Defeating ISIS

ISIS SOCIAL MEDIA: “OUR LIFE IN THE THRILL KILL CULT”

There has been a revolutionary shift in the media usage of jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates. Thirty years ago, al-Qaeda’s first-generation membership promoted itself via audiocassette, printed pamphlets, and face-to-face sermons extolling the virtues of Holy War against the West. Today the modern ISIS terrorist straps on a GoPro action sport camera, sets up to edit on an advanced laptop, and rushes out to record a mass-murder campaign. While the techniques may appear sophisticated due to the improved technology, the motivation, the underlying methods and types of product, have remained constant over the past three decades of terrorism media. What has changed is technology.

From the founding of al-Qaeda in 1988 to about 2000, various forms of media spread al-Qaeda’s ideological messages. The pamphlets and self-published books gave way to the audiocassette, which was ubiquitous in South and Central Asia and the Middle East. When circumstances dictated great secrecy, couriers used the Casio F-91 digital watch to carry messages, fatwas, and speeches. The storage media evolved from cassettes, VHS, and hi8, to smart cards, jump drives, and direct upload. By 1997, the DVD replaced other methods of media and was subsequently replaced by the World Wide Web. When jihadism was still starting, infant personal computers with dot matrix texts on bulletin board system forums (BBS) ruled the day. Networking has moved from BBS boards to BlogSpot, Facebook, Twitter, and WordPress, if not a standalone site. Online forums still have a strong presence on many jihadist sites and act as dump sites for video distribution.

Additionally, jihadis maintain file portals that contain hundreds of PDFs, MP3s, and videos of jihadist activities. Videos speak much more clearly and are easy to find with a little digging. The reason the jihadists of the past didn’t upload photos or videos was due to the limitation of the technology of the time, not the ambition of the jihadist himself. That is why the advent of the CD-R and the early World Wide Web changed the face of messaging.

Today there are many ways to record video and post it immediately to the web. ISIS wants to avoid using cell phones to evade detection by authorities; however, it is still the most convenient way to record surreptitiously and produce the footage for others to edit at a later time. Removal of the SIM card and Wi-Fi–only operation makes cell phones harder to detect.

Now that global extremists are transitioning from the underground al-Qaeda cells to aboveground ISIS platoons, we’ve seen a dramatic advancement in how the cult disseminates its message of bloodlust with the power and near-universal presence of the Internet. ISIS is formidable at harnessing social media for shock value simply because the media are now enmeshed in a revolutionary advanced-tech world. The message has definitely not changed, only the technology. Had Twitter existed, one can be sure al-Qaeda would absolutely have tweeted photos of the 9/11 attacks. The new generation of jihadist is raised in a world filled with graphic-rich video games, action movies, and the Internet’s world reach at their fingertips in the form of the mobile phone and the portable tablet. The tools for terror have upgraded in line with available consumer goods, and this will always be the case for future terrorist organizations.

The driving purpose of terror videos is to simply transmit the threat of terror and to create a vision that the killer is omnipotent and coming next for the viewer. Whether this goal is successful or not is determined by the message narrative that the group creates about itself and a compliant mainstream media. The terrorist organization can no longer just be a flashy black mask and a hood; now they have terror spokesmen and stage media spectaculars. Other relevant factors are who is being killed, who is speaking, to whom they are speaking, the narrative they are trying to frame, and the distribution platform for the horror they wish to communicate. For example, the most sophisticated videos published by the al-Hayat Media Center—the English-language division of ISIS’s media system—are directed at Muslims and non-Muslims in the West as well as an educated global audience. English is the language of business around the world, which makes it a second national language of many countries. ISIS understands that but carefully peppers each message with critical Islamic words and phrases that practicing Muslims should know and converts had better learn.

Virtually all of the terminology ISIS and other jihadis use is based on Islam and virtually identical, no matter where on the planet they espouse their beliefs. This characteristic causes many Western politicians, scholars, and pundits to wholeheartedly believe that the movement is unabashedly representative of Islam, despite the fact that virtually the entire the Muslim world disagrees. ISIS has never had more than tacit support in any country, as wholesale slaughtering of enemies and chattel slavery are now completely un-Islamic. The jihadis’ myriad terms and justifications are all fraught with religious, military, and political contradictions. These signifiers create scholarly races to finally understand the meaning, origins, and motivation of these terrorists. ISIS plays this game gleefully by blasting out enormous quantities of Islamic-laden jibberish that speaks only to its terrorist adherents while befuddling the West.

