IV. The Second Battle of the Somme
Attack upon the Fifth Army, March 2
The Fifth Army front—The story of a Redoubt — Attack upon Congreve’s Seventh Corps—Upon Watts’ Nineteenth Corps—Upon Maxse’s Eighteenth Corps—Upon Butler’s Third Corps—Terrific pressure—Beginning of the Retreat—Losses of Guns
In dealing with the German attack upon the Fifth Army, the first point which should be emphasised is, that heavy as the fighting was in the north, still it was this southern advance which was the main one. The official account of the disposition of the German forces brings this fact out very clearly. From the Sensée River to the Bapaume-Cambrai road they are stated to have had nine divisions in line and eight in close reserve, covering a front of nine miles. In the eight miles from Cambrai road to La Vacquerie they had four divisions. In the southern area from La Vacquerie down to La Fère they had twenty-three divisions in the line and seventeen in reserve, covering a front of over forty miles. This front was defended by eleven British divisions, with three divisions of infantry and three of cavalry in reserve. So far as infantry was concerned the odds were 40 to 14, while the German guns numbered about 3500 to 1300 on the British line. These odds were serious enough if directed equally along the whole area, but when thrown in on special sectors they became more crushing. To add to the total picture of German strength, it should be added that twenty-five fresh divisions were thrown into the fight during the first week, nine upon Scarpe front, three between the Ancre and the Somme, seven between the Somme and Montdidier, and six between Montdidier and the Oise. Against these have to be set British reinforcements, and the influx of French from the south. It was only on the first five days of battle that the odds were so overpoweringly with the Germans.
In this chapter we shall endeavour to gain a superficial view of the general course of events upon the whole front of the Fifth Army upon the fateful March 21. We shall then be in a position to appreciate the situation as it was in the evening and to understand those decisions on the part of General Gough and his subordinates which influenced the subsequent operations.
The front of the Fifth Army extended from its junction with the Third Army in the neighbourhood of La Vacquerie to Barisis, a village some miles south of the Oise, the total frontage being nearly forty miles. This was occupied by four corps. The northern was the Seventh, under General Congreve, a well-known soldier, whose V.C. and shattered arm proclaimed his past services to the Empire. This corps covered the southern part of the dangerous Cambrai salient and extended to the region of Ronssoy. From this point to Maissemy the line was held by General Watts with the Nineteenth Corps. Upon his right, extending as far as north of Essigny, was General Maxse with the Eighteenth Corps. From thence to Barisis lay, the Third Corps under General Butler. All four were soldiers of wide experience, their leader, General Gough, had never failed in any task to which he had laid his hand, and the troops in the line comprised some of the flower of the British army, so that in spite of all disparity of numbers there was a reasonable hope for success. Arrangements had been made by which the French or British could send lateral help to each other; but it must be admitted that the liaison work proved to be defective, and that the succours were slower in arriving, and less equipped for immediate action, than had been expected.
The fortifications along the front of the Fifth Army were of various degrees of strength, depending upon the nature of the ground and upon the time that it had been in British possession, the north being stronger than the south. The Oise, which had been looked upon as an obstacle, and the presence of which had seemed to justify the extraordinarily long sector held by the Third Corps, had to some extent dried up and had ceased to be a real protection. In the main, the defences consisted of a forward line, a chain of small redoubts, each with four machine-guns and all connected by posts; a battle-line which was strongly wired and lay about 3000 yards behind the forward line; and a rear zone, the fortifications of which were not complete. If anything were wanting in the depth of the defences it has to be remembered that we are speaking of a vast tract of country, and that to dig a serviceable trench from London, we will say, to Guildford, furnishing it with sandbags and wire, is a mighty task. There were no enslaved populations who could be turned on to such work. For months before the attack the troops, aided by the cavalry and by several special entrenching battalions, were digging incessantly. Indeed, the remark has been made that their military efficiency was impaired by the constant navvy work upon which they were employed. There is no room for criticism upon this point, for everything possible was done, even in that southern sector which had only been a few weeks in British possession.
Before beginning to follow the history of March 21, it would be well to describe the position and number of the reserves, as the course of events depended very much upon this factor. Many experienced soldiers were of opinion that if they had been appreciably more numerous, and considerably nearer the line, the positions could have been made good. The three infantry divisions in question were the Thirty-ninth, which was immediately behind the Seventh Corps, the Twentieth, which was in the neighbourhood of Ham, and was allotted to the Eighteenth Corps, and the Fiftieth, which was in general army reserve, and about seven hours’ march from the line. The First Cavalry Division was in the rear of the Nineteenth Corps, while the Second Cavalry Division was on the right behind the Third Corps. The Third Cavalry Division was in billets upon the Somme, and it also was sent to the help of the Third Corps. Besides these troops the nearest supports were at a distance of at least three days’ journey, and consisted of a single unit, the Eighth Division.
The German preparations for the attack had not been unobserved and it was fully expected upon the morning of the battle, but what was not either expected or desired was the ground mist, which seems to have been heavier in the southern than in the northern portion of the line. So dense was it that during the critical hours when the Germans were pouring across No Man’s Land it was not possible to see for more than twenty yards, and the whole scheme of the forward defence, depending as it did upon machine-guns, placed in depth and sweeping every approach, was completely neutralised by this freak of nature, which could not have been anticipated, for it was the first time such a thing had occurred for two months. Apart from the machine-guns, a number of isolated field-guns had been sown here and there along the front, where they had lurked in silence for many weeks waiting for their time to come. These also were rendered useless by the weather, and had no protection from the German advance, which overran and submerged them.
