6

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THE NIGHTMARE

On 15 December 2013 violence erupted in Juba. I had just finished a meeting at about 10.30 p.m. and heard gunshots in the distance. A while later a text message came in from the Chief of Security of UNMISS: ‘Fighting broken out at SPLA HQ Military barracks in vicinity of Giyada’. There appeared to be fighting among the Presidential Guard.

Was this a barracks brawl, or something much bigger? Soldiers had gone on the rampage before. Although the atmosphere had been tense at the meeting of the National Liberation Council, and Riek Machar and several others had stayed away on the second day, there had been no sign at this time that any faction would turn to violence. A South Sudanese friend texted me from the town centre. He had passed the President’s compound on his way home. Soldiers and check points were everywhere. Tanks were moving. Shooting and explosions were becoming louder and closer.

Dark December night

Was there anything I could do? I had agreed with the President that in a crisis of national magnitude we would immediately be in touch. But I heard nothing from him, the government or his people. Should I call him? I started scrolling my phones. Not knowing the scale of this, I decided to get in touch with the security people before I disturbed the President. I should be able to get hold of them. Reports from UN Security indicated that the fighting was within the security forces. I checked my watch. It was close to midnight.

Juba Map © 2014 John Emerson Human Rights Watch. All Rights Reserved

At around 00.15 the shooting seemed to abate. Was the situation coming under control? Were those involved regrouping? One of my phones rang. It was Majak D’Agoot, the former deputy defence minister and a former SPLA general:

If this is what it seems […] it can trigger major ethnic killings. Hilde – you have no idea what can happen in this country, but this can set off ethnic violence between the Dinka and the Nuer which can drive us all down. This can become another Rwanda.

I had never heard Majak like this. He urged me to call both the President and Riek Machar and ask them to make a public statement calling for restraint and for an immediate cessation of violence. ‘You are the only one that can reach both of them and convince them’, Majak said. He thought if their respective forces heard such an instruction from their leaders, they would stand down.

Before I managed to reach them, Deng Alor, the ex-minister, called with the same message. The fighting was now surging, and seemed close. It was about 1.15. I told him that I was trying to reach both leaders, but that their mobile phones were either off or busy. Although I also used the satellite phone, the network was terrible, probably because of the emergency. Communication with senior staff to help with high-level phone calls was close to impossible.

An hour or so later I finally managed to talk to Defence Minister Kuol Manyang Juuk; Minister of National Security Obote Mamur Mete; and the Foreign Minister, Barnaba Benjamin Marial. They all said that the President was managing the crisis, and was not available to talk. They seemed to be together in some kind of operations centre. I urged that the President come out strongly calling for calm and asking all forces to stop the violence. I told them that I was calling for Riek Machar to do the same.

I tried to get to Riek on the five or six mobile numbers I had for him. The phones were either switched off or unanswered. I sent the same text message to all the phones, asking him to call me back. At 3 a.m. my phone rang. It was Riek, from a new and unknown number. I urged a public statement calling for calm and asking forces loyal to him to stop the violence. He asked whether the President was going to do the same. I told him that I had spoken to the key security ministers and that I expected to speak to the President very soon. Riek said that he would consider a statement if the President would do the same. He said that his situation was now so serious that he had considered seeking refuge in a foreign embassy. He did not ask for UN protection or other assistance from UNMISS, and I made no offer. I still thought it possible to stop the violence, and said that he now was needed to take control of forces loyal to him and to prevent further bloodshed. At that point we had not yet received reports about any targeted ethnic killings.

At about 5 a.m. I was able to get through to the President, and told him of my conversation with Machar. Kiir listened carefully to my entreaties and said that a public statement would come soon, but that he needed to control the security situation first. I urged him to make the statement now, and not wait, but he was unmoved. I tried to call Machar back, but his phones were switched off.

At the crack of dawn on the 16th the sound of heavy fire resumed in full force. At 6.30 a.m. shooting broke out near the Nyakuron area. UN Security texted that fighting now appeared to be taking place not far from the western gate of the UNMISS Tonyping base, close to Bilpam, the SPLA headquarters. It was spreading. This was also near the UNMISS Residence, where I was. At 7.20 a.m. the house shook from artillery fire. I could feel the impact, but I continued working the phones. I was not afraid for my own safety. Although there was a risk of indirect fire, it was still a distance away. At this juncture I had no bodyguards and only local UN security at the gate, but I considered the risk of being directly targeted as minimal.

In the early morning UNMISS received reports that as many as 300 SPLA soldiers were engaged in the fighting, and that it involved Nuer and Dinka elements of the Presidential Guards. The violence appeared to go both ways. Shootings appeared to be concentrated around the Nacor area (south-west of the John Garang Memorial), at Giyada (SPLA headquarters) and in the Bilpam area on the western side of UNMISS Tomping. We were later told that the shooting during the night had been a major firefight at SPLA headquarters, where government forces, combining elements of the Presidential Guards, SPLA Commandos and some men of the SPLA’s 2nd Division had fought renegade Nuer soldiers.

We soon got reports from security that civilians were fleeing for their lives and assembling outside the UN. During the night, hundreds had gathered around the gates both at UN House in the Jebel area and at Tonyping near the airport. They seemed in a desperate state, at Jebel even starting to cut the fences to enter. At 7.30 a.m. I instructed that we open the gates at both locations and provide refuge. It was clear that people were fearing for their lives. Not long after this, I also had my first conversations with UN headquarters in New York, briefing them about the situation.1

Close to 9.30 a.m. President Kiir sent out Philip Aguer, the SPLA spokesperson, with a first statement:

This situation is under control. People should not panic. The general command is acting and this situation will fully be brought under control any moment from now.2

He called on all soldiers to report to their barracks and announced that the President would speak to the nation later in the day. This was not the message I had been hoping for. I issued a statement calling for cessation of hostilities, which was immediately broadcast on radio.3

Around 10 a.m. I finally got through to Machar again. He appeared to have moved from his previous location. I told him I had talked to the President, referred to Aguer’s statement, and said that an address by Kiir was likely to come soon. I urged him to come out strongly now with his own message of calm and restraint. I offered Radio Miraya, the UN station, to record such a statement immediately over the phone. He temporized; the overnight violence against the Nuer made such a statement difficult. He told me that he would call Radio Miraya if he decided on a statement or interview. Although we knew civilians were fleeing the fighting in large numbers, at this time, information about killings of Nuers had not yet reached us.

I learned later that fighting within the Presidential Guards had spread with lightning speed throughout the barracks. The noise I had heard near my residence had probably come from near the SPLA ammunition store in the New Site area, not far from the main Bilpam barracks. A firefight had occurred between loyal Presidential Guards and predominantly Nuer renegades. In the early morning hours the fighting had spread to nearby residential areas. Supported now by government soldiers with tanks, the security forces pushed the renegades southwards, out of New Site and surrounding neighbourhoods.

‘Attempted coup’

At 11 a.m. President Kiir, who had always worn civilian attire since 2005, appeared on television in full military apparel. He wore the Tiger uniform (the Presidential Guard was called the Tiger Battalion). Kiir stated that an unidentified person had the night before fired into the air near the conference centre where the NLC was completing its two-day session, and that subsequently a group of soldiers allied with Riek Machar had attacked the SPLA’s General HQ.4 The President went on to affirm that the security situation was under complete control and that the SPLA was pursuing the attackers. He announced an immediate curfew from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. until further notice. The security organs would conduct a full investigation into the attacks, and hold the perpetrators accountable.

In situations like these, it is important to note what is not said. At the time of his televised address, Kiir must have known how the military operations had been affecting civilians, and that civilians were fleeing to UN bases for protection. Yet he did not explicitly order his forces to protect civilians or express regret for those killed. This came only two days later. Instead, he again invoked the highly emotive 1991 split in the SPLM. After this we could expect no call for restraint from Riek. A national crisis was unfolding before our eyes.

The Chief Security Advisor of UNMISS wanted me to evacuate. As there was no immediate risk, I requested delay while I completed critical calls. I later went to the base, a short drive away, with military escort and force protection, together with the visiting deputy military advisor from New York, Adrian Foster. Little could I know that six months would pass before I spent another night in the Residence.

I knew that intervention at the highest levels was needed, and decided to contact Uganda. Now was the time to see whether President Museveni could influence events, given his close relations with President Kiir. I called Sam Kutesa, his foreign minister, both old acquaintances, and urged him to ask Museveni to advise the South Sudanese President that a political solution was needed, not a military one. Sam agreed to follow up. I was also in touch with the Kenyan ambassador to see whether his president could intervene.5 But President Kenyatta had already called Kiir. Later in the day I was in touch with UN headquarters in New York to update them about what was unfolding, and to seek advice.

In the afternoon of the 16th Foreign Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin and his deputy gave a briefing to the diplomatic community. Security was extremely tight; we barely managed to pass the numerous checkpoints from the UNMISS base to the presidency, where the briefing was held. A couple of times tense soldiers seemingly under the influence of alcohol or drugs made things difficult. Some of the security forces were uninformed about the meeting, and they repeatedly told us we should not be out in the streets, even with force protection.

The Foreign Minister reiterated the points made by Kiir that morning, and stated that the government had been subjected to an ‘attempted coup’ by Machar and forces loyal to him. The deputy foreign minister, Bashir Banda, briefed us on the proceedings of the National Liberation Council, including the decision to remove Pagan Amum, the SPLM secretary general.

