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THE LEADERSHIP
The power struggle within the ruling party had now escalated. The two main protagonists were Salva Kiir Mayardit, chairman of the SPLM and President of South Sudan, and Riek Machar Teny Dhourgon, his deputy. They were the prime drivers behind the conflict. But there were other players in this game, and many different agendas. It is in these dynamics we find the origins of the political crisis in 2013.
The two foes
Salva Kiir was catapulted into the chairmanship of the SPLM/A following Dr John Garang’s death in 2005. At Garang’s funeral the Archbishop of Juba, Joseph Marona, said that Moses had led them out of Egypt to the Promised Land. Now it was up to Joshua to lead the people through the difficulties that lay ahead.1 The prelate called on all Southerners to support their Joshua, Salva Kiir, in his important mission. South Sudanese adopted this narrative. But who was Joshua?
Salva Kiir
I had known Salva Kiir since 1998, when he led an SPLM delegation to Oslo. Norway had for many years been sympathetic to the Southern Sudanese. NGOs such as Norwegian People’s Aid and Norwegian Church Aid had over decades of tireless work laid a solid foundation for this engagement. I was minister for international development and had taken on the role of chairing the group coordinating efforts to end the civil war, the IGAD Partners Forum. Salva, as we called him, was then deputy chairman of the SPLM/A and Chief of General Staff.
When Salva Kiir first walked into the room, a tall, lean man – he appeared more modest and less imposing than Dr John, quickly taking charge of discussions, speaking softly and with less eloquence than his chairman. But he still got his message across. Later I would meet Salva in the field on several occasions. While my engagement in the peace efforts necessarily brought me much closer to Dr John, Salva’s visit to Oslo began a friendship that would last more than 15 years.
Salva and Dr John were the only survivors of the core group that founded the SPLM/A. Garang’s death in 2005 was for Salva a significant personal loss. He certainly felt the weight that had suddenly been put on his shoulders.
Although he was long thought to prefer independence over unity, Salva pledged to follow in Garang’s footsteps, pursuing the vision of a New Sudan, and working diligently to implement the CPA. However, if unity had ever been attractive, its allure was certainly fading by the day as soon as their visionary leader passed away.
Salva Kiir knew that unity of the Southerners was essential for the referendum to be achieved. This would characterize his presidency. He pursued vigorously his ‘Big Tent’ approach. As we have seen, this led to the Juba Declaration of 8 January 2006, laying the basis for unifying virtually all militia and splinter groups with the interim government.
Like many leaders of the SPLM/A, Salva did not have higher education, but was trained at the Military Academy of the SAF before defecting. He was less interested in politics, negotiating processes and international diplomacy, preferring to remain in the background dealing with military affairs. Despite misgivings, and his own frustrations, Salva stayed loyal to Dr John. Events in Rumbek in November 2004, widely depicted as a coup attempt or mutiny against Garang, were in the end about the conduct of leadership rather than grasping for it. Others around Salva pushed him. But this was still the most serious leadership crisis in more than ten years, and it had a lasting impact.
While Salva’s election to succeed Dr John was undisputed, he had expected a contest. His suspicion of some cadres’ loyalty continued throughout his chairmanship and presidency.
Salva’s background and training as a military intelligence officer, and tendency to be sceptical, had made him circumspect; he avoided conflict and confrontation, preferring indirect communication. Trust came slowly, usually only after years. Early on, his closest associates were from a variety of backgrounds, but in later years he relied more on his own community and kin, assistants, bodyguards and a few friends who had been with him for decades.
In his private life Salva was quiet, almost an introvert, and strikingly deferential, with an aura of dignity and humility. He was commonly regarded as honest and modest. I remember meeting him in Juba in 2005, after Dr John’s death. He had let Garang’s widow remain in the ‘Governor’s House’, while he stayed in a much simpler residence; it had just rained, and buckets were positioned in the dilapidated living room. Salva remained in that house for several years, with only minor changes to its interior.
Here he would gather those closest to him. A night owl, he would play cards, tell stories about the years of struggle, crack jokes, and drink whisky or wine. As a guest I sensed nostalgia. Several times he told me that the struggle had been easy compared to the challenges of running a country.
Within the movement Salva Kiir was respected rather than feared. One rarely saw him angry. He often spoke of having personally intervened to stop abuse and mistreatment of soldiers and civilians during the struggle. But it was difficult to reconcile that response with the inaction he at times showed as president against perpetrators and people who abused their authority.
As president he focused mostly on big, strategic issues, relations with Sudan, national security and defence. Salva seldom went into details. Giving speeches was a duty, not a pleasure, and his limited direct communication to the people or through the media made everyone wonder what was going on. Remoteness undermined his credibility and authority.
Salva was slow to make decisions and often reflected on possible long-term implications, a characteristic of intelligence officers. Rumination could last weeks, even months. It has been said that slow decision making is typical of the Dinka chief,2 who is supposed to listen to people, hear their complaints, reflect, and hold his own counsel. The longer it takes for a decision to be revealed, the more independent the chief is thought to be, and the wiser his eventual ruling. Salva would listen and nod to all the delegations coming to see him, even at times saying ‘yes, I agree’. But that never implied that a decision was made. The final decision, if one came, might be different. Actions spoke louder than words.
Some decisions, however, cannot be put off. Waiting too long can limit options and force emergency decisions in haste. This was certainly the case in South Sudan, especially because the capacity for implementation was so limited. Promises were made, but not acted upon. This was a problem not only with the President: it was typical of Southern Sudanese in office. Implementation was very slow. The President also had a tendency to walk back on positions he had taken. If a decision proved more costly politically than had been foreseen, and it was opportune to change a position, he would do so with a straight face. A close adviser calls this character trait ‘tactical avoidance’.3 But it meant that no decision seemed final, and one seldom knew what ‘policy’ really was.
Over time, Salva Kiir’s modus operandi started to undermine an assessment of him as basically a good man who wanted to do the right thing. While many problems were attributed to the team around him and to ‘bad advisers’, confidence in his leadership eroded. Old tensions within the SPLM leadership resurfaced. Lack of access to the President, including for some ministers, did not help matters. He also seemed more available to community leaders of various ethnic groups than to his own SPLM colleagues. Salva trusted almost no one, but appeared to do little to reach out to these cadres and inspire trust in himself.
The mystery of who had access to the President and when was often blamed on gatekeepers. But he did use access as a tool in the power dynamics around him. This is not uncommon in Africa; it ensures that no one can claim permanent proximity to power and keeps people on their toes. As an observer said, ‘they are like clouds, and they shift almost daily’. There were a few with constant presence in Salva’s office, but whether they constituted an inner circle is a different story.
Any Special Representative needs to establish good working relations with the President. While commitments of close cooperation were made on both sides, and collaboration initially was good, it was not always easy. The complicated dynamics surrounding Salva affected all interlocutors, national and international, myself included. When the conflict broke out in December 2013, our relations were probably saved only due to personal ties from decades back.
Riek Machar
Riek Machar Teny was a different character altogether, almost the opposite of Salva Kiir. A Nuer, he was charismatic and cavalier, a force of nature. He could rush into decisions too quickly, but came across as shrewder and more calculating; rough around the edges. A big man – in every way – he would dominate a room. Riek could be flashy, with expensive watches and the latest gadgets, although he toned things down during his last years as vice president. Indeed, the two leaders seemed to be opposite numbers.
Action-oriented, and eager to show his capacity to lead, Riek wanted to handle problems on the spot, big or small, and particularly when he had an audience. He could resemble a different kind of big chief, sitting in his office or compound with an entourage, listening to complaints and predicaments for hours on end, or showing visitors that he could fix things, picking up one of his many phones to give instructions. Although he was familiar with the principle of delegating authority, he often abused it, giving orders about rather trivial matters; he was often accused of micro-managing. Sources in the SPLM/A-In Opposition, Riek’s most recent political vehicle, have also pointed to a tendency to get involved in things that had already been delegated, or that were far too detailed for his level.
