The Byzantine Empire
On 11 May 330, Roman Emperor Constantine the Great transformed and vastly expanded upon the ancient Greek city of Byzantium, founding the new enormous, political centre of the east, which he named Constantinople.1 Over time, Constantinople not only became the eastern capital of the empire, but eventually the most important imperial city overall, even surpassing the old centre of Rome. When the traditional capital fell, along with the rest of the western half of the empire, the great city founded by Constantine remained as the new, sole capital of the surviving Eastern Roman Empire, now commonly referred to as the Byzantine Empire. Although now centred in Greece, the Byzantines considered themselves the only true successors to the ancient Romans, thus, nearly all aspects of imperial Roman culture and society continued to evolve in the remaining territories of the east. One of the military practices that transferred from the late Roman period to the early Byzantine was the use of the armoured clibanarii.
Early Byzantine Clibanarii
By the 6th century AD, in the beginning of the Byzantine era, the armies of the Eastern Roman Empire finished the gradual transition, which initiated in the 3rd century, from infantry-centred forces to a military dominated by cavalrymen.2 During this period, the Byzantine Empire also experienced a massive resurgence in power during the reign of Emperor Justinian the Great (r. 527–65). Under his rule, the empire of the Eastern Romans not only prospered but also managed to reclaim much of the lost territory in the west. A major reason why the new emperor was so successful in his military exploits was due to the reforms of the military made early in his reign. In the reorganized Byzantine armies, the field forces were still required to be highly mobile and were therefore comprised primarily of cavalrymen, including the heavily armoured clibanarii. On the other hand, the numbers of the elite heavy cavalrymen were limited for several reasons. The first two were issues that the Romans had experienced with the cataphracts for centuries; both their high cost and the length of time it took to properly train a mounted warrior to fight in such heavy armour. Furthermore, when the empire was in its state of decline, it had lost much of the land that was ideal for the breeding of large warhorses used for the cataphracts. The scarcity of proper mounts was a major problem for Justinian, who made efforts to make the region of Cappadocia the primary source of the heavy cavalry steeds.3 Yet, even if Justinian struggled to find heavy warhorses at times during his reign, it is still very possible that the Byzantine military managed throughout the rest of the sixth century to arm approximately fifteen per cent of the cavalry units in its mobile field armies as cataphracts troops.4
The arms and armour of the Byzantine clibanarii were similar to the late Roman version, but with alterations as well. For example, a heavy cavalryman who fought in the Leones Clibanarii unit during the reign of Emperor Justinian I would have commonly worn lamellar armour, especially in Central Asian styles. The lamellar cuirass often protected the arms to the elbows and extended past the waist to the mid-thighs of the rider. The spangenhelm, in Italo-Germanic styles, was a popular type of helmet utilized by the heavy cavalrymen, but it often did not contain a facemask during that period. Protection for the mounts, in terms of barding, was similar to the late Sassanian clibanarii in that the armour covered the front part of the horse, specifically the head, neck and chest; this too was most likely lamellar in construction. The Byzantine horsemen fought with lances, but continued the practice of having more diverse martial skills for they were also armed with bows and arrows that were highly influenced by Turkic and other Central Asian warriors, as well as long swords of a type that was used by the Iranian peoples and tribal groups of the steppes.5 Some units of the heavily armoured clibanarii were most likely a part of the Byzantine forces in the battle of the Casilinus (Volturnus) River in 554 AD, and the battle of Solachon in 586 AD, though they did not distinguish themselves in the combat from the other Byzantine mounted troops in the written accounts of Late Antiquity.6
Near the end of the sixth century, Emperor Maurice (r. 582–602) ascended the Byzantine throne. One of the greatest acts attributed to the new ruler of the empire was the creation of one of the best military treatises made in antiquity, called the Strategikon. Although the term clibanarii is not used to describe them, a significant portion of the treatise was dedicated to the units of heavily armoured cavalry, including a description of the horsemen’s armour, as well as some information on when, and from whom, their equipment was to be acquired:
With individual training progressing satisfactorily, the soldiers must be armed by their commanding officers. The proper equipment needed on campaign may be gotten ready in the leisure of winter quarters. Each soldier should have the equipment corresponding to his rank and his pay and perquisites. This is especially true of the commanders of a meros, a moira, or a tagma, and of hekatontarchs, dekarchs, pentarchs, and tetrarchs, and of the bucellary [personal bodyguard units recruited directly by officials and generals] and federate troops. They should have hooded coats of mail reaching to their ankles, which can be caught up by thongs and rings, along with carrying cases; helmets with small plumes on top… It is not a bad idea for the bucellary troops to make use of iron gauntlets and small tassels hanging from the back straps and the breast straps of the horses, as well as small pennons hanging from their own shoulders over the coats of mail. For the more handsome the soldier is in his armament, the more confidence he gains in himself and the more fear he inspires in the enemy.7
Although not all mounts of the Byzantine heavy cavalry wore extensive barding, there were still a significant amount of horses armoured like the steeds of the earlier clibanarii:
The horses, especially those of the officers and the other special troops, in particular those in the front ranks of the battle line, should have protective pieces of iron armour about their heads and breast plates of iron or felt, or else breast and neck coverings such as the Avars use.8
The Byzantine armoured horsemen and their mounts in the Strategikon may have typically worn slightly less protection than earlier Roman versions, like the contemporaneous Sassanian clibanarii, though they certainly wore heavy armour. The weight of the extensive protection was so high on some occasions that pack animals ‘may be needed to carry the coats of mail and the tents’.9 Furthermore, even though the lance was still utilized by the Byzantine mounted troops, the bow continued to rise in importance for the heavy cavalrymen of both empires as well:
Bows suited to the strength of each man, and not above it, more in fact on the weaker side, cases broad enough so that when necessary they can fit the strung bows in them, with spare bow strings in their saddle bags; quivers with covers holding about thirty to forty arrows; in their baldrics small files and awls; cavalry lances of the Avar type with leather thongs in the middle of the shaft and with pennons; swords; round neck pieces of the Avar type made with linen fringes outside and wool inside. Young foreigners unskilled with the bow should have lances and shields… Apart from the foreigners, all the younger Romans up to the age of forty must definitely be required to possess bow and quiver, whether they be expert archers or just average. They should possess two lances so as to have a spare at hand in case the first one misses. Unskilled men should use lighter bows. Given enough time, even those who do not know how to shoot will learn, for it is essential that they do so.10
Because they wore less armour than the clibanarii and frequently utilized the bow, a better term used to describe the heavy cavalrymen of the Strategikon may be cataphractarii sagittarii.11 It is also very clear that the Avars highly influenced the weaponry and equipment of the armoured horse-archers and cataphract lancers of the Byzantines. Conflicts with the Avars, Huns and other mounted warriors from the steppes of Central Asia forced the Byzantines to adopt the tactics and weaponry of their mounted, nomadic foes and, thus, was also the main factor behind the creation of the archer/lancer hybrid cataphract units.12
Aside from arms and armour, the description of the heavy horsemen also recommended clothing and other important equipment:
The men’s clothing, especially their tunics, whether made of linen, goat’s hair, or rough wool, should be broad and full cut according to the Avar pattern, so they can be fastened to cover the knees while riding and give a neat appearance. They should also be provided with an extra-large cloak or hooded mantle of felt with broad sleeves to wear, large enough to wear over their armament, including the coat of mail and the bow. Then, in case it should rain or be damp from the dew, by wearing this garment over the coat of mail and the bow they may protect their armament and still not find it awkward to use the bow or the lance. Such cloaks are necessary in another way on patrol, for when the mail is covered by them, its brightness will not be seen at a distance by the enemy, and they also provide some protection against arrows… Besides the leather cases for the coats of mail, they should have light wicker ones. During battle or on raids they may be carried behind the saddle arch by the horse’s loins. Then if, as in the case of a reversal, the men with the spare horses are missing for a day, the coats of mail will not be left unprotected and ruined and the soldiers will not be worn out by the constant weight of the armour.13
The Strategikon continued with the saddles, as well as the other related equestrian equipment, for the cataphractarii sagittarii, including the revolutionary stirrup:
The saddles should have large and thick cloths; the bridles should be of good quality; attached to the saddles should be two iron stirrups, a lasso with thong, hobble, a saddle bag large enough to hold three or four days’ rations for the soldier when needed. There should be four tassels on the back strap, one on top of the head, and one under the chin.14
Ever since the battle of Panion in 200 BC, the cataphracts and clibanarii of the Seleucids, Parthians, Sassanians, the earlier Romans, and several other kingdoms, had proven over the centuries that heavily armoured warriors could fight on armoured mounts without stirrups, even with the enormous kontos (contus). Yet, even though the cataphracts certainly existed before the Romans adopted stirrups in the sixth century AD, there is no doubt that the introduction of this significant piece of equipment greatly improved the performance of the armoured horsemen. First of all, the most obvious benefit was that it was considerably easier for such a heavily equipped warrior to mount his horse by using the stirrup as a stable platform to step up on to. Furthermore, while in combat, stirrups made it easier for the cataphracts to use all of their various weaponry. With the increased stability provided by the stirrup, lancers no longer had to wield their primary weapon in both hands, but instead could be armed with both a shield and the lance. In addition, the heavy cavalrymen could put more of their weight into the strikes of their swords, maces and other sidearms, making heavier blows with the potential to cause greater injury to enemy soldiers. However, what was most important for the cataphractarii sagittarii was that stirrups gave mounted archers much more manoeuvrability in their saddle to fire in all directions and even allowed the most skilled riders to stand up, which gave them more stability in order to improve their aim considerably.15
