In the spring of 1945, Soviet troops controlled more than a thousand miles of the Baltic coast and held the Danish island Bornholm in the western Baltic. After 5 years of German occupation, Denmark became a frontline state between East and West. By signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, Denmark abandoned more than a 100 years of non-alignment. The question remains, however, to what extent elements of acquiescence and non-provocation survived in Danish policy. Would fear of political and military retaliation from the East make Danish policy a low-key affair? Would Danish decision-makers succumb to Soviet pressure and abstain from military integration with NATO? To what extent did Danish decision-makers restrict or postpone military integration because of domestic concerns, political or ideological disagreement with official NATO policy, or the avoidance of unnecessary conflicts?
These issues have been the subject of much animated political and scholarly discussion. Greater access to the archives of Danish ministries is now providing a unique insight into the internal deliberations of the Danish authorities and decision-makers. Knowledge of these deliberations regarding how to deal with the continuous political pressure from the Kremlin sheds new light on how Soviet policy affected Denmark's security policy and on the extent of Danish political vulnerability to the Soviet Union.
This chapter begins by discussing the impact on Denmark of Soviet attempts to obtain Danish neutrality or at least Denmark's partial detachment from the Western Alliance. The focus is on the government's adjustments in its relationship with NATO, as well as in Danish public life, in coping with overt and covert Soviet campaigns. The chapter then examines Danish deliberations on how to deal with expected or specific reactions from the Kremlin with regard to Danish defense measures and NATO military initiatives in the Danish and Baltic regions. The focus is particularly on the extent to which Denmark's restraint and hesitations arose from considerations concerning potential Soviet reactions. Finally, brief reflections are presented on the extent to which Danish restraint actually limited the country's military readiness, damaged its political relationship with its Alliance partners, and weakened the Western Alliance.
Danish scholars have not achieved consensus on the topic of the Soviet impact on Danish Alliance policy. A striking example of the broad spectrum of interpretations is the difference between the views of Bo Lidegaard and Bent Jensen. While, generally speaking, the former considers Denmark to have been a completely loyal member of the Alliance, whose minor reservations were generally accepted by the United States, the latter sees Denmark as a more ambivalent member of NATO with low defense capabilities because of Soviet intimidation. Poul Villaume also considers the Danish policy toward the Alliance to have been one of reserve, though he does see the Danish position as having been stimulated by a desire to maintain the Nordic region as one of relatively low tension. He also stresses the significance of lacking Danish trust in the outlook of American foreign policy.1
The Soviet Union considered Scandinavia to be of essential strategic interest. The region constituted a buffer zone for the Soviet homeland from the north and northwest, while the Danish straits were essential for free access to the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.2 Denmark's participation in any kind of Western coalition or Alliance weakened Soviet security, since it prevented control of the area during a future crisis or war.3 Since 1948, when Scandinavia's integration into Western military Alliances was placed on the agenda of Nordic governments, Soviet aims were clear: first, to prevent Danish membership and, after 1949, to bring about a Danish withdrawal from the Alliance. The second was to weaken Danish and Western military capacity in the Baltic region. Moscow did not consider the first aim realistic and therefore only seriously worked on the second.4
Soviet attempts to influence Danish decision-makers consisted in formal and informal approaches to governments, relevant ministries and ministers, politicians and civil servants.5 Diplomatic pressure on the Danish government to withdraw from the Alliance was limited. The Soviet Union addressed a protest note directly to the Danish government in April 1949, days before the latter was due to sign up to the NATO Alliance in Washington. In the following years, Soviet official protests concerning Denmark's steps towards further military integration became more frequent. These protests took a number of forms and were aimed to isolate Denmark within NATO. The goals were both military and political, consisting partly in preventing Denmark from benefiting from Western security guarantees, and partly in attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and a European member of the Alliance. After Denmark joined the Alliance, the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen suggested in its reports to Moscow that the Soviet Union demand new rules for foreign fleets in the Baltic Sea. Thereafter, Moscow developed the thesis of the Baltic as a mare clausum, suggesting that only the fleets of the littoral states — that is, Denmark but not the other NATO allies — should be allowed into the Baltic Sea.6 Moscow published a number of articles on the subject but never went as far as to demand new international rules officially.
In the late 1950s, Denmark became subject to diplomatic pressure over its NATO commitment. Danish governments received a number of proposals in which Denmark was to be included in peace zones that the Soviet Union alternately termed “neutralized” and “nuclear-free.” The first formal proposals appeared in Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin's letters of December 12, 1957, and January 8, 1958. East German officials also proposed a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone to Danish parliamentarians during visits of their delegation to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). From 1959, Moscow became even more explicit in its approaches to the Danish government in speeches and in press campaigns proposing that the whole of Scandinavia be transformed into a neutral zone.
Soviet attempts to influence Danish policy through public campaigns were more frequent and more comprehensive than attempts to influence Danish governments directly at the diplomatic level. One aim of the strategy was to influence as many Danes as possible — parliamentarians, journalists, civil servants, trade unionists, intellectuals, etc. — to support Soviet policy and ideology. A shift in public mood in Denmark in favor of the Eastern bloc could, Moscow hoped, put pressure on the country's NATO membership, as well as on Denmark's political and economic ties with the Western Alliance.
Moscow considered active measures in Denmark worthwhile, since the Danes, with their tradition of neutrality, were expected to be susceptible to influence when it came to security issues.7 Soviet-inspired public campaigns were aimed at influencing a number of groups in Western societies, stimulating public skepticism regarding NATO and creating discontent with the Western democratic system. In 1949, communists in Western Europe stirred up a massive “peace campaign” masterminded by the Cominform, the Soviet-dominated body for the management of European communist parties. International front organizations acted as the main channels of propaganda. During the war in Korea, the propaganda disseminated by these organizations sought to intimidate Denmark and the other European NATO allies by raising fears of Soviet reactions to American imperialism and aggression.
In addition, Moscow took a number of specific steps to encourage neutralist sentiments in Scandinavia, including bilateral agreements, invitations of official delegations to Warsaw Pact countries, and exchanges of military visits.8
In the late 1950s, following West Germany's accession to NATO, the task of organizing public campaigns calling for the “Baltic as an inner sea of peace” was delegated to the GDR and Poland. The tone of these campaigns shifted from denunciations of NATO to an emphasis on common interests and “coexistence” among “Baltic neighbors.” The main tool, apart from Polish and East German public statements, was popular propaganda, conducted principally by the GDR and aimed at all the Scandinavian countries as well as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).9
In the 1950s, all Danish governments were careful not to weaken their relationship with NATO. They characterized Danish territory as difficult to defend because of its exposed geography and poor natural resources. Danish officials felt that the country was dependent on Western deterrence and thus on NATO membership. In 1954, the Foreign Ministry perceived NATO's greatest value for Denmark in its preventive effect: Danish main interests were guaranteed by official US statements of readiness to retaliate any aggression against the free world.10 According to the Foreign Ministry, Denmark could not be 100 percent sure of American help when it came to crisis or war. It was stated, however, that
it is probably the interest of the Soviet Union that people in Western Europe only see two alternatives: a light and smiling co-existence or an absolute darkness of atomic war and not the semidarkness in which smaller aggressions could take place without any warning. For the time being, such acts of semidarkness are blocked by the NATO alarm system.11
Danish attitude towards the Soviet Union took the form of a reassurance policy. Danish decision-makers chose not to be sensitive to any Soviet proposals of semi-neutrality. Proposals for “nuclear-free” or “peace” zones were either ignored or explicitly rejected. Although they felt uncomfortable, Danish officials remained unimpressed by the formal approaches, letters, and notes flowing from Moscow, as well as by informal diplomatic approaches. At the same time, they reacted politely and reassuringly. The aim of successive Danish governments seemed to be to prevent conflict and maintain a good bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union. After 1957, however — a year which heralded Khrushchev's more offensive diplomacy and insistence that Scandinavia become a nuclear-free zone — Danish governments expressed themselves more unsympathetically. They stressed that peace was the responsibility of the Great Powers and — referring to Soviet proposals for nuclear-free zones in Scandinavia and an inner sea of peace in the Baltic — pointed out that Russia was the only power that had nuclear weapons stored in this area. Semi-neutral zones in Scandinavia therefore demanded prior Soviet disarmament.12
By contrast, Danish officials felt much more vulnerable to the effect on Danish public opinion of Soviet-inspired “peace propaganda.” The authorities worried about a possible political convergence of radical pacifist and communist attitudes among Danes. In this respect, Danish governments did not fear “communist attitudes” as such. According to the Foreign Ministry's analysis, Danes were not attracted to communist ideology, since political and material conditions in Denmark limited its influence.13
Early in the Cold War, Danish governments adopted measures to prevent the communist movement from spreading. Governments, both Social Democratic and Liberal, chose socialist-leaning economic policies, which were aimed to appeal to potential communist supporters. Furthermore, Danish governments co-operated with the Marshall Plan in campaigns presenting an attractive image of the “American Way of Life.”14
The worries concerned therefore not so much the subversive activities of the Danish Communist Party (DKP), which the government believed had been countered by laws on fifth columnists in the early 1950s. Police and defense intelligence services carried out strict surveillance of communist-inspired front organizations throughout the decade. It was Soviet psychological warfare that worried governments, as a Danish civil servant in NATO expressed the matter: “While there is no threat of influence from the DKP, Denmark's relationship with the Soviet Union is something quite distinct and concerns the military imperialism of this mighty power.”15
There was a certain anti-militarist and defense-hostile sentiment among the general public and in parliament, in particular in the Social Liberal Party. Whereas the Social Democrats despite many anti-militarist voters in the party had joined the right wing in favor of Danish membership of the Alliance, the Social Liberals had voted against. The fact that the latter party's decision to maintain an anti-militarist profile dated back to before the Second World War and was not the result of Soviet influence allowed it to develop a distinctive image and to have a decisive influence on the debate. In parliament, the Social Liberals, as well as some Liberals and Social Democrats, recalled the reasons for Denmark's tradition of neutrality, which had been brought to an end in 1949.