But this flaw also had a positive side: people would resort to him when they were tired of waiting for a decision elsewhere, and they would often go away relieved that something finally had been done.
I first met Riek in 1998 when I was visiting Khartoum. After meetings with Sudan’s senior officials, they insisted that I meet him too in his capacity as president of the Southern States Coordinating Council and senior advisor to President Bashir. Machar had taken up this position after his breakaway faction of the SPLM/A, under various rubrics, had failed militarily to overthrow John Garang.
My suspicion about the extravagance of Riek’s titles was confirmed when I was taken to his office. Unlike other officials I had met he operated from a small colonial-era house in a back alley away from the Palace. There was not a single paper or file in sight. There were no books, no computer or any other equipment, a rarity for an academic like him, and no activity. He seemed to have nothing to do.
Machar was soon – or already – looking for ways to get out of this dead end. But all possible avenues seemed to require rapprochement with Garang, his arch-rival, with whom he had been at odds for a decade, with disastrous consequences for the SPLM/A. In his empty office he had little to bargain with, and in 2000 Riek decamped to re-establish his own militia group, the Sudan People’s Defense Forces/Democratic Front (SPDF). Only after he had signed a reconciliation agreement with Garang in 2002 did I meet him again.
By then the Norwegian Government and others had been actively engaged in promoting reconciliation for quite a long time; conferences included as many as possible of the seven political groupings that had come to terms with Khartoum. A great deal of work went into the reconciliation process with Riek.4 Many were involved, including church groups, friends of the SPLM/A abroad, and individuals on all sides. The Americans and General Sumbeiywo, the Kenyan Special Envoy and Chief Negotiator of IGAD, were kept informed. Agreement between Riek Machar and Garang would likely not have happened without such intervention and support.5
In return for unity Riek Machar demanded the second position in the SPLM/A, above Salva Kiir, then Garang’s deputy. This was denied him; even his accession as number three was controversial. At the Leadership Council’s meeting in Yei in November 2003, this reportedly provoked one of the most heated debates the SPLM leadership ever had.6 Salva had initially opposed Riek’s return in any leading position, let alone as number three. Deng Alor and Nhial Deng were among those arguing that Riek should be made number three as a way of promoting southern unity.7 After hours of discussion, James Wani Igga, the current third-place holder, agreed to relinquish his position, and Garang ruled accordingly. It is against this background that the 2015 power-sharing negotiations chaired by IGAD should be seen.
It was only after the CPA was signed in 2005 and the interim Government of Southern Sudan was formed that I really got to know Riek Machar, the person behind the reputation. During this period I visited Sudan and Southern Sudan regularly. Salva was commuting between Juba and Khartoum, and there were suspicions that Riek was trying to build up his personal powerbase. He was very active, ran day-to-day affairs of government, and acted for the President whenever Salva was away.
Riek Machar came across as intelligent and sharp. He had an academic PhD, yet he was also practical, and one of the few in the leadership who tried to use basic management tools, made sure that records were made of meetings, and kept substantial files. Whereas Salva did not always do well in selling himself to foreign audiences, and seemed anyway not to care, Riek made a real effort, and seemed effective and credible to Western eyes, at least superficially.
Although as Special Representative my primary contact would always be with the President himself, Riek became UNMISS’s most important interlocutor. A Joint Implementation Committee, set up to ensure that problems were dealt with at the ministerial level, and co-chaired by the two of us, was critical for sorting out problems between the Mission and the government. I realized from the outset that I would have a challenging balancing act, and made sure to brief both the President and the Vice President about issues of concern, lest any perception of bias take hold.
Riek had long been widely regarded as ambitious, always eyeing the top job, and was reputed to be power hungry, even Machiavellian. No one had forgotten his attempted coup against Garang in 1991, which to many seemed an act of personal betrayal. Worst of all, in this view, was his having joined hands with the enemy, Khartoum. Given this history of perceived flip-flopping, most SPLM/A leaders distrusted him. His return to the movement had been strained and formal; feelings remained raw. A clear sign of tension was the Transitional Constitution’s rules for succession. Article 102 (2) stated that in the event of a vacancy the Vice President would assume the presidency for a maximum of 60 days before the governing party made a permanent appointment.8
The Bor massacre of 1991 – in which Riek’s Nuer forces killed many Dinka – followed him like a shadow. The Bor Dinka waited two decades for an apology, which he finally offered in April 20129 and repeated on several occasions later. But their leaders told me that this had not been done in the right way: Riek had never gone to Bor. Nor was a formal apology ever conveyed to the SPLM/A. In other words, Riek appeared not to have been forgiven, and the wound continued to bleed, after more than 20 years. Indeed, the 1991 massacre would play an important role in the crisis of 2013–15.
Although Riek appeared to understand better than most the way international diplomacy works and the ‘do’s and don’ts’ of national leadership, he still made remarkable errors of judgement. One was to aver publicly in July 2013 that it was time for the President to leave office, and that he would contest a consequent election.10 This could not be an off-hand remark, but a calculated step on his part. But he did not appear to understand its gravity. To many observers this indicated that the reputation for impatience and hunger for power was deserved, his interest after all being first and foremost Riek Machar, and much less the country.
Digging deeper: Long-standing tensions within the movement
Those closest to John Garang in the early years of the SPLM/A were often called ‘Young Turks’11 or, later, and unflatteringly by various factionalists, the ‘Garang Boys’, and were from many ethnic backgrounds. The Garang Boys were among the most ideologically focused members of the SPLM, engaging with liberation movements elsewhere and learning from them. They comprised most of the SPLM’s team during the CPA negotiations in Kenya, and were well known to international audiences. Leading members were Pagan Amum, Deng Alor Kuol, Nhial Deng Nhial, Oyay Deng Ajak and Gier Choung Aloung. Among others, Kosti Manibe and Cirino Hiteng Ofuho, never SPLA commanders, were also in the group.12 Majak D’Agoot, a Dinka from Twic East, although Salva Kiir’s adjutant in 1982–5, was later more closely associated with the Garang Boys. Most of them became critical of Salva as president and were detained for several months during the crisis that broke out in mid December 2013.
Paul Malong Awan, Kuol Manyang Juuk, Daniel Awet Akot, Oboto Mamur Mete and Pieng Deng Pieng all belonged to the mainstream SPLM/A.13 In conversations in Juba most did not consider themselves Garang Boys. During the 2013 crisis they and several Garang Boys in the Army remained with Salva Kiir, while those characterized more as ‘politicians’ broke ranks.
An important group of cadres and commanders hailed from the Nuba Mountains and Southern Kordofan, Southern Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and Khartoum. They too were closely associated with Dr John, having joined the Movement as early as 1985–6, attracted by his commitment to fight for justice for all marginalized peoples of Sudan. They did not constitute a separate faction, and if anything resented that many comrades seemed to be Southern nationalists, primarily wanting independence for the South. Most important among this group were Yousif Kowa, Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu, Malik Agar, Yasir Arman and the former Foreign Minister Mansour Khalid.
Relations were tensest between those in Garang’s inner circle and those furthest away, often from the Greater Upper Nile, and mostly Nuer. Riek Machar and Lam Akol, a prominent Shilluk, who openly split from Garang in August 1991, were followed by William Nyoun Bany and Gordon Koang Chol, and later by Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, a Dinka from Bahr el Ghazal. This ‘Nasir faction’ was named after the Nasir Declaration, which preceded the split, advocating for Southern independence, and criticizing Dr John’s reform agenda, but competition for power was likely their primary motive.14 Nasir in Upper Nile State soon became the headquarters for Riek Machar and his opposition forces. Most of the faction’s followers were Nuer, but during the 1990s almost all broke ranks with Riek, including Lam Akol, and started their own militias or parties.15 Animosity between the Dinka and Nuer fuelled a revolving door into and out of the SPLM/A, at times involving deals with Khartoum. As we have seen, although Riek returned to the SPLM/A in 2002 with only a few soldiers, he was still a political force to be reckoned with.
