The limits of locally contrived formal property rights in refugee camps across Lebanon were tested in 2007. Caught in the crosshairs of the 2007 violent conflict between Fatah al-Islam, a military and political group with murky origins, and the Lebanese military, Nahr al-Bared refugee camp was destroyed. Many Palestinians from Nahr al-Bared described the event as the “Second Nakbah” or “Second Catastrophe.” For many it was the second most catastrophic event since the 1948 Nakbah when Palestinians first became refugees. For younger generations, it was their first time bearing witness to the devastation and chaos following dispossession from their “home” in the refugee camps. As a researcher, it was the first time I was able to track the evolution and renegotiation of property rights in real time.
While some might view the destruction of NBC’s formal titling system in 2007 as evidence of the limitation of this study and of property rights in transitional settings more generally, it is clear from the interview data prior to 2007 that for many decades refugees in Lebanon buffered against instability, created a vibrant Palestinian political community, and engaged in institutional formalization that resulted in transformative growth for the camps. That was no small feat for Palestinian refugees given the terrible conditions in the camps in Lebanon. Certainly, there are limits to the powers of refugees in finding protection in transitional settings, but this does not preclude them from developing institutions for protection in all settings at all times.
Moreover, the destruction and reconstruction of Nahr al-Bared after the battle forced Palestinian refugees to renegotiate property rights inside the camp. The existing formal system of property rights negotiated with Fatah in the late 1960s crumbled under the military conflict. In its place, a new system of informal property rights developed that represents the latest iteration in the evolution of property rights in transitional conditions for Palestinian refugees. Palestinians used the general sense of confusion regarding the legality of owning property in the new NBC to their advantage. They embraced the ambiguity to protect the community and to avoid some measure of Lebanese domination. Palestinians strategically deployed pre-2007 titles and older informal Palestinian practices in enforcing property rights to meet the challenges of the Second Nakbah in NBC. This chapter unpacks the renegotiation of property rights between Palestinian refugees in NBC and the Lebanese military.
In the face of chaos after the Second
Nakbah, Palestinians were once against thrust into political economic conditions not of their choosing. The international aid community agreed to rebuild Nahr al-Bared. The Lebanese agreed to the rebuild reluctantly, but hoped to block Palestinians from “owning” any land or assets inside the camp. Though the Lebanese asserted that Palestinians could not “own” their homes in the new NBC, Palestinians still hoped to protect assets through property rights and avoid Lebanese domination. They strategically pushed humanitarian organizations and engineering firms charged with the reconstruction of the camp to use pre-2007 Palestinian titles to map the structure of the new camp. In the new refugee camp, the Nahr al-Bared community sought protection through an ambiguously defined system of informal property rights. Though Lebanon ruled with an iron fist and denied Palestinians formal property rights, refugees were able to keep their own understandings of property ownership alive and avoid complete Lebanese domination by using informal communal templates for enforcement. This new system of property rights was imperfect. In addition, it opened Palestinians up to a significant amount of Lebanese military predation. In the face of very difficult political economic conditions, Nahr al-Bared’s refugees managed to protect their assets through an ambiguous system of informal property rights.
THE 2007 DESTRUCTION OF NAHR AL-BARED CAMP
I had the unfortunate privilege of witnessing the earliest bomb explosion in March 2007 in Nahr al-Bared when Fatah al-Islam rolled into the camp. Fatah al-Islam was a clandestine political group. It was clear that the group originated from outside the NBC camp community because they did not look, talk, dress, or behave like the rest of the community.