Competition between the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals for the votes of those who were skeptical regarding defense issues intensified in 1953, when the Social Liberals came out in favor of some Soviet proposals, in particular the nuclear-free zone. However, despite its opposition to NATO membership in 1949, the party rarely explicitly voiced support for Moscow's alternative security proposals but rather favored UN-inspired solutions. During the party's participation in the government from 1957 to 1961, it silently assented to NATO and also voted for the defense act in 1960.
Public opinion polls indicated some public skepticism towards an active Danish NATO policy. Those favoring NATO membership amounted to only around 50 percent throughout the period. A little more than 25 percent were against NATO membership, and the rest was undecided. However, governments regarded this skepticism as being almost purely homegrown and not Soviet-inspired, just like the profile of the Social Liberal Party. After 1956, and during the early détente period, although those rejecting membership amounted to less than one-fifth, it was the “don't knows” rather than those in favor who increased in number. It is therefore unclear how strongly Danes were opposed to Denmark's policy in NATO. The low level of “pros” might reflect the low public interest in foreign policy. Opinion polls also show that defense skepticism resulted from budgetary concerns. In postwar Denmark, there was a consensus from right to left that a high priority should be given to social policy. This sometimes led to debates on the impact of defense expenditure.16
In order to prevent withdrawal from NATO membership becoming a political issue, the authorities developed methods to prevent Danish criticism of it from growing. To manage the anti-militarist mood, governments frequently stressed that Denmark perceived NATO as a strictly defensive Alliance. They also underlined that having a low-profile member such as Denmark in NATO contributed to a general relaxation of tensions. Within NATO, Danish governments were also careful to propose that Soviet initiatives be responded to politely.17 Such reassuring signals became even more explicit during the late 1960s, when public skepticism regarding NATO was increasing.18
Another way of reassuring the Danish population that Denmark was a moderate NATO member working in favor of dénte was to link Danish security policy to NATO members with whom Denmark traditionally had close ties. The aim was to stress that Denmark was not totally dependent on American political and strategic thinking, which, in the eyes of some pacifists, was aggressive towards the East. Some research on Danish management of Soviet pressure during the early Cold War indicates the existence of a “strategic alliance” between Danish Social Democrats in government and the United States. The thesis is that the US relied on the strong anti-communism of Danish Social Democrats to contain Soviet influence in the area. In return, the US tolerated Denmark's low military and ideological commitment to NATO. This thesis has some relevance for the first few years of the Cold War, when communism as such was still playing a part in Danish policy. A policy oriented toward a Nordic and to some extent to a British context, at least in the official presentation of Danish policy, seems to cover the whole period being scrutinized here.19
Besides, in order to defuse pro-neutrality and isolationist propaganda, it was standard policy to allow front organizations to carry on their peace activities freely. All governments felt obliged to adopt a liberal policy of public expression, not daring to inhibit such activities for fear of being accused of anti-democratic measures.20 The covert part of this diffusion strategy included secret material prepared by the government and planted in Danish newspapers, as well as support for so-called private pro-Atlantic propaganda initiatives. These discrete counter-propaganda measures often consisted in nothing more than systematically ignoring the peace propaganda, because, in the Danish political environment, arguing in favor of a pro-Atlantic posture was regarded as counter-productive.21
Moscow failed in its attempt to effect changes in Denmark's overall security policy. But its campaigns to minimize the impact of Western military measures in the Danish and Baltic regions did apparently enjoy some degree of success. In so far as this happened, the degree to which the Eastern bloc's political pressure influenced Danish actions in ways that furthered the Soviet agenda must be examined.
In order to evaluate the significance of the pressure from the East, a number of cases where Moscow brought extensive pressure to bear on the Danish government will be discussed. The four cases are:
1 the stationing of foreign aircraft on Danish soil (1952–53)
2 NATO military activity and the island of Bornholm (1952–53)
3 the storage of nuclear warheads on Danish soil (1957–60)
4 Danish-West German military cooperation and integration (mid-1950s to 1961).
In order to estimate the extent and significance of the Soviet impact, all major Danish concerns influencing the decision-making process must be taken into account and their individual impact on the chosen Danish policy compared and discussed. Needless to say, making such an estimate is difficult, since any decision-making process is often a conglomeration of numerous, partly interacting elements. Nevertheless, the extensive source material now available, especially from the archives of the Danish Foreign Ministry, demonstrates to some extent the relative importance of the different considerations in the decision-making process.
In early 1952, NATO's military authorities and the United States discreetly proposed to the Danish authorities the stationing of US Air Force units on Danish territory in peacetime.22 In late January 1953, these negotiations more or less collapsed and were never seriously resumed. After an impasse lasting approximately 6 months, the matter was brought to a close with an announcement that the suggestion was being declined “under the present circumstances.”
In 1952 and 1953, the Kremlin sent a number of strong-worded notes to the Danish government, warning it not to accept the US proposal. Bent Jensen argues that it was these Soviet protests that led to the Danish refusal and that Moscow thereby succeeded in obstructing the establishment of military bases for foreign troops.23 However, in fact, the Danish government showed considerable resolve in facing the Soviet intimidation, and considerations other than Soviet pressure influenced the Danish government's rejection of the stationing of US aircraft on its soil.
Although the Danish government received the proposal to station allied aircraft positively, it was considered vital to keep the matter secret for as long as possible. In February 1952, Danish Foreign Minister Ole Bjørn Kraft stated that it would be “unfortunate” if an agreement were reached a year before the airfields had been built and the aircraft were available.24 The Soviet Union should be kept unaware of the agreement until all the necessary preparations had been made. According to the Foreign Ministry, the only certainty about the potential risk of war was that this risk would increase in the period between the Soviet Union learning of a Danish acceptance and the actual deployment.25 In March 1952, the Danish Defense Minister stated that the risk of antagonizing the Soviets was an important issue for Denmark. The logical development, he argued, would be to take the necessary steps when the military forces and external assistance were both ready, since this would lessen the risk.26 But there were other reasons than Soviet reactions for postponing an agreement. Danish public opinion had to become accustomed gradually to the thought of foreign troops being stationed on Danish soil. The general public was expected to have reservations about the prospect of having US soldiers stationed in Denmark. Therefore, as the Foreign Ministry noted in May 1952, several key ministers attempted to prepare the public for this in their speeches on the subject. However, apparently these preparatory measures had to be discreet and somewhat non-factual in order to avoid any premature public debate on the peacetime stationing of US forces.27
In mid-1952, public debate on the stationing of US forces began to take shape. In October 1952, the Soviet Union addressed a strongly worded protest note to the Danish government, warning it not to accept the stationing of US aircraft. Despite the fact that the Danish authorities seemed inclined to dismiss the Soviet warning, the Kremlin did influence the Danish public debate in late 1952 by raising public awareness further and by contributing to public debate on the matter. Also, rather than interpreting the Soviet memorandum as an omen of an impending attack on them, the authorities saw it as an attempt to influence the forthcoming debate in parliament by creating domestic political difficulties for the Liberal-Conservative government.28 Communists and Social Liberals vocally opposed any suggestion of stationing foreign military units in Denmark. By the fall, factions within the Social Democratic Party also seemed inclined to agree with the skeptical parties. Nevertheless, the Soviet impact on actual decision-making was more obscure. Thus, Social Democratic Chairman Hans Hedtoft told the American ambassador that the Soviet October memorandum had actually strengthened his position vis-à-vis his opponents within the party. According to Hedtoft, neither he nor any of the party chairmen would give in to Soviet pressure.29 Also, according to Kraft, the case was further supported by the expectation that the Kremlin would otherwise get the impression that it was possible to intimidate Denmark. Also, a Danish backing out would have negative repercussions for Denmark's relations with its NATO allies.30 Despite the generally non-provocative sentiment inherent in Denmark's security policy and defense posture, Danish decision-makers were ready to accept the American proposal in the fall of 1952.
