Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964

In January 1959, Fidel Castro overthrew the Fulgencio Batista regime, and over the next two years the Cuban revolutionary government established strong ties with the Soviet Union. Alarmed at the potential spread of communism in the Americas, the United States became more responsive to an assistance program of positive action in Latin America.

On March 13, 1961, President John F. Kennedy proposed a new approach for U.S. assistance to Latin America: the Alliance for Progress. This program was to be a multilateral mobilization of the American nations’ efforts and resources against the vast social and economic inequities that beset them. For the United States it meant the re-orientation of its fragmented Latin American aid programs into a program of regional scope generously funded for democratic development.

The charter for the Alliance for Progress was signed at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961 by all the members of the Organization of American States (OAS) except Cuba. The charter established grand goals for the next decade: economic growth and diversification, a more equitable distribution of income, elimination of adult illiteracy by 1970, access to six years of primary education for all children, improved public health conditions, increased low-cost housing, and a strengthening of regional economic integration with the vision of a Latin American common market.⁴

As part of the plan, the signatories agreed to adhere to democratic principles and to establish national social and economic development programs based on the concept of self-help. They also agreed that the developing countries would be assisted with outside capital of at least $20 billion of mostly public money over a ten-year period and that the least-developed countries would be given priority in this assistance. The charter established guidelines for long-term economic development, for immediate and short-term action measures, and for external assistance from the United States in support of national development programs. Finally, it set up an organizational structure, including an expert review procedure for the national plans that all participating countries were to prepare.⁵

Success in Brazil, the largest and most populous nation in Latin America, was important to the success of the new program. Brazil was a constitutional democracy and a nation of spectacular potential, with abundant resources, developing industrial centers, and a growing middle class; but Brazil was also plagued by social and economic problems—staggering poverty, a largely disenfranchised agricultural sector, a chronic balance of payments problem, and a high rate of inflation. Brazil was fertile ground for the message of hope, whether from the left or from such programs as the Alliance for Progress. In Brazil, however, U.S. policy makers would be increasingly frustrated by fiscal inconsistencies in that government’s policies and by a president who seemed to encourage a redistribution of power and structural changes within that system that, it was believed, might result in a communist or socialist-oriented country less tied to the United States.

This book proposes to trace U.S. policy toward Brazil through the turbulent Goulart administration. I treat the role of the United States in Goulart’s overthrow in some detail, in order to provide a context for the considerations by U.S. policy makers that led the United States to support a coup in 1964 and to back generously the succeeding military dictatorships.

Vice-President João Belchior Marques Goulart, a wealthy land owner, cattle breeder, and lawyer from the state of Rio Grande do Sul, was 43 when Quadros resigned. “Jango,” as he was popularly known, had built a political base in labor as a protégé and controversial labor minister of Getulio Vargas (president of Brazil from 1934 to 1945 and 1950 to 1954). As minister, Goulart was active in reforming labor legislation, but he was accused of collaborating with communists, radical militants, and labor leaders.⁶ The military caused his ouster from the cabinet after Goulart attempted to alter the relation between the minimum wages of civilian laborers and army enlisted men in favor of the former.⁷

Although a member of the upper class, Goulart was a populist, in that he sought his support from the people rather than through the more traditional party structures. His lack of personal exposure to the problems of the working class, however, caused some to believe that Goulart simply exploited the growing labor sector for personal political gain.⁸ He remained in national politics after leaving Vargas’ administration and was elected vice-president under Juscelino Kubitschek in 1955 and again under Quadros in 1960. Former U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon has suggested that Jango’s gaucho background may explain a certain pride he took in physical strength and in displays of power and thus in his political style.⁹ He lacked talent, and some say interest, in managing the daily activities of government.¹⁰

The resignation of Jânio Quadros brought on a crisis over legal succession to the presidency. The three military ministers in the cabinet, General Odílio Denys, Brigadier Gabriel Grün Moss, and Admiral Silvio Heck vigorously moved to block Goulart’s return to Brazil as president. The Congress proposed an alternative to the exclusion of Goulart: the creation of a parliamentary system. Determined to prevent Goulart’s assumption of the presidency, the military ministers began organizing the armed forces and put controls on the media.¹¹ They issued a manifesto accusing Goulart of having dealt with “agents of international communism,” and charging that he might promote infiltration of the Brazilian armed forces, turning them into “simple Communist militias.”¹² The effectiveness of the military was weakened by a split between those who favored Goulart’s leftist leanings and those who desired to see the constitution legally upheld. To block Goulart’s assumption of power was clearly illegal and, as it turned out, impossible without the full support of the armed forces.¹³

A compromise was finally reached, and on September 2 the Congress passed an amendment called the Additional Act that established a modified parliamentary system. On September 7, 1961, João Goulart was sworn in as president of the United States of Brazil under this parliamentary system.

During this two-week presidential succession crisis in Brazil, Lincoln Gordon appeared before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee for confirmation as ambassador to Brazil. Gordon, a summa cum laude graduate of Harvard, had been a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, where he had earned a Ph.D. in economics. He had an impressive background both in and out of government. He had been a professor of government and administration at the Harvard School of Business and, as consultant to the State Department, had been a member of a task force that had helped create the Alliance for Progress.¹⁴

Gordon postponed assuming his new post until after the Brazilians had settled the presidential issue. On September 14, one week after Goulart became president, the State Department sent a briefing memorandum to President Kennedy describing what the U.S. position toward the new government in Brazil would be: “Pending the clarification of U.S. orientation, we propose to deal with the new government on the assumption that there has been no break in the continuity of the traditionally close and cordial relations between the United States and Brazil. As for President Goulart, we are prepared to give him the reasonable benefit of the doubt, while trying to encourage him to believe cooperation with the United States is to his and Brazil’s advantage.”¹⁵ The concern of the Brazilian military ministers over Goulart’s past political associations was shared by U.S. policy makers. That they specified a willingness to grant him a “reasonable benefit of the doubt” seems to suggest that from the beginning, Goulart’s motives were regarded with some suspicion. The briefing memorandum went on to say that the United States would honor previous commitments, but that any new assistance would be “based on an understanding that the government of Brazil would pursue its economic program under conditions of financial stabilization and would support and carry out the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.”¹⁶

Ambassador Gordon arrived in Brazil on October 3, 1961. His first request of Niles Bond, who had been chargé d’affaires in the interim, was that he explain the division of power between the president and the prime minister. Bond replied that no one really knew, but that it was reported that Jango had recently said that he “had no intention of being reduced to a ‘Queen Elizabeth,’” meaning he did not accept the notion of his presidential powers having been removed or limited by the Additional Act.¹⁷

Ambassador Gordon soon presented his credentials to Goulart and became personally acquainted with the president. His principal contacts in the government, however, were San Tiago Dantas, foreign minister, and Walter Moreira Salles, finance minister, and, to a much lesser extent, the prime minister, Tancredo Neves. Gordon’s first months were busy as he set about establishing the Alliance for Progress in Brazil. He and his staff worked with Goulart and his cabinet on matters of shared interest—debt rescheduling, aid programs, and Goulart’s proposed visit to the United States.¹⁸

Just before he resigned the presidency, Quadros had appointed Roberto de Oliveira Campos, a career diplomat and one of Brazil’s leading economists, as ambassador to the United States. With Quadros’ resignation, Campos had given up the idea of going to Washington, but his friends Dantas and Neves encouraged Goulart to retain him. Goulart did call Campos, and he told him that even though he differed with Campos politically and he considered Campos too conservative he wanted Campos’ services in Washington. Campos asked the president for instructions, but Goulart replied that he had not had time to think closely about foreign policy and referred Campos to Dantas for instructions.¹⁹

Campos arrived in Washington and presented his credentials to President John F. Kennedy in October of 1961. Kennedy questioned the new ambassador about the parliamentary system, wondering if it were viable and whether or not it would open the way for leftist infiltration and radical movements in the country. Campos related his beliefs that parliamentary systems work best when few parties are in the system (Brazil had twelve parties at the time) and that much depended on the vigor and effectiveness of the new cabinet.²⁰

On November 29, 1961, the Chamber of Deputies passed a remittance of profits bill that raised the question among the U.S. business community in Brazil of whether Brazil, which had traditionally welcomed foreign private investors, was becoming a hostile business environment. The U.S. business sector in Brazil argued that the $30 to $40 million being remitted to all (not just U.S.) foreign investors annually did not deserve the accusations that the investors were “suction pumps” and that they were “bleeding…the Brazilian economy.”²¹ The bill had a number of provisions that would inhibit foreign investment: Reinvested profits would be considered national capital and, therefore, not a part of the base for computing remittances.²² Annual remittances of profits out of Brazil would be limited to 10 percent of registered capital, with no provision covering the depreciation in the value of the Brazilian currency. Moreover, existing Brazilian businesses could not be bought out by foreign firms; foreign companies would not be able to borrow from Brazilian banks; and all Brazilian residents would be required to declare their holdings.²³ That bill did not become law, but the concept of limiting profit remittances became a topic of debate in both houses. The prospect of the passage of such measures dampened foreign investment in Brazil and was a point of deep concern to U.S. business interests and, hence, to U.S. diplomats.

It was in late 1961 or early 1962 that Ambassador Gordon met Admiral Heck, one of the three military ministers under Quadros who had opposed Goulart’s return to Brazil as president. The meeting was arranged, at the admiral’s request, by his niece who had known Gordon since 1946 when he had been a delegate and she an interpreter to a United Nations convention on atomic energy.²⁴

After an informal supper party, Admiral Heck and the ambassador talked. The conversation was in Portuguese, which Gordon understood but could not yet speak with facility. The admiral told Gordon that Goulart was a “dreadful character” and “communist” and that he was “up to no good,” and he warned that Goulart was only “pretending to act good now.” Heck informed the new ambassador that large numbers of civilians and military were organizing a golpe against Goulart, proudly attributing the greatest percentage of conspirators to the navy. Heck told Gordon that he was not requesting American help but that he had wanted the ambassador to be informed. He added, “One of these days we will act, and I hope when that happens, the United States will not be unsympathetic.” ²⁵

Gordon was surprised at what he heard. He managed a few words of appreciation to the admiral for sharing this story and assured Heck he would keep the conversation in mind. This approach was the first of many to Gordon and his staff.

When Gordon returned to the embassy, he cabled the State Department and informed his top staff about Admiral Heck’s story. The ambassador requested that the embassy CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) section expand their traditional intelligence gathering concerning the far left to find out what was going on in the country from all perspectives, and he asked specifically if they could check the validity of Admiral Heck’s story. In addition, Gordon asked the three U.S. military attachés if they had any information about a conspiracy against President Goulart.

The reports that came back to the ambassador suggested that Admiral Heck’s story was not true. U.S. intelligence sources indicated that while Goulart had been friendly with communists, the allegation that he was a communist and the story concerning a concerted effort to remove Goulart appeared to be false. The reports did say that, quite apart from his politics, there were some who believed Goulart to be incompetent, a conclusion which Gordon himself eventually reached. Meanwhile, the ambassador laid aside stories of conspiracy and turned to more pressing matters.²⁶

Following the pattern that Quadros had established, the Goulart administration attempted to pursue an “independent foreign policy,” which had been widely publicized and had gained some national popularity. This policy de-emphasized entangling alliances and included friendly overtures to Communist bloc nations as potential friends and trading partners with Brazil.²⁷

Ambassador Gordon realized that this line of policy under Goulart, as under Quadros, was in practice substantially friendlier to the United States than to the Communist bloc.²⁸ Some U.S. policy makers, however, were alarmed by a lack of tractability in Brazil’s policies. In a position paper regarding Brazil’s independent policy, written for Secretary of State Dean Rusk before an OAS meeting at Punta del Este in January 1962, Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard Goodwin wrote: “the political situation in Brazil is extremely precarious. We have no choice but to work to strengthen this government since there appears no viable alternative.”²⁹

The United States had hoped that the OAS would adopt mandatory sanctions against Cuba at that January meeting.³⁰ Deputy Goodwin and Ambassador Gordon, however, urged Secretary Rusk to take a more moderate line. Gordon suggested that Rusk instead seek to secure “effective moral isolation without mandatory sanctions.” His purpose was to avoid the possibility that the OAS might adopt a position in which Brazil would vote with the minority and in which the majority votes would represent the small, less-populated countries of Latin America. The ambassador feared that “this would place very heavy strain on an already weak government situation, and would probably stimulate a leftist campaign for the denunciation of the whole inter-American treaty structure.” Gordon believed that if the measure passed with Brazil in the dissenting minority, the Brazilian government “would be confronted with a dramatic and clear-cut conflict between their treaty obligations under the Rio Pact and the notion of an ‘independent’ foreign policy…a major theme of the new government.”³¹

Gordon’s advice showed an understanding on his part of the political situation in Brazil, as well as an awareness of the potential implications in Brazil of an exacting position by the United States. At the meeting, Brazil’s Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas and U.S. Secretary Dean Rusk argued the point of mandatory sanctions, and Dantas was openly critical of Rusk for the United States’ anti-Castro position. Following Brazil’s independent policy line, Dantas would not agree to expel Cuba from the OAS or to impose economic or diplomatic sanctions as such against Cuba.³²

Communist Cuba was a raw nerve for U.S. policy makers and Dantas could not convince Rusk to accept a position of “coexisting recognition” that would impose a statute of limitation with negative obligations for Cuba involving “refusal to enter into an armed pact with the Soviet group, discontinuation of the practice of demoralizations of governments in Latin America, subversive activities, and propaganda, etc.”³³ Several years later, when Roberto Campos reflected on the conflict between the United States and Brazil at that Punta del Este meeting, he said, “I found that Saxons are not as rational as they claim to be. In this particular instance of Cuba, they were extremely emotional and quite irrational.”³⁴

Goulart inherited an economy weakened in part by the very rapid growth (“Fifty-Years’ Progress in Five”) policies of the former president, Kubitschek. A U.S. embassy analysis of the Brazilian economy as of January 1961 stated, “The Bank of Brazil has practically no foreign exchange reserves and the Kubitschek Government has exhausted virtually every recourse ‘ethical’ and ‘unethical’ available to it for the purpose of covering the balance of payment deficit…so as to permit President Kubitschek to leave office on January 31 under apparently solvent circumstances.”³⁵

Quadros entered the presidency endorsing a balanced budget and a favorable climate for foreign investors. His anti-inflation program earned him the initial approval of international lending institutions and in May and June, he announced successful negotiations with foreign creditors.³⁶ Quadros began to alter his austerity program. By August when he resigned, his monetary authorities were already exceeding the domestic money-supply limitations required by his foreign creditors.³⁷ The stabilization effort begun by Quadros had completely collapsed by the end of 1961. A State Department study in March 1962 of Brazil’s financial situation noted that inflation in Rio during the last quarter of 1961 had increased more than 50 percent on an annual rate.³⁸

In December 1961 the United States released $40 million of a $338 million loan negotiated in May of that year, bringing the total amount released to Brazil to $209 million. The Brazilians were informed at that time that the remainder would be forthcoming only after the United States “was convinced that Brazil was carrying out a sound stabilization program.” Ambassador Gordon amplified the U.S. position, discussing with Brazilian financial officials areas of concern to the United States, including Brazil’s support of an unrealistic exchange rate (a policy which tended to strengthen import demand and discourage exports), excessive bank credits for the private sector, wage increases to government workers, and the need for taxes on other revenues to cover costs. Finance Minister Salles developed new stabilization plans that were approved by the cabinet on March 15, 1962.³⁹ Pending U.S. assistance and the forthcoming presidential visit by Goulart to the United States at Kennedy’s invitation appear to have influenced the content and timing of these plans.