A third faction developed in consequence of the leadership dynamics. The Bahr el Ghazal community came to believe they were bearing the brunt of the conflict but without the influence they deserved.16 People who saw themselves as core SPLM, but were disgruntled and disagreed with Garang’s leadership style, also joined in.17 By the mid 1990s Salva Kiir himself felt increasingly sidelined, and the so-called ‘Yei faction’, named for the town where he was stationed, emerged. Instrumental roles were played by Bona Malwal and Dominic Dim, both widely considered close to the ruling party in Khartoum.18 From this group came encouragement for a coup against Garang in November 2004 after a rumour had circulated that Salva would be replaced by Nhial Deng Nhial as second in command. A common denominator was opposition to Garang’s vision of a ‘New Sudan’; they were mainly separatists. Some, such as Aleu Ayenyi Alieu and Telar Deng, would play important roles in the 2013 crisis.19
When telling the story of 2004, Salva Kiir has stressed that the crisis was triggered by his dissatisfaction with Garang’s leadership, not to stage a coup. He blames lack of communication and rumour mongering by ‘hardliners’ trying to split the Movement. They had all crossed swords with Garang, and wanted Salva to contest the leadership.20 Dominic Dim and Salva Mathok were in Yei at the time, the former reportedly claiming that Salva already had taken his decision to make his move against Chairman John Garang and that others now had to decide whom they would support.21
Disaster was averted by timely intervention. Several delegations visited Salva in Yei,22 and although he still feared for his safety and thought he was about to be arrested, he agreed to meet Dr John.23 At Garang’s house in Rumbek, sources say, a true reconciliation took place. The subsequent commanders’ meeting ended in a unified SPLM/A, ready to sign the peace agreement with Sudan.
The ruling party in Khartoum, the NCP, had a hand in the Yei crisis. Some Southerners were on Khartoum’s payroll in 2004, and onwards; – information that is corroborated24 from NCP and other sources.25 In particular they wanted to sabotage the CPA and prevent Garang’s accession to the First Vice Presidency of Sudan, which was an integral part of the deal.26 Many in Sudan’s military-security establishment saw Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ and the structural reforms in the CPA as threats to their power base. They would be happy to base a final agreement on the Machakos Protocol and proceed directly to self-determination.27
History repeats itself
When analysing the reasons for the 2013 crisis, the best starting point is therefore not 1991, but 2004.28 Subsequent developments in the Movement were almost cyclical, with the same characters involved in the struggle for power and control in the party and, later, in the country. The most surprising thing is how little changed, despite the achievement of independence. The lack of genuine reconciliation led to deepening mistrust rather than to a strengthened sense of common purpose. With the last crisis, the SPLM had come full circle again. Another constant was the involvement of Khartoum.
A leadership crisis was avoided when Salva Kiir became chairman of the SPLM/A in 2005.29 But Garang’s nomination of Pagan Amum for secretary-general and the return of Riek Machar as deputy chairman and number three had sown seeds of tension within the SPLM, another precursor for the 2013 conflict.
The Yei-crisis still haunted the SPLM. After Dr John’s death Bona Malwal and his network continued to push their same agenda, and those who had negotiated the CPA found themselves isolated.30 As Peter Adwok Nyaba says, the group that Garang had marginalized now surrounded his successor, Salva Kiir, and were in control.31
For Khartoum, these squabbles were very opportune. Those gaining control in the SPLM and the government wanted independence and cared little about the ‘New Sudan’.32 This suited NCP’s agenda, leaving an impression of collusion with the Islamists in Khartoum. In relation to the Government of National Unity, observers would say that the SPLM was outmanoeuvred by the NCP.33 SPLM cadres complained that the CPA was being disregarded and that not bona fide members of the SPLM had more influence in the party than them.34 Several Garang Boys threw in the towel, left Sudan, and only returned much later.35 Renewed efforts were made to regain control from the Yei group.36 Rapprochement between the Garang Boys and Salva Kiir made investigations against Telar Deng Riing, Aleu Ayenyi Aleu37 and Lam Akol – for different reasons – possible. The first two were expelled from the SPLM in 2007, while Lam Akol says he never received formal notice. He was replaced as minister of foreign affairs in October 2007.38
It was also during this period that the SPLM suspended participation in the Government of National Unity. When they returned, it was with stronger representation of the Garang Boys. But underlying problems had still not been addressed. At the SPLM Convention in 2008 the group around Salva Kiir (and other members of the Political Bureau) attempted to replace Pagan Amum with Taban Deng, Governor of Unity State, a Nuer seen as a Salva loyalist. A thinly veiled attempt to demote Riek Machar was a proposal to have one deputy chairman from the Northern sector, and one from the Southern, which would have made Taban the highest-ranking Nuer in the SPLM.39 Salva Kiir’s group and the Garang Boys would replace Riek with James Wani Igga, who had stepped down after his return in 2002.40 It was at this point in 2008 that Riek signalled his interest in competing for the chairmanship.41 Stories were whirling about that he had been making handouts to rally support even before the convention, but this was never confirmed.
In its political appointments the SPLM mirrored the military hierarchy of the liberation struggle. The top five positions were firmly established, and a change in ranking was problematic. When Riek formally declared his candidacy against Salva Kiir, a major crisis was averted only by the last-minute intervention of the elder statesmen Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu. The elders of Greater Bahr el Ghazal also talked to the chairman.42 Both counselled against changes that could risk the unity of the South and jeopardize the referendum. This led to agreement not to vote on any of the proposals.
The more things changed, the more they remained the same. With the 2010 elections scheduled to take place in April, Salva’s group and the Garang Boys were still promoting Taban Deng, now for re-election as Governor of Unity. The SPLM in Unity State put up Angelina Teny, Riek’s wife, a seasoned politician and former official in the Ministry of Petroleum in Khartoum, for the governorship. Although Taban was senior, and hence seen as more entitled to run, another factor in his eventual nomination was others’ wish to prevent the Machar-Teny family from controlling Unity State. Nicknamed ‘Mr. 2 percent’ on the widespread assumption that most of the state’s 2 per cent of the oil revenue ended up in his pocket, Taban was unpopular. When the elections took place, and Taban was declared the winner against Angelina Teny (running as an independent), violence ensued and many people were killed. Rather than mobilization through rebellion, however, she chose the peaceful route. Her formal complaint achieved nothing, but Teny urged her supporters to eschew armed opposition and accept the result.43 It is likely that the proximity of the 2011-referendum weighed in.
The 2010 elections were mired in controversy. Some 370 members of the SPLM stood for election independently, in protest at the way the National Elections Strategy Committee had handled the nomination procedure.44 The SPLM was subsequently accused of rigging several gubernatorial races. International observers noted irregularities, but drew no firm conclusions.45 In a couple of cases the SPLA intervened violently. Rightly or wrongly, many felt marginalized and disaffected by the electoral process and its results. A resurgence of armed militia activity ensued. An ‘All Southern Sudan Political Parties Conference’ in Juba in November 2010 helped to calm things down,46 and efforts were made to bring the militias and all political parties into the fold. No faction wanted to risk blame for putting the referendum at risk. Southern Sudanese were united as they went to the polls in January 2011.
