The Parthian Empire
Pompey the Great’s plan ultimately failed, for it turned out that neither the Parthian empire nor the Romans were able to completely remove the formidable Armenian king, Tigranes, from power. However, neither side cared any longer about the kingdom of Armenia because their primary focus was quickly turned towards each other at the end of the first half of the first century BC. This is the point where Rome’s wealthiest plutocrat, Marcus Licinius Crassus, entered the scene, for he was appointed the governor of the province of Syria in 55 BC. As described in the introduction, Crassus, in his extreme lust for plunder and glory, used his new province as a base to raise an enormous army in order to conquer Rome’s wealthiest and most powerful rival, the Parthian empire. The Roman general even had the opportunity to augment his already huge host with 10,000 cataphracts offered by the new Armenian king, Artavasdes II (r. 54–34 BC) if Crassus invaded Parthia from Armenia in the north. However, Crassus had already secured several fortifications in western Mesopotamia the previous year and so he decided to stick with his initial invasion route instead, thus declining the Armenian king’s offer of the elite heavy cavalrymen.1
After the Parthian cataphracts revealed the bright shine of their glorious armour from beneath their animal hide coverings at the beginning of the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BC, Plutarch recorded that the combat commenced first with the actions of 1,000 heavily armoured horsemen, followed by the attack of 9,000 horse-archer light cavalry:
And at first [the cataphracts] purposed to charge upon the Romans with their long spears, and throw their front ranks into confusion; but when they saw the depth of their formation, where shield was locked with shield, and the firmness and composure of the men, they drew back, and while seeming to break their ranks and disperse, they surrounded the hollow square in which their enemy stood before he was aware of the manoeuvre. And when Crassus ordered his lightarmed troops to make a charge, they did not advance far, but encountering a multitude of arrows, abandoned their undertaking and ran back for shelter among the men-at-arms, among whom they caused the beginning of disorder and fear, for these now saw the velocity and force of the arrows, which fractured armour, and tore their way through every covering alike, whether hard or soft.2
Once his first plan of sending the light infantry outside of the infantry square to disrupt the horse-archers failed, Crassus then decided to keep his legionaries in the defensive formation until the Parthians ran out of arrows. The Roman general knew that the Parthian cataphracts could not break through the dense ranks of his legionaries, but at the same time his men could not withstand for long the near-constant barrage of arrows that rained down upon them and managed to penetrate their large shields and heavy armour. Crassus assumed it would only be a matter of time until the Parthians ran out of their supply of the missiles; he would soon find out that he was horribly wrong.
To their great dismay, Crassus and his men soon discovered that the Parthians seemingly had enough arrows to fire at the Roman army for the entire rest of the day. Not only did the Parthian commander, Surena, make sure that there was a more than ample supply of the missiles, but he also came up with the ingenious idea of loading numerous camels with quivers full of arrows that were placed so close to the front lines that the horse-archers rapidly reloaded their ammunition with ease, before quickly moving on to continue to fire their dense volleys into the Roman ranks. Once Crassus fully realized the predicament he was in, the Roman commander knew that he must somehow break the encirclement of the Parthian forces around his army. Therefore, he ordered his son, Publius Crassus, to lead his Gallic 1,000 horsemen, along with 500 archers, 8 legionary cohorts and 300 additional cavalrymen, outside of the defensive square formation to assault the Parthians in the hope of giving the rest of his army a short reprieve from the constant barrage of arrows. As Publius and his men advanced, the Parthian cavalrymen that faced them broke and fled before the two sides came into contact. The Romans pursued.3
Publius and his men chased the Parthian horse-archers until the 1,000-strong contingent of cataphracts stood before them. Supported by their elite heavy cavalrymen, the horse-archers turned and faced the oncoming Romans with their bows in hand, thus the combat continued:
But the Parthians merely placed their cataphracts to face the Romans, and with the rest of their horse rode about scouring the field, and thus stirring up the sand, they raised such a dust that the Romans could neither see nor speak to one another, and being driven in upon one another in one close body, they were thus hit and killed, dying, not by a quick and easy death, but with miserable pains and convulsions; for writhing upon the darts in their bodies, they broke them in their wounds, and when they would by force pluck out the barbed points, they caught the nerves and veins, so that they tore and tortured themselves. Many of them died thus, and those that survived were disabled for any service, and when Publius exhorted them to charge the cataphracts, they showed him their hands nailed to their shields, and their feet stuck to the ground, so that they could neither fly nor fight. He charged in himself boldly, however, with his horse, and came to close quarters with them, but was very unequal, whether as to the offensive or defensive part; for with his weak and little javelins, he struck against targets that were of tough raw hides and iron, whereas the lightly-clad bodies of his Gallic horsemen were exposed to the heavy lances [kontoi] of the enemy. For upon these he mostly depended, and with them he wrought wonders, for they would catch hold of the kontoi, and close upon the enemy, and so pull them from their horses, where they could scarce stir by reason of the heaviness of their armour, and many of the Gauls quitting their own horses, would creep under those of the enemy, and stick them in the belly; which, growing unruly with the pain, trampled upon their riders and upon the enemy promiscuously.4