When the Sassanians invaded the Byzantine Empire in 603, initiating the decades-long war between the two great superpowers of Late Antiquity, it was the composite lancer/archer version of the Byzantine cataphract that fought against their eastern adversary. However, for the first two decades of the war, the Byzantine forces did not fare well against the armies of the Sassanian Empire. Even after the ruler of the Eastern Romans, Emperor Heraclius, personally got involved in the situation in 613, the Sassanians continued to win the war. It was not until the end of the decade that the Byzantine emperor realized he must put his soldiers through an intensive period of re-training if they were to have any hope of defeating the Sassanians. Therefore, Heraclius left on 4 April 620 and gathered his forces at a location near Caesarea in Cappadocia to begin the process of improving the martial capabilities of his troops. As a vital part of his armies, the cataphracts also underwent further training that especially improved two major aspects of their combat: both their proficiency with the lance, in conjunction with stirrups, for enhanced shock tactics, as well as extensive training with the bow.16
Although it is possible that the Sassanian heavy cavalrymen had also adopted stirrups by this point, there is no solid evidence to prove this. Thus, if it’s true that the Sassanian horsemen did not utilize the revolutionary equestrian equipment, the use of stirrups would have given the Byzantine cataphracts a considerable advantage over their mounted opponents.17 On the other hand, even if both armies had access to the equipment, the new cavalry tactics employed by the Byzantine armoured horsemen alone may have been sufficient enough to overcome the late Sassanian clibanarii. If it was, in fact, solely the use of enhanced shock tactics that gave the Byzantines the advantage, it may have been due to the Eastern Roman lancers’ greater ability to charge into the especially vulnerable rear or flanks of the Sassanian armoured cavalrymen.18
Another advantage that the Byzantine cataphract may possibly have had over the Sassanian version might actually be their archery technique. Even if the Sassanian horse-archers were the masters of rapid-fire archery, as according to the Strategikon, their method of shooting the bow differed in that they drew their bowstrings with the three lower fingers on their hand. By contrast, the Byzantine armoured horse-archers adopted the same draw technique that was utilized by the Huns, later known as the ‘Mongolian draw’. Using this method, the archers of the Eastern Romans pulled the bowstrings with their thumbs instead of their fingers, which may not have been the fastest technique, but it was the way to cause the most potential damage on a shot from a compound bow. Also, once again, if the Byzantine archers had stirrups and the Sassanians did not, that would have made Eastern Roman archery even more superior to that of the Neo-Persian Empire.19
The intensive training and drills were carried out for about six or seven months before Heraclius led the army out of Cappadocia to begin campaigning again around the beginning of winter at the end of 620. In 622, Heraclius and his men encountered the Sassanian forces under the command of the general Shahrbaraz, who after making a failed attack on the Byzantines, fled into the protection of the nearby mountains. While the Byzantine army remained on the level plain, the Sassanian warriors frequently left the safety of their mountainous refuge to make assaults on the army in the field. Yet in each attempt, the Byzantines overcame their attackers and successfully drove them off back into their favoured rough terrain, which negated the effectiveness of the Eastern Roman lancers, as described in the Strategikon. However, it was not just with the lance that the Byzantine cataphracts repelled the attacks of the Sassanians, for the use of the Hunnic draw employed by the Eastern Romans may have also allowed them to shoot farther than the enemy archers. On the other hand, the Byzantine army was either unable or unwilling to rout the Sassanians from out of their mountainous refuge. The first major battle that the newly trained army participated in took place near Ophalimos when general Shahrbaraz led his forces down out of the mountains to attack the Byzantines on the plains. On this occasion, however, the Byzantines managed to make a surprise attack that caught the Sassanians completely off-guard and halted the momentum of their cavalrymen. It was when the Sassanian horsemen were in this vulnerable state that the Byzantine heavy cavalry made at least one successful charge that broke the Sassanian army, leading to victory for Heraclius and his men.20 These violent encounters with the Sassanians also demonstrated how effectively armoured the Byzantine cataphract remained even in its new lancer/archer hybrid incarnation. According to the Chronicle of Theophanes, while the Byzantine emperor was in the thick of the combat, his horse was struck several times but was never wounded:
[Heraclius’ horse] took a lance thrust in the flank and received many sword blows to the face, but because he was wearing armour of layered felt, he was unharmed, nor did the swords have any effect.21
In 625, when both of the generals, Shahrbaraz and Shahin, pursued Heraclius, the Byzantine emperor retreated to the safety of a wooded hill near Tigranocerta. From this superior position, the Byzantine archers dug in and began to launch volleys of arrows down upon their pursuers. Since the Eastern Roman archers had a greater range than their enemies, the Sassanians could not get close enough to damage the Byzantine forces. Without any cover for protection, the Sassanian warriors were slain on the open plain below until they were eventually routed.22
After Heraclius led his army deep into Sassanian territory, the decisive battle of the war was fought near Nineveh in 627. After successfully distracting the Sassanian forces by raining arrows down upon them, while either using fog or kicking up dust to conceal their actions, the Byzantines managed to get into position and outflank them. When the Byzantines appeared to flee, the Sassanian army pursued them into an open plain but then the Byzantines suddenly turned and confronted the Sassanians, showing that the retreat was actually a feint. Before the Sassanians realized what was happening, they found themselves surrounded and began to sustain heavy casualties. The Sassanians fought fiercely for a time until they could no longer take the onslaught and were forced to retreat.23 The conflict between the Byzantines and Sassanians did not end immediately afterwards, but the Byzantine victory at the Battle of Nineveh marked the effective end of true Sassanian resistance.
The Byzantines may have finally overcome their ancient neme- sis, yet the prolonged conflict left the empire of the Eastern Romans severely weakened as well. Thus the jubilation they felt because of this accomplishment was extremely short-lived, for as early as 634 not only was Syria invaded, but the militant Arab followers of the Prophet Muhammad also conquered Damascus. The Islamic conquests continued for many years in several directions from out of the Arabian Peninsula; very few states of Late Antiquity managed to resist, let alone survive. Unlike the Sassanian Empire, the Byzantines ultimately endured the Arab invasions, though it was at a great cost; nearly all of the eastern imperial territories were seized by the conquerors. For the rest of the seventh century, the empire suffered through a period known as the Byzantine ‘Dark Ages’ and yet, since the Arabs failed to take the capital, Constantinople, the Eastern Romans survived and slowly began to recover.24
Long before the disastrous Arab conquests that devastated the Byzantine Empire, the term clibanarii completely fell out of use in the written records by the end of the sixth century.25 Even though they were not called clibanarii, the Byzantines fielded many of the lancer/ archer hybrid cataphracts throughout the Sassanian-Byzantine War, yet the amount of heavily armoured cavalry in the overall army decreased greatly after they were severely defeated by the Arab armies. Heavy horsemen still remained a vital component of Byzantine armies over the following centuries; however, none wore such extensive protection to be deemed as either cataphracti or clibanarii by the early medieval writers of the period that was known as the Byzantine Dark Ages. It was not until the ninth century that the elite heavy cavalrymen of the Imperial Tagmata (full-time professional army) were again armoured much more like cataphracts, along with their mounts. Regarding the armour, segmented metal helmets were worn, as well as mail hauberks that extended to the middle of the thigh and had sleeves that only reached the elbows. Below the helmet, a full mail aventail commonly protected the face and head, leaving only two openings for the eyes. The top layer of armour over the torso comprised of a small, sleeveless lamellar cuirass. Underneath the cuirass, the heavy horsemen also wore a quilted epilorikon with long sleeves that could be laced up if needed. The elite mounted troops fought with swords and lances, but also carried a shield. The facemask that covered the head of the steed was often made of bronze, while the barding that protected the rest of the horse’s body was commonly made with layers of felt that were both stitched and glued together.26
The condition of the Byzantine Empire continued to improve in the ninth century, thus, by the beginning of the tenth century, the economy was also in a much better state. With the improved economic conditions, a greater number of wealthy landowners emerged than those that existed in the previous two centuries, and these could afford to field a much larger number of cataphracts than those that had served in the army since the seventh century AD. The number of cataphracts available to the Byzantine military was augmented even further as a result of legislation passed in the early ninth century, which encouraged poorer soldiers to pool their resources together in order to arm and armour some of their number to fight as cavalrymen, sometimes even as cataphracts later in the tenth century.27 The previous term used to describe the Roman heavily armoured cavalrymen, clibanarii, was not revived in the medieval Byzantine accounts of the tenth century for these new Byzantine cataphracts. Since the empire of the Eastern Romans was moved to the Greek lands of the east, surrounding the new capital of Constantinople, Greek was the official language of the medieval Byzantine Empire. Therefore, an even more ancient Greek term was resurrected to describe the late Byzantine cataphract. Coming back full circle, the last heavily armoured horsemen in the Greco-Roman accounts were predominately known as kataphraktoi, beginning in the tenth century. However, even though the medieval Byzantines did not again use the Latin word clibanarii for their cataphracts, a Greek variation of the term was used to describe the essential lamellar armour cuirass worn by all of the late Byzantine cataphracts, the klibanion.28
Late Byzantine Kataphraktoi
