Chapter 26

1INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will argue that libertarians should endorse open borders. By libertarians, I mean people who believe that we have an extensive set of moral rights, including rights to private property and freedom of contract, and that the primary job of the state is the protection of these rights. Immigration restrictions forbid hundreds of millions of people from crossing borders and residing in the territories of other states. These laws infringe on rights and liberties that libertarians care about, such as freedom of contract and rights to private property, and these laws coercively trap many people in conditions of poverty and oppression. For these reasons, libertarians should condemn immigration restrictions and advocate in favor of free international movement.

I have organized this chapter as follows. In section 2, I will sketch a presumptive libertarian case against immigration restrictions and respond to common objections to open borders. In section 3, I will rebut the argument that states have rights to freedom of association or ownership rights that permit them to exclude foreigners. In section 4, I will consider the objection that immigration would expand the welfare state or undermine institutions that libertarians favor. In section 5, I conclude by arguing that libertarians should endorse civil disobedience to immigration laws as a practical way of resisting these laws.

2THE PRESUMPTIVE ARGUMENT FOR OPEN BORDERS AND COMMON OBJECTIONS

Libertarianism is a family of different views that endorse civil rights, such as freedom of speech and association, as well as an expansive set of economic liberties (Brennan 2012: 37–40). These economic liberties include rights to freedom of contract and private property. Libertarians think that we have broad rights to acquire, use, and trade productive property, such as factories, farms, and other private businesses (Tomasi 2013: 68–86; Brennan 2014: 78–87); and that we have rights to form voluntary contracts with other people, including contracts that are commonly thought to be degrading or exploitative. Libertarians generally believe that individual rights have priority over other moral considerations. For example, most libertarians claim that it is generally wrong to violate people’s rights to private property in order to assist people who are badly off or to promote equality (Nozick 2013; Huemer 2012: 148–60). These libertarians may concede that it is permissible to infringe on individual rights in certain cases. For example, it might be permissible to violate rights when this is necessary to avert disasters. But, according to libertarians, laws that violate individual rights are presumptively unjust.

The libertarian case for open immigration follows straightforwardly from these commitments. Immigration restrictions interfere with the rights and liberties of citizens and foreigners (by immigration restrictions, I mean laws that forbid foreigners from crossing borders or permanently residing in other states). Immigration restrictions forbid foreigners from forming contracts with the citizens of states that restrict immigration. Suppose that Sam owns a farm in the southern United States and Leticia is an unemployed laborer in northern Mexico. Sam wants to hire Leticia to work on his farm, and Leticia is willing to take this job. But Sam happens to be a citizen of the United States, while Leticia is a citizen of Mexico. As a result, the United States government prohibits Leticia from working for Sam. This law violates Sam’s right to use his property as he sees fit and Leticia’s right to form voluntary contracts with Sam. The point generalizes to all immigration restrictions. These laws violate people’s rights to private property and freedom of contract (Carens 1987: 252–4; Steiner 2001). Chandran Kukathas notes that immigration restrictions also constrain freedom of association: “keeping borders closed would…require keeping apart people who wish to come together whether for love, or friendship, or for the sake of fulfilling important duties, such as caring for children or parents” (Kukathas 2013: 207–20).

Many libertarians are deontologists. They think that people have moral rights that prohibit other agents from interfering with them even if this would bring about good consequences. As the above analysis suggests, libertarians with deontological commitments should conclude that immigration laws are unjust because they violate moral rights.1 But some libertarians are consequentialists (Epstein 2002). These libertarians endorse free markets because free markets bring about better results than the alternatives, such as central planning or highly regulated markets. These libertarians also have compelling reasons to endorse open borders.

