8

◆

WAGING PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN

Kofi Annan proved right when he said that waging peace is always much harder than waging war.1 IGAD mediators and leaders of neighbouring countries knew this long before December 2013. In this chapter we will examine how the circumstances of the conflict that erupted then have complicated matters since. For making peace does not take place primarily at the negotiating table. The lack of a clear strategy for building the new nation fostered the very forces that pulled it apart. It is this lesson that now must be learnt before new efforts to wage peace have a chance to succeed.

On 19 December 2013, as the horrors of war recurred, the region’s foreign ministers arrived. The first IGAD delegation led by Ethiopia’s Tedros Adhanom landed in the middle of chaos. Counterparts from all the member countries, including the foreign minister of Sudan, Ali Karti, accompanied him. They hoped to intervene before things escalated, to ‘nip it in the bud’, so to speak. I briefed them on the situation, and warned of the animosity between the leaders and the gravity of the problem.

General Sumbeiywo, President Kenyatta’s envoy, with whom I had worked on the CPA, had arrived the day before. During the liberation struggle, when Sumbeiywo was chief of general staff of the Kenyan Army, he had assisted Salva Kiir personally on several occasions and knew him well. Sumbeiywo and I discussed how to calm the situation and get the detainees released; Riek Machar had already indicated unwillingness to talk to the government unless they were all set free.

This major stumbling block had to be overcome. Sumbeiywo and I quietly worked on face-saving options. He, rather than I, sat with key players on the government side; because of their expressed suspicion of UNMISS support for Riek Machar. I could talk to the President and a few others, but not government hardliners. Sumbeiywo, on the other hand, had no access to Riek Machar, with whom I was in touch by phone. Sumbeiywo kept the Ethiopians, chairing IGAD, informed about our efforts. When the IGAD foreign ministers arrived in Juba, they went directly to talks with President Kiir.

The IGAD peace talks: A bumpy road

Although the foreign ministers had been promised access to the detainees, this was denied, and they left the same day without having made much progress. By 20 December, as we have seen, I was able to reach Riek Machar, but he was available by phone only to the Americans and me. With his permission I gave his number to Tedros Adhanom who managed to get hold of him from Addis Ababa.

Riek informed the media on 23 December that he had spoken to Tedros Adhanom and called for the political detainees’ safe passage to Addis Ababa. Machar had agreed to send a list of delegates to the talks the Ethiopians wanted to hold in Addis, premised on the release of the detainees, most of whom would represent him in negotiations that could commence immediately.

On the same day, our acting state coordinator and senior military adviser in Bor, Mike Chadwick, received a message from Peter Gadet that Riek wanted to see him. They met at the airstrip, where Machar handed over his list of delegates for the talks. He wanted us to send it by email to the Ethiopians, which we did immediately. Interestingly, the designated head of the delegation was Pagan Amum; most of the people on the list were in detention: all had been at the press conference on 6 December. I knew that Riek could not have been in touch with them. That he took their support for his rebellion for granted was surprising, and an error in judgement that would haunt him later.

The Government was unwilling to release the detainees. Sumbeiywo was still working on options we had discussed, and an IGAD summit was in the works. The Kenyans wanted to host the IGAD talks, while the Ethiopians expected Addis to be the site. It was critical to avoid a turf fight and make sure that the process, not the location, had priority. This may be seen as the start of the difficulties IGAD would face in creating a united front for the South Sudan peace process.

At the same time, other foreign officials began to arrive in Juba. On 23 December, President Obama’s special envoy Donald Booth, came to meet President Kiir on condition that he be allowed to see the detainees. The Americans had been in regular contact with Machar from the beginning, and were thus working the phones with both sides, as I had done. Three days later the Ethiopian prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, and President Kenyatta came to Juba to meet Kiir. They also visited the detainees who were being held in good conditions at a ministerial residence.

Worried neighbours

On 27 December the IGAD summit took place in Nairobi. The leaders of Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Somalia attended alongside the First Vice President of Sudan; South Sudan’s foreign minister, Barnaba Marial Benjamin; and the deputy chairperson of the African Union Commission. Neither Salva Kiir nor Riek Machar was present.

A final communiqué condemned all unconstitutional actions, in particular any efforts to change the Government of South Sudan through the use of force. It commended the expressed commitment of both sides to engage in dialogue, requested face-to-face talks with all stakeholders in the conflict by 31 December, and welcomed South Sudan’s commitment to an immediate cessation of hostilities, while calling on all other parties to do the same, in the absence of which within four days the summiteers would consider ‘further measures’.2 The communiqué also called for a review of the status of the detainees. Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, General Sumbeiywo and the Sudanese general, Mohammed Ahmed Mustapha al-Dabi were appointed as IGAD’s Special Envoys for South Sudan.

The Ugandan military engagement was now supported by IGAD, specifically to secure and protect critical infrastructure and installations. Some foreign observers commented that to them it seemed that Uganda was acting beyond that mandate. These tensions would later disturb relations between several IGAD countries.