1 The Lebanese government hypothesized that Fatah al-Islam was the brainchild of Syria. They believe Syria masterminded the group’s entrance into Nahr al-Bared and intended to use it as a proxy force to destabilize Lebanon and pull Palestinians into the political fray (Hanafi and Knudsen 2010b, 100). The pro-Syria Palestinian political group
Fatah Intifada was the nucleus of Fatah al-Islam (Hanafi and Knudsen 2010b, 100). Though some Palestinians were part of Fatah al-Islam, they were not popularly supported. Moreover, Fatah vehemently opposed Fatah al-Islam and even offered to engage in battle against them with the Lebanese military (Hanafi and Knudsen 2010b, 107). It is generally believed that Fatah al-Islam originated from and was orchestrated from outside the camps. Using force, Fatah al-Islam took over a small building on the periphery of the refugee camp in early March 2007. Despite Nahr al-Bared’s camp committee attempts to negotiate with this outside group, Fatah al-Islam refused to leave and threatened more violence if camp residents interfered with their actions. During the first week of their arrival, nighttime curfews were instituted and camp residents feared that the situation would worsen. I was forced to limit my research activities, remain inside my room in the camp when the sun set, and stay inside for fear of angering Fatah al-Islam. By mid-March, I made the prudent decision to temporarily stop my research project in Lebanon and pursue research in refugee camps in Jordan to bide my time. I planned to wait there until May to reassess the prospects for my return to NBC. However, no one expected that Fatah al-Islam would launch a surprise attack against the Lebanese military in Tripoli or that it would ultimately trigger a series of violent events that would destroy NBC. It would be another five years before I would set foot there again.
On May 15, 2007, Nahr al-Bared refugee camp was destroyed during a military conflict between Lebanese army officials and Fatah al-Islam (Butters 2008; UNRWA Report 2009). Ironically, May 15 also marks the exact day of Palestinian’s first
Nakbah in 1948. Neighboring Beddawi refugee camp remained structurally and politically unharmed. After a series of bombings and clashes on the ground, the conflict ended with the annihilation of Fatah al-Islam forces. On September 2, 2007, the Lebanese army declared an end to the hostilities, cordoned off the destroyed camp, and restricted access to military officials and approved Palestinian refugees (UNRWA Report 2009). Initially, it was unclear if the Lebanese government would permit the reconstruction of NBC because of the strategic location of the refugee camp close to the Syrian border and its proximity to the Mediterranean Sea for the Lebanese military. In addition, the reconstruction would be a costly project. In April 2008, Khatib al-Alami, an engineering firm, was contracted by the Lebanese government to conduct a preliminary assessment of damage and contamination (I-93L). Even during a visit to NBC in 2012, the catastrophic devastation of was evident as seen in
figure 5.1.
After it was apparent that the camp was completely destroyed and required reconstruction, a large international donor conference convened in Vienna in June 2008 to decide the fate of NBC (I-57L, I-59L, I-90L, I-92L). In fact, Nahr al-Bared’s Palestinian refugee noninvolvement in the conflict was a key argument supported at the Vienna Conference in 2008 that justified the reconstruction of the refugee camp (I-57L, I-59L, I-90L, I-92L). If Palestinians had not been true victims in the situation, the international community would not have been inclined to support the reconstruction of the camp. At the urging of the international community, the Lebanese government permitted the reconstruction of the camp (I-94L). In an interview, a Palestinian official commented, “Who knows if it [the reconstruction] is what the Lebanese really wanted? The international donor community demanded it as a matter of human rights and justice for Palestinian refugees. Lebanon was constrained to agree with the international recommendations at Vienna” (I-94L). On June 23, 2008, at the Vienna Conference, donors, Lebanese government officials, the Palestinian Authority, and United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) representatives voted unanimously to rebuild NBC and developed a “Master Plan” for reconstruction (I-92L). Reconstruction officially began on April 1, 2010 (I-92L).
