CHAPTER 5

A Rising Russia, a Failing America

Putin was committed to a quiet but decisive plan to revive the national standing of the Russian Federation. He may have used his quiet demeanor to make many in Russia believe he was just a plodding bureaucrat. Still, he was bred in the communist security state ethic of “Love the State. Kill for the State. Make Russia Great.” The KGB addendum would be “… by all means necessary.” This would include in dealing with his opponents: the assassination of Nemtsov; the beating and imprisonment of the band Pussy Riot for exercising free speech when they allegedly defiled an Orthodox church by playing music in it; and forbidding electoral candidates to run against him. If an acceptable “opponent” is found, it’s because he created them. He puts them into the fray and the slightest investigation will find they are secretly Putin loyalists. During the 2018 election cycle, Russian exile Gary Kasparov quipped, “Putin is so popular that anyone who challenges him must be murdered, exiled, or banned. Anyone who treats these ‘elections’ as anything other than a dictator’s theater is a fool.”¹

His popularity did not match the poor state of the Russian economy. Russia’s move to a free market economy from a centralized state distributions system that was antiquated, incompetent, and corrupt was positive for many. Basic food items, milk, canned goods, bread, and clothing soon flooded the nation. Yet, the fire sale–like liquidation of the national assets created massive inequality and a class that hadn’t existed before—the insanely rich oligarchy. Under the Soviet system everyone worked for the state and those in the Supreme Soviet could skim and graft along the edges. Perhaps there were millionaires in that system among the top leadership and mafia, but Putin’s Russia created wealth along the lines of the Romanovs. Unfortunately, just like with the Tsars, the wealth rested in the hands of a few.

Vladimir Putin wanted Russia to prosper with a global tour de force oil economy like no other, but oil and gas sales to Europe aside, it is an economic backwater. In 2008, a reserve fund was created preemptively in the event of market volatility on oil prices. Russia nearly depleted this fund, subsequently tapping into the social services budget. Consequently, by 2016, Russia’s economy was half of the State of California’s and the drop in oil prices really hurt the social and infrastructure sectors of the economy. It did not help that Russia remained one of the most corrupt countries in the world. According to Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Index, Russia ranked as 135 out of 180 countries with a score of 29 out of a range of 0 through 100 (with 0 value being no corruption). Lawlessness and corruption in a kleptocracy are what have contributed to little faith in the Russian economy and investment.

Today there are Russian billionaires worth tens of billions of dollars each. Industries such as oil and natural gas, television media and newspapers, as well as mining uranium or shipbuilding, were divvied up and over time fell into the hands of Vladimir Putin’s closest allies. Technically, everyone in Russia would come to work for them in some way or another.

THE MILITARY WOULD also be a step toward a greater Russia. Putin has always been an outspoken critic of NATO but he was particularly troubled by its expansion into the post-Soviet Baltic states. In January 2016, Putin signed off on the National Security Strategy, a policy that repositioned Russia’s national security posture from one of observation to a more confrontational stance. Putin’s policy list is a litany of grievances he held against the West and the United States in particular: “the intensification of military activities of member countries,” “further expansion of the alliance,” and “moving military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders.”² He declared the United States and NATO as the main “threat to national security” of the Russian Federation.

A key component in the strategy to restore Putin’s Russia to a position of prominence was to redevelop the armed forces. The Soviet armed forces were noteworthy for two reasons: First, the equipment, particularly tanks, were tough but impractical for the survival or comfort of its operators. Russian tanks and trucks were tested in Cold War proxy battles but would only sell in the cheapest markets. The quality of Soviet-era aircrafts was poor compared to NATO. Submarines were good but the technological edge in the West made them a last choice for other navies. Apart from the ubiquitous AK-47 weapons and the RPG-7 Rocket launcher, Russian sales were limited to repairs and resupplies of ammunition. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia embarked on a complete upgrade to quality and cost effective weaponry. Putin gained credibility in counterterrorism by taking over the failed conflict in Chechnya. While labeled “counterterrorist and counterinsurgent” operations,³ Putin let the Ministry of Defense have free reign to kill whomever they pleased. The Russian military received a free hand to bomb, rocket, and decimate Chechen towns with impunity. These were not surgical operations in the American model, they were a massive land and air war within its borders along the model of the Nazis besieging Stalingrad in World War II. These tactics, though brutal, worked at the cost of many lives. Yet Putin and his generals brought Chechnya to its knees in the early 2000s and made the Russian populace bordering Chechnya and Ingushetia feel safer from terrorist attacks. Their beloved military, with the help of state television, saved face after the disastrous Beslan massacre and the terrorist takeover of a theater in Moscow where almost all hostages died.⁴

