INTRODUCTION: THE STUFF OF THOUGHT
1. Jouvet 1999, 169–71.
2. Damasio 1994.
3. James 1890, chap. 5.
4. Descartes’s quotes are from the Treatise on Man, written ca. 1632–33 and first published in 1662. English translation: Descartes 1985.
5. Undoubtedly, another factor was Descartes’s fear of conflict with the Church. He was only four in 1600, when Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake, and he was thirty-seven in 1633, when Galileo narrowly escaped the same fate. Descartes made sure that his masterpiece, Le monde (The World), which contained the highly reductionist section L’homme (Man), remained unpublished during his lifetime; it was not published until 1664, long after his death in 1650. Only partial allusions to it appeared in the Discourse on Method (1637) and Passions of the Soul (1649). And he was right to be wary: in 1663, the Holy See officially placed his works on the Index of Prohibited Books. So Descartes’s insistence on the immateriality of the soul was perhaps, in part, a facade, a protective measure to save his life.
6. Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. Michael Andrew Screech (New York: Penguin, 1987), 2:12.
7. E.g., Posner and Snyder 1975/2004; Shallice 1979; Shallice 1972; Marcel 1983; Libet, Alberts, Wright, and Feinstein 1967; Bisiach, Luzzatti, and Perani 1979; Weiskrantz 1986; Frith 1979; Weiskrantz 1997.
8. Baars 1989.
9. Watson 1913.
10. Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Johansson, Hall, Sikstrom, and Olsson 2005.
11. The philosopher Daniel Dennett calls this approach “heterophenomenology” (Dennett 1991).
1 CONSCIOUSNESS ENTERS THE LAB
1. Crick and Koch 1990a; Crick and Koch 1990b. To be sure, many other psychologists and neuroscientists had previously emphasized a reductionist research agenda for consciousness (see Churchland 1986; Changeux 1983; Baars 1989; Weiskrantz 1986; Posner and Snyder 1975/2004; Shallice 1972). But in my opinion, the Crick and Koch papers, with their down-to-earth approach focused on vision, played an essential role in attracting experimental scientists to the field.
2. Kim and Blake 2005.
3. Posner 1994.
4. Wyart, Dehaene, and Tallon-Baudry 2012; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry 2008.
5. Gallup 1970.
6. Plotnik, de Waal, and Reiss 2006; Prior, Schwarz, and Gunturkun 2008; Reiss and Marino 2001.
7. Epstein, Lanza, and Skinner 1981.
8. For in-depth discussion of the mirror test, see Suddendorf and Butler 2013.
9. Hofstadter 2007.
10. Comte 1830–42.
11. Some scientists use the term awareness to refer specifically to the simple form of consciousness in which we gain access to a sensory state—what I term “conscious access to sensory information.” Most dictionary definitions, however, do not agree with this restricted use of the term, and even contemporary writers tend to treat awareness and consciousness as synonyms. In this book I have been using both words synonymously, while proposing a more precise subdivision in terms of conscious access, wakefulness, vigilance, self-consciousness, and metacognition.
12. Baars 1989.
13. Schneider and Shiffrin 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider 1977; Posner and Snyder 1975/2004; Raichle, Fiesz, Videen, and MacLeod 1994; Chein and Schneider 2005.
14. New and Scholl 2008; Ramachandran and Gregory 1991.
15. Leopold and Logothetis 1996; Logothetis, Leopold, and Sheinberg 1996; Leopold and Logothetis 1999. These pioneering studies have since been replicated and extended with the more sophisticated technique of “flash suppression,” which provides a much tighter control over when an image is suppressed (see, e.g., Maier, Wilke, Aura, Zhu, Ye, and Leopold 2008; Wilke, Logothetis, and Leopold 2006; Fries, Schroder, Roelfsema, Singer, and Engel 2002). Several experimenters also used brain-imaging techniques to explore the neural fate of seen and extinguished images in humans (e.g., Srinivasan, Russell, Edelman, and Tononi 1999; Lumer, Friston, and Rees 1998; Haynes, Deichmann, and Rees 2005; Haynes, Driver, and Rees 2005).
16. Wilke, Logothetis, and Leopold 2003; Tsuchiya and Koch 2005.
17. Chong, Tadin, and Blake 2005; Chong and Blake 2006.
18. Zhang, Jamison, Engel, He, and He 2011; Brascamp and Blake 2012.
19. Zhang, Jamison, Engel, He, and He 2011.
20. Brascamp and Blake 2012.
21. Raymond, Shapiro, and Arnell 1992.
22. Marti, Sigman, and Dehaene 2012.
23. Chun and Potter 1995.
24. Telford 1931; Pashler 1984; Pashler 1994; Sigman and Dehaene 2005.
25. Marti, Sackur, Sigman, and Dehaene 2010; Dehaene, Pegado, Braga, Ventura, Nunes Filho, Jobert, Dehaene-Lambertz, et al. 2010; Corallo, Sackur, Dehaene, and Sigman 2008.
26. Marti, Sigman, and Dehaene 2012; Wong 2002; Jolicoeur 1999.
27. Mack and Rock 1998.
28. Simons and Chabris 1999. See the movie at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJG698U2Mvo.
29. Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark 1997. For more recent work exploiting this technique to study the behavioral and brain correlates of change detection, see Beck, Rees, Frith, and Lavie 2001; Landman, Spekreijse, and Lamme 2003; Simons and Ambinder 2005; Beck, Muggleton, Walsh, and Lavie 2006; Reddy, Quiroga, Wilken, Koch, and Fried 2006.
30. Johansson, Hall, Sikstrom, and Olsson 2005.
31. See the movie at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubNF9QNEQLA.
32. For discussion, see Simons and Ambinder 2005; Landman, Spekreijse, and Lamme 2003; Block 2007.
33. Woodman and Luck 2003; Giesbrecht and Di Lollo 1998; Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink 2000.
34. Del Cul, Dehaene, and Leboyer 2006; Gaillard, Del Cul, Naccache, Vinckier, Cohen, and Dehaene 2006; Del Cul, Baillet, and Dehaene 2007; Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, and Slachevsky 2009; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004.
35. Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, Le Bihan, Mangin, Poline, and Rivière 2001.
36. Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, and Slachevsky 2009; Charles, Van Opstal, Marti, and Dehaene 2013.
37. Dehaene and Naccache 2001.
38. Ffytche, Howard, Brammer, David, Woodruff, and Williams 1998.
39. Kruger and Dunning 1999; Johansson, Hall, Sikstrom, and Olsson 2005; Nisbett and Wilson 1977.
40. Dehaene 2009; Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, Le Bihan, Mangin, Poline, and Rivière 2001.
41. Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, and Seeck 2004; Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, and Seeck 2002.
42. Lenggenhager, Mouthon, and Blanke 2009; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, and Blanke 2007. See also Ehrsson 2007. A precursor of this experiment is the famous “rubber hand” illusion. See Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, and Passingham 2004.
43. An important recent finding is that different paradigms may not block conscious access at the same processing stage. For instance, interocular competition interferes with visual processing at an earlier stage than masking (Almeida, Mahon, Nakayama, and Caramazza 2008; Breitmeyer, Koc, Ogmen, and Ziegler 2008). Comparing multiple paradigms is thus essential if the goal is to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions for conscious access.