Despite the bravery of the Gauls, courage was not enough to overcome the extensive armour of the cataphracts who slew many of the auxiliary horsemen before the wounded Publius was able to make the order for his men to retreat to the relative safety of a small hill nearby. After carrying the injured and leading the horses to the mound of earth, the legionaries surrounded the rest of their surviving comrades with their shields locked; however, according to Cassius Dio, the defensive circular formation of the Roman infantrymen was not effective against the tactics of the Parthian horse-archers and cataphracts:
For if [the legionaries] decided to lock shields for the purpose of avoiding the arrows by the closeness of their array, the [cataphracts] were upon them with a rush, striking down some, and at least scattering the others; and if they extended their ranks to avoid this, they would be struck with the arrows. Hereupon many died from fright at the very charge of the [cataphracts], and many perished hemmed in by the horsemen. Others were knocked over by the lances or were carried off transfixed.5
Seeing that their defeat was inevitable, Publius and his officers took their own lives before the rest of the surviving men surrendered. Out of a force that originally numbered nearly 5,500 soldiers, there was less than 500 Romans left alive that the Parthians could take as captives.6
Meanwhile, the Parthian missile onslaught on the rest of the Roman army under the command of the elder Crassus decreased enough for the general to be able to move his forces to slightly higher ground close by, giving the Romans a little advantage over the Parthian cavalry and the short reprieve the legionaries desperately needed. Yet the relief did not last long for the Romans. Shortly after, Crassus and his men were horrified to see the severed head of Publius at the end of an upraised cataphract lance.7 Though there was no time for even the father, or the rest of the Romans, to grieve over the loss of the contingent and its young commander, for the dreadful sight was quickly followed by another fierce Parthian attack that included the warriors who had returned after slaughtering Publius’ men:
Then, as the enemy got to work, their light cavalry rode round on the flanks of the Romans and shot them with arrows, while the cataphracts in front, plying their kontoi, kept driving them together into a narrow space, except those who, to escape death from the arrows, made bold to rush desperately upon their foes. These did little damage, but met with a speedy death from great and fatal wounds, since the kontos which the Parthians thrust was heavy with steel, and often had impetus enough to pierce through two men at once.8
The carnage, pain and death experienced by the Romans as they desperately tried to protect themselves from the arrow volleys and cataphract lances lasted for the rest of the day until nightfall. Then, the Parthians withdrew, allowing the surviving Romans to escape in the darkness.9
Almost 20,000 Roman troops may have survived the disastrous day’s fighting at Carrhae, but that number also included the wounded who certainly did not live past the night, for they were left behind by the rest of the fleeing Roman army. Furthermore, thousands more Roman troops perished on the long retreat back to Syria as the Parthians did not give up the pursuit. In the end, less than 10,000 Romans reached the safety of their province, while 10,000 men were taken captive and over 20,000 soldiers were slain, including Crassus and his son.10 Although the Parthian victory at Carrhae should mostly be attributed to the continuous hail of arrows shot by the highly mobile horse-archers, the cataphracts also played a key role in the Parthians’ success as well, utilizing their deadly shock tactics. Not only did the elite heavy cavalrymen kill almost all of the contingent led by Publius in their savage mêlée encounter, but the deadly charges of the cataphracts also devastated the Roman lines in the later stages of the battle. Additionally, even when they did not strike the Roman ranks, the threat of their charges caused the legionaries to condense, giving the horse-archers much easier targets to hit. More than any other battle that took place before, Carrhae showed how deadly cataphracts could be when used in conjunction with light cavalry and under the command of a brilliant general.
Even though it is possible that the Parthians may have been the first to use cataphracts, which inspired the Seleucid King Antiochus the Great to adopt the elite heavy cavalrymen, there is no solid evidence of Parthian cataphracts until the first century BC. However, it is certain that the Parthians fielded cataphracts from around the time of the Battle of Carrhae until the collapse of their empire centuries later. As the Parthian state changed and evolved over time, so too did the arms and armour of the Parthian version of the elite heavily armoured horsemen. All of the Parthian cataphracts wore either lamellar, mail or scale cuirasses constructed with iron and untanned leather. The Hellenisticstyle cuirass of the Seleucid cataphracts was not adopted by any of the more nomadic peoples of the east, including the Parthians and their cataphract troops, for scale armour was often the preferred option. The terracotta tile from Babylonia in the second century AD and the statues at Staraya Nisa (along with actual remains of scale armour also found at that site) that depict the Parthian cataphracts in scale armour provide much evidence of the popularity of that type of armour among the elite heavy cavalrymen. In addition, although it is uncertain as to whether the graffito at Dura Europos depicts a Parthian cataphract, or another type of cataphract, the heavily armoured warrior is also wearing scale armour.
