Flying into Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, airplane pilots must navigate a mountain range that surrounds the city, which lies 1,800 meters above sea level. In winter the mountains are covered in snow, creating a stunning panorama on sunny days. From the window of the plane one can see how the houses spread upward on the slopes of the mountains. Many of the smaller huts and houses have the same sandlike color and blend seamlessly with the terrain. The streets are narrow and bumpy, and from above, the traffic seems to be flowing slowly. Although Kabul might look like a large village from far away, it is actually a buzzing urban space. An estimated 4.2 million people live in Kabul Province (OCHA 2014), which is divided into 22 urban municipalities and 14 rural administrative districts (Pajhwok Afghan News 2014). In all of the predominantly rural Afghanistan, Kabul Province has the largest proportion of urban population (Belay 2010, 47).
Afghanistan’s political and geographical landscape has been shaped by the war on terror, during which the Afghan state and foreign forces have tried to fight a growing insurgency. Even though most of the fighting happens in rural parts of the country, the war can be felt in Kabul; security is omnipresent. The pairs of helicopters that fly over my house several times per day at low altitude interrupt every conversation and make the windows shake. The green Afghan National Police’s (ANP) pickup trucks are everywhere; a “ring of steel” of checkpoints surrounds the inner city center; and many roads are sealed off by the police and can be accessed only with a special license. With these and other security measures, the Afghan state responds to threats such as the growing number of insurgency attacks and criminal activities. However, despite all these and many other security practices, many people in Kabul City feel insecure.
Just a stone’s throw from looming checkpoints and barriers, people’s experience is different. From the city center it is only a short car ride to the more rural administrative district of Farza in the northern part of Kabul Province. After passing the last security belt of checkpoints, one observes fewer and fewer security measures. Far fewer police and army vehicles can be seen. Farza was comparatively secure in previous years, but the influence of insurgents and criminals is on the rise. Still, people in this part of Kabul Province are much more confident about their security.
In this chapter I explore the reasons that people’s perceptions of security between certain rural and urban parts of Kabul Province differ so much. The chapter is based on field research in Afghanistan that I undertook from May 2014 to December 2015. I describe and compare people’s experiences in two zones of (in)security in Kabul Province: Kabul City and the more rural district of Farza. On the basis of this comparison, I develop ideas about the mechanisms linking security practices with perceptions of (in)security. I argue that inclusive security practices can help to enhance the level of perceived security and legitimacy of the state, whereas exclusive security practices and segregation contribute to increased perceptions of insecurity for most residents and delegitimize the state.
In Kabul City, the Afghan state is geographically close to the people and highly visible. It features a large number of symbolic buildings associated with the state, such as ministries and headquarters for security forces. This setting provides numerous attractive targets for frequent insurgency attacks similar to those in Baghdad. In response to this threat, the state protects itself with walls, and security forces, separating it from most of the people and segregating the city. People who are associated with the state and/or can afford to do so hide behind blast walls and armed guards, shifting the risk to less influential and poorer people.
The majority of people, who cannot afford a high level of protection, have become the main victims of insecurity. If a bomb goes off in front of a barrier, it tends to kill and injure the people on the street rather than those behind the wall. For instance, in January 2018, a bomb hidden in an ambulance detonated at a police checkpoint on a shopping street known as Chicken Street, close to the Ministry of Interior in Kabul, killing more than 100 and injuring more than 200, most of them civilians. Thus being close to potential targets such as state buildings, government officials, or security forces makes people less secure.
Because of the focus on protection, the police lack the resources to deal with the growing number of kidnappings and other criminal activities that affect residents on a daily basis. In addition, many police officers and other state officials rely on bribes to supplement their low salaries. As a consequence, people perceive the state as ineffectual—or even detrimental—to their security. In the vicious cycle of increasing security measures in response to attacks without providing security for most of the people, the state is increasingly delegitimized.