Economics was never Goulart’s forte and, like most politicians, he found the austerity measures requisite to stabilization plans to be unpalatable. The president walked a tightrope, trying to appeal to foreign groups for financial support and to consolidate domestic support with the hopes of regaining full presidential powers. To reassure the more conservative element of Brazilian society, Goulart expounded on his anticommunist sentiments and his belief in the democratic process.

To some observers, however, his actions and affiliations indicated otherwise. John W. F. Dulles in his book Unrest in Brazil details some of Goulart’s activities with labor and peasant organizations that alarmed anticommunist elements in Brazil.⁴⁰ U.S. labor organizations and U.S. embassy officials noted with concern that Brazil’s labor leadership was “increasingly receptive to communism.”⁴¹

In March 1962, just before Goulart’s visit to the United States, a CIA memorandum sent to the White House reported that Raul Francisco Ryff, Goulart’s press secretary, had been a member of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) since 1932. The report said that Ryff’s appointment immediately after Goulart was inaugurated had concerned some Brazilians who believed Goulart might follow “an openly Communist course,” and that the president had “resisted pressure to remove Ryff from his immediate entourage.”⁴²

Consolidating domestic and foreign support was made more difficult for Goulart by his brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, governor of Rio Grande do Sul. Brizola, who was extremely nationalistic in his politics, was a vocal and emotional advocate for thoroughgoing structural changes in Brazil. On February 16, Brizola disrupted preparations for Goulart’s visit to the United States by expropriating an International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) subsidiary located in his state.⁴³ The next day, Harold S. Geneen, president of ITT, sent President Kennedy an “urgent” and “confidential” telegram alluding to a Cuban resemblance in “the irresponsible seizure of our American-owned properties” and urging Kennedy to “take an immediate personal interest in the situation.”⁴⁴

Officials in both governments were concerned that the ITT matter be settled before the Goulart visit to the United States in April. Brazilian officials involved in the negotiations included Foreign Minister Dantas, Ambassador Campos, and Rio Grande do Sul Secretary of Interior and Justice Brochada da Rocha.⁴⁵ Ambassador Gordon was instructed by the State Department that while he could not be an “advocate” concerning specific proposals for settlement, he was nevertheless to “give fullest possible support to [the ITT] efforts [to] obtain prompt and adequate compensation, utilizing in this regard [the] full weight and influence [of the] U.S. Government.”⁴⁶

Fearful that the ITT case would not be immediately settled, officials at the State Department devised other strategies for countering the bad press that Brazil was receiving in the United States and communicated their suggestions to Ambassador Gordon. They emphasized that an announced change in the profits-remittance bill would improve the climate. Gordon was also told that “if you are able to report that negotiations with [the] government of Rio Grande do Sul under [the] aegis of GOB [Government of Brazil] are moving ahead favorably, President Kennedy will make optimistic answer to planted question at press conference on March 7.”⁴⁷

The State Department also indicated that an announcement by Brazil of a firm commitment to a stabilization program would help and could be a basis for approving additional drawings under the 1961 Quadros aid package.⁴⁸ Loan approval based on Finance Minister Salles’ stabilization program was completed after Goulart arrived in Washington, and Brazil was authorized to draw $35 million immediately with the balance of the agreement to be paid May 31, pending the effective execution of Salles’ program.⁴⁹

The ITT negotiations continued beyond Goulart’s visit in April, and in direct response to the extended negotiations in Brazil the U.S. Congress passed the Hickenlooper Amendment as a rider to the 1962 Foreign Aid Bill.⁵⁰ This amendment obligated the U.S. government to suspend assistance to any country that had expropriated U.S.-owned property unless that country demonstrated that it had taken steps to make speedy compensation for the full property value within six months.⁵¹

In July 1961 President Quadros had been invited to visit the United States as a guest of President Kennedy in December of that year. The visit had been canceled after Quadros’ resignation. Goulart’s invitation to come to Washington was, to some extent, an outgrowth of the earlier invitation to his predecessor. An early visit to the United States was important to Goulart in building his domestic and foreign prestige; the visit could promote the stability of his new government by adding respectability to his administration and by mollifying the military and the conservative elements, which viewed as suspect Goulart’s past left-wing associations.⁵²

Officials at the U.S. State Department considered Goulart to be “not an ideological leftist” but rather a “thoroughgoing opportunist,” who “upon taking office assumed the mantle of a political moderate seeking constructive reform in his country.” It was the State Department position that

whatever the motive for Goulart’s obvious desire to be invited here, he is the President of the most important nation in Latin America—a nation comprising one-third of the region’s population and land area, in which are centered all the economic, social and strategic problems to which the Alliance for Progress is a response…. Given the significance of our success in Brazil for the entire Alliance for Progress program, it is in our interest to try to persuade Goulart that cooperation with us is in his and Brazil’s best interest. In any case, it is in our interest that, as chief executive of a potential world power, he clearly understand the directions of our policy in Latin America and elsewhere and what we hope to accomplish.⁵³

President Kennedy greeted Goulart personally when he arrived at Andrews Air Force Base on Tuesday morning, April 3. Later that day, Kennedy was host at a White House luncheon in Goulart’s honor. It was a colorful gathering with guests from a variety of backgrounds.⁵⁵

That afternoon Goulart and Kennedy, accompanied by staff and diplomats from both countries, met to discuss substantive issues. The expropriation of the ITT subsidiary had not been settled, and Kennedy emphasized the need for procedures for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for nationalized properties. Goulart adhered to the notion of peaceful nationalization through negotiated settlement but requested that payments be stretched over a long period in order to ease the financial strain on the reconstituted companies and to minimize the foreign exchange burden for Brazil. The two presidents left the matter in basic accord.⁵⁶ It was to become a source of irritation to the Americans that this agreement between presidents did not expedite expropriation settlement procedures.

Kennedy followed up on Gordon’s previously expressed concern with “Communist attempts to gain control of [the] labor movement” in Brazil.⁵⁷ Goulart appeared to be irked at the great emphasis that the United States gave to what he considered to be a highly exaggerated problem and told Kennedy that, although communists might have an exaggerated share in labor leadership, he felt confident that he could handle any problems that might erupt. Kennedy, perceiving Goulart’s touchiness on the subject, hastened to interject that his had only been meant as a friendly comment and that he did not wish to intervene at all in Brazilian affairs.⁵⁸

Goulart and Kennedy also discussed some of Brazil’s economic problems. Goulart complained of the restrictive attitude being taken by the Export-Import Bank. Kennedy offered to contact officials at the bank personally; however, Ambassador Campos never detected any additional cooperativeness by the bank to indicate that Kennedy had indeed spoken with them.⁵⁹

Goulart was host at a reception at the Brazilian embassy to which members of the Washington diplomatic corps and business and government officials were invited. President Kennedy attended the luncheon briefly. After this large affair, there was a small private dinner upstairs at the embassy, attended by the Brazilian group and several “Kennedy men,” including Walt Rostow, Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Goodwin, John Kenneth Galbraith, Lincoln Gordon, Ted Sorensen, and Robert McNamara. The purpose of the dinner was to have a frank discussion on pertinent issues of shared interest.⁶⁰

McNamara, commenting on Brazil’s strategic importance, indicated some apprehension about the “leftist infiltration” in Brazil and asked for some clarification of Brazil’s neutral stand in foreign policy. Ambassador Campos suggested that “neutralism” was an inadequate term and explained that “what was involved was really a deep urge of the Brazilian people to assert their personality in world affairs.”⁶¹

Ambassador Campos later related Goulart’s pleasure over a discussion the Brazilian president had had at the dinner with Galbraith concerning inflation. Galbraith criticized orthodox financial policies and Brazil’s acceptance of International Monetary Fund (IMF) domination and suggested that the orthodox Indian economists might benefit from the buoyancy created by Brazil’s inflation. Goulart was delighted to discover this liberal attitude on the part of at least one of Kennedy’s advisors. Campos countered Galbraith by suggesting that Brazil was “risking having inflammation rather than inflation.” Galbraith’s wit and charm as well as his accommodating posture struck a responsive chord with the Brazilian president. Ambassador Gordon was annoyed at this turn of the conversation.⁶²

During this trip, Kennedy and Goulart talked both in meetings attended by diplomats and privately about the question of military coups. Goulart was suspicious of alleged U.S. interference in the deposing of Frondizi in Argentina and warned Kennedy of the danger of encouraging military coups. Kennedy assured Goulart that there had been no U.S. participation in the Argentinean event and that the United States opposed military coups, but Goulart remained unconvinced. Ambassador Campos said later: “I don’t believe that Goulart ever really believed him and subsequently in several of my conversations with Goulart he always brought up the point of American intervention and American sympathies for military regimes. I tried to dissuade him from this viewpoint but it was sort of a basic fundamental suspicion which he never really abandoned.”⁶³

Ambassador Gordon had the impression that Goulart believed that the Americans had never caught up with Russia since the Sputnik space shot, so the ambassador arranged a trip to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) Base at Omaha, Nebraska, before Goulart returned to Brazil. General Amauri Kruel, friend and advisor to Goulart and head of the Casa Militar, accompanied the Brazilian presidential party on this trip. Gordon was pleased that Kruel seemed particularly impressed by what he saw in Nebraska. As the Brazilians were leaving the SAC base, Kruel requested that Gordon convey his thanks to General Thomas S. Power (SAC commander) and added, “You can be certain I will tell my colleagues that the future of the ‘free world’ is in good hands.”⁶⁴

Goulart returned to Brazil with his image much improved in both the United States and Brazil. According to Ambassador Campos, Goulart had dreaded a possibly hostile reception in Washington and was pleased with the cordial tone of the visit. Goulart had been impressed by Kennedy—his personality, his liberal posture, and his advisors—and it appeared that Goulart might become a Latin American supporter of the Alliance for Progress.⁶⁵

The bond Goulart felt between himself and Kennedy began to weaken as he returned to the daily administrative activities of his office. The ties with Washington could not eradicate the many economic and political problems that faced the Brazilian president—problems for which at times there appeared to be no answers or for which all solutions portended negative consequences. The excitement of Washington dimmed as domestic issues jostled for attention: the financial crisis, his own lack of power, and the growing demands from the left. The parliamentary system was a thorn that began to irritate. More and more Goulart focused his energies on proving the unworkability of that system and on gaining full presidential powers.

On May 1, Goulart made a speech demanding “basic reforms” for Brazil and calling for a constitutional amendment to change the requirement that landowners whose land is expropriated must be paid in cash.⁶⁶ Ambassador Gordon interpreted the speech as Goulart’s “new tack to the left.”⁶⁷

According to a CIA report, Goulart told Finance Minister Moreira Salles in mid-May that he had definitely decided to resign.⁶⁸ Goulart had had a mild heart attack in Mexico on his return trip from Washington. He had refused to take the two or three weeks of full rest urged by his doctors and remained sensitive to discussions about his health.⁶⁹ He may have considered resignation because of his health. Another possible motive is that Goulart was vacillating after his recent speech and felt unsure of his position. Whatever the reason, by the end of May, Goulart had reconsidered and decided against resignation, at least for the time being.

Gordon presented Goulart with a large color photograph of the Andrews Field welcoming ceremony when they met on Saturday, May 26. The president seemed genuinely pleased. The ambassador used the visit to follow up on a number of items discussed in Washington.⁷⁰

Gordon urged Goulart to take stronger fiscal control measures. The ambassador said that for the first time he saw a “real danger of runaway inflation in Brazil unless counteraction [were] taken.” The ambassador criticized payrolls padded for political appointment purposes; and, although Goulart agreed that the practice was a “sham,” Gordon knew that as president, Goulart had countersigned such nominations.⁷¹

Goulart indicated that he would support collaboration with the United States on oil shale production. Because the Soviets had made efforts to penetrate Brazil’s petroleum industry and because of the technical knowledge to be gained, the U.S. Defense Department shared with the Brazilian military a strong interest in the strategic significance of Brazilian oil shale development. It was hoped that the venture might also alleviate the major drain on Brazil’s foreign exchange caused by petroleum imports—over $200 million annually.⁷²

Leonel Brizola had made a strongly anti-U.S. speech earlier that week and Gordon suggested to Goulart that he believed it would be helpful if Goulart “could make clear his disagreement [with the] Brizola position.” Goulart responded that his family relationship with Brizola “in no way signified similar political views,” but he would not promise the ambassador any public disavowal of his brother-in-law.⁷³

At the meeting, the ambassador thought that Goulart was preoccupied with the limitations placed on him by the parliamentary system, and, in fact, Goulart complained of the lack of action from the Congress or his ministers. Goulart told Gordon that he believed the cabinet and the Congress had lost so much prestige that if he wished, he “could arouse people overnight to demand [the] shutting down of Congress,” but he added that he did “not want to take such an anti-constitutional line.”⁷⁴

Under the parliamentary system, all cabinet members were to be members of Congress; and, since the constitution stipulated that no one could run for Congress who had held an executive position during the previous ninety days, Prime Minister Tancredo Neves and his entire cabinet resigned June 26, 1962, in order to establish their eligibility to run for office in October of that year.⁷⁵ From the perspective of U.S. State Department officials, Goulart “seized the opportunity to create an artificial crisis to further his desire to regain the full powers of the Presidency.”⁷⁶

Goulart submitted to Congress a nomination for San Tiago Dantas to replace Neves. Dantas had recently made a speech urging policies backed by popular interests, such as agrarian reform. The Congress tended to represent vested interests, and Dantas’ nomination was not confirmed.⁷⁷

Gordon was pleased with Goulart’s choice of a replacement for the Dantas nomination, Auro de Moura Andrade, whom the ambassador described as “center or right of center.”⁷⁸ Within forty-eight hours of his becoming prime minister, however, Moura Andrade resigned. As it turned out, Goulart had secured an undated resignation from Moura Andrade before his appointment. He used the document after arguing with Moura Andrade over names for cabinet posts and after the new prime minister indicated that he would not work for an early plebiscite on the parliamentary system.⁷⁹

Goulart next nominated Francisco Brochado da Rocha who had been a legal advisor to Brizola in the ITT case. Gordon viewed Brochado da Rocha as politically far left, temperamental, excitable, a “mystic,” and “not entirely sane.” Congressmen, eager to return home to begin campaigning for the October elections and also wanting to avoid being blamed for prolonging the crisis, approved the nomination.⁸⁰

President Kennedy had planned to visit Brazil that July, but Gordon suggested that the visit be postponed until the government was more settled. Both presidents agreed and the trip was deferred until the following November.⁸¹

Meanwhile, Brochado da Rocha, in an emotional appeal, submitted a program to the Congress calling for large transfers of power to the cabinet. The program failed to pass the Congress and on September 13, Brochado da Rocha and his cabinet resigned. Three days later Congress set the date for a plebiscite on the presidential question: January 6, 1963.⁸²

The October 1962 elections in Brazil were of keen interest to the United States. They presented the United States with a chance of exerting some influence at the state level in favor of measures similar to those it was promoting without great success at a federal level. President Kennedy, in February 1962, sent a message to Fowler Hamilton, administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), saying: “I feel that we should do something of a favorable nature for Brazil before the election this Fall, which is going to be crucial. Perhaps a food, water or some other project could be proposed. Would you talk to Ted Moscoso about this and then discuss it with me.”⁸³

Riordan Roett, in The Politics of Foreign Aid, describes how, in Brazil’s northeast, U.S. monies were allocated to projects that would benefit conservative gubernatorial candidates with the hopes of influencing those elections in favor of anticommunists.

