Only we can determine how our vision will be read in history books generations from now. Will we let our challenges define us, or will we rise as a nation and define our own future? I believe that we will write a story worthy of the sacrifices of our ancestors and martyrs. If we work together, the story of South Sudan will inspire the world.
Salva Kiir Mayardit, Independence Speech, 9 July 2011
Up to this point, the story of South Sudan had not been much of an inspiration. The leadership had chosen division over unity. On 26 August 2015 Salva Kiir finally signed the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. Riek Machar and Pagan Amum, representing the Former Detainees and Other Stakeholders1 had signed on the 17th. Salva Kiir, although present, had surprised the signing ceremony that day by suddenly requesting two more weeks to review the text. He subsequently raised a number of reservations that reinforced the perception of a leader under serious pressure. The reservations were later dropped, but illustrated the challenges of the IGAD mediation, with both parties voicing misgivings.
Machar had seen strong resistance to the agreement too, but he reluctantly signed. He had been seriously weakened militarily, with six of his commanders breaking ranks, including Peter Gadet.2 Salva Kiir, for his part, signed, but tried to circumvent provisions in the power-sharing arrangements through his surprise decision to establish 28 states in South Sudan.3 Also the closure of several media outlets by National Security,4 the decisions to dissolve the SPLM General Secretariat and fast-track important party processes, 5 the detention of one governor and the sacking of several others, were clear indications of more authoritarian rule.6
However, in the end both leaders had no other choice but to succumb to the pressure and abide with the provisions of the peace agreement.
South Sudan – beyond redemption?
While responsibility for the crisis rests with South Sudan’s liberators across factions, the two belligerent parties have to share the blame for the grave acts of violence against their own people and the civil war. Regional dynamics also played a part in its continuation.
I knew the South Sudanese very well, from way back, and was aware of their tendency to dig their heels in. Yet I was surprised by the depth of intransigence. After numerous deadlines and ‘last rounds’, the two leaders had still been unwilling to come to an understanding,7 preferring yet another round of fighting.
I recalled a warning prior to Independence by a Sudanese official.8 I didn’t believe it at the time, but it now rang true. The official in Khartoum noted what he regarded as a certain naivety on behalf of the South Sudanese leadership in the international community, and said to a UN colleague:
We know our Southern brothers much better than you. We might appear very different. But you will soon be disappointed. We are like trees coming from the same roots.
In a statement at the airport prior to my departure from Juba on 8 July 2014,9 I referred to this:
If there are further delays, and the blame games go on, whether from those wanting to remain in office or those wanting to get back in, we can draw only one conclusion; that this is only about a scramble for power.
There will be claims that there are different reasons (and) [ … ] other explanations, but – please – don’t believe them. If they do not come to an agreement, it is because this – in the end – is only about them, and not about you, the people of South Sudan, or the country.10
Among those most angry and upset internationally were old ‘friends’ of the South Sudanese, those who had shared the struggle for peace and justice for all. Some were among those pushing hardest for international sanctions against those they saw as responsible and, as a last resort, also with an arms embargo.11 Russia, however, was against the use of sanctions.
By April–May 2015, in the fourth year of independence, the Troika, and the US in particular, were close to giving up on the South Sudanese.
As if people mattered
The blame game continued, however. We heard many reasons why the two factions could not come to an agreement, from leaders on both sides.
In the meantime, South Sudan was falling apart.
The Government tried to portray normality; the civil war was just a conflict in one part of the country, in the always difficult Upper Nile Region. The rest of the country was ‘normal’, they said. Towards the end of the dry season in 2015, fighting escalated significantly, particularly in Upper Nile. During this period, opposition forces captured both Malakal and Bentiu again, and threatened the oil fields through a new alliance with Johnson Olonyi’s forces, effectively leading to fragmentation of the state into three areas.12 About 750,000 people were affected by the violence in Unity state alone, and many of them were forced to flee their homes.13 The military offensive in Unity resulted in the systematic displacement of a significant amount of the population.14 SPLA checkpoints prevented thousands from getting to safety in UN bases.15 The situation was certainly not normal. And later in the year it would get worse, with fighting escalating also in Western Bahr el Gahzal and Western Equatoria.