In early 1953, the Kremlin sent yet another note of protest to the Danish government. However, it was not this that caused the breakdown of negotiations. In late 1952, the positive Danish attitude towards the stationing of US aircraft had begun to change when the United States refused to guarantee that the units would be deployed for Denmark's defense. Instead, SHAPE could use them anywhere in the European theater without Danish consent.31 For the Social Democratic Party, it was a sine qua non that Denmark should have the right to veto any engagement of US Air Force units stationed in Denmark in conflicts outside Danish territory. In the early fall of 1952, the Social Democrats had already been somewhat less eager than the government to accept the agreement.32 Given the political disadvantages in peacetime and the increased risk of Soviet bombing in time of war, the security advantage was now considered too modest to be worthwhile. Considering the weakened prospect of strengthening the allied defense in Schleswig-Holstein by West-German accession to the European Defence Community (EDC), the overall military advantage was dubious, the Social Democrats argued.33 In all likelihood, discomfort with the foreign policy outlook announced by the Eisenhower government, not least its “rollback strategy,” served as an impetus for the Social Democratic demand.34 The government acknowledged that the Social Democratic argument was true in so far as the stationing of US air force units would not now lead to a substantial improvement of Danish security.35 Rather, Denmark would be more exposed in respect of the peacetime stationing of aircraft, which actually might be removed in time of war.
Furthermore, in February 1953, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, Nils Svenningsen, stated that the Soviet approach of late January should not influence the government's attitude, not least since, according to the Foreign Ministry, the Soviet aide mémoire did not contain any alarming diplomatic expressions.36 Denmark was ready to risk antagonizing the Soviets as long as the stationing proposal meant an overall improvement in Danish security.
Now, however, the picture had altered slightly. Also, since the Liberal-Conservative government was dependent on Social Democratic parliamentary support for any stationing agreement to go ahead, the negotiations were put on hold, despite the fact that the government was still inclined to accept a stationing agreement on US terms.
Domestic considerations reached further than the government's dependence on the Social Democratic Party. The Social Democratic dismissal of the American stationing proposal was stimulated by domestic political concerns. With the national election approaching in mid-1953, Social Democratic leaders considered it essential to strengthen their image on security issues, especially since they needed the parliamentary backing of the pacifist Social Liberals to get back into government.37
Finally, the change in the international climate in the wake of Stalin's death made a stationing seem less necessary and potentially politically counter-productive, since the Danish population would have difficulties in accepting the overall necessity of such a military measure.38
In the Soviet note of January 1953, the Kremlin had accused Denmark of breaking a promise from 1946 that Bornholm would be kept under Danish administration. In fact, Nils Svenningsen argued that Moscow's goal was to prevent foreign troops from being stationed on Bornholm, rather than the stationing of foreign aircraft in Denmark proper, that is, in Jutland. Ministry officials argued that the Soviet Union had shown a special interest in areas within the Western zone that could be used for forward bases. And Bornholm was just such an area. Despite the fact that the Danish authorities did not consider the 1946 statement on Bornholm's status to be binding regarding the presence of foreign troops there, the protest from Moscow led to serious thinking about how to escape from the predicament without making “dangerous concessions to the Russians.”39 Although Pentagon planning included the use of Bornholm for military installations,40 no Danish-American negotiations were pursued regarding a US presence on Bornholm, and the Danish authorities did not expect future stationing of US forces there. Therefore, a statement on non-acceptance of foreign troops on Bornholm would not actually mean any real concession to the Soviets, Svenningsen argued.41 Eventually, the Danish government decided not to give a formal answer to the Soviet note. Instead, during a visit to Bornholm the Danish Foreign Minister made a public statement, meant to reassure both the Danish public and the Soviets, in which he emphasized that the government was paying attention to the special situation of Bornholm. However, he did not make any explicit promises regarding future stationing of foreign troops on the island.42
There was some disagreement in the Foreign Ministry regarding Bornholm's strategic importance to the Soviet Union and the likelihood of an isolated Soviet attack on the island. Even though it was argued that Bornholm had greater significance in terms of political leverage than as a strategic asset, it was acknowledged that the possibility of an attack could not be ruled out.43 Although the Danish authorities assumed that the Foreign Minister's statement regarding the stationing of foreign forces on Bornholm would reassure the Russians and might help to ease bilateral tensions, they did not consider the statement likely to cause the Kremlin to abandon the issue of Bornholm as such. According to Nils Svenningsen, Moscow was not concerned with NATO deterrence on such minor issues as the status of Bornholm. The Russians knew that, among the European NATO countries, there were strong forces ready to go to great lengths to placate Moscow in order to avoid a confrontation.44 In other words, the West was not ready to go to war for the sake of Bornholm. Svenningsen's fear was increased by the belief among Danish decision-makers that, in case of war, there was little hope of an allied defense of Denmark. The Danes knew that, until the late 1950s, Jutland would be exposed to an eastern attack, as NATO military authorities did not anticipate holding Western Europe east of the Rhine-Ijssel line.45 Nevertheless, the main reason for Denmark's membership of NATO was that core Danish decision-makers generally believed in the effectiveness of deterrence. As a strategic concept, deterrence was considered the only way to ensure that the Russians would think twice before contemplating aggression.46 Still, the dawn of the nuclear age gave rise to doubts. If deterrence failed, would the nuclear defense work? According to one senior civil servant, it was likely that, “hypnotized by the threat of nuclear bombs…the population of a great power [would] be less prepared than ever to ‘die for Danzig’.”47
In general, the Danish worries were most pronounced with respect to Bornholm. The British acknowledged that the Danes were particularly anxious about the island. But, as a British foreign office memorandum from mid-1953 noted, “despite a certain tendency to timidity…the Danes had remained firm when confronted with the recent Russian notes [concerning the stationing of US aircraft].”48
The Soviet reference to the 1946 Danish statement on Bornholm was not without precedence. In the fall of 1952, NATO's Main Brace exercises had demonstrated similar Danish vulnerability concerning Bornholm. Consideration for Soviet concerns eventually led to some changes in the allied plans regarding the geographical scope of both sea and air operations. The negotiations over Main Brace highlighted Anglo-American disagreements over how far NATO should go to placate the Soviets. While the British found the exercise “dangerously provocative” and suggested complete abandonment of the portion that was scheduled to take place in the eastern Baltic, the US administration stood firm: it was important not to give in to Soviet pressure, especially since it would create a precedent. Nevertheless, the Americans stressed that everything possible should be done to avoid anything that might appear provocative to the Soviets.49
The Danish authorities understood and appreciated the American concern. This was due not least to the risk of creating a precedent with respect to the forthcoming negotiations on the stationing of US Air Force units in the country.50 But the Danes also shared the British concern and even calculated the risk of a Soviet occupation of Bornholm once the exercises had been concluded. It is worth remembering that this was at the time of the Korean War, which cast long shadows of fear. Following Main Brace, the geographical limitations imposed by Denmark on allied military exercises on and to the east of Bornholm were adopted as permanent peacetime constraints.51
It is difficult to gauge the politico-military implications of the Danish restrictions relating to Bornholm. The consequences and the level of Denmark's need to placate Moscow may be somewhat overestimated, since the restrictions did not apply to Danish vessels but only to those of the allies. The Danish navy maintained a rather high profile around the island and made expeditions deep into the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia. Moreover, the Danish Ministry of Defense and Danish military authorities emphasized the military importance of NATO allies being familiar with the waters around Bornholm. Nevertheless, the Danish Foreign Ministry stood by the conviction that such activities were not of sufficient strategic importance to counter-balance the politico-military consequences of challenging the Soviet Union over Bornholm. Therefore, it was deemed prudent to avoid incidents that could develop in a dangerous direction. Activity on Bornholm in particular was expected to cause new Soviet reactions.52
Danish decision-makers proved to be quite vulnerable to Kremlin pressure concerning Bornholm and the eastern Baltic. The military consequences of this vulnerability were apparently rather modest. The political consequences to Denmark's reputation within NATO also seemed to be minor, due mostly to Britain's clear expressions of understanding about the complexity of the Bornholm issue. Probably the most significant consequence of the restrictions was that it encouraged the Kremlin, as had also been the case with the stationing of foreign aircraft. The unavoidable Soviet impression must have been that the Danes were susceptible to pressure. Furthermore, strategic considerations aside, NATO emphasized that the restrictions would imply a tacit acceptance by the West that these waters were exclusively reserved for Soviet activity.