In one of the more important races the tactic was unsuccessful. Miguel Arraes whom the State Department described as “the commie-lining Mayor of Recife,” won the election for governor of his state, Pernambuco. Roett’s allegation that U.S. economic assistance tried to influence that electorate was substantiated by a State Department official who said U.S. distrust of Arraes and concern for the political drift in Pernambuco had prompted the United States, against the advice of some State Department officers, to give heavy funding to the Companhia Pernambuco de Borracha Sintetica (COPERBO), a plant designed to use sugar in the production of synthetic rubber. Cid Sampaio, who had backed Arraes’ conservative opponent, had interests in COPERBO.⁸⁴ Gordon later admitted that the planning and approval process of COPERBO was not sufficiently careful because of the politics involved.⁸⁵

Nor was this, Gordon has since acknowledged, the only case of U.S. intervention, citing specifically the U.S. monies that went directly to support the campaign of certain candidates in the 1962 elections. The ambassador later recalled: “Undoubtedly it was much more than a million dollars, and I would not be surprised if it had gone as high as five million dollars. But it was not an enormous sum, it was not dozens of millions of dollars. There was a ceiling per candidate…. Basically, the money was to buy radio time, to print signs, that type of thing. And you can be sure that many more requests were received than were honored.”⁸⁶

About one week after the Brazilian elections, a new defense attaché arrived at the U.S. embassy in Rio de Janeiro. Colonel Vernon Walters was a brilliant linguist. He had served as interpreter for the World War II Brazilian Expeditionary Force that had fought in Italy with the Allied Forces under General Mark Clark. This shared experience was the background for the strong friendly ties between Walters and a number of leaders in the Brazilian military.

Walters had met Lincoln Gordon when the two men had worked together on the Marshall Plan in the late forties. The ambassador had made a special request to have Walters transferred to Brazil. When Walters reported to Gordon and asked for instructions, the ambassador replied, “I want to know what’s going on; I want to be able to influence activities in the country. And,” he added, “I don’t want any surprises.” Later, Walters was to reminisce: “He was never surprised.” As defense attaché, Walters gathered military intelligence. Walters’ many wartime friendships were to be very helpful sources to him as he sought information about the Brazilian military.⁸⁷

All U.S. ambassadors to Latin America were contacted on October 21, 1962, and informed that the United States had discovered Soviet missile installations on Cuba. The ambassadors were instructed to seek out the heads of state in their countries two to five hours before 7:00 P.M. Eastern Standard Time—which was when President Kennedy was scheduled to announce this discovery to the nation and to the world on television and radio and to inform them of the impending message. An official communiqué would be sent for the heads of state.⁸⁸

Gordon took his new defense attaché with him to meet Goulart and to add a “show of uniform.” Kennedy’s message arrived late and the last section was hand-delivered by an embassy messenger to the palace soon after Gordon and Walters arrived. Walters read aloud, translating the English message into Portuguese. Goulart listened with rapt attention, following the English script over Walters’ shoulder. When Walters came to the section of the communiqué that stated that “missiles have arrived or are on their way,” Goulart indicated that he had been following events in the press and had been left with the impression that “Rusk said only a couple of weeks ago that those were only defensive weapons.”⁸⁹

Gordon was impressed with Goulart’s apparent acceptance of the gravity of the situation. When Walters completed the translation, Goulart took a deep breath and said: “if what Kennedy says is true, then this is not just a threat to you but to all of us—and, of course, we are with you.” Goulart seemed almost disappointed that the United States was stopping short of direct military action. He asked why the United States did not “just blow them all up with an atomic bomb?” When the ambassador reminded him that such an action would kill thousands of people, Goulart retorted, “Well, what do you care? They’re not Americans.” Goulart was eager to keep abreast of the situation. He told Gordon he would not be leaving town and that he wanted to see the ambassador each day for a briefing.⁹⁰

Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban missile crisis served to raise his stature in the eyes of Goulart, and public opinion in general in Brazil was quite favorable to the turn of events.⁹¹ On Saturday, when it was clear that the Russians had backed down, Gordon went again to give Goulart his daily briefing. Goulart greeted the ambassador and said, “Let’s go upstairs and have a drink.” Ambassador Gordon did not generally drink anything alcoholic but agreed. Goulart poured two generous measures and seemed to wait for a toast from his guest. Gordon said some words about world peace and prosperity to which Goulart responded with a grin and a wink: “Hell no! To the Yankee victory!”⁹²

President Kennedy’s trip to Brazil, postponed in July and rescheduled for November, was postponed once again after the Cuban missile crisis. The idea developed during November staff sessions at the U.S. embassy in Rio, that Goulart might be influenced to “confront the communist problem” as well as to deal seriously with Brazil’s economic difficulties if President Kennedy’s brother Robert could visit Brazil that year.⁹³ The embassy staff hoped that Goulart might use his influence to counter the growing numbers of organizations, particularly among labor and student groups, which U.S. officials considered to be inspired by communist leaders and basically unfriendly to the United States.

A meeting to discuss the possibility of a trip by Robert Kennedy was held at the White House, attended by Ambassador Gordon, President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, CIA Director John McCone, and officials from the State Department. The trip was envisioned as an effort to enlist Goulart’s support to counter Brazil’s disturbing “drift to the left.”⁹⁴

In contrast to the presidential visit in April, Robert Kennedy’s seems poorly conceived or at least haphazardly executed. Ambassador Campos was miffed at not being included in the planning of the trip. He recalls being informed at an embassy luncheon, “practically on the eve of Kennedy’s departure.” Campos advised officials at the State Department against the proposed trip, which he thought was poorly timed. The reaction he received was that the United States hoped to influence the composition of Goulart’s future cabinet in order to assure continuing cooperation between the two countries. Campos responded: “Well, in the first place, it’s quite inappropriate to try to influence the composition of the Cabinet, and secondly, I don’t think that Goulart will say anything relevant to you right now. You ought to wait for him to win the plebiscite and then if his government choices are such that a working arrangement would be difficult to establish, then bring the case to him.”⁹⁵ Campos believed that a visit by Robert Kennedy at that time and for that purpose would complicate matters. The visit might be construed as an ultimatum that could embitter Goulart and might be followed with other negative reactions by the Brazilian president in order to maintain his public image of independence.⁹⁶

The December 17 meeting of Robert Kennedy and Goulart in Brasilia was a disappointment for U.S. officials. Goulart believed that Kennedy vastly overrated communist infiltration in his government and suggested that Kennedy be more specific in his accusations. Gordon, who was present at the meeting, gave as examples the unions of Petrobrás, the federal oil monopoly, and of the postal and telegraph agency and offered to back up Kennedy’s concerns with specific names. Goulart, while not denying that some workers in those agencies might have communist leanings, stated that he was in full control of the situation. Goulart seized the opportunity of the meeting to discuss other problems in United States-Brazil relations from his perspective, such as declining prices in Brazilian exports compared to rising costs for equipment that Brazil imported from the United States.⁹⁷

Robert Kennedy’s visit appears to have been taken as an informal ultimatum that did not really describe what the alternatives to Alliance for Progress programs and cooperation would be. Goulart later related to Ambassador Campos that it was as if he had been told that he had no capacity for judging the men surrounding him.⁹⁸ Both countries anticipated the plebiscite with some hope. With full presidential powers restored, Goulart could give full attention to being, instead of becoming, president.

On January 6, 1963, the plebiscite was held. The purpose on which Goulart had increasingly focused his energies during the past year and a half was finally realized. Full presidential powers were restored to him by a margin of six to one. For the next five months, Goulart turned his attention to dealing with the economic and political problems that he had inherited and that his policies of the past months had amplified to critical proportions. Inflation in 1962 had been 52 percent. Cabinet ministers had come and gone with frequency over the past month. The machinery of the government had continued to operate, but without any consistent direction to give it stability or purpose.

With his full powers restored, Goulart appointed a new cabinet. San Tiago Dantas assumed the important position of finance minister. Dantas had served as foreign minister in Goulart’s first cabinet and his candidacy for prime minister had been rejected by Congress the previous summer because they considered him too much a hero of the left. In spite of this past negative reaction to Dantas, he appeared to be a good choice, for he was respected by both liberals and conservatives nationally and internationally.

Working with Dantas and also in a cabinet level position (economic planning, without portfolio) was Celso Furtado, well-known past director of the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE), the development agency for Brazil’s Northeast, the country’s largest backward area. Furtado had received his doctorate in economics at the University of Paris. President Kennedy had met Furtado in July of 1961 and had been impressed by his work in the Brazilian Northeast.⁹⁹

Intellectually, Dantas and Furtado appeared to be good choices for designing and administering Goulart’s economic stabilization and development programs. Politically they were identified with the left, but a more moderate left than Brizola’s radical position.¹⁰⁰ It seemed plausible that unpopular measures of austerity might be more palatable to the left opposition when proposed by these men and within the context of a larger package of planned reforms.

Neither Dantas nor Furtado, however, had a strong political base. For their program to succeed, Goulart needed to use his office to muster the domestic support necessary for success of the program. In addition, it would be important for domestic political consumption that any international negotiating done by Dantas and Furtado be acceptable on Brazilian terms; if it were to appear that they gave too much for too little, any political support they had might dissipate in the political rhetoric of the radical left.

Furtado directed the preparation of the Plano Trienial do Desenvolvimento Economico e Social, 1963–1965 (Three Year Plan for Economic and Social Development) during the last three months of 1962.¹⁰¹ The plan became the basis for the Dantas program.

Critics assailed the lengthy plan as a compilation of statistics and trends designed not to depict reality, but to create an optimistic projection.¹⁰² The purpose of the plan was to control inflation and maintain growth while eliminating bottlenecks within the system by introducing fiscal and agrarian reform measures. The plan projected the maintenance of a high level of public investment as an essential element to continued economic growth, which would be financed by new taxes on the wealthier sectors and by reducing government subsidies of industries. Critical to the financing of this comprehensive package was a refinancing of Brazil’s foreign debt.¹⁰³ While the plan also required a more aggressive export program that would assure foreign exchange for imports necessary for continued industrialization, it also depended on Brazil’s receiving $1.5 billion in foreign government aid and $300 million in foreign private investment during the three years.¹⁰⁴

Ambassador Gordon’s response to the plan was that in spite of technical deficiencies, “the broad purposes of it were, we thought, good…[it had] all the essential elements of a combined stabilization and development program.” Gordon approved Dantas’ energetic attack on inflation through removal of import subsidies, credit limitations, limiting wage increases, and certain budget economy measures.¹⁰⁵

Early in 1963, after Goulart had announced his new cabinet, Ambassador Gordon and Ambassador Campos were invited to Brasilia to dine with the president at the Alvorada Palace. During the dinner Goulart turned to Ambassador Gordon and said, “You’ve seen my list. I remember our conversation with Robert Kennedy. What do you think?” Lincoln Gordon considered the cabinet a “mixed bag” as far as “communist influence” was concerned and told Goulart quite frankly that he was quite concerned about the labor minister, Almino Afonso, whom the embassy judged to be “very red” and a threat because he “allowed communist infiltration in unions.” Goulart responded that he was surprised Gordon had not favorably mentioned Dantas who would be handling his economic program.¹⁰⁶

A Gallup poll in early February of 1963 was brought to the attention of President Kennedy. A survey indicated that public opinion was “that the U.S. should be a little more discriminating in its dispersal of foreign aid funds, [and that] of particular irritation to some Americans [were] cases where countries receiving such aid have turned against [the United States] in international disputes.”¹⁰⁷

On March 4, David Bell, AID administrator at the State Department, briefed the president by memorandum on what he believed would be the major theme of the report soon to be released from the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, an executive committee chaired by General Lucius D. Clay. The Clay committee had studied U.S. economic and military aid programs. In relation to Latin America, Bell indicated that the committee opposed “‘bail out’ assistance except where accompanied by the performance (not just the promise) of improved budget and fiscal policies.” Bell agreed with this position, adding that “we can and should require stronger self-help measures by Latin American countries—and the issue will confront us almost immediately in connection with…Brazil.”¹⁰⁸ The Clay report would be read by the U.S. Congress, and the performance of U.S. assistance programs would be measured against its stipulations when the U.S. Congress made appropriations for 1964. It would strengthen the case of those requesting aid appropriations if they could show that foreign assistance was not money thrown away and could be tied to the performance of the recipient country.

Such was the mood at the State Department when Foreign Minister Dantas arrived in Washington in early-March to negotiate with U.S. officials for the generous financial assistance upon which the Three Year Plan had been based.