2 FATHOMING UNCONSCIOUS DEPTHS
1. For a detailed history of ideas on the unconscious, see Ellenberger 1970.
2. Gauchet 1992.
3. For a lucid, detailed, and accessible account of the history of neuroscience, see Finger 2001.
4. Howard 1996.
5. Ibid.
6. Maudsley 1868.
7. James 1890, 211 and 208. See Ellenberger 1970 and Weinberger 2000.
8. Vladimir Nabokov, Strong Opinions (1973, 1990), 66.
9. Ledoux 1996.
10. Weiskrantz 1997.
11. Sahraie, Weiskrantz, Barbur, Simmons, Williams, and Brammer 1997. See also Morris, DeGelder, Weiskrantz, and Dolan 2001.
12. Morland, Le, Carroll, Hoffmann, and Pambakian 2004; Schmid, Mrowka, Turchi, Saunders, Wilke, Peters, Ye, and Leopold 2010; Schmid, Panagiotaropoulos, Augath, Logothetis, and Smirnakis 2009; Goebel, Muckli, Zanella, Singer, and Stoerig 2001.
13. Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, and Carey 1991; Milner and Goodale 1995.
14. Marshall and Halligan 1988.
15. Driver and Vuilleumier 2001; Vuilleumier, Sagiv, Hazeltine, Poldrack, Swick, Rafal, and Gabrieli 2001.
16. Sackur, Naccache, Pradat-Diehl, Azouvi, Mazevet, Katz, Cohen, and Dehaene 2008; McGlinchey-Berroth, Milberg, Verfaellie, Alexander, and Kilduff 1993.
17. Marcel 1983; Forster 1998; Forster and Davis 1984. Many subliminal priming experiments are reviewed by Kouider and Dehaene 2007.
18. Bowers, Vigliocco, and Haan 1998; Forster and Davis 1984.
19. Dehaene, Naccache, Le Clec’H, Koechlin, Mueller, Dehaene-Lambertz, van de Moortele, and Le Bihan 1998; Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, Le Bihan, Mangin, Poline, and Rivière 2001.
20. Dehaene 2009.
21. Dehaene and Naccache 2001 or Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, Le Bihan, Mangin, Poline, and Rivière 2001; Dehaene, Jobert, Naccache, Ciuciu, Poline, Le Bihan, and Cohen 2004.
22. Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, and Carey 1991; Milner and Goodale 1995.
23. Kanwisher 2001.
24. Treisman and Gelade 1980; Kahneman and Treisman 1984; Treisman and Souther 1986.
25. Crick 2003; Singer 1998.
26. Finkel and Edelman 1989; Edelman 1989.
27. Dehaene, Jobert, Naccache, Ciuciu, Poline, Le Bihan, and Cohen 2004.
28. Henson, Mouchlianitis, Matthews, and Kouider 2008; Kouider, Eger, Dolan, and Henson 2009; Dell’Acqua and Grainger 1999.
29. de Groot and Gobet 1996; Gobet and Simon 1998.
30. Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, Berner, and Hoffmann 2009.
31. McGurk and MacDonald 1976.
32. A demonstration of the McGurk illusion can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtsfidRq2tw.
33. Hasson, Skipper, Nusbaum, and Small 2007.
34. Singer 1998.
35. Tsunoda, Yamane, Nishizaki, and Tanifuji 2001; Baker, Behrmann, and Olson 2002; Brincat and Connor 2004.
36. Dehaene 2009; Dehaene, Pegado, Braga, Ventura, Nunes Filho, Jobert, Dehaene-Lambertz, et al. 2010.
37. Davis, Coleman, Absalom, Rodd, Johnsrude, Matta, Owen, and Menon 2007.
38. A much earlier precursor is Sidis’s demonstration that a letter or digit can still be named with above-chance accuracy when it is placed so far away that the viewer denies seeing anything. Sidis 1898.
39. Broadbent 1962.
40. Moray 1959.
41. Lewis 1970.
42. Marcel 1983.
43. Marcel 1980.
44. Schvaneveldt and Meyer 1976.
45. Holender 1986; Holender and Duscherer 2004.
46. Dell’Acqua and Grainger 1999; Dehaene, Naccache, Le Clec’H, Koechlin, Mueller, Dehaene-Lambertz, van de Moortele, and Le Bihan 1998; Naccache and Dehaene 2001b; Merikle 1992; Merikle and Joordens 1997.
47. Abrams and Greenwald 2000.
48. In principle, the association might even run from the letters h-a-p-p-y to the motor response itself. Anthony Greenwald and his colleagues refuted this interpretation, however. When the hands assigned to the “positive” and “negative” response categories were switched, the word happy still primed the “positive” category, even though it was now associated with a different hand. See Abrams, Klinger, and Greenwald 2002.
49. Dehaene, Naccache, LeClec’H, Koechlin, Mueller, Dehaene-Lambertz, van de Moortele, and Le Bihan 1998; Naccache and Dehaene 2001a, Naccache and Dehaene 2001b; Greenwald, Abrams, Naccache, and Dehaene 2003; Kouider and Dehaene 2009.
50. Kouider and Dehaene 2009.
51. Naccache and Dehaene 2001b; Greenwald, Abrams, Naccache, and Dehaene 2003.
52. Naccache and Dehaene 2001a.
53. Dehaene 2011.
54. Nieder and Miller 2004; Piazza, Izard, Pinel, Le Bihan, and Dehaene 2004; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, and Dehaene 2007; Nieder and Dehaene 2009.
55. den Heyer and Briand 1986; Koechlin, Naccache, Block, and Dehaene 1999; Reynvoet and Brysbaert 1999; Reynvoet, Brysbaert, and Fias 2002; Reynvoet and Brysbaert 2004; Reynvoet, Gevers, and Caessens 2005.
56. Van den Bussche and Reynvoet 2007; Van den Bussche, Notebaert, and Reynvoet 2009.
57. Naccache, Gaillard, Adam, Hasboun, Clémenceau, Baulac, Dehaene, and Cohen 2005.
58. Morris, Ohman, and Dolan 1999; Morris, Ohman, and Dolan 1998.
59. Kiefer and Spitzer 2000; Kiefer 2002; Kiefer and Brendel 2006.
60. Vogel, Luck, and Shapiro 1998; Luck, Vogel, and Shapiro 1996.
61. van Gaal, Naccache, Meeuwese, van Loon, Cohen, and Dehaene 2013.
62. For a demonstration of syntactic processing without awareness, see Batterink and Neville 2013.
63. Sergent, Baillet, and Dehaene 2005.
64. Cohen, Cavanagh, Chun, and Nakayama 2012; Posner and Rothbart 1998; Posner 1994.
65. For a review of dissociations between attention and consciousness, see Koch and Tsuchiya 2007.
66. McCormick 1997.
67. Bressan and Pizzighello 2008; Tsushima, Seitz, and Watanabe 2008; Tsushima, Sasaki, and Watanabe 2006.
68. Posner and Snyder 1975.
69. Naccache, Blandin, and Dehaene 2002; see also Lachter, Forster, and Ruthruff 2004; Kentridge, Nijboer, and Heywood 2008; Kiefer and Brendel 2006.
70. Woodman and Luck 2003.
71. Marti, Sigman, and Dehaene 2012.
72. Pessiglione, Schmidt, Draganski, Kalisch, Lau, Dolan, and Frith 2007.
73. Pessiglione, Petrovic, Daunizeau, Palminteri, Dolan, and Frith 2008.
74. Jaynes 1976, 23.
75. Hadamard 1945.
76. Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio 1997. The findings were questioned by Maia and McClelland 2004, then later clarified by Persaud, Davidson, Maniscalco, Mobbs, Passingham, Cowey, and Lau 2011.