The Parthian cataphracts wore iron or bronze helmets, mostly conical in shape, that were sometimes ornamented with a small plume of dyed or natural horsehair. Unlike the Seleucid cataphracts, the Parthian type did not wear a facemask, but occasionally an aventail, or another type of neck guard, constructed of mail, scale or lamellar armour, was attached to the helmet. Similar to the Seleucid version, the Parthian cataphracts commonly utilized laminated limb armour (manica) that extended all the way down the arm from the shoulders to the knuckles of the warrior. Sometimes the protection of the elite heavy cavalrymen even included gauntlets constructed of small metal plates or mail to cover the hands. Even though not all of the cataphracts were equipped with such extensive armour, most wore at least some sort of vambraces, rerebraces and other types of arm guards. The leg armour was often laminated as well, but the protection over the thighs was occasionally lamellar armour instead. Most of the Parthian cataphracts used laminated armour to cover the mail armour worn over their feet. The limb joints and other vulnerable parts of the body were protected with mail that was usually worn beneath the other layers of armour. Cloaks or small fabric tabards were sometimes worn over the armour of the cataphracts and were commonly made of silk brocade or a similar type of luxurious textile for the wealthier Parthian warriors.11
The armour for the mounts of the Parthian cataphracts included a metal facemask and chest protection. Further protection might have been worn in the form of the half-trapper or the full body trapper, which consisted of scale armour that was at times reinforced with alternating steel and bronze rows of metal plates for not only further protection but also for the more impressive appearance it provided; yet not all of the cataphracts utilized such heavy armour for their steeds. Like the Seleucid cataphracts, the Parthian heavy cavalrymen primarily fought with the kontos (heavy lance) that was mostly 3.6 metres (12 feet) in length.12 In the accounts of Cassius Dio, the kontoi of the Parthians were so long ‘that some of the pikes of the barbarians were bent and others were broken’ as they were used in battle against the Romans.13 Since it was so difficult to fight with such a large weapon, along with needing to control the reins as well, the shield was not a part of the cataphract equipment, as Cassius Dio also states ‘Parthians make no use of a shield, but their forces consist of mounted archers and lancers, mostly armoured as cataphracts’.14 Parthian cataphracts were also armed with long swords, daggers, axes or maces. According to Plutarch, one of the key sites for the manufacture of cataphract equipment, specifically the heavy armour, was located at Margiana. Archaeological excavations carried out at Merv, which revealed evidence of metallurgy, adds credence to his statement.15
The army of the Parthian empire consisted of a small royal contingent that strongly relied upon the forces of prominent nobles and satraps for larger campaigns. Therefore, not only did the Parthian kings utilize cataphract troops, but so too did the great suzerains have the heavily armoured cavalrymen in their retinues as well. The most powerful aristocratic families who were wealthy enough to own large tracts of land farmed by peasants, such as the Suren, Karen and Gew, were able to field the largest amounts of the expensive soldiers; besides, of course, the Parthian king himself. Yet even in the service of an affluent noble, the cost of the heavy armour and arms of the cataphract was so high that it meant that only the rich could fight as cataphracts.16
After Crassus’ failed invasion of Parthia, the imperial cavalrymen of the east carried out minor raids for plunder throughout Roman territory, though they returned to their lands east of the Euphrates River in the summer of 50 BC. The Parthian Empire did not carry out true retaliation until ten years later when the Roman general, Quintus Labienus, defected to the service of the Parthian prince, Pacorus, and the two of them invaded the province of Syria in 40 BC. The Parthian army then divided into two forces; Pacorus led one to conquer the lands along the Mediterranean coast, while Labienus and his contingent advanced north into Asia Minor. Before long, most of the eastern territory of the Roman Empire belonged to the Parthians.17
A major reason that the Parthians under Pacorus and Labienus continued to have so much success against Rome was that the western empire was embroiled in civil wars, which all in some way involved the most powerful Roman of the age, Gaius Julius Caesar. After the death of the great general in 44 BC, one of his chief lieutenants, Mark Antony, made an alliance with Caesar’s adopted son and heir, Gaius Octavian, who was later known as Caesar Augustus. The two of them then went after Caesar’s assassins with much success, but even as allies the two men remained highly competitive rivals. Once the assassins were defeated, Octavian effectively ruled the west while Antony took command over the eastern territories. In the beginning of 39 BC, Antony felt confident enough with his position that he could send his best commander, Publius Ventidius, on a campaign to expel the troops of the Parthian Empire. Ventidius moved to attack Labienus in Anatolia first. The enormous army under the Roman general included eleven legions, along with a large amount of slingers. The latter were specifically recruited on the direct orders of Ventidius who hoped that the ranged infantrymen would be able to repel the Parthian horse-archers with their unique bullets made of lead. Unbeknownst to the Romans, the Parthian invasion forces of Pacorus and Labienus predominately consisted of cataphracts instead of the numerous horse-archers that were at the Battle of Carrhae.18