Dantas would have preferred postponing his trip to the United States until he had time for applying some measures for economic recovery and could approach the negotiations from a stronger position. He had no choice, however. Brazil’s plight was indeed desperate; assistance had to come quickly or Brazil might be forced to default on some foreign debt payment.¹⁰⁹

Holding the trumps of the aid giver as the two countries approached the bargaining tables, the United States assumed a posture of “limited and continuous cooperation.” Dantas had made numerous calls to Ambassador Campos, trying to get some advance indication of the magnitude of assistance the United States would consider. U.S. officials, however, remained silent before the actual negotiations. Gordon, who had flown up early to help develop the U.S. position, said later: “We didn’t actually do any negotiating until March…when Dantas came to Washington. We considered that this was part of the strategy; this would hold out a carrot and help influence things in the desired direction.”¹¹⁰

Actually, in spite of reservations over Brazil’s economic and political performance over the previous year, which had been disastrous from a Washington perspective, the United States was disposed to work with Dantas. The position established by Gordon and State Department officials “was that the Three Year Plan, Dantas as Finance Minister, and the kinds of policies he was supporting were the best bet in sight, that if the program were carried through it had real chances of getting Brazil out of its economic difficulties of the year before, and that it was a good basis for collaboration.”¹¹¹

The United States wanted assurance that Goulart backed Dantas in commitments his finance minister might make, so Dantas brought two letters signed by Goulart (drafted by Dantas) to President Kennedy.¹¹² One dealt with negotiations in process in Brazil for the nationalization of the American Foreign and Power Company (AMFORP) and stated that he looked forward to a settlement soon after the U.S. Congress met, which would be in a few days.¹¹³

The second letter masterfully pleaded Brazil’s case in the coming negotiations. Goulart cited the principles of the Alliance for Progress, in which each nation had the right to determine its own destiny and goals of development, and, referring to U.S. postwar assistance to Europe, suggested underdevelopment and instability could be dealt with more effectively if each country could rely on an “adequate level of external cooperation as has been the case with other nations in other regions.” Goulart reminded Kennedy that “economic remedies must be adapted to the reality of the social environment in which they are to be used”; to do otherwise could actually weaken that nation’s economy and could “result in social rebellion and…open the way to dangerous forms of unrest.” He spoke of a solution to which his government was committed (the Three Year Plan) as the only option “capable of harmonizing economic stability, the preservation of social peace, and the continuity of democracy.” Goulart assured Kennedy that should “this cooperation not be available, we will not thereby abandon our fidelity to democratic principles” and closed by alluding to the importance of Brazil and the potential repercussions the case might have on other nations.¹¹⁴

At the negotiations, Dantas and Campos argued that with the establishment of the stabilization program of the Three Year Plan there would initially be unavoidable negative internal repercussions, such as rising prices resulting from subsidy eliminations. Dantas and Campos tried to persuade the U.S. negotiators that “even though the disbursements might be graduated and geared to performance…the commitments should be generous and forthcoming.” Campos reflected later: “We needed then an external victory and demonstration of foreign confidence, of foreign support and assistance that would strengthen politically the hand of those that were seeking stabilization.”¹¹⁵

While the U.S. negotiators (AID Administrator David Bell, Ambassador Gordon, and State Department officials) approved of Dantas’ plans for stabilizing the Brazilian economy, their wariness of Goulart’s intentions made them doubt Dantas’ ability to carry out this program. The United States agreed to provide immediate stopgap assistance to Brazil totaling $84 million and an additional $314.5 million in assistance for fiscal year 1964, pending Brazil’s negotiating long-term financial assistance from such other sources as the IMF, the World Bank, and Western European countries and Japan.¹¹⁶

The $314.5 million was tied to performance measures agreed to by both sides and outlined in a letter from Dantas to Bell. Dantas cited such actions already taken by the Brazilian government (most of which were included in the Three Year Plan) as termination of certain subsidies, the issuance of a plan for containing budget expenditures, and limits placed on credit and on public employee wage increases. In addition, Dantas made commitments to negotiate for additional funding from the IMF and from Japan and Europe, to direct Brazil’s foreign economic policy toward reducing Brazil’s balance of payment deficit, to expand exports, to encourage foreign private investments, and to increase taxes and improve tax collection.¹¹⁷

For Dantas, the restrictive agreement was a bitter pill to swallow. At first Campos advised him not to sign it, but after the two men discussed their options they decided that neither they nor Goulart had enough national backing to implement the austerity program that would be necessary if all foreign assistance were severed and that that kind of support would have required an extreme nationalist spirit in Brazil that could backfire out of their control. One possible repercussion of rejection would also have been a break in relations with the United States. With no good choices available (from his perspective), Dantas signed the agreement “with a very heavy hand” and returned to Brazil to try to pull together support sufficient to allow him to carry out his economic development program.¹¹⁸

From the U.S. perspective, considering events of the previous year, the Bell-Dantas Agreement was fair, generous, and good for both sides. The United States had maintained its position of linking assistance with performance. These negotiations could be an example to the U.S. Congress of foreign assistance tied to a purpose. The agreement also sent a clear message to Goulart—that the United States would not and could not unilaterally rescue Brazil and warned him that U.S. assistance could only be a part of a much larger program for economic development and stability. From the U.S. perspective, the agreement, although “tough,” contained the essential components for pulling Brazil out of its economic quagmire. The United States recognized that the agreement was bitter medicine and tried to dilute the harsh effects of an austerity program with the initial $84 million forthcoming immediately. Gordon remarked later that he thought “what he [Dantas] got was a great deal.”¹¹⁹ The ball was now in Goulart’s court and U.S. State Department and embassy officials were watching closely.

Goulart’s actions were also being followed by conservative elements in the Brazilian military, which in turn were being studied by the CIA. A CIA “Current Intelligence Memorandum” dated March 8, 1963, described plotting against Goulart by conservative groups in the military, led by retired Marshal Odílio Denys, minister of war during the administration of Jânio Quadros. Denys had evidently indicated that a coup depended on Goulart’s first making a move that would precipitate widespread support for a countermove, but the CIA was concerned that “a premature coup effort by the Brazilian military would be likely to bring a strong reaction from Goulart and the cashiering of those officers who are most friendly to the United States.”¹²⁰

Dantas returned to Brazil to try to implement the Three Year Plan. The austerity measures were being felt in sensitive areas. With the wheat subsidy gone, bread prices rose; with the oil subsidy removed, transportation prices—including urban bus fares—rose. The cruzeiro was devalued to meet the IMF requirement for a unified exchange rate, causing a rise in import costs and thus in the cost of living.¹²¹ Dantas had agreed to limit wage increases for public employees to 40 percent, effective in April.¹²² By mid-May, the cabinet had capitulated to the ensuing anger of the military and the civil servants and had agreed to 70 percent increases.¹²³

According to Campos, Goulart viewed the agreement as “proof of U.S. mistrust and that embittered him and further deviated him from the road of cooperation.”¹²⁴ The president expressed his disappointment when he met with Ambassador Gordon in early April. Gordon suggested the agreement was a good basis for cooperation and reminded Goulart that the government of Brazil “was suffering from [a] history of broken promises” and that it would take “time and effort on both sides” to rebuild confidence.¹²⁵

At that meeting, Gordon further commented on his concerns about Brazil and mentioned Brizola’s “campaign of agitation,” and Labor Minister Almino Afonso’s “not cooperating on wage policy” and moving to legalize the “procommunist” General Workers Command (CGT). Gordon reminded Goulart that the settlement of the AMFORP case had again been postponed and suggested that the continued postponement “raised [a] question of [Goulart’s] personal good faith.” Goulart seemed offended by Gordon’s use of the word “stealing” to describe how he believed the Brazilian Congress wished to settle the AMFORP case. Gordon suggested to the president that if Brazil defaulted on a $30 million payment, due in ten days, it would bring Brazil to the “brink of the abyss” with repercussions at the IMF and the U.S. Congress, as well as in Brazil itself which would be faced with shortages of foreign exchange to buy essential imports. Goulart wondered gloomily if the economy were not already in the abyss, to which Gordon responded with assurance that “sensible action” could solve the problems and that Brazil’s “longer run economic prospects [were] very bright.”¹²⁶

At the meeting, Goulart complained of delays in U.S. responses to Brazil’s request to purchase military airplanes; Brazil was considering purchasing the helicopters from Poland. Gordon indicated that while it was his decision, “he could not expect the U.S. to like it, since it would break [the] line on [the] military source problem.”¹²⁷

Gordon described the farewell between himself and Goulart after this meeting as “cordial”; however, it is apparent that the State Department was assuming an increasingly unyielding posture. This position, it was hoped, would result in Goulart’s seriously attacking what State Department officials saw as the growth of left-wing and communist groups within Brazil and giving the full backing of his office to the economic development program outlined in the Three Year Plan and elaborated in the Bell-Dantas agreement. Goulart’s response was far from U.S. desires.¹²⁸

In late April, the Brazilian government appeared to reach an agreement to purchase AMFORP for $135 million, following the tentative arrangement made between Goulart and Kennedy the year before in Washington: 25 percent of the settlement was to be paid in dollars and 75 percent was to be reinvested in Brazilian nonutility holdings. The settlement was attacked for its generosity by both the right and the left in Brazil.¹²⁹ Goulart, finding this agreement unpopular—in the context of other domestic battling over economic issues—tried to disassociate himself from its origins.¹³⁰

President Kennedy personally inquired about developments in Brazil. A State Department brief written in response was supportive of Dantas and acknowledged the tremendous odds he faced. A team from the IMF was to arrive in Brazil on May 10. Continuation of U.S. funding through the Bell-Dantas Agreement was predicated on Brazil’s also obtaining funding through the IMF. The State Department, casting about for ways to lend Dantas some much-needed support, was toying with the idea of sending a letter to President Goulart from President Kennedy. The proposed letter “would express admiration and support for Goulart’s stabilization and development program with appropriate complimentary reference to Minister Dantas.”¹³¹

The letter was never sent. In June, Goulart replaced his entire cabinet, sounding the death knell for the Bell-Dantas Agreement. Ambassador Gordon watched events in Brazil with dismay. In his eyes, the dismissal of the cabinet marked a significant turning point in Goulart’s administration. He testified later before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “Then started the…phase from July until the ending of the regime in March 1964 in which it became increasingly evident that the President’s purposes were, in fact, to overturn the regime himself in the interest of a personalistic dictatorship…modeled after Perón in Argentina or Vargas, his mentor.”¹³²

In fact, however, the new cabinet represented the center and not what Dantas would have called the “negative left.” Dantas’ replacement was the former governor of São Paulo, Carlos Alberto Carvalho Pinto.¹³³

Goulart had an encounter with Kennedy in Rome on July 1, 1963, the day after Paul VI was elevated to the papacy. At that meeting, Goulart requested a ninety-day postponement of the AMFORP settlement, assistance in encouraging Germany to give Brazil some long-term financing based on expected iron-ore exports, and postponement of payment on a U.S. Treasury loan and an Export-Import Bank payment.¹³⁴

The two presidents exchanged letters later that month. In the exchange, Kennedy suggested direct negotiating with AMFORP; Goulart responded that negotiations should not be isolated but should be a part of overall collaboration between Brazil and the United States.¹³⁵ Repayment of the Treasury loan was postponed ninety days, but the United States opposed Brazil’s proposal to borrow money in Germany because earnings from iron-ore exports were a major source for servicing the Brazilian foreign debt.¹³⁶

Cables between the State Department and the U.S. embassy and consulates in Brazil suggest that U.S. influence and the power of people and groups friendly to the United States was eroding.¹³⁷ In July the National Students’ Union (UNE) met in a suburb of São Paulo, for its annual congress. The U.S. consul general in São Paulo, Daniel M. Braddock, sent a description to the State Department of “communists”-oriented candidates having won a landslide victory over what he considered the “democratic slate.”¹³⁸

Braddock suggested that “given the difficulty of overcoming the incumbent machine, there are one or two possibilities for end-runs.” He believed that while direct suffrage (as opposed to the delegate system) would be an improvement there was no assurance that the students would not vote as their delegates had. Braddock suggested a second possibility, “to found competing student organizations outside the framework of the UNE. These groups would not have Government sanction and could not vote in elections, but at least they might furnish a base around which the anti-communist students could pull themselves together.”¹³⁹

The single most powerful group in Brazil is and was the military. The constitution entrusted the military with the mission “to defend the country and guarantee the Constitutional powers and law and order.”¹⁴⁰ Goulart understood the importance of military support within the Brazilian system and set out to obtain it by surrounding himself with military leaders whom he believed would be loyal to him.¹⁴¹ U.S. Defense Attaché Vernon Walters perceived a disturbing pattern in Goulart’s appointments. In August 1963 Walters sent the Pentagon a report in which he stated:

Ultranationalist officers who support President Goulart get promoted and get troop commands and desirable locations. Outspokenly pro-democratic pro-U.S. officers don’t generally get promoted. They get passed over and retired or go to directorates as well as less desirable assignments, and other positions which do not involve troop command. A few colorless neutrals get promoted so that it cannot be said that only ultra-nationalists get promoted, and a few—very few—pro-U.S. officers may get promoted or have their assignments improved. To the great mass of uncommitted officers who want to get ahead and want good assignments, it is clear that the only way to get both is to follow the ultra-nationalist line.¹⁴²

In addition to promoting military leaders who appeared to be most loyal to him, Goulart tended to give support to noncommissioned officers when they came in conflict with higher military authorities. On September 12 military discipline was visibly threatened when a group of sergeants demonstrated in Brasilia for soldiers to be allowed to hold elective office. Goulart’s neutral response angered the Congress, which had become acutely aware of its vulnerability when the noncommissioned officers succeeded in holding prisoner for a time the president of the Chamber of Deputies and a Supreme Court justice.¹⁴³

The U.S. Congress was battling with Kennedy over his foreign aid bill. The House recommended that Kennedy’s request be cut drastically. The bill was before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when General Lucius Clay collaborated with the White House to send letters to newspaper editors throughout the country in support of foreign aid as a component essential to U.S. security.¹⁴⁴

David Bell made a television and radio broadcast with Senators Clark and Scott of Pennsylvania on September 22 in which Senator Scott questioned Bell about U.S. assistance to Brazil, calling it “a bottomless pit.” Bell assured the senators that the State Department was holding Brazil to its commitment to carry out an anti-inflation program, and Bell explained that while some project assistance for poor areas was continuing, “the main things, the large amounts of money which we would be prepared to provide by way of investment, capital, additions to Brazil—these are being held up until the Brazilians undertake and carry through the steps they can and should do.”¹⁴⁵ The U.S. policy was indeed to link aid to performance, but a public statement to that effect made the U.S. position that much firmer; this statement, in fact, represented a foreign policy trend.

Gordon and his staff reviewed the Bell-Dantas Agreement in late August and decided that conditions were not being met. Gordon no longer actively sought to implement that agreement. The policy changed toward emphasis on project loans, loans tied specifically to an activity, as opposed to program loans that provide general assistance to the whole development effort and are related to macro-economic policy. This new policy came to be known at the embassy as support for “islands of administrative sanity.” The United States would not continue to support the central government, but aid would be given in individual cases “when the recipient was performing according to Alliance for Progress standards.”¹⁴⁶

The hardening line from Washington toward Goulart’s government and the policy of dealing increasingly with state and local governments and individual agencies in loan commitments and disbursements was criticized in Brazil. In early September (before Bell’s television appearance), Governor Miguel Arraes leveled a verbal assault on the United States and Ambassador Gordon at a meeting of local officials in the Northeast where the ambassador was a guest of Celso Furtado. Arraes was bitter because the United States had supported, for political reasons, projects that aided his opponent in the governor’s race in Pernambuco in 1962. He subsequently had had a committee study U.S. aid in Brazil and unexpectedly used the northeastern meeting as a forum to release the committee report. He attacked the Alliance for Progress and accused the United States of intervening at the expense of the federal Brazilian government, through its aid programs, in state and local politics.¹⁴⁷

Gordon was able to blunt the immediate barbs of Arraes’s attack by responding to the report at the meeting. He talked about the AID program and said that, while the United States did indeed deal with state and local governments, all loans required a release by the Brazilian government, so nothing was being done outside the purview of the central government.¹⁴⁸

There were complaints by Brazilians that the Alliance for Progress AID program was bogging down. In January, a U.S. political officer from the São Paulo consulate met with Fernando Correa da Costa, governor of the state of Matto Grosso. The governor was discouraged about the slow response to a mid-1962 request for U.S. assistance in building a hydroelectric plant in his state. The embassy officials had been initially encouraging, and the Brazilians had completed a large, detailed study containing required information for the U.S. officials. In the following year and a half the governor had only received vague encouragement from the embassy and requests for new studies—one of which had been completed, another was in preparation. Governor Costa expressed doubt that the project loan would be completed before his term expired in January of 1966. As the officer was leaving, the governor said that he had been reading The Ugly American, and he had found striking similarities between the book and his experiences.¹⁴⁹

On October 4, at the urging of his military ministers who were concerned over the growing numbers of strikes and incidents of political violence, Goulart requested that martial law powers be granted him by the Congress.¹⁵⁰ Congress delayed action on this state of siege proposal, which came under attack from many sides. To the consternation of his advisors, Goulart followed the path of least resistance and withdrew the petition on October 7.