Another abnormal feature was the gravity of the violence. The UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan,16 assessing the basis for sanctions, found that armed forces were ‘intent on rendering communal life unviable and prohibiting any return to normalcy following the violence,’ including ‘by clearing the population from much of Unity state’. It concluded that, since April 2015, the intensity and brutality of the violence aimed at civilians had been greater than hitherto seen.17 The Human Rights report published by UNMISS in late June also gave a chilling picture of violence at a new level of brutality. The scope and level of cruelty suggests a depth of antipathy that in the UN’s view ‘exceeds political differences’ and points to ‘the further ethnicization of the conflict’.18
Burning of towns and villages, mass killings and other terrible atrocities were documented. This included an escalation of abduction and sexual abuse of women and girls, some of whom were reportedly burned alive in their dwellings after being gang-raped. There were abductions of boys as young as 10, some of whom were mutilated. UNICEF reported horrific crimes against children, including castration, rape and murder.19 The stories outraged the world. Only further investigation can clarify whether the latter acts of grave violence were motivated as a generational attack on another ethnic group. Similar crimes and widespread use of sexual violence was reported in Unity state from both sides even after the peace agreement had been signed.20 Recruitment of children also escalated.
The African Union Commission of Inquiry reported sexual violence as a weapon of war and extreme cruelty exercised through mutilation of bodies, burning of bodies, draining blood from people who had just been killed and forcing others from one community to drink it or eat burnt human flesh.21 It was also reported that 50 people had suffocated to death in a container in Leer on 22 October 2015, with the SPLA being deemed responsible.22 UNMISS Human Rights Report of 21 January 2016 documented further atrocities, committed by both sides.23
Outrages on this scale, committed by South Sudanese against South Sudanese, had not been seen before. Something had changed. To paraphrase the anthropologist Sharon Hutchinson, an expert on these communities: ‘God it seems, was no longer watching.’24 In an effort to understand such brutality, Christine Cheng refers to the ‘emotional desensitization’ that can happen during war, stimulating further aggressive behaviour.25 An obscure pattern has also been observed elsewhere, where a society’s stock of ‘conflict capital’ accumulates with its use, generating further violent behaviour.26 In other words, violence breeds further – and often worse – violence.
Given the history of violence and war in South Sudan, additional ‘conflict capital’ had been accumulated, generating more fighting. Leaders will now have the difficult task of stemming this seemingly perpetual violence, reversing the trend, and re-sensitizing communities to the concerns of the other. This will be very difficult unless there also is accountability for the atrocities committed.
This will be an even greater challenge because the fighting has spread and engulfed the nation, ignited and reignited conflicts in many locations, as communal disputes increased, and old tensions between ethnic groups, clans and sub-clans resurfaced. Disagreements over borders and boundaries reemerged, whether across payams, counties or countries, and conflicts between cattle-herders and subsistence farmers and resident populations escalated. With the implementation of the presidential decree to establish 28 states, inter-communal violence is likely to increase further, adding fuel to the fire.
The UN Panel of Experts documented how the conflict spread to Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal states,27 the latter with increasing intensity. Traditional communal violence re-erupted, affecting Lakes and Warrap states in particular. The situation in the whole Equatorian region worsened, with an escalation of conflicts between cattle herders and farmers. This violent conflict in Western Equatoria was particularly serious, affecting tens of thousands of civilians,28 a state which had been among the most peaceful in South Sudan in later years. Conflicts were soon spreading further; the authorities could no longer put out the fires. In early 2016 there were upsurges in violence also in Pibor, Wau, Malakal, as well as Western Equatoria. The already fragile fabric of society was torn apart.
‘There is no more country’
This reminded me of a statement by the Catholic Bishops of Sudan and South Sudan early in the crisis. They quoted the Bible:
And everyone who hears these words of mine and does not act on them will be like a foolish man who built his house on sand. The rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat against the house, and it fell – and great was its fall!29
Many had the feeling they were in a house built on sand, or even worse, that the house was already collapsing. One of them, John Kamis, put it this way: ‘There is no more country’.30 The world, as he knew it, was falling apart.