Conversely, in the rural district of Kabul Province, Farza, people feel secure despite the small number of security forces. Here the threat of insurgent attacks is lower due to a lack of attractive targets. However, also the response to threats in Farza is different from that in Kabul City, making it more difficult for insurgents to gain a foothold and less likely for threats to be carried out. Residents cooperate with the police, helping one another to fight crime and provide security. In this way both residents and security forces are more secure, allowing the state to gain its legitimacy.
This chapter investigates and explains this divergence in how threats are addressed in Kabul City versus Farza. I describe the specific threats, the application of security practices, and the resulting perception of (in)security.1
Zone of Insecurity: Kabul City
Geography of (In-)Security
The last official master plan for Kabul City dates from 1978; it concerned how to accommodate a growing population of up to two million in an area of 32,000 hectares (Konishi 2011, 16–17). Today about 3.6 (OCHA 2014) to 4.5 million (Konishi 2011, 20–21) people live in the 22 municipality districts that form Kabul City in an area that spreads over 102,270 hectares (Konishi 2011, :20–21). Almost 80 percent of these areas have remained informal settlements (Konishi 2011, 18). Kabul is still one of the fastest-growing cities in the world (Rasmussen 2014; Setchell and Luther 2009). A car ride without at least one major traffic jam is surprising and usually occurs only on Fridays and at night. Almost everyone seems to own a car, and the city is packed with Toyota Corollas.
Despite the growing population, airy public spaces exist in Kabul City. There are a number of parks where people go for walks or picnics, as well as the zoo—built during the earlier kings’ modernization drive—which has survived decades of violence. But the more public the spaces, the more they tend to be dominated by men. It is clearly men who define life on the streets. In the vacant spaces between houses one can often find groups of boys or men playing football, volleyball, or cricket. When walking through Shahr-e Naw Park in the city center, one rarely sees women. However, in more restrictive spaces, such as the zoo and Bagh-e Babur garden, where people have to pay an entrance fee, women and families are more commonly seen. Farther from the main paths in Bagh-e Babur garden, one can even see teenage couples sitting together behind bushes. Indeed, their presence is an indication of subtle changes affecting public spaces in the city, alongside an emerging street art scene. For instance, enormous painted eyes appeared on a blast wall outside the presidential palace, a political message against corruption.
Security practices and measures are the main defining feature of Kabul City today. Security shapes not only the appearance of the urban space but also daily life within the city. For instance, public places have been turned into securitized spaces that only certain people can enter. Leaving the airport and entering the buzzing city, one is immediately exposed to security measures. Armed police officers guard the gate of the airport, frequently checking all vehicles and people entering the area. When driving by car to Kabul from one of the neighboring provinces, one must pass the security belt of checkpoints that surrounds the city. Police officers pull over some of the cars to check both vehicles and passengers.
There is a further ring of steel of smaller checkpoints around the city center. The city is permeated with blast-resistant walls and HESCO bastions, containers filled with soil or sand, often blocking parts of the street (figure 2.1.). In some cases, entire streets—for instance, those with important government agencies such as the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Foreign Affairs—are sealed off and can be entered only with an approved numbered license plate or pass. The green Ford Ranger police pickup trucks can be seen at every corner, and the sand-colored vehicles of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are common. Convoys of armored cars transporting wealthy or important people and their accompanying armed guards on pickup trucks often cause blockages as they try to make their way through the slow-moving traffic faster than drivers who are perceived as less important.
Figure 2.1 Street in Kabul, November 2016.
Source: Photograph by author.
But, as in the case of Bamako discussed elsewhere in this book, the international interveners have also helped shape the geography of the city. Walls, armored cars, and armed security contractors separate the people of Kabul from the employees of the various civilian international organizations (Andersson and Weigand 2015; Weigand and Andersson 2019). The headquarters for the international military mission, NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, which replaced the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2015, still occupies a large part of the quarter called Shash Darak. The visibility of the foreign military forces, however, has decreased year after year, and the massive MRAPs (mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles), which replaced Humvees, are spotted on the streets of Kabul less often. Most of the transport of foreign military forces now happens by air. U.S. helicopters commute between Bagram Air Base in the north of Kabul and the headquarters of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, as well as between the airport and the United States, which causes constant noise and window rattling in the city center.