Though the new NBC would be reconstructed to create an exact replica of the old camp (I-90L, I-92L), it would vary in one critical area compared to the old NBC. A Palestinian group, Fatah, had governed camps in Lebanon including NBC since 1969 through locally established camp committees (CC). However, after the destruction and reconstruction of NBC in 2007, the Lebanese military retained control of the new NBC camp and would administer rule at the local level. In fact, the Lebanese military asserted that it would administer the new NBC without the camp committees, abrogating terms of the 1969 Cairo Accords, thereby marginalizing the authority of Fatah and its governing structures (UNRWA Report 2009; I-80L, I-94L; Hanafi and Knudsen 2010a, 34–36). Hanafi and Knudsen (2010a) elaborate that Lebanon pushed for a military base to be built at the base of the new NBC and for a naval base positioned on the camp’s beach. It was “a political statement to assert their absolute authority over the camp” (34–36). A member of the CC in the new NBC said, “Everything is now governed by the Lebanese military, not the CC” (I-80L, I-92L, I-94L). A former Palestinian social affairs director in Nahr al-Bared said,
In the old Camp Committee we helped to solve problems and serve the people. We listened to their voice and we helped to create hope with the protection of homes and businesses. But in the new Camp Committee, we have lost control. Fatah and the CCs are out. The Lebanese mukhabarat [secret police] are everywhere and they rule now. (I-56L)
In addition, the Lebanese would not permit Palestinian refugees to “own” their homes or businesses in the new NBC. One refugee from NBC poignantly described the shift in ownership rules after the Second Nakbah and Lebanese military rule:
Of course, I want to return to NBC. But it will be very different there and most of all I will feel dispossessed for a second time. Do you know why? It is because I hear that I won’t own my new place there, like I did before! I used to own a home in the camp that I was proud of—we worked for sixty years to scrape together a life. Now, we can’t own, rent, or sell parts of our new home. (I-70L)
Unlike the new NBC, neighboring Beddawi remained politically unchanged. Though Beddawi was strained with the influx of NBC residents after the conflict, Beddawi CC members expressed relief and thankfulness that in the aftermath of the 2007 conflict, “the Lebanese army did not enter Beddawi affairs like they did in NBC” (I-58L).
FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL CHAOS FOR NAHR AL-BARED REFUGEES
In the intervening years between NBC’s destruction and the reconstruction of the new camp, NBC residents experienced complete chaos. “There was a lot of anarchy following the conflict” (1-56L). Refugees from Nahr al-Bared identified their financial and social conditions as two of the most challenging areas of life after the 2007
Nakbah.
In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, Palestinians ran from Nahr al-Bared to Beddawi. “I carried my niece, grabbed my jewelry, strapped on my purse, and ran to Beddawi for my life. It was frightening” (I-57L). For the first few nights, they were sheltered in UNRWA school buildings located in Beddawi (I-56L, I 58L, I-59L). They were welcomed in Beddawi camp “because Palestinians are hospitable to each other and wanted to support people from Bared camp. But [the residents] could do very little to help them financially because [they] had such scant resources to meet the demands of the influx of such a large population overnight” (I-58L).
After the initial devastation, UNRWA registered NBC families, gave them a rental allowance to find better shelter, and doled out new food ration cards (I-92L). An UNRWA official described the emergency response:
The destruction was catastrophic and the demands on UNRWA were unprecedented. We had no established emergency plan to deal with such a situation. The first few nights, families slept in the schools, mosques, and even outside in the streets of Beddawi. On the ground, we developed a real-time plan to process the families and quickly get them set up in safe spaces. Aside from offering rental allowances, some families were relocated to the portable housing units. (I-92L)
Palestinians described the portable housing units as “barracks” or “cartons.” In effect, they were trailers or shipping containers transformed into small apartment units. According to interviews, they were far from ideal spots because they were sweltering in the summer and frigid in the winter. “The walls were paper thin and people were stacked on top of each other” (I-79L).
