On 14 September, 1940 the Bismarck turned her bow towards the Elbe. Few people on the brinks of the wide river noted her departure and in the evening she anchored at Brunsbüttel, where the Elbe meets the North Sea. During the night, Bomber Command attacked the harbour and the anti-aircraft guns on board the Bismarck opened fire.33
The air attack was hardly new to the Germans. At this stage of the war, British aircraft repeatedly attacked German ports during the dark hours. Bomber Command tried to disrupt the German build-up for Operation Sealion and the German North Sea coast was well within range of its aircraft. But although transport shipping was the target, there remained a risk that the Bismarck would be hit, with possible delays caused by damage from bombs. However, the Germans were fortunate to have a large area where their ships could be almost safe from enemy aircraft—the Baltic. They were also fortunate in that their ships did not have to sail around Jutland because the Nordostsee-Kanal could be used to move ships from Brunsbüttel to Kiel. This was the route that the Bismarck took to the Baltic on 16 September. The voyage through the channel was not without suspense. No air attacks were noted, but the narrowness of the passage meant that the ship travelled at action stations. The crew had to stand by at full alert and all hatches and doors were closed. It was not an easy task to manoeuvre the large ship, with its powerful machinery, but everything went according to plan and in the evening of 17 September the battleship berthed at Kiel.34
The Bismarck remained at Kiel for a week to adjust the gunnery, before setting course towards Gdynia. In the Baltic, the crew were able to test the ship thoroughly and train so as to make the best use of her qualities. To a battleship, firepower was of course of particular importance. In November 1940 comprehensive firing exercises began, an activity that was repeated many times in the future. Exercises were important in ensuring that the crew gained proficiency, but also in revealing any defects, before the Bismarck was sent into battle. Firing exercises involved the men serving the guns, as well as those who were responsible for fire control, observation, range finding and many other tasks. The comprehensive training actions required men to master more than their own tasks, such as the exercises designed to train them in emergency procedures used, for example, when parts of the fire control system had been put out of action. This knowledge could prove invaluable in real combat conditions. Obviously the crew was also trained to manage a number of lesser tasks: signalling, encryption, quickly reaching battle stations at alarms, damage control, caring for wounded and so on. All shortcomings and frictions had to be eliminated before commencing operations.
Testing the Bismarck
To hit an enemy ship at long range, many factors had to be considered. The Bismarck’s heavy guns could hurl an 800kg shell more than 36km. At such distances even a 250m long battleship was a small target and several circumstances had to be taken account of. To begin with, the firing ship’s own course and speed, roll and pitch affected her firing. The range to the target had to be correctly assessed, but as it could take up to a minute for the shells to reach the target, the projectile’s speed and course had to be properly estimated. When firing at long range, the shell travelled through high trajectories where air conditions might be different than those at sea level. Air density, wind direction and other characteristics had to be accounted for.
To make these calculations quickly and consistently, sensors fed data to calculation machines, which were a sort of mechanical forerunner to modern computers. Manual routines provided a back up in case the calculation machines were damaged or received incorrect data. The first salvo was not expected to hit the target, but if the shells did not land too far away, a minor correction might suffice. Observers usually noted the splashes where shells landed, which could be as high as multi-storey buildings. This made them easy to see, at least when the number of ships was not so great that splashes from different ships became confused.
Despite all the technical devices, man remained a crucial component in the overall firing system. Range finding is an example. The Germans used stereoscopic rangefinders, which were very accurate, but placed heavy demands on the operators in the early stages of battle, causing the operators to tire earlier. The British used a slightly simpler system, which was less taxing for the operators over the course of the battle.
During firing exercises, sub-calibre inserts were mostly used for the heavy guns, a method mandated by the wear imposed from full-calibre firing. The Bismarck’s 38cm guns had an estimated barrel life of about 200 to 250 rounds, before accuracy dropped due to the imposed wear.35 With the inserts, range was reduced, but was nevertheless sufficient for training. Recoil was also much reduced by using inserts. Some of the strains of battle were therefore not imposed during the exercises.
However, at last the day came when the heavy guns would fire full calibre shells for the first time. Excitement filled the crew on board the battleship. No one knew with certainty how the ship would react to the stresses of fire. Full steam was ordered and heat mounted in the boiler rooms. The pressure was 56 atmospheres. Everything related to Bismarck’s mobility had to withstand the shock of firing, as the ship would probably move at high speed during battle. Suddenly the sounds caused by the sea were drowned by an enormous crack. Bismarck trembled sideways, as eight 800kg shells left the guns at a velocity of 3,000km/h. It took less than 5ms for the shells to travel through the barrels, but in this brief period of time the guns developed more than 60 million Hpw.36
The broadside was a violent strain even for a large battleship, but the machines continued to work flawlessly, as did everything else on the Bismarck. A few minor items that had not been sufficiently secured dashed around and a few light bulbs went out, but the ship was quite stable in the sea, a result of her unusually large beam. She was ready for a new salvo as soon as the guns had been reloaded, a process of about 20 seconds. The crew had already held great confidence in their ship, but it was boosted even further by the live fire exercise.
