Briggs’ report sent waves of hope as well as disappointment through the Royal Navy, from the Admiralty, which soon sent an orientation on the Bismarck’s position, to every officer, NCO and seaman on board the British warships that were in pursuit. To many, it became perfectly clear that they would play no further part in the action. The Repulse had been forced to break off the operation long ago. The Victorious, Prince of Wales and Suffolk had set course towards Iceland to bunker fuel oil. On board the King George V, Tovey received the message with mixed feelings. The fact that the Bismarck had been located was of course advantageous, but he realized that his own forces were too far away if she remained on her course and at the same speed towards France. Dalrymple-Hamilton on the Rodney and Wake-Walker on the Norfolk were as ill positioned as Tovey.
Captain Vian, whose destroyer flotilla had escorted WS8B when he was ordered to leave the convoy and join Tovey, could have intercepted the Bismarck a few hours earlier, had he set a more easterly course. At about 08.00 hours, his destroyers had crossed the line that Lütjens had passed merely 30 minutes earlier. For the moment, Vian’s flotilla was in the wake of the German battleship, when he received the information that the Bismarck had been sighted. He must have realized how close the Bismarck had been to WS8B. Had the Bismarck sailed a few knots faster, the freighters would have appeared ahead of the Bismarck’s guns. Vian realized that his destroyers had a fair chance of intercepting the enemy battleship before it reached France. However, to set course directly towards the Bismarck would mean disregarding the orders received from Tovey, because the commander-in-chief was currently located north of Vian’s present position: Vian altered course to south-southeast, but still he remained several hours behind the Bismarck.
If we disregarded this order, the two battleships, King George V and Rodney, which alone could force a decision, would be left entirely unescorted against attacks by U-boats as they closed the enemy. If either were to be torpedoed, Bismarck, unless stopped by air attack, seemed sure to make port. It was clear that the course to take was the one most likely to suit the Commander-in-Chief; interpreting him, we hoped, aright, we plumbed for heading straight towards Bismarck. Strict wireless silence was being maintained; we did not, therefore, inform Admiral Tovey, or anybody else, of this decision.380
Only Admiral Somerville’s Force H had a reasonable chance of intercepting the Bismarck. Vice Admiral Somerville was a tall man with a cheerful temperament. He had an irrepressible tendency to see amusing details in everything surrounding him and he gladly took any opportunity to tell dirty jokes. In 1940 he had been given the unenviable task of sinking French navy vessels in Oran, an experience that left an indelible scar on his soul, but did not affect his ability to command Force H.
His present task required all his skills as sailor and commander. His ships had proceeded northward in extremely bad weather ever since leaving Gibraltar behind them. On the morning of 25 May, Somerville had to order his destroyers to turn back to Gibraltar, but the Ark Royal and Sheffield still accompanied his flagship, the battlecruiser Renown. For the moment, the admiral’s primary concern was not the Bismarck, but the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, since he feared that they would put to sea to support Lütjens. Somerville had instructed one of his destroyers to wait until it had reached a position 130 nautical miles south of his own, before transmitting a question to the Admiralty: were the German battleships in Brest still at their moorings? While waiting for the reply, he sent a reconnaissance aircraft towards Brest. Additionally, he directed a more comprehensive search effort in the area northwest of his task force, hoping to find the Bismarck.381
When the Admiralty’s signal on the Bismarck’s position was received, excitement instantly grew. Somerville and the other officers realized that the German battleship currently was located further west, and was in fact headed into the area where the reconnaissance aircraft from the Ark Royal intended to search. For a while, the Admiral contemplated redirecting his aircraft to support the Catalina, but he refrained. There was always a risk of mistakes and incorrect interpretations when orders were countermanded. However, soon afterwards, Briggs’ report that the Catalina had lost contact with the Bismarck was intercepted. Again, Somerville considered redirecting his aircraft, but he was interrupted by a report originating from one of his searching aeroplanes and contained the encouraging news that a large warship had been sighted slightly east of the position Briggs had given. For some reason, the crew on the aircraft identified the ship as Prinz Eugen, but soon another Swordfish reported, correctly identifying the ship as the Bismarck. As the positions given by the two reports were identical, they obviously shadowed the same ship, regardless of its identity. Furthermore, the enemy was closer than expected, not more than about 60 nautical miles away.