Power struggle – under Garang’s shadow
All SPLM cadres gave Salva Kiir credit for keeping South Sudanese together during the interim period. Without his leadership, independence would not have been achieved. But soon speculations were rife about the new cabinet. Many of the same old tensions in the leadership reappeared. Pagan Amum and Salva had never seen eye to eye. On Independence Day, Salva accepted Pagan’s resignation from the cabinet and party. But after others intervened, Pagan agreed to stay on as secretary-general of the SPLM and chief negotiator with Sudan.
After observing the way things worked during the interim period, people would jokingly say that Juba had not one government, but several. There were most certainly several power centres. Would this change with independence? Although the new cabinet did not imply much change, as early as September 2011 senior ministers expressed concern that ‘non-SPLM’ people appeared to be gaining influence in circles around the President. By this they meant the Yei faction and individuals perceived to be close to Khartoum. Although the status quo prevailed in the cabinet, real decision making often lay elsewhere. The impression was that a ‘kitchen cabinet’ had emerged. ‘T & T’ was the acronym applied to the presidential advisers Telar Deng Riing, an Atout Dinka from Lakes State, whose personal animosity for the Garang Boys was reciprocated, and Tor Deng Mawien, a Dinka former Governor of Warrap with a long history with the NCP in Khartoum and only recent membership of the SPLM. They were easy targets, however, and their enemies may have overstated their influence.
Although he had maintained the status quo in the cabinet, Salva Kiir was soon frustrated; he privately accused many of the ministers of not delivering,47 and even questioned their loyalty. They repaid the compliment: on numerous occasions one heard ministers, particularly Garang Boys, badmouth and belittle the President behind his back. They criticized him for failing in his political leadership, performing poorly abroad and listening to the wrong people. As for the latter, an old SPLM official quoted Garang: ‘If the mosquitos get into your net, you are the one to be blamed, not the mosquitos.’48 While this likely referred to Khartoum sympathizers in the South, the interviewee was talking about the network around Salva.
A dangerous slip of the tongue?
During this period it was widely assumed that Salva Kiir would run for another term in 2015. At a dinner he hosted in August 2011 for Thabo Mbeki and Pierre Buyoya, conversation turned to governance in Africa. Deng Alor, Kosti Manibe, Paul Mayom Akec and Cirino Hiteng were among those present. They asked for advice about how South Sudan as a new country could avoid mistakes.49 Thabo Mbeki reportedly emphasized that the issues they raised were about leadership, and the conversation turned to African leaders’ renewing their presidential terms unconstitutionally.
Salva Kiir said that by 2015 he would have been in power for ten years. That was enough; he would not run again.50 Mbeki responded that many had said the same, and had changed their minds; he would not be surprised if the President had a different view in due course. Salva insisted he was serious. The ministers were surprised. Deng Alor shared this information confidentially with two other high-ranking comrades in the SPLM Political Bureau. He wanted to see what could be done to change Salva’s mind or find a solution that would not destabilize the country.51
Whether Salva’s avowal was off-hand, or designed to test the loyalty of the cadres, or gauge reactions, is difficult to tell. Others had heard him say such things privately in the past, when he talked of his desire to return to his village and the simple life. This had not been taken seriously. Saying it in a setting like this was different, in a formal dinner in the presence of two former presidents. Whatever the case, the subject of succession was no longer taboo. When it later became clear that Salva indeed intended to run again, Deng Alor was blamed for misleading others, and when he tried to explain his motives, he was rebuffed.52
The ‘factions’ from 2004 started emerging again, but tensions with Khartoum kept things in check. The ministerial corruption crisis in June 2012 changed this.53 Salva characteristically avoided direct confrontation. Rather than legal proceedings, or calling in ministers one by one, confidentially sharing what he knew about their malfeasance, demanding reimbursement, and pursuing those who did not cooperate, he chose a different route. Repercussions from the debacle continued for months. But a crisis of confidence had made relations between the President and many ministers even worse, and may have been a first precursor of the 2013 crisis.
However, it was when the leadership debated the constitution of the SPLM as a political party that the most severe tensions surfaced. The Political Parties Act had been passed in March 2012,54 and the SPLM had to be registered, meaning in turn that a SPLM Convention should be held. This was originally planned for April or May,55 and would involve elections for the party leadership. Members of the SPLM Political Bureau and the secretariat of the Party expressed frustration over delays in drafting a party constitution and other relevant documents. Few meetings were called. Repeated appeals to Salva Kiir as chairman to speed up the process were not heeded.
Blame also fell on the secretary general, Pagan Amum, for weak management of party affairs and squandering resources. But with regard to the latest delays, Pagan had appealed several times to Salva to convene the party organs so that registration of the SPLM could take place.56 On 21 June Salva Kiir finally ordered formation of four committees, including members of the SPLM Political Bureau, to prepare this process. Time passed. When the committees eventually got down to work, disagreement emerged. All the issues were in one way or another related to the leadership.
These included whether voting for the chairmanship should be by secret ballot or a show of hands; whether the chairman of the party should be permitted to nominate the list of members for appointment to the Political Bureau; whether the National Liberation Council would elect members of the politburo and the deputy chairman of the party, instead of having the chairman appoint them; and whether the chairman would have the mandate to appoint 5 per cent of the delegates to the National Convention, thus giving him greater control over its outcome. While 5 per cent may not seem much, these votes could be very important if selected carefully.
Salva Kiir wanted to retain the powers granted him in the existing party constitution. The other two main factions in the SPLM, Riek Machar and his allies and the Garang Boys wanted the mooted changes, and they tabled amendments accordingly, which they depicted as democratizing. The party secretariat had already got permission to consult the grassroots, a move championed by the deputy secretary general, Anne Itto.
Consultations were carried out all over the country in June-August 2012. Party cadres travelled to their constituencies and participated. Surveys showed widespread dissatisfaction with the SPLM and the government. The leadership expressed shock, but to many of us it was not surprising. In all 10 states and close to 20 counties, we had contacts with local authorities, civil society and citizens. There was a lot of disappointment and discontent. People did not see the dividends of peace and independence. Opinion polls also confirmed this.57 Predictably, too, the results of the consultation became ammunition in the internal power struggle. Some were accused for orchestrating the outcome to put the President in a negative light; others used the result to point fingers at him.
As we have seen, fundamental reforms were not implemented, and performance of critical state functions was slow. This was owed in part to extremely weak government structures,58 but it was also the result of a dysfunctional leadership team. Paralysis at the highest levels could not continue if South Sudan was to become a successful state. As SRSG, I had to get involved personally to try to move things forward.
I pressed for a retreat for the SPLM leadership, to address internal tensions and various issues of governance.59 The first time I discussed this with the President was in July 2012. From my one-on-one-conversations with the top four of the SPLM-leadership there was full support, and repeated attempts were made for the retreat to happen. Three times tentative dates in early 2013 were agreed with the President,60 but the retreat never took place.
Comrades on a mission
Other attempts were made to bring the leadership together. In August 2012 James Hoth Mai, Taban Deng Gai, and Ambassador Ezekiel Gatkuoth Lul met informally and agreed that a dialogue between Riek and Salva was needed. While all three were Nuer, they warned Riek against contesting the chairmanship of the SPLM. The intention was to prevent the issue from becoming a problem. Taban discussed the need for such a process with the President, who agreed; Tor Deng was his contact point.61 James Hoth Mai eventually brought the two leaders together for an inconclusive discussion that lasted three or four hours.62
In late 2012/early 2013, with Salva’s and Riek’s agreement, an informal group of three met regularly to discuss succession issues.63 A possible compromise was discussed, by which the President would be re-elected in 2015, resign the chairmanship of the SPLM at the convention in 2018, and step aside at the election of 2020. But it was not clear what the President himself wanted to do. Riek, on the other hand, began talking to SPLM leaders individually, criticizing Salva. The President and his entourage knew that such conversations were taking place; National Security was monitoring.