Economists calculate that open borders would bring about massive benefits. Estimates suggest that open immigration would perhaps double the size of the world economy (Clemens 2011). Under open borders, people in poor countries would benefit the most. Why would open borders generate these gains? One part of the answer is that people can make better use of their skills in rich countries (Caplan and Naik 2015). Rich countries tend to have better institutions than poor countries. Private-property rights in rich countries have more protection, political institutions are less corrupt, and rich states do better at promoting the rule of law. Rich states have other advantages too, such as superior technology. As a result, people can be more productive in rich states. If hundreds of millions of people moved to rich states, the global economy would be much bigger. These migrants would also send home remittances, which would benefit even the people who don’t want to move. Consequentialist libertarians should endorse open borders because open borders would massively decrease global poverty and inequality.

So, immigration restrictions violate individual rights and cause harmful outcomes. For these reasons, libertarians of all stripes should conclude that immigration restrictions are seriously problematic.2 And, in fact, libertarian activists and authors have been perhaps the main advocates for open immigration in public debate. Libertarians like Bryan Caplan, Alex Tabarrok, Tyler Cowen, Ilya Somin, Alex Nowrasteh, Michael Huemer, Chandran Kukathas, and Shikha Dalmia have developed influential arguments for broadly open borders. In order to clarify the libertarian position on immigration, I will now consider common arguments for immigration restrictions and explain how libertarians do, or should, reply to them.

Commentators in public debate often defend immigration restrictions by pointing out that immigration can have costs for citizens. Immigrants compete with citizens for jobs and other scarce goods, like housing; and cause other problems, such as crime. Commentators who point to the costs of immigration in defending immigration restrictions often assume (either implicitly or explicitly) that governments have special obligations to protect the interests of their citizens that they lack with respect to foreigners. These special obligations justify prioritizing the interests of compatriots over the interests of foreigners.

For example, the political theorist Michael Sandel considers the possibility that immigration from Mexico to the United States would reduce the wages of American citizens. Sandel then writes:

Why should we protect our own most vulnerable workers if it means denying job opportunities to people from Mexico who are even less well-off? From the standpoint of helping the least advantaged, a case could be made for open immigration. And yet, even people with egalitarian sympathies hesitate to endorse it. Is there a moral basis for this reluctance? Yes, but only if you accept that we have a special obligation for the welfare of our fellow citizens by virtue of the common life and history we share.

(2009: 232)

Sandel makes it clear that he believes that we do have special obligations to our compatriots, and these obligations can help justify immigration restrictions. If immigration imposes costs on citizens, and states owe more to citizens than they owe to foreigners, then it seems permissible for states to restrict immigration.

Libertarians should reject this argument. For one thing, people frequently exaggerate the costs of immigration. Consider the effects of immigration on wages. Most economists who study the labor market effects of immigration conclude that immigration has small effects on the wages of citizens (Peri 2014). Foreigners don’t just compete with citizens for jobs. Foreigners have different skills and attributes than many citizens, and this leads them to complement the labor of citizens. Consequently, immigration can actually raise the wages of most citizens. Immigration has other dynamic effects that improve the economies of recipient societies (Cortés 2008: 381–422; Cortés and Tessada 2011). Popular opinion is also wrong about the relationship between immigration and crime. Most studies on the relationship between immigration and crime conclude that immigration does not increase crime and may in fact reduce it (Nowrasteh 2015). In general, most people overestimate the costs of immigration and underestimate its benefits (Caplan 2008: 58–9).

Even if immigration imposed costs on citizens, this fact would still fail to justify immigration restrictions. Nationalist objections to open borders overlook the fact that duties to respect people’s rights and liberties generally override special obligations. Here is an analogy. I owe more to my children than I owe to strangers. I should show more concern for my children than I should show for other people’s children. Nonetheless, there are stringent limits on what I can do for my children. It is normally wrong to coerce, kidnap, or assault strangers in order to benefit my children. Bryan Caplan (2011) observes that “almost everyone knows that ‘it would help my son’ is not a good reason for even petty offenses—like judging a Tae Kwon Do tournament unfairly because your son’s a contestant.” The same point applies to the special obligations of governments to their citizens. If it is wrong for you or I to violate the rights of strangers for the benefit of our children, then it is hard to see why it would be permissible for the government to violate the rights of foreigners for the sake of citizens. Michael Huemer argues along similar lines that the “special obligations that governments owe to their citizens, whatever these obligations may consist in, do not eliminate the obligation to respect the human rights of noncitizens” (Huemer 2010)

