flash Human Rights Report’, pp. 5–6.

19Ibid., pp. 7–8; UNICEF, ‘Children killed, abducted and raped in South Sudan attacks’, 18 May 2015.

20‘The Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan’, the Security Council, S/2015/902, 23 November 2015, pp. 9–11.

21AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan: ‘Final Report …’, Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014, pp. 21, 194–5, 216.

22‘South Sudan army accused of suffocating 50 civilians’, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2015, an incident of 22 October 2015, reported by the investigation report of JMEC to the African Union.

23UNMISS, ‘The State of Human Rights in the Protracted Conflict in South Sudan’, 4 December 2015, released on 21 January 2016.

24‘Nuer Ethnicity Militarized’, p. 6.

25‘Private and Public Interests: informal actors, informal influence and economic order after war’, in Mats Berdal and Dominic Zaum, Political Economy of Statebuilding, p. 70.

26Ibid., referring to research by N. L. Carnagey, C. A. Anderson and B. J Bushman, ‘The effect of video game violence on physiological desensitization to real-life violence,’ Journal of Experimental Social Psychology xliii/4 (2007), p. 684; L. R. Huesmann, and L. Kirwil, ‘Why Observing Violence Increases the Risk of Violent Behavior by the Observer’, in D. J. Flannery, A. T Vazsonyi and I. D. Waldman (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Violent Behavior and Aggression (New York, 2007), pp. 545–70.

27United Nations, ‘Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’, p. 15.

28‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, established pursuant to SCR 2206 (2015)’, 22 January 2016, p. 2. Fighting between the SPLA and locally based armed groups, including the Arrow Boys, was spreading to virtually all parts of Western Equatoria State.

29Pastoral Exhortation from the Catholic Bishops of Sudan and South Sudan, Meeting in Juba, 21–31 January 2014: ‘Let us Refound our Nation on a New Convenant’, quoting Matthew 7:24–7.

30‘Quote of the Day’, New York Times, 23 June 2015.

31On 11 February 2014, the Emergency Relief Coordinator designated South Sudan a ‘Level 3’ emergency. This is a system-wide classification for the largest-scale emergencies, benefiting from the highest priority by all humanitarian partners worldwide.

32Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, South Sudan report (IPC), referred to in Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, the Security Council, S/2015/902, 23 November 2015, pp. 5–6.

33Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, November 2015, see OCHA South Sudan Humanitarian Bulletin, 6 November 2015. Available online: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/SouthSudan/2015_SouthSudan/OCHA_SouthSudan_HumanitarianBulletin__6_November15.pdf.

34Available online: http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan, 2 February 2016; http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php, 4 February 2016.

35‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, the Security Council, S/2015/902’, 23 November 2015, pp. 5–6 and 8 says 180,000. The number was reported by UNMISS as 200,000 by end of 2015.

36From the budgeted price level of $106 per barrel, by the end of the financial year it had almost been halved.

37‘South Sudan’s oil revenue only about $10/barrel’, Radio Tamazuj, 2 April 2015. Available online: https://radiotamazuj/en/article/s-sudan-oil-revenue-only about-$10barrel; sources in the ministry of finance and economic planning later provided approximately the same figure. It also listed other expenses that South Sudan must carry, estimating the net value of South Sudanese oil revenue at even lower levels.

38United Nations, ‘Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’, p. 11.

39‘War-torn South Sudan under economic attack from fall in oil price’, Financial Times, 21 December 2014, Available online: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6ba9f.528–869c-11e4–8a51–00144f.eabdc0.html; Øystein Rolandsen, ‘Dead Economy Walking in South Sudan’, 8 May 2015. Available online: http://blogs.prio.org/MonitoringSouthSudan/2015/05/dead-economy-walking-in-south-sudan.

40The loans were from ‘Qatar Commercial Bank’, and the Central Bank of South Sudan had to service the debt at commercial rates: Interview 40, 20 February 2015; Interview 35, 24 April 2015; Interview 46, 22 April 2015.See also United Nations, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’, p. 15, para. 27.