Most likely during the reign of Emperor Leo VI Sophos (r. 886–912), the cataphracts had officially returned to the armies of the Eastern Romans. The late Byzantine cataphracts primarily wore mail armour (lôrikion alusidôton) that not only covered the torso and arms to the wrist, but the protection also extended all the way down the ankles. Further armour was also commonly worn over the mail, such as a lamellar cuirass (klibanion) and lamellar protection for the limbs as well. An even greater amount of protection was added on top of the klibanion of the heavy horsemen, for first, splinted armour was attached to the upper sleeves and then later scales, or inverted lamellar pieces, were often attached to the upper arms, as well as to the skirt. Though there were also a good number of the cataphracts who wore scale armour (lôrikion folidôton) instead of mail, which sometimes only protected the torso as a cuirass and thus provided less protection than those armoured with a coat of mail; yet even with this limited armour, the scale armour was also augmented with lamellar limb armour as much as possible. Armour for the lower legs of the rider (podopsella) and the forearms (kheiropsella) were often used, along with the armour for the upper sleeves of the klibanion.29
The helmets utilized by the Byzantine cataphracts often had mail attached to them that protected the entire head and face of the rider, except for openings for the eyes; the most heavily armoured cataphracts had double-layered mail protection, as recommended by Nikephoros Phokas in his military treatise, the Praecepta Militaria:
They must have iron helmets heavily reinforced so as to cover their faces with chain mail two or three layers thick so that only their eyes appear.30
Not only have remains of this kind of helmet been found, such as the those uncovered at Yasenovo in Bulgaria, along with several other discoveries of Caucasian helmets, but also depictions of cataphracts wearing these helmets can be viewed in the Madrid Skylitzes manuscript. The most superbly armoured cavalrymen were also equipped with greater leg protection, with full lower leg armour known as khalkotouva.31 Just as with nearly all of the other Byzantine horsemen, the cataphracts also carried a cloak that was often waterproof. Although not often worn in combat, the garment was a valuable piece of equipment for the long marches carried out by every soldier. Before battle commenced, the cataphracts commonly rolled their cloaks up and stored them behind the saddles of their mounts with straps. Standard military issue cloaks, sandy-brown in colour, were provided for the warriors who needed them, however, many of the heavy cavalrymen wore their own garments, which were usually in bright colours and decorated with hems and panels. The most important of the decorations was the tablion, the central panel that showcased the rider’s main emblem.32
During the reign of Emperor Leo VI, the Byzantine cataphracts, in general, were typically much more heavily armoured than they tended to be later in the tenth century. Nearly all of the heavy cavalry of Leo’s reign wore both a full padded garment and an entire mail shirt underneath their lamellar klibanion and upper sleeve armour. On the other hand, after the reforms enacted by Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (r. 963–9) the weight carried by the cataphracts decreased due to the changes he made to the armour they wore. The newer cataphract replaced the mail shirt and the full padded garment with a smaller, short-sleeved arming jacket or zoupa instead; over which he still wore a klibanion, but this armour for the Nikephorian cataphract was supplemented with padded lower sleeves and skirts that were faced with mail, along with splinted upper sleeve armour.33 According to Nikephoros Phokas, the klibanion was an essential piece of equipment for the cataphracts:
Each warrior must wear a klibanion. The klibanion should have sleeves down to the elbows. Down from the elbows they should wear arm-guards which – both these and the skirts hanging from the klibania – have chain mail and are made of coarse silk or cotton as thick as can be stitched together. Over their klibania they should wear epilorika of coarse silk or cotton. Their hands should go out through the shoulder slits. Their sleeves should be hung behind on their shoulders.34
Especially due to the removal of the mail shirt, the weight of the armour decreased significantly; however, less protection left several areas of the body vulnerable, such as the armpits and elbows. It is possible, though, that the Byzantines did the same thing as the Western European knights by attaching mail facings to these vulnerable areas.35
Although less armoured than the version seen in Leo’s reign, the cataphracts during the reign of Phokas were a near perfect balance between encumbrance and protection; therefore, they still wore a very comprehensive set of armour. Though complex, the arming process of the late Byzantine cataphracts was developed in a way to allow the heavy cavalrymen to arm themselves individually as much as possible, without needing the assistance of another to put on their armour. The system began with the short-sleeved, padded jacket (zoupa) for the torso. Also known as the peristhêthidion, this was either a solid garment pulled over the rider’s head, or the jacket was buttoned up instead. It was important for the heavy horseman to make sure that the jacket was as close to the same size as his lamellar klibanion as possible in order for the armour to fit properly. Next came splinted greaves (podopsella) worn on the lower legs, though later in this era some of the cataphracts may have upgraded their armour to solid metal greaves. After the podopsella, the rider then put on a padded skirt (kremasmata); at first this was augmented with mail but near the end of the era many late Byzantine cataphracts substituted the mail with either a scale or lamellar covering as an alternative. The padded skirt was most likely attached to the bottom of the zoupa on the torso in order to keep it in place around the waist and over the thighs. One of the most vital components of the armour was put on next, the klibanion. Due to a series of technological innovations that began in the eighth century, the Eastern Romans created a type of lamellar armour used for the cuirass that was far superior to any other lamellar they had ever developed. The new lamellae plates were fixed to a leather backing in rows that were both riveted in place at top and bottom and also attached with the common laces used primarily in the past before the rows were suspended, which made the armour somewhat resemble brigandine armour that had been turned inside out. It is unknown exactly how the klibanion was put on; however, since it is likely that the lamellar cuirass needed to be fastened with a series of buckles and straps along the sides, this armour was one piece that the cataphract may have required some assistance to put on properly. Luckily, cataphracts were nearly always accompanied by a groom whose function was to help with such matters, or their ‘spear companions’ who fought alongside them could help as well if need be.36
After the klibanion, the next items worn by the cataphract were known as manikellia, which protected the upper arms. They were initially attached directly to the lamellar cuirass, but over time an armoured shoulder piece was adopted that the upper sleeve protection was attached to instead. Typically, the manikellia were splinted armour, however, the late Byzantine cataphracts often wore upper sleeve guards constructed of inverted lamellae plates or scales near the end of the period. The entire torso of the rider, including the arms and the legs down to the knees, was then covered with further protection in the form of a large padded coat known as an epilôrikion. Then the last major piece of armour was put on, the helmet, which kept the entire head and face very protected, especially due to the thick mail skirt attached to it that left only the eyes vulnerable. To keep the rings of the mail skirt holding onto the helmet, they were often supported by a wire that ran through a channel that was slotted throughout the brim of the helm. Armour for the forearms (kheiropsella) made of padding covered with mail was often put on last and probably attached to the sleeves of the zoupa, which was also probably done with some help from one of the cataphract’s comrades; Byzantine cataphracts may have also worn mailed gloves (kheiromanikia), which, if so, might have been put on after the forearm armour. From the tenth to the twelfth century, most of the heavy cavalrymen were armoured in some variation of this manner.37
Since the quality and quantity of the arms and armour of the cataphracts almost always depended largely upon the personal wealth of the rider, some of the richest warriors were able to afford the full mail coat and chose to wear it underneath their klibanion, even with the added weight that came with it. The most heavily armoured cataphracts of their time were therefore protected more like the earlier heavy horsemen who fought under Emperor Leo, and thus gained the benefit of having much more protection for particularly vulnerable areas like the armpits and elbows.38 Furthermore, the mail skirts attached to the helmets of the heavily armoured cavalrymen may have even been three layers thick for some of the warriors. The super armed and armoured cataphracts during this era, especially after the reforms of Nikephoros Phokas, may have been referred to as klibanophoroi (the Greek version of the Latin term clibanarii) to distinguish them from the other cataphract cavalrymen. The klibanophoroi were rare in the Byzantine ranks and most likely only fought in the Tagmata regiments.39 In fact, the most heavily armoured cataphracts were so rare and expensive to field that they only constituted five per cent or less of the overall forces in the Byzantine army, probably within only three Tagmata units at most, each numbering between 384 and 504 men.40
The mounts of the Byzantine cataphracts were protected as well, though the Eastern Romans continued the popular trend from Late Antiquity and the early medieval period of heavy cavalrymen only protecting the chest, neck and head of the horses, while armour for the rest of the body was very rare and was mostly reserved only for the more heavily armoured klibanophoroi. The head armour covered most of the head and was commonly constructed of iron; however, it is also possible that some of the cataphracts continued to use the leather facemasks of earlier Byzantine heavy cavalry horses. Both the chest and neck were often protected with lamellar armour constructed with ox-hide. Sometimes horses wore different armour, such as iron lamellar or mail, though two to three layers of laminated felt glued together was the most common substitute for the ox-hide lamellar.41 Nikephoros Phokas provided a good description of basic barding that the mounts of the Byzantine cataphracts were expected to have during the period:
They must have sturdy horses covered in armour, either of pieces of felt and boiled leather fastened together down to the knees so that nothing of the horse’s body appears except its eyes and nostrils – likewise their legs below the knees and their undersides should remain uncovered and unconcealed – or they can have klibania [lamellar armor] made of bison hides over the chest of the horse which should be split at its legs and underneath to permit the unhindered movement of their legs.42