Financially, most refugees from Nahr al-Bared lost everything when the camp was destroyed in 2007. Families lost everything they had worked to build since 1948. Families reported that in the old NBC,
Things cost less and we owned our homes and businesses. We could afford a pretty good life, all things considered. After the conflict, even with UNRWA allowance for rent…most were priced out of the market to rent even a filthy spot in Beddawi camp. In Tripoli the prices for renting were so high because the Lebanese were gouging us. There were so many of us that needed homes and there were not enough spaces. We lost everything in the camps and had no savings. Even though my husband has a good job with the UNRWA we can barely afford to make ends meet now. I suppose we are the lucky ones because we found a place to rent. Some families sat in the school shelters for months or they live in the cartons now. (I-74L)
Businesses also lost their shops and customer base following the conflict. For example, one former carpenter from Nahr al-Bared that relocated to Beddawi said, “In 2007 Nahr al-Bared’s destruction ruined my carpentry business. For over one year I had no shop and no work. I used to have a big customer base that included Lebanese people from the villages. Everyone is scared to enter the camps now, even here in Beddawi” (I-65L). One refugee said,
Before 2007, there was a thriving economic market in Nahr al-Bared. I would say it was the most vibrant in the North [of Lebanon]. Things were better from all angles—low prices, high quality, good work, trustworthy people running businesses, and honest customers. After 2007 everything changed. The army is now controlling everything. Lebanese customers are afraid to enter into the camps so demand has gone really low for our products. The Lebanese moved their shopping elsewhere. Poverty levels seem much higher in the community than before. (I-79L)
Socially, the Palestinian community in Nahr al-Bared was fractured after 2007. Overnight the community scattered across Beddawi camp, Tripoli, and the adjacent Baqa’a valley to find shelter. The new living situation disrupted traditional family and community ties that bound the community together during previous conflicts (I-79L). For example, whereas one family once lived in the same building with the different floors and apartments representing different family generations, now the same family was strewn about different high-rise buildings in different camps and towns outside of Nahr al-Bared:
I used to live with my Mom, my brothers, my brothers’ families in one building. Everyone lived above our sundry shop where we sold candy and cigarettes to the camp. After 2007, my Mom found a tiny apartment for us to live in at Beddawi camp. One of my brothers and his family of six children lived with us. Ten of us were crowded in one bedroom and one bathroom. My other brothers found places to rent along the main road close to Nahr al-Bared. My Mom is too old to walk long distances so she can’t visit her friends anymore. No one comes to visit us either. We feel alone here. (I-57L)
Another family that had lived in Nahr al-Bared since its inception described the social breakdown after the conflict:
Everyone used to live close together. Our friends and family all had places next to us. We are now all spread out. We even used to have the cemetery with our loved ones close by to us where we could pray. Do you know we lost the cemetery and our loved ones graves were destroyed too? It is haram [a sin] what has happened to our community! (I-68L)
Though less talked about in public, one woman reported an increase in domestic violence after the conflict. She motioned to me to enter her home from her doorway. She invited me into her home to do an interview. After she removed her veil, I was shocked to see her horrific black eye. I suggested she visit the doctor and make use of UNRWA support groups that address domestic violence. In the meantime, she insisted that she wanted to tell her story:
After 2007, things got very bad between my husband and me. We don’t live close to my friends and family. We used to be very well supported. Even though my husband didn’t make much money, he made enough and we could live with his family. But since 2007, he hasn’t found work for five years now and there was no space to live with his family when we relocated. He has started to drink and he comes home and hits me. Listen it is not like I am blaming everything on 2007, because we have had problems always. But after 2007, everything became bigger [magnified] between us. I felt we had both lost protection from our family and community. I am not so sure he would beat me like this or he could get away with it if we still lived in Nahr al-Bared. (I-77L)
A NBC sheik that was temporarily living in Beddawi camp summarized some of the social ills in the Nahr al-Bared community following the conflict:
We used to live next to one another. Our community was bonded and knitted to one another. We watched out for each other. Now we are geographically spread out, the community and the family cannot monitor, support, and enforce our values in the ways we used to. One thing I have noticed here is the high number of divorces among young women and men. We used to help new couples in the early years of marriage. You know we all lived with each other, we helped with their kids, helped them learn to solve marital problems before it got into a big fight. Now, these young couples live alone in UNRWA barracks and they have no support. Divorce numbers have skyrocketed. (I-72L)
In sum, Palestinians from Nahr al-Bared experienced financial and social chaos in the fractured years following the 2007 crisis. In addition to these challenges, Palestinians would face a new communal political threat in the form of Lebanese military domination.
