1 For a photocopy of the cable, see http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-09.pdf.
2 The conference program is available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/arab-israeli-war/nixon-arab-isaeli-war.pdf.
1 For example, in Israel, Braun 1992, who defended Moshe Dayan; Bartov 1978 and 2002, who defended Israeli chief of staff David Elazar; Bar-Yosef 2001 and 2011, who focused on intelligence and personal accusations against Eli Zeira; Zeira 2004, who expressed his position and blamed Dayan. In Egypt see, for example, Shazly 1987, el-Gamasy 1995, and Heikal 1975.
2 For example, Meir 1975; Sadat 1978; Seale 1993 (biography of Assad); Stein 2003.
3 For example, Rabin 1979; Ismail 1987.
4 For example, Kissinger 1979; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 2001.
5 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–76, Volume XXV, July 2011.
6 Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, January 30, 2013.
1 Golan 1976, 142.
2 Kissinger 1982, 459.
3 Golan 1976, 142.
4 The number of Israeli dead includes victims of the war up to the separation-of-forces agreements with Egypt (January 1974) and Syria (May 1974).
5 Rabin to Meir, February 22, 1973, Lamed Vav/415, Israeli State Archives (ISA).
6 Ibid. At that time Kissinger was the national security advisor to the president and was not yet secretary of state. Only a month before the war did Kissinger fill both positions.
7 NA RN, NSC Files, Box 135; FRUS XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Doc. 60.
8 See, for example, Vanetik and Shalom 2009, 205–45.
9 Minutes of the meeting between Meir, Kissinger, and Rabin at Rabin’s home in Washington, D.C., February 28, 1973, Aleph-7064/8, ISA.
10 US NA, Nixon Presidential Materials, White Tapes, Conversation No. 866-16; see also FRUS XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Doc. 36, 114–16.
11 Lamed Vav/555, Aleph-7052/1, March 30, 1973, ISA.
12 Dinitz to Meir, report on April 11, 1973, discussion, Lamed Vav/608, Aleph-7052/1 April 12, 1973, ISA.
13 Dinitz to Meir on his face-to-face discussion with Kissinger in San Clemente on July 3, after an update on the summit between Nixon and Brezhnev, Lamed Vav/765, Aleph-7046/9, July 4, 1973, ISA.
14 Gazit to Dinitz. Instructions for an answer to Kissinger on the political subject, September 25, 1973, Vav Lamed/738, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
15 Dinitz to Meir regarding his meeting with Kissinger, who invited him urgently to the White House on Sunday, September 30, 1973, Lamed Vav/934, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
16 Minutes of the meeting between Kissinger, Ismail Fahmi, and Ashraf Marwan on February 17, 1974, in Washington, DC. NA RN NSC Country Files, Middle East, Egypt, Vol. X, Box 133.
17 Ibid.
18 Moshe Dayan, in a speech to a Moshav Movement Conference, June 27, 1969, quoted in Davar, June 27, 1969. Dayan repeated his statement in the Knesset on July 15, 1969, in answer to a question by Meir Wilner (Israeli Communist Party). See minutes of Sixth Knesset session 427, July 15, 1969.
19 Institute for Applied Social Research and Hebrew University Communications Institute, as reported in Ha’aretz, April 12, 1973.
20 This is a very common conspiracy theory in Israel. One of its proponents is historian Uri Milstein. See “Conspiracy, Why Not?,” Ha’aretz, April 17, 2011, http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.1171401. In addition, there are those who tie it to the murder of the Israeli air attaché, Joe Allon, in Washington in July 1973: see Who Killed Joe Allon?, Channel One, Israel Television, April 6, 2011.
21 For further information, see the discussion of the understandings of December 1971 in Chapter 2 and the details of the debate that took place in Israel during the hours preceding the war in Chapter 8.
1 All documents from the Israeli State Archives have been translated from the original Hebrew. Lamed Vav/237, December 22, 1972, Aleph-7061/5, ISA.
2 Kissinger 1979, 1293; see also CIA documentation summarizing the process of creating a presidential track, NA RN, NSC files, HAK files, Box 131, and FRUS XXV, 4–5; also, meeting between Kissinger and Rabin, October 6, 1972, Lamed Vav/93, Aleph-7061/5, ISA. Rabin’s report to Meir on this subject is not mentioned in the American minutes; they spoke privately.
3 Shazly 1987, 116.
4 A series of telegrams from and to Cairo from July 20, 1972, to September 1, 1972, NA RN, NSC, Boxes 134 and 658; Saunders to Kissinger, July 29, 1972, ibid.; draft copy of a reply from Kissinger to Ismail, December 20, 1972, ibid.; Kissinger 1979, 1295–99.
5 “Why don’t they wait until I am the new Secretary of State? Why do they have to deal with the issue now?” Kissinger complained to Rabin about the Egyptians at a meeting at the White House on October 6, 1972, exactly one year before the war broke out. NA RN, NSC, Box 610.
6 Kissinger 1979, 1299.
7 Ibid., 1300.
8 NA RN, NSC, Box 131.
9 Rabin, December 11, 1972, Lamed Vav/237, Aleph-7061/5, ISA.
10 See appendix for a discussion of Ashraf Marwan’s role as a Mossad agent.
11 Dinitz to Rabin, February 18, 1973, Lamed Vav/348; Dinitz to Rabin, February 19, 1973, Lamed/349, Aleph-7061/6, ISA; Dinitz to Rabin, February 25, 1973, ibid. Zamir took care to oppose transmitting information that arrived from Marwan; more than once, his attempts to protect Marwan usually resulted in discussion in a limited forum of decision-makers. For example, at the end of November 1972, Marwan transmitted to Israel an alert on Egypt’s and Syria’s intention to initiate a coordinated military action. Rabin, who was in Israel at the time, was permitted to read the information Marwan provided and was instructed to pass it on to Kissinger and Nixon. However, when Rabin returned to Washington, an urgent telegram reached him about a change in instructions “after consultation with the prime minister, the minister of defense, the chief of staff, and the heads of the Mossad and Aman (the army intelligence unit).” The new instructions to Rabin were to pass on only general information: “Tell Shaul that, at the time of your visit in Israel, you managed to meet with various groups. The security organizations are of the opinion that Egypt is preparing a renewal of fighting and they intend to involve the Syrians in this action…. The prime minister has concluded that, at this stage, you should not transmit what you read during your visit to your friend.” See the document that replaces Lamed Vav/197, Meir to Rabin, January 12, 1972, Aleph-7043/16, ISA.
12 Shazly 1987, 24, 126–34. On December 12, the chiefs of staff of the Arab nations assembled in Cairo and agreed on the details of military and financial assistance to Egypt by the states that were not on the confrontation line, especially making Western-made flight squadrons available to Egypt (Saudi and Kuwaiti Lightnings and Libyan Mirages). Later, the Soviets completed the acquisitions which would be necessary to implement the limited war plan, MiG 23s, batteries of Scud ground-to-ground missiles, anti-tank missile launchers, a battery of SAM 6 anti-aircraft missiles, advanced artillery, and armored personnel carriers.
13 Ibid.
14 Shazly 1987, 27.
15 Author’s interview with a knowledgeable source.
16 Author’s discussions with Zamir on February 7, 2011.
17 The military commanders were told that the limited war was a first step in a step-by-step process to free Sinai, and their understanding was that this would be carried out by military moves. Interview with Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy on February 24, 1997, given to the BBC for the series Israel and the Arabs, Fifty Years of War, Liddell Hart Center for Military Archives (LHCMA), King’s College, London. Ahron Bregman and Jihan El-Tahri used these interviews in writing their book The Fifty Years War. I would like to thank Dr. Bregman who enabled me to study this material, now located in the archive, filed under the title “Bregman’s materials.”
18 Braun 1992, 18.
19 Ezov 2011, 66–67; also Bartov 2002, 191–92.
20 Braun 1994, 28.
21 Ma’ariv, July 20, 1973.
22 Ibid.
23 Ma’ariv, February 15, 1973. Symposium of chiefs of staff with the participation of Yigael Yadin, Mordechai Makleff, Moshe Dayan, Haim Laskov, Tzvi Tsur, Yitzhak Rabin, and Haim Bar-Lev.
24 The operation was meant to evaluate the Israeli listening devices, improve them, and assess how long they could continue to supply information.
25 For Egyptian military conduct during the days before the war, see Shazly, 149–59.
26 Zeira 2004, 145. For the deployment of the Egyptian army during the days before the war, see Shazly, 149–59.
27 Meeting between Rabin and Kissinger, October 6, 1972, NA RN, NSC Files, Rabin/Dinitz Box 135.
28 Kissinger 1982, 202–3.
29 Kissinger to Nixon, November 9, 1972, NA RN, NSC Box 134.
30 Allon spoke publicly of Israel’s need and willness to conduct negotiations in two parallel tracks. Israel hurried to deny that this was its official position and stated that it was ready to conduct negotiations for a comprehensive settlement as long as it was not required to obligate itself to return all territory it had captured in 1967. Davar, December 21, 1972.
31 Lamed Vav/229, Aleph-7053/25; Rabin to the Prime Minister’s Office, December 22, 1972, Lamed Vav/237, Aleph-7061/5; Freddie Eini, deputy to the head of the Mossad, to the military secretary of the prime minister, December 24, 1972, Taf Aleph/26, ibid.
32 The headlines and reports cited here appeared in Ha’aretz.
33 Ha’aretz, January 1, 1973.
34 Ha’aretz, January 4, 1973.
35 Ha’aretz, January 29, 1973, and January 31, 1973.
36 Kissinger 1979, 1474.
37 Meeting between Rabin and Kissinger, January 24, 1973, NA RN NSC files, Rabin/Dinitz, Box 135; Lamed Vav/314, Rabin to Dinitz, January 25, 1972, Aleph 7069/6, ISA.
38 Lamed Vav/315, Rabin to Dinitz, January 25, 1973, Aleph-7069. ISA.
39 Ibid.
40 Meeting between Rabin and Kissinger, February 5, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Rabin/Dinitz, Box 135; and Rabin to Dinitz, February 5, 1973, Lamed Vav/334, Aleph-7069/6, ISA.
41 On Rabin’s meeting with Schlesinger, Rabin to Dinitz, February 15, 1973, Lamed Vav/368, Aleph-7046/11, ISA.
42 Ha’aretz, February 20, 1973.
43 Summary of discussion between Meir and Dayan, Aleph-7066/25, ISA.
44 Rabin to Dinitz, February 18, 1973, Lamed Vav/376, Aleph-7061, ISA.
45 Dinitz to Rabin, Lamed Vav/348 and Lamed Vav/349, Aleph-7061, ISA.
46 February 21, 1973, Lamed Vav/397, Aleph-7046/11, ISA.
47 Regarding the first conversation, Rabin to Meir, February 21, 1973, Lamed Vav/397, Aleph-7046/11, ISA; conversation between Kissinger and Rabin at 09:58, February 21, 1973, NA RN, Telcon, Box 18. Regarding the second conversation at 15:40, February 21, 1973, ibid.
48 Telephone conversation between Kissinger and Sisco at 18:30, February 22, 1973, NA RA, HAK, Telcon, Box 18, and FRUS XXV, 59n6.
49 Working memorandum from Kissinger to the president in preparation for his meeting with Ismail, February 23, 1973, NA RN, NSC Files, Box 658; FRUS XXV, 69–71.
50 Rabin to Dinitz about his meeting with Kissinger, February 22, 1973, Lamed Vav/415, Aleph-7061, ISA; for the Americans’ notes on the meeting, FRUS XXV, 60–66.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 NA RN, White House tapes, conversation no. 862-9; FRUS XXV, 67–68.
54 Meeting between Nixon and Ismail, February 23, 1973; meeting between Rogers and Ismail, February 23, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Box 658; FRUS XXV, 72–78.
55 Rabin to Dinitz about his telephone conversation with Kissinger, February 24, 1973, Lamed Vav/424, Aleph-7061, ISA.
1 Meeting protocol, February 28, 1973, Aleph-7064, ISA.
2 Kissinger 1982, 214.
3 Protocol of two days of discussion and Kissinger’s report to the president on the discussion on March 6, 1973: NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 131; Kissinger 1982, 196–216; FRUS XXV, 80–86.
4 “We extend our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness, and we appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people, settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.” Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948, English translation available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration of establishment of state of israel.aspx.