Just as the full body barding was reserved for the mounts of the wealthiest cataphracts, these were the horses that were given armour made with iron. Therefore, nearly the entire bodies of the horses of the klibanophoroi were encased in metal, except for the belly, lower legs, eyes, and nostrils of the animals. The most unique armour added to all of the cataphract mounts, which was almost exclusively used by the Byzantines, were more complete horseshoes that covered the entire underside of the hoof. The full horseshoes were primarily used to protect the horses from caltrops.43
The Byzantine cataphracts commonly carried a shield, as stated by Nikephoros Phokas: ‘The men should also have shields to turn away arrows’.44 The shield carried by the elite heavy cavalrymen was at first round in shape and known as the skoutaria. These circular shields were usually conical or domed and at least 75–80cm (29–32in) in diameter, though larger shields were also carried that could be as large as 90cm (35in) across. Normally, the shield was strapped to the shoulder of the cataphract, especially while he rode on horseback, and was held in place due to one of his arms placed through one of the arm straps; rings attached to the inside of the shield held rope or leather handles for the cavalryman to hold on to. Worn in this manner, the shield still provided extra protection but allowed the cataphract to freely use both hands. If the cataphract ever dismounted or was thrown from his horse while in combat and forced to fight on foot, the shield was then held in one hand like a buckler, gripped in the fist. However, by the twelfth century, Western European practices influenced the Eastern Romans enough for them to adopt the kite-style shields that then replaced the old skoutaria.45 In as early as 975, some shields were described as having three corners, referring to early versions of the kite shield, such as in the Sylloge Tacticorum. The popularity of the Western shields then increased considerably throughout the eleventh century until they became the main type used by the cataphracts. The kite shields of the Byzantine heavy cavalrymen could be as much as 60 cm (2 ft) across, but were often much less broad near the end of the era. These shields were also smaller than the kite types adopted by the Byzantine infantry, and thus were 91–101cm (36–40in) deep.46
Like the ancient cataphracts, the late Byzantine kataphraktoi carried the traditional kontos, which became known as the kontarion, that was mostly 3.6m (12ft) long in the beginning of the period and throughout the tenth century.47 However, some of the later heavy horsemen fought with a kontarion that was often smaller, and some had a length of only 2.5m (8ft 2in). This was chiefly due to the fact that the lance had become a less important weapon to the cataphract at that time when compared to other arms in their arsenals. For close combat, the main weaponry of the heavy cavalrymen included two types of swords: the single-edged, slightly curved paramêrion and the straight, double-edged spathion. The latter blade was a successor to swords utilized several centuries earlier in the early Roman imperial era; however, the paramêrion was a much more recent addition to the cataphract armament, for it was adopted by the Byzantines in the late ninth century. On average, both blades were 91cm (36in) long. Nikephoros Phokas recommended that every cataphract should carry both swords in order to be prepared for different situations while in battle, which was possible due to the different ways that the rider could carry each weapon. The attachments on the scabbard of the paramêrion were on the same side, therefore, the sword hung nearly horizontal whether it was attached to either a belt or a baldric (shoulder strap). On the other hand, when the scabbard of the spathion was attached to a baldric instead of to a belt, the attachments were on each side of the scabbard so that the spathion hung vertically as opposed to horizontal. In this way, both swords could be carried by the Byzantine cataphracts for neither one of the weapons hindered the drawing of the other. However, if a cataphract decided to carry only one of the edged weapons instead, the spathion could also be suspended from the belt like the paramêrion so that it too would be held horizontally. The most heavily armoured cavalrymen were the ones to sometimes choose to bear only one sword, which was commonly the spathion attached to their baldric, for the extra protection made it difficult to wear a belt.48
Some of the late Byzantine cataphracts carried bows and arrows like the Sassanian and Roman clibanarii and cataphractarii sagittarii; however, carrying the weaponry was much less common for the heavy cavalrymen of the period. Beginning in the eighth century, overall archery within the Byzantine military was declining, thus, by the reign of Leo VI in the tenth century, the arms of the cataphracts were reformed so that two out of every five of the warriors were equipped with bows only, instead of lances. Armed in this manner, only the best horsearchers among the cataphracts fought with the ranged weaponry, while the rest of the heavy cavalrymen focused exclusively on close combat. This also meant that the lancers were deprived of the powerful ranged weapon, which was exchanged for either two javelins, or a weapon called a spendobolon, which was a sling or a staff-sling.49 Nikephoros Phokas explained how the horse-archers were incorporated into the cataphract formation:
There must be archers with the kataphraktoi, in the middle where they can be protected by them. The men in the first, second, third, and fourth lines should not be archers, but from the fifth row on back to the rear. If the total number of kataphraktoi in the formation is 504, they must include 150 archers. If it is 384, they must include 80 archers.50
These changes were basically a continuation of the recommendation of Maurice, as recorded in his Strategikon of the late sixth century, in which he stated that even though cataphracts should carry both lances and bows, each warrior should use the weapon more suited to their own personal martial skills. The bow utilized by the Byzantines was most likely influenced by the composite bow of the Huns. It was 114–122cm (45–48in) long and given powerful, short limbs that fired 68cm (27in) long arrows. The heavily armoured horse-archers typically carried a quiver full of thirty to forty arrows.51 The horse-archers among the cataphracts could be equipped similarly to their lancer comrades, though they were typically less armed and armoured. Nikephoros Phokas described the common modifications made to the equipment of the mounted archers:
The archers should wear klibania (lamellar armour) and helmets only. If possible, their horses should be covered with armour. The archers should wear kabadia on their belts to cover a part of their horses and protect themselves from the waist down. If some of them are light horsemen, they must be placed inside the kataphraktoi. The men armed with lances or maces and the archers and the light horsemen must also have swords. All should have shields except for the archers.52
The last weapon carried by the Byzantine cataphracts was a smaller sidearm, such as a mace or axe; however the former was much more popular than the latter amongst the heavy cavalrymen. The maces (vardoukia) were mostly globular in form, yet flanged types were used by some of the horsemen. The iron heads of many of these maces were attached simply to wooden shafts, but by the tenth century the Byzantine cataphracts were some of the first heavy cavalrymen to use maces that were embellished with hilts and guards similar to those on swords, as well as constructed with iron shafts instead of wood; the Eastern Romans called these unique weapons spathovaklion or sideroravdion. Yet maces were so prized by the cataphracts, that even if they had wooden shafts, there were some cases in which the mace was given a fine leather handle that was highly ornate with painted decorations, as described by the twelfth-century Arab writer Al-Tartusi. Most of the saddles of the cataphracts had two holsters on either side of the pommel so that they could hold more of these lethal weapons. The far less popular sidearm utilized by the heavy horsemen was the axe. The blades of these axes ranged from either a slightly flared blade to one that resembled the later eastern tabar, which was a full, nearly semicircular crescent. Like most battleaxes, the weapons of the Byzantine cataphracts had another fitting that either mirrored the first blade, or gave the axe another dimension, such as a spike, hammerhead or a blade that looked like the point of a spear.53 Nikephoros Phokas explained how he wanted the cataphracts specialized for close combat to be armed and formed up in battle:
The kataphraktoi should have the following weapons: iron maces with all-iron heads – the heads must have sharp corners and be three-cornered, four-cornered, or six-cornered – or else other iron maces or sabres. All of them must have swords. They should hold their iron maces and sabres in their hands and have other iron maces either on their belts or saddles. The first line, that is, the front of the formation, the second, third, and fourth lines must have the same complement, but from the fifth line on back the kataphraktoi on the flanks should set up like this – one man armed with a lance and one armed with a mace or else one of the men carrying a sabre, and so they should be all the way to the back lines.54
The last sidearm that was possibly used by some of the cataphracts of the period was a war-hammer known as an akouphion.55
The major reason the Byzantine cataphracts could easily wield both a shield and a lance was due to the stability provided by the continued use of the stirrup. Other equipment that was utilized by the horsemen in order to ride their mounts included saddles, bridles and bits. Saddles were attached to the mounts not only with the common girth straps, but also with straps around the chest and the rump of the horse as well. Wealthier cataphracts decorated the straps with several ornate roundels, while a cheaper option for many of the other heavy horsemen were straps with short pendants. Such ornamentation was critical for the majority of the heavy cavalrymen who required public displays of status to increase their own power and prestige. There were, however, quite a few cataphracts, including the poorest of the warriors, who chose not to use, or more likely could not afford, the adornment and simply utilized plain, leather straps. The saddles of the heavy cavalrymen were highly influenced by Central Asian styles with both a low cantle and pommel, though by the twelfth century the saddle was slightly modified for those cataphracts that only fought with the lance and did not utilize the bow. The lancers did not need to manoeuvre in their saddles nearly as much as horse-archers; therefore, they could utilize saddles similar to the ones used by their counterparts in the West, the knights, which had both higher pommels and cantles. The cavalry seat was constructed in four pieces, including the pommel, the cantle arches, and the side bars. The saddle was curved in order to properly fit around the back of the horse and purposely thickened in the middle to make a better seat for the rider. A slight layer of padding was added to the seats of the saddles for the wealthier warriors, however, most cataphracts simply sat on the wooden frame of the saddle. Like the saddle straps, the bridles used by many of the Byzantine cataphracts were also embellished with metal plaques or roundels, often attached to the junctions of the different pieces, though they could also be in the middle of the bands across the brow of the mount. Aside from the decorations, the only variation between the different bridles was the absence or inclusion of a nose band to go with the standard brow band. The vast majority of the riders used a bit that resembled the snaffle, which lacked any distinctive features, though there were a few cataphracts that used curb bits. As recommended by Leo VI in his military treatise, Taktika, saddlebags with at least three days’ worth of rations for emergencies were also highly recommended for the cataphracts to carry with them while on campaign.56
