The Road to Panama
The Hardships this Party underwent were surprising, they not only struggled with common Difficulties, but likewise encountered Famine and every kind of Misery. They were reduced to feed upon the Leaves of Trees, and to take unheard-of Methods to preserve their Lives.1
It’s at this point in the narrative that perhaps Morgan’s judgement comes into question. At Chagres Morgan left 300 men split between the castle and the fleet now anchored at the foot of the gun batteries, under the command of Major Richard Norman. ‘They started on 9 January 1671, with 1,400 men in seven ships and thirty-six boats up the river,’ Morgan wrote in his official report. Interestingly, Pope follows along with Esquemeling’s number of 1,200 men.2
Morgan decided not to take any provisions, having left them with the fleet anchored under the protection of San Lorenzo Castle. His decision was based on the hope that they would find food along the way. He knew the Spanish had set up ambushes for him and so he assumed that these ambushes would have food. There were also plantations that they could raid for provisions, so there should have been no problem with victualling his men. The main reason for this decision was that the men would have to travel light. Morgan knew the rainy season was over and the river was at a low level. If there was too much weight in the boats they would not be able to haul them over the rough terrain to skirt difficult stretches of river that they couldn’t negotiate. It would mean going aground at the low points in the river, which would slow them down even more.
Although Morgan believed that food and water could be obtained during their journey to Panama, he knew it would be much harder to obtain dry powder and dry match, so every man would have to carry not just the dry powder and match, but also ammunition, a cutlass and a pike. Each man would also need a blanket to keep away the insects and a jacket to keep out the rain. None of these things could be found along the way. Morgan made his decision and began the journey.
While much of the Chagres River has been assimilated into the Panama Canal, in Morgan’s time it twisted and turned to such a degree that it was almost three times longer than the distance directly between Chagres and Venta de Cruz. Branches of the river would fork off in different directions, sometimes almost as wide as the river itself, making it difficult for the buccaneers to know the right way to go. If it hadn’t been for their guides the expedition would have been lost.
On day one of the journey, Esquemeling tells us they travelled 6 leagues and arrived at a place called De Los Bracos, where Morgan sent the men ashore ‘to sleep and stretch their limbs, being almost crippled with lying too much crowded in the boats.’ After resting Morgan ordered the men to go to the plantations in the area to look for food as well as for the enemy. He needed to know as much as he could about the enemy’s strength. But the buccaneers found no food and no enemy. The Spanish had fled and taken everything with them. As hunger pains began to stab, that night the men slept restlessly.
On the following morning they again began rowing downriver. The buccaneers had two kinds of vessels for this expedition. There were the larger river vessels with single masts, sails and oars, which were designed for carrying cargo, and large canoes or boats, which had to be rowed.3
As the day wore on, the going became more difficult. The river became shallower and was littered with tree trunks and branches that had washed down from the hills during the rainy season. The buccaneers pulled out the trunks that blocked their way and hacked at the branches that were causing the river to bottle up or were overhanging to such a degree that they made visibility almost impossible. Progress was also hampered by sudden torrential rain squalls, which soaked the buccaneers completely in a matter of minutes and then departed as quickly as they’d arrived, leaving a scorching sun blazing in their wake.
By evening they arrived at the village of Cruz de Juan Gallego, where, Esquemeling tells us, they ‘were compelled to leave their boats and canoes, the river being very dry for want of rain, and many trees having fallen into it.’4
Turning to the guides, Morgan wanted to know if the way ahead was going to be as difficult as the journey to reach this village had been. The guides told him that in ‘2 leagues’ the jungle thinned along the riverbanks, making the overland journey easier. Morgan decided they would spend the night in the village, which was also empty of provisions and enemy. Realizing he would need the boats for his return journey, he ordered that 160 men remain behind to guard them in case the Spanish should decide to attack and cut off his escape route.
To these, Captain Morgan gave order, under great penalties, that no man, on any pretext whatever, should dare to leave the boats, and go ashore; fearing lest they should be surprised by an ambuscade of Spaniards in the neighbouring woods, which appeared so thick as to seem almost impenetrable.5
On the morning of the third day, the buccaneers, minus the 160 men left behind with the boats, began to hack their way through the jungle, continuing their journey towards Panama. The boats they’d left behind were the larger vessels, which were unable to go any further. The canoes were now carried overland by the men who were not hacking away at the jungle. In the intense, humid heat it was hard going, especially as hunger pains continued to gnaw at their stomachs.