Some political theorists argue that states can restrict immigration in order to preserve a society’s national culture (Kymlicka 2000). Foreigners have different values and cultural practices. If they immigrate, then this will change a society’s culture and identity. One response to this concern about cultural change is to point out that most immigrants to assimilate and adopt the cultural practices of recipient societies (Citrin et al. 2007). Another response to this concern is to ask: So what if immigration causes cultural change? The exercise of many individual rights can change a society’s culture and identity. Consider rights to free speech. Free speech can change a society’s culture by encouraging people to adopt new values and practices. Suppose that Mormons are successful at persuading many people to convert. This could change a society’s culture—Mormons may have somewhat different values and practices than the dominant culture. But it would clearly be wrong to forbid Mormons from proselytizing.

Or consider rights to reproductive freedom. Imagine that Muslims are a minority in a society, but Muslims have more children than the rest of the population, and most of these children adopt the practices and values of their parents. As a result, Muslims’ exercise of reproductive freedom generates cultural change. Libertarians (and, indeed, all liberals) would condemn restrictions on Muslim’s reproductive freedom that aim to stop this change. Individual rights trump the goal of cultural preservation. Foreigners’ rights to immigrate should override this goal as well.

Another common argument for immigration restrictions is that open immigration would encourage “brain drain” (Brock 285–8). Doctors, engineers, and other skilled workers in poor countries often want to immigrate to rich countries. People worry that, if many skilled workers migrate from poor to rich states, then this will make the citizens of poor states worse off. Poor countries may not have enough skilled workers to provide vital services, such as health care, and skilled citizens are more likely to push for political reform. Therefore, some people endorse immigration restrictions in order to prevent the mass migration of skilled workers.

Libertarians like Fernando Tesón (2008) respond that it is wrong to force people to serve the needs of others, even if this brings about good results. For example, perhaps we could promote the development of poor neighborhoods by forbidding educated members of these neighborhoods from leaving. Or we might prohibit doctors from quitting their jobs and becoming musicians because they would do more good as doctors than as musicians. Yet most people would regard these coercive acts to be impermissible. One way of explaining this intuition would be via appeal to self-ownership. Libertarians believe that we own our minds and bodies. Our governments and our compatriots don’t own our minds and bodies (Mack 2010: 53–78). Thus, it is wrong to treat skilled workers as if they are the property of their political communities.

Anyway, there is little evidence that restricting immigration would reduce deprivation. Skilled migration has complex effects (Clemens 2014: 1–39). Skilled migration might deplete a society’s stock of human capital. But skilled migration might also create diaspora networks that increase trade and promote the transfer of technology from rich to poor countries. The opportunity to immigrate could encourage people to pursue higher education because this opportunity raises the value of this education. If skilled migrants move to democratic states with good institutions and then return home, they might encourage the creation of good institutions in their home countries.

It is possible that the migration of skilled workers worsens poverty and other problems in poor countries. It is also possible that skilled migration is associated with poverty because skilled workers want to leave poor societies. Social scientists who study skilled migration struggle to identify the causal effects of this migration because it is unclear whether skilled migration causes poverty or is merely a symptom of it. The economist Michael Clemens observes that social scientists have yet to rigorously document a single case in which restricting skilled migration caused development.3 If we are unable to reliable identify when skilled migration has bad effects, then we should be skeptical about whether policy-makers will have the right kind of knowledge to know when restricting immigration would bring about good outcomes.