When news broke that succession was on the agenda, candidates started to declare. Riek said he would run. Others included Pagan Amum, James Wani Igga (if Salva decided not to stand), and Rebecca Nyandeng, Garang’s widow.
Relations between the President and Vice President were now increasingly affecting the government. I continued to push for a retreat. As late as 25 February 2013 I urged Salva to move ahead with this before the SPLM Political Bureau convened in March. In my view, an informal retreat could prepare the ground and prevent a major confrontation at the party meeting. The President and other members of the leadership reacted positively, but again nothing happened.
I was nonetheless encouraged when members of the leadership met to resolve the problems, with delegations going to see both Salva and Riek, who had agreed on the composition of a committee: Deng Alor (chair), Nhial Deng, Taban Deng Gai, John Luk Jok, Kosti Manibe, Paul Mayom and James Kok. Informally, Deng, Nhial and Taban were most active in trying to prevent an escalation.64
The committee met twice for consultations, then met with the Vice President alone, and finally the President. Riek Machar presented them with six criticisms of Salva Kiir, points he had listed privately with others.65 This was seen as an attempt to rally support for his bid for the chairmanship. Committee members pointed out Machar’s own responsibility for many of the problems he raised, and asked why he had decided to run against the chairman. They advised him to wait. Riek was reportedly ‘furious’ at this suggestion.66
Subsequently Salva Kiir asked Deng Alor to organize a meeting with Riek and the other declared candidates, Pagan Amum and James Wanni Igga. The meeting was held on 5 March with Deng Alor in the chair, and lasted seven hours. Harsh words were exchanged. Riek presented his encyclopedic ‘points’ against the President: inaction against corruption; tribalism – a tendency to give preference to his own community; lack of reform of the security sector; the economy; foreign relations – and the loss of support for South Sudan internationally; and lack of vision and direction for the SPLM. Riek was again told by Deng Alor and others in the meeting that he bore a major responsibility himself, having been vice president throughout the period. At the same time, Salva Kiir was also confronted by Pagan Amum and others present.
The meeting was inconclusive. Salva asked Deng to make a summary for review; the latter assumed that instructions would follow. Little is secret within the SPLM leadership, and the gist of the discussion was soon known to a number of people, including me. Vice President Wani Igga later gave a lengthy account of the meeting, its lack of protocol, and how failures in several areas were put on Salva Kiir, while in his view the blame was squarely on the disaffected participants and Riek Machar, all of whom had managed the government during the interim period.67 The meeting had a very negative impact on the dynamics in the leadership, and was in many ways a turning point for Salva.68
For anyone who had followed South Sudan since 2005, the country’s problems were pretty obvious. But this was hardly the President’s responsibility alone. During the interim period Riek Machar had chaired most cabinet meetings and had significant delegated powers.69 Senior figures in the committee agreed that they needed to convince Riek to pull back. Now he was open to a plan whereby Salva would continue until 2020, but anoint Riek as successor. Deng Alor waited in vain for an opportunity to come back to Salva Kiir and convey this.70
Be this as it may, it seemed that other leading members of the Political Bureau had encouraged Riek. Some of those hailing from Bahr el Ghazal had made negative comments about the President, including at the seven hour-meeting, and Riek might have thought he had a good chance of getting their support. If in this he misread the situation, it would not be the first time – or the last.
Tensions escalate
On 6 March 2013 Salva Kiir finally convened the Political Bureau. On the agenda were reports from the four committees; the objective was to achieve consensus on proposals for the new party constitution and other key documents. The President now announced that he would run for re-election in 2015. Riek Machar likewise declared his candidacy, reiterated his ‘points’, and said it was time for change. Pagan and Rebecca Nyandeng followed suit, but neither was seen as a serious challenger. Owing to Salva Kiir’s statement, James Wani Igga would not be a candidate. The meeting ended in failure, as members of the committee disagreed on key issues.
Salva could not be sure of the outcome from the Political Bureau after this, and he seemed to entertain alternative strategies to ensure support for his positions. He decided to convene the obsolete ‘High Command of the SPLA’ and endow it with decision making authority. With Dr John long gone, the members were Salva, James Wani Igga, Kuol Manyang Juuk, the Governor of Jonglei, Daniel Awet (deputy speaker of the legislature), and the aged Lual Diing, who was hospitalized in Nairobi. Salva turned to this group for regular strategy meetings during the months that followed.71
During March and April, there were no meetings of the leadership committee, although informal discussions continued.72 I continued to encourage them to resolve their differences, but I started to ask whether it was time for an external mediator. We discussed the possibility of bringing in leaders from the region to help, and considered several. But the committee members still thought they could handle this. I continued to urge the President to convene the leadership to sort out the problems.
On 15 April the President issued a decree stripping Riek Machar of ‘all duly delegated powers’ under the 2011 Transitional Constitution.73 From other sources I later learned of an initial plan to replace Riek with another Nuer, although this has never been confirmed.74 There had apparently been consultation with people in the Nuer community, and Salva had been warned that this could lead to instability; curtailing the Vice President’s powers seemed a more judicious route.
On the same day, Salva Kiir suspended the National Reconciliation Conference that Riek had been championing. There had been legitimate concerns in many quarters about the way he had been leading that effort, and about the danger that the national reconciliation process itself was being politicized by the power struggle between the two leaders.
Riek was left applying unsuccessfully for interviews with the President.
Go-betweens in trouble
Riek’s humiliation raised fears that the Nuer would react violently. This prompted church leaders to get involved. Gier Chuong Aloung, a government minister, called the Anglican Archbishop Daniel Deng, and asked him for help: ‘We have tried, but we have come to a dead end’, he said. On 26 April Deng, the Catholic Archbishop Paulino Lukudo, and the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, Peter Gai Lual Marrow met Salva and Riek separately, then together, at the presidency. Abel Alier accompanied the clergymen.
They briefed me immediately afterwards. The religious leaders realized that they had but scratched the surface. Despite their attempts, both Salva and Riek had recited platitudes about working together; there was no true reconciliation. Nevertheless, they all appeared on televison that night, embracing each other, and things calmed down, for a while.
According to the 2008 SPLM Constitution, the third convention of the SPLM should be held no later than 20 May 2013. The mandate of the current leadership was therefore running out. The deadline passed, however, and the whole party apparatus continued to operate without a legal basis. No one seemed to pay any attention to this, and Salva Kiir, as chairman, gave no sign of doing anything. But with the atrophy of the SPLM and the apparent conflation of party and state there was no institutional mechanism which could intervene. As a leading veteran of the SPLM put it: ‘When they needed the party to resolve their differences, they didn’t find it. The SPLM was almost dead.’75
During the first week of June, the President told me there was little likelihood of a solution to the impasse; experience showed that Riek would not be curbed. Salva cast doubt too on Deng Alor, who had been chairing the leadership meetings. I was very worried. Four days later I sat down with Deng to discuss what could be done. Should we bring in regional leaders? The Government of South Sudan had reached a political standstill, and so it seemed, had the leadership of the SPLM.
That the President had concerns about Deng Alor became clear on 17 June when he suspended the minister and Kosti Manibe on account of corruption. In a Republican Order he lifted their immunity from prosecution, and by a separate Order launched an investigation into alleged irregular transfer of $8 million to Daffy [sic] Investment Group for procurement of safes for government offices.76 The two were temporarily suspended from the cabinet, pending further investigations. The security organs had reportedly been on the case for months. The initial investigation cleared Kosti Manibe, but the case against Deng Alor was referred for criminal investigation.77
The donor community had for long requested action against corruption through investigations and prosecution. As we have seen, scandals involving hundreds of millions of dollars had come to light. If by the action against Deng Alor and Kosti Manibe the President was initiating a legal crackdown, observers would have raised fewer questions.78 But when there was no movement on bigger cases, the perception was unavoidable that the two ministers had been targeted primarily for political reasons.