The Government’s version of subsequent events was that at 1830 on 15 December, during the closing of the Council meeting, unidentified persons had fired into the air near the Nyakuron Cultural Center, and escaped. This was a signal for an attack on the Giyada military barracks by soldiers of the Presidential Guard loyal to Machar. According to the government, these had first tried to get keys to the arms depot, failing which they attacked a group of Republican Guards loyal to the President to break into the armoury.6 In the process an officer was shot and killed. Fighting then broke out. This was followed by an attack at Bilpam and, in the early morning hours, on other SPLA posts. The attackers broke into arms depots and stole arms and uniforms at both HQ locations. To the government this confirmed planning rather than a spontaneous outburst.7

Another version of events was that President Kiir had decided to disarm Nuer members of the Presidential Guard, and that they had resisted.8 They broke into the armoury, where their weapons were stored, and fighting started. Machar’s group and others loyal to him adopted this version. They linked an increased number of Dinkas in the Presidential Guard to these events, all of which were part of an elaborate plan, they said, with coordinated attacks and killings in predominantly Nuer neighbourhoods. The very same new Dinka recruits, from Luri, were alleged to have had a leading role in the attacks against the Nuer. They claimed that the ‘attempted coup’ was just a cover for these actions.

Another possibility was that a random shooting incident simply got out of hand and led to the escalation. Concluding his briefing, Foreign Minister Marial said that anyone implicated in this (i.e. the attacks and ‘attempted coup’) would be arrested. He advised diplomats to deny entry to embassy premises to all South Sudanese nationals. The Government would respect the inviolability of embassies, but countries sheltering anyone suspected of a role in the attacks must inform the government of their presence. The hunt was on for Riek Machar, who remained at large. Later in the day, the US embassy, through its Twitter account, denied rumours that he had taken refuge in its compound.

When the minister further suggested that diplomats sheltering South Sudanese civilians should advise them to go home, I wondered whether this was a tacit reference to the UN. We had been sheltering people at our bases since early morning.

Protected: The UN opens its gates

On the streets of Juba civilians were now in danger. But almost all UN forces had been deployed elsewhere in the country, and not least to Jonglei, where civilians had until now been under greater threat. Although our planning exercises had included worst-case scenarios for Juba in the event of a crisis, our forces there were few and lightly armed. They were mainly soldiers guarding UN assets and staff, as well as engineering, aviation, logistics and transport units. They had limited capacity and equipment.9 Of infantry soldiers we had only about 120 who could engage in military operations outside the two bases.10 Given the scale of violence raging in Juba, affecting thousands of people, not much could be done to protect them in the streets.11

UNMISS had a mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat. In my view, we had to give protection to those in need. Opening the gates was therefore a last resort. This had also happened before. During the Mission’s table-top exercises on Protection of Civilians in November 2011, we had tested options for action in situations of large-scale threats to civilians. In Wau in December 2012, the thousands of civilians protected within our base returned home after a few days. In Pibor County, Jonglei State, as we have seen, hundreds of civilians had sought refuge a number of times, but not for long. This experience and the agreed procedures were critical, but never before had we been faced with the numbers that would now confront us.

It was my firm decision that leaving civilians to their fate outside the gates, where they were likely to be killed, was out of the question. In a matter of hours, thousands had flocked to us at Tonyping and UN House. When we had identified areas within our base that were suitable, the crowds were guided to the western gate, screened for weapons, and let in. During the morning of 16 December, approximately 8,000 sought refuge at Tonyping, and some 1,000 at UN House where, when firing resumed nearby later in the day, another 4,000 or 5,000 poured in. During the afternoon the total number passed 10,000.

On the 16th there was shooting on and off all day within the Bilpam barracks and in pockets elsewhere, as government forces attempted to clear areas and gain full control. They entered the residential areas of Khor William, Lologo and Jebel Market with tanks, and conducted house-to-house searches, reportedly looking for Nuer men. They also went on the attack throughout the north-eastern part of town, close to the military headquarters.12 It was particularly from this period onwards that much of the violence against civilians took place. It turned ethnic.

At about 4.30 a.m. on the 17th sporadic shooting resumed in the Tonyping and Jebel areas. We were told that the SPLA was conducting widespread searches, sweeping neighbourhoods and targeting Nuer civilians. In Tonyping the firing became more sustained and included mortar shells. During the day the violence spread to other areas, with significant impact on civilians. I remember being in the office and hearing heavy fire on and off. It was clear that the fighting was not over, whatever the President had announced the previous morning. The numbers of displaced fleeing to our gates were increasing, as were the horror stories.

There were women with babies, elderly with walking sticks – barely managing to get to the camp; children clinging to their parents, crying; teenagers with fear in their eyes. Civilians with gunshot wounds were carried bleeding into the UN hospital. Women in despair had lost their husbands and children. Exhausted men in ragged uniforms were obliged to leave their firearms, fatigues and insignia behind as they entered the gate and became ex-combatants. By the following day the number of people in our two bases had reached approximately 16,000.

Mission staff worked around the clock to manage the crowds, check those entering the base for weapons and sharp items, organize water and sanitation facilities, make sure the wounded got treatment, pregnant women were assisted and the elderly did not collapse. It was a herculean effort. Humanitarian agencies had not yet moved in, so Mission staff had to handle everything. Maintaining the supply of water was extremely difficult. The bases and their infrastructure were not designed for such numbers.13 At UN House, water soon ran out and more had to be trucked in several times daily, in the midst of insecurity, and with force protection from the other UN base. We had crisis meetings twice a day.

We redeployed forces to Juba as soon as possible to guard the multitudes under our protection. The initial expectation was that people would start returning home as soon as the violence abated, as had happened after the Wau trouble. But on 18 December, we realized that with this scale of violence people would not leave any time soon; we entered discussions with humanitarian colleagues to start food distribution. Until then we had been giving out only water. Soon an operations structure with the humanitarians was set up.

Civilian staff were restricted to the two UNMISS bases. There was still fighting in some neighbourhoods, random shooting and tanks operating. At check points soldiers were rough, unpredictable, sometimes drunk. Our soldiers who escorted the water trucks observed numerous bodies in the streets. In many places there was clear evidence of extrajudicial killings of whole groups of civilians. A number of them had clear Nuer markings in their face; it appeared that government security forces were responsible. Our human-rights officers gathered similar information from those fleeing the attacks. The following account of human rights violations and atrocities is based on corroborated information from UNMISS Human Rights Division.14

The genie is out of the bottle

Several eyewitnesses reported that on the morning of 16 December Nuer men, all civilians, had been ordered out of their houses in Gudele and lined up. Any who resisted were shot. They were tied together and told to raise their hands and start walking.

At least 300 Nuer men, possibly as many as 450, were rounded up in this way. According to some reports, the group included men from New Site, Mangaten and Mia Saba. They were brought to a police station used for joint military-police operations and locked in a room. When some asked why they had been detained, the response came quickly. They were Nuer.

After dark, at about 8 p.m., unknown individuals started shooting through the windows. As one survivor states: ‘they fired at everyone … The room was very bright with bullets, sounds of PKM [a standard-issue Russian machine gun], and from an AK 47’.15

This procedure was followed several times during the night, for several minutes each time. Afterwards men in uniform went into the room with flashlights to see if anyone was still alive. Most were dead. Those alive were shot again or stabbed to death. A few, reportedly 12, were shielded under the dead and survived to tell what had happened. Of those a few escaped and the others were released when National Security officers discovered the gruesome site.16 This massacre of civilians in Gudele is rightly known as one of the gravest incidents during the Juba violence.

In June 2014, after our human-rights report had been released, a source within the security forces told me that those in charge of rounding people up that day had gone to their superiors for instructions.17 It was only when they returned several hours later that the massacre began. In other words, the mass murder was premeditated, deliberate and authorized, not perpetrated on the spur of the moment by soldiers who had suddenly gone crazy or were fired up by ethnic hatred.

Another very credible, high-level SPLA source later told me that on 16 December a retired general had been called in to lead the operation at the SPLA armoury in New Site that morning, using the reserve force of Presidential Guards from Luri and SPLA.18 Not long after the Nuer soldiers had been subdued, government soldiers, in uniform and speaking Dinka, entered the neighbourhood nearby. They came in big numbers in tanks and on foot. My source says that the forces under the retired general’s command were responsible for killing many innocent civilians there.

One witness reported that, after the soldiers entered the New Site neighbourhood, 18 men were ordered to stand in line and were tied together with rope. They were directed to walk for about 15 minutes until they reached a place with several tukuls (huts). As many as 200 Nuer men were detained in these tukuls and taken in groups to be interrogated in Dinka, or in Arabic if they could not speak Dinka. In a few cases, following the interrogation, men were returned to the tukuls; in the majority of cases they were not. Gunshots could be heard throughout the night. Those who remained the next morning were reportedly released into the custody of National Security personnel and thereafter detained and interrogated for some days. About eight men survived who spoke Dinka or other languages. None of the survivors had Nuer facial markings.

At about 2 p.m. on the 16th, government forces entered the Mia Saba neighbourhood. They were organized ‘in big groups’ and were ‘collecting’ Nuer civilians from the streets and houses, tying their hands behind their backs and taking them on foot to other places. Three lines of civilians were treated in this way, each of between 10 and 20 people. They were taken away, and no one knows what happened to them.

Several other people in Mia Saba reported having been taken from their houses by Dinka SPLA in a group of about 40 men, all Nuer, tied together with bed sheets, and forced to walk to the New Site cemetery. Smaller groups of between four and eight men were shot dead as they walked. When the main group came across a dead soldier, four or five men from the group were shot to death. This happened two or three times during the walk. Some 20 of those who reached the cemetery were then shot. Those not shot were detained for three days and then released.

During house-to-house searches in many neighbourhoods of Juba, soldiers asked the men in Dinka which language they spoke. If they responded in Nuer and not in Dinka or Arabic, they would be shot, or arrested, or beaten up. If they had Nuer facial marks, their fate would often be sealed.