South Sudan was already classified as one of the world’s biggest humanitarian crises, and at this time the only one on this scale in Africa.31 Counting all those whose livelihoods had been destroyed, and those facing food insecurity, almost half the population of the country was affected. Close to four million were severely food insecure,32 having increased 80 per cent from September 2014 to September 2015, with famine likely in parts of Unity State.33 By the end of January 2016, more than 2.3 million people had fled for their lives, around 650,000 of them across international borders.34 Around 200,000 had sought refuge in UN bases in the country.35 Historic levels of food insecurity and hunger were expected by mid year.
The economy was collapsing. Market prices had skyrocketed, preventing ordinary people from buying the most basic staples. The oil price plummeted, owing to global trends, and even more for South Sudanese crude than for others.36 At the same time, the agreement with Sudan under the Transitional Financial Arrangements implied an automatic transfer of $26 per barrel, whatever the oil price in the market. It was an incredible deal, which implied that South Sudan was getting as little as $9-10 dollars per barrel in late 2015.37 Paradoxically, it was Sudan that now benefited most from South Sudan’s oil income; there was not even a clause for renegotiation should the oil price change dramatically. In addition, there was a reduction in oil production following the fighting. The oil fields in Unity were not producing, and parts of the Upper Nile fields were down too. The estimated deficit of South Sudan was said to be around $3 billion by the end of the financial year in 2015 (1 July).38 The country was almost without income. The economic crisis was total, as reflected in the title of an article at the time: ‘Dead Economy Walking in South Sudan’.39
It is worth highlighting that at independence, four years earlier, South Sudan had no public debt at all. This had dramatically changed. From 2014 South Sudan needed funds for basic government functions and money to finance the war, purchase arms and ammunition, and pay the Army. The only solution was to borrow; South Sudan engaged further in forward selling of oil. A loan was also obtained from Qatar in 2013, allegedly on commercial terms, of $250m per quarter, or a total of $1b a year.40 In 2015 the funding needed to cover the government’s payroll alone was three times its income.41 In June, the ministry of finance and economic planning acknowledged that the debt had reached $4.2b.42 According to my sources, the figure was likely higher. But the government still proceeded with expensive military contracts, acquiring Mi-24 and attack helicopters for close to $140 million, and plans of arms deals of another $50 million.43 Indeed, even after the signing of the peace agreement both sides continued to acquire new weapons.44
While the Central Bank already had problems servicing the debt, it had provided credit lines to the government based on foreign exchange it did not have. The Bank resorted to printing money.45 A huge gap between the black market rate and the official rate ensued,46 and the pound lost half its value between January and July 2015.47 The elite continued to pocket the difference. South Sudanese economists and scholars were now debating what to do with a currency worth almost nothing in the international market. Comparisons with Zimbabwe in 2008, and its decision to dollarize the currency, were frequent.48
South Sudan would never have an easy ride on the economic side, despite its oil income. According to Paul Collier, the country falls into all four traps that keep countries poor. It is struggling to emerge from conflict, gets most of its income from natural resources, is landlocked, and suffers from bad governance.49 But the way the government had managed the economy during the crisis had further entrapped the country in an economically vicious cycle, almost leading to hyperinflation.
And it was getting worse. On 15 December 2015, two years after the civil war started, South Sudan finally unpegged the South Sudanese pound from the dollar, with all transactions following the market determined rate.50 As one could expect, the value of the currency dropped like a stone.51 Soon, the oil price fell even further. As this book went to print in early 2016, the net revenue per oil barrel was believed to be less than $5,52 prompting new negotiations between senior officials of Sudan and South Sudan in early 2016.53 There was no money. South Sudan had hit rock bottom.