On 27 December President Kiir met the ambassadors from the Troika countries (the US, UK and Norway) and told them that most political detainees would be released. Later that evening it was announced that two, Peter Adwok and Deng Deng Akon,3 were already out of custody. However, it soon appeared that hardliners, including Legal Advisor Telar Deng and Interior Minister Aleu Ayieny Aleu were digging in their heels over further releases. Both bore personal grievances against some detainees. At the same time, almost all civil society organizations were united in favour of release, as the detention without charge was seen as unconstitutional. The rationale of the international community, however, was the – possibly misguided – assumption that release would contribute to an early peace.

On the 29th Sumbeiywo and the Ethiopian Foreign Minister returned to meet the President and other officials. Now that IGAD had formally taken on the mediation, my role of engaging directly with the parties in relation to the political process was over. I would support IGAD’s efforts, help if I could, but not facilitate talks.

The urgency of the IGAD engagement to end the fighting could be illustrated by recent events in Bor alone. At least 13 separate incidents had been reported in which minorities and their own citizens were targeted, including Ethiopians, Eritreans, Kenyans and Ugandans. There were also allegations of extrajudicial killings, rape, abduction and other abuses. What had unfolded during the last two weeks had clearly alarmed the region. Neighbouring countries knew that civil war would hit them hard, with refugee flows and a serious impact on their economy and security.

A few hours before the stipulated deadline both sides declared readiness to talk. Delegations moved to Addis Ababa to start the negotiations on 2 January 2014. A main challenge for the IGAD mediation was that member states had differing national interests; coordination was a problem. Nor were the parties really ready to talk after all. Military victory might be impossible, but each side wanted to position itself better before serious negotiations started. Nevertheless, with international pressure mounting, the parties realized that they at least had to attend.

When the delegations arrived, despite the unresolved detainee issue, there was endless discussion about the talks, the agenda, the format, participation, and so forth, and little about substantive issues. The delaying tactics showed lack of commitment.

Apart from a declaration on principles and processes, including humanitarian access, the main outcome of the meetings was the first Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 23 January.4 Only two days later incidents occurred, followed by an increase in fighting; the agreement was repeatedly violated by both sides. There was no mechanism for monitoring it in any case, so no way to hold the parties to account.

Release of the detainees

Although Riek Machar had set release of detainees as a precondition for negotiations, after international pressure his SPLM/A-In Opposition had attended anyway, and President Kenyatta and Prime Minister Desalegn visited the detainees (I followed suit). Ahead of an AU summit in late January, however, the government knew it would be under serious pressure, and before its delegation left for Addis Ababa on 27 January, 7 of the 11 detainees were released,5 This was widely seen as a breakthrough, after which they were quickly whisked off to Nairobi. Now, four remained.

Surprising both parties, but not many others, the released detainees expressed no desire to join either camp, insisting that they be a ‘third’ party in the talks. They were most concerned, they said, about stopping the war. For Riek Machar this was a blow: he had counted on their support, and their independence made his SPLM/A-IO seem that much more Nuer-dominated and, for that reason, weaker than he had foreseen.

Following another IGAD summit in the margins of the AU,6 a second round of negotiations started on 10 February. The SPLM/A-IO delegation had threatened to stay away until the Cessation of Hostilities and Status of Detainees Agreements had been implemented in full, including participation of all detainees in the peace process and the withdrawal of Ugandan forces. But eventually they came around.

Following consultations with the parties, IGAD tabled three documents on 21 February. These included a framework and agenda for political dialogue. Beyond implementation of what had already been agreed in January, the most interesting development was the reform agenda. This comprised restructuring the security sector; justice and accountability; review of the Transitional Constitution; national reconciliation; transparency; and reforming and restructuring the civil service. In addition, a declaration of principles was proposed to guide the entire peace process. A parallel track was devoted to the SPLM reunification process by members of the Political Bureau.

During this round, the question of inclusiveness and the format for the talks were debated. It was agreed to establish a Monitoring and Verification Mechanism to ensure compliance with the cessation of the hostilities agreement. While UNMISS could have taken this on rather quickly, the parties opted for regional responsibility. If the goal was to avoid establishment of an effective monitoring mechanism, and to preclude reporting of violations to the Security Council, this clearly was more convenient.7 That the IGAD-mediators did the same was more surprising.

The round ended on 3 March with the signing of implementation modalities for the cessation of hostilities agreement and some progress on finalizing a declaration of principles. As expected, the monitoring mechanism was slow to be established, and had very limited capacity, which permitted the parties to continue to violate the agreement with impunity. Worse, the mechanism would be operational only from 1 April in Bor, and with a minimal presence in two other places later the same month. It was entirely dependent on logistical support from UNMISS, and was initially weak in confronting serious violations. At the same time, fighting continued, as we have seen, with some of the worst violence happening in March and April.

Another IGAD summit on 13 March ended with a communiqué reaffirming the need for an inclusive political dialogue which would involve the former detainees, political parties, civil society and other stakeholders. The former detainees were recognized as positive contributors to the peace process.8 President Kiir participated. Upon his return to Juba, however, the government claimed that it had protested this part of the text, which should not have been included. This position was subsequently disputed by the IGAD secretariat and chairman of IGAD, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, who reportedly made it crystal clear in a letter to Kiir, copied to all heads of state in the region.9 This was not the first time a delegation would walk back on commitments it had made. Riek Machar, on his part, was upset with the proposal to deploy an IGAD protection force. Neither party was keen to attend the next round of talks.

