On board the Bismarck, engineers, damage control parties and others worked to establish a correct picture of the damage inflicted upon her. Then they would have to deal with it. As already mentioned, the hit in the bow was the most serious, as there was a risk that the bulkhead astern of the compartment could not withstand the pressure caused when water flowed in at high speed. A flooding-control party was ordered to construct some kind of support for the bulkhead, which would enable the ship to steam at full speed. Also, attempts at making the oil in the compartment ahead of the hit available, were made. Lieutenant Karl-Ludwig Richter led a few damage-control groups who tried to use the emergency exits to make their way to the foremost compartment. Once there, they might be able to switch on the pumps and pump the oil to other fuel oil tanks, further astern in the ship. Unfortunately, the pumps turned out to be submerged, and the attempt failed. It was proposed that the pumps in section XVII could be used, by connecting hoses to the forward section. This attempt was also unsuccessful, and it became apparent that the valves to the oil pipes in the forecastle had been damaged as well.306
The hits had resulted in a few thousand tons of water leaking into the hull at the bow and on the port side, so that the starboard propeller was partly above the surface of the sea. Chief engine-room artificer Wilhelm Schmidt was ordered to fill the trim tanks, to restore trim. The manoeuvre was uncomplicated and could swiftly be carried out. A more worrisome problem was the fact that oil poured out from the hit fuel tank in compartment XXI and left a visible trail after the battleship. It might help the British pursuers to find the Bismarck, if they were to lose contact.307
No one on the Bismarck had been killed or severely wounded during the battle. All weapons were still fully combat-ready. Ammunition expenditure comprised 93 38-centimetre shells, equal to about one tenth of the overall supply. Similarly, the armour was completely unharmed and the machinery in perfect order. The German battleship remained a formidable opponent if the British should again try to engage her and all the available evidence suggests that the crew remained confident in their ship.308
Regardless of the feelings of the crew, Lütjens was probably more worried. In his directive for the operation, he had emphasized the need to minimize risks, and the recent battle in the Denmark Strait had clearly shown the dangers inherent in combat with equal opponents. Even though the few hits had been relatively harmless, the operation had to be discontinued. This necessity confirmed the wisdom of the ideas underlying the directive.
In the morning, Lütjens ordered his two ships to exchange places, to allow the officers on the cruiser to study the trail of oil left behind by the Bismarck. The manoeuvre lasted for approximately 40 minutes, whereupon the ships resumed their positions. Immediately afterwards, Captain Brinkmann give his report, which was disquieting. The trail of oil was wide and could hardly escape the British. In daylight it would be very difficult to shake off the pursuers.
There remained one option that Lütjens had not yet tried. During Operation Berlin, he had attempted to cooperate with the submarines, but it had been difficult. This time prospects seemed better. As Dönitz’s headquarters had monitored the radio transmission made by Lütjens, he knew the position of the German squadron. Submarines could be directed to the area where Lütjens and the shadowing enemies were expected to pass. Furthermore, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were soon to enter an area where many submarines operated.309
Lütjens wanted the submarine command to organize a line of submarines right across the course presently held by his squadron, at about the same longitude as the southern tip of Greenland. Hopefully the submarines would be able to attack the pursuing British ships on the morning of 25 May. From this request it can be inferred that Lütjens intended to continue on the southwesterly course, which suggests that he did not regard the fuel oil situation as critical. If he continued the present course for another 12 to 24 hours, his ships would travel far to the west, thus requiring the Bismarck to use the oil in the bow, or bunker from a tanker at sea.310
If Lütjens was not yet unduly concerned about the Bismarck’s fuel situation, he was surely well aware of the limited endurance of the Prinz Eugen. It was very important that the cruiser could be detached as soon as an opportunity was given, to allow her to rendezvous with a tanker. At 15.20 hours, Lütjens sent a message to the Prinz Eugen by signal lamp. The message contained instructions for the detachment. During the next rain squall the Bismarck would turn west, while the Prinz Eugen continued south. The British attention was mainly directed on the Bismarck, which sailed behind the cruiser, and would probably follow the battleship as she sheered to starboard. Conditions seemed favourable to an unnoticed detaching of the cruiser, but success would be dependent on the effectiveness of the British radar. In any case the Prinz Eugen was to maintain her southerly course for another three hours. Unless she had to sheer due to some unforeseen event, she would manage to evade the pursuers. If successful, she could set course for the Belchen or Lothringen to bunker fuel oil. Thereafter, she could go after convoys on her own. The scheme was to be set in motion upon receipt of the code word ‘Hood’.311
Lütjens’ plans were facilitated by the changed weather from noon onwards. The sea became rougher. Rain squalls were succeeded by fog. An attempt to detach the Prinz Eugen seemed quite likely to succeed, even before dusk. However, before the plans were realized, two things happened. The first was a reduction of speed, to 24 knots, by the German squadron. The second was change of course, to south. Speed was reduced to aid the work of the damage control parties in the bow. The change of course is more difficult to explain, as it meant that Lütjens’ ships would pass east of the submarine line that was forming. Perhaps Lütjens wanted to increase the distance to Greenland, to create more room for manoeuvre before trying to detach the cruiser. If so, the change of course was probably intended to be temporary.312
In the poor weather, Lütjens decided to attempt to detach the cruiser. The ships approached a rain squall and at 16.40 hours, the signalmen on board the Prinz Eugen could report that the flagship had sent the message ‘Carry out Hood’. According to the plan, the Bismarck sheered west and soon she could not be seen, but the enemy nevertheless maintained contact. Only a few minutes later the Bismarck could again be seen from the Prinz Eugen and a signal lamp on the flagship flashed ‘cruiser on starboard’. Evidently, the rain squall was not heavy enough, but further opportunities were likely to occur.