During the month of October Goulart escaped a poorly executed kidnapping attempt in which his archenemy Carlos Lacerda, governor of Guanabara, appears to have been peripherally involved. In response to this attempted kidnapping, plans were made, apparently at the presidential palace, to have paratroopers arrest Lacerda. Some of the officers refused to take part in the plot and warned the governor. The would-be abductors arrived late because of car and traffic difficulties. Lacerda exploited the publicity with gusto in his Rio newspaper.¹⁵¹

Goulart was unpopular with the Congress. He was distrusted by the right for his friendships with the left, and his brother-in-law, Brizola, led the attack from the left because his programs were not radical enough to change the system.

Brizola turned to the mass media and toward the end of 1963 he could be seen and heard on his television and radio stations in Rio, flanked by uniformed marines, calling for the people to organize into vigilante “groups of eleven.” Each group was instructed to arm itself and to prepare to support an uprising against opposition. Upon request, Brizola offered to send the group a copy of Ché Guevara’s handbook and other guerrilla information. These organizations were extremely nationalistic in spirit; and, while their presence and purpose was disturbing, the threat they posed was probably overrated.¹⁵²

In mid-November 1963 the second annual meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council was held in São Paulo. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss techniques for better coordination of the Alliance for Progress.¹⁵³ Goulart made a speech in which he pointedly avoided reference to the United States and only mentioned the Alliance for Progress once. The speech stressed Brazilian leadership in Latin America against North America and the idea of building a bloc of underdeveloped nations against the developed nations. Ambassador Gordon was angered by the speech.¹⁵⁴ Roberto Campos, who believed that there was substance in the concept of international trade being promoted by Goulart, had argued against this planned emotional appeal at the council meeting. It was for him another disagreement with the Goulart administration that he was representing.¹⁵⁵

On November 20, the weekly Brazilian magazine Manchete published a supposed interview with João Goulart concerning the grave economic problems of Brazil in which he called for “urgent and ample” reforms to prevent a “chaotic and subversive solution.” In the article Goulart attacked groups that had not cooperated with him in his push for reforms and added that “if the government, in the fullness of its powers, had been in my hands alone (and I say this only as an illustration), no one could doubt that reforms would already have been accomplished.” Goulart appealed to the Congress saying, “the word ‘revolution’ [is now] a real national threat. We must now take emergency measures in the field of internal and international finances, to retain the minimum of social tranquility, indispensable to the peaceful accomplishment of the structural changes which will make possible the realization of the historical destiny that awaits Brazil as a civilized and democratic nation.”¹⁵⁶

In the Manchete article, Goulart laid the blame for Brazil’s economic crisis on the deteriorating terms of trade. He said that over half of Brazil’s $3.8 billion debt was to become due by 1965 and that Brazil’s capabilities coupled with the potential risks to the nation’s stability “should give us [an] inalienable right to the credit we need.”¹⁵⁷

In reporting to the State Department about the Manchete article, Gordon noted with some concern that Goulart justified labor leaders intervening in larger political debates as a move to ensure the support of labor in his future policies. Gordon commented that Goulart “may be opening Pandora’s box for [a] wave of strikes and labor agitation that could provide [a] basis for his assumption [of] extraordinary powers.”¹⁵⁸

Gordon continued to work with Carlos Alberto Carvalho Pinto, the finance minister. In October, Pinto introduced a plan requiring banks surpassing authorized credit limits to purchase treasury certificates from the Bank of Brazil. The purpose of this scheme was to finance the ailing Three Year Plan and simultaneously limit credit to the private sector. Private bankers protested, but the finance minister persevered.¹⁵⁹

Pinto was planning another trip to Washington in early 1964 to negotiate with U.S. creditors. Brazil was the largest debtor of the Export-Import Bank, and the United States was urging that debt rescheduling for Brazil be done multilaterally with other creditors at the negotiating table. Pinto agreed but planned an initial negotiation with the United States to postpone payment on an Export-Import Bank note due on December 2. Gordon was worried that Goulart might proclaim a unilateral debt moratorium as some of his advisors were urging and encouraged the bank to consider Pinto’s proposals. He commented that “with all his limitations, Pinto is on [the] side of [the] angels in this difficult situation; as [the] recent São Paulo meeting makes clear. I have no confidence that any successor picked by Goulart in his present frame of mind would be [an] improvement.”¹⁶⁰

Seemingly endless phone calls and people began coming in to the U.S. embassy on the afternoon of November 23, 1963, when the news reached Brazil that President Kennedy had been shot in Dallas. A line formed outside the embassy, and Gordon ordered the building kept open all night as people walked through and signed a book, paying respects to the assassinated U.S. president.¹⁶¹

Ambassador Campos was in Rio at the time seeking a decision on his proposed resignation, which he had submitted in August, but which had not been accepted. Campos was touched by the profound emotional reaction manifested in Brazil as a result of Kennedy’s death. For Campos it “demonstrated by and large the antagonism towards the U.S. was more of a superficial political phenomenon.”¹⁶²

Goulart made a personal visit to the U.S. ambassador’s home to pay his respects to the fallen president. For the Brazilian president, an important cord tying him to the United States had been cut. Goulart had admired Kennedy and had felt that he had enjoyed some rapport with the U.S. president. His visit to the United States had not become a foundation for consolidated collaboration between the two countries, but his personal meetings with Kennedy had tempered his natural bent for antagonism toward the United States and had provided Goulart with a personal link to that country. That relationship was now gone.¹⁶³

Goulart sent President Lyndon Baines Johnson a letter of support and best wishes soon after Johnson became president. Goulart took the opportunity to add: “No economic system, however well conceived it may be, no modern technique, however effective it may be considered, can establish itself permanently or long assert its validity if it involves the sacrificing of human dignity.” Goulart also spoke of the “spirit of reform” that would unquestionably be a vital part of Johnson’s new administration and would “contribute to the fruitful cooperation that we must continue.”¹⁶⁴

Johnson implied that his reason for concentrating such power in this one individual was that Mann was his longtime and trusted friend. Actually, political considerations played a fundamental role in this decision. By publicly delegating far-reaching responsibilities to Mann, Johnson took the control of Latin American policy out of the hands of Kennedy men and placed it with a career diplomat.¹⁶⁷

In late 1963, the Soviets apparently made an offer to provide transport planes to the Brazilian Air Force. That such plans might be underway was viewed as “extremely significant,” and at the White House Gordon Chase communicated to McGeorge Bundy that “if such a deal seems to be happening, it would appear vital that we act quickly and vigorously. Among other things, we might want to consider the desirability of making a tough approach to the Russians.”¹⁶⁸ Chase did not elaborate on what those “tough” measures might have been. As Ambassador Gordon had emphasized with Goulart, purchase of military equipment meant the establishment of training missions and ongoing contracts for spare parts with the providing country.¹⁶⁹ The United States had a strong Military Assistance Program (MAP) with Brazil and frowned upon any competition, particularly from the communist bloc.

Two days before his death, Kennedy had written David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, who together with other businessmen representing corporations with large interests in Latin America had recently formed the Business Group for Latin America (BGLA). One purpose of this group was to facilitate communication between the branches of government and the business community. Kennedy had assigned David Bell to coordinate governmental relations with the BGLA.¹⁷⁰ LBJ welcomed a meeting with the group early in 1964 and explained: “I want to take this opportunity to reaffirm the important role that private enterprise has to play in helping to achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress.”¹⁷¹

It had been rumored that Goulart would replace Finance Minister Pinto with Leonel Brizola. Instead, when Pinto resigned at the end of 1963, Goulart appointed Ney Galvão, director of the Bank of Brazil and described by Thomas Skidmore as a “colorless bureaucrat.” One of Galvão’s first actions was to revoke the Pinto plan for selling treasury certificates to private banks that surpassed credit limits. The revocation of this controversial plan marked the end of any serious attempt to support the Three Year Plan.¹⁷²

The Congress, fearing that Goulart might declare a state of siege while they were in recess, stayed in session over the Christmas holiday. As Gordon later remembered the progression of events—cabinets coming and going, the president’s brother-in-law calling for people to arm themselves, attempted kidnappings—he recalled that Brazil took on an “unreal, Alice-in-Wonderland quality.” Nineteen sixty-three had been a disappointing year from his perspective—the Bell-Dantas Agreement had failed and there had been extended settlement negotiations over expropriation (AMFORP was still being negotiated), and procommunist groups were gaining strength among students and the labor unions.¹⁷³

Plots were growing for the deposition of Goulart—if he did not do away with the democratic process and assume extraordinary powers first. Gordon, during a Christmas vacation trip by car, learned that discontent extended even to small towns where scattered groups planned Goulart’s ouster.¹⁷⁴

To the ambassador, as the new year began, there seemed to be “only a 50/50 chance” of keeping things “on the rail.” Gordon had a two-pronged policy: to try to maintain some equilibrium in Brazil (by assisting the finance minister with debt rescheduling) and to emphasize that it was Brazil and not the United States that was responsible for Brazil’s current plight. In addition, Gordon and his staff tried to maintain a hand on the pulse not only of the official government, but also of the various conspirators who were discussing the overthrow of Goulart.¹⁷⁵

To the ambassador’s dismay, Goulart signed, in January 1964, the very restrictive Profits-Remittance Law that had been passed by the Congress in 1962.¹⁷⁶ The threat of this legislation becoming a law, coupled with runaway inflation and a volatile political climate, had almost dried up foreign investment in Brazil. To foreign investors, the most detrimental section of the Profits-Remittance Law concerned reinvested profits, which the law considered to be national rather than foreign capital and which, therefore, could not be included in the capital base from which profit remittances would be calculated.¹⁷⁷ Gordon, accompanied by Ambassador Campos, had had a special session with Goulart, requesting that he veto the specific parts of the law that were most restrictive to foreign investors. That Goulart would sign the bill in full after having assured the ambassador he would do otherwise was another indication to Gordon that he was dealing with a man whose word could not be trusted. Gordon later remarked, “He was like a cork bobbing in water. Goulart was impressed by the latest argument he heard.”¹⁷⁸

In his speech at the ceremony on January 17 at which he signed the Profits-Remittance Law, Goulart denied accusations that he posed a threat to democratic order. Goulart called his accusers the “same ones who planned [the] golpe against [former president] Vargas and, more recently, attempted [to] prevent me from assuming [the] Presidency.” Goulart explained, “Our dilemma is not one of reform or golpe…we know that Brazil faces one sole and true dilemma already defined by that young and great statesman John Kennedy. The dilemma is: Reform or Revolution.”¹⁷⁹

During the month of February the Brazilian foreign ministry announced that the Chinese People’s Republic would open a trade office in Brazil under an authorization granted in 1961 by President Quadros.¹⁸⁰ Ambassador Gordon, in accordance with U.S. standing policy, backed the Taiwan-Chinese ambassador in discouraging the developing relationship between Brazil and the People’s Republic of China. President Charles de Gaulle of France had recently recognized the People’s Republic, and Brazil’s allowing that government to open a trade office was viewed by the United States and others, in spite of denials by the foreign minister, as a prelude to Brazil’s recognition of Communist China.¹⁸¹

Also in February, Ambassador Roberto Campos resigned his position and Jorge de Carvalho e Silva became chargé d’affaires ad interim at the Brazilian embassy in Washington, as Campos’s replacement. Campos had found his ambassadorship in Washington a trying experience. He had been acutely aware that U.S. officials had been skeptical concerning his standing with the government of Brazil. Campos returned to Brazil convinced that he “should try to enter politics and acquire an independent political personality of [his] own.”¹⁸² In less than three months Campos would be offered the job of directing Brazil out of its economic turmoil as minister of planning and economic coordination under a new government.

Small groups in the military had begun organizing against the government almost as soon as Goulart became president. Quadros’s three former ministers, Denys, Moss, and Heck, were active among them.¹⁸³ General Olímpio Mourão Filho, “the diminutive fireball and longtime enemy of Goulart,”¹⁸⁴ headed the Fourth Army Division. He had one of the longest histories of plotting against President Goulart, but he was not the strong, respected leader needed to lead a coup against the government.¹⁸⁵

The highly respected army chief of staff, General Humberto Castelo Branco, was disturbed by the economic and political direction of the Goulart administration and by the loss of discipline within the military. According to the former defense attaché Vernon Walters, some time after the first of the year—probably in early February 1964—Castelo Branco joined the conspirators and became their leader.¹⁸⁶

The U.S. embassy was apprised of developing conspiracies against the current government. If a showdown were to come, it seemed likely it would be between Goulart and a conglomeration of leftist and communist supporters (labor members, students, peasants, and noncommissioned officers in the military) on one side and on the other the military leadership aligned with traditionally conservative sectors (business, landowners) and a growing number of centrists to whom the Goulart administration appeared more and more ineffectual or dangerous.

The military was a traditional ally of the United States. War experiences served as a basis for continued shared weaponry and ongoing bonds of friendship. Further, the armed forces claimed the same enemy as the United States—communism. It was natural that Ambassador Gordon would wish to strengthen the capabilities of the U.S. ally, the military, particularly in light of the threat of a coup from either side.

In March 1964, Ambassador Gordon cabled the State Department (to the attention of Thomas Mann) and made a strong case for substantially increasing U.S. military aid to Brazil. He argued that the military was essential in the “strategy for restraining left wing excesses of [the] Goulart government,” and he emphasized the role of the military in maintaining internal security that was critical in the climate of “growing social and political restlessness.” Gordon noted that the underlying premise of the Military Assistance Program was to maintain the long-existing ties between the United States and Brazilian military and to develop closer links with the younger officers who might not feel an automatic alignment with the United States. Gordon played down the danger of a fascist-type military takeover, stating that if the events led to military intervention, he believed the armed forces “would be quick to restore constitutional institutions and return power to civilian hands.”¹⁸⁷

March 13 was the day a much-heralded street meeting was to be held in the square located in front of the Dom Pedro II railway station and across from the war ministry in Rio de Janeiro. Goulart chose this site for the rally in hopes of augmenting the crowd with people going home from work. To counteract this, Carlos Lacerda declared a holiday for all workers in the state for that day.¹⁸⁸ In spite of those who might have stayed at home, the crowd in the square was between 120,000 and 200,000 according to one newspaper estimate.¹⁸⁹

The speeches began at 5:00 P.M. One of the most inflammatory was delivered by Leonel Brizola who dramatically called for throwing out the Congress and for holding a plebiscite “to install a Constitutional Assembly with a view to creating a popular congress, made up of laborers, peasants, sergeants, and nationalist officers, and authentic men of the people.”¹⁹⁰ The crowd responded wildly with ovations and chants.