Although we did not have such details on 17–18 December, stories of summary executions, abductions, arrests and killings began to circulate. The first sources were victims themselves, the wounded in our clinic, and those streaming through our gates, some of whom had even been chased right up to the base by would-be killers. Numerous other sources later came forward, both witnesses and survivors, as well as those telling what had happened to relatives and friends.

The Nuer, and particularly Nuer men, seem to have been by far the main victims throughout the capital, with the government’s security forces, primarily Dinka, appearing to be the culprits. What clearly had been at first a fight between forces of the Presidential Guards loyal to the President and those siding with Riek Machar had degenerated into a deliberate massacre of Nuer, and particularly Nuer males. While the objective at first might have been to arrest Machar’s partisans (in hiding or in civilian clothing), government security forces basically turned on the civilians.

Calling for leadership: This has to stop

On Tuesday, 17 December, what we knew was anecdotal at best. Without any certainty of the scale of the targeting of civilians, I issued another press statement calling for an end to ethnic violence.19 Urging restraint, I underscored all parties’ responsibility to seek a peaceful conclusion to the crisis. Church leaders and the South Sudan Human Rights Commission made statements along the same lines.20

The violence continued. A woman in the UNMISS clinic who had given birth told me what had happened to her. ‘Anna’ was Nuer. The soldiers came to her house at night, in Mia Saba; they went through the whole neighbourhood. As they entered her house, they shouted at her husband in Dinka, then shot him dead. ‘Anna’ was afraid they would go after her and their children as well, so she ran as fast as she could out of the house, down the street towards the UN base, with her children. Two of the children got lost in the chaos. She had not been able to trace them since. A third was with her in the camp. Now her baby girl would grow up without her father.

Some women were raped during the violence, but the targets were usually men. Later sexual violence would be a regular feature and used as a weapon of war.21

At this time, on the 17th, it began to dawn on us what was unfolding. Majak’s stark warning still rang in my mind (‘this could become another Rwanda’). While the international community, the UN system and I personally had clearly failed to stop the fighting and contain the violence, we at least could give protection. Thousands of lives had been saved by the decision to open our gates. We even saw members of National Security, the SPLA, and government officials bring people to the UN bases. In many cases these were civilians they knew personally and wanted to protect. Or their protectors were simply good-hearted individuals who wanted to save people’s lives. Later, government officials and SPLA would themselves turn to the UNMISS bases elsewhere for protection.

The director-general of external security, Major General Thomas Duoth Guet, a Nuer, now advised all Nuer in Juba to go to UNMISS for protection.22 SPLA and National Police vehicles were dropping off relatives throughout the day. It was indeed a very bad sign that even the government’s own security people feared for their families’ lives. They were right to do so. Groups of SPLA soldiers took positions on the roadside leading to the UN base and attacked people who were fleeing there. In other cases, they snatched people and drove away with their prey, who were never seen again. It was deeply disturbing to hear of civilians who had been killed on their way to us, or been attacked when venturing from the bases for food, only to be harassed or raped. UN forces were too few to protect individuals who went out on their own. Although we tried to send patrols through town, to help deter such threats, our main concern now was to make sure that the 16,000 people inside the bases were safe.

I tried to get hold of the President and security ministers the whole day, but all were inaccessible. The centre of Juba now seemed relatively calm, with the violence localized in residential areas, where security forces appeared to have met stubborn resistance by forces loyal to Riek Machar or were conducting military operations among the civilians. The defected forces were expected either to regroup and return, or to retreat.

At the same time, reports that civilians were being targeted on an ethnic basis in these areas were deeply worrying. It was only in the evening that I was able to get in touch with government officials. I first spoke to Foreign Minister Barnaba Benjamin Marial and then to the legal advisor to the President, Telar Deng. I shared the information we had received so far and urged them to do what they could to stop the ethnically motivated violence, which seemed out of control. The same message was conveyed to security ministers.

The minister of defence, Kuol Manyang Juuk, was central in this regard. He expressed concern about the incidents of ethnic violence, attributed these to ‘criminals’, and promised that each officer would be held accountable. The minister of national security, Obote Mamur Mete, concurred, and said that many who had engaged in ethnically motivated violence, including SPLA soldiers, had been apprehended. He mentioned 200, but was vague, and I could not get this number verified by anyone else. Regarding casualties Kuol Manyang had said that the Red Cross had collected 260 bodies, while the SPLA had collected 70. It was impossible to verify any of these figures.

In any case, the scale of violence we had seen and heard about indicated that the numbers were likely much higher. I was later informed that security forces had been instructed to bury bodies as quickly as possible, and that they did so during the night in several mass graves. Separately, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs Martin Lomuro informed us that he had worked with the Red Cross to make sure that bodies were buried according to internationally recognized procedures, and he was ready to show us the records. While we never got access to these records, it is likely that those buried by the Red Cross in this way were only a fraction of the civilians killed.

At this time, information about what was happening was patchy and piecemeal. The Security Council held its first emergency meeting on South Sudan, late on the 17th, and a first statement of grave concern was issued.23

On 18 December our human-rights officers were able to venture out. Teams visited Juba University, Malakia, Tonypiny, the area around the presidential palace, the market behind the John Garang Memorial, and Gudele. Our military patrols had been out the day before and seen civilian bodies, some blindfolded, most with hands tied, and with gunshot wounds in the back of their heads. They had also quietly evacuated civilians hiding in several churches, as well as at Juba University, bringing them to UNMISS bases.

Now, in the morning of the 18th, with more reports of atrocities, I met President Salva Kiir. Foreign Minister Marial was there, too. I called on him personally to order all ethnically motivated violence to stop immediately.

The President assured me of his concern and said that instructions had already been given. He committed to redouble his efforts and make sure there was accountability for abuses; he had conveyed the same to the UN Secretary-General who had called him the evening before. Criminals had taken advantage of the situation, and they would be held responsible. He said that he had already that day met Nuer leaders to clarify ‘misleading information’ that the Nuer were being targeted as a community. I stressed the need for his willingness to participate in reconciliation efforts with Riek Machar.

While such promises were made, the President wanted to know whether the UN was hiding the former Vice President. Since I had been able to reach Machar during the night of the 15th–16th, it seemed that many thought we were protecting him. I said we were not, and that the UN, according to procedures, was indeed obliged to inform government authorities if a person of this importance sought our protection. I had nothing to tell the President in this regard; we had no idea of Machar’s whereabouts. He nodded and seemed satisfied.

It was a positive step that the President in his press conference later that day called for calm, confronting tribalism, and the arrest and trial of anyone found attempting abuse, looting or killing.24 The further announcement, in the evening, of his willingness to enter into dialogue with Riek Machar was another encouraging development.25

Not everyone was happy with the latter statement. Many people, including close advisers of the President, wanted to hunt down Riek Machar – literally – and not to reconcile with him. The President’s question about the UN’s protecting Machar was a first indication of a controversy that would envelop me personally. Much later I learned from credible sources that an email I had sent to UN headquarters on 16 December had been intercepted and brought to the President, allegedly proving my support for Machar. Most of the senior people in the security apparatus apparently wanted to declare me persona non grata. I have saved this email, and its innocent and impartial content tells a lot about the paranoia of the day.26 The President stood firm, however, saying that such an action was simply out of the question. But this would not be the last time he was confronted with a demand to have me removed.

Hardliners around Salva Kiir now seemed to have a personal animus against anyone who opposed their agenda. The cadres around the President, and key members of the cabinet, wanted Machar out of the way. Cadres arguing for more nuanced positions had a tough time. But this did not prevent James Wani Igga from repeating the President’s message of dialogue in a press statement the following day.

At this time, the sequence of events around the beginning of the crisis was still confused. In the Mission we remained unconvinced that an attempted coup had taken place. To make an authoritative ‘ruling’, however, would have required consultation with the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs, and put the Mission at odds with the government. This could have had dramatic consequences at a time when our presence and protection were most needed. It might also have caused difficulty in relation to some neighbouring countries.

Extrajudicial killings and ethnic targeting were our main preoccupation. It was time to sound the alarm. This was better done at higher levels. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, issued a strong statement on 19 December, as did the Secretary-General of the UN.27 With information provided by UNMISS the Security Council followed suit. On 20 December the Council condemned the targeted violence against civilians and specific ethnic communities.28 Four days later the Security Council went further, condemning the ethnic violence perpetrated by both armed groups and national security forces.29 I raised similar concerns in the Christmas message broadcast on most radio stations in the country the following day.

‘Wanted’ – the comrades

Evidence we had collected of the deliberate targeting of Nuer civilians was reinforced by the full details we later learned. The security forces were hunting down not only Machar and his family, but also everyone on his team, advisers, security guards, even secretaries – any person known to be associated with him. His houses in Juba were targeted, even after he was known to have got away. One indication of the level of personal revenge was the attack on the former Vice President’s residence, which he had still occupied after his dismissal from office.

On 16 December forces from the Tiger Battalion had deployed around the perimeter of the residence, and ordered the security guards to disarm. They complied. No one was subsequently permitted to leave the compound. Machar was nowhere to be seen. The following morning, after the troops surrounding the compound were reinforced, a mixed force of heavily armed SPLA troops, National Police, and even Wildlife Service wardens attacked. At least two tanks broke through the walls of the compound, and pick-up trucks mounted with machine guns and other heavy weapons followed. Three named senior government officials were observed on site, monitoring the assault, according to an eyewitness.30

The security forces shot directly into the residence, where as many as 60 civilians were staying, and a number of those, including women and children, were later reported to have been killed. Five unarmed soldiers were also killed, and at least five more wounded. The shooting went on for hours and only after it stopped were the injured taken to hospital, and some people arrested. Later the interior minister, Aleu Ayeny Aleu, explained that the raid had been part of a security operation to ‘clean the area’ of those suspected of being loyal to Machar.31 I had also been told that there had been shooting from the roof of the house earlier, in the direction of the President’s compound.32 The former Vice President’s other houses were also attacked, and people there killed.