The devastating bombardment broke out along the line about five o’clock, and shortly after ten it was known that the German infantry had advanced and had invaded the whole of the forward zone, taking a few of the redoubts, but in most cases simply passing them in the fog, and pushing on to the main British line. As it is impossible to give the experiences of each redoubt in detail, the story of one may be told as being fairly typical of the rest. This particular one is chosen because some facts are available, whereas in most of them a deadly silence, more eloquent than words, covers their fate. The Enghien redoubt was held by Colonel Wetherall with a company of the 2/4 Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry upon the front of the Sixty-first Division. The redoubt formed the battalion headquarters, and was connected to brigade headquarters by a cable buried eight feet deep. In front were two companies of the battalion in the outpost line; behind was the fourth company ready for counter-attack. Early in the morning heavy trench-mortar fire was raining bombs upon the redoubt, and the wire was flying in all directions. At 6 the redoubt was so full of gas that even the masks could not hold it out, so the men were ordered below and put up gas blankets to fend it off. This could be safely done, as when gas is so thick it is not possible for the stormers to advance. At 6:15, what with fog and gas and blurred respirators, it was hardly possible to see anything at all. At 7:30 the gas cleared and there was a shower of high explosive shells with shattering effect. At 9:30 the barrage lifted and the garrison rushed up from their shelters and manned their posts, but the fog rolled white and thick across their vision. The cloud banked right up to their wire, while from behind it came all the noises of the pit. So nerve-shaking was the effect that some of the outlying men came creeping into the redoubt for human company. At 9.40 the whizzing of bullets all around showed that the infantry was on the move. The garrison fired back into the mist, whence came vague shoutings and tramplings. A request was cabled back for a protective barrage, but the inadequate reply showed that the British guns had suffered in the shelling. Suddenly the mist darkened at one point; it broke into running figures, and a wave of men rushed forward, scrambled through the broken wire, and clambered into the redoubt. The Oxfords rushed across and bombed them back into the mist again. There was a pause, during which the attack was reorganised, and then at 11 o’clock the German stormers poured suddenly in from three sides at once. The garrison stood to it stoutly and drove them out, leaving many bodies on the broken wire. The fort was now entirely surrounded, and there was a fresh attack from the rear which added fifty or sixty more to the German losses. At 11:45 there was some lifting of the fog, and Colonel Wetherall endeavoured to get across to the village, 300 yards behind him, to see if help could be obtained. He found it deserted. Stealing back to his fort he was covered suddenly by German rifles, was dragged away as a prisoner, but finally, late in the evening, escaped and rejoined the main body of his own battalion. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Cunningham had taken over the defence of Enghien redoubt, assisted by Lieutenant Richards with the machine-guns. Hour after hour fresh attacks were repelled, but showers of bombs fell in the confined space, and the garrison were continually thinned out. Despairing messages—“What shall we do? What shall we do?”—were sent back over the cable, but nothing could be done, for these outliers are the enfants perdus of the army, marked from the first for destruction. Finally, at 4:30, the great deep all around them sent one heavy wave to submerge them, and the cable was for ever silent.
Such is the typical history of a redoubt. Some succumbed more readily, some survived until the afternoon of the next day; but the difference may sometimes have depended upon the various degrees of severity of attack, which was by no means the same upon all sectors. The total effect was the complete destruction of the eleven gallant battalions which held the advanced line of the Fifth Army, and the loss of all material therein. One can but hope that the enemy paid a full price. Occasionally a sudden rise of the mist gave the defence a splendid opening for their machine-guns. On one occasion such a chance exposed a German officer standing with a large map in his hand within thirty yards of the fort, his company awaiting his directions beside him. Few of them escaped.
We shall now follow the line of the Fifth Army from the north. The Seventh Corps upon the left consisted of the Ninth (Tudor), the Twenty-first (Campbell), and the Sixteenth (Hull) Divisions in the order named, and it carried the line down as far as Ronssoy, where it joined on to Watts’ Nineteenth Corps. The Ninth Division had two brigades in the line, and all the battalions both of the Twenty-sixth and of the South Africans were in the forward zone and exposed to the usual devastating losses. Their front joined that of the Forty-seventh Division at Fifteen Ravine in the north, and the Twenty-first at Chapel Hill in the south. About eleven o’clock the main advance of the Germans struck up against this front. There was no action upon the left between Gauche Wood and the canal, though the bombardment was exceedingly heavy. On the right in the neighbourhood of Gauche Wood the fighting was very severe all day, and the stormers were able to make little progress, although they attacked again and again with the utmost resolution. This attack fell mainly upon the South African Brigade, who held on with the same firm courage which they had shown at Delville Wood, and proved once more that there are no better soldiers in all the vast army of the Empire. It was only at this point, however, near the junction with the Twenty-first Division that the Ninth Division was attacked, for the German infantry was crushed by the artillery fire upon the left in front of Gonnelieu, so that the total losses of the Ninth upon this murderous day were probably less than those of other divisions in the Fifth Army. Gauche Wood was continually attacked, but the Quentin redoubt to the immediate north of it was left alone during the whole day. It was the 2nd or Natal South African regiment which held the extreme front, and after a very fine resistance they were driven through the wood, until at 11:30 the Germans held it all, but the Africans still clung to the system of Chapel trenches to the immediate west and south of it. To this they held all day, being much helped by a local rise in the mist about eleven, which enabled the guns in Quentin redoubt to see their targets in the south. Finally, the Germans were compelled to dig in in Gauche Wood, and give up the attempt to get farther. No other point was gained upon the Ninth Divisional front.