77. Lawrence, Jollant, O’Daly, Zelaya, and Phillips 2009.
78. Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, and van Baaren 2006.
79. Yang and Shadlen 2007.
80. de Lange, van Gaal, Lamme, and Dehaene 2011.
81. Van Opstal, de Lange, and Dehaene 2011.
82. Wagner, Gais, Haider, Verleger, and Born 2004.
83. Ji and Wilson 2007; Louie and Wilson 2001.
84. van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte, and Lamme 2008.
85. van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, and Lamme 2010.
86. Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, and Kok 2001.
87. Lau and Passingham 2007; see also Reuss, Kiesel, Kunde, and Hommel 2011.
88. Lau and Rosenthal 2011; Rosenthal 2008; Bargh and Morsella 2008; Velmans 1991.
3 WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS GOOD FOR?
1. Turing 1952.
2. Gould 1974.
3. Gould and Lewontin 1979.
4. Velmans 1991.
5. Nørretranders 1999.
6. Lau and Rosenthal 2011; Velmans 1991; Wegner 2003. Benjamin Libet expresses a more nuanced opinion, arguing that consciousness plays no role in initiating voluntary actions but may still veto them; see Libet 2004; Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl 1983.
7. Peirce 1901.
8. Pack and Born 2001.
9. Pack, Berezovskii, and Born 2001.
10. Moreno-Bote, Knill, and Pouget 2011.
11. As discussed in Chapter 1. See Brascamp and Blake 2012; Zhang, Jamison, Engel, He, and He 2011.
12. Norris 2009; Norris 2006.
13. Schvaneveldt and Meyer 1976.
14. Vul, Hanus, and Kanwisher 2009; Vul, Nieuwenstein, and Kanwisher 2008.
15. Vul and Pashler 2008.
16. Fuster 1973; Fuster 2008; Funahashi, Bruce, and Goldman-Rakic 1989; Goldman-Rakic 1995.
17. Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, and Lau 2010; Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, and Slachevsky 2009.
18. Clark, Manns, and Squire 2002; Clark and Squire 1998.
19. Carter, O’Doherty, Seymour, Koch, and Dolan 2006. See also Carter, Hofstotter, Tsuchiya, and Koch 2003. The value of the memory-trace conditioning test remains debated, however, because some vegetative-state patients seem to pass the test. See Bekinschtein, Shalom, Forcato, Herrera, Coleman, Manes, and Sigman 2009; Bekinschtein, Peeters, Shalom, and Sigman 2011.
20. Edelman 1989.
21. Han, O’Tuathaigh, van Trigt, Quinn, Fanselow, Mongeau, Koch, and Anderson 2003.
22. Mattler 2005; Greenwald, Draine, and Abrams 1996; Dupoux, de Gardelle, and Kouider 2008.
23. Naccache 2006b.
24. Soto, Mantyla, and Silvanto 2011.
25. Siegler 1987; Siegler 1988; Siegler 1989; Siegler and Jenkins 1989.
26. A recent and controversial report claims that human subjects can solve even complex subtraction problems, such as 9 − 4 − 3, even when they are made invisible, by flashing a series of shapes to the other eye (Sklar, Levy, Goldstein, Mandel, Maril, and Hassin 2012). The design of that study, however, did not exclude the possibility that the subjects performed only part of the calculation (e.g., only 9 − 4). Even if further research supported the capacity to combine several numbers into a calculation, I would still predict that this combination would be performed very differently under conscious and unconscious conditions. Sophisticated computations, such as the averaging of up to eight distinct numbers, may occur in parallel without consciousness (De Lange, van Gaal, Lamme, and Dehaene 2011; Van Opstal, de Lange, and Dehaene 2011). However, slow, serial, flexible, and controlled processing seems to be the prerogative of consciousness.
27. Zylberberg, Fernandez Slezak, Roelfsema, Dehaene, and Sigman 2010.
28. Zylberberg, Dehaene, Roelfsema, and Sigman 2011; Zylberberg, Fernandez Slezak, Roelfsema, Dehaene, and Sigman 2010; Zylberberg, Dehaene, Mindlin, and Sigman 2009; Dehaene and Sigman 2012. See also Shanahan and Baars 2005.
29. Turing 1936.
30. Anderson 1983; Anderson and Lebiere 1998.
31. Ashcraft and Stazyk 1981; Widaman, Geary, Cormier, and Little 1989.
32. Tombu and Jolicoeur 2003; Logan and Schulkind 2000; Moro, Tolboom, Khayat, and Roelfsema 2010.
33. Sackur and Dehaene 2009.
34. Dehaene and Cohen 2007; Dehaene 2009.
35. Calculating prodigies may seem to violate this prediction. I would, however, object that we do not know to what extent their calculating strategies do, in fact, rely on conscious and effortful strategies. After all, their calculations typically require several seconds of focused attention, during which time they cannot be distracted. They miss the verbal resources needed to explain their strategies (or refuse to do so), but this does not imply that they draw a blank mind. For instance, some calculators report moving through vivid visual images of digit arrays or calendars (Howe and Smith 1988).
36. Sakur and Dehaene 2009.
37. de Lange, van Gaal, Lamme, and Dehaene 2011.
38. Van Opstal, de Lange, and Dehaene 2011.
39. Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, and van Baaren 2006.
40. de Lange, van Gaal, Lamme, and Dehaene 2011.
41. Levelt 1989.
42. Reed and Durlach 1998.
43. Dunbar 1996.
44. Bahrami, Olsen, Latham, Roepstorff, Rees, and Frith 2010.
45. Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter 2008.
46. Yokoyama, Miura, Watanabe, Takemoto, Uchida, Sugiura, Horie, et al. 2010; Kikyo, Ohki, and Miyashita 2002; see also Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, and Lau 2010; Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, and Slachevsky 2009; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, and Rees 2010.
47. Saxe and Powell 2006; Perner and Aichhorn 2008.
48. Ochsner, Knierim, Ludlow, Hanelin, Ramachandran, Glover, and Mackey 2004; Vogeley, Bussfeld, Newen, Herrmann, Happe, Falkai, Maier, et al. 2001.
49. Jenkins, Macrae, and Mitchell 2008.
50. Ricoeur 1990.
51. Frith 2007.
52. Marti, Sackur, Sigman, and Dehaene 2010; Corallo, Sackur, Dehaene, and Sigman 2008.
4 THE SIGNATURES OF A CONSCIOUS THOUGHT
1. Ogawa, Lee, Kay, and Tank 1990.
2. Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Hendler, and Malach 2000.
3. Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, Le Bihan, Mangin, Poline, and Rivière 2001.
4. Naccache and Dehaene 2001a.
5. Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, Le Bihan, Mangin, Poline, and Rivière 2001. Nikos Logothetis and his colleagues had made similar observations using the technique of single-neuron recordings in the awake monkey; see Leopold and Logothetis 1996; Logothetis, Leopold, and Sheinberg 1996; Logothetis 1998.
6. Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, Le Bihan, Mangin, Poline, and Rivière 2001. See also Rodriguez, George, Lachaux, Martinerie, Renault, and Varela 1999; Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, and Martinerie 2001 for similar suggestions but without contrasting seen and unseen stimuli.
7. Sadaghiani, Hesselmann, and Kleinschmidt 2009.
8. van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, and Lamme 2010.