To sum up, libertarians reject common arguments for immigration restrictions that invoke special obligations between compatriots, the value of cultural preservation, and the negative effects of skilled migration. This is probably unsurprising on reflection. Libertarians are usually cosmopolitans.⁴ Libertarians think that citizenship in a state is about as morally significant as membership in a car insurance company. Maybe you get some important benefits from your car insurance company or state, but you don’t owe more to the members of your car insurance company or state than you owe to non-members.⁵ Libertarians are also skeptical about nationalism and doubt that it is the business of the state to protect national cultures (Kukathas 2003). Libertarians affirm the value of self-ownership and reject the view that our compatriots own our talents, and these commitments rule out restrictions on skilled migration. Libertarian values and principles clearly point in the direction of free international movement.

But there are other arguments for immigration restrictions that appeal to libertarian premises or values. In the remainder of this chapter, I will evaluate arguments for immigration restrictions that aim to show that libertarians have some reason to endorse immigration restrictions because open immigration is incompatible with values that libertarians care about. Should libertarians endorse some restrictions on immigration?

3FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND OWNERSHIP

Libertarians think that people have rights to freedom of association and rights to own and use property. These rights can justify exclusion. Suppose that you and your friends form a chess club. It seems permissible for you to refuse to allow strangers to join your club. Or assume that you own your home. You are within your rights to prevent homeless people from sleeping in your home. Maybe we can defend immigration restrictions on similar grounds. States might be analogous to private clubs, or perhaps states have property rights in their national territories. Christopher Wellman argues that states have rights to freedom of association (Wellman and Cole 2011). Wellman contends that, if states have rights to freedom of association, then these states can permissibly exclude foreigners. Some political theorists claim that citizens collectively own their political institutions or territories (Pevnick 2014). If property owners have rights to exclude non-owners, then perhaps citizens have rights to prevent immigration.

For ease of reference, let’s call these rights-based arguments for immigration restrictions. If rights-based arguments for immigration restrictions are correct, then libertarians should accept states’ rights to exclude because libertarians also endorse rights to freedom of association and property rights. But libertarians should reject rights-based arguments for exclusion. These arguments have implications that no libertarian can endorse. Rights-based arguments entail the rejection of libertarianism. Here is the problem. If states have rights to freedom of association or ownership rights over their territories, then states can permissibly do more than just restrict immigration. They can restrict all individual rights.

Let’s start with freedom of association. As I noted, private associations, such as clubs, churches, or businesses, can permissibly exclude non-members. For example, the Catholic Church can permissibly refuse to baptize Satanists. In this sense, the Catholic Church has the right to exclude some people. But private associations can also regulate the behavior of their members in illiberal ways. This is why the Catholic Church can forbid its members from using birth control, having sex out of wedlock, worshipping Satan, and so on. People have rights to form, join, and exit any kind of voluntary association that they like. If people have these rights to freedom of association, then they have rights to form associations that impose illiberal demands on their members, like the Catholic Church. In other words, rights to freedom of association explain why associations can restrict the behavior of their members.

If states have rights to freedom of association too, then states could place comparable demands on their members. States could also forbid citizens from using birth control, having sex out of wedlock, or worshipping Satan. In fact, Wellman concedes that states’ rights to freedom of association permit states to restrict the liberty of their members. Wellman says that states can permissibly forbid their citizens from associating with foreigners by inviting them onto their property or forming voluntary employment contracts with them (Wellman and Cole 2011: ch.3). According to Wellman, states’ rights outweigh the rights of individual citizens. But Wellman fails to notice that the same logic can explain why states can restrict any liberty, such as freedom of speech or sexual freedom. If states have rights to freedom of association, they might exercise these rights by excluding outsiders. Or states may exercise their rights to freedom of association by curtailing the individual rights of their members. Wellman’s argument faces a dilemma. Either (a) collective rights to freedom of association fail to justify restrictions on individual liberty, which would rule out the permissibility of immigration restrictions; or (b) collective rights to freedom of association permit restrictions on all liberties, which requires the rejection of liberalism in general and libertarianism in particular.