For non-Muslims this fuses the image of ISIS as a wholly Islamic organization without any context as to accuracy or deviance. For more than a decade, a sizeable team of dedicated staffers crafted each message in al-Hayat publications, framing the message for the viewer in a cloak of piety or aggression, depending on the intended audience. Although the news media in the West is often focused on the violent messages as an accent to heightening outrage, al-Qaeda and ISIS have an industry-level understanding of the importance of filling the news cycle with what producers need, and shoot video for just that purpose.

The most sophisticated videos often have a singular message and may include acts of ultra-violence, or deep devotion laced with charity, each mixed with calm religious dissection and justification. The image created by al-Qaeda was of the itinerant Jihadi “knights” who travel the world, fighting injustice and striking terror into the hearts of the enemy. ISIS prefers the trappings of a transitional expeditionary force on the march, such as those led by the Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century. They show an army of Muslim heroes from around the world that have seized stolen lands, formed an army of God (Jaysh Allah), filled with actual soldiers of God (Jund Allah). These heroes have restored the Caliphate to Islam and are ready to sacrifice their lives to bring about the end of days as the prophecies foretold. These are two distinctly different narratives. They reveal al-Qaeda’s preference for incremental change to achieve a “clash of civilizations” and ISIS’s penchant for bloodlust in a revolutionary war.

For either group, the suicide bombings, executions, immolations, and crucifixions are designed to enrage the Western TV viewer and bring about the clash of civilization between the West and Islam so the terrorists can prevail and rule the world. They need the hatred, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and outrage to continue justifying their self-made image as defenders of Islam in order to eventually coopt and control all of Islam.

SOCIAL MEDIA FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION

However, the overwhelming majority of official terror media over the past three decades from both ISIS and al-Qaeda is internal propaganda aimed at recruiting new members and bolstering the determination of already-indoctrinated members. These audio/video bits include announcements of religious rulings (Fatwas), discussions of law, and sermons aimed directly at compelling the listener to feel guilty for their shortcomings before promising a salvation if they will renounce the world as they know it and enjoy the beauty of the Caliphate. If one doesn’t speak Arabic, the media services have translations built into the stream that provide immediate translation.

VIDEO CALLS TO ABANDON PAST LIFE AND FAMILY

In a style typical of a destructive cult’s indoctrination and brainwashing techniques, almost all ISIS videos call for the viewer to perform emigration (Hijrah) away from the lands of the unbelievers (dar al-Kuffir) and to come directly to Syria to join the caliphate. This misuse of Islamic history—the Prophet Mohammed performed Hijrah to leave Mecca for Medina to start Islam—is actually designed to divide the recruit from family members. The modern call to Hijrah is always a secret directive to leave one’s corrupt past and prove fealty to Islam; if a family suspected radicalization they might intervene or call law enforcement.

In ISIS doctrine, Hijrah is described as the greatest of religious undertakings: no one should stop a prospective recruit except God. In fact, if one cannot leave the dar al-Kuffir, they can perform the emigration mentally and live ultraorthodox lives in their own homes or conceal it in their hearts. The San Bernardino killer Sayed Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik are believed to have done just that. They concealed all about their radicalization from their families while performing mental Hijrah. Even his mother did not know he had radicalized to the point that they would abandon their six-month-old baby and carry out a mass murder.

TERRORISM AS SPECTACLE: WELCOME TO THE THRILL KILL CULT

The most sophisticated videos published by the al-Hayat Media Center—the English-language propaganda division of ISIS—are designed to influence the global media and potential Western recruits. However, the most popular videos among ISIS members and fanboys in the unofficial publications, web streams, forums, and internal storage dumps are the most brutal and barely watchable examples of mass murder, throat-cutting, and games with corpses. Once released into the Internet, these titles get instant global propagation as news outlets scramble to be the first to cover the latest threat from ISIS. There is an entire industry of security and media support companies that monitor terror video media just to be the first to get the latest atrocity into the news stream.

The most common ISIS videos are almost administrative in their dullness. They include province activity reports, unofficial publications, web streams, forums, and internal storage dumps. A handful of ISIS publications instruct how best to perform guerrilla mass marketing. The raw pages of many ISIS releases found on the extremely popular website justpaste.it indicate that ISIS intentionally spreads their message on as many platforms as possible due to the threat of interruptions through takedowns due to policy violations. A typical single post will often include a reference to the wilayat that created it, a custom graphic that represents the video, and a string of links to spread it around many media sources. Most sources are based at archive.org, mediafire, Google Drive YouTube, and a very long list of file-sharing companies.