Success in battle was heavily influenced by the officers’ ability to make correct decisions, for example by making weather, wind and light into factors that worked to their favour. The Bismarck had several highly qualified artillery officers, like Schneider, Albrecht and Müllenheim-Rechberg and the test results were very encouraging. Captain Voss, commander of the training department, made a visit to the battleship. When Voss took leave, he approached Schneider last and confided the parting words to him: ‘My highest wish to you is that the first enemy ship to appear before the Bismarck’s guns is the Hood—and you will sink her.’37
In addition to firing exercises, it was important to learn how the ship behaved in various weather conditions and tactical manoeuvres. The Bismarck was a good sea boat, with moderate pitch and roll. Even during sharp sheers, she heeled fairly little. Of course her speed at full steam pressure was tested too. At most 30.8 knots were measured, an impressive speed for such a colossus and sufficient to steam away from most capital ships at the time.
At an early stage the crew tested whether it would be possible to steer the ship by using propellers only. The rudders were locked in a midship position, whereupon different numbers of revolutions were tried on the three propellers. Usually it was possible to steer a ship with proper combinations of speed on the different propellers, but on the Bismarck it did not work well. She could not maintain course, was caught by the wind and moved uncontrollably. The problems were caused by the proximity of the three propellers, which produced too little leverage. There seemed to be little risk of it ever having consequences in battle, so probably few on board bothered about it.38
Nevertheless, there was a risk that the steering system could be damaged and a recurring exercise was ‘measures after being hit in the steering system.’ Müllenheim-Rechberg later recalled a particular moment during this drill. The exercise assumed that some of the compartments had been flooded. According to the directives, the men who occupied these compartments were assumed to have perished in the explosion or to have been drowned by the inrushing seawater. During the exercise, many seamen had turned their hats back to front, as was usually done to indicate that they were playing the role of the dead.
‘But if it happens in real life,’ one of the seamen asked, ‘would we be killed?’
‘Of course,’ the leader of the exercise, a Lieutenant named Friedrich Cardinal, answered, ‘so, now you turn your hats and pretend to be dead.’ A few seconds later, perhaps after he realized the effect his words could have on the men, he tried to gloss over them. ‘But of course,’ he said and smiled at the seamen, ‘the probability of such a hit is perhaps one in a hundred thousand, virtually nil.’39
Many would later remember his assurance with bitterness.
During the period of training, testing and evaluation, the Bismarck developed close ties with a much smaller ship: the submarine U-556. Both ships were built at the same shipyard, Blohm & Voss, and they had often been moored in the same harbour. U-556 was commanded by Lieutenant Herbert Wohlfarth, who was known as ‘the knight Parsifal’ within the German Navy and was also regarded as an inveterate prankster. In January 1941 he had left the shipyard for a testing tour, when he sighted the Bismarck, which also was at sea for testing. Wohlfahrt got a humorous twinkle in his eyes and semaphored a brief message to the Bismarck. To begin with, he had the impudence to address Lindemann as an equal, which was a breach of etiquette. The second half of the message did not improve matters, as it read: ‘What a nice boat you have.’
Considering Lindemann’s feelings for the Bismarck, the use of the word ‘boat’ instead of ‘ship’ was not the most appropriate choice. The Bismarck soon signalled back an acidic reply: ‘What boat, Lieutenant?’
Wohlfahrt was not discouraged. He semaphored: ‘I can do this, can you?,’ whereupon U-556 submerged and disappeared from the sight of the officers on Bismarck’s bridge.40
To mitigate the effects of the incident, Wohlfahrt invited Lindemann and some of his officers to dinner a few weeks later and when U-556 was officially declared ready for operations, he asked Lindemann to grant him a service. A small submarine did not, of course, have musicians in its crew, but Wohlfahrt wanted to give the ceremony more splendour. He asked Lindemann if he could use the battleship’s orchestra. As a sign of gratitude, the crew of U-556 presented the Bismarck with a homemade certificate that promised support:
We U556 (500t) declare before Neptune, ruler of oceans, seas, lakes, rivers, creeks, ponds and rills, that we will stand by our big brother, the battleship Bismarck (42,000t), everyday, on the water, on land and even in the air.
It was dated 28 January,1941, at Hamburg, and signed ‘commander and crew of U-556’. It included two illustrations. The first showed the knight Parsifal, who used his sword to protect the Bismarck from attacking British aircraft and stopped approaching torpedoes with his left hand. The other illustration showed how the godfather towed the battleship, whose machinery had broken down.41 Lindemann acknowledged the godfathership by placing the certificate in the mess room, next to photographes of Adolf Hitler and Otto von Bismarck. At the time it was regarded as a kind gesture between two warships, but it would prove to be a very bad omen