Threats and Sources of Insecurity
During the time of my research in 2014–15, attacks were frequent. The number of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, targeting mainly members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), reached a new peak. There was also an increase in criminal incidents such as armed robberies and kidnappings of Afghan businessmen and foreigners. This trend was reflected in the interviews I conducted. The main concern raised by residents of Kabul City was the growing insecurity caused by both insurgents and criminals. My interviewees not only blamed the sources of insecurity (insurgents and criminals), but they were also dissatisfied with the authorities’ response. Most people in Kabul City view the Afghan government and security forces as responsible for their security. Although these forces are highly visible in Kabul, my interviewees did not feel protected by them. From their perspective, the security forces not only failed to provide security but, being corrupt and predatory, were often even a source of insecurity. Their objective was protecting the state, prioritizing state security over the security of citizens.
News of attacks such as explosions spread quickly in Kabul. Within seconds, the incident is reported on social media, triggering discussions regarding the target and exact location. Although most people depend on TV and radio reports, word of mouth also plays a central role. After hearing the sounds of an explosion, before returning quickly to business, many people call and check on friends or relatives who might have been affected. Without exception, all the people I interviewed in the city center voiced security concerns; most of them emphasized that insecurity was the most pressing issue they were facing. All interviewees in Kabul City also agreed that they felt increasingly insecure. For instance, one interviewee explained: “Before 2001 our security was reinforced, but we had severe economic problems. After 2001 the government solved the unemployment to a large extent. But over the past four years, the security situation has become worse, and in addition the unemployment is becoming a problem again.”
The perceived main sources of the growing insecurity were attacks and crime. In interviews people mainly blamed insurgents for the deteriorating security situation. They perceived insurgent groups as the masterminds of the IED attacks, suicide bombings, and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) shelling, which killed foreigners, officials, and a large number of civilians. Many people expressed thoughts similar to those of Farhad,2 who works as a security guard: “The Taliban and other insurgency groups are the main source of insecurity here.” However, the interviewees did not think that these groups were isolated actors. It is a common perception that neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), support the insurgents.
Like student Adeeb, most interviewees thought that “Pakistan has always been our enemy.” But the interviewees in Kabul City clearly distinguished the Pakistani people from the government. Although many interviewees expressed their sympathy for the people—for instance, because of the hospitality they experienced while in Pakistan as refugees during the civil war—they voiced their frustration over the perceived Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, seeing it as the root of all insecurity. For example, many interview subjects thought that the Taliban were a Pakistani group used to destabilize Afghanistan.
In addition to the insecurity caused by insurgency groups, the people were also afraid of crime. Many interviewees reported that the number of robberies and kidnappings in their neighborhood was growing steadily. They were particularly worried about the increasing number of kidnappings in the center of Kabul that were targeting people regardless of their political orientation, motivated only by the hope for ransom money.
As a consequence of the growing insecurity, coupled with economic stagnation, many interviewees looked back at past regimes with positive feelings. The achievements of former President Hamid Karzai were frequently emphasized. Hameed, a shopkeeper, explained: “We liked the Karzai regime because there were rules and regulations.” But others had reference points further back in history. For instance, security guard Farhad praised the achievements of the last Communist president (1987–1992), claiming that “the only person who has ever provided security for us was Dr. Najibullah.”
Security Practices and Perceptions
The people I interviewed in Kabul City were extremely disappointed by the failure of the government and the ANSF to provide security. They clearly distinguished between the behavior of different actors. The ANA is generally considered to act in the interest of the country and the people. University student Adeeb said: “I think just the ANA should be providing security in the future, because they have been working well so far.” This positive perception can be explained by the limited interaction between the people and the army in Kabul. Even though the army is visible throughout the city, it does not intervene in citizens’ daily lives. For example, soldiers usually do not check people or cars. Adeeb considered the main responsibility of the army to be defending Afghanistan against potential enemies such as Pakistan. Others also believed that the army is fulfilling this role well.