Let’s turn to the rights-based argument that appeals to property rights. This argument says that citizens collectively own their territories or institutions and that these property rights permit the exclusion of outsiders. This rights-based argument faces a similar problem as the freedom-of-association version. If this argument can justify restricting immigration, then it must be the case that citizens’ ownership rights permit curtailing individual rights, such as the rights of employers and foreigners’ rights to freedom of contract. But, if collective ownership rights can justify restricting these individual rights, then why can’t collective ownership rights justify restricting all individual rights? Maybe citizens should use their collective ownership rights to forbid people from holding political protests, advocating atheism, having more than two children, and so on. If libertarians endorse collective ownership rights, then they must be prepared to jettison their core commitments.

Perhaps rights-based arguments for immigration restrictions succeed. If they do, then they also justify rejecting libertarianism as a whole. Yet, if libertarianism is true, then these rights-based arguments are unsound. Either it is false that states have rights to freedom of association and collective ownership rights over their territories, or it is false that these rights can justify restricting individual liberties. Either way, libertarians must resist the view that states have collective rights that outweigh individual rights.

4BAD CONSEQUENCES

Some libertarians worry that open immigration would have bad consequences. They fear that immigration would imperil rights or institutions that libertarians believe are valuable. For this reason, some libertarians support immigration restrictions because they think that immigration restrictions would prevent bad outcomes. In this section, I will consider two versions of this worry: the argument that immigration would expand the size of the welfare state, and the argument that immigration would undermine good institutions.

4.1Redistribution

Many libertarians oppose the welfare state. They think that the welfare state violates property rights and forces some people to serve the needs of others. Some libertarians also claim that open borders would expand the welfare state. Milton Friedman claimed: “It is one thing to have free immigration to jobs. It is another thing to have free immigration to welfare. And you cannot have both.”6 Friedman’s thought seems to be that, if immigrants qualify for welfare benefits, they will immigrate to consume these benefits. As a result, immigration will increase the size of the welfare state.

It is true that immigration generally increases the size of the welfare state in one sense. Immigration increases the size of a population. If the members of a population are eligible for welfare benefits, then in a trivial sense, larger populations bring about more state redistribution. Yet it is unclear whether immigration imposes greater per capita fiscal costs on citizens. The effects of immigration on public finances are ambiguous (Rowthorn 2008). Most immigrants find work and pay taxes. Immigrants often pay their own way.

Immigration can also have effects that shrink the size of the welfare state. Some social scientists argue that ethnic diversity undermines support for the welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser 2006). People are less inclined to favor redistribution if this redistribution benefits the members of other ethnic groups. If immigration increases ethnic diversity, then immigration may dampen support for the welfare state, which could conceivably result in less redistribution (Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist 2012). Once we consider the complex effects of immigration on state redistribution, it becomes less clear whether immigration brings about bigger welfare states.

But suppose that immigration does increase welfare spending and ultimately imposes higher taxes on citizens. Why is this a reason to restrict immigration? States can instead pursue other policy options to offset the fiscal costs of immigration. States can deny new immigrants access to public-welfare benefits. For example, states can restrict immigrants’ access to public services and welfare benefits. Alternatively, states can sell citizenship to foreigners. Gary Becker, Julian Simon, and other economists argue that selling citizenship would compensate for the fiscal costs of immigration (Becker and Becker 1998: 52–4; Simon 1990: ch.16). Instead of simply excluding foreigners, states could auction off citizenship rights or make the admission of foreigners conditional on their ability to pay a fee. If foreigners are unable to buy citizenship upfront, then perhaps states can allow them to gradually repay the fee over time. So, even if immigration does impose fiscal costs on citizens, states can mitigate these costs without restricting immigration.