Meanwhile, the enemy had pressed their attack with great violence upon the immediate right, where it fell with special strength upon the 2nd Lincolns of the Twenty-first Division. At 12 they were well behind the right rear of the Africans, who were compelled to throw back a flank. The Lincolns held on splendidly, however, and the danger was arrested. At 3:30 a new concentration of the enemy developed in front of Vaucelette Farm, and was heavily shelled by the British guns. At 5 o’clock the fight was very desperate upon Chapel Hill on the southern limit of the South African area, where the Lincolns were still holding out but were being gradually pressed back. The 4th South African Regiment (South African Scots) was therefore ordered to counter-attack in this direction, which was done with great dash, the position upon Chapel Hill being re-established. Such was the general situation when at 8:15 orders were issued for the withdrawal of all units to the rear zone. This was done during the night, the general line of retirement being towards Sorel and Heudicourt, while the Scottish Brigade kept position upon the left. The order to retire came as a complete surprise, as all was well upon the immediate front, but the reason given was the penetration of the line at other points.
Upon the right of the Scots and South Africans of the Ninth Division the line was held by Campbell’s Twenty-first Division, consisting of the Leicester Brigade and two brigades of North Country troops, all of them the veterans of many battles. They covered the ground from south of Gauche Wood in the north to Epehy in the south. Two brigades were in the line, the 62nd in the north and the 110th in the south, and were exposed all day to a very severe attack which they held up with great steadiness and resolution. Heudicourt, Peizière, and Epehy were the scenes of particularly severe fighting. In the evening these places, and the whole line through Quentin Ridge and east of Gouzeaucourt, were still firmly held by the defenders. It may truly be said that along the whole fifty-mile front of battle there was no point where the enemy met with a more unyielding resistance than in the area of the Twenty-first Division. During the long day three German divisions essayed the task of forcing Epehy and overcoming the defence of Chapel Hill, but as the night drew in all three lay exhausted in front of their objectives, and there would certainly have been no British retirement had it not been for the movements in the other sections of the line. Only at one seventh post had the enemy made any lodgment, namely at Vaucelette Farm, and here he could have been thrown out by a counter-attack had the general situation permitted it. The Leicesters and the Northumberland Fusiliers upheld the fame of their historic regiments on this day of battle, but two of the outstanding exploits in the fight lie to the credit of the Lincolns, who kept an iron grip upon Chapel Hill, and to the 15th Durhams, who made a dashing counter-attack which swept back the German advance when it tried to penetrate between Epehy and Chapel Hill. The village of Peizière was held by the 7th Leicesters of the 110th Brigade, who fought as this brigade has always fought and held the Germans out. Once with the help of flame-throwers they gained a lodgment among the houses, but the brave Midlanders came back to it and threw them out once more. It was a party of this same Leicester regiment which held the farm of Vaucelette, and fought it out to the very last man before they suffered it to pass from their keeping.
The fighting upon Chapel Hill was particularly severe, and was the more important as this eminence, lying almost upon the divisional boundary, enfiladed the Ninth Division to the north. There was a trench in front of the hill, called Cavalry Trench, and a farm behind called Revelon Farm, and the battle swung and swayed all day, sometimes the British holding all the ground, and sometimes being pushed back as far as the farm. The 1st Lincolns gained great honour that day, but they could not have held the hill were it not for the co-operation of the South Africans, who twice helped to retake it when it had been temporarily lost. The 11th Royal Scots from the Ninth Division Reserve Brigade struck in also with effect when the enemy filtered round the north edge of the hill and worked to the rear of it. They had got as far as Genin Copse when the Royal Scots attacked and hunted them back once more. The weak point of the Twenty-first Division lay upon their right where they had to throw out a defensive flank 3000 yards deep. They had not troops enough to cover this ground, and it was only the splendid work of the batteries of the 94th Brigade R.F.A. which prevented a disaster.
The Sixteenth Irish Division (Hull) lay upon the right of the Twenty-first Division, carrying the line to the south of Ronssoy. This division had two brigades in the line, the 48th to the left and the 49th to the right, and it appears to have sustained an attack which was of a peculiarly crushing nature. It cannot be denied that the wretched parochial politics which tear Ireland in two, and which are urged with such Celtic extravagance of language, cannot have a steadying effect upon national troops, but none the less every soldier will admit that the men who carried Guillemont and breasted the slope of the Messines Ridge have proved themselves to be capable of rising to the highest exercise of military virtue. If, therefore, they gave way upon this occasion while others stood, the reason is to be sought rather in the extra severity of the attack, which had the same crushing effect upon other divisions both in the north and in the south of the line. All these brigades were desperately engaged during the day, as was the 1 1 6th Brigade of the Thirty-ninth Division which came to the help of the Irish, while the other two brigades of this supporting division endeavoured to strengthen the line of defence in the rear zone with a switch line from Saulcourt to Tincourt Wood. On the right the attack was too severe to be withstood, and not only the advance line but the battle position also was deeply penetrated, the Germans pouring in a torrent down the Catelet valley and occupying Ronssoy and Lempire, by which they turned the flanks both of the Twenty-first in the north and of the Sixty-sixth Division in the south. Especially fierce was the resistance offered by the 48th Brigade in the north, some units of which were swung round until they found themselves sharing with the Twenty-first Division in the defence of Epehy. The 2nd Munsters lived up to their high reputation during a long day of hard fighting, and were for the third or fourth time in the war practically destroyed. Colonel Ireland was hit about 10:30 in the morning, and one company, which counter-attacked near Malassise Farm, was annihilated in the effort; but the survivors of the battalion were undismayed, and under Major Hartigan they continued to oppose every effort of the stormers. One of the features of the battle in this area was the fight maintained all day by C Company scattered in little parties over Ridge Reserve and Tetard Wood. Lieutenant Whelan was the soul of this fine defence, contesting every bay of his trench, and continuing to rally and lead his dwindling band until noon of the next day. A road ran past this position, and it was all-important for the enemy to move their artillery down it in order to press the retreat; but the Irishmen shot down the horse teams as they came up until the passage was blocked with their bodies. Finally, all the scattered bands rallied near Epehy village where, under Captain Chandler, who was killed in the contest, they fought to the last, until in the late evening their cartridges gave out, and the gallant Hartigan, with the headquarter staff of the battalion, was overwhelmed. Lieutenant Whelan, meanwhile, held his post near Epehy until noon of March 22, when he and his men fired their last round and threw their last bomb before surrender. The defence of Malassise Farm by Lieutenant Kidd and his men was also a glorious bit of fighting to the last man and the last cartridge.
