Before making important decisions and after receiving portentous news, Dönitz would go outside for a period of reflection. Shortly after the surprise of his appointment as head of state on the evening of 30 April, he took me for a walk with his dogs, the guard detachment following behind. After a long silence he asked suddenly, ‘What type of State do you think is best?’
Even today I am not convinced that one can answer this question simply by saying ‘Monarchy’, ‘Democracy’ or ‘Dictatorship’ – or at least not until one has obtained some definition of what the terms imply. Therefore I remained silent. Dönitz only asked in order to develop his own line of thought. He did not think that the military way, to which he had been subject all his life as a serviceman, was satisfactory for governing a state because success depended so heavily on the personality of the administrator of state power. Therefore this form came with too many dangers for country and people if the ‘Führer’ or his appointees had their own agenda. He thought that the dualist system we had had at the start of the Nazi regime, in which there was ‘a Chancellor who acted and a state President who restrained him’, both being accountable to Parliament and people, was the best solution.
After this brief digression into political philosophy he returned to a sober consideration of the facts. ‘In a short while I have to contact the enemy. The Foreign Minister, under whose aegis we became embroiled in this war – and immaterial of whatever guilt might attach to him – is not the right man for the job. For the post I need a personality who has some standing abroad. Find out where the former Reich Foreign Minister von Neurath is.’
After unsuccessful attempts to locate him, on 1 May I called Ribbentrop’s military adjutant. He did not know where Neurath was either and asked his chief. I waited on the telephone until Ribbentrop answered and wanted to know why we needed the address. I gave an evasive answer and he asked for a personal meeting with Dönitz. Late that evening he received Dönitz and had it out with him. Why was he looking round for a new Foreign Minister? Dönitz explained and asked for Ribbentrop’s suggestions. He promised to think it over, but reported next day there was no better candidate than himself.
Dönitz now invited Reich Minister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, who had also come to the North, for a talk. The two men knew each other only from a conference a few days earlier in Plön. The night drive from Plön to Flensburg on 3 May had given them a further opportunity for a detailed exchange of views. Schwerin von Krosigk hesitated to accept the office of Foreign Minister that he was offered but finally accepted it as a duty he could not escape. No personal ambition was involved. Dönitz often said later how fortunate he had been in this choice. He had now discussed all questions arising and the decisions to be made. Their shared viewpoint and deep awareness of their responsibilities led to harmonious cooperation. Both agreed that the lost war should be ended as soon as possible accompanied by the saving of the greatest possible number of Germans from Bolshevism, that they should take the difficult path of capitulation, and how this should be handled. They would have to wait and see if the enemy would recognise and co-operate with them, while obviously cutting off all party-political ties. Only purely technically expert ministers should remain in the Cabinet. For this reason it was called ‘the Unpolitical Cabinet’.
In order to give the new head of state a free hand in the choice of his colleagues, the ministers of the old Reich Government in the North were discharged on the evening of 2 May but asked to remain at the disposal of the Grossadmiral in case he should need them. Dönitz was initially undecided whether a formal government was advisable or even necessary. He had no illusions as to its likely term of office and sphere of influence. He did not believe that any of the victor states, and certainly not all four together, would allow a government which had come forth either directly or indirectly from the Nazi regime to remain in office. As full power was bound to pass into the hands of the enemy in the as yet unoccupied parts of Germany within the next few days, his own task as he saw it was simply to help bring this about. He toyed with the idea of having no Cabinet at all, and proceeding with a Foreign Minister alone, but it soon became clear that the other Cabinet portfolios should be filled. The grounds for this were both idealistic and practical in nature:
1. It seemed advisable to replace the Government stipulated in the Testament by Hitler and advised to us in extracts (see signal 1446 hrs on 1 May 1945, Appendix 5) before the publication of the Testament, lest Goebbels or Bormann should suddenly turn up and sow confusion.
2. We wanted to document the Government structure, our claim to sovereignty and the unity of the Reich. This would be considered as the legal representation of the German Reich until such time as this provided the opportunity for the new order. Under no circumstances did we want to give the enemy the chance to act contrary to international law in these questions by our neglect or voluntary rejection of the role.
3. A practical idea became the guideline of all our Cabinet work: to do whatever possible to facilitate the change from war to peace and handle the expected crisis by the best use of our labour force within the framework of what the enemy would allow.