Ventidius and his men reached Labienus’ forces so quickly that the Roman defector found himself under attack before he even knew that Ventidius had landed in Anatolia. Caught completely off-guard and heavily outnumbered, Labienus fled back to Syria to gather reinforcements. In the meantime, Ventidius swiftly reclaimed Cilicia, and then remained there to focus on stabilizing the administrations of the eastern provinces.19 When the two commanders moved out to face each other again, they met at the battle of the Cilician Gates. Ventidius stationed his men on a hill to give his army, mostly made up of infantrymen, a slight advantage over the cataphracts and the rest of the cavalrymen fighting for the Parthians. Labienus and his Parthian troops attempted to draw the Romans out from behind their barricades several times but the legionaries refused to budge. Due to the success they had already gained over the Romans in their invasion of the empire, the Parthian cataphracts and horse-archers most likely believed the forces under Ventidius were cowards, therefore they charged up the hill to assault the legionaries protected by their minor fortifications. Once the Parthian cavalrymen ascended the slope, the Roman legionaries then rushed out to meet them in a fierce attack. The suddenness of the assault surprised the Parthian horsemen to such an extent that the front lines broke and then collided with the mounted troops behind them who were still advancing forward up the hill. The legionaries rapidly exploited the chaotic state of the enemy cavalry by manoeuvring up close to the slow-moving cataphracts to target the few vulnerable areas of their extensive heavy armour. It did not take long before the entire Parthian army was routed and in full retreat.20
After the defeat at the Cilician Gates, Labienus retreated with the Parthian troops to Syria, while the Romans were in pursuit. Aware of the approaching Romans, a Parthian army in northern Syria advanced further north and confronted the oncoming Romans on the border of Cilicia and Syria at the Gates of the Amanus. The Battle of the Amanus Pass began when Ventidius’ chief lieutenant, Pompaedius Silo, with a small contingent of cavalry, managed to lure the Parthians away from their defensive position. The retreating Roman cavalry led the Parthian horsemen straight into an ambush where their flank was viciously assaulted with a barrage of lead bullets fired by the numerous slingers of the Roman army. The hail of leaden missiles was even effective against the heavy armour of the Parthian cataphracts. Ventidius was then able to move the majority of his forces to a strongly defensible position on higher ground. As at the Cilician Gates, the Parthian cavalrymen decided to take the offensive and charge up the hill with a large number of cataphracts. The ascending slope once again led to the Parthians’ downfall for once they had advanced up it, the slingers first halted the forward movement of the Parthian cavalry with their numerous missiles, but then as the heavily armoured horsemen slowed down, the legionaries surged forward to face them. For the second time in a row, the Parthian cataphracts were completely crushed after attempting to charge a Roman army in an elevated position.21
Labienus was soon found and murdered shortly after the Roman victory at the Amanus Pass. In the later part of 39 BC, Prince Pacorus led the rest of the Parthian forces out of Syria, leaving the province free for Ventidius to retake. By the end of the year, the Roman general had reclaimed both Syria and Palestine as well before sending his soldiers to winter quarters. In the spring of 38 BC, Pacorus returned to Syria with another Parthian army. The Parthian forces travelled through Cyrrhestica and advanced until they reached the Roman camp near Mount Gindarus.22 In the last two battles Ventidius fought against the Parthians, he faced a different enemy commander. Then yet again at the Battle of Mount Gindarus, it was the first time that Pacorus attacked Ventidius’ army and made the huge mistake of leading his cavalrymen uphill to assault the fortified Roman camp. Cassius Dio recorded how the Roman heavy infantry, supported by many slingers, overcame the cataphracts once more:
In this way he met Pacorus in Syria Cyrrhestica and conquered him. For when he had not prevented them from crossing the river and had not attacked them at once after they had got across, they imputed sloth and weakness to the Romans and therefore marched against their camp, although it was on high ground, expecting to take it without resistance. But when a sally was suddenly made, the assailants, being cavalry, were driven back down the slope without difficulty; and although at the foot they defended themselves valiantly, the majority of them being cataphracts, yet they were confused by the unexpectedness of the onslaught and by stumbling over one another and were defeated by the heavy-armed men and especially by the slingers; for these struck them from a distance with their powerful missiles and so were exceedingly difficult for them to withstand.23
As the armoured legionaries fought the Parthian heavy cavalrymen, Pacorus and his personal guard were killed in the combat. When the Parthian troops then found out that their leader was dead, some of them courageously sacrificed their lives in the attempt to reclaim his body from the Romans, although the news ultimately led most of the Parthian army to retreat.24
For the third time, Ventidius utilized elevated and fortified terrain, along with ranged infantrymen, to completely negate the effectiveness of the elite Parthian cataphracts, and for the third time in a row the Roman general achieved victory over the armies of the great eastern rival of the Roman Empire. The spectacular Parthian victory at Carrhae redeemed the cataphracts after their overall disappointing performances at Magnesia and Tigranocerta, yet the battles of the Cilician Gates, Amanus and Gindarus showed that higher ground and slingers armed with lead bullets were also highly effective against the heavily armoured horsemen as well. Furthermore, these battles once again reinforced the fact that the cataphracts were most effective when used in conjunction with numerous light cavalry or infantry; and if they were the most numerous type of warrior in an army, the heavy cavalrymen could be extremely vulnerable when stationary, especially without the support of these additional troops.