The general situation upon the front of the Seventh Corps on the night of March 21 was that the Sixteenth Division, reinforced by the 116th Brigade, held the main battle positions, save on the extreme right, as far north as St. Emilie. Thence the line followed approximately the railway round and east of Epehy, in the region of the Twenty-first Division. East of Chapel Hill and Chapel Crossing it entered the holding of the Ninth Division, and passed west of Gauche Wood, through Quentin redoubt and so to the original line. Behind this indented position the 118th and 117th Brigades with the Sappers and Pioneers of the Thirty-ninth Division were hard at work upon the switch line, which should form a cover for retreat or a basis for reorganisation.
Upon the right of the Seventh Corps lay Watts’ Nineteenth Corps, which had two divisions in the line, the Sixty-sixth Lancashire Territorial Division (Malcolm) in the north, and the Twenty-fourth Division (Daly) in the south. They covered a front from south of Ronssoy to south of Maissemy. The Lancashire Division, the same which behaved so splendidly in the mud battle of Broodseinde, had all three brigades in the front, covering 4000 yards, and were exposed all day to a most terrific assault. From the north they were in the order 197th, 199th, 198th. To the south of them an even more strenuous attack was launched upon the Twenty-fourth Division, which had two brigades in the line. These were the 17th upon the left and the 72nd upon the right, with the 1st North Staffords, 8th West Kents, 1st Rifle Brigade, and 8th Queen’s in front. About 11 o’clock the news came that the enemy was pushing through at the point of junction with the Eighteenth Corps upon the right, where there seems to have been a gap of some hundreds of yards between divisions, and later that they had penetrated into the village of Hargicourt in the rear of the Sixty-sixth Division. There was heavy fighting all day, and by evening the whole forward zone held by the 2/3 Lanes Fusiliers, East Lancashires, and Manchesters had passed into the hands of the enemy. Colonel Stokes-Roberts of the former battalion being among the casualties. The twelve redoubts which constituted the main defences of the. battle zone held out stoutly all day, all three brigades fighting with great valour. The Germans were continually pushing in, however, upon the right of the Twenty-fourth Division and enlarging their gains in that direction, so that the First Cavalry Division was called up, and the Pioneer Battalion of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was thrown in on the right of the Sixty-sixth Division near Roisel to form a defensive flank. By 1 o’clock the battle zone of the Twenty-fourth Division was seriously compromised. The 72nd Brigade upon the right had been turned and the village of Maissemy had been taken by the Germans. Stone’s 17th Brigade Corps held a tight grip, however, upon the hamlet of Le Verguier, and though many assaults were made upon it the place remained untaken in the evening. In the area of the Sixty-sixth Division the enemy was still gaining ground, however, and they had pushed on from Hargicourt to Templeux, where a counter-attack by the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers held them for a time. The fighting continued to be very bitter until late in the evening, for though the Germans had infiltrated all the ground between the redoubts, they were unable to overcome their resistance, or to take possession of their gains. At 10:15 the order from General Watts was that there should be no retreat, and that however great the odds against them—and it was manifest that they were indeed very great—the two divisions should prepare for a fight to a finish. Meanwhile, the Fiftieth Division (Stockley) in army reserve had been ordered, after a march of seven hours, to support the line of the Nineteenth Corps, taking up a position in the rear from the Omignon River to the Cologne River, upon a front which had been partly wired. With the early morning of March 22 there came a renewed German attack which forced back the left of the Sixty-sixth, who were always much handicapped by the deep incursion the enemy had made into the area of the Sixteenth Division to the north, which continually endangered their flank and even their rear.
The battle was soon general along the whole front, and everywhere the resistance was most desperate, though the troops were gradually pressed back by the ever-increasing weight of the attack as Hindenburg’s legions came rolling in from the east. Many a bitter curse went up that day from overwrought men against the perjured traitors on the Russian front, who to ease their own burden had thrown a double weight upon those who had helped and trusted them. At 11:30 in the morning the post of Le Verguier, which had been held so long and so gallantly by the 8th West Surreys, was at last carried by storm and its brave garrison destroyed or taken, though Colonel Peirs, who had been the soul of this defence, dashed out, revolver in hand, at this last moment, and got away in the mist. The whole line of the Twenty-fourth Division was shaken by the gap thus created. The pressure was very great also at Roisel, and the 151st Brigade from the Fiftieth Division had to be hurried up in order to hold back the advance down the valley of the Cologne, which would have turned the right flank of the Lancashire men to the north. The 9th Sussex was heavily engaged in this quarter and suffered severely. About noon a valiant attempt was also made by some tanks and dismounted troopers . to turn the tide by recapturing the village of Hervilly, which had some temporary success. The German penetration had been too deep, however, and there was very pressing danger of isolation unless the corps fell back. This they did in the late afternoon and evening, passing through the ranks of the Fiftieth Division behind them. “They were nearly all gassed and dead weary,” said one who observed them as they passed. The 11th Hussars and 19th Entrenching Battalion most gallantly covered the retreat. The enemy were close at their heels, however, in great force and most aggressive mood, as the Fiftieth Division soon discovered. This unit will be remembered as the famous Yorkshire Territorial division who helped to turn the tide at the second battle of Ypres, and have shown their worth upon many fields; but on this occasion the odds were too heavy, though they held the enemy for the rest of the day.