LEBANESE MILITARY DOMINANCE OF NAHR AL-BARED AFTER 2007
The 2007 conflict drastically changed the local political landscape inside NBC. Strikingly, the Lebanese government asserted that it would administer the new NBC with top-down hierarchical military rule, abrogating terms of the 1969 Cairo Accords, thereby marginalizing the authority of Fatah and the consultative structures of the CC (UNRWA Report October 2010 and December 2010; I-80L, I-94L). The Palestinian Authority, UNRWA officials, Beddawi CC members, and NBC CC members lamented the changing political landscape in the new NBC (I-58-L, I-80L, I-89L, I-92L, I-94L). At the Palestinian Embassy in Lebanon, the representative in charge of the Palestinian-Lebanese Dialogue Committee noted that
Lebanon considers the CCs illegal. Those committees have no power outside the camps and they owe their legality inside the camps to the Cairo Conference in 1969, which the Lebanese government has annulled unilaterally in NBC since 2007. Beddawi is ruling their own affairs still even though Lebanon does not recognize the local camp committee offices. Their annulment of the Cairo Accords in NBC is unprecedented. (I-94L)
A member of the CC in the new NBC said, “Everything is now governed by the Lebanese, not the CC” (I-80L, I-92L, I-94L). Camp residents in the new NBC viewed the Lebanese military as a foreign occupying force and feared the presence of Lebanese weaponry, checkpoints, and mukhabarat or secret police. One resident of the new NBC noted, “The new camp is frightening because the Lebanese army and the mukhabarat are everywhere. You are searched upon entry and exit. They control us completely through the use of force” (I-75L).
A woman from the new NBC said, “They clamped down on the camp border, it was once porous, but now you need special permission to get in and out. They [the military] rule us now” (I-78L). Another woman shared, “I have a joke now with my husband. When he fights and yells, I tell him, ‘Be careful and watch way you say because the
mukhabarat (secret police) is on the way!’” (I-57L).
Lebanese control even extended beneath, between, and above the homes and businesses inside the newly reconstructed camp. In an interesting interview with an engineer at Khatib al-Alami, I learned about Lebanese military restrictions on the size of sewer pipes beneath homes, the width of alleyways between structures, and the height of buildings. Prior to 2007, the camps were sprawling mazes with teetering buildings and open sewers flowing down paths. Navigating the camps, even in daylight, took an experienced resident. At night, even traveling to a home a block away required an expert navigator and a flashlight. Lebanese officials felt that the new camp should be better organized. Ostensibly, the new camp would be “better and improved” in its attention to health and sanitation conditions. Lebanese authorities justified the building restrictions as a natural outgrowth of attention to safety. However, the Khatib al-Alami engineer suggested that many of the construction changes were
A reflection of Lebanese military security and an effort to control access and movement inside the camp. For example, sewer pipes have standard guidelines on size. They must be large enough so that an adult can fit inside for repairs and maintenance. A worker must be able to physically access and repair the interior of the pipes. Lebanese officials pushed for smaller sized pipes that men could not fit inside because they did not want Palestinians developing illegal tunnels for smuggling or military guerrilla efforts. (I-93L)
In addition, the engineer stated that most streets, lanes, and alleyways have standard widths to allow vehicles and pedestrians to safely traverse. However, the Lebanese wanted to create extra wide lanes and alleyways, “not for easier refugee access but for military vehicles like tanks to easily access the camps. Extremely narrow alleyways were not permitted because their absence would prevent Palestinians from easily attacking and evading Lebanese security officials” (I-93L).
Finally, homes and businesses were limited in their height to prevent aerial rooftop attacks from homes inside the camps (I-89L, I-93L). Additionally, a construction engineer in the new NBC stated, “The [Lebanese] government has strict rules about the new homes. There can be no more than four floors, there can be no balconies, you cannot dig too deep here, there can be no space for an underground structure to be built here” (I-89L). All of these examples paint a landscape of Lebanese domination inside Nahr al-Bared following the 2007 conflict.
FINDING PROTECTION IN AMBIGUOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS
Palestinian refugees in the new NBC faced a great challenge to protect community assets through property rights in the face of Lebanese military restrictions. There was a general sense of fear and oppression among Palestinians with respect to Lebanese rule. In a 2012 interview, a member of the CC in the new NBC asserted that “we do not control anything now. The Lebanese military controls enforcement in the camp. They [the Lebanese military] do not care about the voice of the Palestinians in the camps. They rule absolutely” (I-80L).