On the heels of the Beslan massacre and the submarine Kursk disaster, Putin and his cabinet then wanted to “modernize” the Russian military, which meant new weapons to replace Soviet artifacts, and policies that would counter NATO forces, and to gain the perception that Moscow was again a top tier world power.⁵ The Kremlin spent the past two decades attempting to modernize the Russian military from the antiquated Soviet model to one with a qualitative edge over Western forces. Russia wants to be recognized as a global military power once again and has indeed managed to move on from outdated military policies and structure, but remains unable to be a global force as it was during its Warsaw pact heyday. It has concentrated on working its way up from an intimidating regional power to attempting American-style power projection in the Middle East. That modernization is evolving and the desired perceptions have started to gain traction. It helped that the Kremlin continued to punch above its weight in Syria, but, with the exception of their airpower, they have not changed their target for military power. But Moscow has certainly tried. In the Mediterranean, Bashar al-Assad in Syria has used military force to flex its muscles by launching cruise missile and ballistic weapons attacks from within Russia to strike both ISIS terrorists and anti-Assad revolutionary targets in Iraq and Syria.

The regional military advance in Georgia in 2008 allowed Russian forces to show they could take territory and stand up to international condemnation. Where annexing South Ossetia and Abkhazia showed the brute force of Russian power, the later annexation of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated a new form of Russian warfare—hybrid warfare.⁶ Hybrid warfare is the Kremlin strategy to use an amalgam of operational techniques, such as hard weapons, kinetic combat, unmarked special operations raids, covert espionage, and unbridled cyber warfare. They battle tested it against Ukraine along with a light signature special operations presence to begin eventual operations to seize the Crimea peninsula. Moscow’s grander goal was a total collapse of the pro-European Kiev government, but for now the hybrid warfare (propaganda framing, special operations, cyber warfare, and conventional military force) showed the Russian military has a recipe for success in regional conflicts.⁷

However, these are small successes. Russia has shown in Georgia and Ukraine that it can take territories where it has placed assets and has long-standing historic ties. What has yet to be tested is Moscow’s military willingness to take and hold an entire country where NATO has a stake, such as one of the Baltic states. There is no sign Moscow can do that successfully or has the strategic willingness to test Western militaries’ appetite for open conflict.

Which is not to say Russia has learned over the past years how to integrate command and control, intelligence and surveillance, and use of precision weapons. Moscow has learned from Western militaries—especially the United States—that Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are a combat multiplier of the highest order and have tried to mimic what we have done. The more the Kremlin can learn from initial usage of these assets the more they can work on adapting that for geostrategic goals.⁸ Russia most recently tested this theory by placing a large garrison inside Syria,⁹ where it has long had military relations with the Assad government.¹⁰ That contingent has done anything but serve as a “peacekeeping force.” They are in Syria and engaging in full-scale combat missions to assist the Assad government in targeting opponents to the regime. Their presence also tests US and allied forces’ willingness to engage with their troops.¹¹ Much like operations in Chechnya a decade earlier, Russian forces engage in indiscriminate and brutal attacks against Assad-chosen targets. The wanton and deliberate destruction of hospitals, public utilities, and homes of civilians was a Nazi technique designed to empty cities. It was learned well. It is now the regional model applied to others.

Moscow is aware of its military shortcomings. The national military framework emphasizes the country’s massive nuclear stockpile, a growing one, as the first deterrent to any encroachment on its territory.¹² This is as much a warning against NATO countries as it is a message for the US to keep anti-ballistic missile batteries out of key eastern European countries.¹³ Moscow took its first step by permanently deploying SS-26 STONE, aka the Iskandar-M-Intermediate-range nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles to Kalinin, the small Russia territory northeast of Poland. They have threatened to deploy the same to Crimea.

