1 Mamatjan Juma and Alim Seytoff, ‘Xinjiang Authorities Sending Uyghurs to Work in China’s Factories, Despite Coronavirus Risks,’ Radio Free Asia (27 February 2020).
2 SCMP Reporters, ‘China Plans to Send Uygur Muslims from Xinjiang Re-Education Camps to Work in Other Parts of Country,’ South China Morning Post (2 May 2020).
3 Keegan Elmer, ‘China says it will ‘Normalise’ Xinjiang Camps as Beijing Continues Drive to Defend Policies in Mainly Muslim Region,’ South China Morning Post (9 December 2019).
4 Erkin, ‘Boarding Preschools For Uyghur Children “Clearly a Step Towards a Policy of Assimilation”: Expert,’ Radio Free Asia (6 May 2020).
5 Gulchehre Hoja, ‘Subsidies For Han Settlers “Engineering Demographics” in Uyghur-Majority Southern Xinjiang,’ Radio Free Asia (13 April 2020).
1 Emily Feng, ‘China Targets Muslim Uyghurs Studying Abroad,’ Financial Times (1 August 2017).
2 See Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, ‘Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State,’ Jamestown Foundation China Brief (14 March 2017); Magha Rajagopalan, ‘This is What a 21st Century Police State Really Looks Like,’ Buzzfeed News (17 October 2017).
3 Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, ‘Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,’ Jamestown Foundation China Brief (21 September 2017).
4 Nathan VanderKlippe, ‘Frontier Injustice: Inside China’s Campaign to “Re-educate” Uyghurs,’ The Globe and Mail (9 September 2017); HRW, ‘China: Free Xinjiang “Political Education” Detainees’ (10 September 2017); Eset Sulaiman, ‘China Runs Region-wide Re-education Camps in Xinjiang for Uyghurs and Other Muslims,’ RFA (11 September 2017).
5 Alexia Fernandez Campbell, ‘China’s Reeducation Camps are Beginning to Look Like Concentration Camps,’ Vox (24 October 2018).
6 See ‘Inside the Camps Where China Tries to Brainwash Muslims Until They Love the Party and Hate Their Own Culture,’ Associated Press (17 May 2018); David Stavrou, ‘A Million People Are Jailed at China’s Gulags. I Managed to Escape. Here’s What Really Goes on Inside,’ Haaretz (17 October 2019).
7 See Amie Ferris-Rotman, ‘Abortions, IUDs and Sexual Humiliation: Muslim Women who Fled China for Kazakhstan Recount Ordeals,’ Washington Post (5 October 2019); Eli Meixler, ‘“I Begged Them to Kill Me.” Uighur Woman Tells Congress of Torture in Chinese Internment Camps,’ TIME (30 November 2018); Ben Mauk, ‘Untold Stories from China’s Gulag State,’ The Believer (1 October 2019).
8 Shoret Hoshur ‘Nearly Half of Uyghurs in Xinjiang’s Hotan Targetted for Re-education Camps,’ RFA (9 October 2017).
9 Sean R. Roberts, ‘Fear and Loathing in Xinjiang: Ethnic Cleansing in the 21st Century,’ Fair Observer (17 December 2018).
10 See Zenz and Leibold, ‘Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State.’
11 Roberts, ‘Fear and Loathing in Xinjiang.’
12 Darren Byler, ‘China’s Nightmare Homestay,’ Foreign Policy (26 October 2018); Steven Jiang, ‘Chinese Uyghurs Forced to Welcome Communist Party Into Their Homes,’ CNN (14 May 2018).
13 James Leibold, ‘Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang Region: Ethnic Sorting, Coercion, and Inducement,’ Journal of Contemporary China (2019).
14 Darren Byler, ‘Xinjiang Education Reform and The Eradication of Uyghur-Language Books,’ SupChina (2 October 2019); Lily Kuo, ‘Revealed: New Evidence of China’s Mission to Raze the Mosques of Xinjiang,’ The Guardian (6 May 2019); Bahram Sintash and UHRP, ‘Demolishing Faith: The Destruction and Desecration of Uyghur Mosques and Shrines’ (28 October 2019); Sui-Lee Wee and Paul Mozur, ‘China uses DNA to Map Faces with Help from the West,’ The New York Times (3 December 2019).
15 Adrian Zenz, ‘Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,’ SocArxiv Papers (12 July 2019).
16 See Darren Byler, ‘Uyghur Love in a Time of Interethnic Marriage,’ SupChina (7 August 2019); Adrian Zenz, ‘Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,’ The Journal of Political Risk, 7:7 (July 2019).
17 Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ‘Facing Criticism Over Muslim Camps, China Says: What’s the Problem?’ The New York Times (9 December 2019).
18 Statistical Bureau of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region ‘National Population by Region, State, City and County’ (15 March, 2017).
19 For more on the nomadic/settled cultural divide in Central Asia, see Elizabeth Bacon, Central Asians Under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980).
20 For more on the local traditions of Islam among Uyghurs, see Rian Thum, The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014) and Ildiko Beller-Hann, Community Matters in Xinjiang, 1880–1949: Towards a Historical Anthropology of the Uyghur (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
21 For more on the ancient Uyghur Empire, see Colin Mackerras, The Uighur Empire According to T’ang Dynastic Histories: A Study in Sino-Uighur Relations, 744–840 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1973).
22 See James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 1–77.
23 See Laura Newby, ‘“Us and Them” in 18th and 19th Century Xinjiang,’ in I. Beller-Hann, M. Cesàro, and J. Finley (eds), Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007); Beller-Hann, Community Matters in Xinjiang; Thum, The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History.
24 UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Voices: Who are Indigenous Peoples?’ United Nations (2006).
25 For official government accounts of the history of the XUAR and the Uyghurs, see State Council Information Office of the PRC (SCIOPRC), Full Text of White Paper on History and Development of Xinjiang (26 May 2003); White Paper: Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang (22 July 2019).
26 Personal communication with Elise Marie Anderson, 2019.
27 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 179.
28 Gerald Seymour, Harry’s Game: A Thriller (New York: Random House, 1975).
29 Boaz Garnor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ Policy Practice and Research, 3:4 (2002), p. 288.
30 Ibid., pp. 294–296.
31 United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, April 2004, p. xii.
32 Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real (London: Verso, 2002), p. 93.
33 Ibid., p. 93. Emphasis in the original.
34 Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’: Lectures at the College De France, 1975–76 (London: Picador, 1997), p. 32.
35 Ibid., p. 256.
36 For more on the concept of homo sacer, see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
37 Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, p. 93.
38 See Stuart Elden, ‘Terror and Territory,’ Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography 39:5 (2007), 781–955.
39 See Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘The Rise of Trump and Its Global Implications; “Radical Islamic Terrorism”: What’s in a Name?’ RSIS Commentaries, No. 23 (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2017); Hilal Evar, ‘Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia,’ Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 21:119 (2012), 119–174.
1 James Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 17.
2 Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State (Studies on Ethnic Groups in China) (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2016), pp. 10–11.
3 See Rian Thum, et al., ‘The Rise of Xinjiang Studies: A New Author Forum,’ The Journal of Asian Studies, 77:1 (2018), 7–18.
4 Max Oidtmann, Forging the Golden Urn: The Qing Empire and the Politics of Reincarnation in Tibet (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
5 Dibyesh Anand, ‘Colonization with Chinese Characteristics: Politics of (In) security in Xinjiang and Tibet,’ Central Asian Survey, 38:1 (2019) 129–147, p. 130.
6 Ibid., pp. 131–133.
7 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 16–18.
8 Lorenzo Veracini, ‘Understanding Colonialism and Settler Colonialism as Distinct Formations,’ Interventions, 16:5 (2014), 615–633.
9 Ibid., p. 623.
10 For official government accounts of the history of the XUAR and the Uyghurs, see SCIOPRC, Full Text of White Paper on History and Development of Xinjiang (26 May 2003); White Paper: Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang (22 July 2019).
11 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, p. 92.
12 Ibid., p. 92.
13 Lazar I. Duman, ‘Feodal’nyi institut iantsii v. Vostochnom Turkestane v XVIII veke,’ Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedenia Akademii Nauk SSSR (Moscow, 1935) (Russian), p. 90; Duman, ‘Agrarnaia Politika Tsinskogo (Manchzhurskogo) Pravitel’stva v Sin’tsziane v Kontse XVIII Veka,’ Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR (Moscow, 1936) (Russian), p. 156; Vasily V. Radlov, Narechiya Tyurkskikh Plemen, Zhivushchikh v Yuzhnoi Siberii I Dzhungarskoi Stepi (St Petersburg: Tipografiy Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1866) (Russian), p. 15.
14 Rian Thum, ‘The Uyghurs in Modern China,’ Oxford Encyclopedia of Asian History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 4.
15 Millward, Beyond the Pass, p. 35.
16 For more on the ambiguous relationship between local Muslims and Yakub Beg’s state, see Eric Schluessel, ‘An Uyghur History of Turn-of-the-Century Chinese Central Asia,’ Maydan (10 July 2019).
17 See Millward, Beyond the Pass; S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontiers (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).
18 See B. Gurevich, Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenija v Central’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v. (Moscow: Izdatel´stvo Nauka Glavnaia Redakciia Vostocnoi Literatury, 1983) (Russian).
19 Malik Kabirov, Pereselenie Iliiskikh Uigur v Semirech’e (Alma-Ata: Izdat. AN Kaz. SSR, 1951) (Russian)
20 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, p. 136.
21 Ibid., pp. 140–141.
22 Cited in ibid., p. 142.
23 Ibid., pp. 144–145.
24 For a description of the usul-i-jadid educational system, see Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).
25 Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, p. 9.
26 Cf. Andrew Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 13–33; Lars-Erik Nyman, Great Britain and Chinese, Russian and Japanese interests in Sinkiang, 1918– 1934 (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1977), pp. 19–26; Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, pp. 17–75.
27 Cited in Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, p. 7.
28 David Brophy, Uyghur Nation: Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).
29 See Millward, Eurasian Crossroads; Newby, ‘“Us and Them” in 18th and 19th Century Xinjiang’; Beller-Hann, Community Matters in Xinjiang; Thum, The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History.
30 Brophy, Uyghur Nation.
31 Sean R. Roberts, ‘Imagining Uyghurstan: Re-evaluating the Birth of the Modern Uyghur Nation,’ Central Asian Survey, 28:4, pp. 361–381 (2009).
32 See Brophy, Uyghur Nation, pp. 217–219.
33 Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, pp. 27–29.
34 See ibid., pp. 75–78.
35 Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, pp. 40–41.
36 Ibid., p. 39.
37 Cf. ibid., p. 42; Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, pp. 79–82.
38 Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, pp. 44–46.
39 Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, p. 86.
40 Brophy, Uyghur Nation, pp. 242–243.
41 Ibid., p. 247.
42 Older works, which characterized this as being inspired exclusively by Islam, tended to call it The Islamic Republic of East Turkistan (or TIRET). See Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia; Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944–1949 (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1990). However, as Millward (Eurasian Crossroads, p. 204) points out, the constitution of the Republic referred to the state only as the Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR).
43 Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, p. 86.
44 Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, pp. 121–123.
45 See Allen S. Whiting, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press. 1958), pp. 21–45; Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, pp. 128–158.
46 Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, pp. 103–110.
47 See Brophy, Uyghur Nation, pp. 254–255.
48 See V.A. Barmin, Sinziyan v Sovetsko-Kitayskikh Otnosheniyakh 1941–1949 gg (Barnaul, Russia: Barnaul’skii Gosudarstvenniy Pedagogicheskii Universitet, 1999) (Russian), p. 144.
