1 The consequences became painfully clear to Müllenheim-Rechberg: it would be a long war, and for him personally, it meant a very long imprisonment. Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union also had a profound and immediate effect on the German Navy. From this point, Germany’s war would be predominantly a land war, in which the Navy and Air Force would increasingly become secondary to the Army. The era of large battleships was over.
2 Kriegstagebuch (‘war diary,’ hereafter KTB) Prinz Eugen, 23 May 1941.
3 Also, see S.W Roskill, The War at Sea (London: HMSO, 1954).
4 Tim Clayton and Phil Craig, Finest Hour (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), p. 70.
5 G. Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten im ozeanischen Zufuhrkrieg (Neckargemünd: Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft, 1963), pp. 81-82.
6 Actually, the Deutschland had already slipped by, but the British remained unaware that she was already close to German ports. See Roskill, War at Sea, p. 82, Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 64-66 and 82-85.
7 Stephen Cashmore and David Bews, ‘Against All Odds – HMS Rawalpindi,’ Highland Archives, http://www.iprom.co.uk/archives/caithness/rawalpindi.htm…
8 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 83-87.
9 U. Elfrath and B. Herzog, Schlachtschiff Bismarck– technische Daten, Ausrüstung, Bewaffnung, panzerung, kampf und Untergang (Freidberg: Podzun-Pallas, 1982), p. 6. Note that we have not used the percentages directly, as the overall weight is calculated differently for the British ships. To obtain comparable figures, we have calculated with an overall weight of 41,700 tons.
10 V. E. Tarrant, King George V Class Battleships (London: Arms and Armour, 1999), p. 30.
11 J. Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck (Munich: Kohlers, 1960), p. 115.
12 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 97-98.
13 As it is not possible to directly measure the power output of such machines, it is not surprising that different figures circulate. Figures are rather based on calculations of steam pressure, speed attained and various other factors.
14 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 85.
15 To penetrate armour, the bomb must not only be heavy, it must also strike at sufficiently high velocity, which was attained by dropping it from high altitude. However, the drawback was reduced accuracy.
16 Tarrant, King George V Class Battleships, pp. 25 & 30; H.T. Lenton and J. J. Colledge, Warships of WWII (London: Ian Allan, 1980), pp. 18-21.
17 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 116
18 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 36-41.
19 Although the British ships were fairly similar, as a consequence of the strategic situation, they were used differently.
20 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 124-126.
21 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 126-130; Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 288-290.
22 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 130-134, 146-147.
23 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 134-146.
24 Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939–1945 (London: Greenhill, 1990), p. 163.
25 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 146-148.
26 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 148-156.
27 For details, see Anlage 1 zu flotte GKdos 50/40 A1, ‘Allgemeiner Befehl für die Atlantikunternehmung,’ Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg (hereafter referred to as BA-MA) RM 92/5246.
28 G. Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck (London: Cassell, 1999), pp. 33f.
29 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 33f.
30 KTB Gneisenau, pp. 11-12.
31 KTB Gneisenau, pp. 11-12.
32 The instructions for the communications were given in the document Flottenkommando B.Nr. 10/41 Chefs, 12. Januar 1941, ‘Nachrichtenanordnungen des Flottenkommandos für das Unternehmen Berlin,’ BA-MA RM 92/5246.
33 The operations order is available as an annex to the Gneisenau’s war diary; see KTB Gneisenau, 2. January – 22. März 1941, p. 11.
34 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 49.
35 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 49.
36 Slightly different figures can be found, probably as ‘too poor accuracy’ is partly a matter of judgement.
37 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 54; Elfrath and Herzog, Schlachtschiff Bismarck – technische Daten, pp. 18-22.
38 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 176.
39 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 50-51.
40 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 219f.
41 Robert C. Stern, Battle beneath the Waves: Uboats at War (London: Cassell, 1999), pp. 95-96.
42 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 208-213.
43 KTB Gneisenau, 22–23 January 1941.
44 KTB Gneisenau, 24 January 1941; Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, p. 35.
45 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, p. 35.
46 KTB Gneisenau, 25–27 January 1941; Flottenkommando B.Nr. GKdos 50/41, 21. Januar 1941, p. 3, BA-MA RM 92/5246.
47 KTB Gneisenau, 25–27 Janaury 1941; Flottenkommando B.Nr. GKdos 50/41, 21. Januar 1941, p. 3, BA-MA RM 92/5246.
48 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 36-37.