Despite Moscow’s goals, there have been few improvements to the nation’s military. The command structure remains top heavy and enlisted troops are more likely to face brutal hazing¹⁴ than they are to have opportunities to lead missions. The military is still unable to conduct combined or joint operations with any precision. While Russian media present these joint and combined exercises as feats of strength, the reality is they are anything but. The footage is chosen ahead of time and is meant to show power but it’s not reflective of any cohesiveness.¹⁵ Open conflicts with powerful militaries would expose these shortcomings.

The Russian military has begun to understand its limits and remains able to flex its muscles throughout the region. The threat of military force—especially Moscow’s missile, submarine, and bomber forces—remains a challenge NATO nations must concern themselves with. The specific use of special forces, military intelligence, and cyber warfare has proven an exceptional edge to gain small swaths of territory while political machinations are more effective to undermine targeted governments.¹⁶ Russian military power remains ferocious and concerning. However, internal organizational problems and historic inabilities to operate on a truly global scale render the current Russian military a shell of its Soviet glory. Kremlin planners have adapted to this by using political and economic levers to undermine NATO and Western nations because the military does not yet represent a true threat. But the longer we remain at the current status quo, the longer Moscow has to improve these deficiencies.

Because the Baltic Sea is strategically important to Russia as a trading route and buffer from the West, Russia moved Iskandar missile systems with nuclear warheads to Kaliningrad in 2010 and later installed air defense systems there. Kaliningrad borders Lithuania, further inflaming a security dilemma for the Baltic countries.¹⁷

Russia’s aggressive actions in Georgia in 1998 and invasion of Ukraine in 2014 have further influenced the Baltic countries’ national security policies. Because Russia uses hybrid warfare tactics, leaders in the Baltic countries have become increasingly concerned about a potential invasion by Russia.¹⁸ NATO subsequently stationed a small battalion of troops in the Baltics as deterrence against Russia. Every few years, Russia performs large-scale military exercises near the Baltic countries, with scenarios such as using tactical nuclear weapons, which further increases tension in the region.¹⁹

Russian Political Parties and Organizations

To assist the Kremlin in integrating European and American groups into the anti-West program, Russian parties and organizations work as advisors to advance Moscow’s goals. United Russia was formed in 2001 and led by Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin. Dimitry Medvedev was its Chairman and Vladislav Surkov was its First Deputy Chief of Staff to the President. Russians refer to United Russia as the Party of Power. Other nations refer to it as “the Party of Crooks and Thieves.” In exchange for financial support, Putin’s party controlled power by giving out contracts, bribes, and kickbacks. Across the country members of the party were routinely accused of corruption, drug trafficking, racketeering, vote-rigging, and murder. Yet, once in office they would not only escape prosecution, in some cases they were awarded medals for their service. Being a member was almost a get-out-of-jail-free card, unless you crossed the party itself. United Russia was Russia’s answer to unity after a period of chaotic displacement after Yeltsin and the fall of the Soviet Union. As of early 2018, United Russia held the majority of seats at the Duma.

For the 2018 Presidential election, Vladimir Putin ran as an “independent.”²⁰ He did this in 2004. But his words are just puffery. He poses as an “independent” to project the idea that he belongs to all of Russia. He ran essentially unopposed by other candidates and won with 75% of the country voting for him.

Motherland-National Patriotic Union, aka Rodina’s organization, was founded by Dmitri Rogozin in 2003. It is popularly believed that the creation of Rodina was the work of Putin advisor Vladimir Surkov, as an effort to erode the voting base of the Communist party before the 2003 elections in the Duma.²¹ Surkov is supposed to have established Rodina to make Putin’s United Russia party look moderate next to the ultranationalist coalition of the right and left that is represented by Rodina.²²

In 2005, the party had two actions that led to its dissolution. The first was a petition to the Prosecutor-General to ban Jewish organizations from operating in Russia. The second was a campaign ad to incite racial hatred when a political advertisement showed swarthy men eating watermelon and throwing the rinds on the ground in front of a white woman. Dmitri Rogozin is seen in the background watching and he steps forward to tell the four men to clean it up. The ad ends with “!” or “Let’s clear Moscow of garbage!” The Liberal Democratic Party filed a complaint and, consequently, Rodina was banned from participating in many regional elections in 2006.