Compared with perceptions about the ANA, those of the Afghan National Police (ANP) are different in Kabul City. Many people explained that they consider the police to be the main force responsible for ensuring their security. Some were indeed grateful for the presence of the ANP, believing that those forces help to mitigate the risks of crime and attacks. One interviewee was pleased that the “police patrol in the city, especially at night.” However, most people thought that the police are failing to achieve their primary mission of ensuring security.
Many interviewees reported that they were afraid of encountering police officers. People often felt they were treated as potential threats or as an additional source of income for the officers. A police general shared the perception of the citizens of Kabul in an interview: “Seventy percent of the police officers do what they want. They neither follow orders nor do they respond to the needs of people. They arrest whom they want and release them once enough money has been paid.” He saw the recruitment of criminals and limited training as the core of the problem, complaining that almost all officers had a criminal record and were trained poorly to serve as low-paid fighters rather than effective police officers: “When people were recruited for the police, in the past they were trained for six months. The training was only about code of conduct, not fighting at all…. The Americans and British train the officers for two weeks and then call them ‘experts of the battlefield.’” This illustrates the prevailing focus of creating a police force that can fight to protect the Afghan state but is incapable of protecting and supporting its citizens, as they are not actually trained in policing.3 Hence residents often do not see the police as a stabilizing force but, instead, complain that they are a source of insecurity. “If you see a police officer on the street, you want to go another way,” an interviewee in Kabul—ironically, a prosecutor—told me.
Another set of actors who play a role in the provision of (in)security are foreign military forces. The perception of these forces varies widely; Karlborg (2015, 16), in her study on the perceived legitimacy of the international forces in Kabul, concluded: “In certain respects, the ISAF presence is evaluated through a liberation frame, while in others, it is evaluated through an occupation frame.” Many people think that the international military is crucial for the survival of the Afghan state. For instance, one interviewee stated that “the international forces shouldn’t be leaving the country but should stay to support the people and the government.” Similarly, student Temur explained: “The international forces brought a lot of change and improvement to our country…. They play a big role in providing security.” Nevertheless, there also are more critical voices in Kabul, often criticizing the behavior of the international military forces. The police general explained his rejection of the international military forces, saying that “any member of ISAF can search any house and kill anybody. They can do what they want.”
Finally, the Taliban was also perceived by interviewees in Kabul City as playing a role as a security provider—despite the dominant perception of insurgents as the main source of insecurity. Some interviewees grew up in other parts of the country or commute between their home province and Kabul to work or study. Often these provinces are fully or partly under the control of Taliban groups, enabling the interviewees to compare different authorities in light of their own experience. Although some who are working for the government or international organizations are too frightened to return to their home cities and prefer remaining in Kabul, those who are not directly affiliated with one of the authorities in the city in some cases prefer the authority of the Taliban. An interviewee from Wardak Province who studies in Kabul told me: “We don’t like the Afghan security forces … such as the ANP because they aren’t able to provide security for us. I think the Taliban are better than the ANP for us.” Another student from Wardak explained further: “We don’t like the Afghan security forces because they often treat people badly and sometimes bother innocent people.” His vision therefore was that “just the Taliban should be providing security in the future.”
Kabul City can be characterized as a zone of high-profile security measures but perceived insecurity. This urban insecurity is driven both by attacks on the large number of targets with a symbolic value that represent the state or the foreign forces, and the increasing number of criminal activities. The interviewees were generally disappointed by the way in which security forces were dealing with these threats. Even though security practices are highly visible in Kabul City, they have failed to contribute positively to residents’ perceived security. Ironically, being close to the Afghan security forces or the foreign military forces often can increase the risk of becoming a collateral casualty of an insurgent attack. Further, people often consider the security forces themselves to be a source of insecurity. Although the army is still widely accepted, possibly also because of its limited scope for causing insecurity, the police often are seen as a threat. In many cases, the remaining support for the ANSF does not seem to be based on trust in the forces or ideology but simply a lack of alternatives. Shopkeeper Edris summarized his frustration: “Security belongs to the nation, not to the government.” In the Afghan capital, however, the state is busy protecting itself and failing to provide security for its citizenry.