49 KTB Gneisenau, 27–28 January 1941.
50 KTB Gneisenau, 28 January 1941.
51 KTB Gneisenau, 28 January 1941.
52 KTB Gneisenau, 28 January 1941, also, see the war diary of the machine room, ‘Flottenkommando B.Nr. GKdos 50/41, 21. Januar 1941, BA-MA RM 92/5246,’ p. 41.
53 KTB Gneisenau, 28 January 1941, also, see the war diary of the machine room, ‘Flottenkommando B.Nr. GKdos 50/41, 21. Januar 1941, BA-MA RM 92/5246,’ p. 41.
54 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 37-38.
55 KTB Gneisenau, 28 January 1941.
56 Roskill, War at Sea, p. 373.
57 Roskill, War at Sea, p. 373; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 38-39.
58 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 40 and 43.
59 KTB Gneisenau, 28 January – 1 Februaury 1941.
60 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 40-41.
61 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, p. 165.
62 KTB Gneisenau, 3–4 February 1941.
63 KTB Gneisenau, 3–4 February 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 43-44. Note that Rhys-Jones has given ranges that are not supported by the Gneisenau’s war diary. Probably Rhys-Jones has mixed up angles with ranges, which were given in a somewhat unusual way by the Germans.
64 KTB Gneisenau, 4–5 February 1941.
65 KTB Gneisenau, 4–6 February 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 44-45.
66 KTB Gneisenau, 8 February 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 45.
67 KTB Gneisenau, 8 February 1941.
68 KTB Gneisenau, 8 February 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 46.
69 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 46-47.
70 Roskill, War at Sea, p. 374.
71 The large German surface ships had been given fairly similar silhouettes, making identification more difficult for the enemy.
72 KTB Gneisenau, 9–10 February 1941.
73 KTB Gneisenau, 10 February 1941.
74 KTB Gneisenau, 11 February 1941.
75 KTB Gneisenau, 11–15 February 1941.
76 KTB Gneisenau, 16–19 February 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 49.
77 KTB Gneisenau, 18 February 1941. On the evening of 5 February, the two battleships tested their radar equipment. It was shown that it successfully detected the other ship at ranges up to 18,000 metres. If the angle of the ships was advantageous, detection could be made at ranges up to 22,000–23,000 metres. See KTB Gneisenau, 5
February 1941. On 23 February the Gneisenau’s radar found the Scharnhorst at a distance of 25km; see KTB Gneisenau, 23 February 1941.
78 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 49-50.
79 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 46 and 50.
80 KTB Gneisenau, 20-21 February 1941.
81 The description of the actions on 22 February is based on an annex to the KTB Gneisenau. For some reason, the actions are not described in the regular war diary. The annex is found on page 133 and onwards in BA-MA RM 92/5246.
82 BA-MA RM 92/5246, p. 133f.
83 BA-MA RM 92/5246, p. 133f.
84 BA-MA RM 92/5246, p. 133f.
85 BA-MA RM 92/5246, p. 133f.
86 BA-MA RM 92/5246, p. 133f and KTB Gneisenau 22–26 February 1941.
87 KTB Gneisenau, 28 February 1941.
88 KTB Gneisenau, 28 February 1941.
89 KTB Gneisenau, 28 February 1941; Erfahrungsbericht des Schiffsarztes Marineoberarzt Dozent Dr. Lepel über die Fernunternehmung des Schlachtschiffes ‘Gneisenau’ vom 22. I. – 22. III. 1941, BA-MA RM 92/5346.
90 KTB Gneisenau 26–27 February 1941.
91 KTB Gneisenau, 28 February 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 55-57.
92 One of the aircraft had been sent away on Lütjens’ orders, when the ships sailed to rendezvous with the Adria. The aeroplane had flown to Trondheim, bringing a comprehensive report and plans for the future actions intended by Lütjens. Subsequently, the aeroplane had not been able to return to the Scharnhorst.
93 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945 (Herford: Mittler & Sohn, 1990), vol 17, p. 393 (29 January 1941); KTB Gneisenau, 2–4 March 1941.
94 KTB Gneisenau, 5 March 1941.
95 KTB Gneisenau, 5 March 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 59.
96 KTB Gneisenau, 5–6 March 1941. Also, see report on communications, p. 204 in file BA-MA RL 92/5246.
97 KTB Gneisenau, 5–6 March 1941.
98 KTB Gneisenau, 7 March 1941.
99 KTB Gneisenau, 7 March 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 60-61.
100 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 61.