49 For more on the Soviet policies of Korenizatsiia, see George Liber, ‘Korenizatsiia: Restructuring Soviet Nationality Policy in the 1920s,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 14:1 (1991), 15–23.
50 Brophy, Uyghur Nation, pp. 256–257.
51 See Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, p. 139; Brophy, Uyghur Nation, p. 261.
52 Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, pp. 140–142.
53 Brophy, Uyghur Nation, pp. 263–264.
54 Ibid., p. 254.
55 Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, pp. 157–158.
56 Cf. ibid., pp. 158–159; Barmin, Sinziyan v Sovetsko-Kitayskikh Otnosheniyakh 1941–1949 gg, p. 21.
57 Barmin, Sinziyan v Sovetsko-Kitayskikh Otnosheniyakh 1941–1949 gg, pp. 20–23.
58 Ibid., p. 71. There is also evidence that Soviet agents were sent to Xinjiang to seek out such local resistance groups to support at the same time. In 1946, several Soviet agents of the MVD and KGB were given awards for ‘fulfilling the mission of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in Xinjiang since May 4, 1943’ (ibid., p. 75).
59 Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, pp. 133–135.
60 Benson, The Ili Rebellion, p. 3.
61 Ibid., p. 52.
62 See Shinjang Uch Villyät Inqilabi. (Ürümchi: Shinjang Güz.l Säniät-Foto Sürät Näshriyati, 1994).
63 See the journals Kuräsh (Ghulja, 1945–1948) and Itifaq (Ghulja, 1948–1949).
64 See Linda Benson, ‘Uygur Politicians of the 1940s: Mehmet Emin Bugra, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, and Mesut Sabri,’ Central Asian Survey, 10:4 (1991), 87–113.
65 See Benson, The Ili Rebellion.
66 Ibid., pp. 97–98.
67 Ibid., pp. 100–103.
68 Ibid., p. 109.
69 Barmin, Sinziyan v Sovetsko-Kitayskikh Otnosheniyakh 1941–1949 gg, p. 180.
70 See Benson, The Ili Rebellion, pp. 175–176; Barmin, Sinziyan v Sovetsko-Kitayskikh Otnosheniyakh 1941–1949 gg, p. 180.
71 Donald H. McMillan, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 8–9.
72 Ibid., pp. 46–47.
73 Cited in J.T. Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 94.
74 Thum, ‘The Uyghurs in Modern China,’ p. 11.
75 Rasma Silde-Karklins, ‘The Uighurs Between China and the USSR,’ Canadian Slavonic Papers, 17:2–3 (1975), pp. 354–355.
76 McMillan, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977, p. 92.
77 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, p. 258.
78 Ibid., pp. 251–252.
79 Ibid., p. 252.
80 Ibid., p. 253.
81 Thum, ‘The Uyghurs in Modern China,’ p. 12.
82 Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, China’s Last Nomads: History and Culture of China’s Kazaks: History and Culture of China’s Kazaks (New York: ME Sharpe, 1998), p. 136; Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, p. 261.
83 James Millward and Nabijan Tursun, ‘Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884–1978,’ in S.F. Starr (ed.), Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 94.
84 Sean R. Roberts, ‘The Uyghurs of the Kazakhstan Borderlands: Migration and the Nation,’ Nationalities Papers, 26:3 (1998), pp. 513–514.
85 See J.T. Dreyer, ‘Ethnic Minorities in the Sino-Soviet Dispute,’ in William McCagg and Brian D. Silver (eds), Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 195–226, p. 209; Malik Sadirov, ‘Beguna Tokulgän Qanlar,’ Yengi Hayat (4 June 1994).
86 Cf. Dreyer, ‘Ethnic Minorities in the Sino-Soviet Dispute,’ pp. 208–209; Sadirov, ‘Beguna Tokulgän Qanlar’; Shämsidin Abdurehim-Ughli, ‘Yeqin Otmushning Qanliq Khatirsi,’ Yengi Hayat (28 May 1994).
87 Abdurehim-Ughli, ‘Yeqin Otmushning Qanliq Khatirsi.’
88 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, pp. 264–265.
89 Cf. McMillan, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977, pp. 181–252; Millward and Tursun, ‘Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884–1978,’ pp. 96–98.
90 McMillan, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977, p. 196.
91 Millward and Tursun, ‘Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884–1978,’ p. 97.
92 See Sandrine E. Catris, The Cultural Revolution from The Edge: Violence and Revolutionary Spirit in Xinjiang, 1966–1976 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University; Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest, UMI Dissertations Publishing, 2015).
93 Ibid., pp. 115–118.
94 See Sabit Uyghuri, Uyghur Namä (Almaty: Nash Mir, 2005), pp. 5–6.
95 Catris, The Cultural Revolution from The Edge, p. 181.
96 See ibid.; Uyghuri, Uyghur Namä, p. 6.
97 Silde-Karklins, ‘The Uighurs Between China and the USSR’ provides the estimate of the Han population in 1967, and Stanley Toops, ‘The Population Landscape of Xinjiang/East Turkestan,’ Inner Asia, 2:2 (2000), 155–170 provides the official data from 1953 and 1982.
98 See Sean R. Roberts, ‘Development with Chinese Characteristics in Xinjiang: A Solution to Ethnic Tension or Part of the Problem?’ in M. Clarke and D. Smith (eds), China’s Frontier Regions: Ethnicity, Economic Integration and Foreign Relations (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).
99 Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Colombia University Press, 2010), pp. 52–53.
100 See Abdurehim Tileshüp Ötkür, Iz (Ürümchi: Xinjiang Khälq Näshriyati, 1985); Turghun Almas, Uyghurlar (Ürümchi: Xinjiang Yashlar-Ösmürluar Näshriyati, 1989).
101 See Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, pp. 327–328.
102 See ibid., pp. 325–327. Some reports supporting this view also note that the uprising was only ended by a substantial bombing campaign in the region, which killed scores of local people. See Marika Vicziany, ‘State Responses to Islamic Terrorism in Western China and their Impact on South Asia,’ Contemporary South Asia, 12:2 (2003), 243–262, p. 249.
103 See John Kohut, ‘Xinjiang Separatist Organization’s Extent Examined,’ South China Sunday Morning Post (23 February 1992).
104 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, p. 328.
105 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, p. 56.
106 ‘Record of the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the maintenance of Stability in Xinjiang (Document No. 7)’ (1996).
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 See Sean R. Roberts, ‘Locality, Islam, and National Culture in a Changing Borderlands: The Revival of the Mäshräp Ritual Among Young Uighur Men in the Ili Valley,’ Central Asian Survey, 17:4 (1998), pp. 673–700; J. Dautcher, Down a Narrow Road: Identity and Masculinity in a Uyghur Community in Xinjiang China (Boston, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009).
111 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, p. 333.
112 Ibid., p. 333.
113 See Amnesty International, People’s Republic of China: Gross Human Rights Violations in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (1999) pp. 127–129.
114 See Sean R. Roberts, ‘Toasting the Nation: Negotiating Stateless Nationalism in Transnational Ritual Space,’ The Journal of Ritual Studies, 18:2 (2004), 86–105.
115 Joanne Smith-Finley, The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
116 Ibid., pp. 235–293.
117 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, pp. 184–188.
118 Toops, Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949, p. 20.
119 See Smith-Finley, The Art of Symbolic Resistance.
1 George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress (20 September 2001),’ Our Mission and Our Moment: Speeches Since the Attacks of September 11 (Washington: White House), p. 11.
2 Ibid., p. 10.
3 ‘President Delivers State of the Union Address,’ WhiteHouse.gov (29 January 2002).
4 See UN Office of Drugs and Crime, ‘Introduction to International Terrorism (Module 1),’ University Module Series: Counter-Terrorism (2018), p. 10.
5 Lee Jarvis and Tim Legrand (2018), ‘The Proscription or Listing of Terrorist Organisations: Understanding, Assessment, and International Comparisons,’ Terrorism and Political Violence, 30:2 (2018), 199–215, p. 201.
6 Ibid.
7 See H. Zhao, ‘Security Building in Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,’ in A. Iwashita and Sh. Tabata (eds), Slavic Eurasia’s Integration into the World Economy and Community (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2004), p. 283.
8 Akihiro Iwashita, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Implications for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of “Partnership” after the Post-Cold War Period,’ in Iwashita and Tabata (eds), Slavic Eurasia’s Integration into the World Economy and Community, p. 264.
9 ‘The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism,’ SCO Secretariat (2001).
10 Bates Gill, ‘Shanghai Five: An Attempt to Counter US Influence in Asia?’ Newsweek Korea (4 May 2001).
11 ‘China Pledges to Battle Internal “Terrorism,”’ Agence France-Press (11 November 2001).
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, ‘Spokesperson on East Turkistan National Conference’s Seminar Held on EP’s premises’ (19 October 2001).
13 ‘No Double Standards in Anti-terror Fight, Says China of Domestic Unrest,’ Agence France-Press (11 October 2001).
14 Permanent Mission of the PRC to the United Nations (PMPRCUN), ‘Statement by H.E. Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of Delegation of The People’s Republic of China, At the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly’ (11 November 2001).
15 This document, which is prominently dated 29 November 2001, is both on the webpage of the PRC Mission to the UN and in a journalistic account of the Uyghur terrorist threat (see J. Todd Reed and D. Raschke, The ETIM: China’s Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publishers, 2010)). Neither source provides the provenance of the document, but its presence on the webpage of the PRC Mission to the UN suggests its origin is the PMPRCUN. It may also have come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the State Council Information Office.
16 PMPRCUN, Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Organizations and Their Links with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban (29 November 2001).
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 As evidence of the PRC’s dedication to getting Uyghurs recognized as an international ‘terrorist threat’, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website lists an impressive number of meetings and statements it made about international terrorism in the two months following 11 September 2001. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PR, ‘China Opposes Terrorism’ (2015), www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/3712_665976/, last accessed 19 February 2020.
22 SCIOPRC, ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity’ (January 2002).
23 Ibid. For a later articulation of this same historical narrative, see SCIOPRC, White Paper: The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang (18 March 2019).
24 SCIOPRC, ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity.
25 Ibid.
26 It is noteworthy that the two incidents of bus bombings in Urumqi also constituted the bulk of casualties from all of the explosions described in the document. The bus bombings in Urumqi allegedly killed 12 people combined, and all other explosions taken together allegedly only accounted for 3 deaths.
27 SCIOPRC, ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity.
28 Most of the 22 Uyghurs who were transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2002 from Pakistan and Afghanistan had originally been detained in late 2001. See Richard Bernstein, ‘When China Convinced the US That Uighurs Were Waging Jihad,’ The Atlantic (19 March 2019).
29 See Shirley Kan, ‘US-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for US Policy,’ Report for Congress, RS21995, Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 2004), p. 2.
30 Qiang Chen and Qian Hu, ‘Chinese Practice in International Law: 2001,’ Chinese Journal of International Law (2002), 328–386, p. 334.
31 Dewardric L. McNeal and Kerry Dumbaugh, ‘China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism,’ Report for Congress, RL31213, Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 2002), p. 5.
32 See Kan, ‘US-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation,’ p. 4.
33 US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – China (Includes Hong Kong and Macau), DOS (4 March 2002).
34 Bernstein, ‘When China Convinced the US That Uighurs Were Waging Jihad.’
35 ‘Determination Pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 Relating to the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)’ [FR Doc. 02-22737], Federal Register, 63:173 (19 August 2002), p. 57054.
36 Philipp Pan, ‘US Warns of Plot by Group in W. China,’ Washington Post (29 August 2002).
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 See Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, p. 136.
41 J.A. Kelly, ‘US-East Asia Policy: Three Aspects, 2002 East Asian and Pacific Affairs Remarks, Testimony, and Speeches,’ US Department of State Archive (11 December 2002).