5 Kissinger also testifies to this and maintains that Sadat’s approach to peace had evolved over time. At the beginning, it was only a tactical move, but later, after the war, the peace process became an end in itself for Sadat (Kissinger 1982, 648).
6 A few days later Kissinger told Meir: “In my talks with Ismail, I could apply my usual delaying tactics. Ninety-eight percent of the time he answered my questions and the rest of the time I filled with platitudes.” Report of Kissinger’s talk with Golda Meir on February 28, 1973, at the home of the Israeli ambassador to the United States. The conversation lasted about two hours. Aleph-7064/8, ISA.
7 A CIA document regarding secret high-level meetings between the governments of Egypt and the United States regarding peace in the Middle East, January 15, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 131; Kissinger 1979, 1229; FRUS XXV, 4–5.
8 Sadat’s position on this point had already been known to Israel since April 1971 (Rabin 1979, 345–46).
9 Kissinger to Dinitz, June 2, 1973, Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
10 Protocol of two days of discussion and Kissinger’s report to the president on the discussion, March 6, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 131, and Kissinger 1982, 196–216; Kissinger’s report to Nixon on the meetings and for their follow-on discussion on February 26, 1973, FRUS XXV, 80–86.
11 Report by Rabin of his of meeting with Kissinger, February 27, 1973, Appendix A, Aleph-7055/8, ISA.
12 All three statements are quoted from the protocol of two days of discussion between Kissinger and Ismail and Kissinger’s report to the president on the discussion, March 6, 1973: NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 131.
13 Discussion between Nixon and Kissinger in the White House, February 26, 1973, 18:31–19:15. NA RN, White House tapes, nos. 413–33; FRUS XXV, 85–86.
14 Rabin, meeting with Kissinger, February 27, 1973. An American-written “Summary of Conversation” reporting on the meeting between Kissinger and Ismail was included in this report; see also telephone conversation between Kissinger and Rabin, 19:15, February 26, 1973, NA RN, HAK, Telcon, Box 18.
15 Discussion between Nixon and Kissinger in the White House, 18:31–19:15. FRUS XXV, 85-86. The following week, Kissinger transmitted an orderly summary in writing about the meeting and about his conclusions. His recommendation was to allow the State Department to prepare an interim agreement “under his direction” and to discuss the full agreement with the Egyptians in the secret channel. “Summary of my discussions with Ismail,” memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, March 6, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 131; FRUS XXV, 28–84.
16 Ibid.
17 Telephone conversation between Kissinger and Rabin, 19:15, February 26, 1973.
18 Rabin 1979, 382.
19 For details of the discussion: Library of Congress (LOC), Kissinger papers, Box TS32, Geopolitical Files, Middle East, Chronological Files; FRUS XXV, 86–95; Kissinger 1982, 216–20.
20 At the start of the war, Hussein’s hands were tied; he could not accept the Israeli government’s request to maintain the calm along the Jordanian border and keep to the armistice line. When an Egyptian commando regiment was stationed in the courtyard of his palace in Amman, Hussein could no longer maintain command of his army. On the first day of the Six-Day War the Jordanian army opened fire on the western sector of divided Jerusalem, attacked targets in Israel from the air, and even fired a number of shells in the direction of Netanya. Later, Arab Legion soldiers captured Armon Hanatziv (the palatial former home of the British High Commissioner) in Jerusalem. Again the Israeli government requested that Hussein withdraw from the Armon and stop the firing; this time, in return, Israel would determine the armistice line to be the permanent border with Jordan. This request did not receive any reaction from Hussein. For the additional letter to Hussein, see Kipnis 2009, 89.
21 Hussein reached Washington in a state of alarm that a coordinated Egyptian-Syrian military action would take place in the near future. Hussein himself had refused to take part in such a step and was trying to advance political developments that would prevent it. He reported to Kissinger about a meeting between his advisor, Zaid Rifai, with Sadat in Cairo on December 17, 1972. Report from Kissinger, January 2, 1973, LOC, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 168, 1973; telegram from the US Ambassador to Jordan, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 135; FRUS XXV, 37–43.
22 Report from Rabin to Meir, February 5, 1973, Lamed Vav/334, Aleph-7061/6, ISA; Meeting protocol, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 135.
23 Ibid.
24 The document’s exact wording of the Jordanian proposal was as follows: “The Americans will build us an elevated highway so that we can get to Gaza without going through Israel.”
25 Kissinger 1982, 220.
26 Meeting between Rabin and Kissinger in the Map Room of the White House, February 27, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135; FRUS XXV, 96–99; see also Rabin’s report, including the American summary of the meeting with Ismail, Aleph-7055/8, ISA. A written report was transmitted to Rabin at 13:00 and the prime minister read it before Rabin met with Kissinger.
27 Telegrams to Rabin from the Prime Minister’s Office, Lamed/348 and Lamed/349, Aleph-7061/6, ISA; also Zamir and Mass 2011, 81.
28 The Soviets primarily feared events that might lead to a conflict between the super-powers. Letter to Kissinger from Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States and Kissinger’s discussion partner for intimate clarifications about relations between the two powers, January 28, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 70; FRUS XXV, 19–21.
29 Dispatch from Brezhnev to Nixon, February 25, 1973. In reply to Nixon to Brezhnev, December 18, 1972, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Country Files, Box 135.
30 It appears that this document was sent on Kissinger’s instructions. Rabin met with Kissinger at 15:15 and, as he reported, “most of it was private.” In his report he wrote, “The discussion took place after I had already received (at 13:00) a written report of the essence of his discussions with the Egyptian.” Report by Rabin of his meeting with Kissinger, February 27, 1973, Appendix A, Aleph-7055/8, ISA.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Meir’s discussion with Cardinal (Kissinger’s codename in these Israeli correspondences, before he became Shaul, which itself preceded Naftali, another Kissinger nickname) on Wednesday, December 1, 1971, Aleph-4239/3, ISA; report of the meeting between Meir and Nixon, December 2, 1971, Aleph-4239/1, ISA; NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 609.
34 Report on the meeting between Rabin and Kissinger, December 24, 1971, Lamed Vav/416, Aleph-7052/20, ISA.
35 This was how Prime Minister Meir described the Rogers Plan in her discussion with President Nixon on December 2, 1971. These understandings were added to the working papers in preparation for Meir’s visit to Washington in February 1973. They were entitled “Prime Minister’s Understandings with ‘Robert’ [Nixon] and ‘Shaul’ [Kissinger],” December 10, 1971, Aleph-4239, ISA.
36 Report on Meir’s discussion with Kissinger, December 1, 1971, Aleph-4239/3, ISA.
37 Israeli protocol of the meeting of February 28, 1973, Aleph-7064/8, ISA. Kissinger determined the meeting to be private, so there is no official American report. The meeting continued for two hours and included Kissinger’s assistant Peter Rodman, Simcha Dinitz, and Avner Idan. For the first and last fifteen minutes, Kissinger, Meir, and Rabin talked alone. There is no documentation for that conversation.
38 The source for all of the quotes is the Israeli protocol of the meeting of February 28, 1973, Aleph-7064/8, ISA.
39 Meeting of Meir with Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson and Assistant Secretary of State Peter Rodman, February 28, 1973, Aleph-7055/9 and Aleph-7062/8, ISA.
40 Discussion between Kissinger and Nixon, 11:07–11:52, February 28, 1973, NA RN, White House Tapes. Conversation No. 865-22; FRUS XXV, 99–101.
41 Report of the meeting with Kissinger, 19:30, February 28, 1973, at Aleph-7064/8, ISA.
42 Rabin 1979, 387.
43 Rabin’s report of his discussion with Kissinger, 19:30, February 28, 1973, Aleph-7064/8, ISA.
44 Ibid. Quotation marks appear in the source.
45 Telephone call between Rabin and Kissinger, 23:15, February 28, 1973, NA RN, HAK, Telcon Files, February 27–28, Box 18; telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, 23:30, February 28, 1973, ibid.
46 Telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, 23:30, February 28, 1973.
47 Discussion between Meir and Nixon in the White House, 11:00, March 1, 1973, Aleph-7038/12, ISA; http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/memcons/1552563.pdf; NA RN, NSC, Box 1026; FRUS XXV, 105–13.
48 Telephone conversation with Kissinger, 10:30, March 1, 1973, Aleph-7062/8, ISA; NA RN, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 866-4.
49 Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon regarding meeting with Hafez Ismail, February 23, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Middle East, Egypt/Ismail, Box 131; FRUS XXV, 69–71.
50 Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon regarding meeting with Meir, February 28, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 135.
51 The Americans understood Israeli politics well. Ministers and key figures often discussed these matters with them and shared their knowledge and their misgivings. One example of this: A report of a discussion between the ministers Pinchas Sapir, Moshe Kol, and Natan Peled. Telegram from the Tel Aviv Embassy regarding Meir’s political plans, February 27, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 610.
52 Kissinger 1982, 212.
53 Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon regarding meeting with Hafez Ismail, February 23, 1973; FRUS XXV, 69–71.
54 Discussion between Meir and Nixon in the White House, 11:00, March 1, 1973; Aleph-7038/12, ISA; NA RN, NSC, Box 1026; FRUS XXV, 105–13; http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/memcons/1552563.pdf.
55 In a telephone conversation between Rabin and Kissinger on March 1, 1973, at 10:30, a half hour before Meir met with Nixon, Kissinger told Rabin that “at a certain stage [of the discussion] Robert [Nixon] would latch onto Meir’s statements about a partial settlement.” Even before that, Rabin had proposed “selling” the president Israeli concessions regarding a partial settlement, which were not known to him and had not been publicized. 19:30, February 28, 1973, Aleph-7064/8; Rabin’s report of the conversation, 10:30, March 1, 1978, Aleph-7062/8, ISA.
56 After the meeting, Kissinger sent a letter to Rogers and Richardson and updated them that, contradicting Israeli demands, the president had decided to approve at least one hundred improved Mirage planes and to continue the supply of Skyhawks and Phantoms in 1974, without specifying the exact numbers. The decision on the quantity and the rate of supply would be discussed later. Memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers and Schlesinger, March 2, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 135; FRUS XXV, 116–17.
57 The meeting between Nixon and Meir ended at 12:39. Nixon and Kissinger talked from 12:44 to 13:06. NA RN, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 866-16; FRUS XXV, 114–16.
58 Ibid.
1 Kissinger to Dinitz at their meeting on April 11, 1973, in the Map Room of the White House. NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 135.
2 James Reston, “The Indefatigable Dr. Kissinger Looks to New Worlds to Conquer,” New York Times, March 8, 1973. Reprinted in Ha’aretz, March 9, 1973.
3 Ibid.
4 This answer, the essence of Kissinger’s program, and the schedule he planned were reported to Israel at the meeting between Kissinger and Rabin, March 9, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Country Files, Box 135. A short time after the beginning of the meeting, Kissinger requested that Rodman, who was the only one present at the beginning of the discussion, leave the room, and most of the discussion in the Map Room took place privately between Kissinger and Rabin. Important details about it are not included in the American protocol and can be understood only from Rabin’s report to Meir, 18:00–18:40, March 9, 1973, Aleph-8/7062, ISA.
5 Letter from Kissinger to Ismail, NA RN, NSC, HAK, March 9, 1973, Box 131.
6 Memorandum from Trone to Kissinger about his conversations with Ismail, after Ismail’s meetings with Kissinger. The document is labeled: Shown to Rabin. March 9, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Country Files, Box 135.
7 Telephone conversation between Rabin and Kissinger, 17:15, March 10, 1973, NA RN, HAK, Box 19, Telcon, March 10–14, 1973.
8 Ibid. According to Rabin, Kissinger warned that if Israel did not cooperate with his plans, the matter would be transferred to the State Department, which was hostile to Israel, and the process would continue with the Soviet Union’s draft proposal. See also report of discussion with Kissinger, March 9, 1973, Aleph-7062, ISA.
