Abbreviations Used
ACSI: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
AFCIN: Air Force Commander-in-Chief
CINCLANT: Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Forces
CINCLANTFLT: Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CFB: Country File, Brazil
COMSECONDFLT: Commander of the Second Fleet
COMUSARSO: Commander U.S. Army, Southern Forces
CSA: Chief of Staff, Army
CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force
DNI: Director of Naval Intelligence
JANAF: Joint Army, Navy, Air Force
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFK: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Waltham, Massachusetts
LBJ: Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas
NSF: National Security File
POF: Presidential Office Files
USCINCSO: U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Southern Forces
WHCF: White House Central Files
Notes on References to Materials in the Presidential Libraries
When citing material from the presidential libraries, I have included the following information whenever possible: the name of the originator of the document, the recipient of the document, the date, the file name, the box and folder titles, and the library in which the document is found. When this information was incomplete, I state in the note what my best judgement is regarding the source or date and I identify the document by the number assigned by the library.
Military messages are relayed using “date-time group” based on Greenwich mean time (also known as “Zulu,” commonly and in this book, denoted by a Z). Date-time groups are read as follows: the first two digits are the day of the month. Z time is five hours ahead of time in Washington, D.C., and three hours ahead of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasilia time. Thus, 010230Z April would be read as April 1, 2:30 A.M. Greenwich mean time. This notation would refer to March 31, 9:30 P.M. Washington time. The advantage of using standard time becomes more evident as the time of the coup approaches and the sequence of events becomes critical.
1. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 10 April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ; also, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Nomination of Lincoln Govdon of Massachusetts to be Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs, pp. 34–35, 37. In 1966, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was considering his nomination as assistant secretary of state for interamerican affairs, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon said, “I am absolutely convinced that the principal purpose for the Brazilian revolution of March 31 and April 1, 1964, was to preserve and not destroy
Brazil’s democracy, and I believe the record since that time bears that out” (p. 8). Although a series of institutional acts preempted the rights of individuals and placed unprecedented powers in the hands of the military presidents, Gordon held to this statement, in spite of the “exceptional powers” of the postcoup regime, until 1968 when the Fifth Institutional Act was signed. That act marked the abandonment of all legal pretense of upholding democratic institutions and gave the president virtually absolute authority. The president immediately suspended the Congress and there was a wave of arrests to counter political dissension. The Fifth Institutional Act prompted Gordon to sign a letter of protest over the arbitrary use of power in Brazil (Lincoln Gordon interview, January 19, 1976, Washington, D.C.).
2. Many of the documents at the Johnson Library have been translated into Portuguese by Marcos Sa Correa,
1964 Visto e Comentado pela Casa Branca.
3. There are recent publications that cite primary sources now open to scholars in Brazil. See John W. F. Dulles,
Castello Branco, and Moniz Bandeira,
O Governo João Goulart.
4. U.S. Department of State, “Declaration of the Peoples of America” and “Charter of Punta del Este,” in
American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1961, pp. 393–409.
5. “Charter of Punta del Este,” pp. 398–409.
6. “Goulart,” Box 112, Goulart Visit, POF, JFK; see also Thomas E. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964, p. 114.
7. “Current Intelligence Memorandum: Brazilian President João Goulart,” March 30, 1962, Box 12, POF, JFK; Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 129–130.
8. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 114; see also Vernon A. Walters,
Silent Missions, p. 379.
9. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
10. Roberto de Oliveira Campos interview with John E. Reilly, p. 34.
11. JCS to White House, Attn: Gen. Clifton, August 28, 1961, Box 12 and 13, Brazil Vol. 1, NSF, JFK.
12. Quoted in John W. F. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 149–150; Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 204–209.
13. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 204–212.
14. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
15. “Background Paper: Brazil,” Attachment to Memorandum from L. P. Battle to Richard N. Goodwin, September 14, 1961, Box 112, Brazil, Security, 1961, POF, JFK.
17. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
19. Campos interview, p. 17.
21. “Notes on Questions Concerning Brazil Which Most Preoccupy U.S. Opinions,” Box 112, Goulart Visit, POF, JFK.
22. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 271.
23. “Position Paper: The Climate for Private Investment in Brazil,” March 27, 1962, Box 112, Goulart Visit, POF, JFK.
24. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
27. See Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 191, 200–201.
28. Lincoln Gordon, “Points Supplementary to R. N. Goodwin Draft of 1–1–62 [
sic],” January 7, 1962, Box 12 and 13, Brazil Vol. 2, NSF, JFK.
29. Attachment to memorandum from Richard Goodwin to McGeorge Bundy, February 7, 1962, Box 12 and 13, Brazil Vol. 2, NSF, JFK.
31. Lincoln Gordon, “Points Supplementary to R. N. Goodwin Draft of 1–1–62.”
32. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 169.
33. Campos interview, p. 41.
35. Herbert K. May, treasury attaché, U.S. Embassy, Rio to State Department, January 23, 1961, Box 112, Brazil, Security, 1961, POF, JFK.
36. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 191, 194–195.
37. Ibid., pp. 194, 196–197.
38. “Position Paper: Additional Financial Assistance to Goulart,” April 3, 1962, Box 112, Goulart Visit, POF, JFK.
40. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 161–167.
41. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
42. “Intelligence Memorandum: Raul Francisco Ryff,” March 30, 1962, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1962, POF, JFK.
43. Campos interview, p. 24.
44. Geneen to Kennedy, February 17, 1962, Box 12 and 13, Brazil Vol. 2, NSF, JFK.
45. Gordon to Rusk, February 25, 1962, Box 12, POF, JFK.
46. Rusk to Gordon, March 7, 1962, Box 12, POF, JFK.
47. Rusk to U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, March 3, 1962, Box 12, POF, JFK.
49. “Position Paper: Additional Financial Assistance for Brazil,” March 3, 1962, Box 112, Goulart Visit, POF, JFK.
50. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
51.
U.S. Code Annotated, Title 22: 2370.
52. L. D. Battle to McGeorge Bundy, “Scope Paper,” March 26, 1962, Box 112, Goulart Visit, POF, JFK.
54. Gordon to Rusk, March 14, 1962, Box 12, POF, JFK.
55. Campos interview, p. 24.
57. Gordon to Rusk, March 15, 1962, Box 12 and 13, POF, JFK.
58. Campos interview, pp. 26–27.
59. Ibid., pp. 26–28; “Position Paper: Brazil’s Desire for a Sugar Quota,” March 26, 1962, Box 112, Goulart Visit, POF, JFK; “Position Paper: Coffee Stabilization Agreement,” March 26, 1962, Box 112, Goulart Visit, POF, JFK. The presidents also discussed sugar quotas, with Goulart pushing for such a quota and Kennedy suggesting the advantages of abolishing all sugar quotas. Goulart urged active U.S. support of an international coffee agreement that the United States stood ready to negotiate even though it was concerned about the overproduction of coffee in Brazil.
60. Campos interview, pp. 27–28.
64. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
65. Campos interview, p. 34.
66. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 218.
67. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
68. “CIA Information Report,” May 29, 1962, Box 12 and 13, Brazil, POF, JFK.
69. Gordon to Rusk, June 5, 1962, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1962, POF, JFK.
72. “Position Paper: Development of Brazilian Shale-Oil Industry,” March 29, 1962, Box 112, Goulart Visit, POF, JFK.
73. Gordon to Rusk, June 5, 1962, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1962, POF, JFK.
75. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 170.
76. Attachment to letter from William H. Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, July 28, 1962, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1962, POF, JFK.
77. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 171–172.
78. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
79. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 173.
80. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976; Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 174.
81. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
82. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 178–179.
83. JFK to Fowler Hamilton, February 5, 1962, Box 112, Brazil, Security, POF, JFK. A CIA intelligence report sent to President Kennedy in early April also emphasized the importance of the October elections. The report noted “a significant growth in leftist and nationalist sentiment in Brazil. These elements will probably substantially increase their present strength in Congress” (attachment to correspondence from John McCone to JFK, April 2, 1962, JFK).
84. Riordan Roett,
The Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 173.
85. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976. The first loan agreement for COPERBO was signed in September 1962 for $3.4 million. A second loan agreement for $3.3 million was signed
in August 1963 (Roett,
Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 140). Attempts to make COPERBO profitable were unsuccessful, and finally the lending institutions involved tried quietly to disassociate themselves from the project.
86. Roberto Garcia, “Castello perdeu a batalha” [trans. David Parker],
Veja, March 9, 1977, p. 6.