9. For more examples of prefrontal and parietal activity in relation to conscious effortful processing, see, e.g., Marois, Yi, and Chun 2004; Kouider, Dehaene, Jobert, and Le Bihan 2007; Stephan, Thaut, Wunderlich, Schicks, Tian, Tellmann, Schmitz, et al. 2002; McIntosh, Rajah, and Lobaugh 1999; Petersen, van Mier, Fiez, and Raichle 1998.
10. Sergent, Baillet, and Dehaene 2005.
11. Ibid.; Sergent and Dehaene 2004.
12. Williams, Baker, Op de Beeck, Shim, Dang, Triantafyllou, and Kanwisher 2008; Roelfsema, Lamme, and Spekreijse 1998; Roelfsema, Khayat, and Spekreijse 2003; Supèr, Spekreijse, and Lamme 2001a; Supèr, Spekreijse, and Lamme 2001b; Haynes, Driver, and Rees 2005; see also Williams, Visser, Cunnington, and Mattingley 2008.
13. Luck, Vogel, and Shapiro 1996.
14. Neuroscientists distinguish a P3a wave, which is automatically generated from a subset of regions in the mesial frontal lobe when a surprising or unexpected event occurs, and a P3b wave, which indexes a very distributed pattern of neuronal activity spread throughout the cortex. The P3a wave may still be evoked under unconscious conditions, but the P3b wave seems to specifically index conscious states.
15. See, e.g., Lamy, Salti, and Bar-Haim 2009; Del Cul, Baillet, and Dehaene 2007; Donchin and Coles 1988; Bekinschtein, Dehaene, Rouhaut, Tadel, Cohen, and Naccache 2009; Picton 1992; Melloni, Molina, Pena, Torres, Singer, and Rodriguez 2007. For a review, see Dehaene 2011.
16. Marti, Sackur, Sigman, and Dehaene 2010; Sigman and Dehaene 2008; Marti, Sigman, and Dehaene 2012.
17. Dehaene 2008.
18. Levy, Pashler, and Boer 2006; Strayer, Drews, and Johnston 2003.
19. Pisella, Grea, Tilikete, Vighetto, Desmurget, Rode, Boisson, and Rossetti 2000.
20. The exact mechanism for this effect is still heavily debated. For glimpses of this fascinating debate, see Kanai, Carlson, Verstraten, and Walsh 2009; Eagleman and Sejnowski 2007; Krekelberg and Lappe 2001; Eagleman and Sejnowski 2000.
21. Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, and Kok 2001.
22. Dehaene, Posner, and Tucker 1994; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, and Donchin 1993.
23. The idea that consciousness arises long after the fact was initially discussed by the California psychologist Benjamin Libet (see Libet 1991; Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl 1983; Libet, Wright, Feinstein, and Pearl 1979; Libet, Alberts, Wright, and Feinstein 1967; Libet, Alberts, Wright, Delattre, Levin, and Feinstein 1964). His clever experiments were well in advance of their time (no pun intended). For instance, in 1967 he already noted that early event-related potentials remain present on unconsciously perceived trials and that later brain responses are a better correlate of consciousness. See Libet, Alberts, Wright, and Feinstein 1967; see also Libet 1965; Schiller and Chorover 1966. Unfortunately, his interpretations were excessive. He did not strive to identify the minimal interpretation of his findings and instead appealed to nonmaterial “mental fields” and backward time mechanisms; see Libet 2004. As a consequence, his work remained controversial; only recently have new neurophysiological interpretations of his findings been proposed (e.g., Schurger, Sitt, and Dehaene 2012).
24. Sergent, Baillet, and Dehaene 2005.
25. Lau and Passingham 2006.
26. Persaud, Davidson, Maniscalco, Mobbs, Passingham, Cowey, and Lau 2011.
27. Lamy, Salti, and Bar-Haim 2009.
28. Dehaene and Naccache 2001.
29. Hebb 1949.
30. Dehaene, Sergent, and Changeux 2003.
31. Dehaene and Naccache 2001.
32. Del Cul, Baillet, and Dehaene 2007.
33. Ibid.; Del Cul, Dehaene, and Leboyer 2006. We made similar observations in other paradigms: Sergent, Baillet, and Dehaene 2005; Sergent and Dehaene 2004. The discontinuity of conscious perception remains debated; see Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, and Ramsøy 2006. Part of the confusion may arise from the failure to distinguish our claim of all-or-none access to a fixed content (e.g., a digit) from the fact that the contents of consciousness may gradually change (one may see a bar, then a letter, then the entire word); see Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, and Dupoux 2010; Kouider and Dupoux 2004.
34. Gaillard, Dehaene, Adam, Clemenceau, Hasboun, Baulac, Cohen, and Naccache 2009; Gaillard, Del Cul, Naccache, Vinckier, Cohen, and Dehaene 2006; Gaillard, Naccache, Pinel, Clemenceau, Volle, Hasboun, Dupont, et al., 2006.
35. Fisch, Privman, Ramot, Harel, Nir, Kipervasser, Andelman, et al. 2009; Quiroga, Mukamel, Isham, Malach, and Fried 2008; Kreiman, Fried, and Koch 2002.
36. Gaillard, Dehaene, Adam, Clemenceau, Hasboun, Baulac, Cohen, and Naccache 2009.
37. Fisch, Privman, Ramot, Harel, Nir, Kipervasser, Andelman, et al. 2009.
38. Gaillard, Dehaene, Adam, Clemenceau, Hasboun, Baulac, Cohen, and Naccache 2009; Fisch, Privman, Ramot, Harel, Nir, Kipervasser, Andelman, et al. 2009; Aru, Axmacher, Do Lam, Fell, Elger, Singer, and Melloni 2012.
39. Whittingstall and Logothetis 2009; Fries, Nikolic, and Singer 2007; Cardin, Carlen, Meletis, Knoblich, Zhang, Deisseroth, Tsai, and Moore 2009; Buzsaki 2006.
40. Fries 2005.
41. Womelsdorf, Schoffelen, Oostenveld, Singer, Desimone, Engel, and Fries 2007; Fries 2005; Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, and Martinerie 2001.
42. Rodriguez, George, Lachaux, Martinerie, Renault, and Varela 1999; Gaillard, Dehaene, Adam, Clemenceau, Hasboun, Baulac, Cohen, and Naccache 2009; Gross, Schmitz, Schnitzler, Kessler, Shapiro, Hommel, and Schnitzler 2004; Melloni, Molina, Pena, Torres, Singer, and Rodriguez 2007.
43. Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, and Martinerie 2001.
44. He, Snyder, Zempel, Smyth, and Raichle 2008; He, Zempel, Snyder, and Raichle 2010; Canolty, Edwards, Dalal, Soltani, Nagarajan, Kirsch, Berger, et al. 2006.
45. Gaillard, Dehaene, Adam, Clemenceau, Hasboun, Baulac, Cohen, and Naccache 2009.
46. Pins and Ffytche 2003; Palva, Linkenkaer-Hansen, Naatanen, and Palva 2005; Fahrenfort, Scholte, and Lamme 2007; Railo and Koivisto 2009; Koivisto, Lahteenmaki, Sorensen, Vangkilde, Overgaard, and Revonsuo 2008.
47. van Aalderen-Smeets, Oosstenveld, and Schwarzbach 2006; Lamy, Salti, and Bar-Haim 2009.