The peace agreement called for a Transitional Government of National Unity, to include both parties, former detainees and other political parties within a period of 90 days.54 President Salva Kiir would remain in office, Riek Machar, representing ‘South Sudan Armed Opposition’, would be first vice president, and James Wani Igga would remain as vice president, a model similar to that in Khartoum after the CPA. At the same time the majority of ministerial seats were divided between the conflicting parties. The former detainees and other parties would get a smaller share. For a 30-month interim period the transitional government would be responsible for implementing the agreement until elections.55 With such a powersharing arrangement there would be very little difference between this government and prior ones. Those who had been responsible for the demise, would also be part of the transition. The question was whether change would now follow.56
Most critical for peace were the security provisions. Unification of forces and a Strategic Defence and Security Review were key commitments. With a stroke of a pen, the mediators had renamed the national Army, the SPLA, ‘The National Defence Forces of South Sudan’. This was included in the government’s list of reservations.57 A similar renaming was attempted with the SPLM/A-IO, called ‘South Sudan Armed Opposition’, corrected in handwriting by Machar, but still minimizing any references to the SPLA in the agreement.58 Despite the signing and agreement to end the fighting, the civil war continued. Only when details were agreed at a workshop on 26 October, and on the numbers of forces in Juba on 3 November 2015, was progress possible.59 UPDF for its part started withdrawing its troops from South Sudan two weeks before.60
It would be in the reunification and transformation of the Army and the demobilization of many soldiers from both sides that the South Sudanese leadership would face their greatest test. A Joint Integrated Police was also supposed to be established, although the agreement did not include details about reforms either within the Army or the police.
The issue of reconciliation and accountability for atrocities was imperative for peace to prevail. On 27 October 2015, the report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry was finally published.61 The AU had held back the report until a peace agreement had been signed; it was handed over a year before. A leaked draft had created consternation in early 2015. Despite clear provisions for the protection of witnesses and victims, that document included names of interviewees, in some cases with inaccurate statements attributed to them.62 The final elaborate report was different, however. It found that a combination of an overall governance crisis, a militarized environment and a political crisis in the ruling party contributed to the outbreak of conflict. The Commission established that there were reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by both parties, and that these were committed in a ‘widespread and systematic’ manner.63
The report recommended that ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility at the highest level [be brought] to account’. While the report did not list the perpetrators, the Commission has a highly confidential list which will be submitted in due course.64
In the peace agreement the parties had agreed to establish a Hybrid Court, and a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing.65 About half the members of the Commission would come from other African countries. The AU Commission of Inquiry recommended something similar, an Africa-led, Africa-owned, Africa-resourced legal mechanism under the aegis of the African Union supported by the international community and the UN, to bring those with the greatest responsibility the highest levels to account. Such a mechanism should include South Sudanese judges and lawyers.66 The lack of accountability by both sides strengthened the case for such a process. By the end of 2015, none of the two parties had taken decisive action against perpetrators and almost no one had been brought to justice for the atrocities committed.67 The report also proposed the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and saw peace and justice as complementary, recommending a sequential approach.68
On 22 January 2016, the UN Panel of Experts issued its final report, with a very clear verdict:
The Panel has […] determined, on the basis of multiple, independent sources with first-hand knowledge, that there is clear and convincing evidence that most of the acts of violence committed during the war, including the targeting of civilians and violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, have been directed by or undertaken with the knowledge of senior individuals at the highest levels of the Government and within the opposition.69
At the time of completion of this book, it was too early to say how the recommendations and findings of these two reports would affect the South Sudanese political equation.
Saving South Sudan from failing
As I highlighted before my departure from the Mission in 2014, South Sudan has been afflicted by three ‘diseases’ since 2005: the cancer of corruption – with oil becoming a curse rather than a blessing; rule by the gun and not by the law, with impunity among security forces and services; and government by a self-serving elite for the elite rather than for the people.70 As we have seen, these diseases were to a large degree self-inflicted. During the crisis they worsened, and curing the country would now be much more difficult.
It is therefore clear to most observers that a quick fix between political elites will not help South Sudan. Band-aids do not cure diseases.