The level of Danish concern, which prompted the decision to restrict allied activity on and around Bornholm, apparently did not change significantly after Stalin's death although, as Vojtech Mastny has emphasized, the Soviets did not by this time have much appetite for risky adventures in Western Europe.53
In mid-1956, NATO decided to equip the shield forces with nuclear weapons. A few months later, NATO military authorities suggested the nuclear armament of Danish military forces to key Danish decision-makers. Secret discussions with the US and NATO military authorities on the delivery of “atomic artillery” went on for nearly half a year before the question became public.
The final US proposal was for the deployment of rockets (HONEST JOHN) and guided missiles (NIKE) with nuclear capabilities. Transcripts of internal Danish deliberations show a surprisingly modest concern for the Soviet Union. The US authorities estimated that “Denmark will ultimately accept NIKE. However, it does not appear that Denmark will make a final decision until the political situation is cleared or until the total cost to Denmark has been determined.”54 The political situation concerned the forthcoming national elections in May 1957. The Danish authorities focused on the potential impact on public opinion.55 Not the least of the problems was the prospects of having US troops guard the nuclear missiles, as this would clash with the basic principles of Danish stationing policy. According to a Gallup Poll, 44 percent of the Danish population was against the permanent stationing of troops from another NATO country on Danish soil. Furthermore, given especially the Social Liberal Party's animosity toward the military, nuclear armament was not expected to be popular. This might pose a problem for the Social Democratic government, which relied on Social Liberal backing. With regard to the economic perspectives, the US delegation assured the Danes that acceptance would not result in extra expenditure for Denmark.
It must be stressed that the US offer covered only the delivery units (rockets and guided missiles), not the actual nuclear warheads, as this was ruled out by US law on nuclear energy at the time. Although the weapons systems could in principle be used for conventional purposes, their tactical range was highly problematic. For instance, due to its low accuracy HONEST JOHN demanded a very wide range of impact. The Danish authorities were clearly aware of the serious problems involved in using such weapons without nuclear warheads. Nonetheless, they showed considerable interest in the dual-purpose facility. In all likelihood, this prospect mainly served as leverage for domestic acceptance of the missiles.
In March 1957, the Danish government accepted in principle the delivery of the missiles (NIKE). After the matter became public later that month, the government received a rather aggressive letter from Soviet Minister Bulganin, who warned Denmark strongly against allowing the presence of US troops equipped with nuclear weapons on her soil. The Danish decision-makers did take the letter quite seriously, but despite some anxiety in the Foreign Policy Committee with regard to sentences about Denmark exposing herself to an unavoidable nuclear strike, the Danish government dismissed the Soviet approach quite sharply. The Danish resolve may have been increased by the fact that the Kremlin had sent similar warnings to several other NATO countries. In conversations with the US Embassy, Prime Minister H.C. Hansen described Bulganin's letter as stupid and senseless, and stressed the Soviet desire to restore relations to their pre-Hungary status. Although Hansen's interpretation must be seen partly as an attempt to reassure the Americans that Denmark was not susceptible to Soviet pressure, similar interpretations flourished in internal Danish discussions of the Soviet approach. Also, the Danish press almost unanimously reacted to the Kremlin's warning in a chilly fashion and emphasized that the Soviet approach should not influence Danish policy.
Although the precise impact of the Soviet approach is unclear, it may have had a greater impact on decision-making than a cursory look at Danish thinking on the issue would reveal. Along with rumors in the press that Denmark might have accepted nuclear-capable guided missiles, Bulganin's letter from late March prompted the Danish Communist Party to bring up the nuclear issue in the election campaigns, leading to a sharp clash between the Social Democrats and the Communists. Thus, the way in which Hansen handled the Soviet approach limited his choices and to some extent locked him into a particular political course. Given the domestic political equation at that time, allowing nuclear warheads to be stored in Denmark was considered politically harmful. The Social Democrats were caught in a tactical electoral ploy where the Social Liberal Party's anti-militarist feelings were allowed to influence the Social Democratic position. During the following general election campaign, Hansen stated that, in his personal opinion, Denmark would have rejected any offer of nuclear warheads for the guided missiles. The newly formed coalition government, which included the Social Democratic and Social Liberal parties, issued a statement that nuclear weapons would not be permitted “under present circumstances.”56
In December 1957, the Danish government decided to maintain the existing policy and made an official statement in NATO on the rejection. That same month, the Danish government received yet another threatening letter from Bulganin, which has been seen as providing the impetus for the Danish government to maintain the existing policy of non-acceptance.57 However, the letter actually arrived a few days after the policy had been agreed. In addition, it is highly likely that the Kremlin knew about the Danish decision before Bulganin's letter was sent. In all likelihood, the Soviet goal was to give the impression that Moscow was able to affect Danish policy-making.58 However, this is not to say that Danish decision-makers did not consider the consequences for the Danish-Soviet relationship when formulating their nuclear policy: in fact, they did. As regards the possibility of intermediate range ballistic missiles being based in Denmark, the government felt that this would be unacceptably provocative, although, during the very same discussions, the avoidance of provocation was never mentioned in debating the potential stockpiling of tactical nuclear warheads for the Danish armed forces. However, in all likelihood the Danish decision-makers did to some degree consider this perspective when deciding to maintain the policy.59
In the late 1950s, the Danish authorities seriously considered changing Danish nuclear policy in peacetime and storing nuclear warheads on Danish soil. The Danish government kept this option open by maintaining maximum flexibility in phrasing its nuclear policy. According to high-ranking officials in spring 1958, a future change of policy was inevitable. In late 1958, the necessity for flexibility was demonstrated when the American government began to bring pressure to bear on the Danes to agree to nuclear stockpiling. Therefore, the foreign minister and the defense minister deemed it prudent to express a positive attitude towards nuclear armament. At the same time, Denmark ensured that it took all the steps necessary to facilitate the introduction of nuclear weapons if circumstances should change. One of these steps was the preparation of storage facilities for nuclear warheads. According to negotiations between NATO military authorities and the Danish Ministry of Defense, it was agreed that Denmark was not committing itself to future nuclear stockpiling simply by establishing NATO financed storage facilities. Furthermore, until there was a change in nuclear policy, the stores could be used for conventional stockpiling. For domestic political reasons, Foreign Ministry officials were doubtful about proceeding with the actual establishment. With regard to foreign political concerns, there would hardly be any reservations. This despite the fact, that criticism could be expected from the Soviet Union. Thus, the expected Soviet criticism of nuclear storage facilities did not carry sufficient weight to raise Danish reservations over the agreement itself. The Foreign Ministry reckoned that, despite its explicit reservations concerning future nuclear deployment, Denmark would in fact accept a future change in its policy of refusing to accept nuclear warheads. Therefore, the Foreign Ministry expected the agreement over storage facilities to reduce the Danish government's political maneuverability with respect to NATO and the Soviet Union.60
In late 1959, the Social Democratic-led Danish government finally decided to abandon the stockpiling of nuclear warheads in peacetime. Although future nuclear armament was still a remote possibility due to the flexible wording mentioning the “present circumstances,” the prospect of peacetime storage was in fact buried. A few weeks earlier, Hansen met the Soviet ambassador, who advised the Danes strongly against any change in their nuclear policy. The renewed Soviet warnings of Soviet countermeasures may have prompted the Prime Minister's decision to maintain the Danish veto on stationing nuclear weapons on Danish soil. However, Hansen's personal memorandum of the meeting indicates his impatient, almost ironic tone in addressing the Soviet ambassador.61 Furthermore, although Danish-Soviet relations had been stable since early 1958, Soviet displeasure at the thought of potential nuclear stockpiling in Denmark can hardly have surprised the Danish authorities.
Apparently, the main reason for the Social Democratic decision to maintain the Danish veto was that negotiations over the National Defense Act showed it was prudent to do so. Despite constant political pressure, nuclear armament proved not to be a sine qua non for the Liberal-Conservative opposition. And, in late August 1959, the Social Liberal Party decided not to support any change in nuclear policy. As the US Embassy noted, the Social Liberals' negative stand would make acceptance more difficult in the near future. Furthermore, since late spring 1959, the American authorities had reduced their political pressure on the Danish government. The American reasoning was that the discussions over the Danish National Defense Act regarding nuclear stockpiling should continue without any US interference, since the change in the Danish attitude should take place without any prodding from outside, which might have the effect of scaring the Danes off.62 This had been one of the lessons the US drew from the earlier discussions on the stationing of foreign aircraft on Danish soil. Finally, as late as June 1959, Hansen stressed that nuclear armament should be considered if the international situation should deteriorate. In September 1959, the international climate emerging from the meeting at Camp David between Eisenhower and Khrushchev could hardly be seen as a deterioration of international relations.