9 Rabin’s report to Meir, 18:00–18:40, March 9, 1973.
10 Personal letter to Dinitz from Gazit, April 8, 1973, Aleph-7550/4, ISA.
11 “Annoyance for Yitzhak Rabin,” Ha’aretz, March 12, 1973; also, Ha’aretz, March 11, 1973, “Golda Meir Returns from the United States,” subtitled “Another Side of the Coin”: “Meir rejected an invitation from Israeli Television to participate in a program about Rabin’s life which had been filmed in Washington. Her refusal stemmed from emotional reasons more than formal ones. A few days later, in the presence of President Nixon, Mrs. Meir explained that her admiration for the outgoing ambassador was not as great as that of Mr. Nixon.” In addition, the article continued, “Mrs. Meir left the clear impression that she was not completely satisfied with the outgoing ambassador, Yitzhak Rabin, and that his political future was not clear at the time.”
12 Kissinger to Rabin at their meeting on March 9. Three days previously, he had made similar comments to the Russian ambassador, Dobrynin. NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 70.
13 Ha’aretz, March 2, 3, and 11. Meir was still weighing her decision regarding whether to continue her political activity after this headline.
14 From Dinitz to Allon, via Mizrahi, March 2, 1973, Lamed Vav/450, Aleph-7466/4, ISA.
15 In addition to Moshe Dayan and Yisrael Galili, ministers Pinchas Sapir and Shimon Peres participated in the meeting. March 13, 1973, Lamed Gimel/Sheleg, Aleph-7062, ISA.
16 Rabin 1979, 384; Shlomo Gross (Poless), “Nixon’s Compliments to Golda Hinted at the Need for a Settlement,” Ha’aretz, March 9, 1973.
17 Rabin 1979, 384.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 March 13, 1973, Lamed Gimel/Sheleg, Aleph-7062, ISA.
21 Telegram from the American embassy in Israel to the State Department, Tel Aviv 1677, March 5, 1973. NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 658; NA, GR, 59 Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr.
22 For Allon’s position regarding the security zones necessary for Israel in Sinai, see Aleph-5001/19, ISA, sixth meeting. At the end of 1979, Allon participated in a series of twenty-three meetings at the Davis Institute in Jerusalem to document his memories. More than twenty-five years later, this testimony was approved for publication, but parts of it are still secret.
23 About two weeks later, Rabin spoke at a gathering of United Jewish Appeal members in Switzerland and stated that the Arab states were interested in having Kissinger mediate a solution to the Middle East conflict. Ha’aretz, March 21, 1973.
24 Syria had not accepted Security Council Resolution 242 and was not a party to political moves.
25 On July 30, 1970, the official bodies of Gahal (the Hebrew acronym for the Herut-Liberal Bloc) decided by a majority of 116 to 112 to leave the government if it accepted the ceasefire initiative.
26 Even from a military standpoint, the ceasefire greatly affected the events of October 1973. Israel ended the War of Attrition without the air force finding a way to deal with the confrontation between planes and ground-to-air missiles, and the Egyptians advanced the missile batteries.
27 At the margins of the election campaign but as a significant political development, considering the internal struggle in the ruling party, on March 22 the Labor Party chose the scientist Efraim Katzir (Katchalsky) as its candidate for the presidency. He ran against Yitzhak Navon, who was identified with the Dayan camp (Rafi) in the party.
28 Ran Kislev, Ha’aretz, April 12 and 14, under the headline: “Dayan’s Political Poker, Decision in the Struggle about Territories in the Labor Party Delayed.”
29 Dayan said this on March 14, 1973, at a meeting of members of the Moshav faction of the Labor Movement, Ha’aretz, March 15, 1973. On March 29, Dayan also met with the kibbutz faction of the Labor Party. He said that this appearance was part of his election campaign, presented his own settlement plan, and thus instigated a sharp debate in the Labor Party with regard to its platform, which culminated in the publication of the Galili document.
30 The Galili document—the written “Oral Law”—reflected the Labor Party’s political position, as did the settlement map, which included two-thirds of the Golan, the length of the Jordan Valley, and the Judean Desert, in Israeli hands, as well as east Sinai along the el-Arish Ras-Muhammad line. Ot, September 23, 1973.
31 Shazly 1987, 137–41. For additional information on Egypt’s internal problems and their connection to its attitudes to war with Israel, see Shamir 1978 and Maytal 1991, 239.
32 Special report on Sadat’s address to the propaganda and media representatives in Egypt on February 27. April 4, 1973, Mem-Daled 118/4. Based on Al-Jadid, Lebanon, March 16, 1973, Aleph-4036/13, ISA; Sadat’s address at the meeting with public figures, February 27, 1973, TZK/1755, Egypt, Aleph-7038/3, ISA.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, March 12, 1973, NA RN, HAK, Box 131; FRUS XXV, 120.
36 For example, Shazly, the Egyptian Chief of General Staff, does not mention the political issues at all in his book, as usually accepted in a reliable source regarding the conduct of the military command during the period preceding the war. Shazly 1987.
37 Brezhnev to Nixon, March 14, 1973 NA RN, NSC, Box 131; discussions between Dobrynin and Kissinger, NA RN, HAK, Telcon, March 10–14 and 15–27, 1973; FRUS XXV, 118.
38 Regarding the complex position of the Soviet Union in the area at that time: Telegram from Freddy Eini, aide to Zamir, to Meir, March 27, 1973, following the meeting between Mordechai Gazit, director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, and Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Kotov, Soviet representatives, Aleph-7061/6, ISA.
39 Sadat’s speech at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the Egyptian People’s Assembly, March 26, 1973, Aleph-7038/3, ISA; excerpts from Sadat’s speech, March 26, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, M.E. Box 132; NA GR 59 POL 27 Arab-Isr., Cairo 909, March 27, 1973.
40 Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon regarding Sadat’s March 26 speech, March 30, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Saunders Files, Box 1171; FRUS XXV, 123–24.
41 On March 1, the Washington Post published an article by James Hoagland analyzing Sadat’s February speech, arguing that it appeared that a military attack on Israel was not Egypt’s immediate policy, that Sadat did not use the term “war” but rather “a battle of all of the nations,” that the diplomatic campaign was not just a performance but rather expressed his intention to give precedence to a peaceful solution, and that if negotiations were started, this approach would receive wide support among the population.
42 Regarding the effect of the diplomats’ murder, Kissinger wrote to Ismail, “You cannot imagine how difficult it is here to deal with the impression that many Arab governments make calculated use of terror as a political instrument against the United States.” NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 31.
43 Ibid.; FRUS XXV, 121–22.
44 Report on meeting between Dinitz and Kissinger, 12:00, March 30, 1973, Lamed Vav/555, Aleph-7052/1, ISA. Quotation marks in original. At this meeting, Dinitz also updated Kissinger on the meetings between Gazit, Primakov, and Kotov, in which the Soviets investigated the possibility of being involved in a political process and reestablishing official representation of the Soviet Union in Israel, although they opposed establishing Israeli representation in Moscow. Further information on the Soviets’ attempts is in Gazit’s report of the meeting on March 24, 1973, Aleph-7045/13, ISA, as well as the American protocol of the meeting on March 30, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135; FRUS XXV, 125–29.
45 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135; report from Dinitz to Meir, April 12, 1973, Lamed Vav/606, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
46 Letter from Kissinger to Ismail, March 30, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135.
47 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 131.
48 Report from Joseph Greene, principal officer of the United States Interests Section in Egypt, to Secretary of State Rogers on his discussion with the Saudi ambassador on April 4 in Cairo, April 6, 1973, Cairo 1024, NA GR 59 Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr.
49 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 131; FRUS XXV, 140–42.
50 Gazit to Dinitz, Lamed Vav/529, and reply, Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/600, both April 9, 1973, Aleph-4996/1, ISA.
51 Greene was the US diplomatic representative in Cairo. He reported on the interview on March 30. The interview was published on April 9, 1973, in Newsweek. NA GR 59 Pol 27 Arab-Isr.; Cairo 950, March 30, 1973; see also Aleph-7062/18, Aleph-7066/11, and Aleph-7038/3, ISA.
52 Medzini 2008, 522.
53 El-Saadany 1994, 102.
54 The official source was quoted by foreign journalists and appeared in Ha’aretz, April 4, 1973.
55 Sadat’s words at the government meeting of April 5, 1973 (Meytal 1991, 263). Based on Ismail’s memoirs, Ismail 1987, 268; Stein 2003, 95. Stein relies on interviews with el-Gamasy and Ismail. Other researchers rely on el-Gamasy’s testimony, but he, like other members of the government, did not know about the political discussion channel.
56 This series of reports appeared in Ha’aretz, April 2–9, 1973. The Sunday Times report was reprinted in Ha’aretz.
57 For a description of the preparations for the operation: Zamir and Mass 2011, 73; about the operation itself, Caspit and Kfir 1998, 118–31.
58 Ha’aretz, April 12, 1973.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Dayan’s talk at a visit to the Jordan Valley, Davar, April 17, 1979. For addition information on this topic, see Kipnis 2006, 248–50.
62 He learned about the details from Kamal Adham, advisor to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, from his telegram titled “The Egyptian-American Dialogue Regarding the Middle East,” NA GR 59 Pol 14-27 Arab-Isr., April 6, 1973, 1023. On April 6 Kissinger even asked Dinitz not to react to a State Department pronouncement regarding the Sadat interview in Newsweek, “because what we know is more than what those in the State Department who will issue the pronouncement know.” Telephone conversation between Kissinger and Dinitz, Lamed Vav/593, ISA; also the record of the discussion, NA RN, HAK, Telcon, April 2–6, 1973.
63 Telegram from Greene regarding communication between the US and Egyptian governments, April 2, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Cairo 978, Box 658.
64 Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger in the Oval Office, February 21, 1973, NA RN, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 860-15; FRUS XXV, 55–59.
65 Meeting between Nixon, Kissinger, and Sisco in the Oval Office, April 13, 1973, NA RN, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 895-24; FRUS XXV, 144–48.
66 Dinitz to Meir, April 9, 1973, Lamed Vav/597, Aleph-7045/2, ISA.
67 Top secret, personal, Gazit to Dinitz, April 8, 1973, Aleph-7550/4, ISA. Later, Meir agreed with Eban that he would receive communications telegrams for perusal but that they were not to be passed on the people in his office. Personal letter from Gazit to Dinitz, April 15, 1973.
68 Telephone conversation between Sisco and Kissinger, 20:02, April 9, 1973, NA RN, HAK, Telcon, April 7–11, 1973. Sisco, the assistant secretary of state, coordinated with Kissinger on the State Department’s reaction to the leaked reports about his contacts with Ismail, while hiding this coordination from the State Department.
69 Dinitz to Meir, 19:30, April 11, 1973, Lamed Vav/605, Aleph-7052/1, ISA; NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 135. On the following day, Dinitz reported in detail on the private conversation. April 12, 1973, Lamed Vav/608, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
70 Dinitz 2003, 69. Dinitz never finished editing his book, which was never published. The manuscript was given to me by his wife Vivian and his daughter Tamar, and I would like to express my thanks here.
71 NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 135.
72 Dinitz to Gazit, April 12, 1973, Lamed Vav/606, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
73 NA RN, NSC, Country Files, Box 135.
74 15:00, April 12, 1973, Lamed Vav/609, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
75 Gazit to Dinitz, 12:45, April 12, 1973, Vav Lamed/536, Aleph-4996/1, ISA.
76 Telephone conversation between Dinitz and the Prime Minister’s Office, 02:10, April 13, 1973, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
77 To Dinitz, for his eyes only, April 12, 1973, Vav Lamed/536, ISA; 18:00, April 13, 1973, Vav Lamed/539, Aleph-4996/1, ISA.
78 Gazit to Dinitz, April 15, 1973, Aleph-7550/4, ISA. Dinitz answered this letter from Gazit as follows: “I tell you that I completely accept the prime minister’s approach. Our main goal is to maintain trust in the Shaul channel. Of course, the trust must be mutual.” But Dinitz continued by defending Kissinger’s conduct: “Regarding his contacts with the mischief-maker: Just to remind you, he does not need our approval to maintain these contacts.” Dinitz to Gazit (handwritten), April 25, 1973, Aleph-7550/4, ISA.
79 “Between the end of January and the second week of April 1973, no concrete warning of war reached Israel” (Bar-Yosef 2001, 168). It appears that the warnings were Sadat’s tool to urge Kissinger to advance the political process and that Sadat had no real intention of opening fire.