THRILL KILL CULT (TKC) VIDEOS

The videos reveal a Thrill Kill Cult (TKC) aspect of the entire ISIS ideological franchise. The members make videogame-like combat videos of merciless mayhem and bathe them with sacred mission rhetoric purposed by God alone to the tune of nasheeds or religious chants and hymns. To a man (and sometimes woman) they use the phrase “In the name of God” to justify whatever horror they are about to reveal. These videos are not just bragging, but allow the “cowards” (a.k.a. you the viewer) to bear witness to jihadists’ mental strength and devotion to their God, no matter how horrible. The TKC videos are almost always intended to inspire fear in the non-faithful and jealousy from the co-denominationalist viewer who has not yet shown the guts to come to join the murderous rampage. The videos often mock the viewers directly and claim that they are not men, but cowards who eventually must either find the ISIS interpretation of Islam correct or die as the others. This is a cult-like core component of recruitment.

The TKC videos appear to intone the old British Army slogan “Come Be a Man among Men,” and add “and Kill Anyone and Anything Not Like Us.” Much of the cinematography is so well-executed, some scenes appear to have been cut from videos of gameplay in Call of Duty or Medal of Honor. The TKC component of ISIS videos show off how “fun” it is to kill kuffir (infidels), rafida (apostates), salibiyeen (Christian crusaders), or just about anyone who opposes ISIS. The raw video on reality sites such as Liveleak shows the bloody murder without any filter. This Thrill Kill Cult component of the terror videos exists within all ISIS jihadist groups from Yemen to Somalia to Nigeria, and is a key component of inspiring the mentally susceptible, the psychotic, and the fanatic to join the jihad and become a fellow murderer for their variant of God.

Whether it is in Mali, Chad, Libya, Syria, Pakistan, France, or Canada the videographer captures the horror in Kodachrome detail. Each terror subgroup performs in a precisely uniform manner and their actors say virtually the same thing:

1. They praise God for giving them the opportunity to fight.

2. They all extol the cult of jihad ideology that allows them to massacre innocents with utter impunity.

3. They issue the message du jour.

4. They perform a horrible act.

5. They praise God for allowing that horrible act to occur as His will.

6. They warn that more horrible acts are to come.

In reality these videos are a form of elite terrorist narcissism and convey their depth of devotion to compatriots; the highest form of worship to God. This is why groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS seek to control the distribution of the media at strategic levels as often as possible. The raw footage that pops up on affiliate sites shows some jihadists behaving with hyena-like bloodlust. In fact the raw, uncut combat footage is shot to show off how fun it is to kill anyone who is opposed to them, which is not helpful to the strategic narrative of the group; the bloodlust must be carefully framed by a central media group.

TERROR MEDIA PRODUCTION UNITS

Al-Qaeda organized the first widespread use of professional centralized media groups around as-Sahab media in the mid-1990s. Though still strong and active—as-Sahab remains al-Qaeda Central Command’s (AQC) official media wing and speaks with the voice of bin Laden’s successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri—it has dramatically lost media share to ISIS after the 2014 declaration of the Caliphate. The heart and soul of the ISIS communications team is al-Furqan Media. It operates the currently popular al-Hayat Media Center for non-Arabic communications and propaganda. The various provinces have their own highly compartmentalized production teams directed by a media emir, who gives video assignments with instructions bearing the official IS logo and seal of the media emir.1135 It would appear that all Jihadi mass communications groups now maintain a few centralized production offices, followed by translation, repackaging, and transmission teams. These multimedia nodes are responsible for maintaining a globally linked multiplatform information technology network with subgroups monitoring, operating, and posting on web forums, Twitter, and other social media.

Approximation of the formal organizations associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS media worldwide.

TYPES OF VIDEO PRODUCTION UNITS

ISIS utilizes three levels of video production as follows:

First Line Video

Body-, Helmet-, or Weapon-Mounted Cameras: The favorite camera of the fighting squads is the GoPro. Increasingly you can find first-person-shooter footage appearing on sites like LiveLeak that resemble video games as the fighters raid villages. One popular video shows a tank with a GoPro mounted as it launches an attack on the Kurdish city of Kobane. Another from Egypt shows a member of the Ansar Beit al-Maqdis terror group storming the remains of an Egyptian army barracks that had just been blown down by a suicide bomber. With a gun-mounted video camera he hunts, finds, and executes several wounded soldiers trapped in the rubble.

Second Line

Video Support Team (VSTs): These are the one- or two-man teams pioneered by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan that follow and shoot media like a military “Combat Camera” team. They never carry arms and exist solely to capture the footage for replay. Iraqi insurgents often co-located the VST with a suicide bomber supervisor who could also trigger the explosive by phone if the bomber backed out.