42 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘Exploring the Nature of Uighur Nationalism: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?’ 111th Congress, 1st Session, GPO Document Source: CHRG-111hhrg50504 (16 June 2009), pp. 20–22.
43 See ‘The Guantanamo Docket – A History of the Detainee Population,’ The New York Times (last data changed 2 May 2018).
44 Pan, ‘US Warns of Plot by Group in W. China.’
45 See ‘President Delivers State of the Union Address,’ and Jason M. Breslow, ‘Colin Powell: U.N. Speech “Was a Great Intelligence Failure,”’ PBS (17 May 2016).
46 See Erik Eckholm, ‘US Labeling of Group in China as Terrorist is Criticized,’ The New York Times (13 September 2002); James Dao, ‘Threats and Responses: Diplomacy; Closer Ties With China May Help US on Iraq,’ The New York Times (4 October 2002); Karen DeYoung, ‘US and China Ask UN to List Separatists as Terror Group,’ Washington Post (11 September 2002).
47 Philip T. Reeker, ‘Designation of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement Under UNSC Resolutions 1267 and 1390,’ Homeland Security Digital Library (11 September 2002).
48 ‘Press Statement on the UN Designation of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement,’ US Department of the Treasury (11 September 2002).
49 ‘China Seeks Cooperation Worldwide to Fight “East Turkistan” Terrorists,’ Xinhua (15 December 2003).
50 ‘Interpol Lifts Wanted Alert for Exiled Uygur Leader, Angering China,’ Reuters (24 February 2018).
51 Robert Malley and Jon Finer, ‘The Long Shadow of 9/11: How Counter-terrorism Warps US Foreign Policy,’ Foreign Affairs, 97 (2018), p. 58.
52 A 2010 Congressional Research Services report [see S. Kan, ‘US-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for US Policy,’ RL33001, Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 15 July 2010] claims that a Russian newspaper mentioned ETIM in an article as early as 2000. However, in checking this article’s text (Ibragimov, ‘Pugayuschii Lik Ekstremizma,’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta (3 February 2000)), I found it only mentions that money was given by a wealthy Uyghur in Saudi Arabia to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan with the stipulation that part of the money be shared with Uyghur militants in Afghanistan, nowhere referring to an organization called ETIM.
53 Council on Foreign Relations, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (24 September 2001); Center for Defense Information, In the Spotlight: East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (9 December 2002).
54 Center for Defense Information, In the Spotlight.
55 McNeal and Dumbaugh, ‘China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism,’ p. 8.
56 Gunaratna has been embroiled in multiple scandals regarding his analysis of different ‘terrorist’ threats, especially during the first years after 2001. In particular, he has been criticized for his lack of due diligence in sourcing and his unsubstantiated speculations. See ‘Rohan Gunaratna,’ SourceWatch: Your Guide to the Names Behind the News, www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Rohan_Gunaratna, last accessed 21 August 2019.
57 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 173.
58 Ibid.
59 The two sources on which Gunaratna draws are Jane’s Intelligence Review (Rahul Bedi, ‘The Chinese Connection,’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, 14:2 (February 2002)) and an unlocatable report from the Middle East Institute (presumably a longer version of Julie Sirrs, ‘The Taliban’s International Ambitions,’ Middle East Quarterly, 8:3 (2001), 61–71). In looking at these two sources, it is difficult to understand how Gunaratna came to his conclusions from them when they actually both only offer minimal information about a handful of Uyghur militants in Afghanistan.
60 J. Wang, ‘Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement: A Case Study of a New Terrorist Organization in China,’ International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47:5 (2003), 568–584, p. 569.
61 James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment (Policy Studies No. 6) (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004).
62 See Yitzhak Shichor, ‘Blow Up: Internal and External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese rule in Xinjiang,’ Asian Affairs, 32:2 (2005), 119–136; Davide Giglio, ‘Separatism and the War on Terror in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region’ (PhD Thesis, United Nations Institute for Peace Support Operations, 2004).
63 See Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘Unnecessary Evil: China’s Muslims Aren’t Terrorists. So Why Did the Bush Administration Give Beijing the Green Light to Oppress Them?’ Washington Quarterly, 34:12 (2002), 26–32; Dru Gladney, ‘Xinjiang: China’s Future West Bank?’ Current History 101 (2002), 267–270; Denny Roy, ‘China and the War on Terrorism,’ Orbis, 46:3 (2002), 511–521; Michael Dillon, ‘We Have Terrorists Too,’ The World Today, 58:1 (2002), 25–27.
64 See Adam Wolfe, ‘China’s Uyghurs Trapped in Guantanamo,’ Asia Times (4 November 2004).
65 ‘Chinese Militant “Shot Dead,”’ BBC (23 December 2003).
66 See Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Background Q&A: Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (China, Separatists)’ (2005).
67 ‘Albania takes Guantanamo Uighurs,’ BBC (6 May 2006).
68 TIP, Islam Yolvasi: Häsän Mäkhsum (Arabic) (21 May 2004).
69 Ibid.; TIP Jihad Lands: Turkestan (9 August 2004).
70 Turkistan, A Message of Incitement to Jihad from a Mujahid to the Muslims of East Turkestan (Arabic) (2006).
71 N. Swanstrom (ed.) ‘Special Issue: Terrorism,’ The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4:2 (May 2006).
72 Cf. Yitzhak Shichor, ‘Fact and Fiction: A Chinese Documentary on Eastern Turkestan,’ Terrorism,’ The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4:2 (May 2006), 89–108; C.P. Chung, ‘Confronting Terrorism and Other Evils in China: All Quiet on the Western Front?,’ 75–88; G. Pan, ‘East Turkestan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China’s Post-9/11 Anti-Terror Strategy,’ 19–24; Rohan Gunaratna and Kenneth Pereire, ‘An Al-Qaeda Associate Group Operating in China?’ pp. 55–62, all in Swanstrom (ed.) ‘Special Issue: Terrorism,’ The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4:2 (May 2006)
73 Gunaratna and Pereire, ‘An Al-Qaeda Associate Group Operating in China?’ p. 61.
74 Kenneth Pereire, ‘Jihad in China? Rise of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),’ RSIS Commentary (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2006).
75 Liza Steele and Raymond Kuo, ‘Terrorism in Xinjiang?’ Ethnopolitics, 6:1 (2007), 1–19, p. 17.
76 Martin Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism: Counter-Insurgency, Politics and Internal Security (London: Routledge, 2008).
77 Ibid., pp. 31–54.
78 Ibid., p. 41.
79 TIP, [untitled] – (Abdul Häq’s statement on the Olympics) (1 March 2008).
80 Jake Hooker and Jim Yardley, ‘China Says Plane and Olympic Plots Halted,’ The New York Times (10 March 2008).
81 W.G. Cheng, ‘Terror Arrests in China Draw Concern About Crackdown on Dissent,’ Bloomberg (14 March 2008).
82 Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, ‘Terrorism and the Beijing Olympics: Uyghur Discontent,’ Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 8:8 (2008).
83 Ibid.
84 See StratFor Series: ‘China: Shining a Spotlight on ETIM,’ ‘China: The Evolution of ETIM’ and ‘China: ETIM and the Olympic Games’ (May 2008).
85 StratFor, ‘China: ETIM and the Olympic Games.’
86 TIP, Yunandiki Mubarak Jihadimiz (23 July 2008); TIP, Duniya Musulmanlargha Umumi Murajät (August 2008).
87 See Andrew Jacobs ‘Ambush in China Raises Concerns as Olympics Near,’ The New York Times (5 August 2008); Jonathan Watts, ‘Eight Dead After Bombings in Western China Mars Olympic Opening Weekend,’ The Guardian (10 August 2008).
88 See Thomas Joscelyn, ‘The Uighurs in Their Own Words,’ The Long War Journal (21 April 2009); Thomas Joscelyn ‘Obama’s Uighur Problem,’ Washington Examiner (21 April 2009); Thomas Joscelyn, ‘Rep. Rohrabacher is Wrong About the Uighurs at Gitmo,’ Washington Examiner (18 June 2009).
89 ‘China Identifies Alleged “Eastern Turkistan” Terrorists,’ Xinhua (21 October 2008).
90 Shaykh Bashir, ‘Why Are We Fighting China?’ The NEFA Foundation (July 2008); ‘The Chinese and Pakistani Media are Full of Lies and Accusations,’ NEFA (1 May 2009); ‘On the Occasion of the Communists’ Massacre of Our Muslim Nation in China and in Urumqi (East Turkistan)’ NEFA (9 July 2009); ‘The History of the Movement and its Development (interview with Abdul Häq),’ NEFA (14 March 2009); IntelCenter, ‘TIP-Threat Awareness Wall Chart’ (2008).
91 US Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets Leader of Group Tied to Al Qaida’ (20 April 2009).
92 Andrew McGregor, ‘Will Xinjiang’s Turkistani Islamic Party Survive the Drone Missile Death of its Leader?’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 8:10 (11 March 2010), 7–10.
93 See TIP, Turkistan-al Islamiyyah (Arabic) (2008); Kirk H. Sowell, ‘The Turkistani Islamic Party in Arabic Jihadist Media,’ Sky News (1 August 2010), 1–23. In a commissioned report for Sky News that surveys the content and popularity of this magazine, Sowell suggests that it has been developed primarily to bring attention to the cause of Uyghur independence from China and for fundraising purposes, but he also suggests it has not been very successful in either case. A similar conclusion is reached by Jacob Zenn (‘Jihad in China? Marketing the Turkistan Islamic Party,’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor (17 March 2011)).
94 IntelCenter, ‘Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) Dramatically Steps Up Messaging Efforts’ (1 July 2013).
95 Karolina Wojtasik, ‘How and Why Do Terrorist Organizations Use the Internet?’ Polish Political Science Yearbook, 46:2 (2017), 105–117.
96 See Tania Branigan, ‘Al-Qaida Threatens to Target Chinese over Muslim Deaths in Urumqi,’ The Guardian (14 July 2009), Chris Zambelis, ‘Uighur Dissent and Militancy in China’s Xinjiang Province,’ CTC Sentinel, 3:1 (2010), 16–19.
97 ‘Urumqi Riots: Weapons Prepared Beforehand, Division of Tasks Clear,’ Xinhua (21 July 2009).
98 See Raffaello Pantucci, ‘Turkistan Islamic Party Video Attempts to Explain Uyghur Militancy to Chinese,’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 9:25 (23 June 2010); Peter Nesser and Brynjar Lia, ‘Lessons Learned from the July 2010 Norwegian Terrorist Plot,’ CTC Sentinel, 3:8 (2010).
99 Reed and Raschke, The ETIM.
100 R. Gunaratna, A. Acharya, and P. Wang, Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
101 Ibid.
102 For moderating voices from regional experts, see Chris Cunningham, ‘Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs,’ International Journal on World Peace, 29:3 (2012), 7–50; Michael Clarke, ‘Widening the Net: China’s Anti-terror Laws and Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,’ International Journal of Human Rights, 14:4 (2010), 542–558.
103 Cf: David Kerr and Laura Swinton, ‘Xinjiang, and the Transnational Security of Central Asia,’ Critical Asian Studies, 40:1 (2008), 89–112; Bhavna Singh, ‘Ethnicity, Separatism and Terrorism in Xinjiang China’s Triple Conundrum,’ Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report, No. 96 (2010); Philip B.K. Potter, ‘Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications,’ Strategic Studies Quarterly, 7:4 (2013), 70–92. These articles all have wildly different characterizations of the evolution of ETIM/TIP, which pick and choose from characterizations of these organizations’ history in earlier sources.