Riek goes public against the President
Riek Machar certainly did not make things easier. On 4 July he gave an interview to the Guardian, explaining his decision to challenge Salva Kiir for the presidency:
Even in your own country, Margaret Thatcher had to leave after leading the Conservative party for a very long time. Tony Blair also had to leave after winning three consecutive elections and give way to the next generation.79
Theirs was an example that Salva Kiir would do well to follow, he said, while rejecting any comparison between himself and Gordon Brown. He also said:
To avoid authoritarianism and dictatorship, it is better to change. Our time is limited now. I have been serving under Salva Kiir. I did my best serving under him. I think it is time for a change now.80
This would mark Riek’s third try for leadership of the Movement.
Two days later Salva Kiir dismissed Taban Deng.81 On 7 July Joseph Nguen Monytuel, whose brother led the main militia operating in Unity, was appointed new Governor, raising hopes that the newly integrated South Sudan Liberation Movement would remain in the fold.82 This followed a similar move against Chol Tong Mayai, Governor of Lakes State, accused of sympathizing with Riek.83 Taban had recently returned from the US where, some sources allege, he had been less than loyal in his comments. It was anyway clear that Taban had lately become suspiciously closer to Riek,84 who now publicly denounced Taban’s removal as unconstitutional.85
International firefighters
In his address to the nation on Independence Day, 9 July 2013, President Salva Kiir did not even acknowledge the presence of his Vice President. Later that day the BBC aired an interview with Riek Machar, who repeated the message of the Guardian interview.86 Pagan Amum, who for the first time was absent from Independence Day celebrations, also publicly criticized the President. Thabo Mbeki and President Museveni of Uganda, in Juba for the anniversary, stayed on for an extra day, and speculation was rampant; was Museveni advising Salva Kiir to remove Machar? The truth about their conversations will probably never be known. Mbeki, for his part, met both leaders individually, advised a moratorium on public statements and an extraordinary meeting of the SPLM Political Bureau to resolve the problems. Both agreed, although no date was set.87 General Sumbeiywo of Kenya had also called on Salva, with a message from former President Daniel Arap Moi.88 Their discussion too remained confidential, but was directly linked to the leadership crisis. Sumbeiywo would return repeatedly over the next few months.
On 17 July Tedros Adhanom, the foreign minister of Ethiopia, arrived in Juba.89 I briefed him late in the evening at his hotel, shared ideas of a compromise that had been discussed in Juba, and urged him to propose a face-saving solution. We agreed that ethnic violence was very likely otherwise. Tedros recommended that Salva Kiir be re-elected as chairman of the SPLM, that he run for a new five-year term as President of South Sudan in 2015, but that he agree to step down two years early, allowing the SPLM Convention in 2018 to choose a new chairman and for early elections to be called. The SPLM Convention would guarantee fulfilment of the plan.
The idea was reportedly shared with the two leaders before Tedros met them separately to discuss it. When he expressed a fear that even the Army could split along ethnic lines the President took exception, but he accepted the plan.90 Riek likewise, in his meeting with the Foreign Minister, dismissed the possibility of ethnic violence and downplayed the gravity of the current situation. As for the succession plan, Riek would ‘think about it’. And that was the end of that. A year later, after the crisis of 2013, Tedros asked why he never got back and took the deal. Machar referred to Salva Kiir and said simply, ‘I didn’t trust him.’91
Only a few days later, on 23 July, Salva Kiir made his next move: he dismissed the entire cabinet, including Machar.92 There was now a full-blown national crisis under way. By another presidential decree, Pagan Amum, secretary general of the SPLM, was suspended, on account of mismanagement in office, with investigations to follow.93 A high-handed separate order instructed Pagan meanwhile not to travel or address the media.
A restructuring of the government had been in train for a long time. The President had initially wanted a cabinet of only 18, which would require major reorganization. Donors had also been pressing for a leaner and more effective set-up. But there was still astonishment at the wholesale housecleaning. Yet by not singling out Riek Machar, the most prominent Nuer leader, Salva hoped to avoid ethnic violence. And if the new cabinet was appointed quickly and its composition adequately balanced, the clean sweep might not be as drastic as it appeared.
Riek’s reaction made a good impression. He publicly stated that the President had acted within his authority, and that it had nothing to do with ethnicity. He worked hard to contain the Nuer community, urging them, and especially the youth, not to respond. He intended to take up his seat in the legislature. I told Riek of the favourable international response to his message of calm and his management of the crisis, and urged him to continue in the same way.
The President did not now resort to personal rule. He regularly convened the former High Command of the SPLA, and discussed next steps with James Wani Igga, Daniel Awet and Kuol Manyang Juuk. On the basis of nominations from the ten governors and the political party leaders they came up with a list of ministerial candidates.94 Contrary to widespread fears, the President did not dawdle; the new government was appointed within a week. He delivered on his long-standing goal of a smaller, more streamlined cabinet, yet one relatively representative in ideological and ethnic terms.
Several ministers were reappointed, but there were two important political differences. One was the absence of anyone associated with the two other factions, Riek Machar’s closest associates and the Garang Boys. What many of the latter had feared had now occurred; they were all out. Another change was that other parties got more prominent positions; among the newcomers were not only technocrats, but also former associates of the ruling party in Khartoum (now new members of the SPLM). Very few remained from the days of the struggle. The President told me and others that he intended to use former ministers as envoys or for special assignments.
The Garang Boys perceived the final outcome as even worse: the President had not used party organs to form the cabinet, and had not advanced the younger, second generation of SPLM cadres. This was regarded a marginalization of the ‘real’ liberators. They now turned to the National Legislative Assembly. If it rejected the new cabinet, there would be a constitutional crisis. But there the President’s whips had the upper hand, and except for Telar Deng, who was personally unpopular and was blocked from becoming minister of justice, the entire list went through. The Garang Boys and Riek Machar had to swallow a bitter pill.
It is not clear whether relations with Khartoum influenced the choice of ministers. In April, President Bashir had made his first visit to Juba since independence, and as we have seen, a page had been turned in bilateral relations. In any case, the new cabinet was greeted with enthusiasm in Khartoum. Several of the Garang Boys had been regarded as hardliners and red flags in Khartoum.95 Bashir returned twice to Juba after the change of cabinet, and several high-level meetings took place, cementing implementation of the 27 September oil agreement.96
With the benefit of hindsight, many donors regarded the dismissal of the whole cabinet as a trigger for the 2013 crisis. Yet many of them had called for a much smaller and more streamlined cabinet, and had complained about SPLM domination and the need for political inclusiveness. This would necessarily mean very significant changes. And the move had public support; people wanted change.
All now depended on how the President managed the predictable fall-out from his move, first and foremost in the SPLM. I therefore continued to engage with the President, and to stress the need for reconciliation, including convening the Political Bureau. While it was good that a government had been formed quickly and there seemed to be competent people on board, resolving the crisis within the SPLM was now critical. I urged the President to meet the leadership and former ministers.
On 23 August the President appointed James Wani Igga, then speaker of the Assembly, as vice president. He was confirmed three days later. Riek Machar refrained from running for the speakership, and in September Manasseh Magok Rundial, a Nuer and former NCP official in Khartoum, got the post. Salva Kiir later appointed Telar Deng his Senior Advisor for Legal Affairs, another provocation to the Garang Boys and leading SPLM cadres.