101 KTB Gneisenau, 7–8 March 1941.
102 KTB Gneisenau, 8 March 1941; Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 375-6.
103 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945, vol. 19, p. 154, 158, 173; RhysJones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 64.
104 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945, vol., 19, p. 173; KTB Gneisenau, 8 March 1941; Rhys-Jones, p Loss of the Bismarck, p. 64.
105 KTB Gneisenau, 8–12 March 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 58 and 64-65.
106 KTB Gneisenau, 12–15 March 1941.
107 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 190-198.
108 KTB Gneisenau, 15 March 1941.
109 KTB Gneisenau, 16 March 1941.
110 KTB Gneisenau, 16 March 1941.
111 Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 376-377.
112 KTB Gneisenau, 19–20 March 1941, Roskill, War at Sea, p. 377; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 67-70.
113 Bidlingmeyer, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten, pp. 190-198.
114 The Scharnhorst had three Arado 196 aircraft, the Gneisenau one.
115 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 126-127.
116 The directive can be found in Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 137-143.
117 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 138 and 152.
118 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 151.
119 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 139-140.
120 See the directive of 2 April 1941, in Brennecke p. 139. In his memoirs, Raeder gives a very positive description of Lütjens’ ability to command operations of the kind envisaged; see E. Raeder, Mein Leben, Band I & II (Tübingen: Schlichtenmeyer, 1956–1957), vol. II, p. 262.
121 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 150.
122 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, p. 44 (4 April 1941).
123 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, pp. 72 and 90 (6 and 7 April, 1941); Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 145; L. Kennedy, Pursuit: The Sinking of the Bismarck (London: Cassel, 2001), p. 28.
124 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, p. 90 (7 April, 1941); p. 73 (6 April, 1941).
125 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 144.
126 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 144-145 and 478.
127 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, p. 115 (9 April, 1941).
128 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, pp. 90, 143 and 163 (7, 11 and 12 April, 1941); Brennecke Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 146.
129 Submarines were different, as they could be protected by bomb proof shelters. The cruisers and battleships were far too large for such buildings.
130 The discussion can be found in Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, pp. 156-159 (12 April, 1941).
131 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, pp. 156-157 (12 April, 1941).
132 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, pp. 156-159 (12 April, 1941).
133 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, pp. 157-158 (12 April, 1941).
134 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, pp. 126 and 137 (10 April, 1941).
135 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, p. 127 (10 April, 1941).
136 Fuehrer Conferences, p. 191 (20 April, 1941).
137 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, p. 298 (21 April, 1941). See also Raeder, Mein Leben, vol. II, pp. 264-266.
138 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, pp. 371-372 (26 April, 1941).
139 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, pp. 371-3722 (26 April, 1941).
140 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, p. 347 (24 April, 1941).
141 The intention to use the period of new moon is also evident in the directive of 2 April; see Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 139.
142 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, p. 347 (24 April, 1941).
143 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 82.
144 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 82.
145 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 149.
146 For more on this, see Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 41-61 and 112-121.
147 Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 8, 293-296.
148 Tarrant, King George V Class Battleships, pp. 30-34.
149 Lenton and Colledge, Warships of World War II, pp. 57-59; Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 268, 298, 307, 382, 396, 421-423, 426, 428-430, 433-434, 440, 491, 534.
150 Roskill, War at Sea, p. 268.
151 R. Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode (London: Faber & Faber, 1948), pp. 20f; RhysJones, The Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 99 and 149.
152 Roskill, War at Sea, p. 396.
153 Roskill, War at Sea, p. 382.
154 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 162-172.
155 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 85-86.
156 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 20, p. 407 (28 April, 1941) and vol. 21, p. 168 (13 May, 1941).
157 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 87, Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 164-166 claims the visit took place on 12 May. However, the Bismarck’s war diary shows that 5 May is the correct date.
158 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 87-88.
159 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 88-89.
160 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 167-169.
161 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 81.
162 L. Kennedy, Pursuit: The Sinking of the Bismarck (London: Collins, 1954), pp. 31-32.
163 Stephen Budiansky, Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II (Penguin, London, 2001), pp. 249-250.
164 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 81.
165 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 34.
166 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 21, pp. 243 and 254 (17 and 18 May, 1941); Brennecke Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 149 and 173.
167 Stephen Roskill, The Navy at War 1939–45 (London: Wordsworth, 1998), p. 126.
168 Budiansky, Battle of Wits, pp. 340-341.
169 Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War:The Secret Story (London: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 206.