The way became so difficult that Morgan ‘thought it more convenient to transport some of the men in canoes (though with great labour) to a place further up the river to a place called Cedro Bueno,’ wrote Esquemeling. The canoes went back into the water and the slow process of moving up the difficult river began again. Not all the men were transported at once and the canoes had to come back for the rest so that ‘about night they got altogether in the said place.’ At Cedro Bueno the buccaneers hoped to find Spaniards and Indians with food but instead they found nothing. There were no Indians, no Spanish and, most of all, no food.6
Day four and the buccaneers were still hungry. At this point, tired of lifting the canoes and carrying them through the stifling jungle to skirt shallows in the river and to then put them in again time after time, the buccaneers wanted to cut their way through the jungle and leave the canoes behind. Realizing that morale was low Morgan agreed but instead split the force, with most of the buccaneers being led overland by one of the guides while the rest, led by another guide who, according to Esquemeling, ‘always went before them, to discover, on both sides the river, the ambuscades. These had also spies, who were very dexterous to give notice of all accidents, or of the arrival of the pirates, six hours, at least, before they came.’7
What of the Spanish during this? Don Juan had chosen Francisco Gonzalez Salado to create a defence between Chagres and Venta de Cruz to try to bottle up the buccaneers in the jungle rather than fight them on the plains before Panama. To do this, four ambushes (stockades, according to Stephen Talty) had been built and Salado had chosen 400 men to man them. The idea was to pick off the buccaneers as they rowed up the river to the point where so many would be lost that the invasion would fail and the buccaneers would be forced into a retreating battle. But these stockades did not have artillery; the men were armed as lightly as the buccaneers.
In addition to this were the Indian guerrillas, some of whom had been languishing in Panama’s jails. Three Indian captains offered Don Juan a proposal. Let them out of prison, give them men and arms to attack the buccaneers and, if they succeeded in stopping the invasion, the charges would be dropped. If not, they would die. It was a simple proposition and one that appealed to Don Juan. He had nothing to lose and accepted the proposal. The three Indian leaders set off into the jungle with 150 men to attack the buccaneers.8
According to Stephen Talty in his book Empire of Blue Water, the Spanish had been manning the first ambush and had moved into the woods just before the buccaneers arrived at De Los Bracos on the first day. Indeed, he states that Spanish sharpshooters, hiding in the woods, had the buccaneers in range of their muskets. Yet they did not open fire.
We can speculate on why they didn’t start firing. For the most part, Salado had been expecting a force of around 400 buccaneers, the same number that had attacked San Lorenzo. Remember that some Spanish soldiers had deserted their gun positions at the fort and headed for Panama with the news of the arrival of the buccaneers. But this was Bradley’s force and was around 400 men. The Spanish, who arrived breathlessly in Panama with news of the invasion force, would only know that there were around 400 men. As a result the Spanish and Indians that manned the ambushes would have been overwhelmed by a force nearly four times larger than what they expected. Once the buccaneers opened fire they would have had their range and position and the ambushers would not have survived.
But there was also another reason, as Talty points out. These buccaneers were not here to take land and occupy it. They were essentially intent on robbing the Spanish and then departing. They were not going to enslave the population; they were not going to force people to live a certain way. They would simply arrive, rob and pillage, and then leave. The settlers—Indians, Spanish soldiers and their families—were not fighting for their freedom so ‘if you could hide from the buccaneers, you could live another day, and every soldier and militia member knew that.’9
Back in Panama, Don Juan was disgusted that his forces did not put up a fight. This meant that the closer the buccaneers came, the more likely he would have to send out forces to meet them on the plains in front of the city.
Meanwhile, the buccaneers marched on and around noon on the fourth day the guide of the canoes spotted an ambush near ‘a post called Torna Cavallos’. They stormed ashore to find the ambush so recently deserted and all provisions taken except ‘a few leathern bags, all empty, and a few crumbs of bread scattered on the ground where they [the Spanish] had eaten. Being angry at this they [the buccaneers] pulled down a few little huts which the Spaniards had made, and fell to eating the leathern bags, to ally the ferment of their stomachs, which was now so sharp as to gnaw their very bowels.’