Zone of Security: Farza District
Geography of (In-)Security
Driving out of Kabul City to the north of the province, one sees rapid changes in the geography. Traffic on the main road that goes all the way to the provinces of Balkh and Kunduz remains hectic, but the number of houses decreases the farther one drives. More and more often, large gardens can be spotted behind mud walls. In addition to the people in the urban areas of Kabul City, a rural population of around 700,000 in the wider province (OCHA 2014) live in the 14 administrative districts that surround Kabul City.
Turning left off the main road after driving about half an hour, one enters the small road to Farza District. Farza is one of the more rural districts of Kabul Province. With a population of around 21,500 people in 18 villages, Farza District is also one of the smallest in Kabul Province (OCHA 2014; Pajhwok Afghan News 2014). The road connecting Farza with the main road is narrow but in good shape. There are only a few cars on the road and green gardens spread out next to small houses across the flat land on both sides of the road. Even though the drive from the city center to Farza is short, it feels like one has entered a different world.
Farza is situated in the northwest of the Shomali plain at the foot of the Hindu Kush, an area once known as Kabul’s garden. It had been a lush, fertile area and a popular destination for weekend picnics for people from Kabul. But heavy fighting and the Taliban’s scorched-earth policy turned the area into an uninhabitable desert (Schetter 2005, 15; Snow et al. 2009, 8; Isby 2010). Throughout the late 1990s, the people of Farza were living on the frontline between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, as the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud were based close by in the Panjshir Valley (Snow, Dennys, and Zaman 2009, 8). The Taliban’s summer 1999 offensive leveled Farza. According to Snow et al (2009 8), the military operation “was marked by summary executions, the abduction and disappearance of women, the burning of homes, and the destruction of other property and agricultural assets, including the cutting down of fruit trees.” Many people were deported, and much of the remaining population fled to Panjshir, Kabul, or neighboring countries (Snow et al. 2009, 8). Only after the U.S.-led invasion in 2001 did people start to return and recultivate the land (Meek 2001). Today many fruit trees are flourishing again, and life has slowly returned to the villages of Farza.
Life in Farza appears to be somewhat peaceful nowadays. In contrast to Kabul City, security forces are not highly visible here. One rarely sees police or army officers on the streets of Farza, nor are there many armed people to be seen in general. I encountered police officers only on my first trip to the district. Driving down the small road toward the district center, I was stopped at a small checkpoint. The officers were surprised to see a foreigner and invited me in for tea. I declined and continued my journey to the district center, where I met another police officer, who invited me for lunch. Not wearing a police uniform but plain clothes, he took me to his house in his old and dented green police pickup truck and asked how he could help me with my research.
Threats and Sources of Insecurity
Spending time in Farza in 2014 and 2015, I felt secure and never at risk when walking around in the district. Most of the people I interviewed in Farza had experienced a high level of insecurity during the Taliban time and had been forced to move to Panjshir or Pakistan. They had only returned after 2001. Today they are generally happy with the security situation in the district, instead demanding improvements to other services, such as health care. People reported an increasing number of criminal and insurgency activities in the provinces but thought that the growing danger was targeted successfully despite a smaller number of security forces in the district. The interviewees explained that they manage to achieve security through close cooperation with and coordination between security forces and the people living in the district. The members of the elected community shuras (councils) and the police meet on a regular basis. So just a short drive from the center of Kabul City, people trust, support, and are satisfied with the work of the police.
The most essential needs that Farza’s residents raised in the interviews were basic services such as electricity and better health care. But although most people were not entirely happy with the status quo, many interviewees acknowledged that things were moving in the right direction. For example, a shopkeeper from Qala-e-Karim village pointed out: “Our most essential need is electricity and asphalted roads. Before we had a lack of drinkable water. But this problem has already been solved.” Not a single interviewee in Farza mentioned security as a major concern. This perception stands in stark contrast to their earlier experiences. Mahmood recalled: “During the time of the Taliban, it was very insecure. Our gardens were burned down, our houses were robbed, and the fruits in our gardens were stolen.” Similarly, Abdul from Hassan Khail village said: “During the Taliban regime, people were dishonored, houses were robbed, gardens were burned down, and the values of humanity were called into question. Now, fortunately, things have changed for the better. People’s rights are observed, their property is secure, and they live in a peaceful environment.”