170 KTB Bismarck, 18 May, 1941.
171 KTB Bismarck, 18 May, 1941.
172 KTB Bismarck, 18 May, 1941; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 92.
173 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 92; Brenneke, Schlachtschiff
Bismarck, pp. 175-176.
174 Brenneke, pp. 176-178; Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 21, p. 292 (20 May, 1941).
175 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939–1945, vol. 21, p. 272 (19 May, 1941).
176 KTB Bismarck, 19 May, 1941.
177 KTB Bismarck, 20 May, 1941, Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 93-94.
178 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 94.
179 KTB Bismarck, 20 May, 1941, Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 94-95. See also the translator’s remark in B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Slagskeppet Bismarck (Höganäs: Wiken, 1987), in particular on p. 82.
180 See the translator’s remark in Slagskeppet Bismarck, p 82.
181 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 95.
182 Arnold Hauge, The Allied Convoy System 1939-45: Its Organization, Defence and Operation (Chatham, 2001), p. 132.
183 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 135.
184 KTB Bismarck, 20 May, 1941.
185 KTB Prinz Eugen, 21 May, 1941; Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 180-181.
186 KTB Bismarck, 21 May, 1941; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 98.
187 Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 395-396.
188 It has never been fully clear who in the Swedish intelligence service gave Lund the information. British sources claim a Major Törnberg, but no such person served in Swedish intelligence at that time. Possibly it may have been a Captain Ternberg. See translator’s comment in Slagskeppet Bismarck, pp. 82-83.
189 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 35.
190 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 35.
191 Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 35-36.
192 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 12-13; Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 39.
193 JGDC/DLW, Interpretation of Report No. 1490, Public Records Office, Kew, London, Battlefront: Sinking of the Bismarck; Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 41-42.
194 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 44.
195 JGDC/DLW, Interpretation of Report No. 1490, Public Records Office, Kew, London, Battlefront: Sinking of the Bismarck; Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, ‘The Chase and Sinking of the Bismarck,’ Public Records Office, Kew, London, Adm 234/322, pp. 3-4; Roskill, War at Sea, p. 396.
196 Kennedy, p Pursuit, p. 42.
197 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 4.
198 KTB Prinz Eugen, 21 May, 1941. We have presumed that the Bismarck could at most take on slightly more than 8,200 cubic metres of fuel oil (see for example the war diary of the machinery 6 May, 1941). At a speed of 17 knots, the Bismarck had an endurance of 8,900 nautical miles, so the voyage to Bergen represented about 10% of her range. Thus, she must have consumed about 800 cubic metres. She was also 200 tons below her maximum capacity when she left Gdynia.
199 KTB Prinz Eugen, 21 May, 1941; KTB Bismarck, 21 May, 1941.
200 Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945, vol. 21, p. 292 (20 May, 1941).
201 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 101-102.
202 KTB Prinz Eugen, 21-22 May, 1941; KTB Bismarck, 22 May, 1941.
203 KTB Prinz Eugen, 22 May, 1941; KTB Bismarck, 22 May, 1941.
204 KTB Prinz Eugen, 22 May, 1941; KTB Bismarck, 22 May, 1941.
205 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 50.
206 KTB Prinz Eugen, 22 May, 1941; KTB Bismarck, 22 May, 1941.
207 Enclosure to Home Fleet letter 659/H.F.1325 of 30 May 1941, ‘Report of Operations in Pursuit of the Bismarck,’ p. 2, Public Records Office, Kew, London, ADM 199/1188.
208 ‘Report of operations in pursuit of the Bismarck,’ p. 2
209 ‘Report of operations in pursuit of the Bismarck,’ p. 2; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 29-30.
210 Coastal Command, The Air Ministry Account of the Part Played by Coastal Command in the Battle of the Seas. 1939–1942. (Issued for the Air Ministry by the Ministry of Information; London and Tonbridge: Whitefriars Press, S.O. Code No. 70- 411).
211 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 32-33.
212 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 33-34.
213 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 34-35; Sink the Bismarck, documentary, History Channel, HMS Hood Association, http://www.hmshood.com/crew/remember/tedflagship.htm.
214 David Mearns and Rob White, Hood and Bismarck: The Deep-Sea Discovery of an Epic Battle (Channel 4 Books, London, 2001), p. 67.
215 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 34-35.