In March 2006, Rogozin left Rodina and was replaced by Alexander Babakov, a relative unknown. The party ceased to exist temporarily as members joined the Party of Life and Party of Pensioners for Social Justice to form a new party, A Just Russia. The A Just Russia party lasted from 2006 through 2012 before Rodina re-emerged under the leadership of Rogozin’s ally Alexsey Zhuravlyov. Many political observers say the party is still controlled by Dmitri Rogozin.²³

The new party was more focused on militarism, uniting nationalist movements, and cooperation with Putin’s All-Russian People’s Front. Rodina member Fedor Biryukov organized a forum in St. Petersburg on March 22, 2015, that brought together far-right movements from around the world. They called for the establishment of a World National-Conservative Movement (WNCM). Additionally, the group has ties to and has encouraged separatist movements in the United States.²⁴

Dmitry Rogozin sought to get protection for Eduard Shishmakov and Vladimir Popov over terror charges levied in a failed Montenegro coup attempt.²⁵ The two GRU officers were arrested and accused of attempting to assassinate the Prime Minister of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic.²⁶ The officers allegedly planned to launch a massive attack on the country’s parliament.

Political party youth organizations stretch back to the early days of the Soviet Union when Lenin advocated the inclusion of young people into the role of social order and thus the Communist Party established its first youth groups: the Komsomol, the Young Pioneers, and the Little Octobrists.

The Komsomol was established in October 1918 in the early days of the post-Tsarist Russia. It trained and indoctrinated youth up to the age of 28 into the objectives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The term Komsomol came from the first letters of the phrase “kommunisticheskiy soyuz moldyozhi” or the “communist alliance of young people.” Under the Komsomol were two younger groups, the Little Octobrists, who ranged from 7 to 9 years old, who would then graduate into the Young Pioneers, who were for 9-to 14-year-olds.

Though scouting groups existed before the Soviet Union, the Komsomol was specifically aimed to promote the ideological demands of the Soviet Union. Any scouting groups that didn’t fall in line under the Soviet rules were driven underground and essentially eliminated.

In the era of Putin, the Nashi replaced the Komsomol and were known for their public displays of affection for Putin and their public scorning of the designated enemies of the state, which included journalists, human rights activists, or anyone who was a critic of Putin and Kremlin policies. They would parade through the streets with signs featuring the faces and “crimes” of these dissidents with the youth scorning their names. The first event, on April 15, 2005, was called “our victory” or nasha podeba, and on the same day of the rally Garry Kasparov accused the kids of attacking him with a chessboard.²⁷ Yearly, the group organized an event called the Russian March with large turnouts. In 2009, an estimated 30,000 people attended, mostly bused in from the Moscow suburbs. These events are used to bolster nationalist sentiment and attack the Kremlin’s enemies as “Russia’s enemies.”

The Nashi were also quite skilled at disrupting other groups and spent many hours planning to disrupt rallies of groups critical of Putin. When they would learn of an event being planned they would fill the space of the event like a flash mob, thus preventing it from taking place. They were known for the rigidity of their doctrine. The group had a list of “Commandments of Honor” written by Ruslan Maslov:²⁸

1. Your fatherland is Russia. Love it above all others, and in deed more than word.

2. The enemies of Russia are your enemies.

3. Every compatriot, even the lowliest, is part of Russia. Love him like you love yourself!

4. Demand only duties of yourself. Then Russia will regain justice.

5. Be proud of Russia! You must honor the fatherland for which millions gave their lives.

6. Remember, if someone takes away your rights, you have the right to say “NO!”

An alternative to the Nashi is the Eurasian Youth Union (EYU), which was created in February 2005 to combat the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Like the Nashi, they were there to espouse a pro-Russian nationalism but with the Eurasian flavor that was typical of their leader, Alexander Dugin.²⁹ They were more tolerant of working with openly racist groups like Alexander Belov’s Movement Against Illegal Migration. In November 2005, the two joined up for a rally that quickly became more identified with neo-Nazi antics. The group was sanctioned by Ukraine, Canada, and the United States for participating in fighting in Ukraine.³⁰ The EYU also created “war camps” outside of Moscow to prepare to fight in Ukraine or beyond.³¹ Dugin’s effort to stoke the fires of conflict were mirrored in his impatience with Putin’s efforts in Ukraine. “When we are hesitating, we are losing,” said Dugin, who never served in the military.