Security forces continued to search elsewhere for anyone affiliated with Machar. But not to arrest them, it appeared; most of those found were killed. One was Lam Chol Tishore, Machar’s private secretary, a competent and reliable young professional whom I knew well. He had fled during the turmoil and gone into hiding. Security forces tracked him down in a Juba hotel, and he was killed in cold blood together with his brother.

High-profile Nuer politicians, soldiers and security personnel, none of whom had joined the renegades, were also targeted.33 They were pursued all over Juba during the following week. Some were arrested, others killed. A number fled to the UNMISS base for protection. For months, we had members of the Legislative Assembly, former ministers and officials under our protection.

We were concerned that other members of the SPLM leadership could be next. It seemed that anyone associated with the notorious press conference of 6 December was at risk. They seemed to be ‘wanted, dead or alive’. As early as the evening of the 16th Majak D’Agoot had spoken live on the BBC; security forces had visited his house and told him to remain there until he was ‘picked up by Government agents.’34 He told the BBC he was about to be arrested.

Local media soon referred to arrests of unidentified ‘disgruntled soldiers and politicians’.35 On the 17th Information Minister Michael Makuei confirmed in a statement that ten people had been arrested for ‘interrogation’ following the purported coup attempt, and he provided a list:36 all had participated in the press conference on the 6th, including Deng Alor Kuol, Kosti Manibe, John Luk Jok and Oyay Deng Ajak. The whereabouts of former SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum, former Unity State Governor Taban Deng Gai, former Minister Alfred Ladu Gore and former Minister Peter Adwok Nyaba, remained unknown. Pagan managed to telephone me at one point, and seemed calm. Later he and Peter Adwok were arrested.

Friends on all sides

Among those now in detention were thus many prominent figures. While some were ‘Garang Boys’; others had been very close to Kiir. A couple had fallen out with him or become sympathetic to Machar. Rebecca Nyandeng seemed to be under house arrest.

Many were held at the house of Pieng Deng Kuol, the inspector general of the National Police. He was a neighbour of Machar’s, and the detainees worried that the attack on the vice-presidential residence might be directed towards them as well, or that they could be hit by indirect fire. Rebecca called me on their behalf, and I took up the matter with the President at our meeting on the 18th.

I was in a very delicate position. I had colleagues of long standing on all sides, in government, among the detainees, and those who had fled, presumably to join Machar. Some I had known for 15 years. They would all expect me to take their side, or at least support their cause one way or another. But my duty was to implement the mandate of the Security Council, and emphatically not take sides. This would be the most challenging balancing act I had ever faced as a SRSG.

In my meeting with President Kiir on 18 December I raised the issue of the detainees. I asked for international access and protection of their rights. The President assured me that his old ‘comrades’ were fine and would be well treated; he also promised me that the Red Cross would have access to them (which never happened). He insisted that the detainees would be subject to due process – immediate release was out of the question. At a second meeting a few days later, I had the President’s permission to visit them.37

Meanwhile the Minister of Information took pains publicly to explain that the fighting in Juba did not have ethnic overtones. As evidence he pointed to the ethnic diversity of both those in government and those accused. Any apparent ethnic targeting had been the result of misjudgement by individual soldiers. Announcing that the airport would be re-opened on the 18th, he called upon the population to resume normal activities.

On 18 December Riek Machar gave his first interviews to various national and international media, from an undisclosed location. He denied that he had tried to stage a coup, and accused President Kiir of inciting tribal and ethnic violence to cover his own failings.38 He blamed the fighting on a conflict between members of the Presidential Guard and made it clear that he would not leave the country. The following day he declared that, if required, he would lead the resistance against Kiir, and was quoted as calling on the SPLM ‘to remove Salva Kiir from the leadership of the country’.39 Following events in Juba, the targeted attacks on Nuer, and this statement from Machar, reconciliation seemed much more difficult. If we now had a declared armed resistance, the ballgame had shifted.

I also needed to do my utmost to make sure nothing happened to those in detention, and see what more could be done to help. I had lost contact with Machar, who was clearly trying to avoid being traced by the security apparatus. But through South Sudanese contacts abroad I was able to establish a channel of communication with him on 20 December. My meetings with the President were initially frequent, at least once a week, and I would usually call Riek the same day. I kept a record to make sure there was impartiality even in this.40

Domino effect

If there had been any expectation that things would get under control, it was instantly contradicted by events. Bor, the capital of Jonglei, had already fallen to opposition forces on 18 December; in Bentiu, capital of Machar’s home state of Unity, they took control on the 21st. The Government lost Malakal, capital of Upper Nile State, on the 24th, although fighting continued for days thereafter. Within ten days, therefore, forces loyal to Machar controlled three state capitals; within two weeks considerable territory beyond also seemed under their sway, despite some back and forth at Bor. Concern was voiced that Riek’s forces might move southwards and even attack Juba. At the same time, he issued a statement to the effect that Salva Kiir was no longer the legitimate leader of South Sudan.41

There were three underlying reasons for these startling developments. First, the SPLA was fracturing along ethnic lines, with defections by Nuer soldiers and officers on all fronts and remaining forces performing poorly in the field. Secondly, the killings in Juba had united the Nuer in a way that generated significant support for Machar, including among armed youth and the ‘White Army’. They needed but one motive for involvement now: revenge! This was enough for massive mobilization, and it added tens of thousands to Machar’s numbers. Their objective was to make the Dinka suffer, just as the Nuer had in Juba. Thirdly, whether in pre-arranged concert or reaction to events, the large majority of security forces in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States defected to Machar. The Greater Upper Nile region was the epicenter of the fighting after Juba, and forces loyal to Kiir in these critical states were few.

Bor falls

The security situation in Bor had begun to unravel as soon as the fighting started in Juba. A seemingly isolated incident within the South Sudan National Police Service Auxiliary Forces sparked shooting at Pakwau. On the night of 16 December some 500 civilians arrived at the UNMISS compound in Bor. The next morning Peter Gadet, still commanding the SPLA’s 8th Division, paraded through the town and urged calm. But on the 17th fighting among the security forces continued and we received reports that they were splitting along ethnic lines. Gadet had switched sides during the night, taking a number of soldiers, their armoured vehicles and heavy weapons with him. A former militia leader from Unity State, he had been reintegrated into the SPLA only in 2012, held grudges against the leadership of the SPLA, and had needed preferential treatment to remain in the fold. Now he had taken the first opportunity to re-defect and join Machar. Gadet soon became a major figure in mobilizing forces against the government.

By the morning of the 18th Gadet and his men had seized control of the SPLA’s Panpandiar barracks in Bor, and made their way towards Bor town. By this time, Nuer members of the auxiliary police had already entered the town and started shooting randomly.42 Apparently by coincidence, the various defectors now joined forces. At the same time, there was an exodus of civilians, with some 12,500 seeking refuge at the UNMISS compound.

On the same day, the 18th, the Jonglei State Governor, John Kuong Nyoun, a Nuer, returned to Bor from Juba to handle the crisis. Upon arrival, he was escorted from the airfield to his compound by UNMISS force protection. The Governor convened a meeting, during which his compound was attacked.43 UNMISS had to escort him to the base in Bor. By then almost the whole state cabinet had sought UNMISS protection. This was the first time – there would be many more – that government officials sought the protection of the UN in the areas where fighting was going on. They would often in future also deposit relatives and others they thought at risk. At times the clearest sign that a town was about to fall would be government officials coming to UNMISS with wives, children and other relatives. It was thus all the more ironic later to be accused of sheltering only ‘rebels’.

Fighting continued in Bor. On the morning of 19 December, sustained heavy gunfire, including RPGs, lasted for two hours. The situation was chaotic; eyewitnesses say that at times it was difficult to know who was fighting whom. Defected Nuer, both police and SPLA, moved in in big numbers. The speed with which Bor fell was shocking. It also had symbolic importance. Bor was where the liberation movement had started in 1983, and close to the home of John Garang. The town would become the site of some of the worst violence against civilians during the first month of the conflict. Within two weeks forces loyal to Machar would exert control over the majority of the counties in Jonglei and two counties in Upper Nile.

We soon had 14,000 people in our base at Bor. But before we could address their needs, beyond mere physical protection, and anticipate the next move by opposition forces, we had another crisis at our hands.

Akobo crisis

On 17–18 December we received reports of intra-SPLA and communal violence at Akobo and Waat (Nyriol County) in northern Jonglei. Our small support base at Akobo was under threat, and I ordered evacuation.44 This took longer than expected,45 and I was surprised to hear that it had not yet been carried out when the base came under attack by some 2,000 armed youths. Approximately 30 Dinka civilians had been sheltering there, protected by a small number of lightly armed peacekeepers.

A survivor explains:

There was no way to escape, the compound was very small. I was inside. Many people were killed in my presence. I got confused and hid with the UN peacekeepers in a small place. They [the attackers] called us out, there was no way to run [but] someone saved my life by saying this man is not Dinka, he is an Equatorian; the rest of the youth they were dancing, shouting that they have killed all the Dinka.46

UN investigations later concluded that the attack had been orchestrated by defected Nuer of the SPLA, police and prison services, together with Lou Nuer youths. Two of our peacekeepers had been killed; one international UN staff, and among the Dinka civilians 11 were found killed. It is not clear how many survived. The UN would soon be under attack elsewhere too.

Press statements condemning the Akobo attack were issued by UNMISS, the Secretary-General and the Security Council. Two days later, Machar acknowledged command of the ‘White Army’ elements, and regretted the incident. I told him that these attacks were a grave violation of international law. He promised to control the armed youths, but I had my doubts that he could.