In the spring of 1960, Denmark and Norway were to present the reasoning for their nuclear policies within NATO. In a memorandum in late March issued during the ministerial preparations for this, Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag stressed that taking Soviet reactions into account was the most important argument against nuclear armament.63 In Danish research, this remark has been used to argue that the continuous Soviet pressure was the single most important reason for Denmark's rejection of the US offer to store nuclear warheads on Danish soil.64 However, there is a significant difference between the motives for creating a policy and the motives for maintaining it. Undoubtedly it became increasingly difficult for the Danish government to abandon its veto on nuclear warheads. Not least from a Soviet point of view, changes in the policy would have been considered most provocative — probably considerably more provocative than an original acceptance.
These considerations aside, the actual meaning of the foreign minister's comment is in itself somewhat blurred and open to discussion. The impetus for Krag's remark was a Norwegian draft emphasizing the potential Soviet responses to Finland and Sweden as a leading motive of Norwegian nuclear policy. In Krag's opinion, Denmark could not use such arguments. With regard to potential Soviet responses, Soviet reactions directed toward Denmark carried more weight and had to be the most important argument against nuclear armament.65 Possibly, the phrase “argument” should not be understood as the reasoning behind the policy, but as the argument to adduce when explaining the policy to Denmark's NATO partners. Counter to this interpretation is the fact that a few days later Krag rejected a similar argument drafted by Foreign Ministry officials, arguing that such statements should only be made in case of strong pressure from the NATO partners. This argument may be seen as weakening the thesis that Krag's comment on Soviet reactions towards Denmark is really referring to arguments within NATO. However, Krag actually rejected several other arguments, which he himself had outlined in the memorandum, for example, considerations for détente between East and West, which was otherwise mentioned as an argument. In all likelihood, Krag eventually came to the conclusion that the Danish presentation should be as brief as possible.
Krag's comment from March 1960 can hardly be considered definite proof of the reasoning behind the Danish nuclear policy. Nevertheless, the considerations in connection with the adherence to this policy demonstrate that there was a desire not to provoke the Soviets. Moreover, the government most likely considered the non-provocative aspect an advantage of the policy. But apparently, avoiding provocation was not the key issue in the Danish rejection of nuclear stockpiling for the dual-purpose missiles: the government's nuclear policy was at least as dependent on domestic considerations.
After the accession of West Germany to NATO in 1955, Danish military co-operation with West Germany began to take shape. From the outset, the negotiations attracted Moscow's close attention. Nevertheless, Denmark's unequivocal stand was that, although there were good arguments for displaying some reservations regarding Danish-German military cooperation, concern for the Soviet Union should hardly obstruct necessary military cooperation between the two NATO partners in a decisive manner.66 Furthermore, the Danish authorities acknowledged that neither the United States nor Britain would welcome a reluctant attitude toward Germany on the part of Denmark.67
In the early 1960s, when Denmark was about to accept the establishment of NATO's Unified Command for the Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP), the Kremlin reinforced its campaign to prevent, or at least slow down, Danish-German military cooperation. When it was on the brink of accepting the establishment in late 1961, the Danish government received a strongly worded Soviet warning. Foreign Minister Krag reckoned that the Soviet approach was aimed at scaring Denmark so much that Denmark would pull out of the Unified Command and thus also out of NATO.68 Nevertheless, Krag observed in his diary that
Soviet pressure must not stand in the way of an unavoidable process.…There can be no doubt that we must stand firm. Compliance will only lead to new demands until we end up in neutrality and stand defenseless…but, of course, the whole situation causes severe worry.69
Apparently, the most worrying aspect was the explicit Soviet references to Bornholm. A few years earlier, the Foreign Ministry had supposed the goal of Soviet policy to be the establishment of “crisis areas” around the world. Should a critical situation arise from a Soviet perspective, Moscow could shift attention to a different area of the world. Thus, Denmark should constantly be prepared for Bornholm becoming the object of Eastern attention if international events should take an unfortunate turn.70
In late 1961, the still vivid recollections of the Berlin Crisis and the Finnish Note Crisis shed a somewhat sinister light on the Soviet Union's aggressive approach. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry stood firm and stated that concern for Bornholm could not stand in the way of Danish accession to the Unified Command. And, despite its considerable nervousness, the government held to its course through a combination of defensive preparations and non-provocative measures. The Danish armed forces were to be held ready at Karup and on Bornholm, but they should not take any action. During a meeting with NATO's military authorities, Danish Chief of Defense Admiral Qvistgaard emphasized that he did not want any allied naval activity near Bornholm, although he would appreciate swift NATO reinforcement in the case of a Soviet attack. Denmark's NATO partners offered reassurances, explaining that such an attack was unlikely, but promising allied intervention in the case of Soviet aggression.71
Nevertheless, on several occasions the Danish government attempted to reassure the Soviets by making cosmetic changes when establishing COMBALTAP. First, American officers were excluded from the Command. Their presence was considered an unnecessary provocation, in the light of Soviet fears that the United States and West Germany were trying to assume a dominant influence in West European politico-military affairs. Second, the Danish authorities carefully considered the name for the Danish-West German command, rejecting the term “Baltic Command” since it was thought that this might upset the Russians. Instead, COMBALTAP became commonly known by the innocuous title of “Unified Command” (“Enhedskommandoen”).72
In addition to these cosmetic changes, a few actual constraints were placed on military activities to avoid any unnecessary provocation. This was not least since the Foreign Ministry expected foreign political concerns to increase along with the increase in German participation in the exercises.73 Therefore, in the late 1950s, the Danish authorities imposed a number of restrictions on West German participation in military exercises. These restrictions were in addition to the 1953 guidelines for naval exercises around Bornholm. Furthermore, immediately after Moscow sent a strongly worded protest against the establishment of COMBALTAP in late 1961, the Danish government issued a statement making it clear that the establishment would not mean any changes in the current situation, where only Danish troops, under Danish command, were stationed on Bornholm. In other words, the COMBALTAP would not result in West German presence on the island. This prompt Danish reaction was due to Soviet references to the Danish statement from 1946 on establishing a purely national administration of the island without the support of foreign troops.74 However, this reassurance was not expected to restrain the Soviet Union from launching an attack against Bornholm. This was still perceived to be a potential outcome of the tense situation in late 1961.
The Soviet attempts to obstruct the establishment of COMBALTAP occasionally proved counter-productive, not least because of the often clumsy and harsh approach used. Thus, the final Soviet memorandum led to a sudden strengthening of Social Democratic efforts to force the Social Liberals to accept the Command, even though its initial effect was to increase the Foreign Ministry's concerns about the disadvantages of the impending decision.75 For years, the Social Democratic Party, whose policy was especially based on concern for public reaction, took shelter behind the Social Liberal Party's objection to the establishment of COMBALTAP. Ironically, Soviet pressure was used as leverage in its final acceptance. Other factors influencing acceptance included the decline in public animosity toward Germans, which had recently heightened public awareness of the need for protection. Furthermore, the Berlin Crisis led to stronger allied pressure on the Danes to accept the establishment of the COMBALTAP.76 This development ran counter to Soviet expectations, even though the Soviet ambassador had warned that it was inevitable. The Kremlin had assumed that the Social Liberal ministers would bring their influence to bear and persuade the government to resist West German pressure.77
Although the Soviet assessment of the Social Liberal influence proved wrong in late 1961, domestic concerns did play a predominant role in the extent of Danish-West German military cooperation. Copenhagen repeatedly responded to allied demands with hesitation and stalling tactics. In 1956, during a discussion about German officers being stationed on Danish soil, Vice Foreign Minister Ernst Christiansen stated that concern for Danish emotions arising from the memory of the German occupation of the Second World War dictated that the government stall as long as possible.78 In fact, this reasoning formed the backbone of the Danish reaction to the development of military integration with West Germany. In some cases, taking public opinion into account completely overshadowed the concern for the Soviet Union's interests. In the case of the establishment of West German storage facilities on Danish soil, Moscow's loud displeasure never became an argument for a re-evaluation of the Danish position. This is especially interesting considering that, in a similar situation, Norwegian officials discussed whether regular NATO storage facilities would be more acceptable to Moscow than West German stores on Norwegian soil.79
The Danish position, on the other hand, was mostly the result of the expected public disapproval of a conspicuous German presence.80 This was why the Danish authorities initially conducted their negotiations with West Germany with a maximum of discretion. Also, when the matter was later leaked to the press, consideration for public opinion was the main argument for shelving the discussions for half a year. And finally, when the Danish government avoided making a bilateral agreement with West Germany by agreeing instead to establish NATO storage facilities for West German forces, once again concern for Danish domestic reaction was the key factor. However, economic considerations also played some part in the Danish policy of making West German military stores on Danish soil a NATO matter, since this would enable joint NATO financing of the stores and thus reduce Danish expenditure.81
Besides the public's — and to some extent their own — lingering animosity towards Germany, Danish policy-makers' decisions regarding military cooperation with the forces of their former occupier were influenced by considerations of the relative strength of the various parties in parliament. First, anti-NATO elements, especially the Communist Party, would no doubt exploit the unpopularity of military cooperation involving West German troops for political gain.82 Second, it was necessary to make concessions to the Social Liberal Party on several occasions, for example, in the elections of 1957 and 1961, when the Social Democratic-led government explicitly mentioned the forthcoming elections in its refusal to make any decisions regarding the development of military cooperation with West Germany.