Somerville ordered Captain Loben Maund, the commander of the Ark Royal, to stage an attack as soon as the reconnoitring aircraft had landed and been armed with torpedoes. Thereafter he set a course that would place the Renown and Sheffield between the Bismarck and France. However, at 11.45 hours an order from the Admiralty was received. It instructed Somerville to engage with the Renown only if the King George V or Rodney were already in battle with the Bismarck. The protection of the aging battlecruiser was not sufficient to withstand direct hits from the Bismarck’s guns. The Admiralty wished to avoid a repetition of the outcome in the Denmark Strait. Somerville changed his plans, but detached the Sheffield to shadow the German battleship, while Tovey struggled to close in. In the meantime, Somerville staked everything on an air attack. The Sheffield had been informed by signal lamp, but the instruction had not been forwarded to the Ark Royal. An encrypted message was sent from the Renown, reporting the activities of Force H, to both Tovey and the Admiralty. The same information was also sent to the Ark Royal, not as an urgent message but as general information. For this reason, the wireless operators did not hurry to decrypt the message. Maund therefore did not know that the Sheffield might appear not far from the Bismarck.
Meanwhile, Maund’s aircraft had managed to land on the Ark Royal, despite the rough sea. The flight deck rose and fell down as the ship heaved in the large waves. All except one of the pilots had succeeded in taking his aircraft down, but one misjudged the seaway. Instead of touching the flight deck when it was moving downwards, the pilot suddenly saw the flight deck heaving up towards him. The contact was violent enough to break the landing gear and the aircraft collapsed as it slid along the deck. All crewmembers survived and the remains of the aircraft were pushed overboard.
The preparations for the attack were soon in full swing. Lieutenant Commander Stewart-Moore was entrusted with the dangerous mission. The take-off would be even more difficult than it had been during the reconnaissance mission, as the aircraft would carry the heavy burden of a torpedo and the weather showed no sign of improving. Furthermore, they would have to attack through intense fire, from heavy guns as well as the lighter anti-aircraft guns. The airmen at least found some consolation in the fact that none of Esmonde’s aeroplanes had been shot down. They had no fear of attacking friendly ships, as they had been instructed that the only warships in the area were either the Bismarck or the Prinz Eugen. Furthermore, the men serving with the 820th Division were veterans from the war in the Mediterranean. As uncertainty about the identity of the ship still lingered, it was decided to reduce the depth setting of the torpedoes from ten to eight metres, to enable the magnetic detonators to operate irrespective of the two possible targets.382
The attack force took off from the Ark Royal just before 15.00 hours. All aircraft made it without mishaps, despite the bad weather. Maund saw them disappear in the clouds. Once airborne, the radarequipped machines switched their sets on and scanned the sea ahead. Within 30 minutes, they got an echo from a ship. It was about 30km closer to Somerville’s force than expected, but as no British ships were supposed to be in the area, Stewart-Moore decided to initiate the attack. Twenty minutes later the 15 Swordfish planes dived towards the sea, to make a coordinated attack from several directions.383 Soon the pilots could make out a large shadow behind veils created by the weather and a warship loomed large in the rain.
It was a textbook attack. Altitude and speed were correct; the angle of attack was suitable. The surprise must have been complete, as the ship had not yet opened fire. The pilot in the lead watched the target through his goggles. The ship grew larger as the range closed quickly. Its grey shape gradually revealed details; guns, masts, gunwales and ladders, men moving on decks. He released his torpedo and felt how the aircraft was pulled upwards when the weight of the torpedo disappeared.
But there was something wrong. The target suddenly seemed so familiar. Immediately before the nose of the Swordfish raised and the ship disappeared below him, he clearly saw the crews standing by their anti-aircraft guns. Why did they not fire back?
The ship had two funnels!
On board the Sheffield Captain Larcom saw Stewart-Moore’s unit appear below the cloud cover. He knew the attack force had started and was not surprised to see the Swordfish aircraft. But instead of just flying past the Sheffield, the unit split and began to fly towards the Sheffield from many directions. A few seconds later, Larcom understood what was about to happen. ‘Good Heavens – they are attacking us!’ he exclaimed. ‘Full speed ahead. Steer hard aport!’
In a second, the bridge seemed to explode in activity. Rapid orders were issued by voice pipes and intercom systems; the loudspeakers announced that the aircraft were British and it was forbidden to open fire on them. The seamen on deck saw how the first aircraft released its torpedo. It disappeared in the water and began its journey towards the British cruiser. Another two followed the first aircraft, but their torpedoes exploded when they hit the water. The Sheffield arduously began to turn away from the first torpedo.
While Larcom skilfully manoeuvred his ship between the approaching torpedoes, the remaining Swordfish attacked, except three whose crews realized they were about to make a grave mistake, but none of the torpedoes hit. However, three of them exploded after passing the Sheffield, indicating that something was seriously wrong with the weapons. At this stage, it was also clear to the crews of 820th Division what had happened and they returned distressed towards the Ark Royal.