80 See also Braun 1992, 27; Bar-Yosef 2001, 168. In another written source, Bar-Yosef (2010, 193) wrote that Marwan transmitted the report using a special two-way radio supplied to him by the Mossad. A year later, a corrected version to this book was published (Bar-Yosef 2011), in which the story of the radio was eliminated. In fact, Marwan did have a two-way radio, but he did not use it. On April 5, Sadat assembled a new government with himself at its head and decided that there was no alternative but to open a military campaign. The warning Marwan provided was based on Sadat’s request to Minister of Defense Ismail following the government decision, in which he “asked General Ismail to examine the possibility of breaching the ceasefire and, at the same time, to assemble the National Defense Council and present the matter, while increasing the intensity of our diplomatic attack.” Gamasy 1994, based on Ismail 1987, 267–69.
81 Author’s personal discussion with Zeira, September 19, 2011.
82 Telegram 234 from GHQ Intelligence to the Embassy in Washington, April 15, 1973, Aleph-7066/4, ISA. The telegram included a detailed report by Aryeh Shalev, head of the military intelligence research department on Egyptian armament.
83 The pilots designated to establish a squadron of MiG 23s were going to be sent for training in the Soviet Union in May or June. The Scud rocket division was planned to arrive in Egypt and begin deployment only in August, in addition to 200 modern armored personnel carriers (APCs), Sager rocket launchers, a division of SAM 6 ground-to-air missiles, and 180 mm field guns (Shazly 1987, 144).
84 As stated at the cabinet meeting, April 24, 1973 (Braun 1992, 23).
85 Letter from Kissinger and reply from Ismail, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 131; for the Kissinger letter to Ismail, FRUS XXV, 140–42.
86 Bartov 2002, 257–62; Bar-Yosef 2001, 172; Arbel and Ne’eman 2005, 162–65. Regarding the meeting and its participants, see telegram from Gazit to Dinitz, April 19, 1973, Vav Lamed/649, Aleph-7045/2, ISA. Zvi Zamir, Eli Zeira, and Avner Shalev, who participated in the meeting, are permitted to read the minutes. They have confirmed that the material quoted by Bartov consists of exact quotes from the minutes of the meeting.
87 This is what Minister Yisrael Galili told Arnan Azaryahu (Sini), his close assistant and confidant, in a long series of discussions conducted at Azaryahu’s home in Kibbutz Yiron between June 2004 and August 2008.
88 Mabat Sheni (Second Look), Channel One, Israeli Television, October 9, 2011.
89 Unlike the channel between Kissinger and Sadat, which was conducted via the CIA, the contacts between Kissinger and Meir were transmitted by the ambassadors: first Rabin, then Dinitz. Communication consisted of personal meetings and telephone conversations between Kissinger and the ambassadors and dispatches to and from the Prime Minister’s Office.
90 After reading the Hebrew version of the book, Zamir told me that only after he had read all of the details had he realized the importance of my emphasizing to him that they (Elazar and the heads of GHQ military intelligence and the Mossad) had not known the details of the secret political channel and the extent to which this had harmed the decisions taken in Israel. Recorded on my telephone answering machine, September 26, 2012.
91 Avner Shalev, the head of the Office of the Chief of General Staff in 1973, testified to this in a telephone conversation I had with him.
92 Agranat Commission Report, Additional Partial Report, Substantiations and Implications, 1974, vol. 1, 167.
93 Revealed in Bartov 2002, 257–62. The following long quotes come from the same pages in Bartov.
94 Bartov 2002, 260–61.
95 Bartov 2002, 261.
96 Ibid.
1 Report to the Prime Minister’s Office about the meeting between Kissinger and Dinitz, May 13, 1973, Lamed Vav/672, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
2 Gazit to Dinitz, 13:00, April 19, 1973, Lamed Vav/649, Aleph-7045/2, ISA.
3 Ibid.
4 April 19, 1973, Lamed Vav/635, Aleph-7052/1, ISA; Lamed Vav/632, ibid.; Lamed Vav/631, Aleph-7061/6, ISA; NA RN, NSV, HAK, Country Files, Box 135.
5 Dinitz to Gazit, April 18, 1973, Lamed Vav/632, Aleph-7052/1, ISA; Aleph-7061/6.
6 Telephone conversation between Dobrynin and Kissinger, April 24, 1973, Aleph-7052/1, ISA; NA RN, HAK, Telcon, Box 19.
7 Dinitz to Gazit on his discussion with Kissinger, April 18, 1973, Lamed Vav/632, Aleph-7045/2, ISA.
8 April 24, 1973, Lamed Vav/643, Aleph-7052, ISA; NA RN, NSC, HAK, Country Files, Box 135.
9 Ibid.
10 Personal letter handwritten by Dinitz to Gazit, April 25, 1973, Aleph-7550/4, ISA.
11 Meeting between Dinitz and Kissinger, 18:30, May 3, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135. With regard to the information received from Jordan, the head of Jordanian intelligence was an additional senior source who transmitted information to the Mossad. He was the source who transmitted the Syrian war plans to the Mossad.
12 Dinitz to Gazit, May 3, 1973, Lamed Vav/655, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
13 Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, May 25, 1973, NA RN, NSC Files, Box 618.
14 Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger about information received from King Hussein, May 17, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Box 757. The CIA confirmed most of the details Hussein supplied. In his reply to the king, Kissinger avoided detailing the diplomatic moves that the United States would make in response to the information.
15 Memorandum from CIA director James Schlesinger to Kissinger, May 5, 1973, NA RN, NSC Files, Box 647. Schlesinger assumed that the Soviets would limit the Syrians, while the Egyptians would not take a military step until the conclusion of the discussions about Israel in the General Assembly. In effect, he estimated that fighting would not be renewed during the coming six weeks.
16 Gazit to Dinitz, urgent, April 22, 1973, Vav Lamed/643, Aleph-4996/1, ISA; Dinitz to Gazit, April 24, 1973, Lamed Vav/643, Aleph-7052/1, ISA; meeting between Kissinger and Dinitz, April 24, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135.
17 Seale (1993, 196) writes that, at the Sadat-Assad meeting in April, they agreed only on the principal guidelines of the war. As a result, Assad traveled to Moscow at the beginning of May to request equipment he was lacking for war, primarily planes and air defense systems.
18 The following reports appeared in Ha’aretz between April 19 and 30, 1973.
19 The complete version of the announcement can be found in Aleph-7027/12, ISA.
20 Oded Zarai, “A Conference of Threats,” Ha’aretz, April 24, 1973.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ha’aretz, April 27, 1973.
24 Egyptian Chief of Staff Shazly testified that only in August were the possible dates for war determined as either September 7–10 or October 5–10 (Shazly 1987, 146–47); the chief of the Operations Branch, General Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, stated that as of April, the date of the war had not yet been determined but he was “convinced that a war between Israel and Egypt would break out within six months” (Stein 2003, 95).
25 Shazly 1987, 26; Seale 1993, 201; Bar-Yosef 2001, 222; Maoz 1988, 97–98; Arbel and Ne’eman 2006, 166.
26 The explanations Marwan gave Israel for these delays were that in April, the Syrians were not ready for war; in May, the delay was so that Egypt could receive the aerial defense systems (SA 6). For additional information, see Shazly 1987, 144.
27 Exchange of telegrams between Jerusalem, the embassy in Washington and the Israeli delegation to the United Nations in New York between April 16 and 18, 1973, Aleph-7066/4, ISA; also Kissinger’s intervention, principally to deal with the State Department, April 20, 1973, Lamed Vav/639, Aleph-7066/4, ISA; telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 21, 1973, NA RN, Telcon, Box 19.
28 Dinitz to Gazit, April 25, 1973, Lamed Vav/646, Aleph-7061/6, ISA.
29 Scowcroft to Kissinger, May 8, 1973. Haig had spoken to the president about changing positions in the government—replacing the secretary of state, appointing Schlesinger as defense secretary, and appointing Casey in his place as the head of the CIA. The president intended to implement these changes only after the summit in June. NA RN, HAK, Trip, Box 39.
30 The Israeli Foreign Ministry knew the place and time of the meeting even before Dinitz’s report; he asked Gazit to find the source of the leak. Dinitz to Gazit, May 3, 1973, Lamed Vav/655, Aleph-7052/1, ISA; HAK to 013, May 6, 1973, NA RN, HAK, Trip, Box 39; May 13, 1973, Lamed Vav/665, ISA.
31 Dinitz to Gazit, May 3, 1973, Lamed Vav/655, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
32 Initiated by the Soviets, a number of secret meetings took place in Geneva between Mordechai Gazit, the and Soviet representatives Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Kotov. Gazit’s report to Meir about the discussions, March 23 and 24, 1973, Aleph-7045/13, ISA; directive to Dinitz to inform Kissinger of those meetings, Lamed Vav/475, March 24, 1973, Aleph-4996/1, ISA; reports of the meetings to the United States, NA RN, Country Files, M.E., HAK, Box 135.
33 Quandt 2001, 100–101.
34 The account that follows is based on the protocol of the meeting between Brezhnev and Kissinger, at the Politburo vacation home in Zavidovo, May 7, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 75.
35 Ibid; Kissinger to Nixon via Scowcroft, May 8, 1973, HAKTO 194, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Trip, Box 32, 19A.
36 Protocol of the meeting between Kissinger and Eban, May 12, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135.
37 Dinitz to Gazit, May 11, 1973, Lamed Vav/664 and Lamed Vav/665, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
38 Gazit to Dinitz, May 10, 1973, Vav Lamed/568, Aleph-7052, ISA.
39 Dinitz to Gazit, May 17, 1973, Lamed Vav/684, Aleph-7052, ISA.
40 Dinitz to Gazit, May 12, 1973 Lamed Vav/668, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
41 An accompanying letter added to Vav Lamed/570, 08:00 Israeli time, May 13, 1973, ISA. Again listed in Vav Lamed/573, Aleph-7052/1, May 13, 1973, ISA: “As background to our understanding Vav Lamed/570, I add the following.” Emphasis and quotation marks in original.
42 Ibid.
43 Dinitz to Meir about meeting with Kissinger, May 13, 1973, Lamed Vav/670, Lamed Vav 672, and Lamed Vav 673, Aleph-7052/1; Lamed Vav/674 and Lamed Vav/675, Aleph-7052/2, ISA; protocol of the open discussion, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135.
44 Central Intelligence Agency, Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013), 41. May 14, 1973. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/arab-israeli-war/nixon-arab-isaeli-war.pdf.
45 Ibid.
46 This and the following are direct quotes from Dinitz’s dispatch to the prime minister (ibid.); Dinitz to Gazit regarding his meeting with Kissinger, May 13, 1973, Lamed Vav 672, Aleph-7052/1, ISA.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 American minutes of the discussion between Kissinger and Dinitz on May 13, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135.
50 Report by Dinitz to Meir on his private discussion with Kissinger on May 13, 1973, 20:30, May 14, 1973, Lamed Vav/677, Aleph-7052/2, ISA. Dinitz recommended accepting the compromise on aircraft supply; perhaps this was Kissinger’s aim in transmitting the information about possible changes in the government. On the following day, Dinitz received confirmation to end the matter of the supply of planes as he had recommended. Telegram from Gazit to Dinitz, May 15, 1973, Vav Lamed/578, Aleph-4996/1, ISA.
51 Dinitz to Gazit regarding his meeting with Kissinger, May 13, 1973, Lamed Vav/677, Aleph-7052/2, ISA.
52 Gazit to Dinitz, May 15, 1973, Vav Lamed/580, Aleph-7052/2, ISA.
53 Ibid.
54 Gazit to Dinitz, undated but apparently from May 15 or 16, 1973, referring to discussion in preparation for Kissinger’s trip to Paris, Aleph-7066/25, ISA.
55 Kissinger 1982, 459.
56 Strategy with Ismail, Saunders to Kissinger, May 15, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Box 132.
57 NA RN, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 919-3.
58 Ibid.
59 National Intelligence Estimate, May 17, 1973, NA RN, NSC files, Box H-91.
60 Ha’aretz, May 20, 1973.
61 Paris 13632, May 17, 1973, NA, Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr.; Paris 13857, May 18, 1973.
62 Protocol of the talks: NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 132; more detailed report to Nixon, June 2, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 132.
63 Ibid.
64 Regarding Kissinger’s report to Nixon, see “Memo for the President” from Scowcroft, May 21, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 132. Scowcroft transmitted the text he had received from Kissinger a day earlier to the president, May 20, 1973.