The Gray Zone

Under the Soviets, the KGB oversaw training of leftist terrorists as a method of frightening and destabilizing the West. They formed and funded groups such as the Baader-Meinhof gang and its successor Red Army Faktion, France’s Action Direct, Belgium’s Combative Communist Cells, Greece’s November 17, and the Irish Republican Army. The Russians also backed anti-American dictators such as Muammar al-Gadaffi and Saddam Hussein. Their intelligence agencies were encouraged to conduct acts of terror. This led to great massacres such as the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and UTA 772 over the Sahara, killing over 400 passengers.

The 1970s and 80s were awash with assassinations of diplomats, military members, kidnappings of Americans, and bombings of embassies and military bases. Russian-and Cuban-backed insurgencies spread to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, Peru, Mozambique, Angola, Eritrea, and Yemen.

The Russian terror strategy was a major component of their active measures. But when the fall of the Soviet Union occurred, the terror methods were placed into secure storage. The communist alliance no longer existed. Russia had shifted from collectivists to capitalists. They also embraced their new religious orthodoxy and cultural conservatism. Under the strategy of neo-Eurasianism and the growth of the internet, the Russians found right-wing groups, even some which were explicitly neo-Nazi, were better examples of Fellow Travelers. Gone were the days of leftist liberals, European socialists with their peace, love, and happiness claptrap. Russia was to be a mighty bear allied with others in Europe and America who saw it their way. This ideological jump from hard left to hard right occurred over 10 years. What it led to was a need for conservative agitators and paramilitaries ready to carry out Moscow’s will in forging a new Russo-European-American axis upon which to confront the Muslim world.

Ultranationalist groups like the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM, or RID, Russkoe Imperskoe Dvizhenie in Russian) were encouraged to open and grow their membership. The RIM is believed to be a Russian paramilitary group that organizes pan-European groups for militant purposes. The group runs paramilitary training camps they referred to as “clubs” and a combat program called “Partisan.” With it, the RIM recruited and trained people from around the world.³² The Partisan camp is run by a former Russian army soldier named Denis Gariev. Gariev formerly served with Russia’s strategic missile troops. He is a graduate of history studies from St. Petersburg.³³ Gariev claims to have been the leader of the Imperial Legion, the paramilitary arm of the Russia Imperial Movement. Stanislav Vorobyov, leader of RIM, said men of the Imperial Legion were combat veterans of the pro-Moscow Ukrainian rebels fighting in the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Lugansk.³⁴ Vorobyov would be seen on social media arriving in Crimea. He wrote on a blog:

“I accompanied an airplane to Crimea that carried Russian military instructors who were to organize the local resistance movement. I remember one night the SBU guys [Ukrainian security officers] burned documents in their yard—then I understood that we were going to annex [Crimea].”³⁵

The Partisan training “club” was located in the Udelnaya district of St. Petersburg. They claimed to have another camp near Kaluga, southwest of Moscow. According to Gariev, they train 10 to 15 members at a time. By 2015, they had graduated over 100 members who paid 250 euros to attend.³⁶ Vorobyov wrote in his blog that the group was maintained by donations that were used to purchase equipment—clothes, radios, bulletproof vests, etc.—and to pay instructor salaries. In keeping with their racist core, he also wrote that they would not train Muslims.

Other extremist groups had trained with Gariev’s crew, including the ultranationalist Stiag (or Flag) Slovak Revival Movement and Nordic Resistance. Nordic Resistance organized a summit in 2015 led by Vorobyov. István Győrkös, a member of the Hungarian National Front, a neo-Nazi group, killed a police officer in October 2016.³⁷ Győrkös is said to have practiced paramilitary exercises with members of Russian military intelligence.³⁸

Private Military Contractors

The American war in Iraq brought about the rise of the private military corporation. Many Russian soldiers served with Western security companies. Post-war Russian energy companies such as Lukoil and Gazprom won contracts in Iraq and formed their own Russian security forces. The war in Ukraine led to Russia using asymmetric forces such as local militias and intelligence subcontractors. Russian hybrid warfare strategy uses special operations forces without markings and flags, or they deploy local surrogates. When they seized Crimea, these off-the-book special forces were called “little green men.” In Syria and Ukraine, contractor companies formed to fill the roles of special action groups so they could provide deniability for their patrons, Russian intelligence. The military intelligence agency GRU is said to operate a contractor training base near Krasnodar where these forces are prepared, armed, and deployed. In a study of Russian private military corporations, journalist Pierre Sautreuil wrote in the blog War is Boring that one in particular, TchVK Wagner, had extra special sanction:

“In eastern Ukraine in 2015, several local separatist warlords died violently in apparent assassinations. The deaths ensured the unquestioned authority of Igor Plotnitski, the Kremlin’s strongman in the region. Interviewed by the author, numerous separatists point to a single culprit—the TchVK (that’s Russian for ‘private military company’) Wagner, a band of Russian contractors who allegedly also took part in the battle of Debaltseve in February 2015.”³⁹

Some efforts are not sanctioned by the Russian government—for example, the Slovanic Corporation.⁴⁰ This organization was a Hong Kong–based Russian company formed in 2013. This group formed to protect assets in Syria for pay. In comparison with the situation in Syria, it was widely considered a joke.⁴¹ Two hundred and fifty men self-organized to come to Syria after responding to advertisements that they were there to conduct “offensive” military operations à la the American Blackwater corporation. This group claimed to have top tier equipment but found trash kits, broken weapons, and no armor as promised. One contractor reported they were given buses with steel plates welded on. The role of the Slavonic Corporation was to seize oil fields in the vicinity of Deir az Zour, which is in the middle of ISIS-held territory and over 500 km from their base camp. Without any planning or fire support, Slavonic militia convoyed out to the east and were quickly ambushed by an al-Qaeda-linked militia. They were saved from massacre by a blinding desert storm. The company quickly went out of business.⁴²

From the ashes of the Slavonic Corporation, the company TchVK Wagner or Wagner Corporation emerged. Wagner was a new model of security contracting. Formed by Dmitri Utkin, they were designed to fill the “little green men” role, with complete deniability of the Russian government. It did not work well, as in 2015 Utkin was sanctioned by the US Treasury for seizing Syrian oil and gas fields for Evro Polis.

Journalist Denis Korotkov told the War is Boring blog “… now [it] seems the TchVK Wagner is building on the Slavonic Corps’ misfortune. Indeed, many members of this mysterious organization, as well as its leader—a former major in the Spetsnaz and ex-employee of Moran Security—were also members of the luckless 2013 expedition in Syria.”⁴³

The Syrian army had difficulty meeting its manpower, so instead of recruiting directly into the army an all-volunteer force made up of tribal units and militias was formed called Fifth Corps. Their nickname, adorned on their black circle logo with a white human skull, was “the Isis Hunters.” Apparently, the contractors from Wagner were attached to Fifth Corps and were operating in the vicinity of Deir az Zour. It is rumored that Wagner Corporation, technically a sister company of Evro Polis, like Slavonic before it, had signed a contract with the Syrian regime. According to the New York Times, “In the petroleum deal, Evro Polis, a corporation formed last summer, will receive a 25 percent share of oil and natural gas produced on territory it captures from the Islamic State, the news site Fontanka.ru reported.”⁴⁴ Evro Polis was a shady oil management company that was operated by the owner of Wagner and director of covert operations for Vladimir Putin, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Prigozhin’s disguised “offensive” contractor operation to seize the American/SDF-held oil field would be literally blown to the winds by direct contact with the US Army Special Operations Command and the US Air Force.

Sometime on the morning of February 17, 2018, US intelligence supporting Special Forces detachments operating in partnership with the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) Kurdish fighters in Deir al Zour, Syria, observed Russian armored vehicles amassing on the opposite bank of the Euphrates River. US forces deconfliction liaison officers notified Russian army command in Syria and asked if they were conducting offensive operations near US units. The Russians officially stated that no Russian army forces were near the Americans as they were completely unofficial.

I have personally participated in US intelligence gathering operations where an unknown enemy is amassing. The myriad of national and tactical intelligence systems that we can bring to bear is staggering. US intelligence would likely have assessed that the Russians were security contractors working for the Assad regime and operating in cahoots with the Syrian militias. Observing them from satellites, drones, reconnaissance aircraft, and on the ground, the Special Forces commander would have made sure enough air assets including F-18 Strike aircraft, AC-130 Gunships, AH-64 Apache helicopters, and even B-1 Lancer bombers were on station to deter or defeat an actual attack. US Marine Corps artillery operating the M777 long-range heavy artillery and US Army HIMARs truck-mounted battlefield tactical missiles would also have been ready and available. All that would be left to do is brew a new pot of coffee and see if the threat develops or evaporates. The bottom line for the Special Operators was that the Russian massing up in dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers were private military contractors with TchVK Wagner. The Syrians supporting them were the uncontrolled locals under the Syrian Fifth Corps.