The lower half of the line between the Omignon and the Cologne rivers was held by Riddell’s 149th Brigade of Northumberland Fusiliers, while the northern half was held by Rees’ 150th Brigade of Yorkshiremen. Against this thin wall dashed the full tide of the German advance as it swept on in the wake of the Nineteenth Corps. It was a long and hard fight in which the enemy had heavy losses, especially in front of Poeuilly, where considerable sheets of wire lay in front of the position of the 6th Northumberland Fusiliers. It was a most gallant affair—gallant on both sides. Their Colonel, Robinson, laid out his machine-guns in the long grass upon each side of this wire and enfiladed the German line with most murderous results. In the south the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers were attacked in front and on the right flank, and the pressure was so great that they had to abandon Caulaincourt, which was then recaptured and again abandoned by the 6th Northumberland Fusiliers from the supporting line. The enemy, with his usual wile, telephoned from the mausoleum, a central building, that reinforcements be sent to that point. Upon asking the name of the officer and getting no reply, General Riddell, in local command, turned on five batteries of 18-pounders and blew the mausoleum to pieces. At Poeuilly also there had been two successful counter-attacks, but the enemy was swarming round the southern flank in great numbers, and the river, which is not more formidable than an average South of England trout stream, was of little use as a protection. An important point named Nobescourt Farm, lying near the junction of brigades, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and the village of Poeuilly was also taken. By evening the Fiftieth Division had done its work, however, as it had held up the pursuit and enabled the Nineteenth Corps to reach the line of the Somme without severe pressure. That night they received orders to withdraw, which were carried out in the morning of March 23, Martin’s 149th Brigade in the south making a show of fighting in order to cover the movements of their companions in the north who were moving over a perfectly flat plain from Mons to Brie. Finally, General Riddell destroyed Tertry bridge and dropped back to St. Christ. During all these operations the German infantry were moving slowly forward in successive lines of skirmishers, about a thousand yards from the British, who retired in leisurely fashion, continually turning and holding them up, so that the whole spectacle was exactly that of a well-ordered field-day. When the main body had reached the bridges, a single company of the 10th Northumberland Fusiliers lay out in the higher ground, under the leadership of Captain Proctor, who received the D.S.O. for his able conduct of the operation. This company held up a brigade for two hours, and then, their comrades being safely across, they withdrew in their turn, leaving half their number behind them. Every one being across, both the St. Christ and Brie bridges were blown up. The latter was a brand-new construction and was in charge of an American officer of engineers who distinguished himself by his cool courage, starting out alone, and bringing across the river a train full of ammunition which lay upon the farther side. The Twenty-fourth Division had crossed at Falvy, the rearguard action being fought by the depleted battalions of the 72nd Brigade. Colonel Pope of the 1st North Staffords, Colonel Charlton of the 4th Yorks, and Colonel Le Fleming of the 9th East Surreys were among those who had fallen.
The Nineteenth Corps was now covering a total front of 20,000 yards along the western bank of the stream, which is shallow and marshy in these reaches. Their line was from Rouy-le-Crane in the south to near Peronne, with some small outposts to the east of the river. The Eighth Division (Heneker) had come up on the morning of March 23, and occupied the southern end of the line, with the remains of the Twenty-fourth, the Sixty-sixth, and the Fiftieth extending to the north. There we shall leave them while we return to the history of the front line upon March 21.
On the right of the Nineteenth Corps was Maxse’s Eighteenth Corps covering the ground from the Omignon valley to a point just west of St. Quentin, with three divisions in the line. These were the Sixty-first on the left, the Thirtieth in the centre, and the Thirty-sixth in the south. The Sixty-first Division, under General Colin Mackenzie, was one of those fine second-line Territorial units which have done so well in the later stages of the war. All three brigades were in the line, the 183rd Brigade of Scottish troops in the north, the 184th in the centre, and the 182nd in the south, both of the last being from the South Midlands. The 2/4th Oxfords, 2/5th Gordons, and 2/8th Worcesters were the devoted battalions which held the forward line, and so fierce was their defence that the battle-line was able to maintain itself along the whole divisional front, in spite of very valiant efforts upon the part of the German stormers, who showed absolute contempt of death in their efforts to cut the wire at those points where their artillery had failed to do so.
The story of the Enghien redoubt and its devoted defence has already been told, but belongs to the record of this division. The battle zone ran in the main along the eastern edge of the Bois d’Holnon, and this was desperately defended from morning to night. In the afternoon the high ground south of Maissery, in the left rear of the division and outside their area, had been captured, and the 2/4th Berkshires endeavoured to help the Twenty-fourth Division in their counter-attack. The Berkshires lost heavily in this venture, and their gallant Colonel, Dimmer, who had won the V.C. in the early days of the war, was shot through the head leading his men on horseback to the very lip of a trench full of Germans. Horse and groom fell before the same volley. The Sixty-first resumed its line after this action in the north, and it maintained it intact until evening, the three divisions of the German attack being practically held up by the three heroic battalions in the front line, so that the full weight of attack never reached the main line. It was as solidly established in the evening as in the morning. The position of the enemy on their left rear had become more and more menacing, as after taking Maissemy they had pressed on to Villescholes. This led to dangerous attacks from the north on the early morning of March 22, in the course of which the 183rd Brigade had to fight desperately to preserve the flank of the division. The weight of this fighting fell chiefly upon the 8th Argyll and Sutherlands, who counter-attacked most valiantly, aided by the remains of the gallant 2/4 Berkshires, who had suffered so severely the day before. Colonel M’Alpine Downie of the Argylls was wounded, and died next day. Even when the enemy had got as far westward as Vermand, the Sixty-first Division was still rooted to its ground, and the Highlanders on the left flank recovered by a spirited advance nine guns which had been overrun by the German advance between Maissemy and Villescholes. The 9th Royal Scots extended their line to the westward, and facing north presented an unbroken front to the constant hordes of Germans who were moving down the northern slopes of the Omignon valley in the direction of Caulaincourt. It was not until late in the afternoon of March 22 that the Sixty-first Division retired, still fighting, to a prepared position north of Vaux.