In these constrained conditions, Palestinians had different paths they could take in response to Lebanese domination. They could submit to Lebanese military domination and abide by strict rules that denied the community the right to own property. Alternatively, they could forge what Qian (2003) calls a “feasible path” to institutional protection that accepted the realities of the transitional setting but avoided total state incorporation and military domination.
Faced with two different responses to Lebanese domination, Palestinians opted for the latter option. They did not accept outside domination or remain “locked in” to the formal system of property rights that governed the camps prior to 2007. Property rights were dynamic. In response to the new ruling coalition of Lebanese military authority, Palestinians shifted their strategy of protection. They worked within the confines of Lebanese military rule and post-conflict confusion to craft a system of informal property rights that protected assets. They protected assets post-conflict by using informal claims and Fatah’s titles predating 2007 in conversations with outside donors and engineers during the reconstruction process of the new NBC. This forced de facto international recognition of Palestinian “ownership” of homes and businesses in the camps. In addition, once residents moved to the new camp, they deployed informal communal enforcement practices to manage conflicts in the shadow of Lebanese domination.
Scott’s (2009) study of the Zomias in Southeast Asia provides helpful insight into the Palestinian situation and how the refugees protected their assets and identity in the face of a more powerful group. “Zomia is and has been what might be called a ‘fracture zone’ of state making…. It has been peopled for two millennia, at least, by wave after wave of people in retreat and flight from state cores” (Scott 2009, 242). In the face of powerful states attempting to control their community, Zomias had a “choice between statelessness and incorporation. Within each of these choices there were, of course, several possible calibrated variations” (2009, 244). Zomias adopted an ambiguous and porous identity to adapt to the challenges of outside domination (2009, 256). As states tried to classify Zomias to create a population census or to formally register land claims, Zomias purposefully claimed a plastic and porous identity that evaded the state’s system of control. Zomias pursued ambiguity as a political calculation to avoid incorporation and to preserve their community.
In a similar situation, Palestinians sought to preserve and protect their community assets by embracing and operating within the ambiguity that followed the conflict. Even if Lebanese authorities would not allow Palestinians to formally claim “ownership” of the new homes or permit them much of a role in the enforcement of the system, Palestinians could still play a significant part in devising the initial map of homes and businesses that outside aid and engineering groups would follow to construct the new camp. At the Vienna Conference, donors and international organizations agreed that reconstruction would only move forward in conversation with Palestinian refugees from Nahr al-Bared camp (UNRWA Report 2009). Though the Palestinian voice was destroyed in the CCs, the Lebanese military was obliged to allow community voice in the early stages of camp reconstruction. Under the guidance of international donors, the Lebanese military engaged in a structured community dialogue over the reconstruction, mapping, and division of resources in the new camp with the help of UNRWA and the Palestinian Embassy in Beirut. They created a working group called the “Nahr al-Bared Reconstruction Commission” or NBRC. “During the process of reconstruction, we had conversations about how the new camp would be set up. Residents were a part of the master plan. We wanted to preserve the village and kinship structure and the homes and businesses from before 2007” (I-89L).
In the aftermath of the catastrophic 2007 conflict, many Palestinians saved their paper titles that identified home, business, and resource ownership in NBC (I-80L). Those that did not still have their paper titles relied on neighbors to verify their claims. Once the international donor community and Lebanon agreed to rebuild NBC, the real task of reconstruction began. One aid worker noted, “It was unprecedented to rebuild a refugee camp. It was a chance to get things right. To create a better space that met the needs of the people but preserved the social fabric of Palestinians in NBC” (I-92L).
In the months and years following the conflict, each camp resident was invited to meet with the camp reconstruction committee, display their old titles (like the ones in appendix A), or to bring witnesses to verbally confirm ownership of a business or land, and sign off on a map that accurately depicted pre-2007 conditions. This was a long iterative conversation between refugees and officials that was called “the validation process” (I-92L). One member of the reconstruction team noted, “This was a messy iterative process. It took us two years to draft and finalize the maps from the homes and businesses. We used various stakeholders to draft the Master Plan” (I-90L).