The participation of other stakeholders in the negotiations was a contentious issue. From the onset of conflict, South Sudanese civil society organizations had demanded a part in the peace process. IGAD mediators consulted a number of them, and other South Sudanese political forces, to establish a means for participation. The former detainees, now calling themselves the Group of 11,10 claimed a place at the table. Including them and others was controversial, despite the backing of all IGAD heads of state, and would later become a source of intense debate between the mediation and the two parties.

During this period, the trial of the four remaining detainees, Pagan Amum, Oyay Deng, Majak D’Agoot and Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth took place. They had been charged under the Penal Code Act of 2008, chapter five, with ‘treason, incitement of the masses, causing disaffection among police forces or defence forces, defaming the Government of South Sudan and undermining authority of or insulting the President.’11 Some of these charges carried a maximum penalty of death. For the first time in South Sudanese history, a national court procedure allowed access to the public and the press, which to many observers seemed a breakthrough in judicial practice.

The detainees remained in custody until almost the end of the trial. It became clear that the case against them was very weak. Key witnesses chose not to turn up, and others, such as the SPLA’s chief of military intelligence, General Mac Paul, undermined it by flatly stating there had been no attempted coup.12 The case collapsed. On 24 April the government withdrew the charges – in ‘the interest of peace and reconciliation’ – and the detainees were freed.

Preventing another cycle of violence

Meanwhile the political process focusing on the SPLM, which was led by the African National Congress and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, was delayed. The intention had been to contribute to the solution of issues within the party through dialogue among members of the SPLM Political Bureau, since tensions there had sparked the crisis in the first place. The party process convened for the first time on 5 April 2014, soon faced some of the same difficulties as the IGAD negotiations. There was an apparent lack of commitment: despite everyone’s agreement, participation was poor from at least two of the factions, and the status of members such as Riek Machar and Taban Deng was moot.

In mid April two of the gravest spikes of violence since the crisis started took place: the massacre in the mosque and surrounding areas of Bentiu, killing hundreds, and the attack on the UNMISS base at Bor, killing more than 50 people. There was grave concern that the vicious cycle could get totally out of hand. The international outrage was loud enough to bring both Salva Kiir and Riek Machar to Addis Ababa. For the first time since the crisis broke, there was a glimmer of hope.

The third round of talks under IGAD auspices had opened on 28 April, and both the government and the SPLM/A-IO now had to show that they were serious. Discussions culminated on 9 May with Kiir and Machar publicly committed to resolving the crisis and implementing the cessation of hostilities agreement with immediate effect.13

The two-page agreement was described as a possible ‘breakthrough’, but the presence of the two leaders was more important than the substance of their commitments. Sure enough, as soon as they returned to their home bases, they complained of undue pressure from their Ethiopian hosts, who had been chairing IGAD.14 This was not well received.

There was nevertheless hope that agreement between the two would lead to a ‘month of tranquility’, so that planting for cultivation could take place, preventing a famine later in the year. A Humanitarian Conference in Oslo in May mobilized donor support. But South Sudan’s representatives, particularly Foreign Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin, angered donors with an apparent unwillingness to take responsibility for the humanitarian crisis in the country. Although $600 million was pledged at the Oslo conference, the agencies had hoped for more.

Another cycle of revenge through mass killings was avoided after the terrible incidents of mid April, but violence rose sharply at the end of May. Following another round of intense negotiations, at the IGAD summit on 10 June Salva Kiir and Riek Machar agreed to set a 60-day deadline for arranging a permanent ceasefire and establishing a transitional government of national unity.15 While they had refused even to greet each other on 9 May, this time they at least shook hands. The deadline for agreement on the transitional government was now set for 10 August.

IGAD mediators had continued to push the parties to allow participation by other opposition groups and civil society representatives. A Multi-Stakeholder Symposium was hosted in Addis Ababa prior to the IGAD summit.16 There was a lot of noise over selection of civil society participants, however, and to what extent they were truly representative or were compromised by association with any of the main factions.17

The SPLM/A-IO refused to participate in the next round of talks from 20 June on the grounds that the inclusive framework undermined the mediation process. They wanted to negotiate only with the government, and to consult other stakeholders separately. The meeting had to adjourn.18

The talks had been fraught with challenges from the start. The mediators had weighed the options of a narrow peace agreement between the belligerent parties and a comprehensive agreement that addressed the ‘root causes’ of the conflict. The so-called Single Negotiating Text did indeed list a number of fundamental challenges facing South Sudan,19 but with the problems facing the inclusive approach little progress was made. Instead the discussions centred on the agendas of the two warring parties, composition of a transitional interim government of national unity, and the SPLM/A-IO’s demand for federalism.

The parallel negotiation process for reunification of the SPLM never got off the ground. Following the request of the ANC and the South Sudanese parties, the Tanzanian ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) later took charge of the process, yielding much better results. The lack of coordination between the IGAD mediation and the reunification process of the SPLM in Arusha would later pose a problem, however.