216 ‘Report of Operations in Pursuit of the Bismarck,’ pp. 2-3.
217 Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, pp. 18-20.
218, Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, pp. 20-25.
219 Ted Briggs, Flagship Hood: The Fate of Britain’s Mightiest Warship, H.M.S. Hood Association, http://www.hmshood.com/crew/remember/tedflagship.htm.
220 Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, p. 68.
221 KTB Prinz Eugen, 22 May, 1941.
222 KTB Bismarck, 22 May, 1941.
223 KTB Prinz Eugen, 23 May, 1941.
224 KTB Bismarck, 22 May, 1941; Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939-1945, vol. 21, p. 323 (22 May, 1941).
225 Lenton Colledge, Warships of World War II, p. 17; Roskill, War at Sea, p. 75; Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 50 and 231.
226 KTB Bismarck, 23 May, 1941.
227 KTB Bismarck, 23 May, 1941.
228 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 112-3; KTB Bismarck, 23 May, 1941.
229 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 112-3; KTB Bismarck, 23 May, 1941.
230 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 113
231 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No 5, pp. 3f.
232 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 43.
233 Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 396-397 and map between these pages; Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 5.
234 Roskill, The Navy at War 1939-45, p. 128.
235 Roskill, The War at Sea, pp. 396-397 and map between these pages.
236 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 38-39; Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 53-55.
237 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 54.
238 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 40.
239 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 40.
240 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 40.
241 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 42.
242 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, p. 104.
243 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 113.
244 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 43; Roskill, The War at Sea, p. 397; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 113-114; Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, pp. 5-6.
245 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 113-114.
246 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 113-114; Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, pp. 5-6; Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 57-58.
247 ‘Report of operations in pursuit of the Bismarck,’ p. 3; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 43-44.
248 Our estimate of the Prinz Eugen’s fuel oil is based on the fact that she had 3,233 cubic metres when leaving Bergen (KTB Prinz Eugen, 21 May, 1941) and 2,466 at 08.00 hours on 23 May (KTB Prinz Eugen, 23 May, 1941). Thus she probably had about 2,100 cubic metres at 20.00 hours on 23 May.
249 Using all her fuel oil capacity of 3 950 cubic metres, the Prinz Eugen could steam at 32.5 knots for 60 hours. See P. Schmalenbach, Kreuzer prinz Eugen unter drei Flaggen (Hamburg: Koehlers, 2001), p. 43. See also previous note.
250 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 209-210.
251 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 209-210; KTB Prinz Eugen, 23 May 1941, Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 115.
252 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, p. 100.
253 Roskill, War at Sea, p. 398, n. 2; Tarrant, King George V Class Battleships, p. 48.
254 R. Hough, The Longest Battle: The War at Sea 1939–1945 (London: Pan Books, 1986), p. 95.
255 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 7; Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 71.
256 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 46.
257 J. H. Wellings, On His Majesty’s Service (Naval War College Press, Newport, 1983), pp. 189 & 197.
258 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No 5, p. 6; Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 106.
259 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, p. 106; KTB Bismarck, 24 May, 1941.
260 Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 71f; Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 106f.
261 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, p. 115.
262 Briggs, Flagship Hood.
263 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 7; Roskill, War at Sea, map between pages 396 and 397.
264 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 7.
265 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 7; Roskill, War at Sea, p. 401.
266 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 7; Roskill, War at Sea, p. 401; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 48; Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 72.
267 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, p. 107; KTB Bismarck, 24 May, 1941.
268 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, p. 107.
269 Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck, p. 117.
270 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 7; Roskill, War at Sea, p. 401; Tarrant, King George V Class Battleships, pp. 30-33.
271 ‘Biography of Bob Tilburn,’ H.M.S. Hood Association, http://hmshood.com/crew/biography/bobtilburn_bio.htm.
272 Briggs, Flagship Hood.
273 Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 80f.
274 Board of inquiry on the loss of HMS Hood, PRO, ADM 116/4352, p. 24.
275 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 121.
276 Briggs, Flagship Hood.
277 Coastal Command, The air ministry Account of the Part Played by Coastal Command in the Battle of the Seas.
278 Board of inquiry on the loss of HMS Hood, p. 25.
279 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 86.