The impact on Danish policy of Soviet campaigns for neutrality and “peace zones” was low in the period being treated here. As perceived by the Danish government, the impact was indirect, running the major risk of encouraging the internal political debate on Denmark's commitment to NATO and, ultimately, membership in it. This does not imply that the Danish government paid any serious attention to Soviet security proposals. Instead, the nation's governments were careful to stress in public and toward the Soviet Union that Denmark conducted a moderate NATO policy. They also chose to tolerate public manifestations of skepticism about NATO.
Throughout the early Cold War Denmark's policy toward NATO seemed to have been characterized by attempts to reject or postpone certain aspects of military integration. To the extent that this was true, it was not particularly due to the considerable Soviet political pressure on Denmark. Even though Danish decision-makers constantly kept Moxcow's attitude in mind and considered consequences for the bilateral Danish-Soviet relationship, this never led to refraining from military measures that were considered necessary for national security. Instead, the Danish authorities showed considerable endurance in the face of Soviet attempts to influence the country's security policy.
Regarding the security policy cases discussed in this chapter, it is true that it was only with respect to Danish-West German military co-operation that the Danish authorities carried out the associated military measures in a generally unrestrained manner. Nevertheless, the rejection of Soviet influence did not only apply to COMBALTAP: to a large extent, it also covered the decision to reject the stationing of foreign aircraft and the storing of nuclear warheads on Danish soil. Probably the most significant reason for abstaining from full-scale acceptance of these military measures was the calculation that acceptance would not result in any decisive improvement of security. Moreover, public opinion and the composition of parliament often gave rise to reluctance and reservations when developing security policy. In all likelihood, the Danish government would have accepted nuclear warheads and the stationing of US Air Force Units if it had expected these measures to make the difference between victory and defeat. This was not the case. Instead, the government prepared for the future removal of these policy restrictions by taking all the steps necessary to change course. One of the arguments for adopting such a flexible posture was the expected positive reaction within the Alliance. Such considerations also appeared in Danish reflections on the issue of co-operation with West Germany.
It must be stressed that the Danish government attempted to mollify the Russians on several occasions with declarations aimed at defusing the tensions arising from Danish security measures. The prospect of upsetting the Soviets often appeared in the government's deliberations and was considered an item in the overall balance of advantage and disadvantage. Although the Danish authorities strove to follow the principle of studied indifference to Soviet declarations of interests and Soviet pressure regarding important military matters, they understood that consideration must be given to how, and to what extent, the Kremlin would react. Nevertheless, their basic assumption was that the Soviet Union's potential reactions could be taken into account in formulating Danish positions as long as reassuring the Kremlin did not put any necessary strategic measures at risk.
What, then, led to Denmark's occasionally self-imposed restrictions and reluctance to accept certain NATO policies? Besides doubts as to whether the measures would in fact increase national security, domestic politics seem to have been a consistent factor. Two aspects in particular alternated in dominating the political considerations behind Danish security policy. One was public opinion, especially the voting public; the other was the specific composition of parliament.
However, any evaluation of the Soviet impact on Danish security policy must also take into account the fact that the Kremlin deliberately tried to mobilize Danish voters. Soviet strategy consisted partly in swaying government attitudes by influencing public opinion and opposition politicians. The goal was to create public pressure on the government to reject allied plans for military measures in the Danish or Baltic regions. The significance of such domestic factors should be thoroughly considered before judging the Soviet campaigns a failure. The Soviet Union invested heavily in peace campaigns and succeeded in provoking internal controversy when it chose to capitalize on issues that were already part of public debate in Denmark. However, it is almost impossible to estimate the effect of these Soviet campaigns because of the existing public animosity to a strong defense policy. Furthermore, the aggressive Soviet diplomacy was often so brutal and clumsy that it proved counter-productive. Nevertheless, to some extent Moscow succeeded in setting the agenda for Danish political debates on security issues, although in the final analysis the firm general Danish commitment to NATO integration would seem to indicate that Soviet campaigns did not have decisive influence on Danish governmental policy.
At one point, Danish resolve was somewhat weakened by Soviet political pressure. Almost every time the Kremlin raised the question of Bornholm, the Foreign Ministry reacted promptly, usually by attempting to reassure the Soviets by imposing restrictions, especially on allied activity in the area. The Danish authorities disagreed among themselves about how to stand firm in these situations, mainly because Bornholm was considered strategically more vulnerable than the rest of Denmark. Nevertheless, without ignoring Denmark's undeniable anxiety about Bornholm, it is worth asking whether the apparent willingness of Danish decision-makers to capitulate to Soviet pressure was at least partially caused by an awareness of other factors.
The apparent Danish concessions mainly concerned issues that were not on the Danish agenda, such as the permanent stationing of foreign troops on Bornholm or the presence of West German troops on the island. Although the restrictions did impose unwanted limits on political maneuverability, concessions to the Kremlin could be perceived as rather cheap, since they required no practical change in the modus operandi for allied activity on Bornholm. Second, Bornholm served a useful purpose in raising allied awareness of the significance of the threat against Denmark. The Danes often stressed Bornholm's strategic value and vulnerability, and a policy of accommodating the Soviets could be justified because of the interest in emphasizing further the need for an allied defense of Danish soil.
We have seen that although the Danish government displayed considerable resolve in the face of Soviet pressure, it nevertheless pursued a policy line that was close to the Kremlin's demands. These apparent Danish concessions led to a strengthening of the Kremlin's conviction that Copenhagen was susceptible to influence. Apparently, the Kremlin believed that Denmark's attitude stemmed from concerns about its relationship with the Soviet Union.83 Furthermore, Danish rejections were exploited in international and domestic propaganda targeted at NATO, thus creating internal discomfort and resentment towards the US-led NATO policy. This was probably the most significant political consequence of Denmark's self-imposed restrictions.
From NATO's perspective, Denmark's political signals carried more weight than the relatively minor military and strategic disadvantages of its policy. Denmark's constraints caused no serious conflicts within NATO, not least because their removal in times of crisis or war was taken for granted and prepared for. Danish airfields and storage facilities were ready for the deployment of US aircraft and nuclear warheads. Nuclear-armed NATO forces, particularly from West Germany, were expected to defend Denmark. NATO's military authorities did stress that Danish restraint might weaken the politico-military position of the West in the Baltic area. Nonetheless, the Western defense capability in the Baltic area did not suffer any substantive harm as a result. Besides, trying to reassure the Soviets in the Nordic area was no Danish specialty. The Americans and British did the same.
In terms of the adaptation theory, Denmark's security policy toward both the friend and the enemy was that of balance, not of acquiescence.84 In relation to the Alliance, the self-imposed Danish restraints were minor adjustments in the bastion strategy of all-out commitment to NATO integration. The other side of the coin — the balancing policy toward the Soviet Union — was in effect a deterrence strategy sprinkled with a few minor concessions to reassure the opponent. The membership in NATO gave Danish decision-makers enough guts to neutralize any decisive Soviet influence.
1 Bent Jensen, Bjørnen og haren. Sovjetunionen og Danmark 1945–1965 [The bear and the hare: The Soviet Union and Denmark 1945–1965] (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1999); Bo Lidegaard, I Kongens Navn. Henrik Kauffmann i dansk diplomati 1919–1958 [On His Majesty's Behalf: Henrik Kauffmann in Danish Diplomacy 1919–1958] (København: Samleren 1996); Bo Lidegaard, Jens Otto Krag 1914–1961 (København: Nordisk Forlag, 2001), Poul Villaume, Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik [Allied with Reservations. Denmark, NATO and the Cold War: A Study in Danish Security Policy 1949–1961] (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995).
2 Georges-Henri Soutou, La guerre de Cinquante Ans: Les relations Est-Ouest 1943–1990 (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 132–3.
3 Report from the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen, dated March 1950, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsialno-Politicheskoi Istorii [hereafter RGASPI], fond [f.] 17, opis [o.] 137, delo [d.] 129, listy [ll.] 31–88.