South Sudan still has to get through its three challenging transitions, from war to peace, from liberation struggle to government, and from secessionist region to independent country. Amazingly, even on the last point, a number of issues remain. And with recent developments, the two other transitions had become more complicated; the civil war in South Sudan had further militarized and ethicized the South Sudanese society. As the UN Panel of Experts also points out, ‘tribal fissures’ have widened and ethnic based lobbying groups such as the Jieng (Dinka) Council of Elders have gained significant influence at the centre of power.71 Most importantly, therefore, it is incumbent upon all South Sudanese leaders to nurture and develop a mindset of a nation, regardless of ethnic affiliation.
We have earlier shown the scale of the challenges South Sudan was already facing in relation to nation-building and state-building. With the civil war, these processes had gone in reverse and become even more complex. This was why the IGAD mediation emphasized an ambitious reform agenda, critical for peace. It included transitional governance arrangements; resource, economic and financial management arrangements; transitional security arrangements, implementation of a permanent ceasefire and security sector reform; transitional justice, accountability, national reconciliation and healing; and a permanent constitution process. This was very ambitious, and rightly so. As Jok Madut Jok says:
Whatever the nature of the agreement will be […] no peace agreement will bring peace to South Sudan. While the conflict is rooted in the lackluster state-building and nation-building programs, corruption, insecurity and injustice prevailing in the country since 2005, there is no denying that the events of December 15, 2013 were the tipping point, and patching them up in a quick fix style of peace agreements will not cut it this time, even if the principal parties sign a peace agreement. Any peace agreement that does not commit the warring parties to programs of (far-reaching) reforms, would be as good as an agreement to continue the war.72
As we have seen, it would take much more than signatures on paper for peace to be achieved – and not least – sustained, in South Sudan. Implementation of the peace agreement has so far been excruciatingly slow. Nevertheless, the country has likely been saved from fighting. Now it also needs to be saved from failing. This would imply fundamental reforms and a complete overhaul of some of the key state institutions. Most South Sudanese leaders did acknowledge this. South Sudan topped the lists of failed and fragile states in the world in 2014 and 2015.73 IGAD had still struggled with getting a full commitment from the parties to several of the proposed reforms.
While some reforms are embedded in the agreement, both in relation to the security sector as well as in management of the petroleum sector and financial resources, an overall problem with the agreement is its complexity. The number of commissions, committees, authorities, mechanisms and roadmaps, as well as special funds – and their multiple governance arrangements and unrealistic deadlines is overwhelming. These would be difficult for any government to implement. For the South Sudanese, with their limited capacity, they will likely be much more than can be handled. Conversely, a Constitutional Review which is expected to be completed within eighteen months is too limited to ensure inclusiveness and a broad-based nation-building process. This warrants further reflection.
The establishment of the transitional government was long overdue. By late 2015 all the former detainees had returned to Juba, except Pagan Amum. After more than two years of fighting, Riek Machar had yet to come back to join the transitional government. While his advance team and several hundred of his people returned to Juba in late December 2015, disagreement over the 28 states held him and the SPLM/A-IO back. The African Union Peace and Security Council and the IGAD ministers issued strong Communiques, calling on the parties to establish the transitional government with immediate effect.74 On 3 February 2016, Riek Machar stated that he wanted to return and form the government of national unity as soon as possible, interpreting the IGAD Communique as supporting this formation while delaying the issue of the 28 states.75
In a surprise announcement on 11 February 2016, and without agreement on this issue, President Salva Kiir appointed Riek Machar as first vice president of South Sudan.76 This was welcomed by the SPLM-IO. As this book went to print, Machar conveyed that he would return to Juba to take up his new position, along with his security.77 Even with further delays, it seemed clear that the Transitional Government of National Unity would soon be established. South Sudan had come full circle, with Riek returning to another vice president position, after all the suffering, fighting and bloodshed. The two will now be in charge of a country at serious risk of fragmentation along ethnic lines, and implosion, with an economy in peril, indebted and without many prospects for improvement.
A fundamental question is whether a transitional government, consisting of many of the same characters, will have the political will and capacity to deliver. Will such a government build institutions and at the same time build the bridges necessary to unify a divided nation? Will such a government implement fundamental reforms? Will such a government be able to tackle the 28 states-issue and prevent tribalism? Or will we witness a largely dysfunctional government, only able and willing to implement what is politically most convenient, choosing tactical avoidance as their primary strategy? The latter is certainly most likely.