280 It has often been argued that the Hood blew up after a shell penetrated her weak deck armour. The thesis may well have been nourished by the pre-war fear. Still, it seems quite unlikely as an explanation. It seems that the range was about 15,000 metres when the fatal shell was fired. At that range, the Bismarck’s guns needed very little elevation to hit the target, only about 8 degrees and the shell would strike a horizontal surface at an angle of only 10 degrees. At such an angle, it is very difficult to penetrate deck armour. Only if the target had rolled considerably, would a penetration have been possible. It would have been different at the range when the battle was begun, but the disastrous hit occurred when the range had closed to about 10,000 metres. Thus it seems that Holland’s plan worked as intended. Unfortunately the dangers were not over. The Bismarck’s guns fired with higher muzzle velocity than the British guns: for example, the Bismarck fired with a MV of 850 m/s (see Elfrath and Herzog, Schlachtschiff Bismarck – technische Daten, p. 22) compared to the King George V’s 754 m/s (see Tarrant, King George V Class Battleships, p. 31). This meant that the German shells followed a lower trajectory and could penetrate more vertical armour than the British guns, but it also meant that the German shells hit deck armour at a less advantageous angle. The difference between German and British guns should not be exaggerated, but perhaps Holland assumed that the German guns’ ballistic properties were similar to their British counterparts. If so, he probably believed the Germans were able to penetrate the deck armour at a shorter distance than was actually the case, but he may also have underestimated the range at which they could penetrate the side armour.
281 The British turrets were called A, B, X and Y from fore to aft.
282 William, J. Jurens, The Loss of HMS Hood: A Re-Examination; and Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, pp. 199-200.
283 Board of inquiry on the loss of HMS Hood, p. 27.
284 Coastal Command, The Air Ministry Account of the Part Played by Coastal Command in the Battle of the Seas.
285 Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, p. 207.
286 Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 87, 93.
287 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 122-123. Müllenheim-Rechberg does not give the name of the assistant and we have not been able to figure it out.
288 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 121-122.
289 Sink the Bismarck.
290 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 122.
291 Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, p. 207.
292 Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, p. 202.
293 Sink the Bismarck.
294 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 132.
295 Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, p. 127.
296 Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 91-92.
297 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 10; Roskill, War at Sea, p. 407.
298 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 10.
299 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No 5, Map 2; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 76-77.
300 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 67-70; Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No 5, Map.
301 Kennedy, Pursuit – The Sinking of the Bismarck, pp. 108-109; Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 9.
302 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 128.
303 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 128-129.
304 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 257.
305 Jack Taylor, ‘I was there - We found only three,’ H.M.S. Hood Association, http://hmshood.com/crew/remember/electra_taylor.htm.
306 Hough, The Longest Battle, p. 97.
307 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 128-129.
308 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 128-129.
309 KTB Bismarck, 24 May, 1941; Elfrath and Herzog, Schlachtschiff Bismarck – technische Daten, p. 22.
310 KTB Bismarck, 24 May, 1941; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 136-137.
311 KTB Bismarck, 24 May, 1941; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 136-137.
312 KTB Bismarck, 24 May, 1941; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 137.
313 KTB Bismarck, 24 May, 1941; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 136-137.
314 By 08.00 hours on 24 May, Tovey’s ships had covered approximately 600 nautical miles. The distance between Tovey and Lütjens was 300 nautical miles at that time. With the current courses and speeds, Tovey only closed the distance at a rate of one or two knots. At least 150 hours would pass before he could engage. At a speed of 28 knots, 4,600 nautical miles would be covered in 150 hours, a distance exceeding the endurance of the King George V by 50 % at the current speed. As she had already consumed part of her fuel oil, it was an obviously impossible situation. See Roskill, map p. 409; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 133; Tarrant, King George V Class Battleships, p. 31.
315 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 132; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 67- 68.
316 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 135-136; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 76-77.
317 ‘Report of Operations in Pursuit of the Bismarck,’ p. 4; Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 407-408.
318 ‘Report of Operations in Pursuit of the Bismarck,’ p. 4; Roskill, War at Sea, pp. 407-409; Wellings, On his Majesty’s Service, p. 198. Note that all these sources differ as to when the Victorious was detached.
319 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 84.
320 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 83-92.
321 Ludovic, Pursuit, p. 109.
322 KTB Bismarck, 24 May, 1941; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 138-139; Schmalenbach, Kreuzer Prinz Eugen, p. 126; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 90-91; Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 109f.
323 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 111.
324 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No 5, p. 14.
325 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 142.
326 Mark E. Horan, ‘With Gallantry and Determination,’ http://www.kbismarck.com/ article2.html.
327 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 119.
