The British efforts to find the Bismarck continued, despite the fact that prospects of success diminished with every hour she proceeded towards St. Nazaire. To return to 25 May, just after the Admiralty erroneously but fortunately interpreted the signal from a German submarine as originating from the Bismarck. Although the bearings taken suggested that the German battleship headed towards France, the situation remained ambiguous, as Tovey persisted in searching further north. Another circumstance complicating the situation was the delays caused when messages were sent. A signal first had to be encrypted, then transmitted, received and decrypted before the content could be of value to the recipient. Thus much time could be lost while information, reports and orders crawled through the system. Furthermore, the delays were not consistent, which meant that one signal could in some cases be received before another, even if the latter had been sent earlier. This could cause serious confusion.
At about 14.30 hours, the Admiralty ordered the Rodney to disregard the previous conclusion that the German battleship headed towards France and instead act according to Tovey’s instructions.370 The origins of this signal have not been established and it is quite surprising, considering that the Admiralty clearly regarded the southern route as the most likely to be followed by the Bismarck. Possibly the Admiralty wanted to reduce the distance between the Rodney and Tovey. However, as Dalrymple-Hamilton had already ordered a northnortheasterly course, the Admiralty’s signal did not induce him to make any alterations, but it did affect Tovey.
While Tovey acted according to the erroneous calculation, further bearings had been taken, which were gradually forwarded to the ships. Aboard the King George V, the staff made new calculations from the original bearings and gradually it appeared that a mistake might have been made. Soon afterwards, at 15.30 hours, the bearings from the German submarine reached the flagship. This information, added to the suspicion that a mistake might previously have been made, prompted Tovey to assume that the Bismarck was in fact heading towards France and he set a course leading to Brest. However, shortly afterwards, he received the signal to the Rodney, instructing her to act according to Tovey’s previous assumption that the German battleship was heading towards the area north of the Faeroes. Thus Tovey abandoned his recently ordered course towards France and turned east, as a kind of compromise between the Faeroes and France. Once more he set a course distancing him from the Bismarck. Ironically, it was the effect of his own orders, which had been delayed, which now struck back against him.
At 16.21 hours, Tovey signalled the Admiralty asking whether it was believed that the Bismarck was making for the Faeroes. This signal indicated that Tovey was no more certain than the Admiralty, and after some consideration the previous order to the Rodney was countermanded. She was again to act according to the assumption that the Bismarck was sailing for France. Unfortunately Tovey lost valuable time while waiting for the reply.371
While Tovey and the Admiralty worked feverishly to bring clarity to the confused situation, the cryptographers worked hard at Bletchley Park to break the Hydra and Neptun codes. Their efforts did not meet with any success and none of the messages sent by the German navy were deciphered in time to affect the operation. However, a few important observations were made. The first was the increased volume of radio traffic from the German naval staffs in France when Lütjens’ squadron had passed through the Denmark Strait. In fact this was due to the simple fact that Lütjens’ squadron had passed the boundary line between Marinegruppe Nord and Marinegruppe West, although the British interpreted it as an indication that the Bismarck was sailing towards France. During the afternoon of 25 May, another observation seemed to confirm that the German battleship had set course for France. Although the Ultra machine was unable to break the code used by the German Navy, it could easily decipher Luftwaffe messages. General Hans Jeschonnek, chief of staff of the Luftwaffe, was in Athens to monitor the German airborne attack on Crete. One of his relatives served as a cadet on board the Bismarck and as Jeschonnek wanted to know if he was expected to arrive in France or Scandinavia, he sent an inquiry encrypted in the ‘red code’.372 Bletchley Park quickly deciphered this message, as well as the reply: that the Bismarck was sailing for a French port, probably Brest.373 This vital piece of information was reinforced by further ULTRA deciphering. A number of Luftwaffe messages showed that air units in France were reinforced, in particular in the area of the Bay of Biscay.374 The Admiralty was informed that intelligence had acquired clear evidence that the destination was a French port, although the circumstances showing how the information had been obtained remained top secret. This was done during the early evening and at 19.34 hours the Admiralty sent a signal to all units that the Bismarck was sailing towards France.
Valuable as this information was, it did not have much impact on the outcome. Tovey waited several hours for the reply from the Admiralty, while still maintaining the eastern course that constituted a compromise between the two alternatives. However, at 18.10 hours, without having received the reply from the Admiralty, he decided that the Bismarck was on her way towards France and set an east-southeast course. When he received the final report from the Admiralty it confirmed his decision and no further mistakes held him back. Unfortunately, the errors made so far had ruined his chances of intercepting the Bismarck, which by now had a lead of at least 80 nautical miles.
At dawn on 26 May most of the British ships that had not yet been forced to break off the operation for lack of fuel, sailed on converging courses towards France. At the same time one of Coastal Command’s new Catalina seaplanes set a southwesterly course to the Atlantic. It had taken off from Lake Erne in Northern Ireland an hour earlier and the first rays of morning light had done little to reassure the crew about their mission. The weather above western Ireland was miserable, with a cloud base varying in altitude from 30 to 300 metres and visibility of 7,000 metres at best, but often down to zero. Conditions hardly improved as the aircraft left the land behind and flew over the open sea, with the crew anticipating yet another boring patrol. The most excitement that they expected was derived from the meals cooked on a small spirit heater, usually consisting of beans and bacon, or the hour long nap on the bunk every fourth hour. None of them believed they would catch sight of a battleship.
In fact, this particular reconnaissance flight was a result of a special request from the commander of Coastal Command, Frederick Bowhill, the same man who had ordered Suckling to London and thus contributed to a delay that allowed the Bismarck to get a head start. Now he had given orders for a mission that was to prove far more profitable than his previous mistake had been detrimental. While most officers within the Admiralty believed Lütjens had decided to follow the shortest route to France, probably Brest, Bowhill found it more plausible that the German admiral would make a more southerly tack, to avoid passing too close to the British Isles. For this reason, he demanded that one of the Catalinas should search south of the shortest route to Brest. The Admiralty accepted.375
Lieutenant Dennis Briggs was captain on the Catalina, but he was not the only pilot on board. A Catalina could remain airborne for 28 hours, so at least two men were needed to pilot the aeroplane in order to make best use of its impressive endurance. Briggs could rely upon Lieutenant Tuck Smith to assist him. Smith was an American pilot who had been detailed to help the British with the new aircraft model. As the United States was not a belligerent nation, Smith’s involvement was quite a sensitive issue, not least in America, where only a few people knew that American airmen participated in missions such as this. ‘If Congress finds out,’ Roosevelt told the Navy airmen, ‘I will be impeached.’376
On numerous occasions, Briggs and Smith had to alter course to avoid flying into zones with very bad weather. Off and on, visibility improved, but above 300 metres it was never good enough. The chances of finding the Bismarck were slight in conditions like these.377
However, Smith was to be lucky during the mission; in fact he may very well have made the most important combat effort by an American officer since the war began. He had been at the controls for about 15 minutes after they reached the search area, when he spotted something through a gap in the clouds. ‘What’s that?’ he asked Briggs, who was sitting next to him.
Briggs straightened himself up in the seat. Before them, perhaps seven nautical miles away, a dark grey shadow could be made out in the haze. Gradually it took on the shape of a major warship. It could very well be the Bismarck.