After he won against Prince Pacorus and sent the Parthian army back to the east, Ventidius did not take any further actions against the Parthian Empire because he did not have permission to do so from his superior, Mark Antony. Yet the victorious Roman general became a hero to the Roman people and in their eyes he had redeemed the disaster at Carrhae. As the effective master of the eastern Roman Empire, Antony made sure that no invasions of the Parthian Empire were carried out until he could personally lead the campaign himself. Antony believed he was the true heir of Julius Caesar, even though the will of the recently deceased great man said that position belonged to his rival, Octavian. Therefore, Antony planned to use the conquest of the Parthian Empire as a way to prove that he was as good a general as the remarkable Julius Caesar. Before his death, Caesar himself had planned to invade the Parthian Empire and although he died before he was able to carry out the action, Antony inherited the intelligence and paperwork gathered by the brilliant general.25
At the end of 38 BC, Phraates IV (r. 37–2 BC) became the emperor of Parthia and, once in power, his first act was to have his father murdered. The new ruler then consolidated his control by killing several half-brothers and exiling his other brother, along with many among the nobility, which even included many of the aristocratic warriors who fought for Parthia against the Romans led by Ventidius. One of these exiled warriors, named Monaeses, met with Mark Antony and promised to be his guide through Parthian territory. The following year, Antony quickly prepared for his massive campaign, hoping to exploit the instability of the Parthian Empire after the dramatic change in government. In his preparations, Antony also made an alliance with King Artavasdes II in order to gain some of his elite Armenian cavalry to combat the many Parthian horsemen. At the end of April or the beginning of May in 36 BC, the hopeful successor to Caesar’s military genius headed for the east with an enormous army that may have numbered as many as 100,000 men, which included approximately 16 legions. Antony first led the Roman army north to the kingdom of Armenia where Artavasdes joined his forces with 7,000 infantrymen and 6,000 armoured heavy cavalry. The Armenian king also convinced Antony to attack first the kingdom of Media Atropatene, which was an ally of the Parthian Empire, because much of the Median army was supposedly away in Parthian territory at the time.26
The huge Roman baggage train of at least 300 wagons, loaded with tons of equipment, such as large siege engines, plus the numerous animals required to pull all of the vehicles, moved way too slowly for Antony so he decided to move ahead with the infantry and cavalry. The Roman general then led his forces to Praaspa, the capital of Media Atropatene, and put the city under siege. In the meantime, the allied kings of Parthia and Media Atropatene avoided Antony’s forces that surrounded the capital and instead struck the ponderous baggage train while it was far from the rest of the army. After killing the Roman commander, Oppius Statianus, and routing the rest of the Roman forces that guarded the baggage train, the allied army burned all of the siege equipment and seized the rest as valuable plunder. To make matters worse, King Artavasdes abandoned the Romans. By the time news of the attack had reached Antony and he was able to respond, 10,000 of his men were already slain.27 In the account of Cassius Dio, however, a large contingent of slingers were able to intercept some of the Parthian and Mede forces shortly afterwards:
When he met them a little later, he routed them, for as his slingers were numerous and could shoot farther than the archers, they inflicted severe injury upon all, even upon the cataphracts; yet he did not kill any considerable number of the enemy, because the barbarians could ride fast.28
The Romans were most likely still intimidated by the impressive armour of the cataphracts even after Ventidius’ great success against them; thus, the Roman writer was probably more than happy to emphasize how effective slingers were against them and specifically highlight one of the weaknesses of the formidable enemy cavalrymen once again.