In late August seven Political Bureau members and former ministers, not including Machar, had a meeting with the President.97 Over dinner they reportedly had a very good discussion; it lasted until midnight.98 They agreed to follow up with a retreat of Political Bureau members and of others the President wanted to include. This meeting in turn would agree on a process to resolve remaining issues, including those related to the SPLM constitution. There was also reportedly agreement that Riek should be encouraged to wait, and not run now.99 Everyone felt they were now on the right track.
In early September the President told me that he wanted to bring former and current ministers together in a retreat to brainstorm on the future of the SPLM. I encouraged him to move forward with this as soon as possible. The President was supposed to follow up with a date. But we heard nothing after this. It appeared that the whole initiative had come to a halt, in the same way as similar plans we had discussed had a year and six months before. Some people around the President did not seem to want any reconciliation and Salva did not appear strong or committed enough to push it through.
On 18–27 September, the President went on a tour of the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region. During his visits to the state capitals, Wau, Aweil, Kwajok, and Rumbek, he made speeches explaining his decision to appoint a new cabinet. But in doing so he ridiculed and slandered former colleagues and those who had attended the reconciliation meeting. At home in his region, and speaking Dinka and Arabic, he probably thought that his crowd-pleasing message would not be widely retailed.100
In Rumbek the President had unaccountably been particularly provocative. ‘The “Tiger” has now taken out its claws and is ready to crush their faces. Blood will flow,’101 he told a crowd of Agar Dinka youth. ‘Tiger’ was Salva Kiir’s nom de guerre from the beginning of the struggle. He reminded the largely Dinka audience of Nuer raids in the 1990s,102 and called on them to be ready to defend themselves again. When I learned of all this I reminded him that such language could be interpreted as incitement.
Still, efforts at reconciliation continued. Several former ministers had individual meetings with the President in the next couple of months, including Nhial Deng, Paul Mayom, Gier Choung and David Deng Athorbei. Deng Alor would have two separate meetings later. Partly as a result of these efforts, some were offered positions. Nhial Deng, former defence minister and foreign minister, who had been seen for years as one of the Garang Boys, ended up as the government’s chief negotiator. He would later occupy the key negotiating position in talks under the auspices of IGAD to resolve the crisis that erupted at the end of 2013. In October the President pardoned several people who had been accused of rebel activity, including Lam Akol, the former foreign minister and chairman of SPLM/Democratic Change.103 While Salva thus seemed open for reconciliation, there seemed to have been an irremediable breakdown in relations with Riek.104
On 8–12 October South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress, with its deputy chairman, Cyril Ramophosa at the helm, held a seminar with the Political Bureau of the SPLM on internal dynamics in party structures. This had been scheduled earlier, but was now utilized to address the current leadership crisis. Almost everyone in the SPLM Political Bureau attended, including Riek Machar and except only Salva himself, whom the ANC-leader met separately. However, Ramophosa did not succeed in finding a solution.
I still held the view that things could be sorted out. In New York in mid November for consultations, I suddenly got a message from Juba that Salva Kiir had announced the dissolution of the SPLM, including the highest organ of the party, the Political Bureau and the National Liberation Council. This appeared to be another spur-of-the-moment gambit; the party apparatus had lapsed because the National Convention had not met before the mandated five-year deadline. While legally and factually this was correct, the demarche was generally perceived as a far-fetched political maneuver, particularly since the office of chairman and the Secretariat were to remain operational.105 But soon we heard from the Minister of Information that Salva’s remarks had been misinterpreted: the organs of the SPLM would continue to function.106 That it was not even a spokesperson for the SPLM who clarified what its chairman had meant to say showed that South Sudan still had a long way to go in making the necessary distinction between party and government.
In the Security Council on 18 November, I noted that while the transition to the new cabinet had been smooth, and Riek Machar had handled the situation well, a key determinant for developments in the country would now be management of schisms within the SPLM. I stressed that the country was at a crossroads, and that the way the preparatory process for the all-important National Convention was handled would indicate where things were heading.107 In separate briefings with Permanent Representatives I highlighted that this could go either way. The SPLM leadership had usually been able to sort out such crises, however, often at the last minute. I was committed to continue to engage with the leadership to help find a resolution in the context of the upcoming meeting of the National Liberation Council.108 Otherwise, things could deteriorate.
By the end of November, delegations from neighbouring countries and other ‘friends’ from around the world had not been able to make progress. Thabo Mbeki had not heard from the President. Two visits to Juba, the latest the last week of November, did not produce results.
I had met Machar only once in September, and he seemed then to have accepted the state of affairs and be motivated to work from his seat in the legislature. Now, however, in November I was told that he had become more confrontational, particularly when speaking to Nuer audiences in private.109 I also heard about some meetings of ex-ministers, at times with Riek, at the houses of Deng Alor, Cirino Hiteng, and Oyay Deng. Such gatherings were very common, so I did not pay much attention to this. I was scheduled to meet Riek again in early December, as usual to urge patience.
The two triggers: Press conference and party meeting
Two unexpected events would change the dynamics in Juba dramatically.
By December, the majority of former ministers had still not heard from the President, and the rumour was that the National Liberation Council might be called without a conclusive meeting of the Political Bureau having been held first. I met with Pagan Amum, who told me about the plans: a number of SPLM leaders were going to hold a press conference, likely the coming Friday (6 December), followed by rallies on 14 December. The intention was ‘mass mobilization’ against the way the SPLM was being led. They would not ask for the chairman’s resignation, but would criticize his leadership. Those behind the initiative were several members of the SPLM Political Bureau, former ministers, Riek Machar, and the two governors who had been dismissed. They could achieve a majority in the Political Bureau, they claimed. Never before had cadres gone public like this about their disagreements.
Upon learning from Pagan of these plans, and concerned about the fall-out and potential violence, I went to see Deng Alor. He and Pagan were among the most senior members of the SPLM Political Bureau. To both of them I appealed for more time before they went public with the conflict. I was worried about violence, and in particular of ethnic violence, as well as their arrest. The plans for a rally, to ‘mobilize the masses’, were a major concern. I had no illusions that this could be contained, despite their promises; the security forces were also incompetent at crowd control.
Just as Salva Kiir had apparently given up on Riek, so Pagan and Deng Alor told me that leading cadres had now given up on Salva. After my discussions, and unsuccessful attempts to delay the press conference and avoid the rally, I got in touch with Akol Kuor, one of two Directors of National Security,110 who was regarded as very close to Salva. It was critical that the government now did what could be done to contain the situation, and avoid escalation.
I had a meeting with the Minister of Interior on the 5th, the evening before the press conference, to make sure that the police or security forces would not disrupt the media event or arrest the participants. The location also mattered; a change was organized in contact with Riek Machar and his team the same evening. I later heard that others had made similar efforts.111 The President was in Paris, at the France–Africa Heads of State summit; holding a press conference in his absence was deeply provocative in my view.112 Salva Kiir called Juba, reportedly overruling several ministers who had advised taking a hard line.113 The press conference was held at the SPLM headquarters.
On the 6th some 15 leading members of the SPLM cadres,114 constituted a rather surprising and powerful public alignment of Riek Machar and the Garang boys. Their statement referred to ‘anti-Garang elements inside and outside the SPLM [who had] encircled comrade Salva Kiir Mayardit’s leadership of the SPLM and the Government of Southern Sudan’.115 That Riek Machar had agreed to this text was interesting, given his animosity towards Dr John. A new political alignment had been formed. The President’s power base was narrowing.