Within a couple of days Gadet had strengthened his grip in the Bor area and reportedly withstood an air strike on 21 December. The SPLA did not have helicopter gunships; this was the first hint of foreign support for the government. President Museveni had visited on the 19th and pledged support to Kiir.47 After the first observation of Ugandan forces on South Sudanese soil – the next day, in Juba – ostensibly to protect strategic locations and assist the evacuation of Ugandans,48 MiG-29s were seen bombing rebel positions near Bor.49

The United States decided to remove its nationals from Bor,50 and all other embassies subsequently implemented evacuation plans, most of them pleading for our assistance. While we were dealing with the Akobo crisis and evacuations, we received reports that Gadet’s forces were attacking villages south of Bor.51 They burnt everything, looted extensively, and took the cattle. Civilians fled, and by the 23rd the number classified as Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Awerial County, across the Nile, had reached over 28,000. By now, Gadet’s forces had control over vast areas of Jonglei State.

The Government could not accept the loss of Bor. Forces were sent north from Juba. On 24 December there was heavy fighting, and by the next morning it appeared that the government had re-occupied the town. At the same time, the majority of Dinka who had sought refuge in the UNMISS base, reaching 15,000, left the compound, and those remaining were mainly Nuer.

But Bor remained a battleground. Credible reports of killing, rape, abduction and threats to life, including of foreigners, suggested a pattern of targeting by both government and opposition forces. Civilians leaving the UN base as the town changed hands were also killed. By the time opposition forces recaptured the town at the end of the month it was almost empty; Dinka were at risk if found. These forces included many more armed Nuer youths than during the previous assault, and the destruction they caused was even more indiscriminate.

The most widespread targeting of Dinka civilians took place during the first two weeks of January. Places of past safety became targets. Civilians seeking refuge at St Andrew’s Church and Bor Hospital were killed, between 10 and 20 in each location. A witness described the killers as men 20 years old or younger.52 At St Andrew’s, the majority of those killed were women, and included clergy; the female church attendants were sexually abused first. This caused widespread outrage among the Dinka.

The total number of people killed at Bor has been contested; UNMISS later found that 2,000 people in Bor County seemed a reasonable estimate. The numbers of displaced south of Bor multiplied, as they fled the town. They ventured across the Nile for safety, reaching close to 90,000 in the area of Awerial alone within a few weeks.

On 24 December, the President issued a statement calling for an end to all ethnic violence, characterizing recent developments as ‘unacceptable’. While referring to ‘terrible acts committed by unruly and undisciplined soldiers and the killing of innocent people’, and promising accountability. The statement fell short of condemning such acts.53 Four days later, the National Police established a committee54 to investigate the Juba violence; the SPLA would follow suit.55 It soon became clear that the commander-in-chief’s appeals went unheeded.

Ethnic killings in Bentiu and Malakal

By 16 December hostilities had already spread to Unity State. On that day fighting broke out among staff at a base camp of the Greater Pioneer Operating Company in the Unity oil field. Fighting spread to the 4th Division,56 and soon there were violent incidents at a number of SPLA barracks. Many soldiers and officers were killed.

Witnesses reported incidents of killing and looting in Bentiu on the night of the 19th. Security forces entered houses, sometimes stole valuables, and killed or wounded civilians and unarmed soldiers. The perpetrators were Nuer, the victims Dinka. At Rubkona on 20 December there were shootings by what witnesses referred to as ‘Nuer SPLA’, and two days later some 30 dead bodies were seen in the market area. We had reinforced perimeter security at our Bentiu base, including around the area where civilians had sought shelter and hundreds of civilians had arrived in the afternoon of the 19th. The number quickly multiplied on the following day; Dinka civilians had been killed near the oil fields, and others taken to our base for protection.

There had been skirmishes at the Rubkona airstrip, in the vicinity of Bentiu town, and near our base. But when on the 21st the commanding officer of the highly regarded SPLA 4th Division, Major General James Koang Chuol, declared his support for Machar, and announced that he was now the interim Governor, Bentiu fell to the opposition. Most of his personnel went over with him. Although previously regarded as a loyalist, he was thought to have had no choice but to change sides or be killed.

The loss of Bentiu and major parts of Unity State was a big setback for President Kiir, who was reported to be responding with military deployments from the neighbouring states and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. At a meeting of the National Liberation Council on 23 December, he admitted that Riek Machar and the opposition were now in control of two states.57 It was still not clear which side the mainly Nuer members of the newly integrated South Sudan Liberation Army would take. The militia had reached agreement with the government just six months before, and many expected them to join the opposition, but for now they stayed loyal to Kiir, a decision that would prove very important.

Bentiu changed hands several times, and the ethnicity of civilians seeking refuge in our base varied accordingly; early in the crisis the number reached 5,000, but it would increase to 40,000 within a few months.58 On each occasion the killing, abuse and impact on civilians grew worse. Rebels from Darfur, elements of the Justice and Equality Movement, opportunistically joining the SPLA, were seemingly prone to attack women and children and engage in sexual violence, being responsible for grave atrocities.

At the same time as Bentiu fell to opposition forces, Machar took control of Nasir in Upper Nile State. By 22 December, Bor and Bentiu were now under opposition control, as well as a number of counties in all three states in the Upper Nile region. Fighting also intensified at Malakal, and there were indications that a split might occur within the SPLA there at any time.

Upper Nile State was of fundamental importance to the government: 85 per cent of South Sudan’s oil was there. Should Machar succeed in gaining firm control of the state, including its oil fields, the government would suffer a major setback. The stakes were very high.

Heavy fighting took place in and around Malakal on 24 December. The SPLA’s 7th Division at Fashoda split, and opposition forces took the town, although the government still seemed to hold the airport and the Paloich area. The UNMISS base had been in the crossfire, and shells hit our Level II Hospital, leading to casualties. Fighting nearby involved tanks, anti-aircraft guns, mortars and heavy machine guns. Thousands of displaced people were allowed into the inner compound for better protection, while many civilians were killed in the crossfire outside. Opposition forces conducted house-to-house searches in the town, looking for alleged collaborators. Gross human rights abuses, including killings and sexual violence, occurred, and houses were looted and destroyed.

Such house-to-house searches affected all ethnic groups, Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer and others. Twelve thousand civilians sought refuge in our Malakal base at this time. After two days of heavy fighting, government forces recaptured the capital on the 28th, and lethal revenge attacks and other abuses ensued. The number of people taking refuge in our base increased exponentially.

From late December onwards, the two sides’ forces swept back and forth through Baliet County, fighting for control of Malakal and other areas in Upper Nile. As they moved through the county, Nuer armed youths from Nasir and defected SPLA left a path of destruction. Hundreds of civilians were reportedly killed, many seemingly at random, entire villages were destroyed, and livestock and food looted. Survivors were left isolated and without food, water or shelter, and thousands tried to find protection in three makeshift camps.

Despite some government successes, the amount of territory that opposition forces had captured within about ten days was astounding. As I will show later, this seemed to be less a result of Machar’s personal leadership than of decisions by individual commanders to take matters into their own hands. Observers found it hard to believe that the national Army, the SPLA, had so quickly lost control in so many places.

Threat against Juba?

As fighting raged in the states we received information about a massive mobilization of Nuer armed youths. It had usually taken weeks for large columns to form. But now several were already marching from locations in Jonglei State and assembling at Gadiang, north-west of Bor. Some had allegedly been mobilized for revenge attacks against the Murle, but with the killings in Juba, their target appeared to be Bor, and possibly Juba itself, for revenge. They were led by Bor Doang and the Nuer prophet, Dak Kueth, who was reported marching in the general direction of Bor and possibly to assembly points farther south. It was clear that Riek Machar had established links with them. On 28 December he told me on the telephone how they had reached agreement, both on objectives and on a code of conduct, and he claimed that they were fully under his command. This was my third conversation with him since 16 December, and I immediately reported this affirmation of control over the White Army to the UN Security Council.

Would Machar succeed in pushing southwards? The Nuer were united in their desire to avenge the killings of their people. If major columns moved beyond Bor, towards Mongalla and the southern counties, the national capital could be at risk. Speculation ran high. Multiple sources reported a column of armed youths, as many as 25,000, heading towards Bor.59

It appeared that the loyalist SPLA was too weak to repel an attack of such magnitude. The Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) had in the meantime moved in with ground troops. Whether the Ugandans could prevent an attack on Juba no one knew. The President confirmed as much on 28 December during my fourth meeting with him since the crisis started. Although the government had regained control of Malakal, I knew that they were about to lose Bor again. But he was most concerned about the possibility of a massive attack by the Nuer column on Juba, and what that would imply, which in his view was a ‘tribal turn’ in the conflict, with devastating consequences.

After that meeting, Riek Machar confirmed to me on the telephone that a major column was indeed on the way to Bor, and might push farther south. I implored him to halt the offensive, reminding him of the many unsuccessful attempts in the past to control such columns, and the risk that thousands of civilian lives could be lost. Riek repeated that he was in ‘full control’ and that every effort would be made to avoid civilian casualties.

The UN under attack

‘From today on, we shall have no excuses or scapegoats to blame.’ So said Salva Kiir to his people and the world on the day South Sudan’s independence was declared in 2011. But his words would not hold.