328 Sink the Bismarck.
329 Sink the Bismarck.
330 Sink the Bismarck.
331 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 144.
332 Sink the Bismarck.
333 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 120.
334 Horan, ‘With Gallantry and Determination’.
335 KTB Bismarck, 24–25 May, 1941; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 145.
336 Sink the Bismarck.
337 KTB Bismarck, 24–25 May, 1941.
338 KTB Bismarck, 24–25 May, 1941.
339 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 268-272; KTB Bismarck, 24 May, 1941.
340 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 268-269.
341 ‘Report of Operations in Pursuit of the Bismarck,’ pp. 4-5; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 96.
342 Wellings, On his Majesty’s Service, p. 199.
343 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 97.
344 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 97.
345 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 91 and 97-99.
346 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 284-286; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, pp. 97-98; Roskill, War at Sea, p. 409.
347 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp 284-288.
348 Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 98.
349 Hough, The Longest Battle, p. 104.
350 ‘Report of Operations in Pursuit of the Bismarck,’ p. 5; Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, p. 16; Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 98.
351 ‘Report of Operations in Pursuit of the Bismarck,’ p. 5; Roskill, The War at Sea, pp. 408-410.
352 Tarrant, King George V Class Battleships, p. 83; Roskill, The War at Sea, pp. 408- 409.
353 KTB Bismarck, 25 May, 1941.
354 KTB Bismarck, 25 May, 1941.
355 The positions of the British ships have been taken from Roskill, War at Sea, map after p. 408. The Bismarck’s exact position is not known, as her war diary was lost when the ship sank. The only position available is from the bearings taken when Lütjens’ message was sent.
356 KTB Bismarck, 25 May, 1941; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 160.
357 Kennedy, Pursuit – The Sinking of the Bismarck, pp. 130-131.
358 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 5, pp. 17-19.
359 Kennedy, Pursuit – The Sinking of the Bismarck, p. 130; Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 164-165.
360 Wellings, On his Majesty’s Service, pp. 204-207.
361 Wellings, On his Majesty’s Service, pp. 204-207.
362 Wellings, On his Majesty’s Service, pp. 204-207.
363 An exhaustive discussion on the issue can be found in Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 235-240.
364 Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 130-131.
365 KTB Bismarck, 25 May, 1941; Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 131-132.
366 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 161.
367 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 158. The speech is puzzling in one respect: Lütjens’ claim that he had received orders to proceed to a French port. In fact, he made the decision himself. Perhaps the speech is not correctly reproduced. The only source is the memory of the five German seamen saved by U-74 and the Sachsenwald.
368 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p 165.
369 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 165-166.
370 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 174-175.
371 Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No 5, p. 19.
372 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 164-165.
373 It has been said that the relative in fact was Jeschonnek’s son. If so, his family name differed from his father, as no Jeschonnek has been found in the list of crew members on the Bismarck.
374 Budiansky, Battle of Wits, p. 190.
375 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 168.
376 Roskill, The Navy at War 1939–45, p. 136.
377 Mary Kelly, Secret Mission, Irelandseye, http://www.irelandseye.com/aarticles/ history/events/worldwar/secret.shtm
378 Sink the Bismarck.
379 Bismarck: The Report of the Scouting and Search for Bismarck by Ensign Smith.
380 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 152; Coastal Command, The Air Ministry Account of the Part Played by Coastal Command in the Battle of the Seas, 1939–1942.
381 Philip Vian, Action this Day (London: Muller, 1960), p. 57.
382 Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 155-156.
383 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 182.
384 Horan, ‘With Gallantry and Determination’.
385 Hough, The Longest Battle, p. 108.
386 Kennedy Pursuit, p. 163.
387 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 170-171.
388 Horan, ‘With Gallantry and Determination’.
389 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 177.
390 Hough, The Longest Battle, p. 108.
391 Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, pp. 141f.
392 Kennedy, Pursuit, p, 169.
393 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 175.
394 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 180.
395 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 172.
396 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 170.
397 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 316-327; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 187-193.
398 William H. Garzke and Robert O. Dulin, ‘Bismarck’s Final Battle,’ http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Bismarck_p2.htm.
399 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 316-327; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 187-193.
400 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 316-327; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 187-193.
401 Brennecke, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 316-327; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 187-193.
402 ‘Report of operations in pursuit of the Bismarck’.
403 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 195.
404 Garzke and Dulin, ‘Bismarck’s Final Battle’.
405 Vian, Action this Day, p. 60.
406 Dawn was just beginning when the Maori fired her last torpedoes at a range of almost 9,000 metres. It was virtually impossible to hit at that range.