In his book, Kissinger (1982, 227) defined a “useful discussion” as diplomatic language meaning one which did not produce practical results. An examination of the thirty-one pages of protocol for the meeting cannot add anything to an understanding of the situation. Kissinger himself testified that what was said at the official meeting was worthless, as Kissinger and Ismail discussed the important things in the two rounds of discussion while walking in the garden. Despite that, in most writing about the events of 1973, the protocol of the official meeting takes a central place, if not the only one, and is presented as an important political event. Kissinger’s summary for Nixon of the meeting with Ismail, dated June 2, 1973, can be found at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-02b.pdf.
65 Dinitz to Meir on a number of additional matters from the private discussion with Kissinger on July 3 in San Clemente, among them a report from the CIA on Ismail’s reaction to the meeting with Kissinger in Paris on May 20, July 4, 1973, Lamed Vav/766, Aleph-7046/9, ISA.
1 Golda Meir, speech to the Knesset, 457th session of the Seventh Knesset, July 25, 1973, 4275.
2 Bartov 1978, 241–70; Braun 1992, 23.
3 Braun 1992, 24. The exchange took place on April 27, as Dayan and Meir were examining King Hussein’s warning about Egypt’s and Syria’s intentions to go to war.
4 “There was no difference of opinion between the Mossad and military intelligence regarding the chances of war breaking out,” Dayan said in reply to a direct question on the subject by Knesset member General (ret.) Moshe Carmel in discussions of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (Braun 1992, 30). The Agranat Commission also determined that Zamir was more skeptical than Zeira regarding the low probability of war in May: “But fundamental differences of opinion did not exist between them” (Agranat Commission Report, Additional Partial Report, Explanations and Completions, 1974, First Volume, 167).
5 Braun 1992, 21.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 21.
8 Ibid., 27.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 25.
11 For example, Bar-Yosef 2011, 20.
12 Braun 1992, 19.
13 Ibid., 29.
14 Ibid.
15 As reported at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee dated May 22, 1973 (Braun 1992, 29).
16 Ibid.
17 Bartov 2002, 284, quoting General Tal at a discussion in the General Staff in May, based on the protocol of the meetings.
18 Braun 1992, 26.
19 Regarding Jordan, Dayan’s proposal was much more complex and was based on the assumption that a peace treaty with Jordan would only be signed twenty years later. Dayan erred only by one year: the peace agreement with Jordan was signed in 1994, twenty-one years later. Tel Aviv 3903, May 18, 1973, Telegram from Zurhellen, deputy US ambassador to Israel, in Tel Aviv, regarding Dayan’s thoughts about the possibility of a peace agreement with Jordan and Egypt (NA, GR, 59 Pol 14–27 Arab-Isr.).
20 Ibid.
21 Bar-Yosef 1992, 196.
22 In May, Assad paid a secret visit to Egypt. For a report of this visit without details, see Arbel and Ne’eman 2005, 178. Bar-Yosef, who wrote in depth about Israeli intelligence in general and Marwan in particular, did not cite this visit. Sadat’s visit to Damascus in the middle of June has not been reported at all in the research literature dealing with Egyptian and Syrian preparations for war.
23 Protocol of the meeting between Dinitz and Kissinger in the White House, Saturday, June 2, 1973, NA RN, NSC files, HAK Box 135.
24 Report from Dinitz to Meir about the meeting. Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/703, June 2, 1973, ISA.
25 Ibid.
26 Ismail to Kissinger, June 2, 1973, NA RN, NSC Files, HAK, Box 132.
27 Central Intelligence Agency, Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 42; Memorandum to the Acting Secretary from INR, Ray Cline, “Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities with Israel,” May 31, 1973.
28 Memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers, May 31, 1973, FRUS XXV, 199; NA, GR 59, Cairo 1619, June 2, 1973, Pol 27 Arab-Isr.; report from Greene, NA, GR 59, Cairo 1689, June 8, 1973, Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr.
29 Ismail to Kissinger, June 10, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 132; FRUS XXV, 202–3.
30 Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/611, Aleph-4996/2, ISA; Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/725, ISA.
31 Dinitz to Gazit, June 13, 1973, Lamed Vav/725; Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/611, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
32 Ha’aretz, June 4, 1973.
33 Author’s discussion with Zamir, February 19, 2012.
34 Telephone conversation between Kissinger and Dinitz, June 14, 1973, NA RN, HAK, Telcon Box 20.
35 Lamed Vav/726, June 14, 1973, 11:00, Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
36 Lamed Vav/704 and Lamed Vav/705, June 2, 1973, Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
37 Vav Lamed/602, June 5, 1973, 20:00, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
38 Heath to Nixon, June 14, 1973, NA RN, Pres. Cor. U.K., Box 764; Dinitz’s report to Meir, Lamed Vav/730, June 15, 1973, Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
39 Discussion points between Meir and Brandt, June 19, 1973, Aleph-370/5, ISA; Ambassador Lothar Lahn to Gazit, report of mission to Cairo, July 3, 1973, Aleph-4239/15, ISA.
40 Vav Lamed/617, June 14, 1973, Aleph-7053/3, ISA; Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/621, June 15, 1973, Aleph-7053/3, ISA.
41 Kissinger to Nixon, June 14, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Box 75; FRUS XXV, 204–7.
42 The document hinted that possible border adjustments between Israel and Egypt, with regard to the situation existing on June 4, 1967, would amount to not returning the Gaza Strip to Egypt. Meeting between Rabin and Kissinger, March 9, 1973, NA RN, NSC Files, HAK, Box 75.
43 Telephone conversation between Kissinger and Dinitz, June 14, 1973, 09:20, NA RN, HAK, Telcon Box 20.
44 Ibid. Kissinger immediately responded to Dinitz: “It will not disappear” (Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/726, June 14, 1973, Aleph-7052/3, ISA).
45 Reports from Dinitz about his telephone conversation, Lamed Vav/726, June 14, 1973, 11:00; Lamed Vav/728, June 14, 1973, 15:45, Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
46 Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/618, June 14, 1973, 20:00, Aleph-4996/2, ISA. At the time, Meir was ill, and it was reported that she had cancelled all of her meetings. However, as may be understood from the messages transmitted, she continued to conduct secret dealings with Kissinger and manage everything connected with the coming summit meeting in the United States.
47 Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/620, June 15, 1973, 12:30, Aleph-4996/2; Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/728, Aleph-7052/3, ISA. Regarding the forum that summarized the instructions, Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/622, June 15, 1973, 16:00, Aleph-4996/2, ISA. Dinitz also received Israel’s detailed comments on each item of the document.
48 Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/628, June 15, 1973, 17:00, Aleph-4669/2, ISA.
49 Protocol of the meeting, NA RN, NSC Files, HAK, Box 135; noted in FRUS XXV, 208n2 regarding the private conversation: Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/352, June 15, 1973, 17:00, Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
50 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135.
51 Dinitz to Gazit about his private conversation with Kissinger, which lasted twenty minutes. Lamed Vav/732, June 15, 1973, Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
52 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/731, June 15, 1973, 16:00, Aleph-7052/3, ISA; FRUS XXV, 202–3.
53 Ibid.
54 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/731, June 15, 1973, Aleph-7052/3, ISA. Ismail to Kissinger, FRUS XXV, 202–3.
55 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/739, June 18, 1973, 12:00, Aleph-7052/3, ISA; Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/740, June 18, 1973, 12:00, Aleph-7052/3, ISA. “This is Shaul’s attempt to prepare an outline for himself based on the 1972 paper, considering our last conversation. The following is the complete paper.” In an additional telegram at 16:30, Dinitz transmitted his comments for the new version and requested instructions for future attention, if this was needed.
56 Medzini 2008, 530.
57 Ha’aretz, June 19, 1973.
58 Ibid.
59 Ha’aretz, June 21, 1973.
60 Ha’aretz, June 27, 1973.
61 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/743, June 19, 1973, 09:30, Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
62 Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/628, June 19, 1973, 17:00 (Israeli time), Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
63 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135; FRUS XXV, 208–11.
64 Lamed Vav/747, June 21, 1973, Aleph-7052/3, ISA.
65 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 75; FRUS XXV, 211–18; Saunders sent Kissinger an updated version of the Israeli-Arab agreement principles, taking into consideration the comments of Israel in three versions: Dinitz’s proposal; the tiny correction made as a result; and, for comparison, the optimal version from the US standpoint. Saunders to Kissinger, June 21, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 136.
66 Kissinger 1982, 294–301.
67 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 75; FRUS XXV, 220–24.
68 Ibid.
69 Kissinger 1982, 298.
70 Rogers’s memorandum, June 28, 1973; FRUS XXV, 227–30; Nixon’s directive, June 29, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 70.
71 NA, RG, 59 Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr.; FRUS XXV, 229n4.
72 Kissinger to Dobrynin, June 24, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 70; FRUS XXV, 225–26.
73 Telephone conversations between Nixon and Kissinger, July 13, 14, and 18, 1973, NA RN, HAK, Telcon Box 21.
74 Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/640, July 2, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
75 Regarding the private conversation, Lamed Vav/762, July 3, 1973, 23:45, Aleph-7046/9, ISA. In an additional dispatch on the same date and time (Lamed Vav/763), the document that Kissinger had proposed to the Soviets was also transmitted. Another dispatch was sent that night, July 4, 1973, 01:30. At the official discussion, which continued for an hour and a quarter, Scowcroft and Shalev were present in addition to Dinitz and Kissinger. For its contents, see Lamed Vav/764, July 4, 1973, Aleph-7046/9, ISA. In the Prime Minister’s Office’s summary of Dinitz’s report, Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/656, July 11, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA; full protocol of the discussion, Ford Library, NS Advisor, Box 2, available at http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/memcons/1552592.pdf.
76 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/762, July 3, 1973, 23:45, Aleph-7046/9, ISA.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Personal letter, Gazit to Dinitz, July 8, 1973, Aleph-7550/4, ISA. However, Gazit added, “With regard to Fohezy, you can simply say that one more meeting took place (does he know about the one in February), and that were the essential points and now another meeting is scheduled to take place in two months. The problem will still remain without solution, even after preparing this summary. The question is what should be done with the telegrams immediately after their arrival. On this matter, the prime minister’s position is clear and unequivocal. That is to say, since the new summary with Robert/Shaul at the time of her last visit, the prime minister has determined to do less.”
80 In discussion of the defense budget, he had made known that a declaration of military alert was too far-reaching (Bartov 1978, 272; Braun 1992, 80). Two days earlier, he had stated in an open lecture that in the next ten years, Israel would be able to maintain its military superiority, deterring the Arabs from action (NA, GR 59 Pol 14-27 Arab-Isr.).
81 Arbel and Na’aman 2005, under the heading “Insanity with No Atonement.”
82 Braun 1992, 31–32. The report of the decision was brought up at the Foreign Relations and Defense Committee on August 10.
83 Dayan’s speech to staff B of the defense system at the Habima Theater in Tel Aviv, July 17, 1973, Aleph-7068/15, ISA.
84 Ibid.
85 Dayan, interview in TIME, July 30, 1973. As reported in Ha’aretz, July 24, 1973.
86 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/813, July 20, 1973, Aleph-7046/9, ISA.
87 Ibid.
88 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/812, July 20, 1973, Aleph-7045/9. ISA. Dinitz proposed Alfred A. (Roy) Atherton; Kissinger reacted positively but said that he had been favorably impressed by L. Dean Brown, then the ambassador to Jordan, with whom he had cooperated when dealing with the crisis in Jordan in September 1970.
89 Ibid.
90 Kissinger to Ismail, July 7, 1973. The message was sent on July 9. NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135.
91 Ismail to Kissinger, July 11,1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135.
92 Sadat’s speech to the Central Committee of the National Assembly, July 16, 1973. Report of the speech in Communication 585, transmitted to the embassy in Washington, July 17, 1973, Aleph-5256, ISA.
93 Dobrynin orally transmitted a message from Brezhnev to Kissinger on July 19, 1973, regarding his meeting with Ismail on July 13 in Moscow (NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135).
94 Ibid.
95 Kissinger to Nixon, July 21, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 68; FRUS XXV, 243–44. Richard W. Smith, the representative of the US Interests Section located in the Spanish Embassy in Cairo, had already predicted that Sadat would now choose to apply coordinated Arab pressure on the United States while taking advantage of the oil weapon. Cairo, 1990, July 3, 1973, Smith to Rogers, NA RN, Country Files, Box 658.