When the violence exploded in Juba in mid December, speculation about Riek Machar’s whereabouts had immediately begun. He had clearly fled his residence during the early morning hours of 16 December. Soon the rumours had it that the UN (and the US?) had helped him to safety. It was not true, of course. It was only several days later that I was made aware that this story was circulating, and that most people in Juba believed it. When the President confronted me, I had no idea what he was talking about. Kiir’s security people knew that Machar had escaped through Jebel Ladu on the outskirts of Juba, across the Nile, and on foot from there. Information later from the cell phone networks confirmed his coordinates.60

But within the President’s circle, many still averred that I had helped Machar and others to escape. Stories began to circulate that I was even sending weapons to him. That I was seen as close to the detainees added to suspicion. All my movements and phones were monitored. Instead of engaging in public advocacy for the detainees’ release, which would only have made it easier for hardliners to compromise my position, I worked behind the scenes. The same applied to our preliminary assessment of whether there had been an attempted coup. I kept quiet. Being declared persona non grata at this point would not have served any useful purpose.

Wild stories

Reinforcing hardline perceptions was the opening of the gates to our bases. We were, it was said, protecting rebels, not innocent civilians; they had hidden their weapons within the bases, and were ready to attack the capital. The proximity of the most important UNMISS base to the airport now assumed sinister implications.

Ironically, as we have seen, at the same time, government politicians and even soldiers had sought refuge along with civilians in our bases at Bor and Bentiu, and would later do so at Malakal. As in Juba, members of the security forces needed to leave their uniforms and weapons behind before being allowed in, and they thus entered as ex-combatants. Everyone was searched going into and out of a base. But our protection of Dinka civilians and government officials seemed to go unnoticed, and the story of our ‘rebel support’ continued unabated.

We knew we had the facts on our side. The protection of civilians within our bases followed strict international procedures. Our demographic information derived from registration for food distribution, conducted by the International Organization for Migration and the World Food Programme by name, age and gender. Although there was always a risk of error, the lists gave a very good picture of whom we were protecting. The vast majority at all our bases were women and children: at Tomping in Juba 77 percent, and at UN House in the Jebel area more than 80 percent.61 The figures were even higher at bases elsewhere. This meant that only a relatively small number could possibly be men of ‘fighting age’. We also counted uniforms and weapons handed over at entry, and reported the statistics to the authorities. But our information was either ignored or dismissed as false.

With time, the fictitious stories were fuelled by statements and badly disguised allegations by government officials in the media. We were repeatedly accused of harbouring rebels, and of acquiescing when UN vehicles were taken or UN premises looted by opposition forces. Even more bald-faced was criticism of the UN for not condemning the attack on our base at Akobo, when of course the Secretary-General, Security Council, and UNMISS had all issued statements immediately.62 The Government’s communications team seemed to be orchestrating all of this, clearly with the intention of building their case that the UN was on the opposition’s side. For this reason, I had tried several times – unsuccessfully – to schedule a meeting with Information Minister Michael Makuei to refute these allegations with the facts.

With the SPLA on its back feet during the first weeks of the crisis, and suffering some astounding defeats, government officials were on the defensive. Scapegoats were needed. When Riek Machar and other opposition leaders, including Hussein Maar, the former deputy governor of Jonglei State, managed to evade arrest at Bor, UNMISS was said to have airlifted them out. It was a joke. That accusations such as this came from cabinet ministers showed the level of propaganda that had been reached.

After the government had retaken Bor in mid January, Minister Michael Makuei, himself a Bor Dinka, jumped on the first flight in. The minister had been advised that he would be welcome at the UN base, where community leaders of the displaced people were ready to receive him. At this time Nuer predominated because most of the Dinka had decamped into town now that the SPLA had regained control. At division headquarters the minister asked that a number of soldiers accompany him to the camp. Even some SPLA commanders wondered why such a large detail was needed for a meeting with civilian refugees under UN protection, but they conceded.63

Soon, therefore, five or six ‘technicals’ – pick-up trucks carrying about 60 soldiers – drove up to the gate of the Protection of Civilians site within the UNMISS base. According to eyewitness accounts, they behaved in a threatening manner. And when Makeui was told that TV cameras would not be allowed to accompany him, owing to the qualms of refugees, a verbal confrontation ensued. Makuei insisted that, as a government minister of a sovereign nation, he had the right to enter with media.

One of the soldiers cocked his weapon and pointed it at Ken Puyoma, our State Coordinator. A few others attempted to go past him into the base, but were stopped by UNMISS personnel. The minister was furious. He claimed that UNMISS was hiding rebels, in uniform, and with weapons, which of course was not true. The situation was very tense, and could quickly have got out of control. Ken was firm, kept his cool, and Minister Makeui departed, fuming that the UN had not heard the last from him about this.

After Ken, on the line from Bor, had told me what had happened I knew there would be political fall-out. The minister had clearly abused the inviolability of UN premises, as stipulated in the agreement between the UN and the government and according to international conventions. I knew the reaction in New York would be very strong. I also knew Michael Makuei well enough to be sure he would pursue the matter. I tried to telephone him, but he was inaccessible, as was the President. I called Kiir’s private secretary, as well as the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and requested that they inform the President as soon as possible that this incident would lead to strong reactions at UN headquarters. The sooner the government could find a way to regret the incident, the better.

Watching the televised local news, my staff who had witnessed the whole debacle were quite upset. The version presented did not chime with what they had experienced. Instead, Minister Makuei was now the victim, and the UN was accused of disrespecting him and denying him entry to South Sudanese sovereign territory. That same evening, the UN Secretary-General issued a firm statement condemning the incident. I met Minister Makuei in his office early the next morning, and used the opportunity both to refute previous allegations against UNMISS – providing evidence through facts and a series of statements – and to discuss what had unfolded the day before. I urged him to prevent a public dispute about the matter. But he demanded an apology from the UN. This was difficult. The statement by the Secretary-General made him even more furious.

President Kiir had scheduled a press conference later in the day, and I was worried that things might get worse. We contacted his spokesperson, explained our side of the story, and encouraged him to help calm matters down instead of escalating the situation. We did not succeed. A question had been planted with a journalist: he asked about the Bor incident, and the President immediately pulled out a piece of paper. What he read included the following:

I think the UN want to be the Government of the South [Sudan] and they fell short of naming the chief of the UNMISS as the co-president of the Republic of South Sudan […] And if that is the position of Ban Ki-Moon, they should make it clear that the UN wants to take over South Sudan.64

This was not an off-the-cuff remark. This was deliberate, and not for the first time. I was shocked that the President could use such language again, in such a volatile situation, and especially since he knew better than anyone how far-fetched it was. It was a surreal accusation.

Unleashing the beast

The following day, demonstrations started. There was every sign that the government had organized them; I knew that the security people often paid youngsters to take to the streets, at times with the help of members of the SPLM youth league.65 The attacks were also very personal. In Rumbek, in Lakes State, flyers indicated that I was the girlfriend of Riek Machar. In other state capitals, posters demanded that the UN in general, and I in particular, leave the country. Many marched to UNMISS bases, handing over letters of protest. The media were full of allegations. And as before, South Sudan TV provided headline coverage. The President, for his part, used the opportunity to appear on Al Jazeera, saying that the UN was giving support to the rebels.66

UNMISS operations were severely affected. There was no point in protesting the accusations, for this would just escalate the tension. Security incidents were now involving both national and international staff. We had to move two senior staff from the mission area after they received direct personal threats and were deemed in New York to be at very high risk. Patrols were interfered with, movement was denied, and in Bor there were no fewer than four attempts by SPLA soldiers to gain forced entry into the base. Church leaders were encouraging us, however, and one said, ‘It is better to be persecuted for saving lives than being praised for having allowed the killings to happen.’

I knew that the President was the only person who could stop the anti-UN campaign. I managed to schedule a meeting with him after five days through the help of senior officials concerned about the situation. At the same time, Gayle Smith, Senior Advisor to President Obama, a friend very familiar with the South Sudanese leadership, flew in. She told Kiir that this had to end; relations with the UN had to be restored. There was also concern for my personal safety. I told the President he was lucky that no UN staff member had been killed so far, and that he had to make a public statement, requesting respect for the UN, UNMISS and its personnel.

Up to this point I had been one of the few Special Representatives in a UN Mission without a personal security detail. The UN’s risk assessment in 2011 had concluded that I did not need bodyguards, owing to my relations with the government and the population at large. Now, however, the situation had turned around. The risk was assessed to be very high, peaking around the time of the demonstrations. I was becoming a target. A full personal security outfit was requested with immediate effect.

The President issued a statement on 24 January calling on the security forces to ensure that the UN and foreign nationals were protected.67 Things began to improve, though slowly, but the Mission was still largely confined to base due to security concerns.

Within a short period of time the number of civilians under our protection had reached 70,000 in the outlying bases, and continued to increase in Juba as well, although the security situation there had improved. We worried that weapons might be smuggled into the bases, increasing the risk of violence. After we got armed police from the UN’s Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in late December, our military and police conducted frequent, unannounced cordon-and-search operations. We also used our de-mining team, with metal detectors, to search the bases and surrounding areas. In these operations very few weapons were found.

We shared the figures with President Kiir, relevant officials and later also in writing with the cabinet;68 they were welcome to verify these through visiting the weapon storage facilities. But facts appeared to be of limited interest. The assumption was that our figures were wrong, and the allegations continued. One issue that infuriated them and the President was the fate of confiscated weapons. They expressed alarm that ‘rebels’ within the bases could attack our stores, take the weapons, and join forces to attack Juba. They insisted that all confiscated weapons were the property of the government, and should be handed over – not an unreasonable demand.69

For the UN this was problematic, however. Handing weapons back to parties at war was a difficult. Things would have been different if a ceasefire were holding, or a peace agreement had been signed. We were caught in the middle. Every time opposition forces took control of Bentiu and Malakal armed youths and defected soldiers demanded the return of weapons we had confiscated when they had sought our protection. On several occasions opposition forces surrounded our bases, and threatened to attack if they did not get their weapons back. But we held our ground. Angry field commanders of opposition forces thereupon denounced UNMISS for siding with the government.