1 UN Security Council, ‘UN Consolidated List of Terrorist Individuals and Entities, res. 1267/1989/2253’ (2019).
2 US State Department, ‘Terrorist Exclusion List’ (2004).
3 Recording of interview with Häsän Mäkhsum by Omär Kanat (January 2001).
4 For articulations of this argument, see Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda; Gunaratna, Acharya, and Wang, Ethnic Identity and National Conflict in China; Martin Wayne, ‘Inside China’s war on terrorism,’ Journal of Contemporary China, 18:59 (2009), 249–261. The assertion that the PRC trained Uyghurs to join the mujahidin is most extensively promoted in John Cooley’s book Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 2002), but the author gives no sources for this argument. Gunaratna’s 2002 book on Al-Qaeda that echoes this assertion does so with reference to one brief report from a 2002 Jane’s Intelligence Review report (Bedi, ‘The Chinese Connection’), which cites none of its sources.
5 See TIP, Jihad Lands. It should be noted that the inspiration Mäkhsum received from Abdulhäkim Mäkhsum, who is described in early TIP documents as the founder of the ‘movement,’ has led many sources to erroneously suggest that ETIM was founded by Abdulhäkim Mäkhsum in the 1940s. See, for example, Reed and Raschke: The ETIM, p. 47.
6 For a description of a wider reformist movement in the XUAR at this time and its connections to Jadid traditions see Edmund Waite, ‘The Emergence of Muslim Reformism in Contemporary Xinjiang: Implications for the Uyghurs’ Positioning Between a Central Asian and Chinese Context,’ in I. Beller-Hann, M. Cesàro, and J. Finley (eds) Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007).
7 For more on the Jadid traditions of Central Asia, see Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform.
8 TIP, Jihad Lands.
9 Ibid.
10 Recording of interview with Häsän Mäkhsum by Omer Kanat (January 2001); ‘Uyghur Separatist Denies Links to Taliban, Al-Qaeda,’ RFA (27 January 2002).
11 See TIP, Jihad Lands.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 These details are from an interview with Omer Kanat, who interviewed Qarahaji for almost ten hours in 2004. Kanat was the interpreter for David Cloud who interviewed Qarahaji for The Wall Street Journal (see David Cloud and Ian Johnson, ‘In Post-9/11 World, Chinese Dissidents Pose US Dilemma,’ The Wall Street Journal (3 Aug 2004)).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 ‘Uyghur Separatist Denies Links to Taliban, Al-Qaeda,’ RFA.
19 Cloud and Johnson, ‘In Post-9/11 World, Chinese Dissidents Pose US Dilemma.’
20 Ibid.
21 TIP, Turkistan Mujahidliri Arkhipliridin 36 (October 2017).
22 TIP, Biz vä Jihad Hazirlighi (2009); TIP, Jännät Ashiqliri 5 (2010).
23 TIP, ‘The Structure of the Turkistan Islamic Party’ (10 August 2004).
24 Cloud and Johnson, ‘In Post-9/11 World, Chinese Dissidents Pose US Dilemma.’ It should be noted that the article that appeared in The Wall Street Journal said they had traveled to Kandahar to explicitly meet with Osama bin Laden, but as translator, Kanat remembers the interview differently. He notes that they went to a large meeting with numerous groups in attendance, and Osama bin Laden had been one of the speakers.
25 Omer Kanat, personal communication (August 2019).
26 There is a brief snippet of video footage of Mäkhsum sitting with bin Laden at what appears to be a large feast, and this footage has been reproduced in many TIP videos to emphasize the importance of Mäkhsum. It is likely that this took place at the aforementioned Kandahar meeting of militant groups.
27 For a discussion of Kazakhstan’s use of the ‘Uyghur card’ to obtain concessions from China on a variety of issues, see Sean R. Roberts, ‘A Land of Borderlands: Implications of Xinjiang’s Trans-Border Interactions,’ in S. Frederick Starr, ed, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderlands (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2004), pp. 232–234.
28 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Taliban Temptation,’ Far Eastern Economic Review (11 March 1999).
29 Kariyatil Krishnadas, ‘Chinese Telecom Company Accused of Aiding Taliban,’ EE Times (12 December 2001).
30 Andrew Small, ‘China’s Man in the Taliban,’ Foreign Policy (3 August 2015).
31 See Charles Hutzler, ‘Attack On America: China Engages Taliban While Others Turn Away,’ The Wall Street Journal (2001); Rashid, ‘Taliban Temptation.’
32 Small, ‘China’s Man in the Taliban.’
33 Omär Kanat, personal communication (August 2019).
34 Ibid.
35 See Guantanamo Docket, GTMO Detainee Reports: ‘Arkin Mahmud ISN103,’ ‘Ahmed Tourson ISN 20l,’ ‘Adel Noori ISN 584,’ ‘Abdul Razak ISN 219,’ The New York Times (2005)
36 ‘Summary of Unsworn Detainee Statement, Ahmed Tourson, ISN 201,’ p. 4.
37 Several of the detainees do acknowledge that Häsän Mäkhsum and Abdul Häq were associated with the ‘camp’ in Jalalabad where they stayed. See, for example, ‘Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings for Bahtiyar Mahnut ISN 277,’ pp. 3–4; ‘Summary of Unsworn Detainee Statement, Abdul Ghappar Abdul Rahman ISN 281,’ p. 4; ‘Summary of Unsworn Detainee Statement, Ahmad Muhamman Yaqub ISN 328,’ pp. 7–8.
38 It is possible that these Uyghurs had been sent to this location to revive the remnants of the original site for Mäkhsum’s community prior to being moved to Khost.
39 ‘Summary of Unsworn Detainee Statement, Akhdar Qasem Basit ISN 276,’ p. 3.
40 See Sean R. Roberts, ‘The Uyghurs of the Kazakstan Borderlands: Migration and the Nation,’ Nationalities Papers, 26:3 (1998), 511–530.
41 TIP, Jännät Ashiqliri 5 (2010).
42 TIP, Turkistan Mujahidliri Arkhipliridin 36 (October 2017).
43 Recording of interview with Häsän Mäkhsum by Omer Kanat (January 2001).
44 Omer Kanat, Personal communication (August 2019).
45 Ibid.
46 See ‘Death of a Militant: Boon for Beijing? StratFor (2003); ‘Chinese Militant “Shot Dead,”’ BBC (23 December 2003).
47 TIP, Jihad Lands.
48 ‘Uyghur Separatist Denies Links to Taliban, Al-Qaeda,’ RFA.
49 TIP, Islam Yolvasi (2004).
50 Turkistan, A Message of Incitement to Jihad from a Mujahid to the Muslims of East Turkestan (Arabic) (2006).
51 The suspect document, which is dated 2003 [see TIP, Häsän Mäkhsumning Shahadit Munasiviti Bilän (2003)], is from a 2010 website that TIP itself suggests is a ‘phising’ trap likely established by the Chinese government to track would-be Uyghur jihadists [see TIP, Barliq Tor Ziyarätchiliri Sämigä (2010)].
52 See ‘China Identifies Alleged “Eastern Turkistan” Terrorists,’ Xinhua (2008) for the Chinese government’s official biography of Häq, including his given name. For the 2003 list, see ‘China Seeks Cooperation Worldwide to Fight “East Turkistan” Terrorists,’ Xinhua (2003).
53 TIP, ‘Sheykh Abdul Haq: “The History of the Movement and its Development,”’ Islamic Turkistan (Translation from NEFA Foundation) (2009).
54 Ibid. It is also possible that Häq only claimed this connection to Salafism to benefit the intended readership of his Arabic-language magazine, which was obviously intended for Arab Salafis.
55 Ibid.
56 US Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets Leader of Group Tied to Al Qaida.’
57 Waliullah Rahmani, ‘Has al-Qaeda Picked a Leader for Operations in China?’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, 5:41 (2008), 8–9.
58 TIP, Jännät Ashiqliri 13 (September 2014). This film includes a posthumous biography of Abdulshukur.
59 Ibid. In the film, which honors Abdulshakur, Mansur talks about coming to Afghanistan with the latter in 1994.
60 TIP, Jännät Ashiqliri 8 (2012).
61 Jacob Zenn, ‘The Turkistan Islamic Party in Double-Exile: Geographic and Organizational Divisions in Uighur Jihadism,’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 16:17 (2018), 8–11.
62 TIP, Imani Burch vä Nursrät (June 2009) and TIP, Biz vä Jihad Hazirligi (2009).
63 TIP, Zalim Qankhur Khitay Komunistlirining Ilip Barghan Qanliq Qirgichiliq Munasiviti Bilän, 2009–Yili, 7–Ayning, 8–Kuni (July 2009).
64 See TIP, Imani Burch vä Nursrät (June 2009) and TIP, Khitay Täshviqäti – Zähärlik Täshviqat: Abdullah Mansur Söbät Bilän (September 2009).
65 TIP, ‘Barbaric Massacres of China Will Not Go Unanswered’ (Arabic) (31 July 2009).
66 Raffaello Pantucci and Edward Schwarck, ‘Transition in Afghanistan: Filling the Security Vacuum – The Expansion of Uighur Extremism?’ CIDOB Policy Research Project, Barcelona Center for International Affairs (2014), p. 11.
67 It appears that Abduläziz was named on China’s most wanted terrorist list in 2012 and that his given name is Abdulkuyum Kurban. See ‘Police Names 6 Wanted Terrorists,’ Xinhua (6 April 2012). Apparently, he was killed by a drone strike in 2012, see TIP, Muminlärning Sayahiti 8 (September 2013).
68 See TIP, Muhim Mäsililär Ustidä (June 2011); TIP, Ämir Mäiruf Abduläzizning Talanma Dävätliridin 1–4 (2011); TIP, Firayliq Toghrisida (2011); TIP, Jamaät Bolup Uyushush vä Yalghuz Jihad Qilishning Hökmi (March 2012); TIP, Muminlärning Sayahiti 3 (February 2012); TIP, Jamaät, Hijrät, vä Jihad Häqqidä Qisqichä Chushänchä (June 2012).
69 On Turkish fighters, see TIP, Tükiye’deki Müsülman Kardeshlerimizde Nashihat (Turkish) (July 2012); TIP, Savasin Aslanlari (Turkish) (December 2012); TIP, Horasan’da Kurban Bayrami Cihad Meydanlarinda (Turkish) (November 2012). On Caucasian fighters, see TIP, Nasha Obitel’ Khorasan 1–2 (Russian) (2012) and TIP, Kavkaz Mujahidlirighä Mäktub (2012).
70 See TIP, Jännät Ashiqliri 4 (2010).
71 For more on the significance of using the name Khorasan for these people’s collective place in the global Jihad, see Adam Taylor, ‘The Strange Story Behind the “Khorasan” Group’s Name’, Washington Post (25 September 2014).
72 See TIP, Äziz Vätän Turkistan (May 2012) and TIP, Turkistan Oghlanliri (2012).
73 TIP, Yeqinda Khotän vä Qäshqärdâ Elip Berilghan Jihad Härikätlär Munasiviti Bilän (7 September 2011).
74 ‘Türkistan Islam Çemaati Mücahidi Sehit Muhammed Türkistanin’in Hayati’ (Turkish) Dogu Türkistan Bulteni (31 March 2016).
75 TIP, Muminlärning Sayahiti 1 (3 October 2011).
76 TIP, Turkistan Mujahidliridin Khitay Khälqigä Khät (May 2011).
77 Pantucci and Schwarck, ‘Transition in Afghanistan,’ p. 10.
78 See Nesser and Lia, ‘Lessons Learned from the July 2010 Norwegian Terrorist Plot.’
79 Raffaelo Pantucci, ‘Uyghurs Convicted in East Turkestan Islamic Movement Plot in Dubai’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 8:29 (2010), 5–6.