41According to sources in the ministry of finance and economic planning, as of May 2015 monthly expenditure for the government payroll was 900 million pounds, and monthly income was 300 million.

42United Nations, ‘Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’, pp. 11–12.

43United Nations, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’, p. 7.

44Ibid., p. 3.

45Exchange restrictions and the dual rate led to large quasi-fiscal losses, as the government had not been servicing its debt to the Central Bank and been building more debt. As of end September 2014, this debt amounted to 4 billion pounds (8.8 per cent of GDP), according to the IMF (IMF Country Report 14/345: ‘Republic of South Sudan 2014 Article iv Consultation; Staff report, Staff Statement; and Press Release, December 2014, p. 7. Available online: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14345.pdf).While the country’s total debt was not known, in mid 2014 sources in the ministry of finance and economic planning estimated the total debt at 7 billion pounds.

46As of June 2015, the official value of the pound against the USD was 11:1, while in December 2015 the official value was 21:1.

47United Nations, ‘Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’, p. 11.

48For dollarization see Christopher Adam and Lee Crawford, ‘Exchange Rate Options for South Sudan’, 1 May 2012, pp. 8–9.

49Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford, 2008), pp. 38–9.

50The pound had at times been trading at 18 pounds to the dollar on the black market, with an official exchange rate of 2.95 SSP., ‘S Sudan devalues currency after 2 years of war’, New Vision, 15 December 2015. Available online: http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/676902-s-sudan-devalues-currency-after-two-years-of-war.html. The pound had at times been trading at 18 pounds to the dollar, with an official exchange rate of 2.95 SSP.

51The exchange rate at this time, in December 2015, was $1 to 21 SSP.

52Sudan Tribune, ‘South Sudan strikes new oil deal with Sudan on oil transit charges’, 3 February 2016. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57895.

53Ibid.

54‘IGAD Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan’, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 17 August 2015 / Juba, 26 August 2015, pp. 5–14.

55The power sharing formula gave the government 53 per cent of ministerial seats, South Sudan Armed Opposition 33 percent, and Former Detainees and Other Political Parties 7 per cent each.

56Elections are stipulated to take place 60 days prior to the end of the transitional period, which was to start 90 days after the signing of the agreement, i.e. 26 November 2015. Elections may therefore be scheduled for the end of March 2018.

57‘The Reservations of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan on the “Compromise Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan”’, Juba 26 August 2015, p. 3. The SPLM/A-IO had been renamed ‘South Sudan Armed Opposition’, a name not accepted by Riek Machar’s group.

58Apart from references to the SPLM-North, the SPLM/A appears only once, under Riek Machar’s signature (‘SPLM/SPLA-IO’). In the rest of the agreement, references are made only to the National Defence Forces of South Sudan and the South Sudan Armed Opposition. The correction in hand-writing is in the Preamble on p. 1.

59‘Minutes of Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements workshop’ (PCTSA), IGAD, Addis Ababa, 26 October 2015; ‘IGAD Outcome of the Principal Signatory Parties to the Agreement on Planning Implementation on the Provisions in Chapter II of the Agreement 21 October–3 November 2015’, Addis Ababa, 3 November 2015.

60The withdrawal from 12 October 2015 was in accordance with Security Council resolution 2241 (2015), 9 October 2015, The Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan, the Security Council, S/2015/902, 23 November 2015, p. 13.

61AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, ‘Final Report of the African Union Mission of Inquiry on South Sudan’, African Union, Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014.

62This included me, as sentences from a background briefing for the AU Commission had been used as an interview, without my knowledge and consent, out of context and given different meaning. Similar things happened to others, who found themselves inaccurately quoted, with their full names, and without their consent (Interview 29, 19 March 2015; Interview 43, 25 April 2015).

63AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report … Addis Ababa, 15 October 2014, pp. 297–9.

64Ibid., pp. 23, 300.

65‘IGAD Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan’, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 17 August 2015 / Juba, 26 August 2015, pp. 40–6.

66Ibid., pp. 300–1.