Next to the Sixty-first Division was the Thirtieth under General Williams. This division had two brigades—the 21st (Goodman) and the 90th (Poyntz) — in the line, the latter officer being known to all sportsmen as the famous Somerset batsman. The front of 4000 yards was from the immediate west of St. Quentin to the Somme, and included two notable strong points, Manchester Hill and the Épine du Dallon. The 89th Brigade under General Stanley was in the immediate rear. It was not used as a unit during the day, but the three fine battalions of the King’s Liverpool Regiment, the 17th, 18th, and 19th, were dispersed in the evening to reinforce three separate units.
The fighting along the front of the Thirtieth Division was of a very desperate character. The forward battalions were the 2nd Wilts and the 16th Manchesters. Rushing through the gaps in their line of defence, the Germans flung themselves upon the battle zone, where after long fighting which lasted into the afternoon they gained possession of the two posts already mentioned, and worked into the main battle-line at Savy. Both brigades lost very heavily during these attacks, but the addition of the 18th and 19th King’s from Stanley’s brigade helped them to carry on under most trying conditions. Both these reinforcing battalions came in for severe fighting in the evening, and the 18th King’s, which joined in a counter-attack by the 21st Brigade, was particularly hard hit, while the 19th had hardly an officer left, the colonel falling at the head of his men. As a final result of the day’s battle both the brigades were somewhat driven in upon the front, but each held its . line and was ready to renew the battle next morning. The 2nd Bedfords particularly distinguished themselves during this day of incessant fighting, making no less than six successful counter-attacks in order to clear their sector when it was partly occupied by the Germans. Up to 4 o’clock in the afternoon of March 22 the Thirtieth were still firm in their positions, and it was only the general situation of the Army which finally compelled them to abandon them. They dropped back upon the general line of Ham, where the three scattered battalions of the 89th Brigade had been ordered to form one unit once more. Of the Manchester men in the front rank upon the day of battle hardly a man ever got away, and their splendid Colonel Elstob lay dead with the greater part of his battalion around him. He had said: “The Manchesters will defend Manchester Hill to the last,” and he lived and died true to his word. A superior officer reporting upon this episode said: “At about 11 o’clock Colonel Elstob informed me that the Germans had broken through and were swarming round the redoubt. At about 2 P.M. he said that most of his men were killed or wounded, including himself; that they were all getting dead beat, that the Germans had got into the redoubt and hand-to-hand fighting was going on. He was still quite cheery. At 3:30 he was spoken to on the telephone and said very few were left and that the end was nearly come. After that no further answer could be got.”
On the right of the Thirtieth Lancashire Division was the Thirty-sixth Ulster Division under the command of General Nugent, one of the many good soldiers who were trained by South Africa for this greater ordeal. That scrambling and difficult campaign has, though its lessons were most imperfectly apprehended, proved to be an invaluable preparation for the leaders in the world’s war of the future. The Ulster division had all three brigades in the line, the 109th (Ricardo) to the north, the 107th (Witteycombe) in the centre, and the 108th (Griffiths) in the south. The three outlying battalions were the 12th and 15th Irish Rifles and the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, which suffered the common fate of all who held that post of danger. Not a man returned, save a few of the Irish Rifles, who swam down the canal that night.
The front held by the Ulstermen was from the Somme on the left to the neighbourhood of Urvillers Battle on the right, a distance of 6000 yards. Three German divisions attacked upon this frontage, but the edge of their onslaught was blunted by the splendid resistance of the three doomed battalions in the van. None the less, it surged with great violence all along the edge of the battle zone, but it was everywhere held save only at the hamlet of Contescourt, where the Germans obtained a lodgment. The whole defence of the division was imperilled, however, by the fact that the Germans had bitten deeply into the British line to the south of the 108th Brigade, getting as far as Essigny on their right rear, with the effect that a deep defensive flank had to be thrown back in this direction, which used up all the reserves of the division. Thus, when the Germans late that day and in the following morning pressed their advantage at Contescourt, and were stopped by the magnificent resistance of the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers at the neighbouring village of Fontaine-les-Clercs, they should have been permanently held, as they were driven back in twelve successive attacks. As there were no reserves available for a counter-attack, however, the defence was gradually worn down by a great disparity of numbers, so that by March 22 the Germans had advanced into the sector of the line which ran down the course of the rivulet which is dignified by the name of the Somme.
Such, in brief, was the experience of the three divisions which held the line of the Eighteenth Corps on March 21. The Twentieth Division in reserve was not employed during the day, nor were its services needed, for Maxse’s Corps, though attacked by eight German divisions, was able to hold its ground, thanks largely to the splendid resistance of the shock-absorbing battalions in the front-line. Up to 4 P.M. of March 22 the enemy had made no permanent advance into the battle zone, but at that hour both flanks of the Corps had been turned at Maissemy in the north and at Essigny in the south, and the alternative was retirement or absolute isolation and destruction. It may then briefly be said that, thanks to the resolute resistance of the battalions in the forward zone, and to the solidity of those in the battle zone, the Eighteenth Corps was able to maintain its ground until it was ordered to leave it, and that save for some indentation of its front, especially at Contescourt, its main positions remained inviolate.
Upon the right of the Eighteenth Corps lay the Third Corps, which covered the enormous front of 30,000 yards. Of the nine brigades in the corps, eight were in the line and only one in reserve, so that between the tenuity of the line and its want of support it was an extremely tempting mark for the German assault, especially as by ignoring the two brigades south of the Oise they could concentrate their whole force upon the six brigades in line in the north. It is true that the wide marshes of the Oise offered an impediment which covered part of the British line, but as already remarked, the waters were exceedingly low for the time of year, and the Germans very cleverly overcame whatever obstacle was left.