96 Ibid.
97 Memorandum from Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore Eliot to Kissinger summarizing the United States’ misgivings regarding the proposed Security Council resolution. NA, RG, 59 Pol 27-14 Arab-Isr.; and FRUS XXV, 245-47; also Shalev-Rodman meeting, 25 July NA RN, NSC Files, HAK, Box 135; also Shalev to Gazit, Lamed Vav/824, Aleph-7046/4 ISA.
98 Telegram 363 from the embassy in Washington to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, July 31, 1973, Aleph-7075/11, ISA.
99 Discussion in Kissinger’s office. The other participants were Richard Helms and Harold Saunders. July 23, 1973, NA RN, NSC Files Box 1027; Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/849, August 14, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
100 When they returned to discuss this subject ten days later, Kissinger proposed a version of a written message. Helms preferred that the message be transmitted orally and not in writing. NA RN, NSC Files Box 1027; FRUS XXV, 248.
101 Protocol of the meeting, Aleph-7027/9. ISA; Gazit to Dinitz on the Meir-Waldheim meeting, Vav Lamed/706, September 2,1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
102 Dinitz to Gazit on his meeting with Kissinger, Lamed Vav/883, September 10, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
103 Braun 1992, 11.
104 Zeira 2004, 66; author’s personal interview with Zeira.
105 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/883, August 14, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA; Dinitz to Gazit on his private discussion with Kissinger, Lamed Vav/849 and Lamed Vav/850, August 14, 1973.
106 As Pinchas Sapir had warned, “Dayan is liable to leave and form an independent party list. He is likely to gain 12 to 15 Knesset seats taken from the Ma’arach [Labor Alignment party]” (Nakdimon 1982, 45); “There is a reasonable chance that Dayan will leave the party and serve in a government led by Gahal [Herut-Liberal bloc] which will be formed by Menachem Begin” (Medzini 2008, 520).
107 Braun 1992, 29. The military intelligence organization also predicted that the aim of an Egyptian war would be to motivate political development, but believed Egypt would go to war only when it had the ability to attack deep into Israel to deter Israel from attacking deep into Egypt, as it had done during the War of Attrition (Shalev 2006, 63). This analysis relies on military intelligence documents from June 1971 and February 1972.
108 As he stated to the air force commander on May 22, 1973 (Braun 1992, 30).
109 As reported to the Economics Committee in Jerusalem on June 1, 1973; Sharon’s words to the air force commander on May 22, 1973; Sharon’s words on a visit to Southern Command along with the chief of staff and the head of the command, June 4, 1973; Braun 1992, 30.
110 Bar-Yosef 2001, 188.
111 Shazly 1987, 144–45.
112 Ha’aretz, “Sadat Is Not Satisfied with the Soviet Aid,” July 24, 1973.
113 Braun 1992, 33.
114 Heikal 1975, 1–5; Shazly 1987, 146–47.
115 The nights between the nine days after the new moon and the full moon was were best for light. Before that, the light would be too weak; after that, the moonrise would be too late after the sunset. The nights of September 7–11 and October 5–10 fit, from the standpoint of lighting needs. The influence of the tides is not felt in the Suez Canal, even though this is erroneously cited in some sources as influencing the determination of the war date.
116 See details in the appendix dealing with Marwan.
117 Regarding this meeting, see Robinson 1988, 136.
118 Heikal 1975, 4–5; Shazly 1987, 146–47; Gamasy 1994; Seale 1993, 197. Seale asserts that the two did not reach an agreement because Sadat wanted to attack earlier while Assad preferred the later October alternative.
119 Ha’aretz, August 28, 1973.
120 For the fact that he reported on a war that would break out only at the end of the year, see also Braun 1992, 68; Bar-Yosef 2011, 218.
121 Report from Smith, the American representative in Cairo, about the information the Soviets held about the opening date of the war, Cairo 3242, October 26, 1973. During those days, Heikal published an article supporting King Hussein, who claimed to represent the Palestinian struggle. Ehud Yaari, in an analytical article, attributed this to Sadat’s desire to strengthen the eastern front (Davar, September 4, 1973).
122 Report to Dinitz on Meir’s meeting with Senator Joe Biden, September 2, 1973, Aleph-7072/21, ISA.
1 Lamed Vav/934, Dinitz to Gazit, September 30, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
2 Davar, September 25, 1973. Open letter sent to Galili by Avraham Shapira of Kibbutz Yizrael. Shapira was the editor of Shdemot, the journal of the younger generation in the settlement movement, and one of the editors of Siah Lohamim (The Seventh Day), a collection of soldiers’ reminiscences after the Six-Day War.
3 Kissinger 1980, 464.
4 Dan Margalit, in an op-ed column, quoted Dayan: Ha’aretz, September 11, 1973. Similar information was published on the same day in Ma’ariv. The US ambassador in Israel reported Dayan’s words to the State Department in Washington. Tel Aviv 7122, September 11, 1973, available at http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=68658&dt= 2472&dl=1345.
5 Ibid.
6 Zeira 2004, 116.
7 Bergman and Meltzer 2003, 182.
8 Shalev 2007, 57.
9 Kissinger 1980, 460.
10 “It’s only between His Majesty and myself. No one else on our side is involved.” Iranian initiative meeting between Zahedi and Kissinger, August 15, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 132.
11 Meeting between Kissinger and Zahedi in Kissinger’s office on September 15, 1973, during which Zahedi reported on his meeting with the Egyptians. Ibid.
12 In addition to statements from Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf states about the use of the oil embargo, on September 1, 1973, Libya nationalized 51 percent of all foreign oil companies operating in the country.
13 El-Saadany 1994, 104.
14 Bar-Yosef 2010, 210–11.
15 Irregular security arrangements during the voyage testify to the advance information about plans to attack an Israeli ship. The shop was accompanied by British battleships and fighter planes. There was also an unexpected change in the route taken along the North African coast. Transportation minister Shimon Peres also made an unexpected visit to the ship, which anchored in Ashdod. Davar, April 22, 1973.
16 Cairo 1230, report from US Interests Section in Cairo, April 25, 1973. No longer available online; copy in author’s possession.
17 Zamir and Mass 2011, 143.
18 El-Saadany 1994, 105–106.
19 Zamir especially feared this. When he met with Marwan a few hours before the war, he saw fit to precede the discussion of the coming war by clarifying the danger to Marwan’s safety following the affair in Rome. Zamir and Mass, 2011, 148; also five interviews which took place between September 21, 2010, and February 19, 2012. Questions about the elite agent Marwan are discussed in the appendix.
20 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/886, September 10, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
21 Zamir and Mass 2011, 150.
22 Quoted at a meeting of newspaper editors on September 5, 1973; Braun 1992, 34.
23 Ibid.
24 Ha’aretz, September 11, 1973. Similar comments appeared in Davar on the same day.
25 Ma’ariv, September 14, 1973. Similar comments appeared in Ha’aretz on the same day.
26 Ibid. Ma’ariv reported Dayan’s planned departure for the United States after the elections, as well as a statement by Dinitz about expected American pressure on Israel in order to motivate a political process on September 13. The US embassy reported this to Washington on September 11. See Tel Aviv 7122 regarding Dayan’s position on new diplomatic activity in the Middle East: “Arab states would prefer new diplomatic round to renewed fighting.” This document is available at http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=68658&dt=2472&dl=1345. See Tel Aviv 7276 regarding Dayan’s position on new diplomatic activity in the Middle East, available at http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?dt=2472&rid=63576&dl=1345. The US embassy made sure to verify Harif’s report; Harif confirmed again that what he had written was what Dayan had actually said. Tel Aviv 7411, September 20, 1973, available at http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?dt=2472&rid=73742&dl=1345.
27 Ma’ariv, September 14, 1973.
28 Tel Aviv 7699, October 4, 1973, available at http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?dt=2472&rid=81407&dl=1345.
29 Kissinger’s impression of Dayan was revealed at the beginning of 1975 in a discussion with President Ford, at a time when the political process between Israel and Egypt had become bogged down: “If he were prime minister, we would be all set…. If it hadn’t been for [the events of] 1973, he would have replaced Golda. He has great imagination and courage. But he’s mercurial and wild—like the others in their domestic politics. He said to me last fall [about a year after the Yom Kippur War] that Israel had to do whatever was necessary in the Sinai to get Egypt off its back.” Working meeting of President Ford and Kissinger with Max Fisher, an American Jewish leader. Available at http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552941.pdf.
30 Regarding the meeting, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135; Shalev to Gazit, Lamed Vav/887, September 10, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA; regarding the private conversation, Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/885, September 10, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
31 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 135.
32 Ibid.
33 Shalev to Gazit, Lamed Vav/893, September 12, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
34 Ma’ariv, September 13, 1973.
35 Ha’aretz, September 17, 1973.
36 Ma’ariv, September 13, 1973; see the front-page headline in Ha’aretz, September 17, 1973. At the end of the month, when Dinitz met with Kissinger, he updated him that Dayan would arrive on December 8. Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/934, September 30, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
37 Quandt, “Developments in the Middle East and Chances for an Arab-Israeli Agreement.” September 24, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Harold Saunders Files, Box 1173.
38 Nahum Barnea, Davar, September 12, 1973.
39 Heikal 1975, 12.
40 Stein 2003, 43, based on an interview with Zaid al-Rifai, the prime minister of Jordan at the time, who accompanied Hussein to the talks.
41 Israeli Foreign Ministry report to the embassy in Washington, Het/955, September 13, 1973, Aleph-7072/21, ISA.
42 Ha’aretz, September 13, 1973.
43 Braun 1992, 35, 68; Bar-Yosef 2010, 208; Shalev 2007, 108.
44 Shazly 1987, 149.
45 A detailed report of the battle sent to General Motta Gur, the military attaché in Washington, September 16, 1973, Aleph-7075/12, ISA.
46 Ha’aretz, September 14, 1973.
47 Military intelligence report to the military attaché in Washington, General Mordechai Gur, about the update communicated to US intelligence services on the air battle. Gimel/5833, September 16, 1973, Aleph-7075/12.
48 Bartov 1978, 288.
49 Braun 1992, 38–41. Regarding the discussion in the General Staff on September 17 and 24, 1973, see Bartov 1978, 290–94.
50 Ibid.
51 Testimony by Yisrael Lior, military secretary, to the Agranat Commission, December 6, 1973, available at http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/Pages/Exhibitions/Agranat2/IsraelLior/7/mywebalbum/index.html.
52 Ibid.
53 Braun 1992, 39.
54 For additional information about Golan Heights settlement, see Kipnis 2013.
55 Braun 1992, 38.
56 Ibid.
57 Bartov 1978, 39.
58 Agranat Commission Report, Additional Partial Report, Explanations and Additions, Vol. I, 167.
59 Gazit to Dinitz on the subject of Zvika, Vav Lamed/738, September 25, 1973, 14:00, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
60 Arbel and Neeman 2005, 190.
61 For the discussion and the updated discussion regarding this meeting, see Shlaim 2009, 315–18; Shalev 2007, 108–18.
62 Ibid.
63 Shlaim 2009, 316.
64 Statements by Zamir and Elazar during the two meetings on the morning of September 26 (Shlaim 2009, 316; Braun 1992, 40; Bar-Yosef 2001, 248). Elazar had received a personal report from Yaakov Stern, head of the Operations Department of the General Staff, one of the officers who heard the conversation between Meir and Hussein.
65 Shalev 2007, 110, quoting from a letter from Gazit to the editor of Ha’aretz, January 10, 1998.
66 Ibid., 109, relying on Gen. Shlomo Gazit, Mabat Malam 34, 7–8.
67 Nakdimon 1982, 55; Bartov 2002, 311.
68 Shazly 1987, 150.
69 Oded Granot, Ma’ariv, September 30, 1973.
70 Bar-Yosef 2001, 251, relying on the military intelligence document dated September 30.
71 Ibid., 251–66.
72 Heikal testified that Sadat avoided reporting to the Soviets about the war and its timing; the report that Egypt would soon break the ceasefire was transmitted to Vinogradov on October 1 at 19:30 (Heikal 1975, 15).