87. Vernon Walters interview, January 20, 1976; Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
88. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
90. Ibid.; Walters interview.
91. Campos interview, p. 40.
92. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
94. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 194.
95. Campos interview, p. 44.
97. Ibid., p. 45; Gordon interview, January 19, 1976;
Jornal do Brasil quoted in Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 195.
98. Campos interview, p. 45.
99. Roett,
Politics of Foreign Aid, p. 90.
100. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 218.
101. Ibid., p. 403 n. 57.
102. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 236.
103. Furtado estimated that in 1962 debt repayments and profit remittances reached $564 million, 45 percent of the value of Brazil’s exports during that same period (see Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 238).
104. Ibid., p. 238; Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 200–201.
105. Lincoln Gordon interview with John E. Reilly, p. 61.
106. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
107. Quoted in Attachment to Memorandum to JFK from Ralph Dungan, February 1, 1963, Box 62, Staff Memorandum, Dungan, POF, JFK.
108. David Bell to Kennedy, March 4, 1963, Box 12, POF, JFK.
109. Campos interview, p. 46.
110. Gordon interview, JFK, p. 60.
113. Goulart to Kennedy, March 8, 1963, Box 112, Brazil, Security, POF, JFK.
115. Campos interview, p. 47.
116. Bell to San Tiago Dantas, March 25, 1963, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1963, POF, JFK.
117. Dantas to Bell, March 25, 1963, attachment to correspondence from William H. Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, March 24, 1963, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1963, POF, JFK.
118. Campos interview, p. 48.
119. Gordon interview, JFK, p. 63.
120. “Current Intelligence Memorandum: Plotting against Goulart,” March 8, 1963, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1963, POF, JFK.
121. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 239.
122. Dantas to Bell, March 25, 1963, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1963, POF, JFK.
123. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 242–243.
124. Campos interview, p. 49.
125. Gordon to Rusk, April 9, 1963, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1963, POF, JFK.
128. Ibid.; Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
129. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 245.
130. Campos interview, p. 50.
131. William Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, May 7, 1963, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1963, POF, JFK.
132. U.S. Senate,
Nomination of Lincoln Gordon, p. 34.
133. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 176, 210.
134. Gordon interview, JFK, p. 65.
135. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 214.
136. Gordon to Rusk, July 17, 1963, and Rusk to U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, July 26, 1963, Box 13 and 14, Brazil Vol. 6, NSF, JFK.
137. See Braddock to Rusk, May 8, 1963; Braddock to Rusk,
May 10, 1963; and Feldman to Department of State, August 16, 1963, Box 13 and 14, Brazil Vol. 6, NSF, JFK.
138. Braddock to Department of State, August 16, 1963, Box 13 and 14, Brazil Vol. 6, NSF, JFK.
140. Constitution of the United States of Brazil, 1946, Title VII, Article 177.
141. Raymond Estep,
The Military in Brazilian Politics, 1821–1970, p. 92.
142. Vernon Walters, Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report, August 6, 1963, Box 2, Schlesinger File, JFK. This report gives the names of “ultranationalists” who were promoted or given better assignments and of “pro-US officers” who were often passed over or retired by Goulart.
143. Estep,
Military in Brazilian Politics, pp. 100–101.
144. Dungan to Kennedy and Attachment, September 27, 1963, Box 62, Staff Memorandum, Dungan, POF, JFK.
145. Joint Department of State–AID Message to U.S. Embassy Rio de Janeiro, September 24, 1963, Box 12 and 13, Brazil Vol. 7, NSF, JFK.
146. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976. The files of Arthur Schlesinger, assistant to the president, contained an article by Holmes Alexander entitled “A Cuba—or a China?” from the October 24, 1963, issue of the
Maryland Monitor. The article was sent to Schlesinger by John Plank at the State Department. The article criticized Gordon’s “islands of sanity” policy as too liberal and suggested that “a time soon may come to ask ourselves whether it is in our self-interest to have Goulart stagger on till the end of his term in 1965—or whether our interests would be better served if Goulart were ‘retired’ ahead of schedule…the only alternative to expect would be a communist-type takeover” (attachment to correspondence from Plank to Schlesinger, October 29, 1963, Box 2, Schlesinger File, JFK).
147. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
149. Niles Bond, minister consul general, São Paulo, to the State Department, January 16, 1963, CFB Vol. 1, NSF, JFK.
150. The Brazilian Constitution of 1946 gave the Congress
the power to declare a state of siege during war or during “serious domestic disturbance or facts evidencing its imminent outbreak” (Constitution of the United States of Brazil, 1946, Title IX, Art. 206).
151. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 263; Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 236–237.
152. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976; Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 246.
153. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 265–266.
154. Gordon interview, JFK, p. 66.
155. Campos interview, p. 52.
156. Quoted in Gordon to Rusk, November 20, 1963, Box 13 and 14, Brazil Vol. 7, NSF, JFK. This document notes that the “interview” was actually drafted by members of Goulart’s staff and had been submitted to the magazine five days earlier.
159. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 268.
160. Gordon to Rusk, November 20, 1963, Box 13 and 14, Brazil Vol. 7, NSF, JFK.
161. Gordon interview, JFK, pp. 67–69.
162. Campos interview, p. 53.
163. Gordon interview, JFK, pp. 55 and 68.
164. Goulart to Johnson, December 13, 1963, Presidential Correspondence—Brazil, LBJ.
165. Philip Geyelin,
Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, p. 97.
166. Robert A. Packenham,
Liberal America and the Third World, p. 94.
167. Thomas Mann interview, November 20, 1975, Austin, Texas. Mann was a former ambassador to Mexico who had served in positions of high responsibility with the State Department under three previous presidents.
168. Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, November 27, 1963, CFB Vol. 1, NSF, LBJ.
169. Gordon to Rusk, April 9, 1963, Box 112-A, CFB, Security, 1963, POF, JFK.
170. David Rockefeller to Johnson, November 29, 1963,
Name File, Business D–G, WHCF, LBJ.
171. Johnson to Rockefeller, December 11, 1963, Name File, Business D–G, WHCF, LBJ.
172. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 266–268.
173. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
177. Ibid.; Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 227, 271.
178. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
179. Quoted in Gordon to Rusk, January 18, 1964, CFB Vol. 1, NSF, LBJ.
180. Rusk to U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, February 18, 1964, CFB Vol. 1, NSF, LBJ.
181. Gordon to Rusk, February 18, 1964, CFB Vol. 1, NSF, LBJ.
182. Campos interview, p. 56.
183. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
184. Estep,
Military in Brazilian Politics, p. 115.
187. Gordon to Rusk, Attn: Thomas Mann, March 4, 1964, CFB Vol. 1, NSF, LBJ.
188.
Brazil Herald, March 12, 1964, p. 1.
189. Ibid., March 14, 1964, p. 1.
190. Quoted in Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 270 from
Correio da Manha, March 14, 1964.
191. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 288; Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 269.
192. In late 1963, Goulart told Gordon of a scheme he had whereby narrow strips of unused land on either side of federal highways would be expropriated for peasant use. Gordon told Goulart that the problem, as he understood it, had to do with large amounts of unused land and too many people in the Northeast section of Brazil and that it seemed whimsical to take strips of land along highways and call that land reform. Goulart responded, “Oh, I know all that, but this will get those PSD [conservative political party] colonels where it hurts.” Gordon
viewed these land reform measures as politically motivated to serve Goulart’s personal ambitions (Gordon interview, January 19, 1976).
193. Quoted in Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 288.
194. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 271, from
O Estado de São Paulo, March 14, 1964.
195. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 271–272.
196. Walters interview; see also Vernon Walters,
Silent Missions, p. 383.
197. Gordon interview, January 19, 1978.
198. Dan Kurzman, “LBJ Seen Reaffirming Latin Aid Today,”
Washington Post, March 16, 1964, p. 9a.
200. Tad Szulc, “U.S. May Abandon Effort to Deter Latin Dictators,”
New York Times, March 19, 1964, p. 1.
202. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
203. Mann interview, February 10, 1976.
204. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
207. According to
O Estado de São Paulo, the resignation of Pierre Salinger, the press secretary of both Kennedy and Johnson, was used to mark a contrast in Kennedy’s and Johnson’s policies that thenceforth were to be guided “by national interest and by the circumstances in which the situation arose.”
208. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, p. 276.
209. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
210. Gordon interview, January 23, 1976.
211. A precedent for a presidential coup had been set by Getulio Vargas in his 1937 seizure of dictatorial power. The precedent had not been lost on Goulart. During the week after Gordon returned from Washington, he and former President Kubitschek had met and discussed the rapidly evolving events in Brazil. At that meeting, Kubitschek told the ambassador a story regarding Goulart while he was Kubitschek’s vice-president. Goulart, noting Kubitschek’s strong support, had said on more than one occasion: “Juscelino, I don’t understand you; you are so popular,
da o golpe [stage a coup—stay in office]. Some of the press will fuss a bit, but everyone will get over it.” Gordon
believed that Goulart wanted a “superversion” or “overmining” of the system—an overthrow from above (Gordon interview, January 19, 1976).
212. Gordon to Rusk et al., teleconference, March 27, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
213. Lincoln Gordon, “Recollections of President Castelo Branco,” p. 2.
214. Gordon to Rusk, Attn: T. Mann and White House, March 26, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
216. Gordon to Rusk et al., teleconference, March 27, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
221. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976; Walters interview.
223. Antonieta Diniz and Paulo Castelo Branco interview with John W. F. Dulles, Rio de Janeiro, December 13, 1975.
224. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
225. Alberto Byington, a Brazilian educated in the United States, had contacted embassy personnel for a U.S. commitment to provide contingent support in the anti-Goulart conspiracy. He had suggested the potential threat posed by Goulart’s Petrobrás support. Byington privately bought two shiploads of oil and had it stored as alternate backing for a military coup (Walters interview).
226. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976; Walters interview.
228. Gordon to Rusk et al., teleconference, March 27, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
230. Gordon interviews, January 19 and 23, 1976.
231. Estep,
Military in Brazilian Politics, pp. 111–112; Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 279–285; Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, pp. 296–298.
232. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 288–289; Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 265.
233. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 290–293; Estep,
Military in Brazilian Politics, p. 113.
234. Quoted in Gordon to Rusk, March 31, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
235. Dulles,
Unrest in Brazil, pp. 313–314.
236. Skidmore,
Politics in Brazil, p. 300.
237. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
238. Rusk to U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, March 30, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
239. Rusk to U.S. Embassy, Brasilia et al., March 30, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ. Following normal procedures, U.S. consulates would have directed their messages to the Rio de Janeiro embassy, which would have in turn relayed them to Washington.
240. Walters describes his possession of this preliminary knowledge as the result of a process of elimination. The Brazilians would not plan a revolution on a holiday, such as Easter, Palm Sunday, Good Friday, or even April Fool’s Day. He also believed the conspirators thought there was some urgency to making a coup before Goulart himself made a presidential coup and before Goulart further damaged military discipline or promoted men loyal to himself over those with more traditional loyalties (Walters interview).
241. Bond to Rusk, March 30, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
242. Rusk to Gordon, March 30, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
243. Gordon via Rusk for Bundy, McNamara, and McCone, March 31, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
244. “Agenda for meeting on Brazil,” CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ; and Message for U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, March 31, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
245. Declassified cables suggest that arms and ammunition plans for Brazil were developed under the U.S. commander in chief of southern forces in Panama in 1961 (called USCINCSO Contingency Plan 2–61). Such plans are developed to respond to possible crises, are maintained at the Pentagon, and are generally reviewed annually (see JCS to CSAF et al. 010102Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ). The cables I have seen do not indicate who approved action on this plan on March 31, 1964, although cables describing this operation were sent by
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I assume that the decision to activate such plans would begin at the Pentagon and would eventually include officials at the State Department, the White House, and the CIA.
246. Message for U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, March 31, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
247. While these governors were not named, I would assume the group would include those mentioned in other cables as “crystallizing overt support for the constitution…and for rejection of communism…Lacerda of Guanabara, Adhemar de Barros of São Paulo, Menghetti of Rio Grande do Sul, Braga of Paraná, and…Magalhaes Pinto of Minas Gerais” (see Gordon to Rusk et al., teleconference, March 27, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ).
250. Gordon to Rusk, March 31, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
251. Message for U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, March 31, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
252. JCS to CINCLANT, 311907Z March 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
253. CINCLANTFLT to COMSECONDFLT, 312250Z March 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
254. CSAF to ZEN/MATS et al., 011644Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
255. JCS to USCINCSO, 010101Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
256. JCS to CSAF et al., 010102Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
258. The tankers, under contract to Military Sea Transport Services, included the
Santa Inez, the
Chepachet, the
Hampton Roads, and the
Nash Bulk (JCS to DSA et al., 010103Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ).
