On board the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen the movements of the British cruiser were anxiously followed with radar and hydrophones. She was invisible to the naked eye, but the instruments all told the same story – the enemy ship first disappeared astern, but soon joined the same course as the German squadron. Soon the signal intelligence on board the Prinz Eugen intercepted a message from the Suffolk. It was coded, but the communications officer, Lieutenant Commander von Schultz, urged his crypto experts to decode it. They did not require much time to break the code. One of them wrote the text of the message on a form and handed it to von Schultz.
The troubled von Schultz hastened to the bridge, where he gave the paper to Brinkmann. A few minutes later a signal lamp flashed on the German cruiser. The message was recorded by a signalman who handed it to Lütjens. A quick glance told the admiral that all hopes of an unnoticed break-out into the Atlantic were dashed. ‘One battleship and one cruiser observed, bearing 20 degrees, distance 13 kilometres, course 240 degrees’ read the intercepted message and everything the German commander knew suggested that the British cruiser was following his squadron at a safe distance.241
Since the ships had been spotted, there was nothing for Lütjens to risk by breaking radio silence. ‘Notify Marinegruppe Nord,’ he said, ‘that we have sighted a British cruiser in this quadrant.’ It was possible that the British message had been intercepted by the German staffs on land too, but as a safeguard Lütjens could just as well confirm it.242 He also instructed his captains that they were allowed to open fire if the enemy cruiser came close enough, or if other enemy vessels appeared.
On board the British cruiser Norfolk, Captain Alfred Phillips had been interrupted in the midst of his supper by the signal received from the Suffolk. Phillips immediately ordered that his cruisers should set course towards the position where the German squadron could be expected, a measure that caused the Norfolk to head more or less directly towards the Bismarck. Phillips and Wake-Walker briefly deliberated on the bridge, but could only conclude that they were in a very dangerous situation. Visibility was poor and Norfolk’s obsolete radar provided scant assistance. It had several wide sectors without any coverage. Hence, the element of surprise might fully favour the Germans.
At 20.30 hours the alarm was again heard on board the Bismarck; her radar had discovered a ship ahead. The dense fog made it impossible to see anything at long range. The radar on the German battleship could give a position accurate enough to open fire, but still accuracy would be less than that allowed by data from the optical instruments. Captain Lindemann decided to hold fire, but ordered his artillery to be ready to fire immediately upon receiving the order to do so.243
As the Bismarck and the Norfolk sailed head to head, the range between them was quickly reduced. ‘Enemy sighted on port side,’ Lindemann informed his crew via the loudspeakers. ‘Battle imminent.’244
Suddenly the fog lifted and the silhouette of the Norfolk was clearly visible from Bismarck’s bridge. The range was only 6,400 metres and Adalbert Schneider did not await instructions. He immediately ordered fire. A violent crash indicated that the Bismarck had for the first time fired her guns in battle.
The crew of the Norfolk had misjudged the position of the enemy ships, and from the bridge Philips and Wake-Walker saw the huge battleship suddenly appear from out of the fog. The Bismarck cut through the waves, creating large cascades of spray and with her guns pointing straight towards the Norfolk. The sight had scarcely sunk in, when an orange blaze flashed through the haze and a huge dark cloud of smoke rose from the Bismarck.
‘Steer hard starboard!’ Phillips ordered. ‘Make smoke!’
The Norfolk had just begun to turn, when columns of water thrown up by the large calibre shells appeared unpleasantly close on the starboard side. A few splinters hit the British cruiser; one of them darted by the bridge, right in front of Wake-Walker and Phillips. A moment later the thunder from the explosions rolled over the ship.
Bismarck fired five salvos at Norfolk, but despite three of them straddling the cruiser, miraculously no shell hit it. Except for insignificant damage from splinters she was unharmed. Subsequently she was protected by the fog.245
With their hearts in their mouths, the crew on board the Norfolk waited until the German ships turned southwest, before beginning to pursue them together with the Suffolk. Meanwhile Wake-Walker reported that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had been sighted. The initial report by Suffolk had not been received on board Tovey’s flagship, but Wake-Walker’s message was heard. Tovey finally became aware of the Bismarck’s position. Even though the Bismarck obviously had almost reached the Atlantic, Tovey found consolation in his previous decision to dispatch Holland’s squadron in advance. His estimates had proved correct and there was still time to halt Lütjens. Tovey himself would not intercept the Germans if they continued southwest, but if they turned south or even southeast matters would look decidedly different. Then he would certainly be in a position to intercept them. As a precaution he decided to increase speed to 27 knots, which was almost the best King George V could do.246 However, if the German ships continued on their present course, only Vice-Admiral Holland had any chance of catching them before they had left the Denmark Strait behind. Tovey’s main hope was that Holland too had heard the signal from Norfolk.
Meanwhile 1st Cruiser Division shadowed the German squadron, while repeatedly reporting on the situation. The weather was fickle. At one moment visibility could be fairly good and the two enemy ships could be discerned as two great towers at the horizon, then they could suddenly disappear in fog, rain or even snow. British chances of bringing the German squadron to battle depended on Wake-Walker’s cruisers and their ability to keep contact with the enemy. Without Suffolk’s radar it would probably have been an impossible task.