80 See TIP, Shähid Bulsam (December 2012); TIP, Berding (27 April 2012); TIP, Shärqi Turkistan Musulman Qerindashlirimizgha Näsihät (August 2012); TIP, Äziz Vätän Turkistan (21 April 2012)
81 TIP, Jännät Ashiqliri 13 (2014).
82 TIP, Jännät Ashiqliri 8 (2012).
1 Amnesty International, ‘China’s Anti-terrorism Legislation and Repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,’ Amnesty International (2002), 1–34.
2 Ibid., pp. 19–22. Drawing from unofficial reports, Amnesty documents the criminal sentencing of over 100 Uyghurs on terrorism charges between September and November of 2001, with at least nine receiving death sentences, but it also cites Uyghur diaspora sources claiming that some 3,000 Uyghurs were detained during this period with 20 of them executed and scores more incarcerated.
3 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
4 Ibid., p. 16.
5 UHRP, ‘Prosecution of Uyghurs in the Era of the “War on Terror”’ (16 October 2007), pp. 6–7.
6 See Stanley Toops, Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949 (Policy Studies, No. 1) (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004), p. 20.
7 While not without skepticism, Joanne Smith Finley points out this trend in international scholarship on Uyghurs in the early 2000s. See Smith-Finley, The Art of Symbolic Resistance, pp. 393–394.
8 Toops, Demographics and Development in Xinjiang after 1949.
9 Ibid., p. 20.
10 Doris Ma and Tim Summers, ‘Is China’s Growth Moving Inland? A Decade of “Develop the West,”’ Asia Programme Paper: ASP PP 2009/02 (London: Chatham House, 2009), p. 5.
11 See Scott Radnitz and Sean Roberts, ‘Why the Carrot Isn’t Working, Either,’ Foreign Policy (13 November 2013); Roberts, ‘Development with Chinese Characteristics in Xinjiang.’
12 This argument was famously asserted by Walt Whitman Rostow (The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960)) in his capitalist response to the Communist Manifesto. Rostow’s logic followed the same modernist logic as Marx employed, suggesting that the new economic relations fostered by economic growth would lead to a withering of cultural differences.
13 Nicolas Becquelin, ‘Staged Development in Xinjiang,’ The China Quarterly, 178 (June 2004), 358–378, pp. 364–365.
14 Ibid., p. 370.
15 Ibid., p. 359
16 For international reaction, see UNESCO Mission to The Chinese Silk Road as World Cultural Heritage Route, ‘Mission Report: A Systematic Approach to Identification and Nomination,’ UNESCO (2003), p. 25; Ross Perlin, ‘The Silk Road Unravels,’ Open Democracy: Free Thinking for the World (29 July 2009).
17 UHRP, ‘Living on the Margins: The Chinese State’s Demolition of Uyghur Communities’ (30 March 2012), p. 37.
18 See The Erdaoqiao Bazaar of Urumqi Guide, www.itourbeijing.com (www.itourbeijing.com/china-travel/the-silk-road-guide/the-erdaoqiao-bazaar-of-urumqi.htm), last accessed 10 November 2014.
19 Ildiko Beller-Hann, ‘The Bulldozer State: Chinese Socialist Development in Xinjiang,’ in M. Reeves, J. Rasanayagam, and J. Beyer (eds), Ethnographies of the State in Central Asia: Performing Politics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2014), pp. 173–197.
20 UHRP, ‘Uyghur Language Under Attack: The Myth of “Bilingual” Education in the Republic of China’ (24 July 2007).
21 Ibid.
22 Arienne Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse (Policy Studies No. 15) (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2005), pp. 37–41.
23 Ibid., pp. 46–50.
24 These twelve four-year schools, modeled on similar institutions established far earlier for Tibetans, initially enrolled 1,000 Uyghur students per year, with the intention of having a steady enrollment of 5,000 by 2007. See Yan and Song, ‘Difficulties Encountered by Students During Cross-cultural Studies Pertaining to the Ethnic Minority Education Model of Running Schools in “Other Places” and Countermeasures,’ Chinese Education and Society, 43:3 (2010), 10–21.
25 UHRP, ‘Uyghur Language Under Attack,’ p. 6.
26 Timothy Grose, ‘(Re)Embracing Islam in Neidi: the “Xinjiang Class” and the Dynamics of Uyghur Ethno-national Identity,’ Journal of Contemporary China, 24:91 (2015), 101–118.
27 Ibid., 110–111.
28 Ibid.
29 UHRP, ‘Deception, Pressure, and Threats: The Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China’ (8 February 2008).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 3.
32 Jennifer Tayman, who has studied Chinese-educated Uyghur youth in Urumqi, notes that they felt estranged from others in their ethnic group, but ‘like the rest of the Uyghur community, the Min Kao Han … in Xinjiang were not supportive of the Han presence in the region.’ Jennifer Taynen, ‘Interpreters, Arbiters or Outsiders: The Role of the Min Kao Han in Xinjiang Society,’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 26:1 (2006), 46.
33 Justin Hastings, ‘Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest,’ The China Quarterly, 208 (2011), 893–912.
34 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in their Own Land.
35 Simon Elegant, ‘China’s Curious Olympic Terror Threat,’ TIME (10 March 2008).
36 Hastings, ‘Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest.’
37 TIP, ‘Untitled’ (Abdul Häq’s statement on the Olympics) (1 March 2008).
38 Elegant, ‘China’s Curious Olympic Terror Threat.’
39 Hastings, ‘Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest,’ p. 910.
40 Elegant, ‘China’s Curious Olympic Terror Threat.’
41 Hastings, ‘Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest,’ p. 911.
42 Wang Zhengua, ‘3 Killed, 12 Injured in Shanghai Bus Explosions,’ China Daily (5 May 2008); Gordon Fairclough, ‘Bus Blasts Kill Two in China,’ Wall Street Journal (21 July 2008); TIP, Yunandiki Mubarak Jihadimiz (2008).
43 See ‘China Dismisses Bus Bombs Claim,’ BBC (26 July 2008) for more on the official state denial of Uyghur involvement in the bombings.
44 Geoffrey York, ‘Beijing Busy Welcoming the World as it Turns Away its Ethnic Minorities,’ The Globe and Mail (18 July 2008).
45 Ibid.
46 Hastings, ‘Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest,’ p. 911.
47 Edward Wong, ‘Doubt Arises in Account of an Attack in China,’ The New York Times (29 September 2008).
48 Ibid.
49 Hastings, ‘Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest,’ p. 911.
50 Ibid.
51 UHRP, ‘Deception, Pressure, and Threats,’ p. 2.
52 Ibid., p. 6.
53 UHRP, ‘Massive Rise in State Security Arrests in East Turkestan in 2008’ (6 January 2009), p. 14.
54 Tania Branigan, ‘Ethnic Violence in China leaves 140 dead,’ The Guardian (6 July 2009).
55 Angel Ryono and Matthew Galway, ‘Xinjiang Under China: Reflections on the Multiple Dimensions of the 2009 Urumqi Uprising,’ Asian Ethnicity, 16:2 (2015), 235–255, pp. 235–236.
56 ‘Urumqi Riots: Weapons Prepared Beforehand, Division of Tasks Clear,’ Xinhua (21 July 2009).
57 Jane Macartney, ‘Hundreds Die in Bloodiest Clashes since Tiananmen Crackdown,’ The Times (7 July 2009).
58 See Peter Foster, ‘Eyewitness: Tensions High on the Streets of Urumqi,’ The Telegraph (7 July 2009); UHRP, ‘A City Ruled by Fear and Silence: Urumqi, Two Years On’ (2011), p. 15.
59 Rian Thum, ‘The Ethnicization of Discontent in Xinjiang,’ The China Beat Blog (2 October 2009).
60 Thomas Cliff, ‘The Partnership of Stability in Xinjiang: State-Society Inter actions Following the July 2009 Unrest,’ The China Journal, 68 (2012), 79–105.
61 HRW, ‘Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang’s Protests’ (20 October 2009).
62 Kathrin Hille, ‘Xinjiang Widens Crackdown on Uighurs,’ Financial Times (19 July 2009).
63 UHRP, ‘Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices from the 2009 Unrest in Urumqi’ (2010) pp. 42–43.
64 HRW, ‘Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang’s Protests.’
65 UHRP, ‘Can Anyone Hear Us?’ p. 19.
66 UHRP, ‘Sacred Right Defiled: China’s Iron-fisted Repression of Uyghur Religious Freedom’ (8 March 2013).
67 Shan Wei and Weng Cuifen, ‘China’s New Policy in Xinjiang and its Challenges,’ East Asian Policy, 2:3 (2010), p. 61.
68 Cui Jia, ‘New Measures to Boost Xinjiang Livelihoods,’ China Daily (28 May 2010).
69 Wei and Cuifen, ‘China’s New Policy in Xinjiang and its Challenges,’ p. 62.
70 Cui Jia, ‘Xinjiang Takes a Leaf out of Sichuan’s Book,’ China Daily (21 May 2010); Lisa Zeng Sommer, ‘Xinjiang Enticements,’ Energy Tribune (21 July 2010).
71 Cliff, ‘The partnership of stability in Xinjiang,’ p. 99.
72 Michael Clarke, ‘China’s Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia: Securing a “Silk Road” to Great Power Status?’ China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 6:2 (2008), p. 89.
73 UHRP, ‘Uyghur Homeland; Chinese Frontier: The Xinjiang Work Forum’ (27 June 2012), p. 16.
74 Amy Regar, ‘From Kashgar to Kashi: The Chinese Remaking of Kashgar,’ Huffington Post (17 April 2012).
75 UHRP, ‘Uyghur Homeland; Chinese Frontier,’ p. 19.
76 Andrew Jacobs, ‘Economic Aid Fuels Change of Fortune on Silk Road,’ The New York Times (14 November 2010).
77 Alessandro Rippa and Rune Steenberg, ‘Development For All? State Schemes, Security, and Marginalization in Kashgar, Xinjiang,’ Critical Asian Studies, 51:2 (2019), 274–295.
78 UHRP, ‘Uyghur Homeland; Chinese Frontier,’ pp. 3–6.
79 Ibid., p. 17.
80 UHRP, ‘Living on the Margins,’ p. 29.
81 UHRP, ‘Uyghur Homeland; Chinese Frontier,’ p. 15.
82 Grose, ‘(Re)Embracing Islam in Neidi,’ p. 106.
83 Becquelin, ‘Staged Development in Xinjiang.’
84 Cliff, ‘The Partnership of Stability in Xinjiang,’ p 82.
85 James Leibold, ‘Toward a Second Generation of Ethnic Policies,’ Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 12:13 (6 July 2012).
86 Ibid.
87 Jonathan Watts, ‘China Raises Xinjiang Police Station Death Toll to 18’ The Guardian (20 July 2011).
88 Gulchehra Hoja, ‘Uyghurs “Fenced In” to Neighborhoods in China’s Xinjiang Region,’ RFA (19 August 2016).
89 See UHRP, ‘Sacred Right Defiled.’
90 For a revealing timeline of how violence escalated at this time and further in coming years, see RFA, ‘The Uyghurs: The Fate of a Troubled Minority’ (2015), www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghurtroubled/home.html, last accessed 26 February 2020.