In the meantime, Admiral Tovey was troubled by the unfolding of events. Unlike Lütjens, he did not lack vital information. In fact, his awareness of the situation was fairly complete. Unfortunately, the facts available to him were not encouraging. With the course and speed maintained by the Germans, he slowly shortened the distance to the enemy. If the Germans became aware of his position, perhaps by a German submarine observing his ships, Lütjens would be able to increase the distance. As if this was not bad enough, all calculations of the distance, speed, course and the fuel consumption of the British ships indicated that they would run out of fuel oil before catching the Germans.313
There were only two things Tovey could hope for. The first was that damage sustained in the battle would force the Germans to turn; the second was that they would be forced to find a tanker to bunker fuel oil from, whereupon perhaps British ships could surprise them. For the moment nothing suggested that any of these scenarios were likely. A Sunderland seaplane reported that the Bismarck left oil behind her, but initially no conclusions were inferred from this observation. Towards the afternoon, the British did begin to nurture hopes that there was at least something wrong with the Bismarck. There was no suggestion that she had suffered severe damage, but her trail of oil provided some hope.314
Meanwhile, Force H was heading north from Gibraltar, but Admiral Somerville’s ships could only cover one of many alternatives that the Admiralty had to consider as German options. Other ships were much closer to the main action. The Ramillies had sailed at a paltry speed of 8 knots when she received the signal from the Admiralty instructing her to leave convoy HX127 and take part in the hunt for the German ships. If the old battleship was to reach the 18 knots ordered, she would have to raise steam pressure rapidly, thus emitting large clouds of dark smoke which would be clearly visible at considerable distances. Captain Read had sharply criticized many of the merchant ships for doing precisely this, because the smoke could easily be seen from enemy submarines. Now he had to engage in the same sort of behaviour himself and he realized than many commanders on board the freighters laughed up their sleeves. But orders were orders and the Admiralty obviously accepted the risks involved.
It was not the only risk accepted by the Admiralty. Several ships, among them Wake-Walker’s cruisers, but also the cruisers Edinburgh and London, which had been redirected from other tasks to take part in the chase for the German squadron, were ordered to search for the Bismarck at any cost. Once contact had been made, the German battleship was to be shadowed as far as possible, even if it meant that the British ships would run out of fuel and become immobile in the midst of the Atlantic.315
When Lütjens decided to change course and reduce speed, the situation transformed. Wake-Walker reported the changes made by the German ships as soon as possible. Up to now, Tovey’s situation had appeared hopeless, but at a stroke chances of success improved notably. If the Bismarck maintained her latest course, it would be possible to intercept her with the King George V and Repulse. The chances were still far from good, because the German change of course and speed might be temporary, but an opportunity had at least been revealed. The distance between Tovey and Lütjens diminished hour by hour. Also, Tovey had yet another card to play. The torpedo planes carried by the Victorious might damage the Bismarck, perhaps reducing her speed. The weather was unsuitable for air power, especially for the poorly trained air crew assigned to the Victorious. Also, the distance to the German battleship remained great, making the task daunting. However, the poor weather also increased the risk that during the time it would take Tovey’s heavy ships to catch up with the Bismarck, he might lose contact with her. Without the Suffolk’s radar, the British would hardly have been able to shadow the German squadron. Despite the risks, an air attack by the torpedo planes from the Victorious had to be attempted.316
If it were to be possible to conduct the air attack at all, the Victorious had to be detached and set a southwesterly course, while Tovey’s main force would sail on a south-southwesterly course. The split of forces was mainly mandated by the differences in speed and endurance between ships and aircraft. The latter of course travelled much faster, but their range was limited. With a southwesterly course, the Victorious would pass astern of the German squadron, but close enough to enable the aircraft to reach the Bismarck. However, it was unthinkable to allow the King George V and Repulse to set the same course, as it would deprive them of any chances to intercept the German ships, unless the latter were severely damaged by the air attack.
There was a distinct disadvantage with this decision. The Victorious would probably not be close enough to launch an air attack on the German ships on 25 May. Even worse, her reconnaissance aircraft would not be within range to act as scouts in case contact with the German squadron was lost. Nevertheless, Tovey decided to accept the risks and just before 16.00 hours, the four cruisers Galatea, Aurora, Kenya and Hermione together with the Victorious were detached, all of them led by the commander of the 2nd Cruiser Division, Rear Admiral Curteis.317
At this stage, Tovey could not expect too much of the battleships and battlecruisers, except the King George V. He was well aware of the shortcomings of the Revenge and Ramillies, and the Rodney was still too far away. Force H was of course even further from the scene. If the air attack launched by the Victorious failed, or if Wake-Walker lost contact, virtually all hope of engaging the Bismarck would be lost.