407 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 226.
408 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 212.
409 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 212-214.
410 Sink the Bismarck.
411 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 222.
412 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 222
413 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 222.
414 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 222.
415 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 200.
416 Sink the Bismarck.
417 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 222-223.
418 Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, p. 204.
419 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 248.
420 ‘WW2 Cruiser Operations,’ http://www.world-war.co.uk/index.php3.
421 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 224-225. When the wreck of the Bismarck was discovered 1989 it was revealed that the parts above the armoured turret of Müllenheim-Rechberg’s instrument had been cut off by a direct hit.
422 The Rodney had two torpedo tubes below the waterline.
423 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 203.
424 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 208.
425 Garzke and Dulin, ‘Bismarck’s Final Battle’.
426 Sometimes, Tovey has been criticized for closing the range rather than fighting at longer range. It has been argued that the trajectories became so flat that the British shells only hit superstructures and the thick side armour of the Bismarck. It has been argued that at longer range the shells might have been able to strike the deck armour at such angles that it could have been penetrated. Such a theory appears shaky. First of all, the range has to be very long to achieve the striking angles needed, with the attendant poor accuracy. Considering the risks posed by German submarines and air power, combined with the grave shortage of fuel oil, a drawn-out battle was clearly undesirable. Furthermore, Tovey did not have the knowledge of the Bismarck’s protection-layout to establish the optimum range for such a tactic. Rather he had to settle for a more reasonable solution. At shorter ranges, the penetration of battleship main guns was so great that armour plates had to be virtually impossibly thick to afford adequate protection. It was thus reasonable to assume that his ships would be able to pentetrate the Bismarck’s main belt at short range. Thus Tovey’s tactic seems reasonable enough. The fact that the Bismarck did not sink is remarkable. Altogether, the Rodney and King George V fired 719 heavy shells and 2,157 lighter shells. It has been estimated that as many as one quarter of them may have hit the Bismarck. If so, it is understandable that Tovey said: ‘This would have sunk a dozen battleships’. If as many as 150-200 heavy shells the Bismarck, it is much more than any battleship sustained. It suggests that the Bismarck’s protection overall must be regarded as very good, an impression confirmed when the wreck was found in 1989.
427 It has not been possible to establish exactly when the event took place, but about, or just before, 10.00 hours seems most plausible.
428 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 259-260.
429 The Battleship Bismarck.
430 Sink the Bismarck.
431 Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 209f.
432 Sink the Bismarck.
433 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 235-236.
434 Sink the Bismarck.
435 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, pp. 239-240.
436 There has been a kind of dispute after the war on what actually caused the Bismarck to sink. From the German side it has been claimed that the crew sunk her, while the British have questioned this and instead emphasized the torpedoes fired by the Dorsetshire. Nevertheless, it seems beyond doubt that the Germans did scuttle their ship. The testimonials from the survivors are unanimous, irrespective of which ship saved them. When the wreck was found in 1989, it provided strong evidence that the Bismarck must have been scuttled. The hull was very well preserved, which means that it must have been completely waterfilled very early on its way down to the bottom of the ocean, or else it would have imploded under the pressure from the surrounding water. A ship that is not sunk by the crew will contain much air, unlike a properly scuttled ship which is quickly filled with water. At depths like 5,000 metres, the pressure from the water is enormous and no hull can withstand such pressure, unless it is filled with water inside. Thus the torpedoes from the Dorsetshire may well have hastened the process, but the Bismarck would nevertheless have sunk.
437 B. Fitzsimons (ed.), Warships of the Second World War (London: BPC Publishing Ltd, 1973), p. 18.
438 Mearns and White, Hood and Bismarck, p. 150.
439 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 254.
440 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 254.
441 Told personally by Walter Fudge to the authors, via email.
442 Sink the Bismarck,
443 Müllenheim-Rechberg, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, p. 263.
444 Walter Fudge, personal correspondence with authors.
445 Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 216.
446 It still remains unclear if it was U-74 that caused Captain Martin to break off the rescue action, or if it was just a mistaken observation. It seems however likely that the cruiser observed by Kentrat was indeed the Dorsetshire.
449 Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 216f.
450 Roger Parkinson, Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: The War History from Dunkirk to Alamein, based on the Cabinet Papers of 1940 to 1942Die Wende im U-Boot-Krieg.