73 An official report was issued regarding the meetings between Vinogradov and Sadat on September 22 and October 3 (but not their contents) (Ha’aretz, October 4, 1973). Arbel and Neeman argue that the report to the Soviets was transmitted only to the Russian ambassador in Damascus and that only after the evacuation decision was made did the Soviet ambassador report this to Sadat, even informing him that Moscow accepted the decision with understanding and would stand behind Egypt (Arbel and Neeman 2005, 230).
74 It is possible that, at this opportunity, the two sides coordinated the announcement that would be made at the beginning of the attack—that it was in response to an Israeli attack at the Gulf of Suez (Shazly 1987, 151).
75 Heikal 1975, 22.
76 Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in Al-Ahram, December 7, 1973, which appeared in Ha’aretz on December 9, 1973.
77 Heikal 1975, 14.
78 Marwan’s contact person communicated this information. He was with Zamir at the decisive meeting in London on the night of October 5.
79 Shazly 1987, 155. Bar-Yosef 2011, 232–34, presented a different version of how Marwan found out that this time there would actually be war.
80 At the end of 2012 and into 2013, the Israeli State Archives and Defense Ministry Archives released a large number of documents for publication that had not been accessible to researchers in the past. Bartov 1978 and Braun 1992 have provided us with most of the details, the former in defense of Elazar and the latter in defense of Dayan. Other researchers have summarized their findings and added to them, but only minimally. In essence, they have all tried to explain the gap between the information about the clear and obvious signs of war and the defense elite’s weak response to these signs. Each of the researchers has his or her own ideas about who bears the main responsibility for this failure: Bar-Yosef (2001) emphasized the role of military intelligence; Arbel and Neeman (2005) blamed Dayan for knowingly leading the nation to war; Zeira (2004) has defended the position of military intelligence and particularly his own position, with the central argument that Ashraf Marwan actually was acting as an emissary of Sadat in order to trick Israel; Shalev (2007) has attempted to explain events from his own viewpoint as the former head of the research department of military intelligence.
81 Quandt 1973, NA RN, NSC Files, Harold Saunders Files, Box 1173. Quandt asserted in a conversation with the author that Dayan did not have a personal discussion channel with Washington and that information about him was based on reports from the US Embassy in Israel.
82 Ibid.
83 Reported by Kissinger to Dinitz when they met a few days later, Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/934, September 30, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA. Kissinger thus understood that, in contrast to Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban, Zayyat was included in what was occurring in the secret discussion channel.
84 NA RN, NSC, HAK Box 71.
85 In a telephone conversation with Dobrynin, October 7 (Kissinger 2003, 98).
86 Kissinger 1982, 453.
87 Kissinger 1982, 453; Kissinger 2003, 76; minutes of the discussion with Zayyat, October 6, 1973, 20:48, NA RN, HAK, Telcon, Chron. Files 1973, October 6.
88 Telephone conversation with Zayyat, October 8, 1973, 13:45, Kissinger 2003, 129.
89 Telegram sent by Smith, head of the US Interests Section in Cairo, regarding Sadat’s reports to the Soviets and his own people about the opening date of the war. Cairo 3243, October 26, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Box 1175; FRUS XXV, 347–48.
90 Ismail to Kissinger, received via the “back channel,” October 7, 1973, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 132; Kissinger’s reply to Ismail, October 8. In this reply, Kissinger mentioned the message from Sadat via Iran; the message from Ismail, October 9; and Kissinger’s reply of the same day (FRUS XXV, 347–48).
91 Kissinger 2003, 110.
92 Ibid.
93 NA RN, NSC, Box 132; FRUS XXV, 367–68.
94 Discussions between Dayan and Meir in the Prime Minister’s Office, October 7, 1973, at 09:10 and 14:50, available at http://www.archives.gov.il/ArchiveGov_Eng/general/YomKippurWar
95 Kissinger 2003, 112–13, 260–61.
96 Telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger on October 8, 1973 (Kissinger 2003, 138–41).
97 Protocol of a working meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House on October 10, 1973, Ford Library, NSA, Box 2.
98 Telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger on October 14, Kissinger 2003, 249–53.
99 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/918, September 23, 1973, Aleph-4966/2, ISA.
100 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/918, September 23, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
101 Dinitz to Gazit Lamed Vav/918, September 23, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
102 Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/738, September 25, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
103 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/922, September 25, 1973, referring to ibid.
104 Zamir and Mass 2011, 148; Egyptian general Taha Magdub, the Egyptian counterpart of the Israeli deputy chief of staff, in discussions of the Military Committee of the Geneva Conference, which was negotiating a separation of forces agreement between Israel and Egypt after the war, provided similar information. This was in response to General Herzl Shafir’s question as to what would have happened if Israel had reacted differently to the Egyptian military deployment preceding the war. The Egyptian general responded that Sadat could have stopped the attack even at the last moment (lecture by Shafir at a conference at Efal on December 2, 2010, dealing with the separation of forces agreement).
105 Philip Ben, Ma’ariv, September 23, 1973.
106 Moshe Carmel, Davar, September 26, 1973. Moshe Carmel was an ex-Israeli government minister. On June 19, 1967, he was the only minister of the unity government not to support the government decision to propose a peace agreement to Egypt and Syria on the basis of the international borders.
107 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/934, September 30, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
108 Kissinger 1982, 463.
109 Dinitz to Gazit on his private discussion with Kissinger on September 30, 1973, Lamed Vav/937, Aleph-4996/2, ISA. In this discussion, the two also dealt with the commercial treaty with the Soviets, filling positions in the State Department and White House, and compartmentalizing the Israeli foreign minister, who had arrived for the UN General Assembly session and with whom Kissinger was scheduled to meet.
110 Central Intelligence Agency 2013, 46.
111 Ibid.
112 Dinitz to Gazit, September 30, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
1 Nakdimon 1982, 71.
2 Hever 1987, 17; Arbel and Neeman 2005, 189.
3 Report from Ray Cline, director, Bureau of Central Intelligence, State Department, September 30, 1973, NA RN, NSC, Box 1173; FRUS XXV, 278–79.
4 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/934, September 30, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
5 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/918, September 23, 1973; Gazit to Dinitz, Vav Lamed/738, September 25, 1973; Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/924, September 25, 1973; Dinitz’s reports of the meeting, Lamed Vav/934, September 30, 1973, and Lamed Vav/937, October 1, 1973; all at Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
6 Dinitz to Gazit, Lamed Vav/935, September 30, 1973, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.; Dinitz to Meir’s military secretary Lior, Lamed Vav/941, October 1, 1973, 15:00, ISA.
9 Researchers of the events of that day rely on Braun 1992, 44–45, which was based on his private notes, and Bartov 2002, 313–16.
10 Bartov 2002, 313.
11 Gordon 2008, 170.
12 Armoni 2008, 105. Sini (Arnan Azaryahu), who was, together with Allon and Dayan, one of the founding members of the Palmach, later served as personal assistant and confidant to Yisrael Galili, as head of the national headquarters of the Haganah, and, later, as a government minister during the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War.
13 Bartov 1978, 301.
14 The events of that day have been discussed by Braun 1992, 45–48, on the basis of his private notes, and by Bartov 1978, 299–301, as well as Bartov 2002, 316–21, which relied on and quoted the discussion. This section relies on their accounts. The following were based on and added to his version: Shalev 2006, 118–22; Arbel and Neeman 2005, 2004–2009; Asher 2008, 50–52; Bar-Yosef 2001, 258–66.
15 Bartov 2002, 317.
16 Braun 1997, 47.
17 Bartov 2002, 318.
18 Ibid., 334.
19 Arbel and Neeman 2005, 209.
20 Braun 1992, 48.
21 Researchers of the events of that day in the military and intelligence realms rely on Braun 1992, 48–51; Bartov 1978, 303–304; Bartov 2002, 322–23; Bar-Yosef 2001, 267–72; Arbel and Neeman 2005, 210–14.
22 Times of London, October 1, 1973, as reported in Ha’aretz, October 2, 1973.
23 The events of that day in Israel have been described by Shalev 2006, 147–48; Braun 1992, 51–55; Bartov 1978, 306; Zeira 2004, 165–75; Nakdimon 1982, 67–71; Agranat Commission Report, 14–20. The following sources were based on and added to their descriptions: Bar-Yosef 273–86; Arbel and Neeman 2005, 215–25.
24 In February 2011, I visited Aryeh Shalev at his home in Ramat Gan to interview him about the events of those days. His ill health made it difficult for him to answer my questions. After a number of questions, I gave up and asked him to try to tell me what seemed important to him. With tears in his eyes, he succeeded in murmuring, “I told her. I told her. On October third I told her.” He could not manage any more than that. There was no doubt that, for the past thirty-eight years, Shalev had been living with the burden of those days—all the more intensely during his last days.
25 Bar-Yosef 2001, 279.
26 Nakdimon 1982, 70.
27 Braun 1992, 19.
28 Ibid., 52; Zeira 2004, 172.
29 After the war, it became clear that, at first, the Syrians had planned “to establish their defense lines along the Jordan or on the Golan slopes,” but a short time before the attack, they changed plans and decided “to be satisfied with holding the line of cliffs on the Golan inclines and to establish their defense lines there against reinforcements.” It appears that the Syrians avoided nearing the lower areas of the Golan, outside of the defensive range of Syrian surface-to-air missiles. When the commander of the Syrian tank force, in the excitement of battle, deviated from these instructions, he was ordered to retreat immediately (Asher 2008, 81–86).
30 Zeira 2004, 173.
31 Arbel and Neeman 2005, 221.
32 Agranat Commission Report, Arguments and Supplements to the Partial Report, 19; Zeira 2004, 175.
33 Meir 1975, 406–7.
34 All of the information in this paragraph appeared in Ha’aretz, October 3, 1973.
35 About the events of the first part of the day: Braun 1992, 55–56; Bartov 1978, 311–12; Bartov 2002, 329–31.
36 Braun 1992, 55.
37 Ibid.
38 Meir’s assistants testified that “Kreisky had not even offered her a cup of water during their meeting, not to mention coffee” (Medzini 2008, 541).
39 Agranat Commission Report, 310–11.
40 Information passed on by Shalev, filling in for Dinitz, to the White House on October 5, 1973, 17:00, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, HAK, Box 136; for more about this see Ben Porat 1991, 60–61; at length, Zeira 2004, 177, 179–82.
41 Ben Porat et al. 1974, 53–55. A short time after the war, Yeshayahu Ben Porat, Yonatan Gefen, Uri Dan, Eitan Haber, Hezi Carmel, Eli Landau, and Eli Tavor, all newspaper reporters and among them experienced military commentators, contributed to a book about their personal views of the events that preceded the war and the war period. See also Bartov 1978, 317.
42 Regarding the report from Marwan and the events that followed until his meeting with Zamir on the night of October 5: Zamir 2011, 146–47; protocol of the testimony of Freddie Eini, Mossad bureau chief, to the Agranat Commission, available at http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/Pages/Exhibitions/Agranat2/AlfredEini/15/mywebalbum/index.html.
43 Eini testimony.
44 Zamir and Mass 2011, 147.
45 Intelligence report that included the Israeli assessment of low probability for war, Shalev to Nixon, October 5, 1973, 17:00, NA RN, NSC, Country Files, HAK, Box 136.
46 Descriptions of the events of that day have been presented by: Braun 1992, 57–67; Bartov 1978, 315–24; Agranat Commission Report. Relying on these descriptions and adding information were: Bar-Yosef 2001, 295–340; Zeira 2004, 177–208; Arbel and Neeman 2005, 235–56; Shalev 2006; 150–60. Agranat Commission Report, available at http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/pages/Exhibitions/agranat/agranat_commission.asp.
47 Bartov 2002, 332.
48 Zeira 2004, 181; Bar-Yosef 2001, 300.
49 Braun 1992, 59; Arbel and Neeman 2005, 237. In contrast to them, Bar-Yosef not only ignores this quote, but blames Zeira for not reporting to the forum about Zamir’s trip to meet Marwan. Bar-Yosef 2001, 303–304. He bases his assertion on the oral testimony of the head of the Bureau of the Chief of Staff, Avner Shalev. It is possible that Shalev was not alert during Zeira’s report.