4 The Soviet policy as summarized in a conversation between the Danish communist Ib Nørlund and the Soviet diplomat A.S. Kaplin, the document dated September 12, 1956, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii [hereafter RGANI], f. 05, o. 28, d. 435, ll. 233–9.
5 Outline of diplomatic strategy during the 1950s. Report from the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen, dated April 19, 1963, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [hereafter AVPRF], f. 085, o. 48, papka [p.] 173, d. 8, ll. 1–9.
6 Report from the Soviet embassy in Denmark, dated March 1950, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 137, d. 129, Chapter VII.
7 Report from the Scandinavian Section in the Soviet Foreign Ministry (MID) to the embassy in Copenhagen, dated August 10, 1953, AVPRF, f. 085, o. 37, p. 147, d. 11, ll. 7–29; M.G. Gribanov's memorandum, MID, 1956, AVPRF, f. 085, o. 40, p. 158, d. 10, ll. 19–21. At the time of writing, Gribanov was Head of the MID's Scandinavian Department, and was later the same year appointed ambassador to Norway.
8 Reports from the Danish Foreign Ministry, dated June 12, 1957 and October 16, 1957, Archives of the Danish Foreign Ministry [hereafter UM],105.T.1.f/1; Intelligence Report dated November 19, 1957, box 24, lot file 86 D 232, RG 59, National Archives [hereafter NA].
9 Thomas Wegener-Friis, Den ny nabo. DDR 's forhold til Danmark 1949–1960 [The New Neighbor: GDR's Relations with Denmark 1949–1960] (Copenhagen: SFAH, 2001), pp. 97–9.
10 “New-look,” memorandum dated March 26, 1954, UM 105.I.1.a/1. On this point, see also Jonathan Søborg Agger and Lasse Wolsgaard, “Pro Memoria: Atombomben er vor ven. Den danske regerings stillingtagen til og reaktioner på atomvåbnenes integration i NATOs forsvarsstrategi 1949–1956” [Pro Memoria: The Atomic Bomb Is Our Friend. The Danish government's Position and Reactions regarding Atomic Weapon Integration in NATO's Defense Strategy 1949–1956] (Danish) Historisk Tidsskrift, vol. 101 (2001), no. 2: 404.
11 Memorandum by Hessellund-Jensen, dated August 26, 1955, UM 105.I.40.b.
12 An example is a letter of February 8, 1958 from Prime Minister H.C. Hansen to Bulganin, in Udenrigsministeriet [Danish Foreign Ministry], Dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1948–1966 [Danish Security Policy 1948–1966], vol. II (Copenhagen: Danish Foreign Ministry, 1968), vol. 2, annex 164, p. 383.
13 Discussions on counter measures, 1952–53, UM 105.M.2.g.
14 Vibeke Sørensen, Denmark's Social Democratic Government and the Marshall Plan (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 2001) pp. 26–7; and Marianne Rostgaard, “Kampen om sjælene. Dansk Marshallplan publicity 1948–1950” [The Battle for Minds: Danish Marshall Plan Publicity 1948–1950], Historie, no. 2 (Århus: Jysk Selskab for Historie, 2002).
15 The Danish representative in NATO, April 25, 1951, UM 105.K.2.a.
16 Poul Villaume, “Denmark and NATO through 50 Years”, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, eds. Bertel Heurlin et al. (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for Foreign Affairs, 1999), pp. 29–61.
17 Speech by H.C. Hansen in NATO, May 5, 1958, UM 5.a.5; report from the Danish representative in NATO, January 22, 1958, UM 119.K.4.b.
18 Letter from the Danish Delegation to NATO to the Belgian Delegation, Comments on the suggested outline, July 12, 1967, The Harmel Dossier, NATO Archives.
19 Rasmus Mariager, Trust and Warm Sympathy: Anglo-Danish Relations and the US 1945–1950–1955, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 2003. Mariager contests the thesis of the “strategic alliance” presented in Bo Lidegaard, “Danmarks overlevelsesstrategi i den kolde krigs første år” [Denmark's Strategy of Survival in the First Years of the Cold War], Arbejderhistorie, 1999 (4), pp. 35–46.
20 Comments, May 27, 1952, UM 105.M.2.g; memorandum dated December 13, 1953, UM 105.T.1.f/1.
21 Memorandum dated August 1952, UM 105.M.2.g; report dated July 26, 1954, UM 5.E.95; memorandum dated July 4, 1953, UM 105.G.9. See also Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, chapter 9.
22 The development of this question is described in Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, p. 411.
23 Jensen, Bjørnen og haren, pp. 451–5.
24 Memorandum by Foreign Minister Ole Bjørn Kraft, dated February 21, 1952. Quoted from Danish Institute for International Studies, Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945–1991 [Denmark during the Cold War. National Security Policy and the International Environment 1945–1991] (Copenhagen: Gullander, 2005), chapter 12. Kraft made his statement to US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange during a NATO Ministerial Meeting in Lisbon.
25 Memorandum dated February 8, 1952, quoted from Danish Institute for International Studies, Danmark under den kolde krig, chapter 12.
26 Minutes of meeting with Admiral Brind and General Taylor, March 17, 1952, quoted from Danish Institute for International Studies, Danmark under den kolde krig, chapter 12.
27 Memorandum dated May 28, 1952, quoted from Danish Institute for International Studies, Danmark under den kolde krig, chapter 12.
28 “Referat: Sovjetrussisk note til Danmark vedrørende fredstidsstationering” [Memorandum: Soviet Note to Denmark Regarding Peacetime Stationing], by H.H. Mathiesen, dated October 4, 1952, UM 105.K.7.b/3.
29 Villaume, Allieret medforbehold, p. 435.
30 “Samtalen i Udenrigsministeriet mandag den 8 sept. kl. 10” [Conversation in the Foreign Ministry, Monday September 8], undated Memorandum (from 1952), H.C. Hansen collection, box 21, folder 1 Arbejderbevægelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek [Archive and Library of the Danish Labor Movement — hereafter ABA].
31 “Extraktafskrift af forsvarsmøde den 6. februar 1953” [Excerpts of Defense Meeting February 6, 1953], UM 105.K.7.b/4; “Orienterende samtaler mellem danske og amerikanske repræsentanter vedrørende indholdet af en eventuel aftale om fredstidsstationering i Danmark” [Preliminary Discussions between Danish and American Representatives about Contents of a Possible Agreement on Peacetime Stationing in Denmark], memoranda dated January 23, 26, and 28, 1953, UM 105.K.7.b/4.
32 This is partly due to the uncertain Norwegian position and rumors about British support for a potential Norwegian rejection of similar proposals. The Social Democrats emphasized that Denmark could not accept the proposal without British assent. In case of a conflict of interests between the Americans and the British, Denmark could not be in a position where it was tied more strongly to the United States. A few weeks later, however, the British government assured that they would support a Danish acceptance of the proposal. “Samtalen i udenrigsministeriet mandag den 8 sept. kl. 10” [Conversation in the Foreign Ministry, Monday, September 8], undated Memorandum (from 1952), H.C. Hansen collection, box 21, folder 1, ABA.
33 For example, the foreign-policy committee, February 4, 1953.
34 For a discussion of the impact of the Eisenhower administrations “New Look” policy, see Villaume, Allieret medforbehold, pp. 450–60.
35 “Extraktafskrift af forsvarsmøde den 6. februar 1953” [Excerpts from Defense Meeting February 6, 1953], UM 105.K.7.b/4.
36 Udenrigsministeriet, Dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1948–1966, vol. 2, annex no. 125, pp. 288–90. “Den sovjetiske regerings aide mémoire af 28. januar 1953” [The Soviet government's aide mémoire dated January 28, 1953]; “Nogle bemærkninger om den russiske démarche” [Some Comments on the Russian Move], memorandum by Secretary-General Nils Svenningsen, February 3, 1953, UM 105.K.7.b/3.
37 Furthermore, the Swedish Social Democratic Party strongly advised Denmark not to accept the stationing proposal, since this would increase the risk of Soviet aggression against the neutral Nordic countries. Letter from M. Wassard to N. Svenningsen, see Danish Institute for International Studies, Danmark under den kolde krig, chapter 12.
38 For the significance of the change in international climate, see for example, Lidegaard, Jens Otto Krag 1914–1961, pp. 450–1.
39 Analysis dated February 20, 1953, quoted from Danish Institute for International Studies, Danmark under den kolde krig, chapter 12; memorandum by E. Schram-Nielsen, dated March 2, 1953, UM 105.K.7.b/3; comment by C.A.C. Brun, dated March 2, 1953, UM 105.K.7.b/3.
40 Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, p. 426.
41 “Nogle betragtninger vedrørende besvarelsen af den russiske note” [Some considerations on answering the Russian note], memorandum by Secretary-General Nils Svenningsen, dated March 12, 1953, UM 105.K.7.b/3.