91 Watts, ‘China Raises Xinjiang Police Station Death Toll to 18.’
92 Choi Chi-yuk, ‘Ban on Islamic Dress Sparked Uygur Attack,’ South China Morning Post (2011).
93 Watts, ‘China Raises Xinjiang Police Station Death Toll to 18.’
94 Michael Dillon, ‘Death on the Silk Road: Violence in Xinjiang,’ BBC (3 August 2011).
95 Jason Dean and Jeremy Page, ‘Beijing Points to Pakistan After Ethnic Violence,’ The Wall Street Journal (1 August 2011).
96 TIP, Yeqinda Khotän vä Qäshqärdä Elip Berilghan Jihadi Härikätlär Munisiviti Bilän (August 2011).
97 Ibid.
98 Dean and Page, ‘Beijing Points to Pakistan After Ethnic Violence.’
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 ‘At Least Eight Uyghurs Shot Dead by Chinese Authorities in Xinjiang,’ RFA (19 June 2012).
102 UHRP, ‘Uyghurs Shot to Death in Guma County, Amid Intense State-led Repression’ (29 December 2011).
103 ‘Immigration Tensions Led to Attack,’ RFA (19 February 2012).
104 Ibid.
105 ‘“Hijack Attempt Foiled” in China’s Xinjiang,’ BBC (29 June 2012); Alexa Olesen, ‘Chinese Police Raid Religious School; 12 Kids Hurt,’ Associated Press (6 June 2012).
106 ‘China Jails 20 on Jihad, Separatism Charges in Restive Xinjiang,’ Reuters (27 March 2013).
107 Qiao Long, ‘Korla Under Tight Security After Police Confirm Attacks,’ RFA (7 March 2013); Shohret Hoshur, ‘Suicide Attack on National Day,’ RFA (12 October 2012).
108 See ‘China Official Vows “Iron Fist” Crackdown in Xinjiang,’ BBC (5 July 2012).
109 See for example Alexander Evans, ‘China Cracks Down on Ramadan in Xinjiang,’ Foreign Policy (2 August 2012) and Kathrin Hille ‘China Bans Religious Activities in Xinjiang,’ Financial Times (2 August 2012).
1 William Wan, ‘Chinese Police Say Tiananmen Square Crash Was “Premeditated, Violent, Terrorist Attack,”’ Washington Post (30 October 2013).
2 See Sean Roberts, ‘Tiananmen Crash: Terrorism or Cry of Desperation?’ CNN.com (31 October 2013).
3 ‘CNN Disrespects Itself with Terror Sympathy,’ Global Times (4 November 2013); ‘CNN恶意报道北京“10·28”暴力恐怖袭击案 中国网友群起反击’ (Chinese) CCTV (3 November 2013).
4 Li Qi, ‘Why 140,000 Chinese People Want to Kick Out CNN,’ Washington Post (8 November 2013).
5 TIP, Beijing Tiänänmen Mäydanda Elip Berilghan Jihadi Ämäliyät Toghrisida Bayanat (1 November 2013).
6 Raffaelo Pantucci, ‘Tiananmen Attack: Islamist Terror or Chinese Protest?’ Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 14:1 (2014), 6–8.
7 Robert K. Merton, ‘The Self-fulfilling Prophecy,’ The Antioch Review (1948), p. 185.
8 Ibid., p. 190.
9 Qiao Long, ‘Korla Under Tight Security After Police Confirm Attacks’; Shohret Hoshur, ‘Fresh Clashes Hit Kashgar,’ RFA (26 May 2013)
10 ‘Gasoline Bomb Attack on Police Station in Hotan,’ RFA (12 March 2013); Hai Nan, ‘Second Clash Reported in Xinjiang,’ RFA (26 April 2013).
11 Chris Buckley, ‘27 Die in Rioting in Western China, The New York Times (26 June 2013).
12 Ibid.
13 TIP, Turpan Lukchundä Elip Berilghan Jihadi Ämiliyät Toghrisida Bayanat (July 2013).
14 ‘21 Dead in Xinjiang Terrorist Clashes,’ CNTV (24 April 2013); ‘China’s Xinjiang Hit by Deadly Clashes,’ BBC (24 April 2013).
15 ‘Overview of the Maralbeshi Incident on 23 April 2013,’ World Uyghur Congress (May 2013), p. 1.
16 Ibid.
17 TIP, Maralbeshi Seriqboyida Elip Berilghan Jihadi Ämäliyät Toghrisida (May 2013).
18 Zunyou Zhou, ‘Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization,’ Terrorism and Political Violence, 31:6 (2017), 1187–1209.
19 Catherine Traywick, ‘Chinese Officials ask Muslim Women to Unveil in the Name of Beauty,’ Foreign Policy (26 November 2013).
20 Ibid.
21 Leibold, Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang Region: Ethnic Sorting, Coercion, and Inducement, p. 8.
22 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
23 Shohret Hoshur, ‘At Least 15 Uyghurs Killed in Police Shootout in Xinjiang,’ RFA (25 August 2013) and ‘Up to 12 Uyghurs Shot Dead in Raid on Xinjiang “Munitions Center,”’ RFA (17 September 2013).
24 Qiao Long, ‘Chinese Police Shoot Dead Seven Uyghurs in Kashgar: Group,’ RFA (7 October 2013).
25 TIP, Shärqi Turkistanda Elip Berilghan Jihadi Ämäliyätlär Toghrisida (September 2013).
26 Steven Jiang and Katie Hunt, ‘Five Arrested in Tiananmen Square Incident, Deemed a Terrorist Attack,’ CNN (30 October 2013).
27 ‘China Says 11 Killed in Attack on Xinjiang Police Station,’ Agence France-Press (17 November 2013).
28 Shohret Hoshur, ‘Six Women Among Uyghurs Shot Dead in Xinjiang Violence,’ RFA (18 December 2013).
29 Ibid.
30 Edward Wong, ‘China Executes 3 Over Deadly Knife Attack at Train Station in 2014,’ The New York Times (15 March 2015).
31 Shohret Hoshur, ‘China Train Station Attackers May Have Acted “in Desperation,”’ RFA (3 March 2014).
32 TIP, Kunmingdiki 2-Qetimliq Jihadi Ämäliyät Munisiviti Bilän: Khitaygha Ochuq Khät (March 2014).
33 ‘Train Station Attackers Were Trying to Leave China for Jihad: Official,’ VOA News (5 March 2014).
34 Hoshur, ‘China Train Station Attackers May Have Acted “in Desperation.”’
35 Tania Branigan and Jonathan Kaiman, ‘Kunming Knife Attack: Xinjiang Separatists Blamed for “Chinese 9/11,”’ The Guardian (2 March 2014).
36 Hannah Beech, ‘In China, Deadly Bomb and Knife Attack Rocks Xinjiang Capital,’ TIME (1 May 2014).
37 Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, ‘The Xinjiang Papers: “Absolutely No Mercy” – Leaked Files Show How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,’ The New York Times (16 November 2019).
38 Li Jing and Adrian Wan, ‘Security Tightened After Three Killed in Bomb, Knife Attack at Urumqi Train Station,’ South China Morning Post (1 May 2014).
39 Ibid.
40 TIP, Ürümchi Jänubi Vokzalda Elip Berilghan Pidaiyliq Ämäliyiti Toghrisida Bayanat (1 May 2014).
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Yang Fan, ‘Uyghur Shot Dead by Police in New Attack in Xinjiang,’ RFA (8 May 2014).
44 Shohret Hoshur, ‘Over 100 Detained After Xinjiang Police Open Fire on Protesters,’ RFA (23 May 2014).
45 Ibid.
46 Simon Denyer, ‘Terrorist Attack on Market in China’s Restive Xinjiang Region Kills More Than 30,’ Washington Post (22 May 2014).
47 Andew Jacobs, ‘In China’s Far West, a City Struggles to Move On,’ The New York Times (24 May 2014).
48 ‘Urumqi Car and Bomb Attack Kills Dozens,’ Associated Press (22 May 2014); Jacobs, ‘In China’s Far West, a City Struggles to Move On.’
49 UHRP, ‘Legitimizing Repression: China’s “War on Terror” Under Xi Jinping and State Policy in East Turkestan’ (3 March 2015), p. 7.
50 ‘Xinjiang’s Party Chief Wages “People’s War” Against Terrorism,’ Xinhua (26 May 2014).
51 See Susan Traveskes, ‘Using Mao to Package Criminal Justice Discourse in 21st-century China,’ The China Quarterly, 226 (2016), 299–318.
52 Ibid.
53 Ondrej Kilmeš, ‘Advancing “Ethnic Unity” and “De-extremization”: Ideational Governance in Xinjiang under “New Circumstances” (2012– 2017),’ Journal of Chinese Political Science, 23:3 (2018), 413–436, p. 418; James Leibold, ‘Xinjiang Forum Marks New Policy of “Ethnic Mingling,”’ Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 14:12 (2014).
54 ‘President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC (7 September 2013)
55 Leibold, ‘Xinjiang Forum Marks New Policy of “Ethnic Mingling.”’
56 Ibid.
57 Zhou, ‘Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization,’ p. 4.
58 Ibid.
59 See Gisela Grieger ‘China: Assimilating or Radicalising Uighurs?’ European Parliament Research Service (2014); Ishaan Tharoor, ‘China’s War on Ramadan sees Muslim Students Forced to Breakfast,’ Washington Post (11 July 2014); Barbera Demick, ‘China Imposes Intrusive Rules on Uighurs in Xinjiang,’ Los Angeles Times (5 August 2014).
60 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘China’s “People’s War” Against Terrorism,’ The Diplomat (2 August 2014); Wong Chun Han, ‘“People’s War” on Terrorism in China Turns Lucrative with One Million Yuan Rewards,’ The Wall Street Journal (11 September 2014).
61 ‘The Colourful Propaganda of Xinjiang,’ BBC (12 January 2015).
62 See Tiezzi, ‘China’s “People’s War” Against Terrorism’; Demick, ‘China Imposes Intrusive Rules on Uighurs in Xinjiang.’
63 Edward Wong, ‘To Temper Unrest in Western China, Officials Offer Money for Intermarriage,’ The New York Times (2 September 2014).
64 See Isobel Cokerell, ‘Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation,’ WIRED (9 May 2019).
65 See Ilham Tohti, ‘Present-day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region: Overview and Recommendations,’ ChinaChange.org (2013), trans. Cindy Carter.
66 Edward Wong, China Sentences Uighur Scholar to Life,’ The New York Times (24 September 2014).
67 ‘Counter-Terrorism Law’ China Law Translate (27 December 2015).
68 Ibid.
69 Kavitha Surana, ‘China Tells Citizens to Inform on Parents who “Lure” Kids into Religion,’ Foreign Policy (12 October 2016).
70 Julia Famularo, ‘Chinese Religious Regulations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: A Veiled Threat to Turkic Muslims?’ Project 2049 Institute (8 April 2015), 1–16, p. 5.
71 Denyer, ‘Terrorist Attack on Market in China’s Restive Xinjiang Region Kills More Than 30.’
72 Tom Phillips, ‘Beijing Assembles People’s Army to Crush China Terrorists With an Iron Fist,’ The Telegraph (20 July 2014); Tania Branigan, ‘China Detains More than 200 Suspected Separatists in Xinjiang, State Media Says,’ The Guardian (26 May 2014).
73 ‘Arrests in China’s Xinjiang “Nearly Doubled in 2014,”’ Agence France-Press (23 January 2015).
74 See Darren Byler, ‘Spirit Breaking: Uyghur Dispossession, Culture Work and Terror Capitalism in a Chinese Global City’, (PhD Thesis, University of Washington, 2018), p. 124.