I left South Sudan in July 2014 after completing my contractual period as SRSG. I had stayed on longer than most in these assignments. It also followed the new and very different mandate for UNMISS, where state-building and peace-building was replaced by a focus on crisis management and protection of civilians.20 As I departed, I hoped that both sides would take the new 60-day deadline seriously. But it passed without any substantial developments. A new deadline of 15 August was set for agreement on the transitional government.21 A preparatory meeting of the leaders of Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan – but without the chairman of IGAD, the Ethiopian Prime Minister – ratified a prior agreement among the three for transitional arrangements, during which Salva Kiir would remain president.22 The Ethiopians had little choice but to join the consensus, in what was only the latest of many examples of disharmony within IGAD.

From the outset of the process the IGAD leaders had been united in calling for respect for the cessation of hostilities agreement and for humanitarian access. They had joined in expressing dismay at the multiple violations by both sides, demanding release of the detainees, and stressing the need for inclusivity in the talks. Later they agreed on the establishment of a regional protection force, establishment of a transitional government, and the need for fundamental reforms in South Sudan. But on other issues the mediators needed mediation.

Neighbours and others: Peacemakers or troublemakers?

Each country in the region had its own strategic interests. The venue and leadership of the talks were initially a matter of tension between Ethiopia and Kenya. More serious was disagreement over the approach to the negotiations. Seyoum Mesfin emerged as chief mediator, although such a term never existed, and he made most decisions on strategy.23 This led to tensions not only within the mediation team, but to some extent also between IGAD governments. The first sign of these challenges was tension between Uganda and Sudan. Uganda had the full backing of IGAD for its limited military engagement,24 and in December and January its intervention probably prevented an attack on Juba by opposition forces. While the degree of Ugandan military support for the SPLA was contentious, some observers quietly noted that this prevented an even worse scenario from unfolding. An opposition attack on the capital could have involved heavy loss of civilian lives, with possible irreversible national implications.

There was a difference between strategic support at a critical juncture, however, and continuous military engagement. While members of IGAD did not publicly criticize, the main concern was that this engagement could prompt Sudan to enter the conflict on Machar’s side. Sudan and Uganda had been in dispute for a long time. The danger of internationalization of the conflict led to demands for withdrawal of Ugandan troops.25

It did not help that South Sudan had also quickly solicited support from the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur, particularly in Unity State where the SPLA was especially weak. This provoked Khartoum; Mohammed Atta, the head of the national intelligence and security services, was fuming about this when I met him in June 2014.

Sudan soon appeared tacitly to adjust its policy. Having supported Salva Kiir and his new, and in their view more Khartoum-friendly cabinet, Bashir’s government reportedly rebuffed early overtures from Riek Machar’s side,26 just as he had rejected similar approaches through business contacts and military intelligence prior to the crisis. The Sudanese President therefore continued to reassure Kiir of his support, including through sales of military hardware. (Twenty-four armoured personnel carriers were purchased in Khartoum for the SPLA as late as March 2014.)27 With excellent contacts in the South Sudan Government, Khartoum could still exert effective influence.

When they defected to the opposition, many SPLA units had taken their hardware with them. The SPLM/A-IO also captured significant assets during the ebb and flow of battle. Still, external support was critical for the continuous supply of ammunition and to confront better equipped government forces. Chinese weapons ordered by the SPLA before the crisis, in 2013, worsened the opposition’s long-term predicament.28

In due course, indications of support for Riek Machar and the SPLM/A-IO from across the border were discernible. Sudan had an obvious interest in the security of oil supply lines, but Uganda’s intervention and the involvement of the Darfurian rebels seemed more important in determining Khartoum’s next moves.

Rumours multiplied of arms deliveries to the opposition via Eritrea, as well as direct Eritrean involvement. Later there were more substantial indications that Sudan and Iran were providing direct support, and that Qatar was contributing financially.29 (Sudan’s collaboration with Iran would later switch to alignment with Saudi Arabia.) SPLM/A-IO attacks in areas adjacent to the Sudan– South Sudan border, where supplies would be easily accessible, showed at least passive support from Khartoum. Sudan was probably playing both sides up to mid/end of 2014, but there was clearly an increasing tilt towards Machar’s camp.30

Khartoum’s support for the opposition has been confirmed by two important sources. Firstly, London-based Conflict Armament Research has documented direct airdrops of weapons and ammunition from Sudan to the SPLM/A-IO.31 It appears that Iranian weapons may have been trans-shipped through Sudan.32 Secondly, very reliable sources have provided information from security meetings in Khartoum33 in which their support to Riek Machar Teny and the SPLM/A-IO was mentioned.34

Hardliners in Khartoum have always seen developments in South Sudan as a zero-sum game. This is a legacy of decades of civil war, and the mentality remains; the weaker the Southerners, the better for Khartoum. As we have seen, long-time support of proxy militia was publicly acknowledged by Sudan in September 2012 in the context of the AUHIP negotiations. The signing of the CPA was the only exception to this approach, of divide and rule. After John Garang died and his counterpart, Vice President Ali Osman Taha was sidelined, elements in the military-security apparatus deliberately and systematically undermined its implementation, and reverted to old strategies.

Riek Machar and a number of his commanders had at times been allied with or supported by Khartoum. The military-security apparatus there now revitalized contacts, and established a network of direct links with Riek’s commanders, some of whom went to Khartoum for meetings. This strategy would enable Khartoum to keep proxy militia operating in the Upper Nile region even if Riek Machar returned to the fold.