The worst was yet to come. On 23 December the Security Council had approved reinforcing UNMISS with 5,500 troops. The Mission was dangerously overstretched, with close to 100,000 civilians under our direct protection. But despite support from New York headquarters and colleagues in other UN missions that had been requested to provide support, deployment was very slow. We should have had five more battalions within a few weeks, but six months into the crisis we had received only one-fifth of the promised number. We needed more police units as well. Much of the equipment we had been promised was also delayed. This was the UN at its worst.70

In early March the first units of a Ghanaian battalion were finally on the way. They were meant for Bentiu, where we were short. The troops would be flown in, but their equipment had to be transported overland. Owing to insecurity, however, we had already established a practice of shipping all arms and ammunition by air. On 5 March an UNMISS convoy on its way to Bentiu was stopped south of Rumbek for a government security check. Although this was a violation of the agreement on freedom of movement, UNMISS had nothing to hide; our people decided to open the containers.

All necessary permissions to bring in the military equipment had been given by the government, and the paper work was correct. Unfortunately, the transport papers for the consignment did not match the cargo. And weapons were found in a container labelled incorrectly. The Ghanaians had mixed things up. The following day more weapons were found. This was terribly embarrassing. I immediately called relevant ministers, including the Minister of Information, to explain the mix-up, and asked them to pass the message to the President. I also immediately sent a letter, explaining what had happened, to them.

A press statement was issued, to the effect that UN headquarters would at once launch a high-level investigation. We had hoped for a joint investigation, but the government in the end decided to launch its own. Ministers all seemed to understand that the incoming battalion had made an error. I was later informed that our early intervention had helped, and that there had been agreement among senior ministers not to make too much of the issue.

But the temptation to exploit our embarrassment was too strong for government hardliners to resist. On 8 March Minister of Information Makuei, against the advice of some colleagues, went to Rumbek with a number of local and foreign journalists.71 There he claimed that land mines and air defence systems had been discovered in the trucks, none of which was true. A new round in the propaganda campaign against the UN had begun. The story line across the country was that weapons were being smuggled into the country for the rebels, and that I was involved.

Rallies and demonstrations followed.72 Government officials gave inflammatory speeches to a crowd in Juba, saying that South Sudan had been ‘colonized’ by the UN, that we were supporting the rebels, and that the international community wanted to replace President Kiir, who also was present at the rally. Vice President James Wani Igga similarly railed against the UN and the international community, saying the intention was to take over the country. Only a couple of weeks earlier I had been in his office with factual evidence refuting the allegations that had been circulated, and Wani Igga had offered to help clarify the issues and get our relations back on track. Now, instead, he did the opposite. The political winds were blowing in a different direction.

That the demonstrations were well organized was clear. The many large photo-shopped posters of me pointing a gun at people could not have been produced by private individuals or civil society organizations; they looked like ads for an action movie. This was pretty advanced, and had to have been orchestrated by elements in government. Slogans such as ‘Why Hilda Kills People of South Sudan’, ‘Why Hilda supports rebels’, and ‘Why [is] UNMISS importing land mines’ were further evidence.73 This marked the start of a campaign that would run on South Sudan TV for the next week or so, with even more fabrications. The lurid comments by the President at the press conference of 20 January – which he later retracted – were also run again and again. The atmosphere was poisonous, and the security situation was worse than ever, for Mission staff, patrols and me personally.74

I knew that this was not about me, but about them, about South Sudanese fighting each other, and looking for someone to blame. It reminded me of an Equatorian saying a SPLA general once told me: ‘Don’t throw your spear against your own shadow.’

In January, when things heated up, I had created what I called my ‘crazy file’. In this plastic folder I put printouts of the most far-fetched and ludicrous press statements and allegations. I included several speeches of government officials. Now I had new treasures for my file: the latest reports and pictures from the demonstrations. As I joked to my staff, if they wanted to put me on a poster with a gun, and send me worldwide on the news wires, it was good that they at least had used a decent photo.

What worried me much more were reports I received from the field and from friends with their ears to the ground. This time, I was told, many people really believed that the UN had been involved in dangerously underhanded activity. In doing so, they said, we had made a very stupid mistake, so now we deserved the opprobrium we were getting. It was clear that the government’s propaganda was beginning to have an impact.

Before leaving for New York and the Security Council on 16 March, I went to see the President again, and appealed to him to calm things down. He promised to issue a statement the following day, and I informed headquarters and the Security Council accordingly. They were waiting for it, and so was I. No statement emerged. This questioned the President’s control and credibility.75 The security threats against the Mission prevailed.

By the end of the month the results of the UN investigations were published. The UN’s high-level independent committee had concluded that procedural mistakes had been made on several fronts, and was rightly critical of the Mission in this regard. But it concluded that there was no basis for the many other allegations that had been made.76 Having returned to Juba I held a press conference on 3 April, sharing the findings and refuting 12 of the gravest allegations against UNMISS.77 A fact sheet was handed out to the media, providing factual corrections one by one. Although the conference was packed, and a lot of media covered the story, the government-run SSTV was nowhere to be seen. This was the first time in my almost three years as SRSG that I had noticed its absence from a major press event.

A few weeks later, the UN findings were confirmed by the government’s own investigations. Although critical of our handling of transport, it produced no evidence for UN support of rebels, for the charge about land mines, and the rest. The Government made no attempt to publicize these findings. Only later, when the Secretary-General arrived, was there coverage of this important conclusion.

Despair: South Sudan in civil war

In mid January Uganda finally admitted its role in fighting alongside the SPLA. On the same day, its parliament passed a motion in support of the deployment. A few weeks later South Sudan’s minister of defence, Kuol Manyang, confirmed publicly that South Sudan was paying the Ugandans,78 whose role by then was significant. Their intervention was probably the main factor in deterring the opposition from advancing towards Juba, and in the absence of anything more to loot, the White Army temporarily withdrew.

While the situation seemed therefore to have stabilized in Juba and the Equatorial states, fighting continued in all three states of Upper Nile region. The taking and retaking of the state capitals, numerous times between January and April, involved untold human suffering, with abuses and atrocities on both sides. Women and children were severely affected and grave incidents of sexual violence became a regular feature. Villages were looted and burnt, and thousands fled their homes. Everywhere, civilians bore the brunt of the conflict.

The Government had also recruited Darfurian militia to help them in the fight against opposition forces.79 When they entered Leer, Riek Machar’s hometown, at the end of January, they burned most of it, including the hospital, in what many saw as solely an act of revenge. Forty thousand civilians seeking refuge there were again forced to flee. Later, places such as Mathiang and Duk north of Bor in Jonglei were subject to similar retaliatory destruction by opposition forces.

Among the worst incidents were attacks by both government and opposition forces on civilians seeking sanctuary in places of worship and hospitals in all three state capitals, with numerous witnesses reporting that armed men would enter, in some cases nearly every day, harassing and looting, targeting individuals on the basis of ethnicity, killing, abducting, and in some cases sexually violating women and girls. Gang rape also occurred.

The courage and dedication of individual peacekeepers and humanitarians was noteworthy. In Bentiu, UNMISS peacekeepers rescued hundreds of civilians hiding in churches, mosques and hospitals on several occasions during this period. They also did so under fire, while fighting was going on. Through the use of trucks they were able to transport people to safety. Humanitarian corridors were created to make sure that thousands were able to get to the protection sites within our base.

In Malakal several thousand people had sought refuge in St Joseph’s Cathedral, Christ the King, two Catholic churches, and the Presbyterian church. We learned of desperate cries for help from Christ the King Church, through families calling us, worried that their women and young girls would be raped and killed. Several thousand people had sheltered there while elements of the White Army were roaming the town. I instructed our forces to assist. Beyond the hundreds extracted from the church, safe passage was provided to many more, and all came to the UNMISS base for protection.

Broken promises – large-scale attacks

In mid April opposition forces moved in and again took control of Bentiu. Their behaviour this time proved even worse than before. On the 15th they attacked and killed several hundred civilians at the mosque. The killings seem to have occurred in several stages. Around mid morning, a score of soldiers accompanied by armed civilians entered the mosque compound and began shooting at civilians in the yard. People inside the mosque then locked the doors.

A second group of fighters then arrived. After extorting money and other belongings from civilians, they began shooting into the mosque. Multiple shooters were identified by witnesses, including one with a machine gun and one with an AK-47. Ethiopians and Eritreans were escorted out of the mosque, while the attackers especially targeted Darfurians. (It was well known that Darfurians had been active in fighting on the government side.) This was their revenge.

That evening, over 200 bodies from the mosque were reportedly loaded onto military trucks and taken to a place about a two-hour drive from Bentiu, in the direction of Kaljak.80 UNMISS staff who arrived at the mosque later observed dead civilians outside, in the market place and along the road. The number of people killed might have been as many as 400, although this figure could not be verified. But a death toll of at least 287 civilians sheltering in the mosque was later confirmed. It was an abomination. Astoundingly, Riek Machar did not take responsibility.81

On the same afternoon as this horrific incident, an individual claiming to be SPLM ‘Secretary-General of Unity State’ came on the air of Radio Bentiu and stated, in a mix of Nuer and Arabic, that Dinka SPLA and allied Darfurian fighters had raped Nuer women, who were now pregnant. He called upon young men to meet at the SPLA’s 4th Division headquarters the next day in order to do what the Dinkas had done to their wives and girls. Another individual, claiming to be acting Commissioner for Rubkona, later reiterated the same message and advised all Dinkas to leave Bentiu.