Goulart climaxed the evening with a speech which ran for more than an hour. Earlier at the rally, it had been announced that Goulart had signed a document (called the SUPRA decree, after the abbreviation for Superintendency for Agrarian Reform Planning) for the expropriation of underutilized land ten kilometers on either side of federal highways, railways, and water projects.¹⁹¹ This decree closely resembled a land reform idea of Goulart’s that Gordon had criticized months earlier.¹⁹² When Goulart spoke of the SUPRA decree, the crowd responded with enthusiasm. Goulart noted that this decree was not yet agrarian reform, but only “a step forward on the path of the great structural reform”¹⁹³ and that there would be no structural reform without reforming the antiquated constitution.¹⁹⁴

At the rally, Goulart signed another decree, this one expropriating all privately owned oil refineries, all of which were already domestically owned, and putting them under the control of Petrobrás, the federal monopoly. He also announced plans to sign another decree dealing with rent control and ceilings. The crowd cheered these announcements as well.¹⁹⁵

General Castelo Branco watched part of the rally from across the street at the war ministry building. In the opinion of Vernon Walters, Castelo Branco’s decision to overthrow Goulart was probably made as he watched and listened to the crowd and the speeches calling for radical reforms that attacked basic institutions and private ownership and demanded legalization of the Communist party. Walters visited Castelo Branco that evening and together they watched the mass meeting on television. Castelo Branco commented that the only signs he had seen at the rally were hammers and sickles. After hearing the speeches and watching the crowd’s response, the general told his friend that he did not believe that Goulart would leave office when his term was completed.¹⁹⁶

Ambassador Gordon watched the rally on television and listened to the last of Goulart’s speech over the car radio on his way to the airport. He was disturbed by the unstable atmosphere, the overt communist participation in the rally, and the attacks on private ownership.¹⁹⁷

On Monday, March 16, the three-day conference began for U.S. ambassadors and some of the AID directors from Latin America. Ambassador Gordon was the only representative at the conference from the U.S. embassy in Brazil. Other participants were President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Assistant Secretary Mann, AID Administrator David Bell, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and representatives of various executive departments.¹⁹⁸

President Johnson’s speech on Monday reaffirmed strong U.S. support of the Alliance for Progress. He intended his remarks to allay any developing fears among Latin American leaders that U.S. interest in the Alliance, and therefore in Latin America, had waned with the change in administrations.¹⁹⁹

Thomas Mann’s address at a closed session on the evening of Tuesday, March 17, was leaked to the press and formed the basis of what became known as the Mann Doctrine. According to an article in the New York Times, Mann had outlined a policy in which the United States “would no longer seek to punish military juntas for overthrowing democratic regimes.”²⁰⁰ This policy seemed in effect to be a reversal of the Kennedy policy that had been “to deny diplomatic relations and economic aid to newly created military regimes, unless they offered firm assurances of restoring democratic rule within the foreseeable future.” Mann was reported to have emphasized four purposes of U.S. policy in Latin America: support of economic growth, protection of U.S. investments, nonintervention, and opposition to communism. Mann allegedly told the ambassadors that each case would have to be decided on its own merits and that they “should be guided by pragmatism and diplomatic professionalism.”²⁰¹

Lincoln Gordon, who heard Mann’s speech, thought that the press misrepresented Mann’s views and that someone who did not like Mann had leaked the story.²⁰² Mann believes that the reason for the leak went back to the conflict between the Kennedy men and President Johnson and that he became the focus of attack because the authority delegated to him frustrated those who wished to continue to control United States-Latin American policy.²⁰³

Lincoln Gordon thought that news accounts of Mann’s speech overstated a contrast by misrepresenting both the pre-existing Kennedy policy (making it sound more uniformly opposed to military coups) and the proposed LBJ policy (making Thomas Mann sound more sympathetic to such coups).²⁰⁴ Gordon believes that Kennedy’s dramatic show against military action in Peru did not help democratic institutions in that country and that in reacting to subsequent coups in Latin America, Kennedy had already shifted toward a more pragmatic approach.²⁰⁵

Vernon Walters corroborates Gordon on this count. When he was in Italy, just before transferring to Brazil, Walters had an occasion to talk with someone “high in the Kennedy administration” about the new assignment he was soon to assume as defense attaché in Brazil. Walters was told at that time that the United States was concerned about the political unrest and the growth of communism in Brazil, and that President Kennedy would not be averse to seeing the overthrow of Goulart’s government if it were replaced with a stable, anticommunist government, aligned with the “free,” Western world.²⁰⁶

Whether or not Tad Szulc’s stories in the New York Times provided an accurate report of Mann’s description of the United States-Latin American policy in the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations, the press account was important. The Brazilian press picked up the story and gave it heavy coverage. On Friday, March 20, O Estado de São Paulo reported that Thomas Mann had informed U.S. Latin American ambassadors of a new policy according to which “military and right-wing dictatorships will no longer be punished by non-recognition when they overthrow democratic regimes.” It further outlined Mann’s four principles as they had appeared in the New York Times. The following day the headlines of O Estado de São Paulo linked turnovers in the presidential staff in the United States to the new policy toward Latin America.²⁰⁷ At least in Brazil, these changes were viewed as both new and significant.

Factions in Brazil were becoming more polarized and were mobilizing. In reaction to the rally in Rio on the thirteenth, a “March of Family with God for Liberty” was held in São Paulo on March 19. This march was organized largely by women, and the banners were anti-Goulart and anticommunist: “Resignation or Impeachment” and “Down with Red Imperialism.” There were more presidential rallies and decrees planned.²⁰⁸

After the Washington conference adjourned, Gordon delayed his return to Brazil in order to confer with U.S. officials. A meeting about the Brazilian situation later that week included Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John McCone, Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs Thomas Mann, Undersecretary of State George Ball, Special Assistant to the President Ralph Dungan, and Ambassador Gordon. Gordon was assigned to evaluate the situation in Brazil upon his return and to report back to Washington his opinion on conditions along with any policy suggestions he might have.²⁰⁹

Ambassador Gordon returned to Rio on Palm Sunday, March 22. The following Monday, and most of Tuesday, he met with his top staff members to assess conditions in Brazil and to consider U.S. responses. Included in this planning group were Ambassador Gordon; Colonel Vernon Walters, defense attaché; Jack Kubisch, director of AID in Brazil; the CIA representatives; and Gordon Mein, deputy chief of mission. Also consulted were Niles Bond, consul general in São Paulo, and Robert Dean, who was in charge of the U.S. embassy branch in Brasilia.²¹⁰

To the embassy group making the assessment, it appeared that Goulart’s support of social and economic reforms was contrived and a thinly veiled vehicle to seize dictatorial power.²¹¹

The embassy planners considered that the United States had several options. It could take no new action and simply observe whether or not Goulart would attempt to extend his powers and, if he did, make the necessary adaptations thereafter. If this were the choice, the United States would continue the current policy of giving and withholding assistance and of supporting those groups most aligned with official U.S. policy goals.

In Ambassador Gordon’s view, the best solution to the situation from both a Brazilian and a U.S. perspective would have been for Goulart to be “frightened off this campaign,” for the presidential elections scheduled for October 1965 to be held, and for a new president to take office January 31, 1966. While Gordon did not completely reject the possibility that something might yet keep Goulart on this track, he believed that “Goulart’s commitments to the revolutionary left [were then] so far-reaching…that the chances of achieving this peaceful outcome through Constitutional normalcy [seemed] a good deal less than 50/50.”²¹²

Defense Attaché Walters brought to the meeting on Monday morning a copy of a brief, as yet unpublished, memorandum he had just obtained, written by the army chief of staff, Castelo Branco, to the Army Officer Corps.²¹³ The memorandum provided a justification for the military in opposing the proposed constitutional assembly that Castelo Branco believed would lead to the closing of the Congress and the initiation of a dictatorship, and it upheld the charge of the military to defend and protect the constitution and the law.²¹⁴ In the Brazilian military, the memorandum was to serve as a catalyst for activating support for a challenge to Goulart’s administration.

Walters informed the ambassador that General Castelo Branco had assumed active leadership in the theretofore widespread and loosely organized anti-Goulart movement.²¹⁵ U.S. intelligence indicated that a group of governors, including Carlos Lacerda of Guanabara, Adhemar de Barros of São Paulo, Ildo Meneghetti of Rio Grande do Sul, Nei Braga of Paraná, and José de Magalhães Pinto of Minas Gerais were aligning with this movement. The large showing of public support at the São Paulo march and former President Kubitschek’s recent acceptance of a nomination for president served as rallying points in the anti-Goulart movement.²¹⁶

Gordon attempted to determine where Goulart’s support was strongest and what that support might mean in terms of strategies in the Goulart movement. The embassy believed Goulart was supported by 15 to 20 percent of the population and of the Congress. Furthermore, Goulart and his supporters could enlist support from Petrobrás, the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, union leadership in transportation and other trade unions, units within the ministries of education and justice, elements in other governmental agencies, and the civil and military households of the president. Goulart could also find backing in rural workers’ associations. The embassy believed that attacks on military discipline, “through subversive organization of the noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel,” had had significant results—particularly in the air force and the navy. Gordon and his sources, however, believed that the “overwhelming majority [of the military] were legalist and anti-communist” and were backed by a “modest minority of long-standing right-wing coup supporters.”²¹⁷

Gordon believed Goulart would initially concentrate on pressuring the Congress to pass reform measures including a plebiscite law, delegation of additional powers to the president, legalization of the Communist party, and the enfranchisement of illiterates. In order to achieve these aims, Gordon foresaw Goulart’s immediate tactics as including “a combination of urban street demonstrations, threatened or actual strikes, sporadic rural violence, and abuse of the enormous discretionary financial power of the federal government…coupled with a series of populist executive decrees of dubious legality.” The embassy planners noted that Goulart could weaken resistance at the state level by withholding federal financing, and they believed that he was already attempting to control the news media for propaganda purposes.²¹⁸

The embassy assessment, based primarily on Walters’ information, was that Castelo Branco preferred to make a coup after some obviously unconstitutional move by Goulart, but that Goulart might consciously avoid unconstitutional acts “while continuing to move toward an irreversible [de facto]…assumption of power.” Based on this assumption, Gordon’s understanding was that Castelo Branco was “therefore preparing for a possible move sparked by a communist-led general strike call, another sergeant’s rebellion, a plebiscite opposed by Congress, or even a major government countermove against the democratic military or civilian leadership.” The embassy concluded that if Castelo Branco moved against Goulart on an issue which was not clearly unconstitutional, the general would enlist political coverage from the governors or the Congress.²¹⁹

After staff meetings and additional intelligence gathering, Gordon’s assessment was that “a desperate lunge [by Goulart] for totalitarian power might be made at any time.” Goulart planned further rallies and executive decrees. Gordon believed that any of those might become the forum for him to annul the Congress and the existing constitution and to establish a plebiscite to ratify both his action and a rewriting of the constitution.²²⁰

An attempt to overthrow Goulart was imminent. If the Brazilian military attempted a coup, a civil war appeared to be a real possibility. If events led to a showdown between these two forces, then the United States preferred that the anti-Goulart conspirators be successful in their bid for the government.²²¹

Vernon Walters believed that the Brazilians would resent the United States’ assuming a show of leadership in the coup. The conspirators had indicated that a coup was being planned and that if it were successful they were going to need economic cooperation and assistance from the United States in getting the government and the economy moving again. To this group the U.S. policymakers had made no binding commitments but had left generally favorable impressions. As the United States considered alternative strategies, Walters recommended that no plans be made to send troops to Brazil.²²² Walters seemed to take care to avoid what might be interpreted as U.S. involvement in the developing conspiracy; he would drive past Castelo Branco’s home without stopping to visit as he had in earlier, less difficult days.²²³

The first plan dealt with petroleum supplies. In the event of a coup, access to petroleum could be critical to the conspirators, both for military transportation and to keep civilian aspects of the country running smoothly. The U.S. planners feared that Goulart supporters in the Petrobrás union might blow up the refineries.²²⁵ If U.S. petroleum were needed and supplied, the United States could in this one action be helpful both to the conspirators and to Brazil as a whole, since presumbly large portions of the country might otherwise be temporarily paralyzed without oil supplies.²²⁶

The second plan proposed by the embassy was that a U.S. carrier task force be sent to Brazil. Two purposes could be served through this action. Based on reports from various intelligence sources, the embassy planners believed that when the coup occurred the largest section of the country would probably fall immediately to Castelo Branco, but that a dissident fringe might resist, particularly in Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco. A U.S. carrier fleet in waters off the Brazilian coast might assist in maintaining stability through a U.S. military presence. The carriers might also be used to evacuate U.S. citizens if the military coup developed into a life-threatening situation.²²⁷

On March 27, Ambassador Gordon sent a lengthy Top Secret teletyped message to the State Department that he requested be passed immediately to Secretary of State Rusk, Assistant Secretary Mann, Director of the Office of Brazilian Affairs Ralph Burton, Defense Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, CIA Director John McCone, Colonel J. C. King, Desmond Fitzgerald (CIA), McGeorge Bundy (White House), Ralph Dungan (White House), and General Andrew P. O’Meara (U.S. commander in chief-south, Canal Zone).²²⁸

In this message, only parts of which have been declassified, the ambassador concluded that Goulart was definitely engaged in a campaign to seize dictatorial powers and that, if Goulart were to succeed in this effort, Brazil would probably come “under full communist control.” Gordon flatly rejected the possibility that Goulart’s purpose might be to secure constructive social and economic reform but proposed instead that it was “to discredit the existing constitution and the Congress, laying a foundation for a coup from the top down.” Gordon described Goulart’s tactics, the resistance led by General Castelo Branco, and the conditions under which Castelo Branco would move. The ambassador believed that “the possibilities clearly included civil war, with some horizontal or vertical division within the Armed Forces, aggravated by widespread possession of arms in civilian hands on both sides.”²²⁹ Gordon recommended the two contingency plans developed at the embassy that would keep open U.S. options to be able to respond positively in favor of the conspirators.²³⁰

On March 26, around 1,200 sailors rallied at the metal workers’ union building in protest of Navy Minister Mota’s ordering the arrest of eleven men in the sailors’ union who had been making demands for political privileges and improved living conditions. When the rally did not disband, Goulart flew in from Rio Grande do Sul on March 27 to intercede. Labor leaders were involved in the negotiations, and the sailors were granted amnesty. Goulart accepted Mota’s resignation over the incident and selected as a replacement retired Admiral Paulo Mario Cunha Rodriguez, whose name had been suggested by the Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT). It was a galling affront to the military that leftist and communist leaning labor leadership should give direction to military affairs.²³¹

When General Kruel conveyed to Goulart the detrimental impact on the president’s relations with the military of the actions he had taken in the case of the sailors’ rebellion, the president reacted verbally with concern. Any positive action by the president was short-circuited by the reassurances of Assis Brasil, head of the presidential military household, that Goulart did indeed have strong military backing. Goulart once again suffered for being poorly informed.²³²

On March 30, Goulart delivered an impassioned televised speech before 2,000 army corporals and sergeants at Rio’s Automobile Club. Goulart had been advised by former Prime Minister Tancredo Neves of the folly of his addressing a military group so soon after granting the sailors amnesty, but Goulart was confident he could carry the evening. Casting aside his prepared speech, Goulart aligned himself with the rebellious sailors. The president accused a privileged minority with responsibility for the crisis in Brazil. Goulart talked of false discipline and vowed that he would not allow disorder in the name of order.²³³

General Mourão Filho, commander of the Fourth Military Region located in Minas Gerais, heard Goulart’s March 30 speech on the radio and decided to act. The morning of Tuesday, March 31, he began moving troops and tanks toward Rio. Castelo Branco was surprised and concerned because all of the coordinating plans had not been completed. Unable to stop Mourão’s advance, even temporarily, Castelo Branco and the other conspirators focused on giving Mourão all possible support.²³⁵

That same day, General Kruel urged Goulart by phone to make a turnabout on his leftist policies. The president, citing his popular support, refused. That evening Kruel ordered his army to move on Rio, thereby joining “a revolução.”²³⁶