All the people I talked to confirmed this view of Farza as being very secure. Many interviewees expressed thoughts similar to Mahmood’s: “In Farza District, insecurity does not exist at all. While some people might still be armed, they hide their weapons.” The comparatively good security situation in Farza almost certainly can be explained in part by the different kinds of threats in the districts, as many insurgent attacks in Kabul Province now appear to be targeting sites with high symbolic importance, such as highly secured ministries, hotels, or military convoys. Hence Farza as a rural district with no prominent institutions is a far less attractive target for insurgents than Kabul City. Similarly, there are more incentives for insurgents and criminals in Kabul City, where many of the wealthy Afghans and foreigners live.
Nevertheless, most of the fighting in Afghanistan takes place in rural areas. The Taliban is successfully expanding its control in many parts of the country. Increasing insurgency, therefore, is also a potential threat for districts such as Farza, although of a different kind compared with the attacks conducted in Kabul. Indeed, my interviewees reported a growing number of criminal and insurgency activities in the district from mid-2015 onward; no security incidents were reported to me in the year before. Some interviewees pointed out, though, that petty crime continued to occur at a low level. For instance, Zabi complained: “Here are some drug addicts who cause insecurity.” However, interviewees also reported more serious threats. For instance, an interviewee from Hassan Khail village said in summer 2015: “One of my relatives here is a businessman. Some days ago he received a letter saying ‘If you don’t give us 50,000 USD we will kidnap your son or another member of your family.’” An interviewee from Fainda village also reported a potential threat: “One day I was at the local school and saw a person with explosive material. I called the police and they arrested him.” But despite the growing danger, the interviewees from Farza were satisfied with the current security situation.
Security Practices and Perceptions
Several reasons explain why people continue to feel secure in Farza despite the growing threats. Some people I talked to outlined the relevance of history. They emphasized their longing for peace after experiencing so much violence and destruction. One interviewee argued: “Three decades of war and the extremist Taliban regime made people hate violence. Therefore, people prefer not to start or get involved in conflicts.” This is unusual, as in many cases the war destroyed the sense of community and traditions of providing security in Afghanistan.
Aside from how the sense of community evolved in Farza, all interviewees agreed that the key to success was a more cooperative way of providing security, which works despite or because of the small number of security forces. According to the interviewees, the number of police officers for the entire district is only around 50. They are trained the same way that all other police officers are trained, including those in Kabul City. But the people with whom I talked pointed out that the small number was sufficient to provide security because residents were coordinating closely with the security forces. This indicates that police officers’ training is not the only factor; rather, the overall culture of security provision at a certain duty station also matters. One of the community authorities explained: “Security reinforcement is designed in a way that involves all community members…. Security is the result of close cooperation between the people and police, while neither of the parties would be able to achieve security alone.”
Almost all the other interviewees explained this success in a similar way. For example, the principal of a local school said that “security is provided by both people and police,” and another interviewee said: “Security is provided by the people in close coordination with the security forces…. As there are only 50 police officers, they couldn’t ensure security without the support of the people.” The head of the development council further outlined what collaboration between the people and the police looks like: “We patrol the main road ourselves. If we see suspicious individuals or groups, we chase them, report them, and, if we realize that they might escape before the police arrive, arrest them ourselves.” In addition, people in Farza viewed the composition of the police as a success factor, in that it combines local expertise with external neutrality. Mahmood explained to me: “The ANP consists of residents from this area as well as some outsiders. Having people from this area in the police force helps to assist the police to find the right targets.”