During the IGAD talks, it was reported that Sudan’s leadership several times advocated giving the parties more time,35 the only member state that seemed in no rush to reach an agreement. While representatives of the Sudanese Government continued publicly to express deep concern about developments in South Sudan, there was no urgency at all, and other elements of the military-security apparatus seemed to be making full use of this opportunity for their own ends.

On the military side, there appeared to be several tacitly accepted red lines between the neighbouring countries. Credible sources warned that if Ugandan forces were to engage farther north, beyond Gadiang, a reaction from both Sudan and Ethiopia might be triggered. Similarly, if Sudan moved in ground forces – for example to assist the SPLM/A-IO to occupy oil fields in Upper Nile State, strong reactions might be expected from the neighbours. In this way, the IGAD countries watched each other and had a deterrent impact, preventing any of them from overstepping the line.

Other strategic interests: Carrots and sticks

As the conflict continued and the IGAD peace process faced increasing difficulties, it appeared that tensions in the region itself were impeding progress. There was hegemonic competition in relation to South Sudan (Ethiopia versus Uganda), and competition over the lead role in the peace process (Ethiopia versus Kenya). There was direct support to opposing belligerents (Uganda versus Sudan) and at times directly opposing national interests of several neighbouring countries in South Sudan (Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya). The refugee crisis in South Sudan was also creating problems in the neighbouring countries, affecting Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan, with a total of around 450,000 at this time, a figure which would increase exponentially.36

Ethiopia’s economic interests in South Sudan were predominantly in the property markets and hotel and restaurant business, rivalled only by Kenyan interests in the financial sector. Ethiopia has a large Nuer population, and given the history of conflict in the region the Ethiopian Government had to tread carefully.37 Riek Machar was based in Addis Ababa.

Ethiopia pushed for a joint protection and deterrent force, the mandate of which would be to ensure full implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement, support the Monitoring and Verification Mission, protect civilians, and help to prevent any attempt to occupy or attack the South Sudanese oil fields. Indirectly, this was also intended to provide the basis for a Ugandan withdrawal from South Sudan, which the Ethiopians saw as a prerequisite for a meaningful peace agreement.38 The Ethiopians would provide forces and be joined by units from Kenya and Rwanda; Uganda and Sudan were seen as too involved to participate in such a force.

Uganda had significant security interests in relation to South Sudan, revealed through its military engagement. As early as 18 February Uganda stated a preference for invoking ‘the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis’, a security mechanism under development within the African Union, enabling a progressive withdrawal of Ugandan forces. This was not a realistic proposition at this time, however. A ‘lighter’ deployment, such as regional forces within an UNMISS framework, was another alternative which could provide for increased protection.

Riek Machar and the SPLM/A-IO had called for Ugandan withdrawal from the very outset, but also opposed a separate regional protection force. Machar claimed that extra forces to be deployed under the authority of the UN through UNMISS would be more than enough; his resistance was likely linked to proposed deployment near the oil fields.

The IGAD countries could not fund the joint protection and deterrent force and requested assistance from the UN. But the Security Council would only agree to fund additional forces if these were under UN command and control, integrated within UNMISS and under the same mandate. Since additional forces for UNMISS were delayed, however, units from the IGAD countries ended up constituting the reinforcement of UNMISS and not a separate protection force. It had never been clear whether Uganda really would withdraw if the regional force materialized, and they now remained on South Sudanese territory. But Ethiopia’s influence was ensured as the country pressed for, and got, the Force Commander position in UNMISS, and provided the majority of the additional troops.

At the same time, Ethiopia had a strong interest in maintaining good relations with Khartoum. Sudan supported the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, a mega-project opposed by Egypt. It was critical for the Ethiopians that this support continue. While Ethiopia remained largely impartial in relation to the South Sudanese conflict, it therefore also had to be careful in confronting Sudan.

Kenya and Uganda had significant economic interests in South Sudan. South Sudan was Uganda’s most important export market and second only to the UK as a source of remittances.39 Kenya dominated the banking and insurance sector. Both countries enjoyed a significant surplus in trade relations with South Sudan, and both had citizens deeply engaged in business in Juba and beyond. For both countries South Sudan was a major market for manufactured goods and food. Quite a number of business partnerships had been formed between members of the SPLM leadership and influential individuals in both countries. To what extent this influenced the positions of their governments is difficult to tell.

As time passed without a settlement, the IGAD mediation increasingly faced challenges with resolving the impasse. An observer from the region, in close contact with the South Sudanese, put the blame on the Ethiopians, who were ‘not behaving as mediators, but as prescribers’. At one point, the South Sudan Government urged not only a change of venue, from Ethiopia to Kenya, but also replacement of the (Ethiopian) chairman, Seyoum Mesfin, who had publicly criticized other IGAD states, with the experienced (Kenyan) Sumbeiywo.40 The Kenyans did not take the bait. No change was forthcoming.