As developments in Brazil reached a crisis, the Americans stepped up the efficiency of their communications. A teletype machine, set up in the embassy during the week after Gordon returned from Washington, remained in operation through part of the first week in April, with exchanges between the State Department and the Rio embassy usually scheduled at least twice daily.²³⁷ On the afternoon of March 30, Secretary Rusk instructed the U.S. embassy in Brazil to expedite dissemination of information by including the White House, the office of the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander in chief of the southern command, and the CIA as recipients of “all important telegrams dealing with substantive matters.”²³⁸ Washington took a further lead. A cable that evening from Secretary Rusk (drafted by Burton and approved by Mann) instructed all U.S. consulates in Brazil to be on a twenty-four-hour alert and to report directly to Washington “any significant developments involving military or political resistance to the Goulart regime.”²³⁹ Ambassador Gordon canceled a trip to Alagoas at the suggestion of Vernon Walters who was convinced the coup would begin on the thirty-first.²⁴⁰

On the evening of March 30, Niles Bond, consul general in São Paulo, cabled Washington that “two sources active in [the] anti-Goulart movement say that [the] coup against GOB [government of Brazil] should come within forty-eight hours.” Bond was not convinced about the forty-eight—hour timetable but believed that the opposition to Goulart was taking the offensive. Bond added an important message: these two unnamed principal conspirators had inquired for the first time “whether [the] American fleet can reach Southern Brazil fast.”²⁴¹

On the evening of March 30, the Associated Press released a House Foreign Affairs Committee Report dealing with “Winning the Cold War.” The story, while reporting criticism of Goulart’s tolerance of communism, quoted the report as saying that “despite [the] critical situation [in] Brazil, there is little prospect for [a] communist takeover there in the foreseeable future.” Concerned about the timing of positive statements about Goulart just as the United States was committing itself to his overthrow, Secretary Rusk gave a special briefing to reporters to explain that the report had been prepared in January and that Brazil was “increasingly subject to communist influence,” much to the dismay of the United States. The briefing statements were reported along with the story.²⁴² Gordon was pleased and felt it was timely for the United States to make “some public expression of interest and concern.”²⁴³

At 11:30 A.M. on March 31 in Washington, a meeting was held attended by Secretary Rusk and other State Department representatives, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Maxwell Taylor, U.S. Commander in Chief of Southern Forces (USCINCSO) Lt. Gen. Andrew P. O’Meara, CIA Director John McCone, and other top officials. At the meeting there were briefings on the military situation in Brazil and on U.S. naval and air support capabilities. The group considered what political actions should be taken (such as consultation with other Latin American countries, public statements, and other possibilities) and discussed organizational arrangements for dealing with the Brazilian crisis, including setting up an interdepartmental task force and considering “relations and communications between [the U.S.] Embassy [in] Rio, consulates, and U.S. military forces.”²⁴⁴

At this meeting or earlier a military contingency plan was considered and approved that went beyond the embassy’s two suggestions that petroleum and a carrier fleet be sent to Brazil. This third plan involved arrangements for actual arms and ammunition to be sent to Brazil as contingency support for the conspirators.²⁴⁵

After the Washington meeting, Undersecretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Mann, and Special Assistant to the President Ralph Dungan prepared a teletyped message to Ambassador Gordon. The message stated, “the dilemma we face is: a) our concern not to let an opportunity pass that may not recur, b) our concern not to get USG [U.S. government] out in front on [a] losing cause.” The teletype suggested that Gordon send no more messages to Brazilian governors or military until some policy decisions were made in Washington.²⁴⁶

Earlier Gordon had sent word to some governors in Brazil, in which he had emphasized the necessity from the U.S. point of view of creating a government which would have a claim to legitimacy.²⁴⁷ The teletype message from the State Department suggested that some combination of four items would be regarded by the United States as minimal elements in a claim to legitimacy: “establishment of unconstitutional acts by Goulart,” a “claim to [the] Presidency by [the] individual in [the] line of succession,” “action by Congress or some elements of Congress having some claim to legislative authority,” and “recognition or ratification by some or all state governments.” Although only Mourão’s army was in revolt, the teletype made clear what conditions would be necessary for any overt assistance by the United States to the group laying claim to the government after the overthrow of Goulart: “the formation of a government claiming to be [the] Government of Brazil,” “the establishment of some color of legitimacy,” “the successful seizure and holding of significant Brazilian territory in the name of such government,” “and a request by such government to the United States and other American States for recognition and assistance in upholding [the] Constitutional government.” The teletype did ask what civilians might lay claim to the presidency but added “this does not rule out [the] possibility of [a] military junta as [a] last resort, but that would make U.S. assistance much more difficult.”²⁴⁸

The teletype of March 31 contained some specific questions about Brazilian military plans for action and then turned to the logistics of getting petroleum, oil, and lubricants (called POL in teletype communications) to Brazil. The message indicated that tankers could not arrive for fourteen days. An alternative suggested by Washington was the possibility of delivering the petroleum, oil, and lubricants by air; such a delivery, however, would require a “secure landing field able to accept jets and [the] probable need for fighter cover during transit to Brazil” or “alternatively and preferably [the] use of West Coast group which would involve landing and over-flight rights over other American states.” The second alternative assumed the establishment of a new government that would be recognized by the countries the craft would fly over.²⁴⁹

On the morning of March 31, former President Kubitschek indicated that there would be resistance to a takeover in the form of a general strike lasting two or three days but that workers would return to work “when they got hungry.”²⁵⁰ Based on U.S. policy makers’s concerns that there might be a two- or three-day general strike, Gordon was asked in the March 31 teletype whether it would be “necessary for the U.S. to mount [a] large material program to assure [the] success of [the] takeover.”²⁵¹

The afternoon of March 31, the United States began turning military contingency plans into action. The first plan implemented sent a heavy attack aircraft carrier, the Forrestal, and supporting destroyers (including one destroyer with guided missiles) sailing toward Brazilian waters. The purpose of the task group was “to establish U.S. presence in this area and to be prepared to carry out tasks as may be assigned.”²⁵² The ships were to depart Norfolk, Virginia, at 7:00 A.M. local time (9:00 A.M. Rio time) on April 1 and were scheduled to arrive at Santos, São Paulo’s port, around April 11. Additional support for the ships included attack oilers, ammunition ships, and provision ships.²⁵³

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. George S. Brown was appointed mission commander for project “Brother Sam.” This operation combined the carrier task force and POL support planned at the Rio embassy with the contingency operation, which originated in Washington, to supply arms and ammunition to the military conspirators in Brazil.²⁵⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed U.S. Commander in Chief South Lt. Gen. Andrew P. O’Meara to airlift 250 twelve-gauge shotguns marked “Brother Sam” to Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico by 3:00 P.M. Rio time on April l.²⁵⁵ In addition, 110 tons of small arms and ammunition marked “Brother Sam” were to arrive no later than noon EST on April 1 at McGuire Air Force Base, N.J., for airlifting to Brazil.²⁵⁶ Planes for the airlift included 7 C135 transport aircraft, 8 fighter aircraft, up to 8 tanker aircraft (for air rescue support), 1 communications aircraft, and 1 airborne command post.²⁵⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized secrecy in “Brother Sam” instructions that four tankers be loaded with a total of 136,000 barrels of motor gas, 272,000 barrels of JP-4 (jet fuel), 87,000 barrels of aviation gas, 33,000 barrels of diesel, and 20,000 barrels of kerosene. The ships were due at Aruba by 7:00 P.M. Rio time on March 31 where the petroleum, oil, and lubricants would be loaded.²⁵⁸

Gordon did meet with Kubitschek at the former president’s home at about 9:00 P.M. that evening. Gordon wanted Kubitschek to take a stronger position against Goulart and to use his considerable influence to “swing [a] large congressional group and thereby influence [the] legitimacy issue.”²⁶¹ Kubitschek felt that the legitimacy problem that so concerned Gordon would be readily handled by the Congress, if there were a favorable military balance. The former president was distracted by the lack of news from São Paulo (Kruel had not yet marched) and kept flipping dials on his radio. Kubitschek explained that a move from São Paulo was critical because if Mourão’s rebellion were quashed, “Goulart would be on [a] high road to dictatorship.” When Gordon left Kruel still had not made his move.²⁶²

At 11:00 P.M. on the thirty-first, Colonel Walters went to the apartment of Gen. Floriano de Lima Brayner.²⁶³ Walters explained that Ambassador Gordon wanted to know about the situation in Brazil. Brayner told Walters that Kruel had issued his manifesto. “Graças a Deus,” responded the American colonel.²⁶⁴

At 7:00 A.M. at Howard Air Force Base in Panama (9:00 A.M. Rio time) on April 1, a Top Secret joint U.S. Army-Navy-Air Force-CIA task force went into action under the command of air force Major General Breitweiser.²⁶⁵ The purpose of this task force appears to have been to follow and coordinate the logistics of Brother Sam.²⁶⁶

A naval group headed by Admiral Levi Reis set up a command post on Copacabana Beach on the morning of April 1. He was trying to arrange for three destroyers to operate off Rio and a submarine to operate off Santos as part of the coordinated anti-Goulart movement. Reis asked the U.S. chief of naval mission “if and when U.S. might be able to provide fuel for submarines.”²⁶⁷

At 10:00 A.M. on April 1, U.S. officials in Washington contemplated the political effects of overt U.S. support in the coup and asked the embassy whether “the momentum [would] continue on the anti-Goulart side without some covert or overt encouragement from our side?” The concern of the policy makers appears to have been not the appropriateness of U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of Brazil, but whether overt indication of U.S. support would “play into Goulart’s hands at this moment?”²⁶⁸

Gordon responded, “Momentum now clearly gathered and for these hours does not need special encouragement from us…. At this moment overt indication [of] our support would be a serious political error which would play into Goulart’s hands.” Gordon did not rule out overt U.S. support, for he added, “We shall of course continue focusing on this question hourly as situation evolves.” To Washington’s question of whether any leaders in the rebellion had “pressed…for overt support,” the ambassador played down the importance of the requests of Governor Adhemar de Barros and others from São Paulo “who continue talking unclearly about arms needs and possible desirability of [a] show of Naval Force.” In the meantime, U.S. contingency operations continued moving toward their positions of support to the overthrow of Goulart.²⁶⁹

U.S. decision making was based on accurate and timely information from excellent intelligence sources. An unnamed source in the telegraph agency informed the embassy when Second Army troops crossed the state line between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro on the morning of April l.²⁷⁰ There were two demonstrations that afternoon in downtown Rio, and runners shuttled back and forth between these rallies and the embassy keeping the staff apprised.²⁷¹ Vernon Walters made arrangements to see Castelo Branco or a member of his staff at 2:00 P.M. on April 1 and again on the morning of April 2.²⁷²

In the early morning hours of April 1, the president of the Brazilian Senate, Auro de Moura Andrade, without a congressional vote declared the Brazilian presidency vacant. The president of the supreme court, without a vote of that court, presided over the swearing-in of an interim president, Paschoal Ranieri Mazzilli, president of the Chamber of Deputies.²⁷³

Goulart’s support was disoriented and ineffective. Strikes were called but were not carried out. The resistance lacked coherent planning and strong leadership. At about 1:00 P.M. on April 1, Goulart left Rio, flying to Brasilia.²⁷⁴ Instead of taking a planned stand in Brasilia, Goulart flew on to Rio Grande do Sul that night.

On the afternoon of April 1, Gordon and his staff were in the ambassador’s eighth-floor embassy office tracking movements by radio, telephone, and messengers. In spite of the day’s heat, the air conditioning was cut off as a precaution against someone’s using the vents to smoke out the occupants. The drapes were closed to discourage snipers.²⁷⁵ Events were moving quickly. Castelo Branco had issued a statement that Goulart had stepped outside legal bounds.²⁷⁶ The First and Second armies reached an agreement without fighting. Word came that the anticoup demonstrations in Rio had dispersed and that most resistance appeared to have been neutralized.²⁷⁷

At 5:30 P.M. Gordon teletyped the State Department, “We believe it is all over, with [the] democratic rebellion already 95% successful.” He noted that there might yet be some civil strife and that “we have begun staff work on possible needs for internal security help, financial stabilization, etc.”²⁷⁸ Washington responded, “We have [had] a special task force here now at work several days on economic and financial assistance, emergency relief, etc. and are prepared promptly to act on your recommendations.” After the teletype conference, Undersecretary Ball called President Johnson to tell him the news.²⁷⁹

Overt U.S. military support of Goulart’s overthrow quickly became unnecessary. Gordon cabled Washington a lengthy situation report at 1:00 A.M. on April 2, in which he described the strengths of the apparent victors and the few remaining pockets of resistance. In considering possible U.S. responses, he noted that “until democratic²⁸⁰ control [of] refineries [is] assured, [the] possible need for petroleum products cannot be excluded.” This statement meant that the tankers loaded with petroleum, oil, and lubricants continued toward Brazil. Gordon did not immediately cancel the pending shipment of 110 tons of U.S. arms and ammunition, because, he explained, “until [the] Third Army situation [is] clearly under control,…we cannot completely exclude [a] possible request for materiel.” Gordon focused on the potential economic repercussions of the coup and communicated to Washington that he believed that the situation might “require some emergency supplies such as food, public safety materiel, POL.” He went on to say that “we are also considering here what many economic aid steps will be required to provide rapid support to [the] new administration.”²⁸¹

Although the embassy staff began to focus on economic support, they maintained their high-level intelligence of military operations in Brazil. On April 2, at 4:00 P.M., Gordon communicated to Washington that he had “just received confirmation from Castelo Branco that all resistance has ceased in Porto Alegre and democratic forces now in full control of RGS [Rio Grande do Sul]. This eliminates last pocket military resistance.”²⁸²

That same afternoon, 200,000 persons crowded into downtown Rio for a victory parade of the group March of Family with God for Liberty. Gordon described the euphoria of the crowd waving Brazilian flags and anticommunist banners, singing their national anthem, and throwing confetti. Gordon added that the “only unfortunate note was [the] obviously limited participation in [the] march of lower classes.”²⁸³

U.S. attention was largely focused on changing the economic picture for Brazil. On April 2, in the day’s first teletype message, Gordon was asked who he thought would be the next finance minister and what the chances were that he would in the next thirty days make a serious effort to put Brazil’s financial affairs in order.²⁸⁴

On the evening of April 2, Assistant Secretary Mann described to Gordon the thinking at the State Department concerning U.S. assistance to Brazil, which, according to Mann, would have two objectives: to be helpful to and support the new regime and to encourage a “reasonable stabilization development program supported by total free world resources, including U.S.” Mann explained that in order to get either U.S. congressional or international agency support, “it will be necessary to prevail upon the Brazilian authorities to work out a program for economic development and financial stability.” The United States hoped a program of this sort would begin immediately under Interim President Mazzilli. Mann noted that attention must be given to the unattractive aspects of any effective program which could be “exposed to attack from many sides, particularly the communist and commie-liners.”²⁸⁵

The assistant secretary added that “in light of latest developments” the ambassador might wish to consider areas in which the U.S. government could cooperate more effectively with the Brazilian government; Mann mentioned specifically Title I/PL 480 (Food for Peace) shipments, development of the Northeast, agrarian reform, and reconsideration of the current U.S. position to provide only project, as opposed to program, loans. Mann indicated that the United States was interested in seeing a presidential successor “above party interests,” a strong finance minister and cabinet that would implement an effective economic program, and an economic package that would require “sacrifice for all groups including land reform and more effective tax collection.” Mann inquired of the ambassador, “To what extent could [the] possibility [of] large scale external assistance influence along [the] lines of this message?”²⁸⁶