Wake-Walker and his squadron still played a vital, role. He not only had to maintain contact with the Germans, he also had to ensure that his ships were not surprised by the Germans. In the poor weather, the Norfolk, with her inferior radar, could easily lose contact with the Germans and become vulnerable to surprise attacks. At 13.30 hours Wake-Walker ordered the Norfolk to turn around 360 degrees, positioning her three to four nautical miles astern of the other two British ships. The decision was justified about 40 minutes later, when Lütjens attempted to detach the Prinz Eugen and suddenly the Bismarck appeared eight nautical miles from the Norfolk. As we have seen, the Bismarck turned east immediately, whereupon the Norfolk lost contact, but this time she was informed of the change by the Suffolk, whose radar still provided admirable assistance. Thus the Norfolk escaped further unpleasant surprises.318
In addition to radar and lookouts on Wake-Walker’s ships, reconnaissance aircraft provided surveillance. The advantage with the aircraft was that they could keep an eye on the Germans at a distance from which the latter could not strike back. Wake-Walker, on the other hand, had to manoeuvre his ships in such a way that he balanced two risks, the risk of being hit and the risk of losing contact, against each other. The fickle weather made the task even more difficult, as visibility changed dramatically from minute to minute.319 Early in the afternoon the Hudson that had thus far watched over the Germans returned and was replaced by a Catalina that had started from Iceland. Unfortunately the Catalina suffered engine problems and had to break off the mission after two hours.
While all this took place, Wake-Walker found some time to ruminate on the Admiralty’s inquiry after his intentions to re-engage the Germans with the Prince of Wales. He was fairly certain that Tovey would prefer it if there were no actions before the King George V and Repulse arrived, with the Victorious’ torpedo planes as backup. Nevertheless, it appeared that the Admiralty held a different opinion to that of Tovey. Wake-Walker must have asked himself numerous times if he was being too cautious and defensive. His available information suggested that the Admiralty thought along those lines, or else the signal would not have been sent.
Wake-Walker decided upon a compromise. To stage a naval battle against the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, with the ships he commanded, appeared ill-conceived, but perhaps he could ‘tease’ the enemy to chase the British ships and thereby lure Lütjens closer to Tovey. He ordered the Suffolk to leave her position on the right flank and move closer to the Norfolk, while the Prince of Wales increased speed and assumed a position ahead of the cruisers. Wake-Walker’s navigation officer objected and emphasized that the arrangement would render it more difficult to shadow the enemy, but the admiral overruled these objections. He wanted to manoeuvre his unit as a close formation.320 No one should accuse him of lacking offensive spirit.
In that way, the inquiry from the Admiralty unintentionally played into Lütjens’ hands, because at 19.14 hours he decided to make another attempt to detach the Prinz Eugen. On board the German cruiser, Captain Brinkmann was dictating a message to his signals officer. He intended to suggest to Lütjens that the squadron should first attract the British pursuers to the trap formed by the German submarines and then, provided the enemy ships had lost contact, rendezvous with the Belchen and Lothringen and bunker fuel oil. If the scheme did not bring the intended results, he suggested a change of course, to south, while the tankers Esso Hamburg and Spichern would be instructed to sail north, to meet the German warships.
However, Brinkmann’s message was never transmitted. Suddenly the signal officer reported: ‘To the Prinz Eugen from the Fleet Commander…’
Without hearing the rest of the message, Brinkmann nevertheless understood the content. The Bismarck had already begun to turn to starboard, while her fore gun turrets traversed to enable them to fire on the enemy.
‘…carry out Hood!’ the signal officer finished.
The Prinz Eugen increased speed to 31 knots while the Bismarck turned sharply. On board the Suffolk, the radar screen suddenly indicated that the range to the German battleship rapidly fell. Ellis quickly ordered the helmsman to turn sharply to port, while the engine control room was ordered to increase to full speed. It was at the very last moment. Shells from the Bismarck’s 38cm guns splashed into the water unpleasantly close to the British cruiser, and as the Suffolk replied with her own guns, trained abaft of the beam, pressure from the blast of the B-turret shattered the bridge windows. Fortunately, the poor visibility limited the accuracy of the Bismarck’s fire. The Prince of Wales hastened to support the cruiser, but only a brief exchange of fire between the two battleships ensued, without either of them being hit.321
On board the Prinz Eugen, which managed to evade detection in the tumult, the crew could hear the thunder from the Bismarck’s guns, soon followed by the more distant noise when the enemy fired back. Many of the men who were not busy gathered at the gunwales to get a glimpse of the fighting. Briefly they were rewarded with the dark silhouette of the battleship on the horizon; they saw a few gun flashes and the brown clouds of smoke that rose towards the thick grey clouds above. Then she disappeared behind a rain squall.
‘There our big brother disappears,’ Jasper said at the bridge. ‘We’re going to miss him very, very much.’322 They would never see the Bismarck again.