50 Zeira 2004, 184; Bar-Yosef 2001, 302.
51 Zeira 2004, 184.
52 The approval was given in a telephone conversation with Colonel Yoel Ben Porat, the commander of the collection unit, after a request from Ben Porat. In his book, Bar-Yosef (2010, 237) argues that Zeira “chose to lie to those in charge and tell them that the devices were operating, and there is no doubt that, in this way, he personally and significantly contributed to the lack of perception by the chief of staff and the minister of defense during those hours.” Up-to-date information indicates that Bar-Yosef’s argument about Zeira on this point has no basis in fact.
53 Colonel Yossi Langotsky, who commanded the unit responsible for operating the “special devices,” testified that his commander, Yoel Ben Porat, ordered him to activate the devices only for a trial. See Ha’aretz, December 19, 2005. It is possible that Langotsky was not aware of the fact that they were operating for more than ten hours.
54 Braun 1992, 59.
55 Zeira 2004, 184.
56 Braun 1992, 58.
57 Zeira 2004, 185.
58 Braun 1992, 54. He was relying on the minutes taken by Colonel Yehoshua Raviv, Dayan’s military secretary, of the conversation between Zamir and Dayan on November 15, 1973.
59 Of course, Dayan erred in assessing Sadat’s calculations. His error was based on Kissinger’s intentions and his own willingness to lead negotiations likely to satisfy Sadat. Dayan had already planned a trip to Washington at the beginning of December, immediately after formation of the new Israeli government. Kissinger demanded that Israel present its position for reaching an agreement by January 10.
60 Zeira 2004, 184.
61 Ibid.
62 Central Intelligence Agency, 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 44: “Judgment [Redaction] that Syrian Military Preparations are Defensive in Nature”. See also Central Intelligence Agency, “Judgment [Redaction] that Syria Military Preparations are Defensive in Nature,” October 3, 1973, 45; United States Intelligence Board, Combined Watch Report, October 4, 1973, 45: “We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future, although the risk of localized fighting has increased slightly as the results of the buildup of Syrian forces in the vicinity on the Golan Heights. Egyptian exercise activity under way since late September may contribute to the possibility of incidents” (quoted in ibid.). For a description of the events of that day, see Kissinger 1982, 462–67.
63 Kissinger 1982, 467.
64 Minister Sapir was in Tel Aviv, but the government secretary-general could not locate him. Ministers Kol and Moshe Haim Shapira were not called to the meeting and later protested this omission. Nakdimon 1981, 90.
65 The discussion that follows relies on the protocol of military-political consultation at the Prime Minister’s Office in Tel Aviv, October 6, 1973, at 11:30, 1.
66 Ibid.
67 Bar-Yosef 2001, 317. Bar-Yosef’s interpretation was: “The feeling was that if the chief of staff had proposed such a mobilization, the prime minister would have supported it.”
68 Golda Meir’s address to the nation the night of Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, was broadcast on radio and television. Available at: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/meir73.html.
69 Braun 1992, 64.
70 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Dinitz, Box 136; FRUS XXV, 284–85; Gazit to Shalev, Vav Lamed/760, October 5, 1973, Aleph-4996/3, ISA; Shalev to Gazit, Lamed Vav/952, October 5, 1973, Aleph-4996/3, ISA; Shalev to Gazit, Lamed Vav/956, October 6, 1973, Aleph-4996/3, ISA; Kissinger 1982, 464–65.
71 NA RN, NSC, HAK, Dinitz, Box 136; FRUS XXV, 284–85.
72 Ibid.
73 Report on the meeting between Rabin and Kissinger on December 24, 1971, Lamed Vav/416, Aleph-7052/20, ISA.
74 Meir 1975, 411.
75 Bar-Yosef 2001, 320, based on an interview with Avner Shalev; Bartov 1978, 324.
1 Haber 1987, 13, 24.
2 Regarding the meeting in London: Zamir and Mass 2011, 146–49.
3 Agranat Commission Report, additional partial report, explanations and substantiations, Vol. 1, 167.
4 Zamir and Mass 2011, 148.
5 Ibid.
6 According to the testimony of Freddie Eini to the Agranat Commission, Protocol of Commission Discussions, Session 15.
7 Gordon 2008, 267, based on the protocol written by Shlomo Gazit, who was at the discussion.
8 Dayan 1976, 575.
9 Gordon 2008, 224; Bartov 1978, 324; Dayan 1974, 575; Braun 1992, 68.
10 Author’s discussion with Shlomo Gazit, May 8, 2012.
11 Gordon 2008, 258, based on the protocol written by S. Gazit.
12 Braun 1992, 69–70.
13 Ministry of Defense Archives, minutes of discussion between Dayan and Elazar, October 6, 1973, at 05:45.
14 Discussion with Shlomo Gazit, May 8, 2012. Quoted from the protocol of the discussion between Dayan and Elazar.
15 This discussion is based on the minutes of the meeting as written by Eli Mizrahi, head of the Prime Minister’s Office, ISA, available at http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/66FC5A72-27F7-41A6-9969-7ED71A097F57/0/yk6_10_0805.pdf.
16 Haber 1987, 25.
17 “The most significant warning arrived at the research department only about three months after war had broken out. This was the news from a good source on October 4 who reported the urgent preparations of President Sadat’s operations room” (Shalev 2007, 122).
18 Sadat 1978, 187.
19 Author’s discussion with Zamir on February 19, 2012. “I wouldn’t have written it if I hadn’t thought that it was important,” testified Zamir about the doubts Marwan had expressed, which were included in Marwan’s message reporting on his meeting with Zamir, transmitted on the day the war began.
20 Protocol of the consultation in the Prime Minister’s Office, Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, 08:05, http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/66FC5A72-27F7-41A6-9969-7ED71A097F57/0/yk6_10_0805.pdf
21 Nakdimon 1978, 187.
22 Ronen 2002, 330–31.
23 Gordon 2008, 269. Based on Amir 2000, 225, and Ronen 2002, 332.
24 Gordon 2008, 223–96.
25 Ibid., 272.
26 Tel Aviv 7766, October 6, 1973, 10:33, NSC, NA RN, 1173. A copy of the original flash cable can be found in the National Security Archive at George Washington University: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-09.pdf.
27 Author’s interview with Zamir, February 19, 2012.
28 Kissinger 1982, 466–67; Kissinger 2003, 13–14.
29 Message transmitted by Shalev to the White House, October 5, 1973, 17:00, NA RN, NSC, HAK, Box 136; National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-07.pdf. Even the next morning, a short time before the war broke out, the CIA, perhaps influenced by Israeli appraisals, assessed that “for Egypt, a military initiative makes little sense at this critical juncture of President Sadat’s reorientation of domestic and foreign policy” (“President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,” Central Intelligence Bulletin, October 6, 1973, 45).
30 Kissinger 1982, 466.
31 Ibid., 467.
32 Regarding Kissinger’s actions and words before and during the early hours of the war: Kissinger 2003, 7–37.
33 NA RN, HAK, Telcons Box 22; see also Kissinger 2003, 17–18.
34 Zayyat had been scheduled to speak at the General Assembly meeting the day before, on October 5, but at the last minute, asked to change the date and speak on October 11. Regarding the decision not to inform him of the impending war, see Heikal 1975, 15–16.
35 NA RN, HAK, Telcons Box 22; FRUS XXV, 292.
36 Heikal 1975, 31.
37 Kissinger 2003, 19–21.
38 Ibid., 22.
39 Ibid., 22–23.
40 Ibid., 23.
41 Ibid., 24–25.
42 Braun 1992, 78.
43 Bartov 1978, Vol. II, 30.
44 Nakdimon 1982, 145.
45 Stein 2003, 91. Based on the author’s interview with Mordechai Gazit.
46 At a consultation on Friday, October 5, 1973. He was referring to the coming elections in Israel (Zeira 2005, 187).
47 Medzini 2008, 548.
1 Bar-Yosef 2010, back cover.
2 Ibid.
3 Bregman’s testimony to the London police, Document 1, LHCMA, Bregman Files.
4 Ibid.
5 Bregman’s testimony to the London police, Document 6, LHCMA, Bregman Files.
6 Ibid.
7 Zamir and Mass 2011, 130.
8 Five conversations with Zeira between January 22, 2011, and January 15, 2012; Bar-Yosef 2011, 148. Bar-Yosef wrote that the war plans Marwan communicated “reinforced what was already known in Israel.”
9 Zamir and Mass 2011, 141.
10 Bar-Yosef 2010, 11.
11 Zeira 2004, 158.
12 Zamir and Mass 2011, 141.
13 The only one to mention a report on that date was Bar-Yosef 2011, 200.
14 Gamasy 1994, 157.
15 Shazly 1987, 132–43; Gamasy 1994, 135–36.
16 Gamasy 1994, 153. Based on Hafez Ismail, The National Security of Egypt, 267–69. This is not a description of a focused preparation.
17 Cairo 2494, August 17, 1973; Cairo 2540, August 22, 1973. Report of the United States Interests Section in Cairo, NA, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=57586&dt=2472&dl=1345 and http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=59677&dt=2472&dl=1345.
18 Heikal 1975, 14; El-Saadany 1994, 121.
19 Zamir and Mass 2011, 149.
20 Ha’aretz, October 5, 1973. The article includes a photograph of them with President Sadat dated October 3, 1973.
21 Saadany 1994, 121.
22 Braun 1992, 63.
23 About the feeling that Zamir was not serious enough about the significance of the warning, see the testimony of Freddie Eini, director-general of Zamir’s office, who communicated Marwan’s announcement. Minutes of the Agranat Commission discussions, Meeting 15, http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/Pages/Exhibitions/Agranat2/AlfredEini/15/mywebalbum/index.html
24 Zamir and Mass 2011, 148.
25 Ibid.
26 Ha’aretz, December 9, 1973, quoting Al-Ahram, December 7, 1973. Heikal said that twenty minutes before the war broke out, Sadat received a dispatch from Nixon.
27 Bar-Yosef 2010, 145–46.
28 Ibid., 149.
29 Bar-Yosef 2011, 150. Quoting the head of air force intelligence research.
30 Zeira 2004, 111; Bar-Yosef 2010, 137–43.
31 Braun 1992, 18.
32 Author’s interview with Zamir, February 19, 2012.
33 Braun 1992, 18.
34 Bartov 2002, 259.
35 Bar-Yosef 2001, 79.
36 Braun 1992, 18.
37 Bartov 2002, 257–58.
38 Braun 1992, 18.
39 Bartov 2002, 259.
40 Ibid.
41 Author’s discussion with Zamir, February 19, 2012.
42 Zamir and Mass 2011, 138.
43 Dayan 1976, 576.
44 Rabin 1979, 345–46.
45 Bergman and Meltzer 2003, 182.
46 Braun 1992, 18.
47 Bartov 2002, 262.
48 Dinitz to Gazit about his discussion with Kissinger, September 30, 1973, Lamed Vav/934, Aleph-4996/2, ISA.
49 Ma’ariv, December 2, 1994.
50 Aluf Benn, “How I Found the Spy,” Ha’aretz, December 26, 2004.
51 Interview with Zeira, January 15, 2012.
52 Ha’aretz, September 17, 1999.
53 Rami Tal, “Egyptian Double Agent,” Yedioth Aharonoth, May 9, 2000.
54 Mail from Rami Tal to Ahron Bregman, September 15, 2002, LHCMA, Bregman Files.
55 Regan 1998.
56 Sawt al-Umma, December 2, 2002; Bregman’s police testimony, January 25, 2008, LHCMA, Bregman Files.
57 Al-Ahram, December 21, 2002.
58 Bregman to Marwan, fax, December 29, 2002, LHCMA, Bregman Files.
59 Ibid. Bregman transmitted the text of his conversations and correspondence with Marwan to the police as part of his testimony after Marwan’s death.
60 Ibid.
61 Yedioth Aharonoth, May 6, 2005.
62 Bregman’s police testimony, Document 5, Bregman Files, LHCMA.
63 Bregman’s police testimony, Document 4, Bregman Files, LHCMA.
64 Gilboa was a former head of the military intelligence research department; Langotsky was a former head of the military intelligence collection department (Bar-Yosef 2010, 351).
65 Final Supplement, Israeli television, September 10, 2004; Or 2006, 2.
66 Final Supplement, Israeli television, September 23, 2004.
67 Or 2006, 36.
68 Ibid., 1.
69 Bregman’s testimony to the police, Document 7, LHCMA, Bregman Files.
70 Bar-Yosef 2011, 13.