75 See Shohret Hoshur, ‘Four Killed in New Violence, Nine Sentenced to Death in Xinjiang,’ RFA (5 June 2014); ‘Six Killed, Two Injured in Fresh Xinjiang Clashes,’ RFA (11 June 2014), ‘Five Uyghurs Killed in Connection with Raid on Xinjiang Suspect,’ RFA (7 July 2014), ‘Police Officer Stabbed to Death, Another Wounded in Xinjiang Attack,’ RFA (25 June 2014).
76 See Shohret Hoshur, ‘Five Police Officers Killed in Attack on Xinjiang Security Checkpoint,’ RFA (22 June 2014).
77 RFA, ‘The Uyghurs: The Fate of a Troubled Minority’.
78 See Emily Rauhala, ‘China Now Says Almost 100 Were Killed in Xinjiang Violence,’ TIME (4 August 2014).
79 Cf. Rauhala, ‘China Now Says Almost 100 Were Killed in Xinjiang Violence’ and Shohret Hoshur, ‘At Least 2,000 Uyghurs Killed’ in Yarkand Violence: Exile Leader,’ RFA (5 August 2014).
80 Barbera Demick, ‘Deadly Clash in China: An Ambush by Uighurs or a Government Massacre?’ Los Angeles Times (7 August 2014).
81 Bob Woodruff and Karson Yiu, ‘What Happened When I Went to the Alleged ISIS Breeding Ground in China,’ ABC News (29 May 2016).
82 Rauhala, ‘China Now Says Almost 100 Were Killed in Xinjiang Violence.’
83 Shohret Hoshur, ‘Five Dead After Security Checkpoint Clash in Xinjiang’s Hotan Prefecture,’ RFA (30 January 2015);‘Uyghur Man Draws Knife, is Shot Dead by Police,’ RFA (19 February 2015); ‘Hacking, Shooting Incident Leaves 17 Dead in Xinjiang’s Aksu Prefecture,’ RFA (20 February 2015);‘Chinese Authorities Shoot “Suspicious” Uyghurs Dead in Xinjiang Restaurant,’ RFA (13 March 2015);‘Six Uyghurs Die in Village Police Operation in Xinjiang,’ RFA (1 May 2015); ‘At Least Eight Uyghurs Shot Dead by Chinese Authorities in Xinjiang,’ RFA (19 June 2015); Lee Sui-Wee, ‘Police in China Shoot Dead Six in Restive Xinjiang,’ Reuters (12 January 2015);‘Chinese Police Shoot Seven Uyghurs Dead Following Fatal Xinjiang Knife Attack,’ RFA (18 March 2015).
84 Shohret Hoshur, ‘Six Dead, Four Injured in Two Successive Suicide Attacks in China’s Xinjiang,’ RFA (13 May 2015); Eset Sulaiman, ‘Chinese Police Shoot Two Uyghurs Dead in Xinjiang Bomb Attack,’ RFA (28 May 2015); Michael Martina and Ben Blanchard, ‘At Least 18 Chinese are Dead in China’s Western Xinjiang Province after a Ramadan Attack on Police,’ Reuters (23 June 2015).
85 Ben Blanchard, ‘At Least 50 Reported to Have Died in Attack on Coalmine in Xinjiang in September,’ Reuters (1 October 2015).
86 Michael Forsythe, ‘Suspect in Xinjiang Mine Attack Spoke of Jihad, Chinese News Reports Say,’ The New York Times (17 December 2015).
87 ‘Chinese Forces Kill 28 People “Responsible for Xinjiang Mine Attack,”’ BBC (20 November 2015).
88 Forsythe, ‘Suspect in Xinjiang Mine Attack Spoke of Jihad, Chinese News Reports Say’.
89 ‘Xinjiang: The Race Card,’ Economist (3 September 2016).
90 Andrew Jacobs, ‘Xinjiang Seethes Under Chinese Crackdown,’ The New York Times (2 January 2016).
91 Michael Martina, ‘“Violent Terrorism” in China’s Xinjiang Has Dropped: Party Official,’ Reuters (8 March 2016).
92 Byler, ‘Spirit Breaking,’ p. 124.
93 Ibid., p. 50.
94 UHRP, UHRP Briefing: Refusal of Passports to Uyghurs and Confiscation of Passports Held by Uyghurs Indicator of Second-Class Citizen Status in China (7 February 2013).
95 HRW, ‘China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in Xinjiang’ (21 November 2016).
96 ‘Life Sentence for Asylum Seekers,’ RFA (26 January 2012).
97 Kendrick Kuo and Kyle Spriger, ‘Illegal Uighur Immigration in Southeast Asia,’ cogitASIA (24 April 2014).
98 Parameswaran Ponnudurai, ‘Malaysia Hit for Deporting Uyghurs,’ RFA (4 February 2013).
99 Catherine Putz, ‘Thailand Deports 100 Uyghurs to China,’ The Diplomat (11 July 2015).
100 Ibid.
101 WUC, ‘Seeking A Place to Breathe Freely’ (2 June 2016).
102 Ibid., pp. 18–20.
103 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
104 Chelsea Sheasley, ‘Chinese Official: Train Station Attackers Were Trying to “Participate in Jihad,”’ The Christian Science Monitor (5 March 2014); Nadia Usaeva, ‘Chinese Authorities Kill “Religious Extremist,” Detain 21 Others,’ RFA (24 December 2014).
105 ‘China Claims 109 Uighur Refugees Deported From Thailand Planned “To Join Jihad”’ VICE News (12 July 2015).
106 See Nodirbek Soliev, ‘Uyghur Militancy in and Beyond Southeast Asia: An Assessment,’ Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 9:2 (2017), 14–20.
107 See ‘Explaining Indonesia’s Silence On The Uyghur Issue,’ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (20 June 2019).
108 ‘China “Breaks Turkish-Uighur Passport Plot,”’ BBC (14 January 2014).
109 Ibid.
110 Feliz Solomon, ‘China Orders Everyone in One Province to Hand Their Passports Over to Police,’ TIME (25 November 2016).
111 Qiu Yongzheng and Liu Chang, ‘Xinjiang Jihad Hits Syria,’ Global Times (29 October 2012).
112 Lin Mellian, ‘Xinjiang Terrorists Finding Training, Support in Syria, Turkey,’ Global Times (1 July 2013).
113 Jacob Zenn, ‘China Claims Uyghur Militants Trained in Syria,’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 11:14 (2013), 1–7.
114 See TIP, Gheriblirgha Jännät Bolsun #1 (May 2014), TIP, Gheriblirgha Jännät Bolsun #2 (May 2014); TIP, Nadir Surätlär Albumi #3 (June 2014).
115 See TIP, Jisir Shughur Fäthisi (April 2015), TIP, Qarqur Fäthisi (August 2015), and TIP, Äbu Zohur Härbiy Ayrodrom Fäthisi (September 2015).
116 Dima Nassif, ‘The Syrian Village of Zanbaqi is Closer to China than to Damascus’ (Arabic), Al Mayadeen TV (3 September 2015); Mohanad Hage Ali, ‘China’s Proxy War in Syria: Revealing the Role of Uighur Fighters,’ Al Arabiya (2 March 2016).
117 ‘Islamist Group Claims Syria Bombs “to Avenge Sunnis,”’ Al Arabiya (12 March 2012).
118 Zenn, ‘China Claims Uyghur Militants Trained in Syria.’
119 See TIP, Jisir Shughur Fäthisi; TIP, Qarqur Fäthisi; TIP, Äbu Zohur Härbiy Ayrodrom Fäthisi; Sahil Gaptiki Yeqinqi Jänglär Nos. 1–4 (October 2015).
120 TIP, Bugun (July 2015); TIP, Oyghan (September 2015); TIP, Fidayi (October 2015); TIP, Ehdimiz (July 2015); TIP, Diniga Qayt (August 2015); TIP, Hush Mubarak Gheriblar (June 2015).
121 TIP, Aslima (November 2015); TIP, Bizning Ghayimiz (November 2015); TIP, Tosmighin (February 2015); TIP, Nadir Suretlar Albomi, 7–9 (May 2015).
122 See TIP, Bizler Bu Davanin Ordulariyiz (Turkish) (July 2015); TIP, Gharip (Kazakh) (May 2015); TIP, Jenhisttin Sebepteri (Kyrgyz) (2015).
123 Gerry Shih, ‘AP Exclusive: China’s Uighurs Grapple With pull of Extremism,’ Associated Press (29 December 2017).
124 Ibid.
125 Nassif, ‘The Syrian Village of Zanbaqi is Closer to China than to Damascus’; Christina Lin, ‘Will Turkey’s Invasion of Syria Draw China into the War?’ Times of Israel (4 July 2015).
126 Emrullah Ulus, ‘Jihadist Highway to Jihadist Haven: Turkey’s Jihadi Policies and Western Security,’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 39:9 (2016), 781–802.
127 Colin P. Clarke and Paul Rexton Kan, ‘Uighur Foreign Fighters: An Underexamined Jihadist Challenge,’ The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 8:5 (2017), p. 3.
128 Itamar Eichner, ‘Israeli Report: Thousands of Chinese Jihadists are Fighting in Syria,’ YNet News (27 March 2017).
129 Mohanad Hage Ali, ‘A Different Type of Jihadi,’ Carnegie Middle East Center (30 August 2017).
130 Ibid.
131 The schools appear to be well-resourced, and one can access a variety of the textbooks used in TIP schools at the TIP website; see: www.muhsinlar.net/ug/muslim_php.php?muslim_kitap_tur=15&bat=1, last accessed 26 February 2020.
132 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee and Emir Yazici, ‘Counter-terrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang, International Security 44:3 (2020).
1 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944) p. 79.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Leora Bilsky and Rachel Klagburn, ‘The Return of Cultural Genocide?’ European Journal of International Law, 29:2 (2018), 373–396; Robert Van Krieken (2004) ‘Rethinking Cultural Genocide: Aboriginal Child Removal and Settler-Colonial State Formation,’ Oceania, 75:2 (2004), 125–151; Damien Short, ‘Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples: A Sociological Approach,’ International Journal of Human Rights, 14:6 (2010), 833–848; Lindsey Kingston, ‘The Destruction of Identity: Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples,’ Journal of Human Rights, 14:1 (2015), 63–83.
5 Shai Oster, ‘China Tries Its Hand at Pre-crime,’ Bloomberg Businessweek (3 March 2016).
6 Adrian Zenz, ‘“Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude”: China’s Political Re-education Campaign in Xinjiang,’ Central Asian Survey, 38:1 (2019), 102–128, p. 105.
7 Ibid., pp. 113–114.
8 Ibid., pp. 114–115.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 115.
11 Adrain Zenz and James Leibold, ‘Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,’ Jamestown Foundation Chine Brief, 17:12 (2017) 16–24.
12 Ibid.
13 Wu Qiang, ‘Urban Grid Management and Police State in China: A Brief Overview,’ ChinaChange.org (12 August 2014).
14 Ivan Nechepurenko, ‘Suicide Bomber Attacks Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan,’ The New York Times (31 August 2016).
15 Olga Dzyubenko, ‘Kyrgyzstan Says Uighur Militant Groups Behind Attack on China’s Embassy,’ Reuters (6 September 2016).
16 ‘Kyrgyzstan: Chinese Embassy Attack Still Mired in Mystery,’ Eurasianet (5 October 2016).
17 Te-Ping Chen, ‘China Vows to Strike Back Over Embassy Attack in Neighboring Kyrgyzstan,’ The Wall Street Journal (7 September 2016).
18 Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, ‘Securitizing Xinjiang: Police Recruitment, Informal Policing and Ethnic Minority Co-optation,’ The China Quarterly (12 July 2019) p. 10.
19 Ibid., p. 11.
20 James Leibold, ‘Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang Region: Ethnic Sorting, Coercion, and Inducement,’ Journal of Contemporary China (2019) p. 5.