259. Quoted in Gordon to Rusk, March 31, 1964, CFB Vol. 2, NSF, LBJ.
260. Gordon teleconference, no date, no named recipients [judging from the contents, I think the message was written
by Lincoln Gordon in response to Ball, Mann, and Dungan in Washington, March 31, 1964], CFB Vol. 2, (Item 61), NSF, LBJ.
262. Gordon et al. [to Ball et al.] teleconference, attachment to Ball et al. (to Gordon, et al.), 1500Z, April 1, 1964 [some teleconferences are recorded in Z time without writing out the full date-time group], CFB Vol. 2 (Item 59), NSF, LBJ; Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
263. Brayner had been informing Walters of expected movements in the conspiracy (see JANAF Attachés Brazil, Action White House, J-5 et al., 311800Z March 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ).
264. Brayner interview with John W. F. Dulles, Rio de Janeiro, October 6, 1975.
265. USCINCSO to COMUSARSO et al., 011900Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
266. Capt. Thomas V. Solan interview, March 10, 1976, Austin, Texas.
267. Joint Message J-9 for AFCIN, ACSI, and DNI, no date [apparently written in the early afternoon of April 1], CFB Vol. 3 (Item 34), NSF, LBJ.
268. Ball [to Gordon et al.], teleconference, 1500Z, April 1, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 59), NSF, LBJ.
269. Gordon et al. [to Ball et al.], teleconference, 1500Z, April 1, 1964, and Ball et al. [to Gordon et al.], teleconference, 1500Z, April 1, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 59), NSF, LBJ.
270. Gordon to Rusk, April 1, 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
271. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
272. Joint Message J-9 for AFCIN, ACSI, and DNI, no date [probably written in the early afternoon of April 1], CFB Vol. 3 (Item 34), NSF, LBJ; Gordon et al. [to Ball et al.], teleconference, 021500Z, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 57), NSF, LBJ. See also Gordon to Rusk, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 3 (Item 105), NSF, LBJ. In his memoirs, Walters has played down the political importance of his contacts with Castelo Branco (see
Silent Missions, pp. 383, 391); at the time, however, given the cables and other messages being sent from the Rio embassy to Washington, there was some significance attached to these meetings.
273. A CIA Biographic Intelligence Bulletin described Mazzilli as a “cautious practitioner of the possible,” and a “middle-of-the-roader.” The biography noted that Mazzilli had “amassed considerable wealth, but [that] his riches were not inherited; rather, they were accumulated during an arduous climb to the top of the bureaucratic heap” (“Paschoal Ranieri Mazzilli: Interim President of Brazil,” CIA Biographic Intelligence Bulletin, April 2, 1964, CFB, NSF, LBJ).
274. Gordon to Rusk, April 1, 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
275. Gordon interviews, January 19 and 23, 1976.
276. Joint Message, J-9 for AFCIN, ACSI, and DNI, no date [probably written in the early afternoon of April 1], CFB Vol. 3 (Item 34), NSF, LBJ.
277. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
278. Gordon et al. [to Ball et al.], teleconference, 2030Z, April 1, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 58), NSF, LBJ.
279. Ball et al. [to Gordon et al.], teleconference, 2030Z, April 1, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 58), NSF, LBJ.
280. Embassy cables from this period refer to the military conspirators as the “democrats” or the “democratic forces.”
281. Gordon to Rusk, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 3 (Item 103), NSF, LBJ.
282. Gordon et al. [to Ball et al.], teleconference, 021900Z, April 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 56), NSF, LBJ.
283. Gordon to Rusk, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
284. Ball et al. [to Gordon et al.], teleconference, 1500Z, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 57), NSF, LBJ.
285. Mann to Gordon, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
287. Gordon to Rusk to White House, Attn: Mr. Bundy for Senator Carl Hayden, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
288. Gordon to Rusk, April 2, 1964, NSF, CFB Vol. 3 (Item 103), NSF, LBJ.
289. Gordon et al. [to Ball et al.], teleconference, 1500Z, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 57), NSF, LBJ.
290. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
291. Ball et al. [to Gordon et al.], teleconference, 2300Z, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 55), NSF, LBJ.
292. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
293. Gordon et al. [to Ball et al.], teleconference, 2300Z, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 55), NSF, LBJ.
294. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
295. Ball et al. [to Gordon et al.], teleconference, 2300Z, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 55), NSF, LBJ.
296. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
297. Gordon et al. [to Ball et al.], teleconference, 2300Z, April 2, 1964, and Ball et al. (to Gordon et al.) teleconference, 2300Z, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 2 (Item 55), NSF, LBJ.
299. Quoted in U.S. Department of State News Release, “Historical Chronology: U.S. Policy toward Governments of Brazil, 1821–Present,” August 1973, p. 10.
300. Rusk to U.S. Embassy, Montevideo, Uruguay, April 2, 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
301. CINCLANTFLT to COMSECONDFLT and COMSERVLANT, 031750Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
302. This joint task force commanded by Maj. Gen. Breitweiser had already terminated operations at 5:00
P.M. Rio time on April 2, 1964. See USCINCSO to COMUSARSO 021722Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
303. USCINCSO to JCS 031724Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
304. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
305. JCS to CSA et al. 032214Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
306. JCS to CSA et al. 072309Z April 1964, CFB Vol. 3, NSF, LBJ.
307. Now there is also a third type of loan called a “sector loan.” Sector loans are granted for a broad category of assistance, such as education or health.
308. The ambassador’s relationship with the ministers of finance varied, but one indication of rapport between Gordon and at least one minister was the fact that Carvalho Pinto asked the ambassador to speak for him at loan negotiations in Washington after the Brazilian Minister had to return to Brazil unexpectedly in response to Goulart’s request that Congress declare a state of siege (Gordon interview, January 19, 1976).
309. Quoted and translated in Octavio Ianni,
Crisis in Brazil, trans. Phyllis R. Evelyth, p. 146.
310. Mann interviews, November 12 and 24, 1975.
311. See earlier reference, p. 82.
312. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
313. Lincoln Gordon has described the Bell-Dantas Agreement as “foreshadowing a program loan” status.
314. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,
United States Policies and Programs in Brazil, May 4, 5, and 11, 1971, p. 186.
316. Ibid., pp. 189–191. Loans to private enterprises and to enterprises that had a mixture of private and governmental ownership tended to concentrate in, but were not limited to, the same years. The remainder of the loans were negotiated with the federal government or federally owned enterprises.
317. Kennedy to Fowler Hamilton, February 5, 1962, Box 112, Brazil, Security, POF, JFK.
318. Roett,
The Politics of Foreign Aid, pp. 130–132; Gordon interview, January 19, 1976; Robert Ballantyne interview.
319. Roett,
The Politics of Foreign Aid, pp. 141–169.
320. See
U.S. Policies and Programs in Brazil for a description of the Public Safety Program’s purpose, funding, and training. The program received criticism in the U.S. Congress because of stories in the press of repression and torture that people suffered at the hands of the Brazilian police, and the program was phased out in the early seventies.
321. See Agency for International Development,
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations. This report was prepared for the use of those congressional committees primarily concerned with foreign aid and is a useful document for comparing assistance figures with those of other Latin American countries.
322. Gordon to Rusk, Attn: Mann, March 4, 1964, CFB Vol. 1, NSF, LBJ.
323. Gordon interview, January 19, 1976.
324. “Background Paper: Brazil,” Attachment to Memorandum from L. P. Battle to Richard N. Goodwin, September 14,
1961, Box 112, Brazil, Security, 1961, POF, JFK.
325. Gordon to Rusk, Attn: Mann, March 4, 1964, CFB Vol. 1, NSF, LBJ.
326. The literature on repression and torture in Brazil is extensive. For example, see Rieck B. Hannifin’s
Repression of Civil Liberties and Human Rights in Brazil since the Revolution of 1964; Fred B. Morris, “In the Presence of Mine Enemies: Faith and Torture in Brazil,”
Harper’s Magazine, October 1975, pp. 57–70; Ralph della Cava, “Torture in Brazil,”
Commonweal, April 24, 1970, pp. 135–141; Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Persecution of Political and Social Scientists in Brazil,”
P.S.: Political Science 3 (1970): 123–128; and U.S. Senate,
The Congressional Record, May 10, 1976, S6754–S6758.
327. Edmar Morel,
O Golpe Começou em Washington.
328. Gordon to Ralph Dungan, April 13, 1964, Name File–Lincoln Gordon, WHCF, LBJ.
329. U.S. Senate,
Nomination of Lincoln Gordon, p. 44.