Citizens’ perception of the security forces in Farza is also different compared with that in Kabul City. All interviewees in Farza expressed their satisfaction with all security forces, including the police, despite the small number of officers. For instance, a shopkeeper in the district center said: “We like all security forces in the area, and I always supported them.” An interviewee from Qala-e-Karim village confirmed: “We are convinced by all security forces because they are the main source of security.” Whereas interviewees in Kabul City distinguished carefully between the different actors in the security sector, most of the people I interviewed in Farza were happy with all of them, while some expressed a preference for the ANA over the ANP. Only the international forces are perceived mainly negatively. For example, an interviewee from Hassankhell village told me: “I don’t like any international forces because they haven’t achieved anything substantive for our country in the past 15 years.” Others, like Shafiq, were indifferent: “If the international forces are present or not, it does not make a difference to our lives.”
Policing in Farza appears to be similar to what the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a U.S.-sponsored village-level defense force, was supposed to achieve; however, it failed to do so in many cases, as the program often was co-opted by local power dynamics (Vincent, Weigand, and Hakimi 2015). Conversely, in Farza, policing appears to be driven by a collective interest in security rather than only the authorities’ objectives. The people in Farza trust and feel respected by the police, and the officers appear to be interested in providing human security—that is, security for the people in the district that is also officers’ home. This close cooperation between security forces and residents is driven in part by the shared history of violence under the Taliban and the small size of the district, resulting in community oversight, mutual dependencies, trust, and willingness to cooperate. That the police are partly sourced locally is likely to contribute positively to this relationship, as is the contingent of more neutral officers from other parts of the country. Forces from the outside, such as the foreign military, however, are perceived more as a threat than a source of security.
These conclusions on Farza need to be researched and developed further, also considering the changes that may have occurred in the district since 2015. My impression was that most people I talked to were happy to have the chance to state their opinion, but it is difficult to say to what extent they always felt secure and confident enough to share with me their honest views. The conclusion that emerged from the interviews I conducted is that the feeling of being included or considered in security practices helps to construct a perception of security and state legitimacy. But that does not mean that everyone in Farza is equally happy. I might have talked only to more or less influential people in Farza, who are content with the kind and degree of coordination, and it is possible I did not have sufficient access to marginalized people who would dare to speak up. For example, my access to female interviewees in rural Farza was more limited than in Kabul City. Further research is necessary to gain a deeper understanding—for instance, by looking at other zones of security and insecurity in the country more broadly, and paying more attention to the perspective of women.
Conclusion
People in Kabul Province have lived through times of conflict, destruction, and insecurity continuously over the past few centuries. Today insecurity again affects and alters daily life in the province. But comparing Kabul City with Farza District illustrates that the degree of (in)security people experience differs greatly between the urban center and the rural outskirts of the province. The interviews I conducted indicate that not only the kinds of threats but also the security practices and objectives contribute to the differences in perceived (in)security.
On the one hand, negative self-reinforcing dynamics are in place in Kabul City. Here the security forces are numerous and highly visible, but most people do not consider them to be helpful. Although the army is respected far more than its forces are encountered, the opposite appears to be the case for the police. People come across police officers at every corner but often feel less rather than more secure in their presence, as the officers are seen as predatory and corrupt. Some interviewees think that police officers are not trained to do so-called real policing, such as investigating crime, but are little more than poorly trained soldiers.
The relevance of international forces is decreasing and perceived differently. Some believe that they are essential for stability, but others see them as destructive occupying forces. Even though the various potential security providers and other authorities have different and competing objectives, they create a perception of the state as a network of national and international actors that defends itself but has no capacity for or interest in providing security for its citizens. Consequently, many people feel alienated from the state and see a large gap between the state and themselves. Still, most hope that the state will provide security, often because of a lack of alternatives. This perception also indicates that the insurgents’ strategy is successful. By keeping the state busy with attacks, it is neglecting its citizens, resulting in decreasing trust in the security forces and, ultimately, in a reduced legitimacy of the state.