Antony returned to Praaspa, but without the siege engines, the city was nearly impossible to take. Quickly running out of food and with the Parthian horse-archers constantly harrying the legionaries with hitand-run attacks, especially against the foraging parties, Antony finally gave up. Even though the Parthians refused to fight a pitched battle with Antony, their tactics of rapid assaults were killing many of the Roman troops. Therefore, the Roman general decided to retreat at the beginning of winter before the weather conditions made the situation much worse. Antony led his men through the hill country to the north to avoid the same fate as Crassus in the open fields to the south; however, the terrain did not prevent the Parthians from continuing their attacks on the Romans as they tried to escape. By the time the Romans had finally reached the safety of Armenia, a total of around 24,000 men had perished in the campaign.29
Yet Antony and his men felt betrayed by the Armenian king for his desertion, so they did not stay long and quickly continued their journey to the Roman province of Syria, losing another 8,000 men to the harsh winter conditions. The Roman general spent the next year rebuilding his army and returned to Armenia in 34 BC. Antony and his forces then quickly captured Artavasdes and effectively conquered the kingdom, which intimidated the Median king to such an extent that he signed a treaty with the Roman general against the Parthian Empire. He may not have come anywhere near to conquering the Parthians, but when Antony eventually celebrated his triumph, the Armenian king was forced to participate in the procession before he was executed.30 The hostile situation between the Romans and the Parthians was not resolved until several years later in 27 BC, for after Octavian defeated Antony and became Caesar Augustus (r. 27 BC–14 AD), the first emperor of the Roman Empire, the new ruler made peace with his great eastern rival. The official border was agreed upon by the two powerful states and Augustus even managed to regain the lost legionary standards from the Parthians in 20 BC.31 Yet the cataphracts of the Parthians had successfully made their mark on the Romans, which would last for centuries to come. The terrifying mounted troops encased in metal had struck so much fear into the Roman people that it was reflected in their literature, for in the poem of ‘Chaste and Faithful Galla’ in The Elegies of Propertius, it was the cataphracts and the archers of the enemy that Galla feared would turn her into a widow while her husband was away fighting against the Parthian Empire:
[Galla] in the meantime will pine away at each idle rumour, for fear your courage will cost you dear, or the arrows of Medes enjoy your death, or the cataphract on a golden horse, or some bit of you be brought back in an urn to be wept over.32
Throughout the first century AD, the ancient accounts do not mention any other major conflicts between the Parthian Empire and its mighty western rival where the cataphracts played a key role in the combat. However, in the last half of the century, the Parthians managed to gain control of the kingdom of Armenia when the brother of the Parthian emperor, Vologases I (r. 51–78), became its new ruler.33 The Parthians continued their dominance over Armenia in 109 AD when Emperor Osroes I (r. 109–129) made sure his nephew, Exedares, was the next ruler of the kingdom. Since the Parthians then ruled over the two greatest eastern states, they became too great of a threat to the Romans, thus Emperor Trajan (r. 98–117) organized the largest eastern campaign against the Parthian Empire and their deadly cataphracts since the one led by Mark Antony.34
In the spring of 114, Trajan and the Roman army left Syria and headed towards the Kingdom of Armenia. By the end of the year, Trajan had seized the Armenian king, had him executed and made Armenia into a Roman province. After spending the winter in Armenia, Trajan led his forces into Mesopotamia. To take the region, the Roman emperor divided his army into two; one was led by his general, Lusius Quietus, and approached from the east, while the other half of the army was commanded by Trajan himself, which he led into Mesopotamia from the west. The two forces broke through all resistance they faced and reunited at the end of 115. On 21 February 116, Trajan sent a letter to the Roman Senate proclaiming his successful annexation of Armenia and Mesopotamia. The Roman army then spent the winter in Syria, yet returned to Mesopotamia in 116. After continuing to establish his hold over the region, Trajan led his men to capture Seleucia first and then the Romans seized the Parthian capital of Ctesiphon without facing any resistance because Emperor Osroes had already fled from the city. The Romans had advanced into his territory with an army much larger than he could muster at that moment, therefore the Parthian emperor made a tactical retreat to the protection of the Zagros Mountains. Once Ctesiphon was taken, Trajan considered himself the conqueror of the Parthian Empire and had ‘Parthicus’ officially added to his name.35
Emperor Trajan then decided to make a short trip down the Tigris River to the Persian Gulf. But when he returned shortly after, the Roman emperor found out that the Parthians had taken back much of the newly claimed Roman territory in Armenia and Mesopotamia, or instigated rebellions to destabilize the regions. The Roman emperor failed to properly garrison the new provinces he had made, thus the gains were quickly lost. To end the revolts, Trajan once again divided his forces, yet this time into three large contingents. Although the Parthians crushed one of the three armies, the other two Roman forces managed to reclaim much of the territory, including key cities like Nisibis, Edessa and Seleucia. The Roman armies then reunited and defeated the Parthians outside of Ctesiphon. Trajan followed up this victory by placing the son of Osroes, Parthamaspates, on the throne as a client king of Parthia, subservient to the Romans; the Roman emperor then made a similar arrangement with the Parthian who had seized the throne of Armenia. Ultimately, Trajan had finally fully realized how vast the eastern lands were that the Parthians held sway over while he carried out his eastern campaign; therefore, the Roman ruler lost all hope of ever fully taking control over the Parthian Empire and felt that putting a vassal on the throne was sufficient.36