Third Line

Professional Newsmedia Teams (PNTs): These are high-quality media shot digitally and produced in a large format facility such as a newsroom or dedicated media site. The John Cantlie hostage news reports, such as his report from the Mosul souk, used this format and camerawork.

MESSAGING TYPOLOGY: ISSUE IDEOLOGICALLY SOUND MESSAGES

Consistent with the history of terrorism propaganda, the majority of multimedia produced and distributed by ISIS involves a call to action to prove one’s faith. This tradition dates back through many movements to compel the viewer from watching to acting.

MAINTENANCE OF NARRATIVE CONTROL

There are hundreds of videos across the jihadist landscape. The tie that binds them all is the central message that the Islamic State or other jihad zones are the present utopias for all pious Muslims who emigrate from the land of the unbelievers. Getting to the utopia requires leaving a state of “ignorance” and understanding that the entire world except the AQ/ISIS-occupied lands are unclean.

Additionally, the image of a pastoral religious paradise with he-man fighting knights spreads quietly through systems of internal messaging in the ISIS/al-Qaeda franchise world. “Mujatweets” are Twitter messages that are archived and compiled for the benefit of prospective jihadis. Mujatweets are generally hidden from the news media and casual observers by dumping them into hidden folders. Though al-Qaeda and ISIS are believed to have issued over ninety thousand Twitter messages a day, the best and most representative for their media are kept from public view. Most Mujatweets are completely pastoral presentations of how wonderful life is in the self-named ISIS Caliphate and how brave the ISIS knights are to battle the entire world. On the other hand, the news media–style reports from the British hostage John Cantlie, detailing the “stability” of ISIS-controlled cities such as Mosul and Ar-Raqqa, are slick, convincing National Geographic documentary–style segments. The purpose of these media activities is to project a “nation” that is a paradise on Earth filled with images of cool water, a devoted Muslim community, and laughing mujahedeen children enjoying calm and stability, instead of the hellscape reality of the Syrian civil war and protracted aerial bombardment. To many Internet viewers, these ISIS media reports have as much validity as BBC or CNN.

One of the last but no less important uses of ISIS media is to maintain control and unanimity of effort in their jihad zone, be it the caliphate of the Islamic State or the combat regions of new ISIS provinces. This was especially prevalent when ISIS proclaimed itself the sole Islamic caliphate and government on earth. Many former al-Qaeda groups were exhorted to line up and swear an oath of loyalty to the new Calife à la place du Calife, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

These publications also demonstrate cohesion of message in battlefield reports from the various district media centers that proclaim the enemies of monotheism have been conquered, or that repelled and wayward Muslims have confessed and are now ready to be part of the Islamic State.

Videos showing hostages and murder victims also validate the messaging. Hostage John Cantlie, a British journalist, “reported” on the conditions in Mosul under ISIS. At one point an Iraqi aircraft flew overhead and he shouted on camera “Here I am. Drop your bombs. Try to rescue me again… Rubbish.” This was designed to show the viewer that Western forces were powerless with Cantlie standing out on a street. Although it may not have played well on CNN, in Iraq, Syria, and other parts of the Middle East it struck a chord.

HOSTAGE CONFESSION VIDEOS

Hostages who are not to survive captivity give coerced “last confession” videos. In a horrible routine, the victim is paraded before the camera to testify how ISIS helped them find the way back to pure monotheism and redemption, and they ask to be forgiven their sins. They never are. To the cultists, the terminal blessing of God is appointed the moment the victim confesses. To ISIS, the coming murder is an immediate reward for the victim wisely finding the way back to God. Usually, the camera shot is cut to reveal a gun at the back of the head or a large knife. The end is swift unless the victim is slated for “royal command performance” deaths such as immolation, drowning in a cage, decapitation by explosive detonation cord, stoning, or being thrown off a roof. Not one iota of this is Islamic in any way, but the novelty and barbarity is especially appealing to the consumers of terrorist propaganda.

There is a stark difference between the false humility of al-Hayat Media’s highly polished propaganda videos and the raw combat footage. Al-Hayat seeks to maintain a positive and powerful image. The loose, individually shot combat reels show an undisciplined gang. Organized footage seeks to portray discipline in the ranks, while the loose footage reveals harassment and a lack of confidence in authority.

DEMONSTRATING THE PROJECTION OF POWER

First and foremost, the official media services of ISIS serve to project the constitution and viability of the organization on the world stage: “we are a force to be dealt with.” A video will then bombard the viewer with a dizzying mashup of video team operations and proclamations of gains and glory, especially of future rewards. The narrative is laden with more than simply apocalyptic messages meant to signify what these propagandists believe; they are telling you what they want you to believe.