With the sudden appearance of the British cruisers, Lütjens had to consider what to do next. The cruisers themselves were hardly a menace to his squadron, which was vastly superior in firepower. The real danger was what British actions would follow on receipt of the information from the cruisers. It is likely that the intelligence Lütjens had received from Marinegruppe Nord played a prominent role in his considerations. In particular the air reconnaissance report from 22 May, which stated that the British battleships were still in Scapa Flow, must have been important. It meant that he should have a great lead if he maintained the present course. He would have plenty of time to shake off the cruisers. When the German ships had reached further south, and the land mass of Greenland no longer restricted manoeuvre, it would be very difficult for the British to force him to battle. Unfortunately Lütjens did not know that he was basing his decisions on an inaccurate reconnaissance report.
Had Lütjens known how close Holland’s force really was, he may have decided upon a completely different course of action. His response to the circumstances as he knew them was to focus on breaking contact with the British cruisers, in order to give the Prinz Eugen a chance to refuel within a few days. He had several options for refuelling and there was no immediate hurry. When the two British cruisers appeared, the Prinz Eugen still had almost two thirds of the oil she had taken on at Bergen.247
Lütjens had three options to choose from. The first was to turn back and steer towards Norway. Since his intelligence suggested that the Home Fleet was still in Scapa Flow, this seemed unsuitable. The distance from Lütjens’ present position to Trondheim was twice as great as the distance between Scapa Flow and Trondheim. An encounter with heavy British ships was very likely if he returned.
A second alternative was to sink the British cruisers. However, they probably had enough of a speed advantage over the Bismarck to escape. The third alternative was to continue according to plan. Prinz Eugen still had enough fuel oil to proceed for another 40 hours if she matched her speed to that of the slightly slower Bismarck. The British ships would probably have to refuel during that period. Lutjens did not know if the British had bunker ships in the Atlantic, but even if they did, they would be forced to break off their pursuit in order to refuel.248
Lütjens’ more immediate concern was the bow radar on the Bismarck, which had been disabled when her 38cm guns fired. The construction had not been able to withstand the violent vibration caused by the heavy guns. Lütjens decided that the Prinz Eugen should move into first place in the squadron, so that full 360 degrees of radar coverage would be restored. The fact that Bismarck was placed closest to the pursuing enemy cruisers was another advantage to the manoeuvre.249
The Prinz Eugen increased speed while Bismarck slowed down and made a slight starboard turn. The two ships were so close that Lütjens could wave to the crew on the cruiser, while he let a message be sent: ‘Admiral to captain: You have a wonderful ship.’
Brinkmann replied and during the brief exchange he sent a sentence that puzzled Lütjens. ‘What do you think about the latest information from Marinegruppe West?’
No messages from Marinegruppe West had been received on board the Bismarck. As the squadron moved through the Denmark Strait it passed from the area of Marinegruppe Nord to the sector for which Marinegruppe West was responsible. It was not surprising that the latter sent reports. Lütjens himself had made a report after the encounter with the Suffolk. The shore staffs ought to be aware that his squadron was about to enter the Atlantic. None of the weather and reconnaissance reports Brinkmann had received gave any notable information. What really worried Lütjens was the fact that the radio messages had not been intercepted by the radio receivers on the battleship, which suggested that some technical deficiency might rob him of vital information. This problem was to recur several times during the days that followed.
While the ships were in the midst of changing position, the Bismarck’s rudder unexpectedly jammed at a very inconvenient angle and the battleship began to veer off towards the Prinz Eugen. Brinkmann quickly realized what was about to happen, but while the cruiser travelled at full speed, as she did for the moment, regulations did not allow for radical shifts of the helm, for safety reasons. In the sudden emergency Brinkmann disregarded the regulations and ordered the helm to be shifted as far as possible so that Prinz Eugen turned away from the Bismarck.250
Soon the cruiser was in the lead. The Bismarck had moved behind and was keeping an eye on the two British cruisers, assisted by her stern radar. The two British ships could be discerned only sporadically by the Germans. The Suffolk sailed westward and was usually visible; the Norfolk could only occasionally be glimpsed behind the increasingly frequent snow squalls. Sometime before midnight, Lütjens decided to try attacking the shadowing cruisers and began a 180 degree turn, to meet them head on. The manoeuvre did not meet with success. The bow radar was inoperable, so the battleship could not track the enemy ships during the turn and as she broke through the squalls where Lütjens expected to find the cruisers, the sea was empty. He ordered another 180 degrees turn, to bring the battleship back to its previous course. Soon the echoes on her aft radar appeared again, showing that the British cruisers remained behind him, but kept a healthy distance. The behaviour of the British ships during this incident provided some confirmation to the suspicions held by the German Navy that not only were the British ships equipped with radar, but that it was a very sophisticated system. If this suspicion were true, the strategy of cruiser warfare against British shipping had to be completely reassessed.
All information available to Lütjens suggested he should continue on the southwesterly course. Forecasts and general knowledge about the climate in the region indicated that poor weather could be expected and as the squadron reached further south, the nights would be longer. The Bismarck was capable of such high speed that the pursuing cruisers could ill afford any mistakes. If they lost contact even for a brief moment they would have to set an accurate course almost immediately. With a speed advantage of one or two knots, they would only have to set a course that was just a few degrees off, and the distance to the German squadron would increase. As long as pursued as well as pursuer were confined to the narrow Denmark Strait, there was little room for manoeuvre. But further to the south, Lütjens would get more freedom of action.