The negotiations revealed that while all the factions of the SPLM were at loggerheads on most issues, they were united on one. The international community had advocated more transparency and accountability over the management of financial resources, and not least the revenue from oil production. Proposals for stricter controls with international participation were discussed. Various ideas were considered, including stronger external oversight. When this news broke, all factions of the SPLM protested. This was not surprising, given the endemic corruption involving a large number of the cadres on all sides. However, it was disturbing, and it gave many people the feeling that in this area the status quo – and not reforms for financial transparency and accountability – was the priority, even after so many months of civil war. A weakened Economic and Financial Management Authority was the end result.78
Nevertheless, the establishment of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) under the leadership of former President Festus Mogae of Botswana is tasked with overseeing that Authority’s work and making sure that the peace agreement is implemented to the letter, reporting regularly to the IGAD Chair and Heads of State, the African Union Peace and Security Council and to the Secretary General and the Security Council of the UN.79 With the inauguration of JMEC on 27 November 2015, the IGAD mediation had completed its job, and with the highly respected former head of state at the helm the commission certainly had teeth.
International donors have often talked about the ‘post-war moment’ emphasizing the need to make use of the important window of opportunity after a peace accord has been signed.80 This moment was largely lost in Southern Sudan after 2005 and after independence, as we have seen. The leadership of the SPLM squandered moments of opportunity. Much more could have been achieved. Following the return of Riek Machar and the establishment of the transitional government, South Sudan has got a second ‘post-war moment’. This time, however, less support will be forthcoming, and much more will be expected of the South Sudanese themselves.
In this regard, it is important to be realistic about what can be achieved in the short term. As the AU Commission of Inquiry pointed out, it is critical to avoid an over-ambitious reform agenda.81 With the limited capacity to manage and implement reforms, a sequential approach would be needed.82 Setting clear priorities and getting the sequencing right would be critical, focusing on a few reforms at a time. International donors and stakeholders should also realize this, and apply lessons learnt from the past of supply-driven, uncoordinated aid, a tendency to favour technocratic blue-print approaches, and ignoring critical political dynamics.
Attention to the political economy of state-building83 can give guidance for South Sudan’s post-war efforts. Informal structures of power and personal interests crystallize during periods of protracted violence, with the ‘recycling’ of old networks whose interests may be served even by retaining a weak or ‘failed’ state.84 New state institutions can often become instruments for continuation.85 Informal networks also equal ethnic ties in many societies, as well as political and economic linkages that are resilient, adaptable and difficult to transform by outsiders.
No country can succeed in implementing major reforms in one go, and least of all South Sudan; they have to be moved forward in a prioritized manner. And no country can succeed in doing so on its own, operating in a vacuum.
For such engagement to happen, however, the process of fragmentation and implosion in the country will have to be halted by a leadership pursuing a unifying agenda, not a divisive one. Furthermore, South Sudan will have to make a major effort in restoring its own lost credibility. International partners will also have a significant responsibility. The peace agreement was a result primarily of international and regional engagement and pressure. Neither IGAD, the AU, nor the Troika can now walk away from South Sudan. Evidence from numerous peace processes shows that there is a high risk that agreements signed under external pressure will fail. The architects and midwives of the South Sudan agreement, the guarantors and observers, now need to make sure that this accord does not face the same fate. The international stakeholders have all signed the agreement in various capacities. They must now own up to their commitments. In this regard, JMEC, in close cooperation with the UN and its mission in the country will have decisive roles to play, as the new UNMISS’ mandate also reflects.86
Furthermore, for South Sudan it is imperative that regional relations are repaired to avoid negative dynamics from undermining peace in the country. This includes refraining from any interference in the affairs of the world’s youngest nation through proxies.
Redemption – by whom?