Suppose, though, that immigration increases state redistribution and that these alternative policies are infeasible for some reason. Even so, libertarians should conclude that immigration restrictions are unjust. Libertarians should believe that some rights violations are worse than others (Sobel 2012). When the government forces citizens to pay for the welfare state, it violates their property rights. If immigration expands the welfare state, then citizens may need to pay somewhat more in taxes. But, when the government restricts immigration, it violates basic economic liberties and often traps people in poverty and other harmful conditions. Immigration restrictions are worse than taxes. Suppose that you are a citizen of Sweden, and the Swedish government gives you a choice. You can either pay 5 percent more in taxes every year, or the government will exile you to Haiti. Almost everyone would take higher taxes over exile. But immigration restrictions coercively force many people to stay in places as poor and dangerous as Haiti. This suggests that immigration restrictions pose a graver threat to individual rights than higher taxes. So, if we confront a tradeoff between allowing immigration or lower taxes, we should opt for allowing immigration.

4.2Institutions

Some libertarians worry that open immigration will have bad effects on institutions (Jones 2015: 161–3). As I noted in Section 2, good institutions are an important source of prosperity. Institutions such as respect for property rights and the rule of law generate economic growth. The institutions of rich states help explain why these states are rich. Suppose that rich states opened their borders. Hundreds of millions of people would plausibly immigrate to these states (Pritchett 2006: 72; Clemens 2011: 83). This immigration could negatively influence their institutions. Many of these immigrants would be coming from authoritarian or illiberal cultures. Perhaps these immigrants would vote for laws that infringe on civil and economic liberties. Or maybe good institutions depend on social trust, and mass immigration would undermine this trust. Another possibility is that open borders would create a political backlash that empowers nationalist parties, and these parties would then enforce anti-libertarian policies.

The claim that immigration will damage valuable institutions is an empirical one. What does the evidence say? Economists Alex Nowrasteh, Benjamin Powell, and their co-authors try to answer this question (Clark 2015). They examine the relationship between immigration and measures of economic liberty, such as the size of government, respect for property rights, and the freedom to trade internationally. They find that immigration marginally improves economic freedom in recipient countries. As the authors of this study note, few social scientists have systematically examined the impact of immigration on institutions, and it is possible that future research will determine that immigration has negative effects on institutions. But, so far, there is little evidence for this claim.

An objector might counter that, while existent immigration flows fail to harm institutions, immigration under open borders would have bad effects. While this is possible, it is also speculative. And we can’t justify violating people’s rights on the basis of mere speculations. Remember that libertarians think that people have weighty rights and that it is hard to justify violating them. Libertarians would say that, to justify rights violations, we would at least need to show that violating these rights is necessary to prevent a seriously bad outcome (Huemer 2012: 148–59).

As I noted above, there is not much evidence to suggest that restricting immigration is necessary to preserve good institutions, and there is some evidence against this claim. Even if open immigration did damage institutions, this might not be an immutable fact. We might be able to adapt our institutions so that they are more compatible with open borders. So, we don’t know that immigration restrictions are necessary to protect good institutions, but we do know that existent immigration laws violate rights. If certain laws violate rights and we have no clear evidence that these laws are necessary to prevent harmful outcomes, then the presumption is against these laws.

5PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

If my argument in this chapter is correct, then libertarians must endorse open borders. But open borders are politically infeasible. Majorities in most rich states reject open borders or even more immigration than the status quo (Pritchett 2006: 73–77). In democracies, public opinion influences policy (Facchini and Mayda 2008). Thus, it is unlikely that states will open their borders anytime soon.

Why then should we care about the argument for open borders if open borders are infeasible? Although completely open borders may be infeasible in the near term, marginal improvements over the status quo might be feasible. The members of the European Union have opened their borders to one another in recent decades, and the right to free movement is now enshrined in European law (Carrera 2005). The members of the South American regional association Mercosur have also agreed to liberalize their immigration restrictions, and citizens of member countries have qualified rights to freedom of movement within this region (Arcarazo and Geddes 2014). Some countries, such as Argentina, give foreigners constitutional rights to immigrate (Hines 2010). These examples suggest that states can sometimes move closer to open borders in a meaningful way. Libertarians should, of course, endorse marginal improvements over the status quo. These examples also indicate that libertarians have reason to investigate novel institutional arrange ments that promote open borders, such as constitutionalizing the right to immigrate and international institutions that facilitate free movement.