The three divisions which formed Butler’s Third Corps were the Fourteenth Light Division (Cowper), which extended as far south as Moy, the Eighteenth Division (Lee) covering the ground between Moy and Travecy, and finally the Fifty-eighth Division (Cator) extending to Barisis, five or six miles south of the Oise. As usual, we will take them from the north, confining the narrative to the point at which the fighting in the front line came to an end.
The Fourteenth Division had all three brigades in the line, their order being 41st, 42nd, and 43rd from the north. This division, composed entirely of light infantry battalions, has had more than its share of desperate adventures during its service in France. Again and again, notably in the fire-attack before Ypres in 1915, in the third battle of Ypres, and upon the present occasion, they have been exposed to ordeals of the most tremendous kind. Their frontage was 5500 yards, which was not excessive as compared with that of other divisions, and it contained some high ground north of Essigny which should have been valuable for observation and defence, but none the less the attack was so severe and so concentrated that it rapidly made an impression upon the defence, which became more serious as the day wore on. The three outlying battalions were the 8th and 9th King’s Royal Rifles and the 6th Somerset Light Infantry, and these, as usual, were sacrificed almost to a man. The enemy then stormed in upon the line, making his advance here, as elsewhere, with a systematic skill which showed how thoroughly he had been drilled and exercised behind the line. This process of infiltration by which small bodies here, there, and everywhere extend their advance where they find a cranny into which to push and establish machine-gun posts which, unless they be instantly rooted out, soon grow into formidable positions, shows the remarkable adaptability of the German soldier—a quality with which, it must be admitted, the world had not credited him in the past.
It may also be admitted that we yielded too easily to such tactics, and that there was a tendency, as Third was pointed out in a memorandum from the Higher Command, to consider a position as untenable because it was outflanked, instead of closing in upon the intruders and pressing each side of the nut-crackers against the intrusive nut. In many cases this was done, but in others small bodies of daring men with a few machine-guns were able to dislodge whole lines which they had managed to enfilade. On this occasion the Germans pushed in upon both flanks of the Fourteenth Division, but their most serious gains occurred about mid-day, when they captured Manufacture Farm north of Essigny, and .shortly afterwards the weighbridge west of that village. The 41st Brigade on the left were driven out of their headquarters, while the 43rd on the right were pushed back to the Gibercourt road. A very weak point was evidently developing, so General Butler hurried up part of the Second Cavalry Division (Greenly), and also his only spare infantry brigade, the 54th (Sadleir-Jackson) in order to make a line of resistance at the switch line between Camas and Lizerolles. About 1:30 the Germans had got in between Essigny and Benay and taken Lambay Wood. In view of their accelerating advance and the ominous reports which were also coming in from the 173rd Brigade on the right. General Butler continued to build up his rear line, putting into it not only all three brigades of the Second Cavalry and the 54th Infantry Brigades, but also the 12th and Entrenching Battalions, thus covering the whole rear zone of the corps. Isolated parties of the 41st Brigade were holding out in the main position upon the left, but Hinacourt had also fallen and the line was slowly rolling westward, so that by evening the Fourteenth Division had practically lost its hold of the whole of its battle position.
Things were going better, however, with the Eighteenth Division, which held 9000 yards of front in the centre of the Third Corps. As this great frontage was maintained by only two brigades, the 53rd (Higginson) in the north and the 55th (Wood) in the south, it must have been very thinly held, and even admitting that the pressure was less than on either of the wing divisions, it was none the less a fine achievement to keep a grip on so wide an area. Three battalions were in the forward zone, the 8th Berks on the left, the 7th West Kents in the centre, and the 7th Buffs on the right, all of whom did splendidly, so that the defence of Fort Vendeuil, Cork, Cardiff, Durham, and other redoubts upon this point form a whole series of epics. Besides the infantry, the 79th Company Royal Engineers shared in the peril and the glory of this defence. The wires connecting up these forward garrisons were speedily cut, and no news came back all day, save the rattle of their rifle-fire. The first definite tidings of the German advance came back through the fog about 12 o’clock, when some gunners emerged from its folds and announced that the advanced guns had been overrun by the enemy. Soon after came a runner with a message from Colonel Crosthwaite of the West Kents to say that his headquarters was surrounded, and asking for a barrage on one side of it. A second message arrived from him: “Still holding, 12:30 P.M. Boche all round within fifty The yards except rear. Can only see forty yards, so it is difficult to kill the blighters.” It was the last word.
At 1:30 the enemy had closed in on the battle zone, and the high ground at Cerisy in the area of the 53rd Brigade had been lost. On the front of the 55th Brigade at the same hour strong parties of the enemy who had pushed between the redoubts in the fog had occupied Vendeuil, while a section of guns in Ronquenet Wood had been rushed by them. The reserve company of the Buffs in front of the battle zone fought desperately against these intruders, while near the Dublin redoubt Captain Dennis fought his guns till 5 P.M., inflicting heavy losses upon the Germans, who collected in masses in front of the wire at this point. Eventually his gun-pits were rushed, all the gunners being killed or taken. The main weight of the attack fell upon the 53rd Brigade upon the left, and by the middle of the afternoon all the redoubts upon this front had gone, while the 55th was still well covered. The battle zone, however, was still intact, though the enemy massed heavily in front of Moulin Farm and opposite the switch line from Vendeuil to Ly-Fontaine. They came forward several times, but the mist had risen and the rifle-fire was accurate so that they made no progress. At Caponne Farm there was also a brisk attack, but the 10th Essex, the only battalion left in the brigade, held firmly to its position, though much plagued by low-flying aeroplanes who skimmed their very heads, while the British Headquarters was equally disturbed by a captured anti-tank gun with which the Germans kept up a point-blank fire. To ease the pressure upon this wing, General Lee put in the 8th East Surreys from divisional reserve to thicken the line in the neighbourhood of Remigny.