When I heard about this I recalled my visit, as Norwegian minister of international development, to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha ten years before. This was the first time media professionals had been tried for inciting ethnic violence, resulting in genocide. In a groundbreaking verdict, the so-called ‘Media Case’ in 2003 ended in the conviction of all three defendants. Broadcasting hate messages, inciting violence, was now a very serious crime under international law.

In Bor the situation had been largely stable for weeks when another shocking attack on the UN took place. On 17 April a group of at least 200 individuals, including Dinka youths, approached the UNMISS compound under the guise of a peaceful demonstration. They claimed that they intended to present a petition demanding evacuation of ‘Nuer White Army youth’ from the camp within 72 hours.

By this time, virtually all other groups had left the UNMISS base, leaving only Nuer behind. Several thousand civilians were under our protection. They were afraid to leave. Tensions were still high in the town, and both the local authorities and SPLA were uneasy with – and at times hostile towards – UNMISS and the refugees. Opposition forces had just retaken Bentiu, and many of the displaced were celebrating. This provoked the local population and Dinka youths.

As the group advanced on the UNMISS compound, they did not proceed to the main gate as expected, but instead moved directly towards where the displaced were located. Uniformed SPLA and National Police nearby did nothing. It was later clear from witness statements that those personnel knew what was going to happen. Local authorities had tried to talk to the youths before, but did not succeed. As the mob approached, they began to throw rocks and other objects over the walls, followed almost immediately by small-arms fire.

When the mob breached the perimeter of the protection site UNMISS military returned fire, from both fixed and mobile positions. Several attackers were killed, causing the mob to retreat and thus saving many lives. But due to unfortunate delays in response at least 51 people, almost all of them Nuer civilians, were killed in the attack, most of them within the UNMISS compound.82

The slaughter of civilians under UN protection was totally unacceptable. The President told me how angry he, personally, was. In a public statement on 20 April he condemned the attack,83 and he later vowed to investigate the matter and hold perpetrators to account. But despite the fact that the identities of many individuals involved in the attack were known, no arrests have ever been made.

The events in Bentiu and Bor sparked international condemnation and fear that the fighting and ethnic killings would lead to a new cycle of revenge attacks that could get totally out of control. We arranged visits by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, and Special Adviser to the Secretary General for the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng.84 Following this came John Kerry, the US secretary of state, and the Secretary General himself, Ban Ki Moon, on 6 May. The pressure on both sides increased. In many ways the events in Bentiu and Bor were a game changer for international engagement.

In a press conference with the Secretary General, President Kiir said that they had clarified ‘misunderstandings’ between the UN and the government. The investigations of the Rumbek incident had both concluded that the UN had made a mistake, but that there had been no intention of supporting the rebels. He said that he appreciated the efforts of SRSG Johnson, although I noted that he used the past tense. But the atmosphere changed after the Secretary General’s visit, easing the tensions.

At the same time, our human-rights investigations had the highest priority. One of the main problems was to get a grip on the numbers and scale of killings in the various places where the worst atrocities had been committed. Our human-rights team had done their utmost to get such data and identify the mass graves that would have made possible more credible estimates. Difficulties of access arose, however, in particular when these were near military installations from which our staff were barred. Numerous localities suggested by witnesses were visited, but proved to be incorrect. In many cases witnesses pulled back at the last minute, afraid to help. Security conditions were in other cases not conducive to deeper investigation, given the risk of reactions by security forces.85

All this made it difficult to provide a credible estimate of the number of people killed, both in Juba and elsewhere. Also the AU Commission of Inquiry, later able to access more sites of mass graves with forensic expertise, had problems estimating the number of civilians killed in Juba and overall in South Sudan.86 Without such verification, numbers would be only approximate. Several thousand people had been killed, but providing a substantiated figure beyond this was impossible. On 8 May we released as scheduled our UNMISS Human Rights Investigation Report covering the period 15 December 2013 to 1 May 2014. This concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed during the conflict, by both government and opposition forces. Further criminal investigations would be necessary to establish the scope of the violations and responsibility of perpetrators.87

That South Sudan, in only its third year of existence as an independent country, could be subject to international justice for mass atrocities perpetrated by its own leadership against its own people was something that none of the liberators, or international observers, could ever have expected.

‘Crisis is opportunity’ – to steal

But there were other things that also astonished some of us. While the country was in economic difficulties and more than a third of the population was in dire straits, the corruption problem increased. A Crisis Management Committee (CMC), established five days into the crisis and chaired by Vice President James Wani Igga, was eventually tasked with assessing the political, social, economic, security and diplomatic aspects of the conflict. It was also to assess the impact – and mitigate the effect – of the purported coup attempt, and was given wide administrative responsibilities. According to very credible sources, functions normally delegated to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labour and Public Administration, including even salary payments, ended up under the auspices of the CMC.88 To some, it appeared to be a parallel government.89

There were thus ample opportunities for mismanagement and misappropriation of financial resources. Sure enough, after the worst fighting was over and the government had contained the situation in Juba and most state capitals, stories started to circulate about what the CMC had been up to. As a saying goes: crisis is opportunity. And in this case the crisis seemed to have been used to the maximum degree possible. The amount of money allegedly syphoned away was shocking, even for South Sudan. A government insider with knowledge of the committee’s operations warned the President of ‘a new Dura scandal’.90 The figures reported from confidential sources went beyond most of the corruption scandals of the interim period. This information has been corroborated. Transfers were made directly to the foreign accounts of at least two senior government officials on the committee.

The sums involved were in the hundreds of millions of South Sudanese pounds.91 People started to call the CMC the Corruption Management Committee. Indeed, it presided over a slush fund used for all sorts of things, from mobilization of new recruits to the customary servicing of patronage networks. While the latter was probable during a period of conflict, to ensure the loyalty of officers and men, the figures appeared to go far beyond that. Ironically members of the CMC appeared to be grabbing so much for themselves that a likely result of its work could be a deepening of the security impact of the crisis it was supposed to ‘manage’. If, for example, the delays in salary payments to the SPLA could be attributed to this malfeasance, with the inevitable increase in disaffection, the CMC made an already tenuous security situation worse.

Whatever the case may be, the leadership hardly seemed to care. By this time South Sudan had received a total of US$19 billion in oil revenue between 2006 and 2014.92 Now, they were using crisis money to cater for themselves. In April the deputy chairman of the committee, Daniel Awet Akot, said that some members were being investigated for misappropriation of funds, and that some had been suspended for misconduct. On 1 May President Salva Kiir, after proposals to abolish the CMC had languished for some time, finally dissolved it.93

But crisis was opportunity also in other ways. Most of the staff of the foreign banks had been evacuated by their embassies, some without time to put their affairs in order. One day an ambassador from a neighbouring country came to my office in shock and said: ‘Our bank has been stolen!’ I responded, ‘A bank robbery? Here in Juba?’ With the current security situation and crime levels it would not have been so surprising. But the ambassador continued, ‘No, not in that way; the people in the Central Bank have taken it.’ I raised my eyebrows, and he told me the most astonishing story.

A commercial bank from his country had been established in South Sudan with an investment of $7 million. It had registered with the Central Bank, got permission to operate, and filed the necessary paperwork. During the crisis, however, when the management and staff had been evacuated, documents were altered. The same thing happened to a foreign exchange bureau owned by the same people. The ownership of both the bank and the forex bureau was transferred to South Sudanese individuals. The ambassador was very discreet, and wanted to deal with the issue confidentially, so the story never reached the public domain. Whether he succeeded through quiet diplomacy in getting the bank and exchange bureau returned to their rightful owners I do not know.

The President did nothing to stop the misappropriation of funds or to hold culprits accountable. Although the CMC was dissolved, those alleged to be involved are still in office – apparently with their bank accounts intact. It is likely that the increasingly narrow political base of the President, who had alienated the leadership of the other SPLM factions, meant that his room for manoeuvre was very limited, and still is. He could not afford to confront or marginalize his remaining political allies, and now more than ever he would need to retain his networks of loyalty. Credible information indicates that large sums were paid to some individuals just to keep them in the fold.94

The grip of fear: No return home

At the same time as resources were literally syphoned away from the government coffers, almost 100,000 people were still seeking protection in UN bases. With the rainy season upon us, things deteriorated further. In a very short time, the bases became swampy and flooded,95 and people were literally forced to live amid mud and pools of infected water. One of our greatest fears was cholera. A major cholera epidemic would likely lead to thousands of deaths. Impressive collaboration had already developed with humanitarian partners, whereby they took responsibility for management of the protection sites within our bases and provided basic services. Cooperation in this regard was unique. The Humanitarian Coordinator, my deputy SRSG, Toby Lanzer, had experience in both peacekeeping and the humanitarian and development side, and so had I. This helped us navigate the very difficult political and operational landscape to ensure an adequate humanitarian response within our bases.

Humanitarian partners worked around the clock with UNMISS logistics colleagues to keep the UN bases cholera-free for a very long time. Following the first cholera cases, however, two government ministers blamed UNMISS and cited the experience of Haiti, where peacekeepers had been blamed for being the origin of the epidemic. This comparison was factually incorrect; the South Sudan outbreak began elsewhere, and our bases remained cholera free for much longer than other areas. It was also deeply unfair to all the UN staff and humanitarian partners who had worked so hard, day and night. As a response to this and a host of other challenges within our bases, new Protection of Civilian sites were established, allowing improvement in living conditions. As the fighting showed no signs of abating, most civilians were too afraid to return home and remained under UN protection. They were in a grip of fear.

The US had decided to pursue targeted sanctions against individuals alleged to have been involved in atrocities and human rights abuses.96 The EU followed suit.97 The conflict had at this time, according to established definitions, reached the threshold of civil war.98

How could this happen? And how could the conflict escalate so quickly, and seemingly take on a life of its own? To understand this, we need to take a closer look at the security sector.

It is the heart of the matter.