‘Sorry for the kipper,’ one of them signalled to the Sheffield before the Swordfish disappeared into the clouds. When Stewart-Moore landed at the Ark Royal and reported, he was sorry about the mistake. ‘It was a perfect attack,’ he reported. ‘Right height, right range, right cloud cover, right speed, and the wrong f–––ng ship!’384
While Stewart-Moore conducted his failed attack, Tovey continued eastwards with the King George V. It was clear to him that, under the prevailing conditions, he had lost the race. He had already reduced speed to husband scarce fuel oil and the Bismarck would have reached France long before he could catch her. Tovey and his staff waited eagerly for the report on the air attack, when one of the lookouts on the port side shouted: ‘Ship, bearing red seven-oh!’
For a moment it was feared that the distant object might be the Prinz Eugen and the crew quickly assumed battle stations. But when the superstructure of the unknown ship was revealed, her identity became clear. The Rodney had attached to the commander-in-chief. Numerous signals were exchanged between the ships. One of them concerned the maximum speed the Rodney could attain. Tovey received the reply: 22 knots, which happened to be the speed the King George V was making for the moment. Tovey decided to continue at 22 knots, but the Rodney slowly but inexorably lagged further and further behind. Finally Dalrymple-Hamilton had to signal: ‘Am afraid your 22 knots are faster than ours.’
It was gratifying for Tovey to have two battleships again, but still the prospects remained dim, and when he received the report on the air attack, it seemed even worse. Somerville had chosen not to report any details of the attack on the Sheffield, he confined himself to reporting that no hits on the Bismarck had been observed. However, Somerville reported that he intended to launch another attack as soon as conditions permitted, probably at about 18.00 hours. Tovey acknowledged Somerville’s report and added that it was probably the last chance to halt the Bismarck before she reached a French port. Tovey could not sail fast enough to reduce the distance to the enemy, but would have to be content to avoid lagging further behind. Unless the Ark Royal’s aviators managed to score a hit that reduced the enemy’s speed, the pursuit was definitely over.
To Lütjens and the Bismarck’s crew, the sight of Briggs’ Catalina made it obvious that they had been discovered again. A few hours earlier they had seen the masts of Vian’s destroyers, as the latter passed in their wake on their way to join Tovey, but nothing suggested that the British seamen had seen them.385 The seaplane was very different. Anti-aircraft guns had opened up, but it managed to evade the bursting shells and was soon out of gun range. Soon afterwards, the German wireless operators intercepted Briggs’ message, which was promptly handed over to the B-Dienst. The code was quickly broken and Lütjens was given the same information as the Admiralty received. At the same time, it was observed that the Catalina was following at a safe distance.
The knowledge that the Bismarck was being followed again caused some anxiety, which soon turned into discouragement when another aircraft was observed. This time it was not a seaplane but a biplane with a fixed undercarriage. At this stage the Catalina had disappeared, but the new aircraft was much more ominous than the seaplane. Müllenheim-Rechberg immediately knew the implications:
A wheeled aircraft! So there must be an aircraft carrier quite nearby. And other, probably heavy, ships would be near her. Would cruisers and destroyers pick up contact before we ran into them? And were we now to experience a new version of our happily ended pursuit by the Suffolk and Norfolk?
We in the Bismarck had the realization forced upon us that another page had been turned. After thirty-one hours of almost unbroken contact, thirty-one hours of broken contact had now, perhaps for good, come to an end – an exactly equal number of hours, how remarkable! Did the carrier plane really signify a decisive turn of events? Morale sagged a little among those who could read the signs.386
But the expected attack did not occur, although the shadowing Swordfish aircraft was joined by second. The Bismarck continued east. The weather deteriorated further. Brief showers washed the decks and visibility alternated between poor and virtually zero. Was the weather too poor for air operations? Quite possibly it was. Or did the shadowing Swordfish aircraft, which were soon joined by a new Catalina, have longer range than their armed sisters? In that case, the carrier might be too far away. The Germans were completely unaware that the respite was caused by Stewart-Moore’s mistaken attack on the Sheffield. When the afternoon was relieved by the evening, the Germans hoped to be spared the trial of yet another air attack.
Shortly after 18.00 hours, a shadow was sighted in their wake and for a brief moment, it was possible to identify it as a cruiser of Southampton-class. Lütjens presumed that it must be the Sheffield and that Force H could not be far away. The pursuit was again in full swing.