The conflict in South Sudan bears the hallmark of a society held hostage by its bloody past.87 After a civil war involving such unfathomable atrocities and a very repressive climate,88 the divisions and wounds in South Sudan are deeper than ever. The gulf between the leaders and the communities is severe, and the animosity worse than we have ever seen at any point in South Sudanese history. A simultaneous process of healing and reconciliation, justice and accountability will be critical.89 As a first step, reconciliation within the leadership is urgently needed, making it possible for a more unified leadership to take on the numerous daunting tasks of the peace agreement. This is also necessary to be able to lead a process of healing and reconciliation in a divided country.
One of the greatest risks in this regard is the temptation of leaders to continue with ethnic politics, building their powerbase from divisive strategies aimed at rallying their support base and antagonizing others.90 This will undermine state-building, nation-building and peace-building processes. In South Sudan, the only alternative organizing principle to ethnicity has been the multi-ethnic SPLM. This was the case during the civil war, and this is the case now. When the party is weak, sectarianism takes hold, and becomes decisive. Short-sighted politicians playing to their own power base and ethnicity make this worse. That was why reunification of the SPLM was so important. Reconciliation within the leadership is key for implementation of the reform agenda and for the state- and nation-building processes in the country to succeed.
The cadres of the SPLM did agree on reunification of the party through negotiations in Arusha from late 2014, leading up to a groundbreaking agreement on 21 January 2015.91 Unfortunately, the misgivings of some members of the IGAD mediation team against the Arusha process and lack of coordination led to lost opportunities in the talks. Both sides probably have to take responsibility for this. International observers have mistakenly seen the SPLM as the problem and the origin of the crisis in South Sudan. In fact, despite the recent political crisis and the fault lines among the liberators, the Movement is the only glue that can hold South Sudan and its leadership together across ethnic lines. Technocrats and competent leaders, including from other parties will be important, but a transformed and reinvented SPLM – or a similar multi-ethnic platform – may be the only mechanism that can prevent sectarianism and tribalism from fragmenting the country. For this reason, such a reunification process is still imperative, whoever provides the platform going forward.
This includes addressing the historical tensions within the leadership, and not least the critical reform and succession issues. They cannot now leap-frog over these essential processes. They must confront their past – for the sake of the future of their country. Most importantly, and for the first time, they will all have to address the origins of the cyclical tensions in the SPLM leadership from the 1990s onwards, and not least from 2004. Accommodation, ‘buying’ peace through positions or other means, and not reconciliation, will never solve the problems. Only confronting the past, followed by reconciliation and healing will. This will be vital to avoid a return to conflict in the long run. Even if there were to be changes in party affiliations, such a process is critical.
A unified leadership will have the best chance of unifying the country, and strong checks and balances are ensured, not least through the active engagement of the South Sudanese people – who after all, are the ones that now must have the greatest say over the direction of their country.
Leadership remains most critical, however. Recycling of old leaders will over time be counter-productive, even in reinvented versions. Indeed, not without reason, the reunification of the SPLM put the succession issues high on the agenda. The current leadership – across all factions – is now facing its greatest test. Even with the peace agreement, it is at risk of failing, failing their people, failing the struggle and ultimately failing their country – its primary achievement. There is not much time left to prevent the country from fragmentation and implosion.
On Independence Day in 2011 President Kiir asked: ‘Will we let our challenges define us, or will we rise as a nation and define our own future?’
In the last four years the leaders of South Sudan let the challenges define them. And they let the challenges get the better of them. The liberators betrayed themselves and their people. South Sudan is now at risk not only of failing, but also of falling apart.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu says: ‘Hope is being able to see that there is light, despite all of the darkness’. From a generational perspective, however, the story of South Sudan is yet to be told. The next generation of South Sudanese leaders is ready. They should soon be given the chance. It is likely that we will have to count on them to get that story right, a story worthy of the sacrifices of the ancestors and martyrs. If the current crisis can be overcome, and with strong partnership from regional and international partners, we hope they will be given a chance to win a different kind of war, a war against poverty, disease and ignorance, a war where lives are saved rather than taken, where prosperity is achieved rather than destroyed, where hope is brought, rather than despair.92
With such support, and with the people holding them to account, they may still be able to save South Sudan, both from fighting and from failing, and finally build the country their people dreamt of.
Only then can South Sudan rise as a nation.