According to the statement, the SPLM’s crisis had ‘started immediately after the tragic death of the SPLM historical and eternal leader Dr. John Garang de Mabior’,116 with all subsequent troubles linked to this. It rehearsed the weakening of the SPLM to the benefit of regional and ethnic lobbies around the SPLM chairman; and promotion of ‘recent converts’ from the Khartoum regime to leading positions. The statement denounced Salva Kiir for unconstitutionally dissolving SPLM organs, allowing the party to become dysfunctional, and for impeding transformation of the Movement from a liberation movement into a mass-based political party:
The deep-seated divisions within the SPLM leadership, exacerbated by dictatorial tendencies of the SPLM Chairman, and the dysfunctional SPLM structures from national to local levels are likely to create instability in the party and in the country. For these reasons, and out of our sincere concern about the future of our people, we the SPLM members of the Political Bureau and the Leadership of the party are obliged to inform the public about the true state of affairs in the SPLM and how General Salva Kiir is driving our beloved Republic of South Sudan into chaos and disorder.117
Strong public criticism of the President and SPLM chairman at a press conference of prominent members of the leadership was unprecedented, and represented a radical shift in the history of the SPLM. The reference to possible chaos and disorder can be interpreted as either a worry or a threat – or both.118 Although the statement was clearly provocative, participants did not call for precipitate changes at the top, which likely would have triggered an emergency. Instead they demanded that Salva Kiir, as chairman, convene the Political Bureau prior to the meeting of the National Liberation Council.119 The signatories seemed to assume that they could mobilize support in a way that would force Salva Kiir to cave in.120 In this they misjudged the situation.121 Their move was widely seen as evidence that they regarded themselves as indispensable, as entitled to lead the party. This did not go down well in all quarters.
In the absence of the President, the new Vice President James Wani Igga returned the favour. Instead of calming things down and taking discussions behind closed doors, he held his own press conference the next day and made a provocative retort.122 Whether he had the President’s blessing to do so is not clear, but it certainly contributed to making matters even worse.
It was now Salva Kiir’s reaction that people were waiting for. His management of the crisis would be decisive. He returned from Paris and wisely decided not to utter a word. I tried to see him before he left for South Africa for the funeral of Nelson Mandela, but time was too short. We knew that invitations for the meeting of the National Liberation Council on 14–15 December had been sent out, and that he had thus decided to leapfrog the Political Bureau meeting and convene the NLC directly.
Unable to see the President, I scheduled other meetings to try to prevent an escalation that could lead to violence. I met Riek Machar; the minister of national security, Obote Mete Mamur; and senior people around the President, including the director of national security, Akol Kuur; and Daniel Awet, another of the old ‘High Command’. I asked them to make contact with the President prior to the NLC, and do everything possible to prevent violence in connection with the upcoming meetings and possible rally.
I also went to see Telar Deng, who was now back in the presidency as Legal Advisor. In the absence of the Minister of Presidential Affairs he was likely in charge of preparing Salva Kiir’s speech for the opening of the NLC. We did not know whether the rally would go ahead on 14 December as planned, or whether a Political Bureau meeting might be called at the last minute. What we did know, however, was that the chairman’s opening statement would be very important. He had not appeared in public since before the 6 December press conference.
I told Telar that this was a decisive moment. The President, despite the criticism, needed to be inclusive and conciliatory, not confrontational, I urged him to keep the interests of the country and the presidency itself at heart. If there was to be no Political Bureau meeting before the NLC, the President needed to convey willingness to debate, to listen, to have transparent processes, and to give people the feeling that he welcomed different views. Telar listened, and said he would take this into consideration and pass it on.
During the week, I actively engaged the main actors around the President, encouraging them to convene the Political Bureau. It could still be called at the very last minute, and the NLC could also be delayed for a few hours to allow discussion about the SPLM constitution. According to one source, there was in fact an attempt to hold a meeting of the cadres during the week, but misunderstandings around timing and invitations resulted in poor attendance and it was cancelled.123 The day before the NLC was supposed to start, Riek Machar issued a statement that the planned rally would take place one week later, on 20 December.
Salva Kiir returned from South Africa on the 13th, the day before the National Liberation Council meeting. Given the importance of the presidential speech, I wanted to talk to him directly upon his return. I was in touch with his office several times, but was unsuccessful.
At dawn on the 14th Juba was full of security forces. It was Saturday and the National Liberation Council (NLC) was to be opened. The assembly hall at the Nyakoron cultural centre was filling up. In the usual South Sudanese way, people greeted each other warmly, hugged, patted each other’s backs and laughed, whatever their ranks or animosities. Riek Machar, the deputy chairman, arrived to warm applause. But the atmosphere was tense. While things looked normal on the surface, the empty diplomatic seats were witness to the true mood: most ambassadors stayed away for security reasons.
Another sign was that many members of the SPLM Political Bureau were absent. Pagan Amum stayed at home.124 Deng Alor and several others were at an award ceremony in Addis Ababa, and could only fly in later. All eyes were on the President when he arrived. The atmosphere was charged.
When the religious leaders arrived on stage in their robes, the gravity of the crisis and its possible implications were brought home. The highest representatives of the Church and Muslim community in South Sudan125 offered prayers, and a strong appeal not only for peace, but – strikingly – for delay of the NLC itself. Going through with it could lead to unrest. It was better to wait, they said. Similarly, they called on those behind the press statement not to organize any rallies, and make sure that the streets of Juba remained quiet and peaceful. The room was dead silent.
The church in South Sudan carries a lot of weight. Throughout the civil war, the clergy played important roles in reconciling Southern factions and communities, and they ran ‘people-to-people’ peace processes that yielded impressive results. That the church leaders spoke out in this way was significant. After them I was asked to greet the audience. While I had not prepared anything to say, I repeated the strong appeal of the church leaders for peace. Referring to how the government had consolidated peace by reintegrating those who had rebelled, the disagreement was now in words and not with arms. I urged the leadership to find ways to reconcile with each other. I was later told that people around the President took this as confirmation that I was supporting Riek Machar; another example of the charged atmosphere at the time.
The chairman of the SPLM, Salva Kiir, was then invited to take the podium. It was time to break the silence. Did he know how decisive this speech was? I was not sure. I recalled a similar situation at the Commanders Conference in November 2004, when Salva Kiir had been the one challenging Dr John Garang, and where many of the same accusations had been thrown at the chairman. Dr John had ended up reconciling with his old comrade.126
It soon became clear that Salva had not seen any links between the two leadership challenges and their responses, or – for that matter – with the late President Mandela’s management of foes and adversaries. Instead, the chairman launched a frontal attack on the SPLM cadres who had ‘challenged his executive decisions’, that is, those behind the press conference. He made a strong reference to 1991, and the massacre of the Bor Dinka:
I must warn that this behavior is tantamount to indiscipline which will take us back to the days of the 1991 split. We all know where the split took us from that time. This could jeopardize the unity and the independence of our country and we must guard against such things, my dear comrades. I am not prepared to let this happen again.127
Warnings against repeating 1991 had been conveyed to Riek Machar several times before, but the context now was different. While there were also positive messages of democratic process and unity of the party in the speech, the damage had already been done. A woman in the audience started singing, and the President joined in. I got the meaning of this song only later. It was a liberation song, a call to action, urging that it was better to fight and die than to be humiliated. Some heard this as a signal; for those critical of the President, his speech had thrown down the gauntlet.
The rest of the NLC proceedings echoed these dissonant views. The internal conflict in the party was not discussed. The members mechanically went through proposals for the SPLM constitution. The President’s lieutenants had lobbied to make sure that loyalists dominated the audience. All alternative proposals for the constitution failed. There was no attempt to reconcile the other factions, and none of them turned up for the second and last day of the Council meeting.
Was it the chairman’s speech and the NLC that triggered the violence that erupted the following day? Or were the shooting incidents part of a pre-planned operation by Riek Machar and his allies in an attempt to seize power? The Government claims the latter, but it also seemed to have been prepared for such an eventuality.
Whatever the case may be, all factions of the SPLM had, intentionally or not, played with fire. Together, all these events triggered the violence that erupted on Sunday evening, the 15 December.