21 Daren Byler, ‘Ghost World,’ LOGIC, No. 7 (1 May 2019).
22 Ibid.
23 Edward Wong, ‘Xinjiang, Tense Chinese Region, Adopts Strict Internet Controls,’ The New York Times (10 December 2016).
24 Oiwan Lam, ‘Leaked Xinjiang Police Report Describes Circumvention Tools as “Terrorist Software”’ Global Voices (29 October 2016).
25 HRW, ‘China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region’ (26 February 2018).
26 Ibid.
27 Leibold, ‘Surveillance in China’s Xinjiang Region’ p. 2.
28 Ibid.
29 ‘Xinjiang Attack: Four “Terrorists” and One Bystander Killed, Says China,’ Reuters (28 December 2016).
30 ‘Chinese Police Kill Attackers After Xinjiang Explosion’ Reuters/Agence France-Press (29 December 2016).
31 Stephen Chen, ‘Chinese Police Out in Full Force After Xinjiang Terror Attack,’ The Star (15 February 2017).
32 Ibid.
33 Nectar Gan, ‘Censure of Officials Sheds Light on Sweeping Surveillance Measures in China’s Restive Xinjiang,’ South China Morning Post (7 April 2017).
34 ‘Xinjiang’s “Open Letter” Drive Forces Uighurs to put Loyalty to China in Writing,’ RFA (2017).
35 Philip Wen, ‘Fellow Uighurs Should Beware of “Two-Faced” People in Separatism Fight, Official Says,’ Reuters (10 April 2017).
36 Eva Li, ‘Show of Force in Xinjiang Sends Hardline Message,’ South China Morning Post (3 January 2017).
37 Ibid.
38 Philip Wen, ‘China Holds “Anti-Terrorism” Mass Rally in Xinjiang’s Uighur Heartland,’ Reuters (17 February 2017).
39 Tom Phillips, ‘In China’s Far West the “Perfect Police State” is Emerging,’ The Guardian (22 June 2017).
40 Ibid.
41 ‘Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification,’ China Law Translate (30 March 2017).
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid. Emphasis added.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Zenz, ‘“Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude,”’ pp. 106–112.
47 Ibid. p. 117.
48 Ibid., p. 116.
49 Cf: Zenz, ‘“Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude”’; Megha Rajagopalan, ‘This is What A 21st-Century Police State Really Looks Like,’ Buzzfeed News (17 October 2017); Tom Phillips, ‘China “Holding at least 120,000 Uighurs in Re-education Camps,”’ The Guardian (25 January 2018).
50 Nathan VanderKlippe, ‘Frontier Injustice: Inside China’s Campaign to “Re-educate” Uyghurs,’ The Globe and Mail (9 September 2017); HRW, ‘China: Free Xinjiang “Political Education” Detainees’; Eset Sulaiman, ‘China Runs Region-wide Re-education Camps in Xinjiang for Uyghurs And Other Muslims,’ RFA (11 September 2017).
51 HRW, ‘China: Free Xinjiang “Political Education” Detainees.’
52 Ibid.
53 Sulaiman, ‘China Runs Region-wide Re-education Camps in Xinjiang for Uyghurs And Other Muslims.’
54 Ibid.
55 Zenz, ‘“Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude,”’ p. 118.
56 Shawn Zhang, ‘List of Re-education Camps in Xinjiang,’ Medium (20 May 2018).
57 Zenz, ‘“Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude,”’ p. 122.
58 Nick Cumming-Bruce, ‘“No Such Thing”: China Denies U.N. Reports of Uighur Detention Camps,’ The New York Times (13 August 2018).
59 ‘Inside the Camps Where China Tries to Brainwash Muslims Until They Love the Party and Hate Their Own Culture’.
60 Nectar Gan, ‘Xinjiang Camps: Top Chinese Official in First Detailed Admission of “Training and Boarding” Centres,’ South China Morning Post (16 October 2018).
61 Shohret Hoshur, ‘Xinjiang Authorities Up Detentions in Uyghur Majority Areas of Ghulja City,’ RFA (19 March 2018).
62 Tenner Greer, ‘48 Ways to Get Sent to a Chinese Concentration Camp,’ Foreign Policy (13 September 2018).
63 Cf: ‘Inside the Camps Where China Tries to Brainwash Muslims Until They Love the Party and Hate Their Own Culture’; David Stavrou, ‘A Million People Are Jailed at China’s Gulags. I Managed to Escape. Here’s What Really Goes on Inside,’ Haaretz (17 October 2019); Chang Xin, ‘Xinjiang Camp Survivor Exposes CCP’s Fake News,’ BitterWinter (28 August 2019); Ferris-Rotman, ‘Abortions, IUDs and Sexual Humiliation’; Eli Meixler, ‘“I Begged Them to Kill Me.” Uighur Woman Tells Congress of Torture in Chinese Internment Camps,’ TIME (30 November 2018); Ben Mauk, ‘Untold Stories from China’s Gulag State,’ The Believer (1 October 2019).
64 See Roberts, ‘Fear and Loathing in Xinjiang’; Stavrou, ‘A Million People Are Jailed at China’s Gulags.’
65 Roberts, ‘Fear and Loathing in Xinjiang.’
66 Ibid.
67 Stavrou, ‘A Million People Are Jailed at China’s Gulags.’
68 ‘Inside the camps.’
69 Erkin Azat, ‘A Letter From a Prison Guard in the Newly Built Concentration Camp in Dawanching,’ Medium (18 May 2019).
70 Stavrou, ‘A Million People Are Jailed at China’s Gulags.’
71 Roberts, ‘Fear and Loathing in Xinjiang.’
72 Azat, ‘A Letter From a Prison Guard.’
73 See Ferris-Rotman, ‘Abortions, IUDs and Sexual Humiliation’; Meixler, ‘“I Begged Them to Kill Me.”’
74 ‘Inside the Camps Where China Tries to Brainwash Muslims Until They Love the Party and Hate Their Own Culture’; Stavrou, ‘A Million People Are Jailed at China’s Gulags’; Meixler, ‘“I Begged Them to Kill Me.”’; Mauk, ‘Untold Stories from China’s Gulag State.’
75 Meixler, ‘“I Begged Them to Kill Me.”’
76 See Ferris-Rotman, ‘Abortions, IUDs and Sexual Humiliation.’
77 Mauk, ‘Untold Stories from China’s Gulag State.’
78 Azat, ‘A Letter From a Prison Guard.’
79 Ibid.
80 Adrian Zenz, ‘Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,’ SocArxiv Papers (12 July 2019), 9–10.
81 Ibid., pp. 9, 11.
82 See: Vicky Xiuzhong Xu (with Danielle Cave, Dr. James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Nathan Raser), ‘Uyghurs for Sale: “Re-education,” Forced Labour and Surveillance Beyond Xinjiang’ (Policy Brief, Report No.26/2020), Australian Strategic Policy Institute (March 2020) and Dake Kang and Yanan Wang, ‘Gadgets for tech giants made with coerced Uighur labor,’ Associated Press (7 March 2020).
83 ‘Journalists from 24 countries visit Xinjiang,’ Xinhua (23 July 2019).
84 Zenz, ‘Beyond the Camps,’ p. 12.
85 Ibid., p. 12.
86 Ibid., p. 3.
87 Zenz, ‘Beyond the Camps,’ pp. 16–18.
88 Xiuzhong Xu, ‘Uyghurs for Sale.’
89 Zenz, ‘Beyond the camps,’ p. 8.
90 Chris Buckley, ‘China’s Prisons Swell After Deluge of Arrests Engulfs Muslims,’ The New York Times (31 August 2019).
91 See Shohret Hoshur, ‘Xinjiang Authorities Secretly Transferring Uyghur Detainees to Jails Throughout China,’ RFA (2 October 2018); Holly Robertson, ‘China Reportedly Begins Mass Transfers of Uighur Detainees from Xinjiang to Prisons Nationwide,’ ABC News (9 October 2018).
92 Phillips, ‘In China’s Far West the “Perfect Police State” is Emerging.’
93 For a particularly good account of this system, see Josh Chin and Clément Bürge, ‘Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China’s Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life,’ The Wall Street Journal (19 December 2017).
94 ‘China Uighurs: Detained for Beards, Veils, and Internet Browsing,’ BBC (17 February 2020); Adrian Zenz, ‘The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing’s Internment Drive in Xinjiang,’ Journal of Political Risk, 8:2 (February 2020).
95 Darren Byler, ‘China’s Nightmare Homestay,’ Foreign Policy (26 October 2018).
96 Timothy Grose, ‘“Once Their Mental State is Healthy, They Will Be Able to Live Happily in Society,”’ ChinaFile (2 August 2019).
97 Steven Jiang, ‘Chinese Uyghurs Forced to Welcome Communist Party into their Homes,’ CNN (14 May 2018).
98 Ibid.
99 Lily Kuo, ‘Revealed: New Evidence of China’s Mission to Raze the Mosques of Xinjiang,’ The Guardian (6 May 2019).
100 Bahram Sintash and UHRP, ‘Demolishing Faith: The Destruction and Desecration of Uyghur Mosques and Shrines’ (28 October 2019).
101 Kuo, ‘Revealed: New Evidence of China’s Mission to Raze the Mosques of Xinjiang.’
102 Grose, ‘“Once Their Mental State is Healthy, They Will Be Able to Live Happily in Society.”’
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 ‘Millions Attend Flag Raising Ceremonies Across Xinjiang,’ Global Times (16 April 2018).
106 Darren Byler, ‘The Future of Uyghur Cultural – And Halal – Life in The Year of The Pig,’ SupChina (6 February 2019).
107 Byler, ‘Xinjiang Education Reform and the Eradication Of Uyghur-Language Books.’
108 Ibid.
109 Adrian Zenz, ‘Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,’ The Journal of Political Risk, 7:7 (July 2019).
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Wong, ‘To Temper Unrest in Western China, Officials Offer Money for Intermarriage.’
113 Eva Xiao, ‘China Pushes Inter-ethnic Marriage in Xinjiang Assimilation Drive,’ Agence France-Press (17 May 2019).
114 See Darren Byler, ‘Uyghur Love in a Time of Interethnic Marriage,’ SupChina (7 August 2019).
115 Ben Dooley, ‘Tear Gas, Tasers and Textbooks: Inside China’s Xinjiang Internment Camps,’ Agence France-Press (25 October 2018).
1 Chris Buckey and Stephen Lee Myers, ‘China Says it Closed Muslim Detention Camps; There is Reason to Doubt that,’ The New York Times (9 August 2019)
2 Eva Dou and Philip Wen, ‘Admit Your Mistakes, Repent: China Shifts its Campaign to Control Xinjiang’s Muslims,’ The Wall Street Journal (7 February 2020)
3 See Ellen Halliday, ‘Uighurs Can’t Escape Chinese Repression, Even in Europe,’ The Atlantic (20 August 2019); Ondrej Kilmes, China’s Xinjiang Work in Turkey: The Uyghur factor in Sino-Turkish Relations, Paper presented at the workshop “Mapping China’s footprint in the world II,” organised by Sinopsis and the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences (2019).
4 Kilmes, China’s Xinjiang Work in Turkey.
5 TIP, Abdulhäq Damollam Bilän Sûhbät (August 2019)
6 Ben Westcott and Robert Roth, ‘UN Members Issue Dueling Statements over China’s Treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,’ CNN (29 October 2019)
7 Ibid
8 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019)
1 S. Frederick Starr (ed.), Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004).
2 See Daniel de Vise, ‘US Scholars Say Their Book on China Led to Travel Ban,’ The Washington Post (20 August 2011).