48. Wyart, Dehaene, and Tallon-Baudry 2012.
49. Palva, Linkenkaer-Hansen, Naatanen, and Palva 2005; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry 2009; Boly, Balteau, Schnakers, Degueldre, Moonen, Luxen, Phillips, et al. 2007; Supèr, van der Togt, Spekreijse, and Lamme 2003; Sadaghiani, Hesselmann, Friston, and Kleinschmidt 2010.
50. Nieuwenhuis, Gilzenrat, Holmes, and Cohen 2005.
51. Lesions to the brain stem nuclei in the vicinity of the locus coeruleus may induce coma; see Parvizi and Damasio 2003.
52. Haynes 2009.
53. Shady, MacLeod, and Fisher 2004; Krolak-Salmon, Henaff, Tallon-Baudry, Yvert, Guenot, Vighetto, Mauguiere, and Bertrand 2003.
54. MacLeod and He 1993; He and MacLeod 2001.
55. Quiroga, Kreiman, Koch, and Fried 2008; Quiroga, Mukamel, Isham, Malach, and Fried 2008.
56. Wyler, Ojemann, and Ward 1982; Heit, Smith, and Halgren 1988.
57. Fried, MacDonald, and Wilson 1997.
58. Quiroga, Kreiman, Koch, and Fried 2008; Quiroga, Mukamel, Isham, Malach, and Fried 2008; Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, and Fried 2005; Kreiman, Fried, and Koch 2002; Kreiman, Koch, and Fried 2000a; Kreiman, Koch, and Fried 2000b.
59. Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, and Fried 2007.
60. Quiroga, Mukamel, Isham, Malach, and Fried 2008.
61. Kreiman, Fried, and Koch 2002. This research builds upon pioneering research by Nikos Logothetis and David Leopold in the macaque monkey, where animals were trained to report their conscious perception while neuronal discharges were being recorded. See Leopold and Logothetis 1996; Logothetis, Leopold, and Sheinberg 1996; Leopold and Logothetis 1999.
62. Kreiman, Koch, and Fried 2000b.
63. Fisch, Privman, Ramot, Harel, Nir, Kipervasser, Andelman, et al. 2009.
64. Vogel, McCollough, and Machizawa 2005; Vogel and Machizawa 2004.
65. Schurger, Pereira, Treisman, and Cohen 2009.
66. Dean and Platt 2006.
67. Derdikman and Moser 2010.
68. Jezek, Henriksen, Treves, Moser, and Moser 2011.
69. Peyrache, Khamassi, Benchenane, Wiener, and Battaglia 2009; Ji and Wilson 2007; Louie and Wilson 2001.
70. Horikawa, Tamaki, Miyawaki, and Kamitani 2013.
71. Thompson 1910; Magnusson and Stevens 1911.
72. Barker, Jalinous, and Freeston 1985; Pascual-Leone, Walsh, and Rothwell 2000; Hallett 2000.
73. Selimbeyoglu and Parvizi 2010; Parvizi, Jacques, Foster, Withoft, Rangarajan, Weiner, and Grill-Spector 2012.
74. Selimbeyoglu and Parvizi 2010.
75. Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, and Seeck 2002.
76. Desmurget, Reilly, Richard, Szathmari, Mottolese, and Sirigu 2009.
77. Taylor, Walsh, and Eimer 2010.
78. Silvanto, Lavie, and Walsh 2005; Silvanto, Cowey, Lavie, and Walsh 2005.
79. Halelamien, Wu, and Shimojo 2007.
80. Silvanto and Cattaneo 2010.
81. Lamme and Roelfsema 2000.
82. Lamme 2006.
83. Zeki 2003 actually defends the hypothesis of a “disunity of consciousness” and speculates that each brain region encodes a distinct form of “micro-consciousness.”
84. Edelman 1987; Sporns, Tononi, and Edelman 1991.
85. Lamme and Roelfsema 2000; Roelfsema 2005.
86. Lamme, Zipser, and Spekreijse 1998; Pack and Born 2001.
87. Koivisto, Railo, and Salminen-Vaparanta 2010; Koivisto, Mantyla, and Silvanto 2010.
88. On change blindness, see Beck, Muggleton, Walsh, and Lavie 2006. On binocular rivalry, Carmel, Walsh, Lavie, and Rees 2010. On inattentional blindness, Babiloni, Vecchio, Rossi, De Capua, Bartalini, Ulivelli, and Rossini 2007. On attentional blink, Kihara, Ikeda, Matsuyoshi, Hirose, Mima, Fukuyama, and Osaka 2010.
89. Kanai, Muggleton, and Walsh 2008.
90. Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, and Lau 2010. My opinion is that—contrary to focal single-pulse stimulation, which seems safe—repeated, intense, and bilateral stimulation, as used by Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, and Lau 2010, should be avoided. Although the effect of such stimulation is reputed to wear out within the following hour, psychiatrists routinely apply repeated transcranial stimulation over longer periods in order to induce a month-long remission from depression, with detectable long-term changes in brain anatomy (e.g., May, Hajak, Ganssbauer, Steffens, Langguth, Kleinjung and Eichhammer 2007). In the current state of knowledge, I would not let them do it to my brain.
91. Carlen, Meletis, Siegle, Cardin, Futai, Vierling-Claassen, Ruhlmann, et al. 2011; Cardin, Carlen, Meletis, Knoblich, Zhang, Deisseroth, Tsai, and Moore 2009.
92. Adamantidis, Zhang, Aravanis, Deisseroth, and de Lecea 2007.
5 THEORIZING CONSCIOUSNESS
1. Dehaene, Kerszberg, and Changeux 1998; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, and Sergent 2006; Dehaene and Naccache 2001. Global neuronal workspace theory relates directly to an earlier theory of a “global workspace,” first presented by Bernard Baars in a seminal book: Baars 1989. My colleagues and I fleshed it out in neuronal terms, specifically proposing that long-distance cortical networks play an essential role in its implementation: Dehaene, Kerszberg, and Changeux 1998.
2. Taine 1870.
3. Dennett 1991.
4. Dennett 1978.
5. Broadbent 1958.
6. Pashler 1994.
7. Chun and Potter 1995.
8. Shallice 1972; Shallice 1979; Posner and Snyder 1975; Posner and Rothbart 1998.
9. James 1890.
10. This hierarchical organization, emphasized by the British neurologist John Hughling Jackson in the nineteenth century, has become textbook knowledge in neurology.
11. van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte, and Lamme 2008; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, and Lamme 2010.
12. Tsao, Freiwald, Tootell, and Livingstone 2006.
13. Dehaene and Naccache 2001.
14. Denton, Shade, Zamarippa, Egan, Blair-West, McKinley, Lancaster, and Fox 1999.
15. Hagmann, Cammoun, Gigandet, Meuli, Honey, Wedeen, and Sporns 2008; Parvizi, Van Hoesen, Buckwalter, and Damasio 2006.
16. Goldman-Rakic 1988.
17. Sherman 2012.
18. Rigas and Castro-Alamancos 2007.
19. Elston 2003; Elston 2000.
20. Elston, Benavides-Piccione, and DeFelipe 2001.
21. Konopka, Wexler, Rosen, Mukamel, Osborn, Chen, Lu, et al. 2012.
22. Enard, Przeworski, Fisher, Lai, Wiebe, Kitano, Monaco, and Paabo 2002.
23. Pinel, Fauchereau, Moreno, Barbot, Lathrop, Zelenika, Le Bihan, et al. 2012.
24. Lai, Fisher, Hurst, Vargha-Khadem, and Monaco 2001.
25. Enard, Gehre, Hammerschmidt, Holter, Blass, Somel, Bruckner, et al. 2009; Vernes, Oliver, Spiteri, Lockstone, Puliyadi, Taylor, and Ho, et al. 2011.