As the most recent type of cataphract to fight on the battlefields of Europe and the Middle East, more information is known about the lives of individual Byzantine kataphraktoi than any of the earlier versions of the heavily armoured horsemen. Some of the best-equipped mounted troops served as full-time soldiers in the imperial capital, or in the garrisons of important provincial cities. Depending on their background, these professional cataphracts could utilize their own arms and armour if they desired, but the Byzantine state also provided full-time troops with whatever equipment they required. In general, these soldiers chose whatever equipment was best, either their own or the military’s. On the other hand, most of the late Byzantine cataphracts, like many of the other native cavalrymen who fought for the empire during the period, were part-time soldiers recruited from what was known as the ‘theme’ system. Themes, or themata, were military districts in the imperial provinces with designated farmlands, called strateia, that were owned by farmer-soldiers and their families. In exchange for the right to live on and farm the land, the family had to provide an equipped mounted soldier to serve in the Byzantine army. All of the cavalrymen that were recruited, including the cataphracts, not only had to be skilled riders and in top physical shape, but young as well, for men over forty years of age were rarely accepted (although some managed to slip through the cracks and serve longer than they were supposed to). Generally, if a father did not meet these requirements, a son served in his place, usually the eldest. Therefore, the strateia often remained in the hereditary possession of one family, passing from fathers to sons. The regional commanders made sure to keep lists, known as the adnoumia or muster rolls, of the men who were required to serve, or at least find a substitute.58
Like the earlier aristocratic, heavily armoured Parthian and Sassanian mounted warriors, the soldiers who fought as Byzantine cataphracts usually had to be wealthy in order to fulfill that role on the battlefield. Specifically, the kataphraktoi not only had to be able to afford their own mount, arms, armour and equipment, but also needed to be rich enough to hire servants, or buy slaves, who could work the land and harvest sufficient agricultural produce to pay for everything. During the reign of Nikephoros Phokas, the most heavily armoured cataphracts required enough land to equal at least 1,152 nomismata, or 16 pounds of gold, to properly equip themselves, which is roughly the equivalent of an estate with 30 families working the land. Due to the large size of the strateia, and the amount of people that worked there, the wealthy landowners were often required to also supply the imperial armies with resources, money and support staff, including servants, grooms, muleteers and wagon drivers, along with physicians, army medics and even veterinary doctors for the valuable cataphract mounts and the other horses.59 The Byzantine military also paid the estate owners, or whoever served in their place, for their time in service, so even though there could be many obligations to the state, there was also that monetary benefit as well on top of the valuable land ownership. It is unknown exactly how much the late Byzantine cataphracts earned throughout the period, though the thematic soldiers were typically paid well in general.60
As stated above, if the landowner of the strateia was too old or sick to serve, any family member could serve in his place. Though the Byzantine state also occasionally forced the replacement of some estate owners who had committed a serious crime. In such cases, ownership still tended to stay within the family, even if it passed to an extended family member. If the master of the estate was not a criminal but was still unable to serve, nor had any family members suitable for service, the owner of the strateia had the option of paying a fee instead. When landowners needed to be replaced, most often due to death in battle, and they no longer had any living relatives to take their place, the Byzantine state stepped in and gave the strateia to someone else.61 Landowners were also sometimes replaced when they could no longer afford to provide a cataphract, or any sort of mounted soldier, nor even pay the fine. To prevent this, Nikephoros Phokas tried to institute reforms that made the wealthiest landowners help to provide their poorer comrades with arms and armour, though even with assistance, some were still unable to fulfill their obligation, and thus lost their strateia and their farmer-soldier status.62 Regardless of the numerous qualifications and obligations of the cataphracts from the themata, many soldiers still served as the elite heavy cavalrymen in the Byzantine armies of the period. During the reign of Leo VI, some themata could supply the Byzantine forces with as many as 4,000 cataphracts, though there was certainly a wide variation in the level of quantity or quality of arms and armour of these mounted soldiers; for example, many of the mounts were probably not completely armoured.63
Late Byzantine kataphraktoi fought in units of eight men known as kontoubernia. The Byzantine armies preferred to place cataphract warriors in units with men from in the same areas; and it was even better if the heavy cavalrymen in the kontoubernia were all family members or friends, as Nikephoros Phokas stressed in the Praecepta Militaria:
The kontoubernia of the kataphraktoi must be arranged according to friendship and kinship in battle array, in encampments, and on the march. Each line should have a commander, the bigger lines two apiece, who quarter, live, and march together with them. Not only these officers, but the whole unit, should be under the command of the one head officer and the men should quarter and march together with him.64
These practices were carried out primarily in the hope of optimizing unit cohesion to get the best possible performance from them on the battlefield. However, another major reason the Byzantine military wanted the soldiers to know each other was to prevent enemy spies from infiltrating the ranks. While the kontoubernia was on campaign, the eight warriors camped near each other and shared some common equipment to decrease the weight of their overall baggage in the train. There were usually two cataphracts per tent, along with a groom or servant to help with tasks such as preparing food or putting on armour. The three men collectively were known as ‘spear companions’.65
Thanks to the tenth-century AD military treatises, the Sylloge Tacticorum, the Praecepta Militaria of Nikephoros Phokas and the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos, very specific information about the tactics and formations of the late Byzantine kataphraktoi is known. These heavily armoured cavalrymen typically attacked with a powerful charge in a triangular wedge formation in the hope to break through the enemy lines, as according to Nikephoros Phokas:
It is necessary for the commander of the army to have the triangular formation of kataphraktoi at the ready and the other two units which accompany it, and, on whichever front the enemy is facing, have them move out through those intervals very calmly in proper formation. Even if the enemy formation is made up of infantry, that is to say heavy infantry, the kataphraktoi should not be apprehensive but should proceed to the attack very calmly (even if the enemy formation is made up of infantry, as mentioned) and aim the triangular formation of kataphraktoi right at the spot where the commander of the enemy army is standing. And then the spears of the enemy infantry in the front lines will be smashed by the kataphraktoi, while their arrows will be ineffective, as will the javelins of their javeliners. Then, with the help of God, they will turn to flight.66
The Byzantine Empire was one of the wealthiest states of the Middle Ages; therefore, the imperial troops were almost always equipped with better arms and armour than any of their enemies. Furthermore, infantry was not nearly as well trained as it was in the ancient past and there were no contemporary foot soldiers armed with enormous pikes (the best weapon used against heavy cavalry). Because of this, the combination of their lancers with armoured horse-archers meant the cataphracts were equipped to fight against most kinds of troops (both mounted and on foot), especially in close-quarter combat, yet the late Byzantine kataphraktoi were primarily used against infantry. Since most foot soldiers of the age were lightly armoured and armed merely with short spears, or even smaller weapons, the heavily armoured horsemen were almost always able to overcome such forces unless there was a great multitude of them.67 Nikephoros Ouranos described just how deadly the cataphract wedge, with the numerous lethal weapons they carried, could be when it charged into the enemy forces:
And with God lending us aid through the intercession of His immaculate Mother, the enemy will be routed by this triangular formation of kataphraktoi. For the enemy’s spears and pikes will be shattered by the kataphraktoi and their arrows will be ineffective, whereupon, the kataphraktoi, gaining in courage and boldness, will smash in the heads and bodies of the enemy and their horses with their iron maces and sabres, they will break into and dismember their formations and from there break through and so completely destroy them.68
One of the most detailed segments of information about the late Byzantine kataphraktoi in the Praecepta Militaria provides specific information about the battle formation of the heavy cavalrymen. With unique details, such as exactly how many men should be in the formation, more is known about the battle tactics of these armoured horsemen than any other previous cataphract warrior from both Late Antiquity and the Ancient world:
Take note that the triangular formation of kataphraktoi, if there is a very large body of men, its total must be 504 men, its depth 12 men, which means that the first row of the line is 20 men, the second, 24 men, the third, 28 men, the fourth, 32 men, the fifth, 36 men, the sixth, 40 men, the seventh, 44 men, the eighth, 48 men, the ninth, 52 men, the tenth, 56 men, the eleventh, 60 men, the twelfth, 64 men, so that together the number of men in the whole formation is 504. If such a number of men is not available, this formation must become more modest, so that the first row has ten men, the second, 14 men, the third, 18 men, the fourth…and the entire total of the formation is 384 men. No matter if the contingent is larger or smaller, it is necessary to make the first line, that is, the front, conform to the number of the quantity of the host, just as the commander of the host sees fit or prefers. From the second row on down to the back each row must receive an additional two men on the right side and two on the left to make up the triangular formation. The kataphraktoi are to be under one commander with assorted officers.69