42 DUPI, Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945–68 [Greenland during the Cold War: Denmark and American Security Policy] (Copenhagen: Gyldendals Forlagsekspedition,1997) vol. 1, p. 408.
43 Memorandum by Secretary-General Svenningsen, dated July 2, 1953, UM 105.K.7.b/3.
44 “Nogle betragtninger vedrørende besvarelsen af den russiske note” [Some Considerations on Answering the Russian Note], memorandum by Secretary-General Svenningsen, dated March 12, 1953, UM 105.K.7.b/3.
45 Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, chapter 3; Agger and Wolsgaard, “Pro Memoria: Atombomben er vor ven”, pp. 396–7.
46 Agger and Wolsgaard, “Pro Memoria: Atombomben er vor ven”; Lidegaard, Jens Otto Krag 1914–1961, p. 336.
47 Memorandum by Hessellund-Jensen, dated August 26, 1955, UM 105.I.40.b.
48 Meeting of HMG Ambassadors in Scandinavia, June 1953, “United Kingdom and Scandinavia,” minutes dated June 18, 1953, British Foreign Office Archives (hereafter FO) 371/106109B, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO).
49 Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, p. 579; memorandum by Secretary-General Nils Svenningsen dated August 13, 1952, UM 105.I.5.b/1; “Øvelsen Main Brace” [Exercise Main Brace], memorandum by Secretary-General Nils Svenningsen dated August 18, 1952, UM 105.I.5.b/1.
50 Memorandum by Secretary-General Nils Svenningsen, dated August 18, 1952, UM 105.I.5.b/1.
51 Memorandum dated March 10, 1954, UM 105.I.5.a/2.
52 “NATO-øvelser i Østersøen” [NATO Exercises in the Baltic Sea], memorandum by H.H. Mathiesen dated August 14, 1953, UM 105.I.5.a/2; “Extrakt af møde i koordina-tionsudvalget den 21. august 1953” [Excerpts from a Meeting in Coordination Committee August 21, 1953], UM 105.I.5.a/2; “Political considerations regarding exercises,” telegram from Admiral Patrick Brind to the Danish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defense, memorandum dated March 18, 1953, UM 105.I.5.a/2; “Vedrørende øvelser i Østersøen” [Regarding Exercises in the Baltic Sea], memorandum dated September 9, 1953, UM 105.G.9.
53 Personal comment to the authors by Vojtech Mastny, May 2003.
54 With respect to HONEST JOHN, the Americans reckoned that there would be “no special problems for the Danes.” “Briefing Material on Denmark for General Norstad's Visit March 13–14”, dispatch no. 697 from American embassy in Copenhagen to Department of State, dated March 6, 1957, 759.00/3–657 XR 740.5, NA.
55 “Forsvarsministerens møde med general Sugden den 28. December 1956 vedrørende atomartilleri til den danske hær” [Defense Minister's meeting with General Sugden, December 28, 1956, on atomic artillery for the Danish army], memorandum dated January 14, 1957, Danish Ministry of Defense Archives, 91–26/57.
56 Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, pp. 536–40; Jonathan Søborg Agger and Lasse Wolsgaard, “Den størst mulige fleksibilitet. Dansk atomvåbenpolitik 1956–1960” [A Maximum of Flexibility: Danish Nuclear Weapons Policy 1956–1960] (Danish) Historisk Tidsskrift, vol. 101 (2001), no. 1, pp. 81–4.
57 For example, Jensen, Bjørnen og haren, p. 514.
58 Agger and Wolsgaard, “Den størst mulige fleksibilitet. Dansk atomvåbenpolitik 1956–1960”, p. 81.
59 Foreign-policy committee, December 11, 1957, appendix: “Bilag vedr. ministerrådsmødet, pkt. III” [Attachment re: Council of Ministers Meeting, pt. III].
60 “Notat til udenrigsministeren” [Memorandum for the Foreign Minister], dated January 13, 1960, UM 105.Dan.6; Memorandum dated March 3, 1958, UM 105.I.40.e; Agger and Wolsgaard, “Den størst mulige fleksibilitet. Dansk atomvåbenpolitik 1956–1960,” pp. 96–7.
61 Memorandum by Prime Minister H.C. Hansen, dated September 17, 1959, UM 105.Dan.6.
62 Villaume, Allieret medforbehold, p. 590.
63 Memorandum by Foreign Minister Krag, dated March 30, 1960, UM 105.Dan.6.
64 Jensen, Bjørnen og haren, pp. 508, 548.
65 Memorandum by Foreign Minister Krag, dated March 30, 1960, UM 105.Dan.6.
66 “Nyorientering m.h.t. dansk—tysk samarbejde på forsvarets område” [New Orientation against Danish—German Cooperation in the Area of Defense], memorandum dated September 24, 1957, UM 105.K.25.
67 Agger and Wolsgaard, “Den størst mulige fleksibilitet. Dansk atomvåbenpolitik 1956–1960,” pp. 94–5; “Dansk-tysk samarbejde på forsvarets område” [Danish—German Cooperation in the Area of Defense], memorandum dated February 13, 1956, UM 105.K.25.
68 Jensen, Bjørnen og haren, p. 586.
69 Lidegaard, Jens Otto Krag 1914–1961, p. 710 (entry in Krag's diary September 10, 1961, our translation).
70 “Østersøspørgsmålet m.v.” [Baltic Sea etc.], analysis by the chief of the politico-juridical department E. Schram-Nielsen dated January 13, 1959, UM 105.Dan.1/2.
71 Telegram from the permanent Danish delegation to NATO (DANATO) by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, J.O. Krag, and NATO ambassador, E. Schram-Nielsen, dated December 14, 1961, UM 105.I.19b/3; telegram from London by the Secretary-General of the Danish Foreign Ministry, dated December 14, 1961, UM 105.I.19.b/3.
72 “Den officielle betegnelse for NATO-enhedskommandoen for Danmark og Østersøområdet” [The Official Term for the NATO Unified Command for Denmark and the Baltic Sea Area], memorandum dated November 29, 1961, UM 105.I.19.b/1.
73 “Forsvarsspørgsmål og Østersøen som et 'fredens hav'” [Defense Questions and the Baltic Sea as a “Sea of Peace”], memorandum dated August 24, 1959, UM 105.Dan.1/2.
74 DUPI, Grønland under den kolde krig, p. 417; Lidegaard, Jens Otto Krag 1914–1961, p. 713.
75 Statement by Torben Rønne to Danish ambassadors, October 13, 1961, UM 105.I.19.b/1.
76 Villaume, Allieret medforbehold, pp. 255–69.
77 Jensen, Bjørnen og haren, pp. 573–4.
78 Villaume, Allieret medforbehold, p. 238.
79 Despite the Norwegian expectations, the final outcome of creating NATO stores on Norwegian soil reserved for West German use led to Soviet expressions of strong dislike. Anders Jølstad, “Det tyske problem. Norsk sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid med Vest-Tyskland 1955–1965” [The German Problem: Norwegian Security Policy Cooperation with West Germany 1955–1965] Forsvarsstudier. Årbok for Forsvarshistorisk forskningssenter, Forsvarets høgskole 5/1995 (Oslo: Tanum/Norli, 1995), p. 42.
80 Danish Institute for International Studies, Danmark under den kolde krig, chapter 14.
81 This was not the only time that economic considerations proved essential to the Danish position. With respect to Denmark's military integration with West German forces, the Danish authorities acknowledged on the one hand that it was important to avoid upsetting the Germans in order to maintain beneficial trade relations. On the other hand, the Danish attitude towards military cooperation was also inspired by the need to obtain political leverage in the trade negotiations. Thus, the Danish ministers implied to their German counterparts that a solution to the growing Danish—German trade problems (which stemmed from German membership of the EEC) was imperative to a swift resolution of the delays regarding the establishing of the COMBALTAP. “Telegram af 25. januar 1961 fra udenrigsministeren til forsvarsministeren, p.t. den Kgl. ambassade i Bonn” [Telegram of January 25, 1961 from the Foreign Minister to the Defense Minister, at present at the Royal Embassy in Bonn], UM 105.I.19.b/1; “Referat af møde i forbundskanslerens hus i Bonn den 24. maj 1961” [Minutes of Meeting at the Federal Chancellor's house in Bonn May 24, 1961], UM 105.I.19.b/1.
82 “Nyorientering m.h.t. dansk-tyske samarbejde på forsvarets område” [New Orientation regarding Danish—German Cooperation in the Area of Defense], memorandum dated September 24, 1957, UM 105.K.25.
83 Dispatch from the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Copenhagen, dated April 19, 1963, AVPRF, f. 085, o. 48, d. 173, 1. 8.
84 Danish Institute for International Studies, Danmark under den kolde krig, chapter 3.