According to survivor accounts, Wagner had indeed organized a massive armored force spearheaded by highly modernized T-72 tanks and BRDM armored cars to seize the al-Jabar oil fields. The fields in the Deir az Zour region produce 40% of Syria’s oil reserves and the allied SDF forces had captured this facility in late September 2017.

US force commanders contacted the Russian army’s deconfliction liaison officer in Syria. This liaison was set up to stop accidental exchanges of fire between the US and Russia. The Russian liaison said that no Russian forces were anywhere near the American positions. That meant whoever was coming had gone rogue and was not under Moscow’s control—or were they?

The joint Russian and Syrian forces started their armor assault to take the American-Kurdish positions. Well before they reached their first objective, crossing a pontoon bridge over the Euphrates, an ominous sign occurred, a large American stars-and-stripes flag was raised over the most forward position. It was not for the Russians—it was to make sure the incoming American airstrikes knew their precise location. The Russians did not know it yet, but they were already dead.

Recorded phone calls from the battle shared with US media showed the mercenaries were completely decimated by US air power, with special forces Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTAC) calling in precise strikes.

In one extended telephone call that was played in Russian on Voice of America a survivor described the flow of the battle once they launched their attack on the Special Forces outpost:

“The reports that are on TV about… well, you know, about Syria and the 25 people that are wounded there from the Syrian [fucking] Army and—well… to make it short, we’ve had our asses [fucking] kicked. So, one squadron [fucking] lost 200 people… right away, another one lost 10 people… and I don’t know about the third squadron, but it got torn up pretty badly, too.… So, three squadrons took a beating.… The Yankees attacked… first they blasted the [fuck] out of us by artillery and then they took four helicopters up and pushed us in a [fucking] merry-go-round with heavy caliber machine guns.… They were all shelling the holy [fuck] out of it and our guys didn’t have anything besides the assault rifles… nothing at all, not even mentioning shoulder-fired SAMs or anything like that.… So they tore us to pieces for sure, put us through hell, and the Yankees knew for sure that the Russians were coming, that it was us, [fucking] Russians.… Our guys were going to commandeer an oil refinery and the Yankees were holding it.… We got our [fucking] asses beat rough, my men called me.… They’re there drinking now… many have gone missing… it’s a total [fuck] up, it sucks, another takedown.… Everybody, you know, treats us like pieces of [shit].… They beat our asses like we were little pieces of [shit] but our [fucking] government will go in reverse now and nobody will respond or anything and nobody will punish anyone for this.… So these are our casualties…”⁴⁵

Syrian Fifth Corps would later claim they were attacking a joint SDF unit working with ISIS, as Syria maintains that all US operations are in support of the terrorists, not liberation forces. Unofficial counts would say up to 300 Russians and Syrians were dead.⁴⁶

The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed the attack was nothing like the US Central Command described:

“Material about the deaths of dozens and hundreds of Russian citizens—it is classic disinformation. It was not 400, not 200, not 100, and not 10. Preliminary figures indicate that as a result of the armed clash that took place, the causes of which are now being investigated, we can talk about the deaths of five people, presumably citizens of Russia. There are also wounded, but all this needs to be verified—in particular, and first and foremost, [their] citizenship; whether they are citizens of Russia or other countries.”⁴⁷

US intelligence agencies learned that Prigozhin, who has contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry, spoke with Kremlin officials before the attack. Yevginy Prigozhin, who is close to Putin, received permission from a Russian minister to move forward with a “fast and strong” initiative in early February, then later spoke with Syrian presidential aides to coordinate. In the end, Prigozhin’s bid ended in wholesale slaughter. The 12 or so American special operators on the ground called in nearly three hours of airplane, artillery, and helicopter strikes against the Russians that obliterated the entire assaulting column. For now, Russia’s ambitions to seize Syria oil was as dead as their mercenaries.