Formed into their triangular wedge formation, the cataphracts used shock tactics to great effect on the battlefield. Indeed, due to their heavy armour, they were almost entirely restricted to shock attacks and nothing else, for they were much less mobile than the other Byzantine cavalrymen:
When [the enemy troops] do turn to flight, it is not the kataphraktoi who should undertake the pursuit but their two accompanying units trailing behind them. Likewise, the remaining units should move out through the intervals on both flanks to scatter the Arabitai lest they come up behind the pursuers and strike against them. Do not go chasing after the Arabitai. The commander of the army together with his four units should move out behind the two units escorting the kataphraktoi and follow them while the kataphraktoi take their place with the infantry units and follow the commander of the army. In case the enemy formation moves quickly and joins battle with our heavy infantry with the result that there is not enough room for the body of kataphraktoi to go out through the intervals, they must head out through the intervals on the flanks in proper formation with, as noted, the two cavalry units trailing, to annihilate and destroy the enemy.70
After the death of Emperor Leo VI in 912, the Byzantine Empire was not only wrought with internal turmoil, but also greatly threatened by the tsar of Bulgaria, Symeon the Great (r. 893–927). Fortunately, the Bulgarian threat was sufficiently dealt with in the early 920s until the death of the powerful enemy ruler in 927.71 The danger of attacks from Symeon may have been over but the reprieve for the Eastern Romans was short because another extremely dangerous enemy had risen to power in the east. This new formidable adversary, Sayf al-Dawla (meaning ‘Sword of the Dynasty’), was a member of the Hamdanid family that controlled both Aleppo and Mosul. The general already had some military successes against the Byzantines in the late 930s , though it was not until after Sayf al-Dawla became the emir of Aleppo (r. 945–67) that the Byzantines considered him their true nemesis in the east. When the Arab ruler led another particularly successful raid into Byzantine territory in 953, the new sole emperor of the Eastern Romans, Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos (r. 945– 959), and the top Byzantine general, Bardas Phokas, had finally had enough. Therefore, Constantine VII made sure his main military commander had the resources necessary to raise a large army and defeat Sayf al-Dawla.72
After the Byzantine general Bardas Phokas gathered his numerous forces, he led them to face the army of Sayf al-Dawla at the Battle of Hadat in October 954. The Byzantine army consisted of foreign mercenary troops from many different nations, which greatly impressed their opponents, although the Arabs were arguably even more amazed by the sight of the many kataphraktoi in the Byzantine forces.73 In a poem about the battle written for his patron, al-Mutanabbi, the court poet of the emir, marvelled at the sight of the armoured cavalrymen who appeared to be clothed in iron upon equally armoured mounts:
The enemy came at you, hauling their weapons as if they travelled on legless horses. When their ranks caught the light, their swords remained unseen, since their shirts and turbans were also made from steel.74
What is particularly interesting about the Arabs being impressed by the cataphracts of the Eastern Romans is that they had their own elite heavy cavalrymen as well. However, it may be safe to assume that the armoured horsemen of the Arab army were not as extensively protected as the Byzantine kataphraktoi. Regardless of their lighter equipment, it was armoured cavalrymen of the Arab forces who decided the outcome of the battle, when Sayf al-Dawla led his elite mounted troops in a powerful charge directed right at the enemy commander, Bardas Phokas. The heavy cavalry of the Arabs managed to penetrate deep into the Byzantine ranks and almost reached general Bardas before his men desperately formed into a solid shield wall to defend their leader. The loyal troops managed to save their commander’s life but the devastating charge had broken the Byzantine forces, so the massive army was routed.75
After his disastrous defeat against the Hamdanid forces at Hadat, Bardas Phokas was replaced as the supreme general of the army by his son, Nikephoros Phokas, in 955, and he turned out to be a much greater military leader than his father. However, the change did not bring instant success, for Sayf al-Dawla led another successful raid into the Byzantine Empire in 956. Yet, although the Byzantines were defeated in another battle near Tall Bitriq that same year, one major incident in the violent encounter once again demonstrated how truly effective the heavy cataphract armour of the Byzantines was at that time. Even after his men had lost the battle, the commander of the Byzantine army, John Tzimiskes, continued to fight. In the end, the general was struck several times by his Hamdanid enemies but still managed to survive the encounter because of his extensive armour. The poet al-Mutanabbi was so amazed by the incident that he said it was as if the Byzantine commander was being attacked with feathers because his armour was so effective.76
Even though the Byzantine armies still lost against Sayf al-Dawla and his men shortly after Nikephoros Phokas had become the head commander, once he was able to firmly establish his command, and implement his tactics and reforms to the military, the tide began to shift in the Byzantines’ favour. From 962 to 965, the Byzantine armies under the leadership of Nikephoros won several victories against the Hamdanid Arabs and even seized the important fortresses of Adana in 964, and Mopsuestia the following year, both located in Cilicia. It was also in 963 that the brilliant general succeeded the previous emperor upon his death to become the new ruler of the Byzantine Empire. Furthermore, in the spring of that same year, Nikephoros heavily trained and drilled his soldiers before leading them to battle. It was most likely as this point that Nikephoros began to implement the changes to the strategy, tactics and equipment of the overall Byzantine military in order to conform to the guidelines that he set forth in his Praecepta Militaria.77 These reforms would have included his changes to the arms, armour and tactics of the cataphracts, which would have also lead to the creation of the super-heavily armoured klibanophoroi, who wore even more protection than the general kataphraktoi troops.78 After taking the city of Mopsuestia, it would be in the combat outside of the walls of the next major city in the campaign that the revised cataphracts of Emperor Nikephoros Phokas would be able to demonstrate how effective they truly were.
Later in 965, the Byzantine emperor focused his forces on the assault of the city of Tarsos, the capital of Cilicia, even though it was rumoured to be impregnable; the formidable defences of the regional centre were first comprised of a deep trench that surrounded the fortifications, and then there was a two-layered stone wall, filled with murder holes for archers to shoot through when the city was under attack. Furthermore, the citizens of Tarsos were very militaristic people that were fully capable of defending themselves. On the other hand, fortunately for the Byzantine cataphracts, the land surrounding the key stronghold consisted of open, level fields that were ideal for cavalry warfare. Once Nikephoros and his army reached the city, he immediately ordered his men to first construct a fortified camp and then to destroy much of the nearby countryside so that no enemy soldiers could hide behind trees or bushes and easily ambush his troops without warning. The Byzantines did not have to wait long for a response from Tarsos though, for shortly after they finished devastating the land, the Tarsians arrogantly left the protection of their city walls to face the invaders on the battlefield.79
The medieval chronicler, Leo the Deacon, has provided an account of the battle at Tarsos in his book, The History, including some information on the actions of the cataphracts in the Byzantine army. In the text of the account, Leo is the first Byzantine author to use the new Greek term pansideroi ippótes 
– meaning ‘ironclad knights’ – to describe the kataphraktoi. Even though the word kataphraktoi remained in use in the written records of the tenth century, ‘ironclad horsemen’ was a term used simultaneously that effectively meant the same thing.80 According to the Byzantine historian, when the Tarsians marched outside their city, Nikephoros and his ‘ironclad horsemen’ moved out to confront them:
The emperor himself led out from the camp the bravest and most robust soldiers, and arranged the divisions on the battlefield, deploying the [cataphracts] in the van, and ordering the archers and slingers to shoot at the enemy from behind. He himself took his position on the right wing, bringing with him a vast squadron of cavalrymen, while John who had the sobriquet Tzimiskes, and was honoured with the rank of doux, fought on the left…When the emperor ordered the trumpets to sound the charge, one could see the Roman divisions move into action with incredible precision, as the entire plain sparkled with the gleam of their armour. The Tarsians could not withstand such an onslaught; forced back by the thrusts of spears and by the missiles of the [archers] shooting from behind, they immediately turned to flight, and ingloriously shut themselves up in the town, after losing most of their men in this assault.81
The deadly charge of the terrifying ironclad cataphracts, reinforced by the volleys of arrows fired from the archers behind them, quickly overcame the Tarsians, thus, the Byzantines decisively won the battle. Even though some of the surviving citizens managed to escape back into their city, Tarsos was still captured that same year by the Byzantines, along with the seizure of the region of northern Syria. Even before Sayf al-Dawla died in 967, the Byzantines could already advance to Antioch without facing any resistance; therefore, that city also fell in 969. Without its formidable leader, the Emirate of Aleppo became a client state of the Byzantine Empire and was no longer the great threat it once was.82
Sayf al-Dawla and the Hamdanid Arabs may have no longer been of any concern, however, a new incredibly dangerous adversary quickly took their place for the Byzantines in 969. Initially, Emperor Nikephoros had requested the ruler of the Kiev Rus’, Grand Prince Svyatoslav I (r. 945–972) to be a part of a pincer attack to subdue the Bulgarians, but the prince accepted the offer with far too much enthusiasm and completely conquered Bulgaria on his own. The conquest of the entire Bulgarian kingdom was certainly an unforeseen consequence of Nikephoros’ action, which was made worse when the Byzantines soon realized they were the next targets for the highly ambitious Rus’ prince and his huge army.83 According to Leo the Deacon, Nikephoros took immediate actions in preparation for the Rus’ attack, including the muster of the cataphracts: ‘He began to equip the infantry, to arm the companies, to draw up the cavalry regiment in depth, and to display the [cataphracts]’.84
However, the Byzantine emperor was unable to witness the result of his preparations because, before the year was over, he was assassinated. Nikephoros’ death left his successor, John I Tzimiskes (r. 969–976), primarily responsible for the defence of the Byzantine Empire when, shortly after, a large Rus’ army invaded Thrace in the spring of 970.85