But it was not only neighbouring states that had political interests in South Sudan, and in how the conflict evolved. The stakes were also high for the Troika – the US, UK and Norway, with their critical role behind the CPA. They knew that a South Sudan in prolonged conflict was at risk of imploding and fragmenting, with a potentially destabilizing impact on the whole region. Their Special Envoys followed the talks closely and supported the IGAD mediation every step of the way. They also helped to fund the mediation effort and the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism of IGAD.

The US administration watched with growing anger and impatience as the conflict unfolded, and was the first to impose sanctions against individuals identified as responsible for the worst violence in South Sudan.41 The European Union followed suit. The Security Council also discussed sanctions against individuals, but only later would the legal basis for such sanctions be formally approved.42 South Sudan did its best to charm Russia, despite the unfortunate handling of the investigations following the downing of the Russian helicopter in December 2012, but did not succeed – at least at this stage.

China had the potential to play an important role in South Sudan. Chinese companies were the most significant oil producers in the country. The Chinese Special Envoy engaged actively with the parties to the conflict, and at times in consultation also with his counterparts in the Troika. But the Chinese operate discreetly and only they know which messages were conveyed to the South Sudanese parties. It was clear, however, that major Chinese commercial interests were at stake if the conflict continued; it would be in China’s interest to help end it.

True colours

That the two parties would criticize the IGAD talks was to be expected. Mediators can seldom avoid reproach. But the team trying to broker agreement between the South Sudanese warring factions faced intransigent leaders on both sides, who at times played the IGAD countries against each other, both through public statements and through their approach to the talks.

Conflict usually brings out the true colours of leaders. It turned out that the two principals in this conflict, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, seemed willing to go to extreme lengths to gain or retain power. Salva Kiir’s resolve was likely rooted in several factors. He had long been subject to pressure and spitefulness from his comrades, which probably reinforced his determination not to bend. Pressure from leading figures in his own community in the Greater Bahr el Gahzal, who wanted to maintain the status quo, was also likely involved. Besides, government hardliners hated Machar, and were unlikely to favour any compromise.

Riek Machar, with his long-standing ambition to be president, had been deeply provoked by the atrocities committed in Juba. The clear message from his side, and that of opposition forces in general and his own community, was that Kiir had forfeited legitimacy and had to go. This view was engrained in the minds of his key commanders, who had no loyalty to Kiir and no interest in extending his presidency.

The all-or-nothing position from each side made a power-sharing agreement extremely hard to achieve. Although neither leader was really tribalistic in his approach, each increasingly leaned on his own community for support, both as his political base and as a basis for personal security. Riek Machar’s SPLM/A-IO was predominantly Nuer. Although the make-up of Salva Kiir’s last cabinet was multi-ethnic, his presidency was perceived as progressively Dinka dominated, with Bahr el Ghazal elders taking centre stage. While this tendency was already obvious before my departure from Juba in July 2014, it was later much reinforced.43

At the same time, it is important to note that Salva Kiir during these critical months managed to contain the Greater Bahr el Ghazal community from large-scale ethnic mobilization against the Nuer. If the Dinka hardliners who hailed from his community had got a free hand, it is likely that the atrocities in Juba would have been repeated nationwide, in a scenario one could honestly compare with Rwanda. Although the atrocities that did occur were bad enough, this did not happen. Nevertheless, the way both leaders rallied their followers and sustained their backing is a central issue. Both, in the end, used ethnicity as a basis for continued support.

That both leaders signed on to commitments that they would not keep came as no surprise. Both had often been opportunistic. If commitments had a higher price than expected they could be broken. And as mentioned above, ‘tactical avoidance’ was a trait of President Kiir, one that, with the crisis, became much worse, as IGAD leaders and the UN would discover. But changing positions was more familiar to Sudanese traditional political culture than South Sudanese liberators would like to acknowledge. In this tradition, as the Southerners themselves complained many times, agreements were interim arrangements subject to renegotiation, depending on what seemed convenient at the time.44

After signing agreements on the cessation of hostilities, for example, government forces and the SPLM/A-IO continued fighting. When they promised humanitarian access, they did not follow through, at least according to their agreements. Among the leadership on both sides there appeared an inability or unwillingness to prevent atrocities. Key perpetrators were known to both leaders; none were held accountable. Officers were not even suspended pending investigation. This failure to act could hardly be interpreted as anything other than condoning such actions. Impunity prevailed.

The intransigence of the two parties was among the reasons for the mediators’ insistence on broadening the peace process. Other stakeholders might have a greater interest in peace, and would push for fundamental reforms. But this strategy gave both sides a new excuse to delay, and it ultimately complicated the talks. A dilemma in all peace negotiations is the parties’ interest in retaining control and avoiding anything that can hinder their chance of getting a deal on their own terms.45 Yet inclusiveness could be critical for sustaining peace in the long run.

It was in this landscape the IGAD-mediators were navigating. To achieve peace, signatures on paper would not suffice; the South Sudanese leaders were in for a much longer journey.

Sustainable peace: A longer journey

Waging peace in South Sudan was a multi-layered and complex process. Tensions undermining peace and national unity often had deeper roots, but the lack of willingness to deal with them in the past had made them worse. Furthermore, South Sudanese leaders had themselves contributed to widening the divisions in the country by playing the ethnic card in their own competition for power.