On the other hand, more positive self-reinforcing dynamics are in place in Farza District. Here, compared with residents of Kabul City, people are happy with the work of the Afghan security forces. Their satisfaction appears to be based on a perception of an inclusive security practice that rests on strong cooperation between residents and the security forces. The officers and the people trust one another, cooperate, and try to enforce human security for all. Taking the history of the district into consideration, this is surprising, as war tends to destroy traditions and community relationships. However, people in Farza once again have developed a strong sense of community and see their history as an incentive to provide security more successfully in the future. However, although authorities from Farza are perceived positively, the external foreign forces are viewed with a far greater degree of mistrust. In Farza the state and the people are part of the same community and jointly take care of their security.
The success in Farza rests not only on the willingness of the state authorities to cooperate with the people but also on the ability of the people to organize themselves and cooperate with state authorities. This is much easier to achieve in a rural setting, where the community is small and defined and includes state authorities as integrated members, and in which the threat is perceived to be external. In contrast to “urban capabilities” (Sassen 2012) in cities, this ability of rural communities perhaps can be termed rural capabilities. Rather than being an essential characteristic of Afghan culture, this term simply points to the broader civic potential of small-scale communities in the face of conflict.
However, the foregoing comment does not mean that we can conclude that rural security provision or community policing is necessarily better for people. The case of the Afghan Local Police illustrates the unpredictability of what can happen if policy blueprints are inserted onto a dynamic rural landscape on the assumption that the so-called pristine locale is more efficient or legitimate. The sense of community in Afghan villages often was destroyed by war and displacement or became fragile with ongoing conflicts over land rights. Further, the “enclavization” of any community—whether rural or urban—might have negative side effects, as the case of Karachi illustrates in this volume.
By and large, in Farza the local dynamics appear to have been beneficial. The case illustrates that cooperation between the state and the people in the interests of achieving security for all depends on developing a sense of community and an inclusive and participatory strategy, and on having authorities with a genuine interest in achieving human security rather than extracting protection money. As in Farza, an inclusive and human-centric security strategy might help to establish a virtuous cycle of state legitimacy and improved security. Achieving the same undoubtedly is much more difficult in a large urban area such as Kabul City, which, in addition, is the capital and therefore a symbolically attractive target for insurgent attacks. Trapped in a vicious cycle, the state in Kabul City protects itself through distance from its citizenry, not only failing to provide security but also becoming a source of insecurity itself, which delegitimizes the state and might foster further instability and insecurity.
Notes
I would like to thank Mary Kaldor, Saskia Sassen, Ruben Andersson, Jörg Friedrichs, Abe Simons, the authors contributing to this volume, and other friends and colleagues for their critical comments and valuable suggestions. My sincere appreciation goes to the interviewees and to Maiwand Rahimi and Mirwais Wardak for making my research in Afghanistan possible. This work was supported by the UK Economic and Social Science Research Council (ESRC grant number ES/J500070/1).
1. The chapter reflects the situation and perceptions in Kabul during my research in 2014–15. Since the time this research was conducted, the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated further. In addition, progovernment forces have become increasingly responsible for civilian deaths in the country, exceeding the number of civilians killed by antigovernment elements in the first quarter of 2019; see UNAMA 2019.
2. The names of all interviewees were changed for their protection.
3. See also Weigand 2013.
Isby, D. 2010. Afghanistan—Graveyard of Empires. A New History of the Borderland. London: Pegasus.
Sassen, S. 2012. “Urban Capabilities: An Essay on Our Challenges and Differences.” Journal of International Affairs 65 (2).
Vincent, S., F. Weigand., and H. Hakimi. 2015. “The Afghan Local Police—Closing the Security Gap?” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 4 (1): article 45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gg.
Weigand, F. 2013. “Human vs. State Security: How Can Security Sector Reforms Contribute to State-Building? The Case of the Afghan Police Reform” (LSE International Development Working Paper Series 13-135). http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62690/1/WP135.pdf.
Weigand, F., and R. Andersson. 2019. “Institutionalized Intervention: The ‘Bunker Politics’ of International Aid in Afghanistan.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding (February 1). https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2019.1565814.