Since most of the Byzantine forces were still in the east following the conquest of Cilicia and the fall of Antioch, Emperor John was unable to immediately respond to the Rus’ invasion himself. Therefore, the Byzantine ruler ordered two of his best generals, Bardas Skleros and Peter, to gather vital intelligence on the invasion force before his arrival. Not only was the reconnaissance mission successful, but Bardas even managed to win a spectacular victory with only 2,000–3,000 troops against a significantly larger force. The vital win had two major results that were beneficial to the Byzantines; the first was that thousands of the invaders were slain in the encounter, but even better for the empire was that it gave John sufficient time in order to gather an army that could both repel the invasion and then expel the Rus’ from Bulgaria as well. By April 971, Emperor John had reached the borders of Bulgaria with possibly as many as 30,000 soldiers in his army.86
The Rus’ were busy attempting to quell revolts in northern Bulgaria, so the Byzantine army advanced to Preslav, the capital of Bulgaria, before facing any resistance. The Rus’ foot soldiers finally confronted the Byzantines outside the walls of the Bulgarian royal city.87 In the violent encounter that resulted, both the Byzantine and Rus’ warriors fought fiercely to a stalemate for some time.88 Leo the Deacon stated that the decisive moment of the battle did not arrive until Emperor John ordered the Athanatoi, an elite cataphract unit from the Tagmata imperial guard, to charge the Rus’ left wing:
When the battle was evenly balanced on both sides, at this point the emperor ordered the [Athanatoi] to attack the left wing of the [Rus’] with a charge. So they held their spears before them and violently spurred on their horses, and advanced against them. Since the [Rus’] were on foot (for they are not accustomed to fight from horseback, since they are not trained for this), they were not able to withstand the spears of the Romans, but turned to flight and shut themselves up within the walls of the town; the Romans pursued them and killed them mercilessly.89
Just as at the battle outside of Tarsos, the heavily armed and armoured Byzantine kataphraktoi smashed through the ranks of the enemy and routed them. The Rus’ foot troops were drawn up in a tight formation and even wielded enormous shields that extended down to their feet, yet this was not enough to repel the devastating charge of the cataphracts. The victory at Preslav demonstrated just how brutally effective the heavily armoured cavalrymen were against infantry who were not nearly as well armed and trained as the legionaries of the ancient Roman Empire of old. After a few more brutal fights, the Byzantines eventually expelled the Rus’ from Preslav and captured the city. The surviving Rus’ warriors then escaped to rejoin Grand Prince Svyatoslav and the rest of their army to the north at the stronghold of Dorostolon, located near the southern bank of the Danube River.90
After taking Preslav, Emperor John led his troops north towards Dorostolon and faced little to no resistance. Although a small group of Byzantine scouts ahead of the main army were successfully ambushed and killed by the Rus’, this was the only minor encounter that occurred before the Byzantine army reached Dorostolon. Once the Byzantines reached the fortress, the events were similar to what happened at Tarsos, in that the emperor first ordered his men to build a fortified camp to get ready for the siege but then found the Rus’ outside the defensive walls to meet the Byzantines in battle. After John made sure to leave a small contingent to guard the siege equipment and the supplies of the baggage train, he then led his men to face the Rus’. The ancient sources claim the Rus’ army numbered as many as 60,000 men. This is definitely an exaggerated figure, though the Rus’ forces did almost certainly outnumber the roughly 30,000 Byzantine soldiers.91
The Rus’ infantrymen were drawn up in close formation again with their shields and armed with spears, though the ranks were deeper and the front extended much further than at the previous encounter outside Preslav due to the greater amount of the warriors on the battlefield, under the command of the Grand Prince. Upon seeing the densely packed lines of Rus’ foot soldiers, the Byzantine emperor decided where to place his troops, including the lethal cataphracts:
After the emperor deployed the Romans in the van and placed [cataphracts] on both wings, and assigned the archers and slingers to the rear and ordered them to keep up steady fire, he led out the army.92
Whereas, normally, the late Byzantine kataphraktoi were stationed in the centre of the army formation, John changed the common heavy cavalry tactics slightly by placing the cataphracts on both wings instead. On the other hand, the Byzantine emperor also ordered his ranged warriors to barrage the Rus’ front with missiles in order to soften it up before the impact of the cataphract cavalry charge, just as at the Battle of Tarsos.
The first battle outside of Dorostolon began early in the afternoon when both sides formed up to face each other and the Rus’ initiated the combat by charging straight at the Byzantine forces, ferociously screaming and shouting war cries in the process. The Byzantine soldiers not only managed to withstand the rushing mass of Rus’ footmen, but also succeeded in driving their way through the enemy infantry lines in one or two locations along the front. However, in each instance, the Rus’ were also able to regroup and halt the Byzantine advance with their shield walls. After over an hour of brutal combat, the troops of both sides were forced to fall back due to exhaustion, especially for the cataphracts in their heavy armour, so the warriors had a short break before the fighting vigorously began anew. The battle continued for most of the day as neither side was able to gain the upper hand. The Byzantines did manage to force the Rus’ to give ground, but at the same time the imperial forces were also unable to break the enemy infantrymen and defeat them.93 According to Leo the Deacon, it was when evening was quickly approaching that Emperor John gave the order for a decisive strike:
Until late afternoon victory appeared to be in the balance, as the course of battle swayed this way and that. The sun was already setting, when the emperor threw the cavalry against them in force, and bolstered the men’s spirits, shouting that, since they were Romans, they should display their prowess by means of their deeds. So they pressed forward with an extraordinary assault and the trumpeters sounded the call to battle, and a shout arose from the Romans in a body. And the [Rus’] were not able to withstand their attack, and turned to flight and rushed to the fortifications, losing many of their men in this battle.94
With the Byzantine infantrymen attacking the Rus’ from the centre, while the cataphracts charged from both sides on the wings, the Rus’ foot soldiers could not take the onslaught and were finally broken and routed.95 The first major encounter in the field outside Dorostolon was a Byzantine victory with numerous Rus’ slain, though many Rus’ had also survived and escaped to the safety of the stronghold. With the Rus’ back behind the fortified walls, the Byzantine siege of Dorostolon officially began.
For most of the next day, as the siege was underway, the Rus’ remained inside the fortress successfully repelling the attackers. It was not until late in the day that Rus’ horsemen actually left Dorostolon to attack the Byzantines, though the far-superior imperial cavalrymen were able to drive the Rus’ back into the stronghold, as stated by Leo the Deacon:
The Romans quickly protected themselves with armour and mounted their horses, and after snatching up lances (they use very long ones in battle), they rode out against them with a vigorous and mighty charge. And since [the Rus’] did not even know how to guide their horses with reins, they were cut down by the Romans, and turned to flight and shut themselves up inside the walls.96
The next day, the Byzantine forces surrounded the fortress, though Emperor John kept his men at bay for the most part in the hopes that if he slightly relented with the intensity of the siege, it might draw the Rus’ outside of Dorostolon again so that the Byzantine army could crush them once again on the battlefield. The plan did not work right away, but that did not matter because the Byzantines were given a huge morale boost on the third day of the siege when the fleet arrived to blockade Dorostolon from the Danube River. Not only were the Rus’ completely encircled and trapped, but the fleet also brought further reinforcements and supplies, including the devastating napalm-like weapon known as ‘Greek fire’.97
Following the arrival of the Byzantine naval forces, the surrounded Rus’ decided to face their attackers on the field another time in order to try and break the siege:
The next day the [Rus’] slipped out of the town and arrayed themselves on the plain, protecting themselves with shields that reached to their feet and chainmail breastplates; and the Romans also emerged from their camp completely sheathed in armour.98
In the next major encounter, the two armies fought to a stalemate again for most of the day until the Byzantine cataphracts were able to break and ultimately defeat the Rus’ infantrymen once again. In his account of the battle, Leo the Deacon emphasized how much the late Byzantine kataphraktoi relied on their lethal maces in a description of the martial prowess of one individual cavalryman:
Theodore Lalakon, a man who was hard to withstand and invincible in the might and strength of his body, killed great numbers of the enemy with an iron mace; for he wielded it with such force in his arm that he would crush at the same time the helmet and the skull protected by it.99
The Rus’ who managed to survive the second major encounter with the cataphracts did make it back to Dorostolon; however, the Byzantines finished setting up the siege engines shortly after, so the defenders were forced to endure a continuous bombardment from then on.100
The Rus’ attempted several times to leave the defences and destroy the siege engines, though it was futile, for they were always forced back into the fortress. The Rus’ were taking heavy casualties from the missile fire of the siege engines, and in one of their sorties outside of the fortress gates they managed to kill the commander of a unit guarding the war machines; therefore, they decided to try and defeat the Byzantines in another pitched battle. With no more luck than in the previous encounters, the Rus’ were, yet again, overwhelmed and defeated. The Byzantine army, with its infantry phalanx in the centre, supported by the cavalry on the wings, including the cataphracts, and the ranged troops in the rear, drove them back into Dorostolon once more. This time the victory was even better for the Byzantines though, for one of the emperor’s imperial guardsmen, Anemas, managed to kill Svyatoslav’s best general, Ikmor, in the combat.101
During the night following the battle, Grand Prince Svyatoslav and the other Rus’ military commanders held a council to discuss their next actions. Many of the Rus’ nobles were well aware of the fact that they were not winning the conflict; thus, they desired to end it:
Some advised that they should embark on their boats in the middle of the night and steal away by any means whatsoever; for they were not able to contend with [cataphracts], and besides they had lost their best warriors, who had encouraged the army and sharpened their mettle. Others counselled, on the contrary, that they should come to terms with the Romans, and receive pledges in return, and thus save the remaining army.102