A basic aim in nation-building, one would assume, should be to avoid tearing a country further apart through ethnic politics. Divisive politics has consequences. When people have a lot of grievances and no political influence, they are more likely to resort to violence. Even statistical evidence collected by the SPLM Secretariat itself showed palpable dissatisfaction. Jok Madut Jok published a stark warning about this only a fortnight before the outbreak of violence in December 2013 and asked what happens:

when people become so poor, desperate, unable to speak, insecure – and above all loose [sic] trust in their leadership? Such is the stuff with which civil unrest, protests, and even outright revolutions are made. The political leadership in South Sudan should not play with fire.46

But they all did. At the same time, processes that could have helped unify the nation and give people a say were not prioritized.47 To successfully wage peace going forward, therefore, it will be essential to avoid repeating these mistakes. In the South Sudanese environment today, marred by newly exacerbated ethnic divisions, it is even more important to prevent such policies from gaining new momentum. In the IGAD talks, two of the most important reform processes were the new constitution and national reconciliation, both essential for building and sustaining peace in a divided South Sudan.

A country is not a nation

With the goal of providing the young nation with a democratic permanent constitution, the Transitional Constitution outlines four stages through which that process should happen.48 These include a National Constitutional Review Commission, National Constitutional Conference, the National Legislature, and the assent of the President. The drafting and adoption of the Transitional Constitution had been rushed and divisive, granting the President sweeping powers, and without consultation of all stakeholders; the process for the permanent document was meant to be different.

Owing to initial delays, appointments to the National Constitution Review Commission on 9 January 2012 were made haphazardly at the last minute. Although the chairman, the late Professor Akolda Maan Tier and his deputy were seen as impartial, there were complaints about lack of representation of civil society, non-partisan stakeholders and technical experts.49 Under terms of the Transitional Constitution they had only one year to submit a report to the President, much less than constitutional processes had enjoyed elsewhere in Africa. Although this was clearly linked to the schedule for the next elections, from a nation-building perspective these timelines were a missed opportunity for South Sudan.50

The legitimacy of a constitution is of the greatest importance, and can be assured only by the greatest possible degree of public participation.51 We advocated broad consultation across the country. But although his committee would consult the people as stipulated, the chairman considered that consultation at the county level, involving the grass roots, would be difficult, referring to the high levels of illiteracy. This was contrary to experience elsewhere on the continent, where grass root-consultations had worked well, and indeed in polls and focus group research in South Sudan.52

Despite extension of its timelines, the National Constitutional Review was caught up in the overall political paralysis of the country in 2013. The peace agreement will provide a golden opportunity to change the constitutional review process entirely, so that the constitution emerges as a document around which people can rally as citizens of a nation, above and beyond their ethnic identity. For that to happen they need to have a say and to contribute to it. The process should not be another missed opportunity for nation-building.

One topic that will be at the centre of discussion is federalism, which emerged as a very contentious issue in the IGAD negotiations.53 As Douglas Johnson has pointed out, federalism has meant different things to different people at different times.54 John Garang, for example, used the term ‘confederation’. It was only when South Sudan got its independence, however, that the demand for federalism was revived, this time by Equatorian politicians feeling marginalized by larger Nilotic ethnic groups.

For this discussion to have any meaning, however, federalism needs to be defined. There are many models, with varying degrees of devolution of powers. For example, according to Johnson ‘The SPLM/A-In-Opposition’s proposal of making 21 states along the 1956 boundaries of the South’s districts … [would create] … weak states unable to challenge or restrain whoever holds power in central government.’55

Increasingly, federalism has been associated with ethnicity. As a woman from Malakal said in a meeting after the explosion of violence: ‘how can we live side-by-side with these people again?’, ‘Let them stay in their own area,’ was her solution.56 This sort of federalism would mean segregation rather than national unity.

It is impossible to build a nation out of a broken society that has not dealt with its past. When people primarily identify themselves with their ethnic group, and not the nation, ethnicity rather than the larger common good will drive their actions. While there were positive signs of an emerging national identity earlier,57 the reverse happened during the recent crisis. And priority of ethnic identity will prevail, whatever the content of a peace agreement, unless very deliberate policies are put in place to counteract it.

National reconciliation

Amnesty and accommodation, through political positions, military rank or other forms of benefit, is not true reconciliation. As Jacob J. Akol, editor of Gurtong writes:

Re-instating the situation before mid December 2013 and do little or nothing would be to bury our heads in the sand and continue the vicious cycle of rebellion, destruction, revenge and counter revenge even at a much larger scale.58

As Douglas Johnson says, a peace agreement that merely tinkers with the structures of government and the distribution of offices will not address the trauma that threatens to divide South Sudanese from one another. For peace to be sustained, major changes are needed in the way the leadership deals with the drivers of conflict, and in processes of reconciliation between communities and adversaries.

In the past, reconciliation did not have high priority in the SPLM-leadership. These provisions in the CPA were virtually ignored,59 and tactical avoidance prevailed. Long-standing grievances between the SPLA and certain communities, and between opposing communities, remained largely unaddressed. If peace is to be achieved going forward, reconciliation not only at the political level between the parties in conflict and its leaders, but also in relation to these tensions, will be critical. However, reconciliation will have to occur in tandem with the healing and accountability processes.