The case for open borders has practical implications for individual action as well. Most libertarians are skeptical about political authority. Libertarians believe that citizens don’t have obligations to obey the law and that states lack the right to rule (Huemer 2012: ch.7; Lomasky and Tesón 2015: ch.7). Libertarians say that, if it is wrong for your or I to coerce or assault other people, then it is wrong for the state to do these things too, and other people are under no duty to assist states by obeying their commands. These commitments imply that it is permissible to disobey immigration laws. Consider unauthorized migrants. These are migrants who cross borders or reside in a state without official authorization. Many people object to unauthorized migration because unauthorized migrants break the law. But libertarians should think that unauthorized migrants are merely permissibly exercising the moral rights that states are unjustly violating. Unauthorized migration is a way of resisting the wrongful coercion of states that restrict immigration.

Sometimes violating immigration law is morally praiseworthy. Take human smugglers. Human smugglers help millions of migrants across borders ever year. In popular discourse, people condemn human smuggling because human smugglers help migrants to immigrate illegally. Yet, from a libertarian perspective, many human smugglers are acting in a praiseworthy way. Like most people, libertarians believe that people have samaritan duties to aid people who need assistance. Unlike most people, libertarians don’t think our samaritan duties are constrained by what the law prohibits. While some human smugglers abuse migrants or extort money from them, other smugglers are satisfying their samaritan duties to aid needy people by helping them to exercise the rights that they are owed (Spener 2014). Libertarians should praise these human smugglers as modern-day participants in an underground railroad.

Finally, libertarians should consider disobedience to the law as a practical way that the citizens of rich states can do their part in resisting injustice. In fact, libertarians should believe that disobedience to the law is often morally mandatory. This is so because states conscript private citizens in enforcing immigration restrictions. Most rich states prohibit private citizens from hiring unauthorized migrants, landlords from renting to them, and companies from transporting them (Pham 2008). These laws force citizens to be complicit in injustice.

To illustrate, return to the example of Sam and Leticia. To recap, Sam is an employer in the United States, and Leticia is a citizen of Mexico. Suppose that Leticia immigrates to the United States illegally and becomes an unauthorized migrant. Sam hires Leticia and later discovers that she lacks the government’s authorization to reside and work in the United States. But the government forbids Sam from hiring Leticia. This law violates Sam’s right to use his private property as he pleases. This law also violates Leticia’s right to form voluntary contracts with employers. Imagine that Sam complies with the law and fires Leticia. Sam doesn’t merely allow something bad to happen to Leticia; Sam also actively contributes to violating Leticia’s right to freedom of contract.

This example indicates that the government can violate rights in two different ways. First, the government can directly prohibit someone from exercising her rights. For example, the government could violate Leticia’s rights by punishing her for forming an employment contract with Sam. Second, the government can violate Leticia’s rights by prohibiting employers like Sam from hiring Leticia. But the government can only violate rights in this second way if citizens like Sam comply with the government’s demands. In complying with these demands, Sam contributes to violating Leticia’s rights.

Almost everyone agrees that we have pro tanto moral obligations to refrain from contributing to rights violations. But libertarians also think that we lack duties to comply with the law. So, employers, landlords, the managers of transportation companies, and other citizens should refuse to contribute to injustice by obeying laws that prohibit them from interacting with unauthorized migrants. These obligations may be overridden in some cases. Sometimes the risk of punishment may be too great. But many citizens, such as many employers, can violate the law and interact with unauthorized migrants in illegal ways with little risk of punishment (Pham 2008). Libertarians should conclude that we are often morally required to disobey immigration laws.