To prove their viability, the regional offices of the jihadist news services often applaud each other or themselves for hard-fought campaigns against enemies of the group. It is not unusual to see an al-Yemen media group congratulate a Boko Haram operation or vice versa. Within Syria the regional groups from one state will work to let each other know that the systems are working and that life is normal in the Caliphate.

DEVOTION THROUGH MARTYRDOM VIDEOS

From early on, ideological martyrdom videos of hyperbolic sermons overlaid with chanting ISIS music have been compelling recruitment tools. They usually have the same format, no matter which jihadi group issues it. The media centers give a brief clip of a suicide bomber before his or her mission. Without exception the young suicide bombers in martyrdom videos express unbridled joy about their coming death. Leaders then exploit their names in calls to other fighters to stay dedicated to the group’s mission.

In the martyrdom video filmed by al-Qaeda follower Amedy Coulibaly—one of the early Paris attackers—the viewer can read of his path, see him work out with focus, express joy at the prospect of his future in heaven, and then watch muffled footage of the raid that ended his life. Prior to the London 7/7 al-Qaeda bombing operations, in their martyrdom videos, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shezhad Tanweer told their families that they would miss them.

CORPSE MANIPULATION FOR MYSTICAL EFFECT

Whenever possible, particularly in post-combat martyrdom videos, if the head or body can be recovered, the videographers manipulate the face to look like it is peaceful or that the martyr died happy and is smiling. If the body or even just a hand is recovered they are posed and made to hold the forefinger up in the symbol of “One God.”

The first viral jihadist video on the web was of the decapitation execution of a Russian soldier, Yevgeny Rodionov.

THE BEHEADING VIDEO TRADITION CONTINUES IN HIGH DEFINITION

Despite the recent shock and disgust of the West, terrorists have documented their spectacles for decades now, yet the news media struggles to cover the latest atrocity with this historical context. Instead, they fixate on the glossy nature of the image.

The first viral video on the Internet was the beheading of Russian soldier Yevgeny Rodionov in 1996 by Chechen jihadists. Six years later, al-Qaeda would release “The Slaughter of the Spy-Journalist, the Jew Daniel Pearl,” after he was murdered. Nick Berg was murdered on camera by Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi in May 2004, followed by nine others including citizens of Japan, South Korea, Nepal, Egypt, Bulgaria, and the United Kingdom. The jihadists recorded and disseminated these for both shock value and as a recruiting device.

ISIS ADAPTIVENESS IN THE BEHEADING GENRE

The huge difference in response between the 2004 execution of Nick Berg, for instance, and the death of James Foley ten years later came by adding only a few changes to the original media style. The first change was to the venue. Berg’s was in a basement and had all the appearance of murdering a trapped rat. ISIS conducted their murders outdoors in what they claimed was liberated land in a holy caliphate. They showed no fear of being caught or attacked from the air. The ISIS videos implied freedom to execute at will. The second change was that ISIS managed to get the victim to recite his message to the target audience, his people, and leaders. The third change was to select a native speaker from the victim’s region of the world. Using Mohammed Emwazi or “Jihadi John” to speak in English and carry out the beheadings was powerful. Having him speak eloquent English and directly threaten the Western world demonstrated a degree of sophistication and caused a level of political emotional outrage that the murder of Nick Berg did not.

OFFICIAL VS UNOFFICIAL BEHEADINGS AND MURDERS ON VIDEO

Al-Qaeda leadership frowned on official beheadings after the globally negative impact of the Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi/Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) videos of Nicholas Berg and other Western hostages. In fact, the use of official beheading videos from AQI was suspended after 2004. AQI knew that mass murders could continue in order to lure more Arab recruits, but not so publicly. When ISIS transitioned to all-Iraqi leadership, they wanted to reinstitute media spectacle as a form of Terror Shock Value (TSV) in order to subjugate the will of the victim populations and lure the Americans back in to a conflict with the Islamic State. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reinstituted official ISIS beheadings of Westerners with the murder of journalist James Foley in 2014.

Islamic State boycott of Apple products.

It should be noted that before the Foley video, hundreds of beheadings were already occurring throughout Iraq and Syria. Videos of beheadings, crucifixions, hangings, and massacres proliferated on unfiltered sites like LiveLeak without notice by Western media. These were not official videos put out by al-Furqan for the polished presentation to the Western news stream, but unofficial documentation and recruitment videos, usually unpolished Handycam work revealing the gleeful pursuit of murderers admiring their handiwork.