They include not only the 1991 Bor massacres and the multiple rebellions of different cadres during the 1990s and post-election periods, but also the 1982–3 Kokora-violence in Juba,60 participation in ‘clearing’ areas for Khartoum’s oil-production in multiple locations, the mutual grievances of various ethnic minorities and the SPLA, and post CPA-conflicts between cattle herders and Nilotic communities and the Equatorians. These ‘ghosts of the past’ are conflict drivers, fuelling fresh conflict. If they are not confronted, violence – given its cyclical nature – will reappear.

Many have been of the opinion that the government itself cannot lead such a reconciliation process; it has to be home grown and independent.61 In some cases it was the state – or the SPLA – that would stand to be accused. This would likely be the case for example for minority communities such as the Fertit, the Shilluk, the Murle. Mutual mistrust had led to grave violence in the past. Among the Equatorians, land grabbing and abusive behaviour against their communities by SPLA commanders were the concern. It would be difficult for a national reconciliation committee led by the government to be able to handle such issues with credibility.

When the President appointed instead the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation, headed by Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, there were no direct links to the government. The committee was dominated by church representatives and civil society, probably modeled on the earlier people-to-people processes in South Sudan. The committee soon faced difficulties, however, with lack of resources, inadequate capacity and question marks about its composition. Before the crisis erupted in December 2013, the committee had barely started its work.

Soon after the initial violence, the new Vice President James Wani Igga also saw the opportunity to play politics with reconciliation, and launched what many regarded as a competing initiative. While he had been asked by the President to coordinate the government’s efforts, his initiative looked more and more like a strategy for political rallying. The plan was to combine a major reconciliation conference with a general amnesty. If anything, this looked much like a repetition of the past, and his National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation did not move forward.

The most recent fighting has not only torn the social fabric of society, but also further aggravated multiple grievances and tensions between communities and escalated local conflicts. It is this cumulative impact of the past and the present that now complicates the efforts of achieving peace. As Professor Jok Madut Jok says:

The war experience, dating back over several decades, may appear unrelated to the immediate triggers of new violence, but is actually what draws groups of people into a new conflict, making any new conflict spread quickly, and more vicious in its brutality.62

As the conflict wore on, relations deteriorated to almost unprecedented levels, with the cycle of revenge killings spreading to communities uninvolved in the initial conflict. As Jok also underscores, peace will not return if people are not collectively given a chance to face the history of violence head on, to engage in dialogue about the communal conflicts that have wrecked ethnic relations and address the relationship between the state and the citizens. Lessons learned from elsewhere show that there is never a shortcut to reconciliation and restoration of social cohesion.63

In the IGAD talks, the parties agreed to establish a National Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, mandated to create a historical record of human rights violations, including the identification of victims and perpetrators, recording the experiences of victims, investigating the causes of conflict (and making recommendations on how to prevent the repetition of conflict) and facilitating local and national reconciliation and healing. In addition, there were discussions about compensation and reparation for victims.64

As South Sudanese scholars themselves have pointed out, it is not possible to reconcile people by merely telling them to forget the past and start a new page. Difficult histories need to be unearthed, facts of who did what to whom have to be considered, even if that does not result in punitive justice, as some communities may be willing to come to terms with their loss, if someone admitted culpability and expressed remorse.65

Traditional customary practices can contribute to reconciliation and healing, but also compensation mechanisms that can ensure justice for aggrieved communities, individually and collectively. Nevertheless, as the African Union Peace and Security Council stated as early as 30 December 2013, the gravity of the crimes and atrocities committed in South Sudan during the civil war would require a credible judicial mechanism.66

The African Union Commission of Inquiry, chaired by former President Obasanjo, was tasked with setting the course for this process. The Commission of Inquiry started its work on 12 March 2014, and was mandated to:

investigate the human rights violations and other abuses committed during the armed conflict in South Sudan, and make recommendations on the best way and means to ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing among all South Sudanese communities.67

After the UNMISS Human Rights Investigation Report was released,68 including our recommendation for an international process of accountability for the grave violations, atrocities and crimes committed against civilians, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon recommended to the Security Council on 12 May that a Special/Hybrid Court for South Sudan be considered,69 pending also the outcome of the AU Commission of Inquiry.70

At the time of my departure from UNMISS, the Commission had not yet submitted its report to the chair of the African Union. Nevertheless, it was clear to me that the gravity of atrocities committed meant that reconciliation would not be possible unless accountability was served. To many, peace would be a reality only when justice was in process, whether through inter-communal processes or international accountability measures. It was also clear to me that any attempt at skirting this responsibility, and relying on impunity for the perpetrators who had committed atrocities during the civil war would likely imply a return of new violence later, revenging what had happened to the victims, or in other ways making sure that the crimes were not forgotten. The cyclical pattern would continue.

As I left the region, I wondered whether South Sudanese leaders would be willing to do what was needed to save their country, not only from fighting, but also from failing. This meant not only achieving peace on paper, but also to achieve sustained peace; refrain from playing divisive politics, implement genuine and inclusive processes of reconciliation and healing, as well as constitution-making, and end impunity. Only then would South Sudan stand a chance of becoming a nation. I was not sure.