26. Di Virgilio and Clarke 1997.
27. Tononi and Edelman 1998.
28. Hebb 1949.
29. Tsunoda, Yamane, Nishizaki, and Tanifuji 2001.
30. Selfridge 1959.
31. Felleman and Van Essen 1991; Salin and Bullier 1995.
32. Perin, Berger, and Markram 2011.
33. Hopfield 1982; Ackley, Hinton, and Sejnowski 1985; Amit 1989.
34. Crick 2003; Koch and Crick 2001.
35. Tononi 2008. Giulio Tononi has introduced a mathematical formalism for differentiation and integration that yields a quantitative measure of information integration called Φ. High values of this quantity would be necessary and sufficient for a conscious system: “consciousness is integrated information.” I am reticent to accept this conclusion, however, because it leads to panpsychism, the view that any connected system, be it a colony of bacteria or a galaxy, has a certain degree of consciousness. It also fails to explain why complex yet unconscious visual and semantic processing occurs quite routinely in the human brain.
36. Meyer and Damasio 2009; Damasio 1989.
37. Edelman 1987.
38. Friston 2005; Kersten, Mamassian, and Yuille 2004.
39. Beck, Ma, Kiani, Hanks, Churchland, Roitman, Shadlen, et al. 2008.
40. Dehaene, Kerszberg, and Changeux 1998; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, and Sergent 2006; Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dehaene 2011.
41. Fries 2005; Womelsdorf, Schoffelen, Oostenveld, Singer, Desimone, Engel, and Fries 2007; Buschman and Miller 2007; Engel and Singer 2001.
42. He and Raichle 2009.
43. Rockstroh, Müller, Cohen, and Elbert 1992.
44. Vogel, McCollough, and Machizawa 2005; Vogel and Machizawa 2004.
45. Dehaene and Changeux 2005; Dehaene, Sergent, and Changeux 2003; Dehaene, Kerszberg, and Changeux 1998. Our simulations were inspired by a previous model (Lumer, Edelman, and Tononi 1997a; Lumer, Edelman, and Tononi 1997b), which was, however, limited to early visual cortex. Much more extensive and realistic simulations of the same ideas were later implemented by Ariel Zylberberg and Mariano Sigman at the University of Buenos Aires: Zylberberg, Fernandez Slezak, Roelfsema, Dehaene, and Sigman 2010; Zylberberg, Dehaene, Mindlin, and Sigman 2009. Along similar lines, Nancy Kopell and her colleagues at Boston University have developed detailed neurophysiological models of cortical dynamics, capable of simulating sleep and anesthesia: Ching, Cimenser, Purdon, Brown, and Kopell 2010; McCarthy, Brown, and Kopell 2008.
46. Ariel Zylberberg later extended the simulations to much broader networks. See Zylberberg, Fernandez Slezak, Roelfsema, Dehaene, and Sigman 2010; Zylberberg, Dehaene, Mindlin, and Sigman 2009.
47. The scientific literature contains several detailed proposals of phase transitions corresponding to anesthesia, vigilance, and conscious access. See Steyn-Ross, Steyn-Ross, and Sleigh 2004; Breshears, Roland, Sharma, Gaona, Freudenburg, Tempelhoff, Avidan, and Leuthardt 2010; Jordan, Stockmanns, Kochs, Pilge, and Schneider 2008; Ching, Cimenser, Purdon, Brown, and Kopell 2010; Dehaene and Changeux 2005.
48. Portas, Krakow, Allen, Josephs, Armony, and Frith 2000; Davis, Coleman, Absalom, Rodd, Johnsrude, Matta, Owen, and Menon 2007; Supp, Siegel, Hipp, and Engel 2011.
49. Tsodyks, Kenet, Grinvald, and Arieli 1999; Kenet, Bibitchkov, Tsodyks, Grinvald, and Arieli 2003.
50. He, Snyder, Zempel, Smyth, and Raichle 2008; Raichle, MacLeod, Snyder, Powers, Gusnard, and Shulman 2001; Raichle 2010; Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, and Menon 2003.
51. He, Snyder, Zempel, Smyth, and Raichle 2008; Boly, Tshibanda, Vanhaudenhuyse, Noirhomme, Schnakers, Ledoux, Boveroux, et al. 2009; Greicius, Kiviniemi, Tervonen, Vainionpaa, Alahuhta, Reiss, and Menon 2008; Vincent, Patel, Fox, Snyder, Baker, Van Essen, Zempel, et al. 2007.
52. Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter 2008.
53. Mason, Norton, Van Horn, Wegner, Grafton, and Macrae 2007; Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and Schooler 2009.
54. Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, and Handy 2008.
55. Dehaene and Changeux 2005.
56. Sadaghiani, Hesselmann, Friston, and Kleinschmidt 2010.
57. Raichle 2010.
58. Berkes, Orban, Lengyel, and Fiser 2011.
59. Changeux, Heidmann, and Patte 1984; Changeux and Danchin 1976; Edelman 1987; Changeux and Dehaene 1989.
60. Dehaene and Changeux 1997; Dehaene, Kerszberg, and Changeux 1998; Dehaene and Changeux 1991.
61. Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, and O’Reilly 2005.
62. Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, and Sergent 2006.
63. Ibid.
64. Sergent, Baillet, and Dehaene 2005; Dehaene, Sergent, and Changeux 2003; Zylberberg, Fernandez Slezak, Roelfsema, Dehaene, and Sigman 2010; Zylberberg, Dehaene, Mindlin, and Sigman 2009.
65. Sergent, Wyart, Babo-Rebelo, Cohen, Naccache, and Tallon-Baudry 2013; Marti, Sigman, and Dehaene 2012.
66. See also Enns and Di Lollo 2000; Di Lollo, Enns, and Rensink 2000.
67. Shady, MacLeod, and Fisher 2004; He and MacLeod 2001.
68. Gilbert, Sigman, and Crist 2001.
69. Haynes and Rees 2005a; Haynes and Rees 2005b; Haynes, Sakai, Rees, Gilbert, Frith, and Passingham 2007.
70. Stettler, Das, Bennett, and Gilbert 2002.
71. Gaser and Schlaug 2003; Bengtsson, Nagy, Skare, Forsman, Forssberg, and Ullen 2005.
72. Buckner and Koutstaal 1998; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter 2008.
73. Sigala, Kusunoki, Nimmo-Smith, Gaffan, and Duncan 2008; Saga, Iba, Tanji, and Hoshi 2011; Shima, Isoda, Mushiake, and Tanji 2007; Fujii and Graybiel 2003. For review, see Dehaene and Sigman 2012.
74. Tyler and Marslen-Wilson 2008; Griffiths, Marslen-Wilson, Stamatakis, and Tyler 2013; Pallier, Devauchelle, and Dehaene 2011; Saur, Schelter, Schnell, Kratochvil, Kupper, Kellmeyer, Kummerer, et al. 2010; Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2012.