Additional U.S. assistance to Brazil of the magnitude being considered would require congressional approval. On April 2, Gordon sent a cable by way of the State Department and White House to Carl Hayden, president pro tempore of the Senate and a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, recommending that “the greatest possible consideration be given to any request [by the new Brazilian government] for economic emergency assistance.” Gordon described Goulart’s “de facto ouster” as “a great victory for [the] free world,” without which the result could have been a “total loss to [the] West of all South American Republics.” Gordon indicated that the change in government should “create a greatly improved climate for private investments” and for the Alliance for Progress. Noting that AID had been important to the economic and political life of Brazil in “strengthening efforts in support of democratic ideals,” Gordon closed, “I believe it to be to U.S. interests to support and strengthen as much as possible the present regime.”²⁸⁷

The Brazilian constitution provides automatic forfeiture of office if the president leaves the country without congressional permission. Goulart, however, had still been in the country when Mazzilli had been sworn in; therefore, there was no constitutional basis for this unilateral move. Gordon was troubled by the illegitimacy of the new government and wanted the Brazilian Congress to ratify the action by vote before President Johnson sent a message of recognition. With that purpose in mind, he advised Bob Dean, who headed the U.S. embassy branch in Brasilia, to seek out congressional legitimization.²⁸⁹

In the meantime, Ambassador Gordon and Undersecretary Ball had a series of teletyped conversations concerning the wording of the recognition message to be sent from President Johnson.²⁹⁰ Gordon’s draft contained the phrase “in accordance with Constitutional procedures.”²⁹¹ Gordon wished to use the opportunity to emphasize obliquely that the United States expected the new government to proceed along constitutional lines.²⁹² Ball deleted the line, and Gordon suggested an alternative referring to Mazzilli’s “installation as constitutional President of Brazil.”²⁹³ Ball vetoed this wording also. His rationale for leaving out both suggestions was possibly because he thought they were clumsily worded²⁹⁴ or possibly because he thought an earlier reference to Brazil’s resolving difficulties “within a framework of constitutional democracy”²⁹⁵ made the suggestion unnecessary²⁹⁶ or perhaps it was because it seemed foolish to call a procedure constitutional when in fact Interim President Mazzilli had been appointed illegally.

There was further discussion on the timing of Johnson’s message. Ambassador Gordon recommended that the statement of recognition be issued immediately. At 6:00 P.M. on April 2 he sent a teletype to Washington emphasizing that “despite continued uncertainty [of the] whereabouts of Goulart I reiterate [my] recommendation [that the] Presidential message [be sent].” Ball was willing to acquiesce to the ambassador’s recommendation pending the removal of the “constitutional” phrases, but he had some misgivings as to whether or not the statement might be premature or whether such alacrity might be interpreted as U.S. interference in the internal affairs of another nation. The issue here appears not to be concern that the United States might be overextending its involvement, but rather that it might be interpreted as such. Gordon made his case for immediate release of Johnson’s statement:

We naturally reflected on precisely these points before making [our] recommendations. Since [the] country [is] now completely pacified and in [the] hands [of] democratic forces with Congressional support even though no formal vote, I cannot see how the message could be construed as interference. Since prospects [for a] Congressional vote now seem minimal, I believe that the sooner we act the better. Our failure to send [the] message by tomorrow would begin to raise questions here [in Brazil] as to whether we are reacting as in Peruvian case. Our line should be that there is no break in constitutional continuity.²⁹⁷

Johnson’s message was released that night, less than eighteen hours after Mazzilli’s hurried installation. The U.S. president sent his “warmest good wishes,” admiring “the resolute will of the Brazilian community to resolve…difficulties within a framework of constitutional democracy and without civil strife.” Johnson looked forward to “intensified cooperation in the interests of economic progress and social justice for all, and of hemispheric and world peace.”²⁹⁸

The next day (April 3) Secretary Rusk adroitly obfuscated the issues that had been troubling U.S. policy makers. In reply to questions at a news conference, he stated the U.S. position:

I would think that recognition is basically a political act which normally, in the usual circumstances, applies where a government is in control of the country and accepts its international responsibilities, but this will vary from time to time because as a political act it needs to be taken alongside of the other interests of the United States in a particular situation, including our interest in moving jointly with others whenever possible in a concert of policy. Now in the case of Brazil, of course, this matter does not arise because the succession there occurred as foreseen by the Constitution and we would assume that recognition is not involved in that particular issue or point.²⁹⁹

Goulart finally left Brazil on April 4 and flew to Uruguay to join his family in exile. Before he left Brazil, Secretary Rusk cabled the U.S. embassy in Montevideo communicating his concern that Goulart might be received as if he were still Brazil’s president on the grounds that he had not yet resigned. Rusk suggested to the U.S. staff in Montevideo “it would be useful if you could quietly bring to the attention [of] appropriate officials the fact that despite his allegations to [the] contrary Goulart has abandoned his office.”³⁰⁰

By noon on April 2, the ambassador was contemplating canceling the orders of the carrier task force sailing toward Brazil. The next afternoon, through orders of Admiral Harold Smith, this operation was canceled with instructions to “preserve the ‘Quick Kick’ cover story for entire operations.” Smith suggested that the carrier force carry out a training exercise on April 8 “off MHC” and then revert units to normal operations.³⁰¹ On the afternoon of April 3, General O’Meara in Panama, under whom the joint task force had been tracking all military contingency operations for Brazil,³⁰² recommended that the “110-ton package of arms and ammunition continue to be held at McGuire pending Ambassador Gordon’s determination of whether Brazilian military forces or state police forces will require early U.S. support,” and that the Tactical Air Command, the Strategic Air Command, and the Military Air Transport Service sections of the “Brother Sam” operation be released, and that “only that part of the POL movement which [the] Ambassador considers essential to current situation be continued.”³⁰³

The “Brother Sam” petroleum, oil, and lubricants remained in transit until Friday or Saturday, April 4 or 5, when Ambassador Gordon contacted officials at Petrobrás to see if Brazil had need of extra petroleum products. The Brazilian officials thanked the ambassador but declined the offer. Gordon reported to Washington that the petroleum, oil, and lubricants would not be needed, and these supplies were diverted elsewhere.³⁰⁴

On the evening of April 3 an order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff canceled the airlift and fighter and tanker support for the “Brother Sam” arms and ammunition project.³⁰⁵ The actual materiel remained in storage until Monday, April 7, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the arms order pending shipment to Brazil be canceled and that the guns be returned to normal storage.³⁰⁶

Thus, the “Brother Sam” military contingency plans initiated action and terminated it, with the United States never having been physically involved in Goulart’s overthrow.

Economic assistance is a major tool of U.S. foreign policy. In 1961, the Alliance for Progress marked a dramatic increase in total U.S. economic assistance to Brazil (see Tables 1 and 2).

Development assistance loans through AID during this period were divided into two categories: program and project.³⁰⁷ Central governments are recipients of program loans that are made for general economic development and address macro-economic problems involving a country’s balance-of-payments deficit and its fiscal and monetary programs. The United States tends to prefer multilateral solutions to problems requiring program loans, so that cooperation with the IMF is usually sought in program loans. Project loans are more specific in purpose, such as for construction of a dam or road. Some U.S. assistance is in the form of grants; with the self-help goals in the Alliance for Progress, however, U.S. policy tended to emphasize loans.

Any U.S. development loan or grant has to meet standards for potential contribution to development and for feasibility. During the early sixties, AID funded a variety of projects in Brazil, including health services, educational services, roads, and power plants. Ambassador Gordon, a respected economist, worked with the various finance ministers to assist in creating sound economic and development policies within the social and economic development design of the Alliance for Progress.³⁰⁸

Bilateral aid generally has an implied if not an overt political purpose. During the sixties a pattern emerged from the U.S. aid programs to Brazil of assistance being withheld from those who were perceived as friendly with the radical left or with communists and of aid being channeled most often to those governors and institutions that were perceived as protectors of a noncommunist society. This pattern has suggested to some that the United States exerted an undue influence on the direction of internal Brazilian affairs.

In the April 19, 1964, edition of O Estado de São Paulo, Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann described the pattern and purposes of U.S. assistance before and after the coup:

Last January when we assumed our duties we were convinced that communism would rapidly erode the government of João Goulart in Brazil. Even before assuming our actual position, moreover, we already were following a policy destined to grant aid to certain state governments in Brazil. We did not furnish any money to support the balance of payments or the budget, nor did we take any measures that could directly benefit the central government of Brazil. In our opinion, which I believe is shared by many Brazilian specialists, and in words attributed to efficient governors of various states, the limited assistance destined for the Goulart administration contributed toward financing democracy…. Now after the replacement of Sr. Goulart, if the government of Brazil supports a stabilization and self-help program, which is the type of development program that we want to see, or in other words, if they accept their responsibilities in the Alliance for Progress, we would be prepared to consider making appreciably more substantial funds available.³⁰⁹

Mann later elaborated on this statement: the United States did not “Intervene in Brazil’s internal affairs” in the classic sense of the word (military coercion), and he did not recall that the United States tried to influence Brazil’s policies through economic leverages.³¹⁰ On this point, State Department cables written by Mann and his later recollections tend to create divergent impressions.³¹¹

U.S. economic assistance during the Goulart administration evolved into one of not assisting the central government. Ambassador Gordon denies the contention that U.S. aid was designed to harm the central government or that it was purposely skewed to assist Brazilian opposition to Goulart. He asserts that the policy of giving aid to “islands of administrative sanity,” which met Alliance for Progress standards, was designed for the most part, though not entirely, for economic development purposes.³¹²

There were no program loans negotiated while Goulart was president.³¹³ As a result of the Bell-Dantas negotiations, there was a final release of $25.5 million in April 1963 of monies from a program loan negotiated during the Quadros administration.³¹⁴

In June 1964, three months after the coup, the United States negotiated and released $50 million as “an emergency measure to meet a foreign exchange crisis.” Within four years there were four program loans for an additional total of $475 million from the United States to the military government of Brazil.³¹⁵ U.S. policy makers could point to the fiscal inconsistencies in the Goulart administration in order to justify both not releasing funds to his government and subsequent generosity of the U.S. government to the military that overthrew Goulart.

Based on State Department work sheets and the annual reports to Congress it is difficult to draw conclusions about the ideological or security purposes of U.S. project assistance. Reports do indicate that between 1956 and 1970 the only years in which the United States gave project loans directly to state governments or state-owned enterprises were the calendar years 1962 to 1966 (see Table 3).³¹⁶ Loans, however, could benefit more than one state; and, aside from knowledge of a governor’s political affiliations, the political implications of funding one group over another require further specific knowledge (through cables, memoranda, interviews, or other studies) of the negotiations and the options available.

President Kennedy’s request to AID Administrator Fowler Hamilton to do something favorable for Brazil before their October 1962 elections, which the United States considered crucial, carried obvious political implications.³¹⁷ The United States unsuccessfully tried to influence the gubernatorial race in Pernambuco in those October elections by funding projects of those opposing Miguel Arraes, a nationalist and social reformer who was regarded by the United States as a communist.³¹⁸

Riordan Roett, in his book The Politics of Foreign Aid, analyzes the political constraints and purposes which permeated the large AID mission to the Brazilian Northeast in the early sixties. Roett describes numerous decisions made by AID officials for the stated purpose of regional development that were designed first to meet the more immediate objective of blocking communist penetration in the area. The United States concentrated on high visibility programs that would gain support from the governors and that would prove that noncommunist democratic government responded to the needs of the people. Roett demonstrates the political implications of U.S. development loan activities by comparing the concentration of U.S. economic assistance to the Northeast before the coup (when the anticommunist security issue was critical) with the neglect of those projects after the coup and the concomitant economic support of the new central government, which then assumed the primary role in the opposition to communism.³¹⁹

Some U.S. economic assistance in the sixties supported projects that corresponded to the desire of the United States to see Brazil take serious measures to deal with problems of internal security. The purpose of the AID Public Safety Program was to improve the quality of the police forces in Brazil. In the early sixties, in addition to criminology equipment, this AID program furnished Brazilian police with over 31,000 grenades, as well as batons, body shields, and vests for riot control. Trainees studied such subjects as riot control, fire arms, investigations, counterintelligence, handling explosives, patrol operations, and border and customs control.³²⁰ Compared to total AID monies in Brazil, the Public Safety Program was relatively small; it is, however, an example of how U.S. assistance was able to address a political concern for internal security matters in the country through an economic development program.

Not all economic assistance is through development aid programs. Throughout the fifties and the sixties, Brazil was by far the largest single recipient of the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Latin America.³²¹ Military assistance to Brazil during the Goulart administration fluctuated between $17 million and $44 million annually (see Table 1).

Ambassador Gordon recognized the MAP as a “major vehicle for establishing close relationships with personnel of [the] armed forces” and as “a highly important factor [in] influencing [the Brazilian] military to be pro-U.S.” He regarded the Brazilian military as “an essential factor…in [the] strategy for restraining left-wing excesses of the Goulart government.” While Brazilian police forces were important in maintaining order against minor disturbances and crime prevention, the ambassador viewed the regular armed forces as the “only force capable of putting down large-scale uprisings or disorders.”³²² Judging from State Department cables, the United States considered internal security in Brazil a significant purpose and focus of the MAP.

In addition to outright military assistance and the Public Safety Program, Brazil received “security supporting assistance” channeled through AID during the year before the coup ($25 million) and the year of the coup ($50 million). Security supporting assistance does not have to meet the same requirements as development assistance loans and grants and is associated with some perceived threat to U.S. security.

Lincoln Gordon was a particularly able ambassador. His suggestion that no policy is so perfectly orchestrated that the United States completely controls the outcome of a series of events rings true. Taken individually, no loan or grant proves that U.S. development programs in Brazil were politically designed. Taken as a whole, however, U.S. development assistance, as well as military aid, seems to have had security motives of creating and maintaining U.S. alliances and of eradicating communism from the hemisphere. For the United States there was no conflict. The Foreign Assistance Report to the Congress for 1962 specifically linked social justice and economic development with a stand against communist subversion and infiltration. For Brazilians, such as SUDENE Director Celso Furtado or President Goulart, this black-and-white model was sometimes politically unfeasible. U.S. policy makers reacted to this lack of cooperation by assuming an adversary position and by seeking friendships and alliances elsewhere.

What was the role of U.S. economic assistance in the events in Brazil in the early sixties? The Goulart years were a disappointment for Ambassador Gordon in the lack of recognizable accomplishments through economic aid from and collaboration with the United States by Brazil.³²³ The accomplishments of specific projects could not eradicate a dismal set of economic trends in that country up to 1964. The evidence does not suggest that U.S. economic assistance caused the downfall of Goulart. There is evidence that U.S. aid further weakened an already weak central government, not only by withholding assistance from Goulart’s government which the U.S. policy makers felt would not or could not handle the aid responsibly, but also by effectively bypassing that government through direct U.S. dealings with and support of other groups, leaders, and institutions in the country and by frequently aligning U.S. assistance with those elements of Brazilian society that eventually overthrew Goulart.