It did not matter who took the necessary measures to ameliorate the suffering of the refugees, to ease the housing shortage, improve the transport situation, stimulate the economy and above all prevent famine, only that these measures should be taken as quickly and efficiendy as possible. If necessary the attempt would have to be made to offer the Allies all plans, ideas, proposals and estimates of the labour force in order to obtain the best outcome for the German people. The emergency was on such a scale that personal feelings, such as giving up in despair and not being prepared to take any more abuse from the enemy, had to be suppressed for the greater good. Collaboration was therefore not to be declined even if we were prisoners. The ‘technical expert’ Ministers who had the best understanding of matters in their own portfolios must not be allowed to stand idly by.
Following a number of conferences on 3 and 4 May, principally involving Schwerin and Speer, on the 5th a purely specialist Cabinet was formed and given the title ‘Caretaker Reich-Government’. In order to emphasise its provisional character, an official form of Government and the appointment of full-blown ministers was avoided. The Cabinet had been composed bearing in mind the principles set out here earlier and with people available in the North, thus:
Head of Cabinet with portfolio of Caretaker Reich Foreign Minister and Reich Foreign Minister |
Graf Schwerin von Krosigk | |
Chargé d’affaires, Reich Interior and Culture Ministry |
Dr Stuckart | |
Caretaker Reich Economy and Production Ministry |
Speer | |
Caretaker Reich Minister for Food, Farming and Forestry |
Backe | |
Caretaker Reich Labour and Social Security Ministry |
Dr Seldte | |
Caretaker Reich Minister for Transport and Posts |
Dr Dorpmüller |
Montgomery and Eisenhower were informed of this plan. The Party bosses discharged from the Government and still in the North were von Ribbentrop, Himmler, Rosenberg and the former Reich Health Minister Dr Conti. I will deal with the case of Himmler in Chapter 12. Dönitz requested Rosenberg and Dr Conti to make themselves available voluntarily to the occupying power or at least let it be known where they could be contacted. Both complied. Rosenberg had a severe sprain suffered during a drinking bout and was in the makeshift military hospital at the Flensburg-Mürwik naval college. Two days later, in a sensationalist piece of theatre, the hospital was surrounded by tanks and infantry, searched and then British troops emerged bearing the injured Rosenberg in triumph, the Nazi philosopher having ‘hidden himself away there feigning injury’.
On 7 May Dönitz decided to rid himself of the former Reich Justice Minister Dr Thierach. The business of this Ministry, on which special importance was being placed in view of the reports about excesses in the concentration camps (see Chapter 12), was taken over by Secretary of State Herbert Klemm. Work in the individual portfolios was now begun according to the guidelines for the Caretaker Reich Government set out by Dönitz and Schwerin.1
As no national activity could take place without Allied help, the Government was limited to gathering materials, preparing reports about local situations and working out concrete plans. The results partially justified the hopes. Speer and Dorpmuller considered that it would take only six weeks to restore communications and transport to normal working. When one thinks of the communications difficulties which had been overcome almost to the end of the war despite endless air attacks, the lack of personnel, machinery and fuel: when one considers further that the surrender released innumerable technicians, vehicles of all kinds, fuel and above all specialist troops such as pioneer units, highway construction battalions and Organisation Todt units which could have been useful here, we see that the proposed deadline could have been met had the personnel and equipment not been left to rot in dumps and prison camps. The postal system would be restored in a much shorter time.
In the food sector Minister Backs and Secretary of State Riecke provided an exact picture of the situation and the future estimates to ensure equal distribution across the various zones of occupation, and identify which other measures needed to be taken to avoid catastrophe. When the Allied Control Commission and OKW met, these plans and forecasts were handed over and were apparently read with great interest. Following reports and conferences on the submissions, consent was given to continue with and update the reports.
In two cases this kind of influential reporting had an unexpected outcome. On 15 May Reich Minister Backe, and a few days later Reich Minister Dr Dorpmuller, were being flown to Allied HQ in the belief that there were to be specialist consultations. We were hopeful that they could be of use to the people in the work of rebuilding. I still see Dr Dorpmuller, old and grey, in my mind’s eye as he – although very sick – took his leave of Dönitz bristling with enthusiasm. We never heard from either again, however. Much later, in captivity, we learned that they had both been arrested as soon as they touched down and placed in a prison camp. Dr Dorpmüller did not survive this change in circumstances and died in captivity. Backe, charged as a war criminal, took his own life in prison in 1949. We heard nothing more of their proposals nor of those from the other portfolio holders.
What is certain is that decisive measures for the healing of Germany and the relief of suffering in the various regions were not begun until very much later and then with little urgency. It is also certain that if the immediate postwar problems in Germany had been addressed much sooner, we would have been spared great suffering and the taxpayers and charitable organisations in the West much expense.