75. Davis, Coleman, Absalom, Rodd, Johnsrude, Matta, Owen, and Menon 2007.
76. Beck, Ma, Kiani, Hanks, Churchland, Roitman, Shadlen, et al. 2008; Friston 2005; Deneve, Latham, and Pouget 2001.
77. Yang and Shadlen 2007.
78. Izhikevich and Edelman 2008.
6 THE ULTIMATE TEST
1. Laureys 2005.
2. Leon-Carrion, van Eeckhout, Dominguez-Morales Mdel, and Perez-Santamaria 2002.
3. Schnakers, Vanhaudenhuyse, Giacino, Ventura, Boly, Majerus, Moonen, and Laureys 2009.
4. Smedira, Evans, Grais, Cohen, Lo, Cooke, Schecter, et al. 1990.
5. Laureys, Owen, and Schiff 2004.
6. Pontifical Academy of Sciences 2008.
7. Alving, Moller, Sindrup, and Nielsen 1979; Grindal, Suter, and Martinez 1977; Westmoreland, Klass, Sharbrough, and Reagan 1975.
8. Hanslmayr, Gross, Klimesch, and Shapiro 2011; Capotosto, Babiloni, Romani, and Corbetta 2009.
9. Supp, Siegel, Hipp, and Engel 2011.
10. Jennett and Plum 1972.
11. Jennett 2002.
12. Giacino 2005.
13. Giacino, Kezmarsky, DeLuca, and Cicerone 1991. Neurologists now use the Coma Recovery Scale Revised (CRS-R), as described by Giacino, Kalmar, and Whyte 2004. This battery of tests continues to be debated and improved. See for instance Schnakers, Vanhaudenhuyse, Giacino, Ventura, Boly, Majerus, Moonen, and Laureys 2009.
14. Giacino, Kalmar, and Whyte 2004; Schnakers, Vanhaudenhuyse, Giacino, Ventura, Boly, Majerus, Moonen, and Laureys 2009.
15. Bruno, Bernheim, Ledoux, Pellas, Demertzi, and Laureys 2011. See also Laureys 2005.
16. Owen, Coleman, Boly, Davis, Laureys, and Pickard 2006. Because this patient showed fluctuating behavioral responses to stimulation, there is an ongoing discussion among clinicians as to whether she should have been classified as minimally conscious in the first place. Even then the contrast with her extensive and largely normal brain activation patterns would remain striking.
17. See, e.g., Davis, Coleman, Absalom, Rodd, Johnsrude, Matta, Owen, and Menon 2007; Portas, Krakow, Allen, Josephs, Armony, and Frith 2000.
18. Naccache 2006a; Nachev and Husain 2007; Greenberg 2007.
19. Ropper 2010.
20. Owen, Coleman, Boly, Davis, Laureys, Jolles, and Pickard 2007.
21. Monti, Vanhaudenhuyse, Coleman, Boly, Pickard, Tshibanda, Owen, and Laureys 2010.
22. Cyranoski 2012.
23. The undisputed pioneer of the field of EEG decoding and brain-computer interfaces is Neils Birbaumer from the University of Tübingen. For a review, see Birbaumer, Murguialday, and Cohen 2008.
24. Cruse, Chennu, Chatelle, Bekinschtein, Fernandez-Espejo, Pickard, Laureys, and Owen 2011.
25. Goldfine, Victor, Conte, Bardin, and Schiff 2012.
26. Goldfine, Victor, Conte, Bardin, and Schiff 2011.
27. Chatelle, Chennu, Noirhomme, Cruse, Owen, and Laureys 2012.
28. Hochberg, Bacher, Jarosiewicz, Masse, Simeral, Vogel, Haddadin, et al. 2012.
29. Brumberg, Nieto-Castanon, Kennedy, and Guenther 2010.
30. Squires, Squires, and Hillyard 1975; Squires, Wickens, Squires, and Donchin 1976.
31. Naatanen, Paavilainen, Rinne, and Alho 2007.
32. Wacongne, Changeux, and Dehaene 2012.
33. Although the mismatch response does not index consciousness, it is a useful clinical sign: coma patients with a clear mismatch response have a greater probability of later recovering than those who do not; see Fischer, Luaute, Adeleine, and Morlet 2004; Kane, Curry, Butler, and Cummins 1993; Naccache, Puybasset, Gaillard, Serve, and Willer 2005.
34. Bekinschtein, Dehaene, Rohaut, Tadel, Cohen, and Naccache 2009.
35. Ibid.
36. Faugeras, Rohaut, Weiss, Bekinschtein, Galanaud, Puybasset, Bolgert, et al. 2012; Faugeras, Rohaut, Weiss, Bekinschtein, Galanaud, Puybasset, Bolgert, et al. 2011.
37. Friston 2005; Wacongne, Labyt, van Wassenhove, Bekinschtein, Naccache, and Dehaene 2011.
38. King, Faugeras, Gramfort, Schurger, El Karoui, Sitt, Wacongne, et al. 2013. See also Tzovara, Rossetti, Spierer, Grivel, Murray, Oddo, and De Lucia 2012 for a similar approach.
39. Massimini, Ferrarelli, Huber, Esser, Singh, and Tononi 2005; Massimini, Boly, Casali, Rosanova, and Tononi 2009; Ferrarelli, Massimini, Sarasso, Casali, Riedner, Angelini, Tononi, and Pearce 2010.
40. Casali, Gosseries, Rosanova, Boly, Sarasso, Casali, Casarotto, et al. 2013.
41. Rosanova, Gosseries, Casarotto, Boly, Casali, Bruno, Mariotti, et al. 2012.
42. Laureys 2005; Laureys, Lemaire, Maquet, Phillips, and Franck 1999.
43. Schiff, Ribary, Moreno, Beattie, Kronberg, Blasberg, Giacino, et al. 2002; Schiff, Ribary, Plum, and Llinas 1999.
44. Galanaud, Perlbarg, Gupta, Stevens, Sanchez, Tollard, de Champfleur, et al. 2012; Tshibanda, Vanhaudenhuyse, Galanaud, Boly, Laureys, and Puybasset 2009; Galanaud, Naccache, and Puybasset 2007.
45. King, Faugeras, Gramfort, Schurger, El Karoui, Sitt, Wacongne, et al. 2013.
46. Our measure of “weighted symbolic mutual information” was inspired by an earlier proposal called “symbolic transfer entropy”; see Staniek and Lehnertz 2008.
47. Sitt, King, El Karoui, Rohaut, Faugeras, Gramfort, Cohen, et al. 2013.
48. The trade-off between high and low frequencies enters heavily into the computation of the bispectral index, a commercial system that purports to measure the depth of unconsciousness during anesthesia. For a critical assessment, see for instance Miller, Sleigh, Barnard, and Steyn-Ross 2004; Schnakers, Ledoux, Majerus, Damas, Damas, Lambermont, Lamy, et al. 2008.
49. Schiff, Giacino, Kalmar, Victor, Baker, Gerber, Fritz, et al. 2007. The priority of this research has been questioned (Staunton 2008), as deep brain stimulation was frequently attempted in coma and vegetative-state patients starting in the 1960s. See, for instance, Tsubokawa, Yamamoto, Katayama, Hirayama, Maejima, and Moriya 1990. For a reply, see Schiff, Giacino, Kalmar, Victor, Baker, Gerber, Fritz, et al. 2008.
50. Moruzzi and Magoun 1949.
51. Shirvalkar, Seth, Schiff, and Herrera 2006.
52. Giacino, Fins, Machado, and Schiff 2012.
53. Schiff, Giacino, Kalmar, Victor, Baker, Gerber, Fritz, et al. 2007.
54. Voss, Uluc, Dyke, Watts, Kobylarz, McCandliss, Heier, et al. 2006. See also Sidaros, Engberg, Sidaros, Liptrot, Herning, Petersen, Paulson, et al. 2008.
