On 18 May, Tovey explicitly ordered the Suffolk, then patrolling the Denmark Strait, to keep vigilant supervision of the strait. In particular, Tovey emphasized the need to ensure that the area close to the pack ice was well covered. At the same time he instructed Wake-Walker to be on constant alert to reinforce the Suffolk with the flagship Norfolk, if necessary. For the moment, Norfolk was moored at Hvalfjord, just north of Reykjavik on Iceland. On 19 May she weighed anchor with Wake-Walker on board. She was to relieve the Suffolk, to allow the latter ship to bunker fuel oil at Hvalfjord. It was essential that the cruisers had sufficient fuel on board if the Germans were attempting a break-out. In addition to the first cruiser division, Tovey also dispatched a few light cruisers, to patrol the area between Iceland and the Faeroes. The remaining ships of the Home Fleet remained in their bases while Tovey waited for more information about the German activities.¹⁸⁶

Soon Tovey would receive the information he hoped for. Roscher Lund was in Stockholm, as military attaché of the Norwegian government in exile. He was well acquainted with the British naval attaché in Sweden. Lund had also made good contacts with important people in the Swedish intelligence service and on 20 May they leaked the information on the German squadron to Lund.¹⁸⁷ He quickly contacted the British naval attaché, captain Henry Denham, who was dining at a restaurant. Denham rapidly paid the bill and went to the British mission, where they transmitted the important information to the Admiralty in London.

Further confirmation was to follow. In Kristiansand, on the southern coast of Norway, Viggo Axelsson went for an evening walk together with a few friends before having dinner at a club. When they reached a place called Runningen, they halted and looked out upon the sea in front of them. Visibility was excellent and almost immediately they discerned a group of ships at high speed. One man in the party had a small binoculars and Viggo Axelsson asked to borrow it. He could clearly see two major warships escorted by several smaller as well as planes providing air cover. Axelsson returned the binoculars and said it was time to go to the club.¹⁸⁸

In fact, Viggo Axelsson was a member of the Norwegian resistance and had sent information to London several times before. Usually he gave the messages to Arne Moen, a bus driver who took them to Gunvald Tomstad. The latter lived in Flekkefjord, half way to Stavanger, where he had a radio transmitter.¹⁸⁹

As most of the party was unaware of Axelsson’s work for the resistance, he had to create a cover story. He excused himself and said that he had to go back to his office, where he had forgotten something. Once at the office, he wrote an encoded message which he gave to Arne Moen, just before the bus was to depart for Flekkefjord. Late in the evening, Tomstad got the message. He realized it was urgent and transmitted it immediately, without taking his transmitter to some desolate place. Thus, the Admiralty received confirmation of the information sent by Denham and Lund.¹⁹⁰

Tovey was, of course, informed. He was on board his flagship, the King George V, where he had a direct cable to the Admiralty in London. Tovey raised the readiness on his ships, but did not yet make the decision to sail. If the ships sailed too early, they might consume valuable fuel oil unnecessarily and perhaps lack it when urgently needed. Rather, Tovey intnded to direct air reconnaissance as soon as daylight and weather allowed.¹⁹¹

The German intentions were by no means obvious, but the available information suggested that the German squadron would reach Bergen early on 21 May. At least it allowed for a fairly useful direction of the reconnaissance. Lieutenant Michael Suckling took off with his Spitfire from the Scottish air field at Wick and steered towards the southwest coast of Norway. At first he found nothing remarkable. He could see the sea, fjords, bays and Norwegian fishing boats, but no German warships. Still he had fuel for a run over Bergen and nearby fjords. While remaining at high altitude, Suckling steered his Spitfire over Bergen and saw two warships at sea. His aircraft was equipped with special cameras and they performed as expected. On the ground, nobody seemed to notice the small aircraft high up in the sky. When Suckling had taken his photographs, he turned west, towards the open sea. Fifteen minutes later, the air raid alarm was heard in Bergen, but by that time, the British pilot had already covered a significant part of the distance to Wick.¹⁹² As soon as Suckling had landed, the films were taken to the darkroom and developed. They clearly showed a battleship of Bismarck-class, a cruiser of Admiral Hipper-class and several smaller vessels.

The commander of the Home Fleet was promptly informed, as was the Admiralty. Tovey’s quandary over whether or not he should sail was not alleviated by the confirmation that the Bismarck was in Bergen. The weather over Norway and the North Sea rapidly deteriorated and he received no further intelligence. He could not know if the enemy ships remained at Bergen, or if they had already put to sea. If they were heading for the Atlantic, a disaster might follow, as no less than 11 Allied convoys were plodding on the Atlantic.¹⁹³ Tovey decided that Vice-Admiral Lancelot Holland should immediately sail with the Hood, Prince of Wales and six destroyers, to reinforce Wake-Walker’s cruisers in the Denmark Strait. If reports received suggested that the Germans intended to break out between Iceland and the Faeroes, Holland could turn back and within 24 hours he could assume a central position between Iceland and the British Isles. Most of the remaining Home Fleet warships were ordered to remain in Scapa Flow, but at high alert. The light cruisers Manchester and Birmingham, on patrol between Iceland and the Faeroes, were ordered to bunker fuel oil immediately and then resume patrolling. The light cruiser Arethusa, on its way to Reykjavik, was ordered to stay in Hvalfjord after bunkering and be placed at Wake-Walker’s disposal.¹⁹⁴

The Admiralty wanted to mount an air attack on the German ships in Bergen. The Air Ministry concurred. The commander of Coastal Command, Frederick Bowhill, however, wanted to let his staff examine the photographs taken by Suckling, before staging an air attack. Suckling was the only available pilot on the air base at Wick. Again, he had to get behind the controls of his Spitfire, this time to fly to London. When he approached Nottingham at dusk, his fuel was almost consumed. Fortunately, he was close to his home district. He landed outside Nottingham, borrowed a car from a friend and drove in darkness to London, where he delivered the photos. Both the Air Ministry and the Admiralty confirmed the conclusions drawn in Wick.¹⁹⁵

The delay caused by Bowhill’s desire to examine the photographs in person proved disadvantageous. In the darkness navigation became difficult and when the 18 dispatched bombers reached the Norwegian coast, they found it covered by fog. Only two bombers reached the Korsfjord and they saw nothing. The weather deteriorated further during the night. At dawn on 22 May, the clouds were very low, in some cases only 60 metres above sea level. These were poor conditions for a successful air attack or reconnaissance in the Bergen area.¹⁹⁶ Still, it remained vital to establish the whereabouts of the German ships.