At 3:30 the covering forts upon the front of the 55th Brigade were still holding out. Fort Vendeuil had made a particularly fine defence and broke up a heavy attack. There was lamp signalling from this fort till 6 P.M., when the lamp went out for ever. The 7th Buffs, who had charge of all this portion of the battle front, did a magnificent day’s work, and the famous regiment to which this battalion belongs has won no prouder laurels in all the centuries. Little is known of their fate save the pregnant facts that the front was screened all day, that repeated messages for help were received up to 8:30 in the evening, and that rifle-fire was heard from their posts till midnight. Bald words—and yet to him who can see they convey a sure picture of fading light, dwindling cartridges, and desperate men, baited from all sides and dying with clenched teeth amid the ever-flowing German hordes.
About 4 o’clock the Germans had not only penetrated deeply into the battle zone of the Fourteenth Division to the north, but had also dented that of the Fifty-eighth in the south, so that both wings of the Eighteenth were in a perilous state. The East Surreys were pushed forward, therefore, into the switch line from Gibercourt to Ly-Fontaine. Two regiments of dismounted cavalry from the Second Division were sent also to form a defensive flank upon the right of the 55th Brigade. At 6 P.M. the attack upon the battle zone of the Eighteenth had ceased, but it was being pushed hard upon the two wing divisions, and the Fifty-eighth had lost both Quessy and Fargniers. Orders were then issued to get behind the Crozat Canal after dark, this having always been chosen as the second line of defence. The 64th Brigade, which behaved with great steadiness, was directed to cover the retirement of the Fourteenth Division, and the guns were withdrawn first, so as to cover the infantry at the canal crossings. A few of the outlying posts were gathered up and brought back in safety. The East Surreys covered the withdrawal of the poor remains of the 53rd Brigade, while the 3rd Hussars covered the 55th Brigade on the right. It was a most difficult and delicate operation with a victorious and elated enemy swarming upon the rear, but it was successfully carried out, and by 6 A.M. the Third Corps were all across the canal, and the bridges in that sector had been destroyed.
The performance of the Eighteenth Division had been a very fine one, and- it was one of the units which could boast that on the evening of that terrible day they still held the main position which they had covered in the morning. The main German attack seems to have been conducted by four divisions, the Thirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, One hundred and third, and Two hundred and eleventh, while four more were identified as either partly engaged or in immediate reserve. The direction of the attack was mainly from the north and came upon the front and flank of the 53rd Brigade, which could hardly call itself a battalion in the evening. The gunners had to fire by guess until the mist lifted, after which time they did great execution, and stuck to their pieces to the last moment. A particularly notable performance was that of Captain Haybittle of C Battery, 83rd Brigade Royal Field Artillery, whose guns, just south of Benay, were rushed in the mist at noon. He and his crews removed the blocks and held a neighbouring position with their rifles, directing at the same time the fire of two guns in the rear which played upon the German masses as they debouched from Lambay Wood. Afterwards he and his men fell back upon these guns and fought them until late in the evening, when both of them were knocked out. Nineteen hundred rounds were fired, and this stubborn defence did much to hold the northern flank of the battle zone.
It only remains now to give some account of the events upon the front of the 173rd Brigade (Worgan) of the Fifty-eighth London Division (Gator) upon the extreme right, in order to complete this rapid bird’s-eye view of the events of March 21 upon the front of the Fifth Army. This brigade, which filled the space between Travecy on the left and the Oise upon the right, had the 2/1 Londons in the forward zone, the 2/4 Londons in the battle zone opposite La Fère, and the 2/3 Londons in the rear zone upon the Crozat Canal.1 The single battalion in front was attacked by the impossible odds of three German divisions, but held out for a long time with great constancy. Their brave Colonel, Richardson, was last seen surrounded by the enemy, but still fighting with his headquarters troops around him.
The Germans stormed forward to the battle zone, but there on the high ground across the Oise they also met with a very vigorous resistance from the 4th Londons, aided by some sappers and a company of pioneers. It was indeed a great achievement of Colonel Dann and his men to hold up the attack with such disparity of numbers, for according to the official German account several divisions took part in the attack. Finally, as the afternoon wore on the enemy obtained a lodgment in the left of the position, and before evening they occupied Travecy and part of Fargniers, winding up by the capture of Quessy. The 2/3 Londons had been drawn into the fight, and now the 2/8 Londons from the 174th Brigade were brought north and placed in reserve along the line of the Crozat Canal, across which the troops were now ordered to fall back. This battalion with the 18th Entrenching Battalion guarded the whole canal line from Condren Crossing on the right to the junction with the Eighteenth Division on the left. By 5 A.M. all troops were across and the bridges had been destroyed. The 2/4th Londons succeeded in removing all their stores and munitions, and their remarkable achievement in holding the high ground of La Fère against ten times their numbers for as many hours, during which they inflicted very heavy losses upon their assailants and repulsed six separate attacks, was among the outstanding military feats of that difficult day.
It is needless to say that the losses in men were very heavy on March 21, though it is difficult to separate them from the general losses of the retreat, which will be recorded later. Among senior officers of note who died for their country that day, besides those already mentioned, were Colonels Acklom of the Northumberland Fusiliers, Thorne of the North Staffords, Wrenford of the East Lancashires, and Stewart of the Leicesters.
British Battle Line, March 21
1. When two numbers are given to a Territorial battalion, for instance 2/4 Londons, it means that the 4th Londons have two battalions and that this is the second of them.