55. Laureys, Faymonville, Luxen, Lamy, Franck, and Maquet 2000.
56. Matsuda, Matsumura, Komatsu, Yanaka, and Nose 2003.
57. Giacino, Fins, Machado, and Schiff 2012.
58. Brefel-Courbon, Payoux, Ory, Sommet, Slaoui, Raboyeau, Lemesle, et al. 2007.
59. Cohen, Chaaban, and Habert 2004.
60. Schiff 2010.
61. Striem-Amit, Cohen, Dehaene, and Amedi 2012.
7 THE FUTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
1. Tooley 1983.
2. Tooley 1972.
3. Singer 1993.
4. Diamond and Doar 1989; Diamond and Gilbert 1989; Diamond and Goldman-Rakic 1989.
5. Dubois, Dehaene-Lambertz, Perrin, Mangin, Cointepas, Duchesnay, Le Bihan, and Hertz-Pannier 2007; Jessica Dubois and Ghislaine Dehaene-Lambertz, ongoing research at Unicog lab, NeuroSpin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France.
6. Fransson, Skiold, Horsch, Nordell, Blennow, Lagercrantz, and Aden 2007; Doria, Beckmann, Arichi, Merchant, Groppo, Turkheimer, Counsell, et al. 2010; Lagercrantz and Changeux 2010.
7. Mehler, Jusczyk, Lambertz, Halsted, Bertoncini, and Amiel-Tison 1988.
8. Dehaene-Lambertz, Dehaene, and Hertz-Pannier 2002; Dehaene-Lambertz, Hertz-Pannier, and Dubois 2006; Dehaene-Lambertz, Hertz-Pannier, Dubois, Meriaux, Roche, Sigman, and Dehaene 2006; Dehaene-Lambertz, Montavont, Jobert, Allirol, Dubois, Hertz-Pannier, and Dehaene 2009.
9. Dehaene-Lambertz, Montavont, Jobert, Allirol, Dubois, Hertz-Pannier, and Dehaene 2009.
10. Leroy, Glasel, Dubois, Hertz-Pannier, Thirion, Mangin, and Dehaene-Lambertz 2011.
11. Dehaene-Lambertz, Hertz-Pannier, Dubois, Meriaux, Roche, Sigman, and Dehaene 2006.
12. Davis, Coleman, Absalom, Rodd, Johnsrude, Matta, Owen, and Menon 2007.
13. Dehaene-Lambertz, Hertz-Pannier, Dubois, Meriaux, Roche, Sigman, and Dehaene 2006.
14. Basirat, Dehaene, and Dehaene-Lambertz 2012.
15. Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, and Morton 1991.
16. On infant experiments, see Gelskov and Kouider 2010; Kouider, Stahlhut, Gelskov, Barbosa, Dutat, de Gardelle, Christophe, et al. 2013. The adult paradigm, which I described in Chapter 4, was published in Del Cul, Baillet, and Dehaene 2007.
17. Diamond and Doar 1989.
18. de Haan and Nelson 1999; Csibra, Kushnerenko, and Grossman 2008.
19. Nelson, Thomas, de Haan, and Wewerka 1998.
20. Dehaene-Lambertz and Dehaene 1994.
21. Friederici, Friedrich, and Weber 2002.
22. Dubois, Dehaene-Lambertz, Perrin, Mangin, Cointepas, Duchesnay, Le Bihan, and Hertz-Pannier 2007.
23. Izard, Sann, Spelke, and Streri 2009.
24. Lagercrantz and Changeux 2009.
25. Han, O’Tuathaigh, van Trigt, Quinn, Fanselow, Mongeau, Koch, and Anderson 2003; Dos Santos Coura and Granon 2012.
26. Bolhuis and Gahr 2006.
27. Leopold and Logothetis 1996.
28. Kovacs, Vogels, and Orban 1995; Macknik and Haglund 1999.
29. Cowey and Stoerig 1995.
30. Fuster 2008.
31. Denys, Vanduffel, Fize, Nelissen, Sawamura, Georgieva, Vogels, et al. 2004.
32. Hasson, Nir, Levy, Fuhrmann, and Malach 2004.
33. Hayden, Smith, and Platt 2009.
34. Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter 2008.
35. My colleagues and I are currently pursuing explorations of the local-global paradigm in monkeys (in collaboration with Lynn Uhrig and Bechir Jarraya) and in mice (with Karim Benchenane and Catherine Wacongne).
36. Smith, Schull, Strote, McGee, Egnor, and Erb 1995.
37. Terrace and Son 2009.
38. Hampton 2001; Kornell, Son, and Terrace 2007; Kiani and Shadlen 2009.
39. Kornell, Son, and Terrace 2007.
40. Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, and Kok 2001; Logan and Crump 2010; Charles, Van Opstal, Marti, and Dehaene 2013.
41. Kiani and Shadlen 2009; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, and Rees 2010. A specific part of the thalamus called the pulvinar, which is tightly interconnected to the prefrontal and parietal areas, also plays a key role in metacognitive judgments. See Komura, Nikkuni, Hirashima, Uetake, and Miyamoto 2013.
42. Meltzoff and Brooks 2008; Kovacs, Teglas, and Endress 2010.
43. Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, and Tomasello 2007.
44. Marticorena, Ruiz, Mukerji, Goddu, and Santos 2011.
45. Fuster 2008.
46. Elston, Benavides-Piccione, and DeFelipe 2001; Elston 2003.
47. Ochsner, Knierim, Ludlow, Hanelin, Ramachandran, Glover, and Mackey 2004; Saxe and Powell 2006; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, and Rees 2010.
48. Schoenemann, Sheehan, and Glotzer 2005.
49. Schenker, Buxhoeveden, Blackmon, Amunts, Zilles, and Semendeferi 2008; Schenker, Hopkins, Spocter, Garrison, Stimpson, Erwin, Hof, and Sherwood 2009.
50. Nimchinsky, Gilissen, Allman, Perl, Erwin, and Hof 1999; Allman, Hakeem, and Watson 2002; Allman, Watson, Tetreault, and Hakeem 2005.
51. Dehaene and Changeux 2011.
52. Frith 1979; Frith 1996; Stephan, Friston, and Frith 2009.
53. Huron, Danion, Giacomoni, Grange, Robert, and Rizzo 1995; Danion, Meulemans, Kauffmann-Muller, and Vermaat 2001; Danion, Cuervo, Piolino, Huron, Riutort, Peretti, and Eustache 2005.
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57. Luck, Fuller, Braun, Robinson, Summerfelt, and Gold 2006; Luck, Kappenman, Fuller, Robinson, Summerfelt, and Gold 2009; Antoine Del Cul, Stanislas Dehaene, Marion Leboyer et al., unpublished experiments.
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63. Dehaene, Sergent, and Changeux 2003; Dehaene and Changeux 2005.
64. Wong and Wang 2006.
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66. Friston 2005.
67. Dalmau, Tuzun, Wu, Masjuan, Rossi, Voloschin, Baehring, et al. 2007; Dalmau, Gleichman, Hughes, Rossi, Peng, Lai, Dessain, et al. 2008.
68. Block 2001; Block 2007.
69. Chalmers 1996.
70. Chalmers 1995, 81.
71. Weiss, Simoncelli, and Adelson 2002.
72. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), book 2.
73. Eccles 1994.
74. Penrose and Hameroff 1998.
75. Dennett 1984.
76. Edelman 1989.