CONTROLLING THE NARRATIVE

Individuals also act as self-generating media centers without editors or middlemen to the ISIS publication services, in a phenomenon similar to the Western “iReporter.” Al-Furqan media tends to a carefully arranged message, even if this means reshooting a scene over and over. The self-generating individual doesn’t have to adhere to criteria for official videos and may share footage that is insufficiently gory, or may overlook the necessity to remind the viewer there is only one God. This lack of editorial control has become troublesome for ISIS leaders, and they have told supporters and combatants to rein in unofficial video and to avoid giving away intelligence. Always wary of spying, ISIS leaders recently released a prohibition on Apple products, as the NSA and Mossad may use them to detect the whereabouts of leaders or units for attack by drone strike.

TRICKS OF THE TRADE FOR THE SOPHISTICATED MEDIA JIHADIST

Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi all had to hide their video production in the shadows, and as a result, used a few familiar outside shots. Bin Laden used to have to summon a trusted videographer to come tape his latest lecture. It was also critical to the security of the group, since bin Laden had the famous Afghan warlord, Ahmed Shah Massoud, assassinated with a bomb in a video camera the day before 9/11 in order to hinder his assistance to the Americans. After the trusted videographers edited the product in a location far from the site of the shoot, they could then disseminate copies via courier to the world. The methods were advanced for the day.

During the Iraq insurgency, the Washington Post noted, “analysts said that as-Sahab is outfitted with some of the best technology available. Editors and producers use ultralight Sony Vaio laptops and top-end video cameras. Files are protected using PGP, or Pretty Good Privacy, a virtually unbreakable form of encryption software that is also used by intelligence agencies around the world.” This changed when ISIS seized terrain. After conquering cities with large-scale television stations and production studios, they were more interested in exploiting full-scale media organizations and operating teams in captured newsrooms. They also seized all the electronic shops that sold cameras and gear, which provided them with all the tools necessary to produce their media on a grand scale until destroyed or overrun.

Zarqawi makes plans “in secret” on camera.

ISIS’S MISSION: GO SMALLER, FASTER, PORTABLE, AND MAKE BROADCAST-READY MEDIA

HIGH DEFINITION CAMERAS—THE GOPRO GENERATION

In the 1980s and 1990s al-Qaeda used Sony Handycams with videotape cassettes of low-definition quality. Today, jihadis use many different types of camera systems, most of which are not level of quality found in al-Hayat publications, but have high enough digital quality for broadcast news.

Much of the first-level combat footage shows fighters using GoPro action cameras, iPad-styled tablets, smart phones, and an array of digital cameras. Examination of all the official publications by al-Hayat Media has shown that the quality of the cameras has simply gone up as they have kept pace with the average technology any of us can use to render a quality product. However, al-Hayat appears to be fixated on the quality of the video, because it is seeking to gain outside listeners to its message. Only the trained eye knows the best methods of capturing images. Most of the footage indicates that few quality videographers work for al-Furqan or as-Sahab, and none are working for the satellite groups like Boko Haram, AQAP, or lesser groups.

GOPRO AND THE CHARLIE HEBDO ATTACKERS

In the al-Qaeda inspired Charlie Hebdo Paris attacks of 2015, all the attackers had GoPro cameras. Two years previous, Medhi Nemmouche and Mohamed Merah also had GoPro cameras. Merah even had his strapped around his neck and wanted to have his footage played on Al-Jazeera.

According to a Paris police report, the Kouachi brothers never opened their GoPro camera box.1136 That may indicate that the camera footage was an afterthought and they decided to carry out the attack and let the traditional media cover the result, rather than try to survive and issue their own footage. On the other hand, Amedy Coulibaly, who conducted the kosher supermarket siege, was pressing his hostages to upload video he had already filmed and edited on a laptop he had in possession.1137 His video “Soldat du Califat” was, in essence, his martyrdom video. The laptop would indicate which software he used, and we know he used a jump drive from GoPro to computer, according to hostage accounts. Contrast this with the ISIS-directed terrorist attack at Stade de France and the Bataclan theater massacres. ISIS did not issue any media or send cameras with their teams. In a clever reversion to the fundamentals of terrorist propaganda propagation of the 1970s for the twenty-first century, they relied on the spectacular nature of the act to force global media to provide all the coverage they wanted and needed.