67UNMISS, ‘The State of Human Rights in the Protracted Conflict in South Sudan’, 4 December 2015, released on 21 January 2016, p. 4.

68Ibid., p. 304.

69‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, established pursuant to SCR 2206 (2015)’, 22 January 2016, p. 4.

70‘Statement by SRSG Hilde F. Johnson’, 8 July 2014.

71‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan’, pp. 9–10, paras 16–17.

72Sudd Institute, ‘Policy Brief’, 12 August 2014, p. 1.

73Fragile States Index (available online: http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf), South Sudan ranked 1st in 2014 and 2015 (available online: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015); Failed States Index 2014 (available online: http://www.infoplease.com/world/statistics/failed-states-vulnerable-countries.html), although it may appear premature to pass the latter judgement after only three years of independence.

74IGAD Communique of the 55th extra-ordinary session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30–31 January 2016, p. 4, para. 7; AU Peace and Security Council, 571 Meeting at the level of the Heads of State and Government, Communique PSC/AHG/COMM.(DLXXI), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 January 2016, p. 2, para. 7.

75‘Q&A – The Future of Peace in South Sudan’, Al Jazeera, 3 February 2016. Available online: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/qa-future-peace-south-sudan-160202104527157.html.

76In Presidential decree number 59 President Kiir removed James Wani Igga from the position of vice president and reappointed him to the position of (second) vice president, and in Presidential decree number 60, he appointed Riek Machar Teny to the position of first vice president, see ‘SPLM-IO welcomes Machar’s appointment as South Sudan’s first vice president’, Sudan Tribune, 12 February 2016. Available online: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57989.

77Statement by Ambassador Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, SPLM-IO, Cairo, February 2016.

78The Economic and Financial Management Authority had the mandate to ‘provide an effective oversight of economic and public financial management, and to ensure transparency and accountability particularly in the oil/petroleum sector’, as reflected in section 8.1 of the agreement. The oversight body also had international representation, but it had an unclear mandate and questionable authority.

79‘IGAD Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan’, Addis Ababa, 17 August 2015/Juba, 26 August 2015, pp. 48–9.

80Stina Torjesen, ‘Transition from War to Peace: Stratification, Inequality and Postwar Economic Reconstruction’, in Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum (eds), Political Economy of Statebuilding, p. 52.

81‘Final report of the AU …’, 2015, pp. 106–8, referring to an overwhelmed administration appearing to have taken on too much at once, and external support taking on a too technical approach, ignoring political dynamics.

82Support to reform efforts in the security sector would have to include vetting of personnel in relation to human rights, and for the UN in accordance with the Human Rights Due Diligence policy.

83Berdal and Zaum, Political Economy of Statebuilding, pp. 9–12.

84Ibid.

85Torjesen, ‘Transition from War to Peace’, p. 59.

86Security Council Resolution, SCR 2252, 15 December 2015, S/RES/2252 (2015).

87The Way Forward for the African Union in South Sudan, Policy Brief, South Sudan Law Society with African colleagues, January 2016 (co-authors: Yasmin Sooka, Arnold Tsunga, David Deng, Betty Kaari Murungi).

88‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan’, S/2014/537, 25 July 2014, 10; ‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan’, S/2014/708, 30 September 2014, 11; ‘Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan’, S/2014/821, 18 November 2014, p. 10.

89‘The Way Forward for the African Union in South Sudan’, Policy Brief, p. 2.

90Riek Machar’s proposal to create 400 counties, and subsequently 21 states, and Salva Kiir’s decision to establish 28 states appear to have strengthening the power base as the primary motivation.

91‘Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM’, Arusha, 21 January 2015.

92Opening Statement by His Excellency Festus G. Mogae, Chairperson of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), at the inaugural meeting of JMEC held in Juba, 27 November 2015, p. 8. Available online: http://www.nyamile.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/opening-statement-by-festus-mogae-chairman-of-jmec.pdf.

93The Comprehensive Needs Assessment was presented to the leadership of the SSNPS on 19 August 2013 and to donors on 19 September.