The Rus’ were clearly terrified of the Byzantine cataphracts, though Svyatoslav and many of the warriors were unwilling to retreat or surrender. Therefore, later that same night, a group of 2,000 Rus’ stealthily left Dorostolon to desperately seek food supplies along the banks of the Danube River. In the end, not only did the Rus’ succeed in their mission, but they also managed to surprise and kill some unarmoured Byzantine cavalrymen who were gathering wood and watering their horses. The incident gave a much-needed boost in morale to the Rus’ warriors in the stronghold, while it also infuriated Emperor John who almost executed the military officers in charge of the guard on the naval side of the siege.103
Following up their success the night before, in the late afternoon of the next day, on Friday, 24 July, the Rus’ foot soldiers formed up on the field outside of Dorostolon in their densely packed infantry formation, armed with shields and spears. However, the Rus’ tried to adapt and counter the assaults of the cataphracts and the other Byzantine cavalry on the flanks by placing foot archers on their wings. Emperor John used the same formation he had utilized before, with the cataphracts stationed behind the other Byzantine cavalrymen on the wings and the infantry phalanx in the centre, along with the ranged soldiers placed in the rear. The Byzantine Emperor then led his troops with his imperial guardsmen held in reserve behind the ranged warriors and the infantry phalanx. Even though the formations remained relatively the same, this battle was different, in that it was fought closer to the fortress than any of the other previous encounters, on a stretch of the field between woods and marshland, making the battlefield much more compact.104 Leo the Deacon has provided an account of the initial combat:
Once the battle broke out, the [Rus’] stoutly attacked the Romans, harassing them with javelins and wounding their horses with arrows, and hurling their riders to the ground. At this point Anemas, who had distinguished himself the previous day by killing Ikmor, saw Svyatoslav charging the Romans in a frenzied rage and encouraging his regiments; and he spurred on his horse (for he was accustomed to doing this, and had previously killed many [Rus’] in this way), and giving the horse free rein, he rode up to him and struck him on the collarbone with his sword, and knocked him flat, but did not kill him; for he was protected by his coat of mail and the shield with which he was equipped, out of fear of the Roman spears. And although Anemas was surrounded by the [Rus’] army, and his horse was brought down by numerous spear thrusts, he killed many of the [Rus’], but then was himself killed, a man surpassed by no one his age in brave feats in battle.105
The Rus’ were managing to slay formidable warriors like Anemas and other Byzantine cataphracts, regardless of their heavy armour, mostly by using the age-old tactic of targeting their horses. The infantry bowmen on the wings were also making a positive impact in the battle for the Rus’ as well. John could see that his men were both exhausted and dehydrated, yet the violent encounter was far from over. Therefore, the Byzantine emperor ordered the military support staff to provide the troops with a mixture of water and wine, without disrupting the combat taking place on the front.106
Eventually, Emperor John realized that he must fall back to the more wide-open plains in order for his cataphracts to meet their true potential on the battlefield. Therefore, the Byzantine forces made a tactical retreat but they were severely hard-pressed by the vigorous attacks of the Rus’ at the same time. When it looked to the emperor like his lines might break, John then entered the combat himself with his heavily armed, elite mounted bodyguard. At first, the action instantly rallied the Byzantine troops, but then the emperor and his elite cataphract guardsmen made an even greater impact in the battle when they smashed into the Rus’ lines. As the attack was made, a thunderstorm began over the battlefield, which, fortunately for the Byzantines, caused fierce winds to blow rain and dust into the faces of the Rus’ warriors.107 The coup de grace of the encounter then occurred when one of the Byzantine commanders led his men into a devastating assault on the flank of the Rus’ army:
When fierce fighting broke out, the [Rus’] could not withstand the assault of the cavalry, and were surrounded by the magistros Bardas, whose surname was Skleros (for he made the encircling movement with his accompanying host), and turned to flight, and were trampled right up to the city wall and fell ignobly.108
Once the battle was over, possibly as many as 15,000 Rus’ lay dead on the field, while the Byzantines only suffered 350 casualties.109
After the last major battle of Dorostolon, Svyatoslav and the Rus’ were forced to finally surrender. In exchange for the stronghold, along with the plunder and captives the Rus’ seized during the entire conflict, the Byzantines allowed the Rus’ to cross the Danube River and return home. After securing the fortress, along with the rest of eastern Bulgaria, which was claimed by the Byzantines as a new province, the victorious emperor then led his men back to Constantinople where a triumph was celebrated.110 The Byzantine cataphracts were a pivotal part of the overall success of the Bulgarian campaign against the Rus’, just as they were in the conflicts with the Hamdanid Arabs in Cilicia and Syria during the reign of Nikephoros Phokas. However, over the next hundred years, they played an increasingly smaller role in the Byzantine military. It is possible that the heavily armoured cavalrymen may have continued to still be a part of the Byzantine forces of Emperor John, and the later emperor, Basil II (r. 976–1025), against the Fatimids in Palestine and Syria throughout the 970s and 990s. Yet, from the beginning of the eleventh century there is much less evidence of the existence of the Byzantine cataphracts; in fact, the term kataphraktoi completely fell out of use in the medieval written record during that century.111
A major reason for the gradual decline of the late Byzantine cataphracts from the end of the tenth to the early eleventh century was due to a change in the type of warfare that was fought during the period. When the Byzantine military was focused on its Arab enemies in the east, the heavily armoured horsemen were very useful against infantry on the wide, level ground that was common in the region and was ideal for cavalry warfare. However, in 1001, Byzantine Emperor Basil II made peace with the Fatimid ruler, al-Hakim (r. 996–1021). With no more great threats from the east, the focus of the Byzantine military shifted to the west, to the Balkans were the terrain was predominantly uneven and filled with wooded areas, characteristics of ground very unsuitable for cavalry warfare. Furthermore, in many border regions of the Byzantine Empire, from Bulgaria to Antioch, the combat shifted to a much more mobile focus, involving raids and skirmishes rather than large, pitched battles. Evidence of this shift is located in the words of Nikephoros Ouranos in his military treatise, Taktika, written c.1000.112 For instance, if the Byzantine mounted troops were carrying out a raid for plunder or captives, the medieval writer recommended that the cataphracts should be left behind:
He must leave the entire infantry force and the baggage train of the infantry to proceed in good order behind him and he must not leave any cavalrymen behind for the protection of the infantry save only the kataphraktoi.113
On top of that statement, Ouranos even suggested that many of the cataphracts should remove their armour so that they could claim their share of the booty with the rest of the cavalry:
Forty or fifty of the kataphraktoi should be set apart, who will leave their heavy armour and that of their horses with the baggage train and head out with the other light horsemen.114
But aside from the change in enemies, strategy and tactics, another obvious reason for the eventual fall of the Byzantine kataphraktoi (and certainly the reason for the disappearance of the more heavily armoured version, the klibanophoroi) was the same problem that the ancient Romans had probably had with the heavy horsemen: both their expensive cost to put them on the battlefield and the amount of training it took to make the mounted warriors effective in combat.115 The final reason for the decline of the cataphracts, especially the parttime cavalrymen from the themata, was the growing trend throughout the period of the soldier-farmer owners of the strateia paying the fine instead of serving in the military. Not only did this increasingly popular practice drastically decrease the amount of thematic forces available to the Byzantine military, but so too did the largest landowners, who managed to gradually obtain the farmlands of many other minor landowners over time. Because of these two trends of the eleventh century, the Byzantine military became more and more reliant upon the Tagmata troops of the professional army and foreign mercenaries.116 Then, after 1071 when the Byzantine Empire suffered the disastrous defeat at the Battle of Manzikert, the Eastern Romans were so devastated financially that the heavily armoured klibanophoroi were completely gone from their armies from then on.117
Byzantine armoured riders upon armoured mounts still existed after Manzikert, but they were almost exclusively in the elite imperial Tagmata units. Byzantine royalty and their horses were also still extensively protected as well. For instance, when three Norman knights attacked the Byzantine emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118) with their lances at the Battle of Dyrrachium in 1081, he emerged from the incident completely unscathed, most likely because of the layers of heavy armour the emperor wore.118 Even after the disaster at Manzikert, the economy of the Byzantine Empire improved in the twelfth century, allowing the military to supply its troops with more higher quality arms and armour than at the end of the eleventh century. Additionally, the improved finances of the empire led Emperor Manuel Komnenos (r. 1143–1180) to try to reintroduce numerous heavily armoured cavalrymen into the Byzantine armies once more. The new cataphract type of troops, however, were much more of an imitation of Western European knights than the earlier kataphraktoi, as shown in features such as the replacement of the old skoutaria with the new kite-style shields and the adoption of saddles with higher pommels and cantles that were better for lancers. However, Manuel’s attempt to reestablish the prominence of the cataphracts ultimately failed, for the Byzantine type of knights fared poorly against the empire’s main enemy of the period, the Turks.
In 1176, the empire was dealt another serious blow that severely weakened it when the Turks crushed the Byzantines at the Battle of Myriokephalon. Although devastated from the defeat, it was not until the havoc and destruction of the Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople in 1204 that the late Byzantine cataphract truly died. From that point on, the Byzantine Empire never recovered, and even though it officially lasted until 1453, the damage caused by the Latin crusaders was so great that the sophisticated lamellar armour, which was so prized by the late Byzantine kataphraktoi, completely disappeared.119 Thus, as the once great empire of the Eastern Romans became a shadow of its former self, the last heavily armoured cavalrymen called cataphracts faded from existence.