Trajan may have put client kings on the thrones of Parthia and Armenia but areas of Mesopotamia were still under revolt when severe weather forced the Roman emperor to return to Syria. Furthermore, a massive Jewish rebellion erupted, which took a considerable amount of effort on the part of the emperor and his soldiers to put down. By the time he felt ready to return to Mesopotamia in 117 to re-establish his dominance over the region, Trajan was afflicted with a stroke, making him unable to carry out the campaign. Therefore, the emperor placed his future successor, Hadrian (r. 117–138), in command of the eastern forces of the Roman army. On the journey back to the west, the elderly Trajan became ill and died. As the new emperor, Hadrian’s eastern policy was completely different than the one carried out by his predecessor. Although a few client kings in the region may have remained loyal to Rome, Hadrian effectively relinquished all control over the lands east of the Euphrates River, which practically negated everything that Trajan had accomplished. Before long, the only kingdoms that the Romans retained their hegemonic control over were Armenia and Edessa.37
In the beginning of Hadrian’s reign, the border between the Parthian Empire and the Roman Empire returned to its traditional place along the Euphrates River; though while the boundary between the two great empires stayed the same, a major change was made to the Roman military during this period. The first unit of Roman cataphracts, known as ala I Gallorum et Pannoniorum catafractata, may have been created while Trajan was on his eastern campaign. On the other hand, it is more likely that the unit was introduced as a reform instituted by Emperor Hadrian.38 Centuries after the Romans had faced cataphracts for the first time at the Battle of Magnesia against the Seleucid Empire in 190 BC, the predominately infantry-minded western empire finally realized the great worth of the horsemen and began to utilize the heavily armoured cavalrymen as a part of the extensive imperial military. One of the reasons for the Romans change of heart regarding cataphracts may have been from their encounters with the elite heavy horsemen of the Parthians during Trajan’s eastern campaign. Even if Trajan’s campaign against the Parthians was not specifically responsible for the emperor’s adoption of a Roman version of the cataphracts, in later Roman history when cataphracts had become commonplace within the military, Roman writers understood that interactions with the Parthian cataphracts were a major factor in inspiring their predecessors to adopt this type of troops. For instance, when the later Roman writer Nazarius reflected on the conflict with the Parthian Empire in the second century AD, he stated:
When Antoninus, an outstanding Emperor in peacetime and not without energy and capacity in war, made trial of the Parthians in combat, after he had seen their cataphracts he lapsed so completely into fear that on his own he sent the King a letter promoting peace. And when the overly proud king had spurned it, the barbarian’s insolence was vanquished indeed, but it was made clear that there is so much potential power in that type of armour that he who was to be overcome felt confident and he who was to conquer was afraid.39
After the peace established in the beginning of the reign of Hadrian, the Parthians and the Romans did not come into major conflict again until the Parthian Emperor Vologases IV (r. 147–191) invaded Armenia in 162. A major reason that the Romans had enjoyed so much success against the Parthian Empire in Trajan’s earlier invasion was that the eastern empire was embroiled in civil wars over control of the throne. While eastern Parthia was controlled by Vologases III (r. 105–147), Osroes I ruled the western territories of the Parthian Empire, yet the ruler of the west was weakened after fighting the Roman army under Trajan. Therefore, Vologases was able to seize control of most of the Parthian Empire after the death of Osroes, and then the new ruler attempted to exploit the change in power in the Roman Empire after Emperor Antoninus Pius (r. 138–161) passed away. Once he quickly took control of the Kingdom of Armenia, Vologases followed the practice of many of his predecessors by placing a Parthian family member on the seized throne. Vologases also crushed a small Roman army led by a foolishly ambitious legate and then invaded the Roman province of Syria, which drove one of Rome’s two emperors, Lucius Verus (r. 161–169), to command the first major eastern campaign since the one led by Trajan.40
Even though Verus travelled to the east with the army, the true command of the Roman forces belonged to his generals. In 163 AD, one of these generals, Statius Priscus, seized the Kingdom of Armenia and placed a pro-Roman client king on the throne. The next year, the chief Roman general of the campaign, Avidius Cassius, invaded Mesopotamia. Key cities in the region, such as Nisibis, Dura Europos and Edessa were taken, and the Roman forces defeated the Parthians on several occasions, including battles fought at Sura and Dura Europos. Near the end of 165, the Romans gained the important city of Seleucia without facing much resistance and then moved on to storm Ctesiphon. With these last two treasures won, the Roman generals had managed to reclaim all of the territory that Trajan had previously conquered. However, the victory over the Parthian Empire was bittersweet for a devastating plague ravaged not only the Roman soldiers, but also spread throughout the Parthian territories. The Romans returned to the west victorious, though they were forced to leave prematurely, and even worse, they brought the disease back to the Mediterranean world with them.41