THE VIDEO SUPPORT TEAM VS INDIVIDUAL VIDEOGRAPHER

The extensive use of VST (Video Support Teams) in most operations continues to this day, but only in active war zones. We are seeing more and more self-driven first-person-shooter footage across the web portals we monitor. The ability to franchise the experience of adventure to a generation who grew up with the ability to play first-person-shooter war games is an obvious draw. This would also enable the fighter to be more than simply a fighter in combat, as they become part of the message-making mechanism.

RENDER HIGH-QUALITY EDITING

The quality of video has improved in most digital cameras over the past decade, enabling even the most unskilled videographer to capture moving images that would make their family and coworkers happy. The camera is only part of the work.

Editing is another discipline altogether. Simple editing suites are included with most new cameras, and in an examination of several of the major videos published by al-Furqan Media, there are areas where the editing is rushed unnecessarily, including bad edits in the November 16, 2014 video of Syrian soldiers and short edits in the Jordanian pilot video. In some cases, the frames listing the ISIS intended targets for attack were simply thrown in after the important names had been rendered.

GO HOLLYWOOD STYLE

The discussion in the media seems to often be focused on how advanced these operations are and whether professional filmmakers or Professional Newsmedia Teams (PNTs) are involved in the process. Al-Hayat products are called “Hollywood style” by most of the major media. While it may be easy to marvel at how advanced the techniques in these video productions may be, the videos examined so far could have been filmed with fewer than three cameras and edited on a standard laptop. The speculation about professional filmmakers assumes much about producing a film. Most of the videos are raw combat footage mixed with PowerPoint or inserts. If al-Hayat created one ubiquitous intro file and simply passed it along, it would only have to be made once. Once branded, the rest of the media outlets could more readily propagate the message instead of being caught up in the assembly of the message.

The average ISIS video clip usually lasts no longer than fifteen minutes. Two notable segments, one about the murder of Syrian soldiers and the other about the murder of Coptic Christians in Libya, were less than ten minutes apiece. To do this, the “directors” of these videos clearly conducted retakes and changes in angles. The preponderance of uninspired single-shot tripod-mounted camera videos dwarfs the number of sophisticated, well-made videos.

Despite speculation that the dozen or so high-quality films were produced on complicated platforms like Avid, it is also possible that they were created via Adobe Premiere with AfterEffects or Sony Vegas. In the past, many jihadists would use Sony Vaio laptops to edit their video, which leads one to suspect they are still PC-based and likely using pirated software.

DISTRIBUTION

ISIS has been conducting the same operations with al-Farqan as its predecessor al-Qaeda did with as-Sahab. Foot couriers are no longer necessary due to ISIS’s advanced operational security systems, unless maintaining the most rigorous operational security, as al-Qaeda still does. Once the videographers have completed the finishing touches on their product, they enjoy innumerable options to disseminate their message. Most of the official media clips are readily available at Archive.org, a repository of video, PDF, and MP3 clips and other media from a wide variety of sources. Other sites used by jihadists for propagating their message include YouTube, Liveleak, Dailymotion, Facebook, Vid.me, MediaFire, badongo.com, extabit.com, rapidspread.com, easyshare.com, 2shared.com, and zshare.net, to name but a few.

ISIS released a video detailing precisely how it wants users to use hashtags (#) to project their message on the world stage. The video demonstrates a wrong way and a right way to do this. The right way includes jumping on to trending hastags that have nothing to do with the Islamic State. In other cases, the latest campaigns get a fresh hashtag that trends and shortly fades away.

Those who don’t want to be found downloading the material use encryption, but the material can be often found without any protections in place on any number of download sites, supported by free blogs that host a repetitious updated list of links to download sites. Many of these sites are able to deal with copyright infringement, but not with terrorism propaganda. Twitter and YouTube actively remove posts and pages, but it only takes a few hours for another to pop up and republish the same material.

DABIQ Magazine

ISIS moved into an arena that had been dominated by al-Qaeda for years, the slick online magazine. In 2010, al-Qaeda produced an English language magazine called Inspire, which featured articles about explaining their ideology, using counterintelligence tradecraft, and how to make homemade explosives. Their most famous article was called “How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”1138 The Tsarnaev brothers used these simple instructions to carry out the Boston Marathon bombing that killed three and wounded 246.

After dominating the online world, ISIS debuted the first edition of Dabiq in July 2014. “Dabiq” is the location of the small Syrian village near Aleppo where an apocalyptic battle between Islam and “an Army from Rome” is supposed to take place before the return of the Mahdi and the second coming of the Prophet Jesus. The first edition of the magazine announced of “The Return of the Khilafah,” followed by new editions monthly.