So hungry were the men that Esquemeling tells us they made a banquet of these leather bags. To make them edible they sliced them into strips, which they beat between two stones and then rubbed, ‘often dipping it in water, to make it supple and tender. Lastly they scraped off the hair, and broiled it. Being thus cooked, they cut it into small morsels, and ate it, helping it down with frequent gulps of water, which, by good fortune, they had at hand.’10
Having had their feast, they continued on their march and by evening arrived at Torna Munni, where the Spanish had made another ambush. Like every village, settlement and post they’d come across so far the enemy was nowhere to be seen and there was no food, ‘the Spaniards having been so provident, as not to leave anywhere the least crumb of sustenance.’
On day five they arrived at Barbacoa but it too was, like all the other places, deserted and free of any provisions left by the retreating Spanish. Not far from the settlement were plantations, which the buccaneers searched, but ‘could not find any person, animal, or other thing, to relieve their extreme hunger. Finally, having ranged about, and searched a long time, they found a grot, which seemed to be but lately hewn out of a rock, where were two sacks of meal, wheat and like things, with two great jars of wine and certain fruits called plantanoes.’ Knowing his men were badly off and desperate for food, Morgan ordered it to be shared out to those that were most desperate, the ones that now needed to be carried in canoes because they were too weak to walk.11
With those small provisions having been consumed the sixth day saw the men eating ‘leaves of trees and green herbs or grass such as they could pick, for such was the miserable condition they were in,’ writes Esquemeling. Around noon they arrived at a plantation and found a barn filled with maize. Breaking down the doors the men fell onto the grain, eating it dry ‘as much as they could devour; then they distributed a great quantity, giving every man a good allowance.’ They continued on, now sustained with maize, until they reached the tiny settlement of Santa Cruz, where they made camp for the night. Here, Morgan began to hear just how unhappy some of his men were. ‘Great murmurings were made at Captain Morgan, and his conduct; some being desirous to return home, while others would rather die there than go back a step from that undertaking: others who had greater courage, laughed and joked at their discourses.’12
Nevertheless, their sleep was fitful and the following morning, the men checked and cleaned their weapons, discharging them to ensure that the powder and the match were dry and all the muskets and pistols were working.
The seventh day and the buccaneers reached Venta de Cruz. In the distance they could see smoke rising from the town, which they assumed came from the chimneys. This meant people, and the smoke meant people cooking. Esquemeling tells us this gave the buccaneers ‘great joy and the hopes of finding people and plenty of good cheer. Thus they went on as fast as they could, encouraging one another.’
Over difficult ground the buccaneers made record time and arrived, sweating and panting from the stifling heat in the town, expecting to find people and food. Instead they found the place deserted, no Spanish, no militia, no Indians, no sign of any food. ‘Nothing but fire, for the Spaniards, before their departure, had everyone set fire to his own house, except the king’s storehouses and stables.’13
However, in the stables they found a large sack, full of bread, and sixteen jars of Peruvian wine, which they immediately began to consume. Very quickly the men began to fall ill, which Morgan realized was very likely due to their ‘want of sustenance and the manifold sorts of trash they had eaten’. Instead of saying this to his men, Morgan told them the wine was likely poisoned and had what remained thrown away. He decided to wait for the sickness to pass and so they made camp in Venta de Cruz until the following morning.
Morgan and his men were still only half way. The rest of the journey—another 26 miles—would have to be on land as the Chagres River now wound its way north-east, away from Panama. The canoes had to stay at Venta de Cruz.
How different would this journey have been if Morgan had allowed his army to carry provisions? If he’d ordered that a canoe filled with provisions be taken on the expedition would he have arrived in Venta de Cruz any earlier? Would the men have been in better health and have had the strength to cut through the jungle faster than they did?
There is a fair degree of speculation around this subject but Morgan could not have known that the Spanish would desert each ambush and take every morsel of food with them. He could not have known they would burn their villages and ambushes to ensure the buccaneers could get no provisions at all. This was Don Juan’s strategy—to deny the enemy any form of sustenance so that by the time his forces met the buccaneers, they would be too weak to fight.
Up until this point, Morgan and his army had yet to face the Spanish or the Indians. Now that the rest of the journey to Panama was to be over land, the situation was about to change.