The Romans returned to the east in 166 to consolidate their control over territory in Mesopotamia and invade the region of Media in the Parthian Empire. By the end of this next short campaign, the Romans once again overcame the Parthians and had extended the border of the empire to include western Mesopotamia, with the boundary of the province of Syria moved to as far as Dura Europos.42 The Roman victories over the Parthians were certainly far from complete, yet the invasions had weakened the eastern empire. The decline of the Parthian Empire was exacerbated even further decades later when the Roman army successfully invaded in 197 AD, seized Ctesiphon once again, and burned the Parthian royal palace.43 Even so, the Romans were forced to leave the total conquest of the Parthian Empire for another time, so it was not until civil war erupted between two Parthian princes, Artabanus V and Vologases VI, that the new Roman emperor, Caracalla (r. 198–217) decided to strike while his great eastern rival was unstable and weak. Upon the death of his father in 211, Caracalla became the sole ruler of the empire and quickly began to prepare for his eastern campaign. The Roman emperor first increased his hold over the kingdom of Edessa by imprisoning its king. This was followed up by a similar attempt made in the kingdom of Armenia that failed to subdue the Armenian people. While the Armenians violently resisted the Romans, Caracalla prepared to invade the Parthian Empire. However, as time passed, the Roman ruler considered the situation in Armenia a higher priority; thus, he sent his general, Theocritus, to deal with the opposition. In 215, the Roman army advanced to Armenia, but once it reached the kingdom, Armenian forces managed to crush the Romans.44
Meanwhile, the conflict between the new emperor, Vologases VI (r. 208–228 AD), and his brother, Artabanus V (r. 208–224 AD), continued within the Parthian Empire. By 216, Artabanus had taken control over most of the empire, while Vologases retained his hold over the city of Seleucia and the surrounding territory. After Caracalla managed to cause much further damage at Ctesiphon and throughout Media (possibly due to a cruel, yet clever, ruse carried out by the Roman emperor), Artabanus remained in a superior position over his brother. The Parthian ruler then raised an army and advanced into the Roman controlled part of Mesopotamia. Caracalla was assassinated by one of his own guards in 217, so when the Romans confronted the Parthian invasion force it was under the command of the new emperor, Macrinus (r. 217–218). The ruler who took Caracalla’s place desired a peaceful resolution, but Artabanus adamantly refused peace terms unless he was given back all of the Parthian lands that were taken by the Romans east of the Eurphrates River. Macrinus would rather fight than give up Roman territory, so the two armies met at the Battle of Nisibis.45
Like most Parthian armies, the forces under Artabanus consisted mostly of cavalrymen and archers. On the other hand, the Parthian army at Nisibis was unique in that it contained a contingent of a rare cataphract-type of warriors who were mounted not upon horses, but rather camels instead. In his History of the Roman Empire, Herodian first mentions the distinctive troops in the events leading up to the battle:
Artabanus was marching toward the Romans with a huge army, including a strong cavalry contingent and a powerful unit of archers and those cataphracts who hurl spears from camels.46
The camel cataphracts fought with either spears or lances, and both riders and mounts wore extensive armour like the traditional cataphracts who rode horses. Along with the legionaries, the Roman army also included contingents of light infantry and Mauretanian cavalrymen. The fighting between the two ancient superpowers was brutal and lasted for three long days.47 Herodian recorded how deadly the Parthian warriors, including the camel cataphracts, were on the first day of the fighting, yet he also described how the Romans eventually managed to gain the upper hand:
The barbarians inflicted many wounds upon the Romans from above, and did considerable damage by the showers of arrows and the long spears of the cataphract camel riders. But when the fighting came to close quarters, the Romans easily defeated the barbarians; for when the swarms of Parthian cavalry and hordes of camel riders were mauling them, the Romans pretended to retreat and then they threw down caltrops and other keen-pointed iron devices. Covered by the sand, these were invisible to the horsemen and the camel riders and were fatal to the animals. The horses, and particularly the tender-footed camels, stepped on these devices and, falling, threw their riders. As long as they are mounted on horses and camels, the barbarians in those regions fight bravely, but if they dismount or are thrown, they are very easily captured; they cannot stand up to hand-to-hand fighting. And, if they find it necessary to flee or pursue, the long robes which hang loosely about their feet trip them up.48
However, with the coming of night and no clear victor to the battle, the two armies retreated to their camps to rest for the night.49
The second day of the fighting ended in a stalemate as well. The third day of the battle, however, decided the outcome when the Parthians changed their tactics to try and fully envelope the numerically inferior Roman force. In response to the encircling attempts of the Parthian soldiers, the Romans extended their own lines to compensate for the extended Parthian front. However, the Parthians were able to exploit the weakened thinner lines of the Romans and achieve a great victory. Knowing he had lost the battle, Emperor Macrinus retreated and, soon after, his men fled to the Roman camp as well. Although the Parthians won the Battle of Nisibis, it was a Pyrrhic victory for Artabanus; the losses were heavy for both sides. Since the Parthian emperor desired peace almost as much as Macrinus, Artabanus accepted only a substantial payment in return for a cessation of hostilities, as opposed to the territory he previously demanded.50
Although Emperor Macrinus was quickly defeated, executed and replaced by one of his rivals, Elagabalus (r. 218–222), in 218 , the Roman Empire continued to persist for centuries following its defeat at Nisibis. The Parthian Empire, on the other hand, became even weaker after its conflict with Rome and continued on its steady decline. Revolts from within the empire continued to plague Artabanus so he could not sit back and enjoy his success over the Romans. In 220, the leader of the Persians, Ardashir, managed to break free from Parthian rule and exploit the weakness of the empire to extend his control over more and more land. By 224, Artabanus met Ardashir on the field of battle and lost more than his life; the Parthian Empire collapsed shortly after his fall. In place of the Parthians, a resurgent Persian state arose known as the Sassanian Empire.51 As the new supreme empire of the east, the armies of the Sassanians had some of the greatest warriors of the ancient world. Like its Parthian predecessor, the elite heavy cavalry of the Sassanian Empire were also cataphracts.