A representative from the Palestinian Embassy shared a map of the validation process with me. The map shown in
map 5.1 was the product of the sustained dialogue that took over two years to complete with residents. Careful examination of the map identifies the owner, location, and size of each camp residence or business prior to 2007. Neighbors on either side of the business or home represented on the map had to sign off on it. Engineers involved in the reconstruction created conversion charts that permitted residents a percentage of space in the new camp based on their old titles. This also extended to the amount of electricity and water that each resident and business would be permitted to consume (I-92L, I-94L). Businesses and homes were allotted specific access rights to water and electricity based on their needs like business type, key inputs, and size of family (I-92L).
Every single business that was interviewed prior to 2007 was destroyed during the Fatah al-Islam and Lebanese conflict. Despite their destruction, many businesses reopened in the new NBC with the assistance of UNRWA/Euro Commission small business grants and with the assistance of family remittances (I-81L, I-82L, I-83L, I-84L, I-85L, I-89L, I-92L). For example, former business owners from the old NBC were eligible for international grants valued up to $9,000 (I-81L, I-82L, I-83L, I-84L, I-85L, I-89L, I-92L). UNRWA used pre-2007 private asset titles to validate claims for business loans post-2007 (I-94L). Palestinian businesses in the new NBC were fighting to reestablish their businesses.
For example, an electrician in the new NBC chose to reopen his shop after 2007 because he received a $4,000 UNRWA grant (I-83L). He also felt that his business has been good for him because UNRWA’s new NBC reconstruction teams are purchasing plastic electrical wire casings from him (I-83L). A bottled water producer also asserted that there was high demand inside the camps for his product (I-88L). In the new camp dynamics, these business owners noted that they simply sought to protect themselves and push for recognition of their previous claims to businesses.
New businesses and residents were uncertain if they actually legally “owned” their new spaces. Importantly, they felt the newly reconstructed camp would preserve and knit together the community. Neighbors from before the conflict would remain neighbors in the new camp. Families and villages would stay close to each other. The prevailing sense of social order from before 2007 would be protected and enshrined in the new mapping of the camp. Palestinians were able to preserve the community’s identity by using pre-2007 titles and informal property claims during the validation process. The new camp would “bring back to life and preserve our social kinship ties that were lost in the past few years after the conflict” (I-79L). Another family excitedly said, “We cannot wait to return and find the fabric of social and community life again” (I-68L).
In interviews, I pointed out that the international community was admitting de facto Palestinian “ownership” of assets in the camps by using Palestinian’s informal claims and documents from Fatah’s era of rule to map the new camp. When I asked if this meant that Palestinians owned property, most people evaded the question or said,
It is very confusing. (I-90L)
No one knows what this new system [of property rights] means. (I-91L)
Palestinians in the camps are in a very difficult confusing position. (I-92L)
Though the ambiguity was a logistical and bureaucratic nightmare for outsiders, officials, and researchers trying to make sense of property ownership in the camps, a closer look at the situation suggests that the ambiguity was a valuable tool for Palestinian protection. Like the Zomias, Palestinians used the general sense of confusion to their advantage to protect the community and avoid some measure of Lebanese domination and predation. One NBC resident and official described the confusion and Palestinian strategy at length:
Listen to me, no one wants to talk about this because no one knows the answer. We think that the land in Nahr al-Bared was taken back by the government after 2007. Look, you can see they even built a military war hero statue for the bravery of Lebanese soldiers in the fight right in front of the camp. Clearly, they want to control this space. But then the international community puts pressure on Lebanon to rebuild the camp. I have no idea if they really wanted to rebuild or not. But when you asked me, “Does the refugee really own the home or not?” then my thought is that I have no idea! I do not think anybody really knows! The [Lebanese] government wants to own the homes and more importantly to own the people here. Of course, I am a Palestinian from here too and I know what will happen. You know too. We all know that Palestinians will make do in the confusion here and will do things under the table, informally. They will, and in fact have already started to, informally transfer apartments and businesses to each other without Lebanese or CC permission. (I-90L)
In the midst of the confusion, Palestinians crafted a system of informal property rights that protected assets. Aside from drawing the map of the new NBC, Palestinians deployed informal communal enforcement practices to resolve conflicts over property in the shadow of Lebanese domination. When there were disputes between Palestinians over property, they did not turn to Lebanese authorities or to the CC. Instead they used the network of pre-1948 kinship ties, village elders, and religious officials described in
chapter 2 to resolve disputes. A steel construction worker that set up a new business in Lebanon after getting a loan from the UNRWA reported, “Since 2007, I no longer look to the Camp Committee for help. I certainly don’t go to the Lebanese either. Our protection for the business and the home is with God and my neighbors. We do things within the [Palestinian] community” (I-62L).