Each edition contains articles on how the Caliphate is challenging the unbelievers of the world, building infrastructure, and normalizing itself into statehood; stories of brave suicide bomber “martyrs” and great adventurous military campaigns; announcements of the most popular videos no fanboy should miss; and even advertising pages for hostages for sale.

The trend in the first twelve editions shows the expansion of ISIS from its central concerns in Iraq/Syria to its growth in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and other regions where groups have sworn allegiance. Notably, there are sections devoted to the Islamic converts who are lauded as examples of good men who turned to Islam, left the West or Australia, and joined the Islamic State.

The magazine has become the official mouthpiece to take credit for terrorist attacks. Apparently working under deadline, they managed to complete a very fast five-day turnaround for the rapid release of edition twelve, “Just Terror,” featuring the November 13, 2015 Paris attacks and the destruction of the Russian airbus over the Sinai. The publication featured a photo of the explosive device that allegedly blew up the airliner—a soda can filled with explosives—along with the claim that ISIS Sinai was behind the attack.

HOW YOU CAN HELP DEFEAT ISIS SOCIAL MEDIA

THE PRIVATE CVE CAMPAIGNS

The cyber hacking group Anonymous launched a global cyberwarfare campaign against ISIS and al-Qaeda, which flared first after the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks and then again after the November 2015 Paris massacre. Called “Op ISIS,” the secretive group harnessed the power of anonymous computer specialists they call “hacktivists” and collectively attacked ISIS’s Twitter feeds, websites, and servers. Their methods—denial of service attacks, doxing, and other means—are no big secret, and the campaign has proven somewhat successful in bringing down the mundane posts of jihadi-fanboys and the most egregious images, but the Internet works so quickly that no non-government group could take down the majority of the real data without being fully integrated into the companies that host the content, like Facebook and Twitter.

Anonymous has identified (“doxed”) tens of thousands of Twitter users it claims are ISIS followers and supporters. Critics have challenged the lists as improperly outing people who have nothing to do with ISIS, or innocent people who just post in Arabic or on Islam. Due to Anonymous’s lack of expertise, innocents are treated the same as ISIS followers. In addition to Anonymous, there are many other small groups that employ other methods to engage ISIS online, from takedowns to parody.

BASICS FOR TAKING ISIS OFFLINE

The primary method used by Anonymous and small groups is to just use one’s computer to make a complaint. This comes in the form of a “take down” notice being sent to Twitter, YouTube, Google, Facebook, and other online locations demanding that offensive or policy violation material should be “taken down.” Though YouTube and Facebook have specific language related to terrorism content, Twitter and others only have general complaint forms with prescribed categories of concern. To make use of this, just find the email address for the company that is sponsoring the offensive material and send it to the abuse@ contact address for the site. Although this won’t stop the posting of social media, if the thousands of watchers and users were to become hundreds of thousands, ISIS’s ability to rapidly jump and continue to distribute widely would quickly come to an end.

On Twitter there are other methodologies such as filing complaints referencing “Not Interested in this account,” “They are posting spam,” “This account may be hacked,” and “They’re being abusive or harmful.” After this point, the user must select a range of options to make their complaint so effective the server operators have no choice but to remove the data.

After choosing “They’re being abusive or harmful,” you can select “Pretending to be me or someone else,” “Engaging in harassment or violence,” and “This person might be contemplating suicide or self-harm.”

If you select “Engaging in harassment or violence,” the remaining two choices will be “Who is (name of Twitter user) targeting?” and the options are “Me” or “Someone else.” Twitter then asks what the user is doing: “Being disrespectful or offensive,” “Harassing me,” or “Threatening violence or physical harm.” At the end you will get the final tab, which is a general contact entry for additional commentary where you can give details of why this is an ISIS user and should be removed.

Then wash, rinse, repeat, hundreds of thousands of times.

Taking down Twitter accounts is Sisyphean at best. ISIS and their fanboys tend to crop right back up and the takedown must start all over. However, it does work. The ideal way to deal with these accounts would be for the hosting companies to use digital fingerprints on files to prohibit the uploads in the first place, or identify avatars commonly used by ISIS supporters, including the black shahada flag, or pictures of ISIS fighters, Osama bin Laden, and Zarqawi.

For example, with YouTube, one could easily identify ISIS material by using already-existing algorithms to compare the contents of new video uploads to previously flagged uploads. The system that YouTube currently uses to cross-match material with digital fingerprints is highly accurate and is distinct in behavior from direct takedown notices. Once an offensive video is discovered, it can be calculated, identified, and used to eliminate all the other copies found on YouTube, no differently than if you uploaded a clip from television and it matched existing material. Material is often instantly flagged at YouTube to check for copyrighted music alone.