A carpenter described post-2007 life:
There is no security for us [Palestinian refugees] in the camps. The Lebanese military is everywhere. People say we should carry a weapon and not get involved in any politics or a religious party even. The absence of the Camp Committee is a problem. We have to just look to respected elders in our own community to solve any problems with the business. (I-65L)
Another resident of the new NBC described the workings of the informal system of property rights:
I am one of the first shop owners to move back into Nahr al-Bared, everything is so new. I switched businesses to electricity and gas oven manufacturing and repairs. My place is located in the same place my shop used to be before 2007. The French government gave me a small grant around $1,000 U.S. dollars to buy machinery for my shop. I suppose things feel pretty safe here. Now, I don’t look to the Lebanese for help or the Camp Committee. If I have problems now, I turn to older people. For example, I might go to the sheik. Otherwise, families sort out problems amongst themselves. (I-66L)
Within the confines of Lebanese domination, Palestinians found protection through an informal system of property rights that defined and enforced ownership claims.
PROTECTION IN THE FUTURE?
At the time I completed field research in May 2012, UNRWA officials and engineering firms had partially completed the reconstruction of the new Nahr al-Bared camp. In addition, the first wave of refugees from the old NBC had just moved into their new homes in the new NBC. I took a tour of a gleaming new apartment that a family seemed grateful to finally occupy after the years of stress and chaos following the conflict. The arrival to the new NBC said, “I feel like I have my home again here” (I-86L).
Against all odds, Palestinians had recreated the structure of property ownership from the old NBC in the newly reconstructed Nahr al-Bared during the validation process of the reconstruction map. Moreover, they were using older established practices of resolving disputes using community enforcement mechanisms like village elders, family networks, and religious officials.
Still, the new system of informal property rights was imperfect because it existed in the shadow of Lebanese military domination. In the ambiguity of an informal property rights system, Palestinians coexisted with a much more powerful state neighbor. Informal property rights provided little formal protection from predation. The Lebanese military’s primary resource, the use of force, was used to subdue Nahr al-Bared Palestinians if it was suspected that they were overstepping boundaries and undercutting Lebanese rules. On May 15, 2012, I visited Nahr al-Bared camp. It marked the fifth anniversary of the Second Nakbah of Nahr al-Bared and, interestingly, the sixty-fourth anniversary of the First Nakbah from Palestine. Palestinian refugees in NBC read aloud a proclamation that they would continue to persevere in the face of oppression inside and outside the camps. Then members of the community began to set fire to tires and chant in solidarity. The Lebanese military stood at the ready with tanks and guns as a reminder that their military power was a serious threat. In addition, it was suspected among camp residents that Lebanese military officials had an extensive network of local Palestinian refugees acting as informants.
Some Palestinians will sell themselves for just about anything. It is pretty sad what someone will do for a smart phone. The Lebanese will give them phones and pre-paid phone minutes as payment for information about what the community in Nahr al-Bared is doing. We must always be careful. Ultimately, the Lebanese can clamp down on us at any time. (I-88L)
It was too early to assess the future of their informal system of ownership. Palestinian refugees in Nahr al-Bared are living in a precarious transitional setting. They have found some protection and autonomy from outsiders, but still occupy the penumbra of Lebanese military power. Nevertheless, the preliminary study of the validation process, reconstruction map, and desire to find protection through informal property rights suggested that Palestinians managed to navigate a precarious post-2007 political economic climate and claim some protection of their community’s assets from Lebanese incorporation.