When war broke out in 1939, British naval strategy rested on two pillars. The first aim was to secure Britain’s transoceanic imports; and the second was to blockade Germany, which it was hoped would cause Hitler’s downfall. The availability of raw materials again dictated British naval strategy, which was very much a repeat of that of World War I. However, despite the basic similarities between the wars, there were also substantial differences. The German Navy was much weaker in 1939 than it had been in 1914, so it appeared easier for the British to secure their shipping and maintain a steady flow of essential imports. The focus could switch to depriving Germany of the raw materials needed to keep up the war effort. Attention soon fell on Swedish iron ore, which was vital to the German arms industry. Plans for depriving the Germans of access to the Swedish iron ore took a long time to develop and meanwhile the Royal Navy focussed on controlling the Atlantic.
Although Italy had not yet joined the war in 1939, it was important to keep the Italian Navy in check in case she did. The role of patrolling the western Mediterranean fell to the French Navy, and French warships also helped chase away German pocket battleships during the autumn of 1939.145
Tacit support from the United States was also a vital factor. The strong US Pacific Navy tied down the Japanese Navy, enabling the British to commit only scant resources to the defence of their possessions in the Far East. Most of the Royal Navy was therefore available to control the seas nearer England, in areas through which the German warships would have to pass, should they attempt to strike at Allied shipping on the Atlantic.
The successful German campaign in Norway in 1940 struck a harsh blow at British naval superiority. With bases in Norway now open to the German Navy, the British Navy was forced to cover larger areas to prevent the Kriegsmarine from reaching the Atlantic. Furthermore, by making use of Norwegian air bases, the Luftwaffe could pose a threat to British ships. As a consequence, the British could no longer blockade the Germans along the short line from Scotland to southwest Norway. It became necessary to cover the entire area from the Orkneys to Greenland.
The situation worsened when the German army defeated France in May–June 1940, and the support from the French Navy vanished. Mussolini declared war on 10 June 1940 and in the Far East, Japan began to act more ominously. In a short span of time, the Royal Navy was stretched to the utmost in her attempt to cover two additional theatres of war. The British Mediterranean fleet, based in Alexandria, had to be reinforced. Force H, based in Gibraltar, was created to take the place of the French Navy in the western Mediterranean.146
The increased demands made it impossible to provide the Home Fleet with the resources it desired in the short term, and the likely ongoing effect of losses due to battles in the Mediterranean meant that the Home Fleet could expect to be further stripped as the war went on. A respite was provided by the damage to German warships from the Norway Campaign. Three cruisers and many destroyers were lost and several other damaged ships were undergoing prolonged repairs. However, within a few months, they would be ready for service and British shipping on the Atlantic would again be endangered.
Still, there were some positive developments suggesting that the hard pressed British could allow themselves a little confidence. Several warships neared completion. Britain had been rather late in resuming production of battleships, but in the autumn of 1940 the first in a series of five was completed. Her name was King George V and she would soon become the flagship of the Home Fleet.147 The British lagged behind the Germans in battleship production. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been in service more than a year when the King George V was commissioned and the Bismarck and Tirpitz were clearly more powerful than the contemporary battleships of the King George V class. Admittedly, the British possessed several older battleships, but few of them served with the Home Fleet, as they were too slow.
At least the British did maintain superiority with regard to aircraft carriers. Britain had been leading the development of this new type of weapon, while the Germans, like the Italians, completely lacked carriers. When the Washington Naval Treaty (aka the Five-Power Treaty) was signed, numerous battleship projects had to be cancelled. In many cases, the already-initiated projects ended up as carriers, which were not limited by the Washington Treaty. During the decade preceding World War II, Britain also embarked on building several warships, designed as carriers from the very beginning, and some of them were already in service at the end of 1940. But the carriers too had been spread out. Of the four fully modern carriers Britain possessed, one was undergoing repairs, one was based on Alexandria and one was in Gibraltar. The brand new Victorious could not yet be described as fully operational. Also, the Royal Navy had two older carriers in the Indian Ocean and another two, even older, were used to transport aircraft to exposed or desolate positions like Gibraltar, Malta and bases in Africa. Consequently, Admiral Tovey had no fully combat-ready carrier when he replaced Admiral Charles Forbes as commander of the Home Fleet.148
Admiral John Cronyn Tovey was 56 years old, short in stature, and had served with the Royal Navy since the age of 15. During World War I he had commanded a destroyer and fought in the Battle of Jutland. When World War II began, Tovey commanded a destroyer flotilla, but soon he was appointed to command the 7th Cruiser Division and in July 1940 he fought against the Italian Navy at Punta Stilo. He was an esteemed and competent commander who inspired respect. He was also deeply religious. He always prayed, morning and evening.
When Tovey assumed command of the Home Fleet, it was stronger than it had been since the beginning of the war. As already mentioned, the King George V had just entered service and flew Tovey’s flag. Also, he had at his disposal the battleships Nelson and Rodney, the battlecruisers Hood and Repulse, 11 cruisers and 17 destroyers.149 It was a respectable force, in fact larger than the entire German Navy. He could also count on receiving the battleship Prince of Wales as soon as it was completed.
During the initial months of his tenure, Tovey’s Home Fleet did not fight any major battles. He had been engaged in intensive searching activity when Lütjens’ two battleships raided the Atlantic, and the activity of Admiral Hipper and Admiral Scheer also caused him to send his forces to sea. Nevertheless, these hide-and-seek games did not result in any combat.
As the German warships returned to their bases, a quieter period followed. However, it was well-known by the British that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had been commissioned by the Kriegsmarine and their crews had almost completed training. These two ships could be expected to participate in offensive operations at short notice, which would require Tovey’s full attention. The Gneisenau and Scharnhorst still remained in Brest. It seemed clear that British attacks had caused damage to them, but it was more difficult to judge when the two battleships might again be considered battle-worthy.
Tovey’s main task was clear. He had to prevent the Germans from reaching the British trade routes in the Atlantic. The Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were in the Baltic and they would have to pass the area north of the British Isles, should they undertake to reach the transatlantic trade routes. On the other hand, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau threatened to break out south of the British Isles, so Tovey would have to cope with this threat too. If he had to act to prevent the German battleships in Brest from reaching trade routes, he could cooperate with the Force H at Gibraltar. The area north of Britain was his sole responsibility.
Reliable intelligence was a prerequisite for Tovey’s attempts to prevent a German break-out, but the wear on both ships and men if they were kept constantly on patrol, as well as the consumption of valuable fuel oil was too high a price. Tovey preferred to rely on intelligence gathered from several sources, such as aerial reconnaissance, wireless interceptions and agents. Once the Germans had reached open sea, sources like agents of course had little to provide, but if the German ships sailed close to a coastline, they might still give useful information. Another important source was called ULTRA, which we will discuss later. The British decision-makers complemented this sort of information with their own observations on the weather, the phases of the moon and light conditions.
It was necessary to have fairly strong indications that the Germans were indeed staging a break-out, because if the heavy ships they sailed too early, they might consume too much fuel oil and be forced to return to port to bunker, perhaps at the most crucial moment. Thus the importance of solid intelligence was thus clear.
To make matters more difficult for Tovey, he not only had to predict when the Germans would try to break out, he also had to cover several alternative break-out routes they might follow. There were three main alternatives: (1) The southern route between the Orkneys and the Faeroes; (2) the middle between the Faeroes and Iceland; and (3) the northern route, the so-called Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland, which Lütjens successfully used during Operation Berlin.
Only one circumstance suggested that the Germans might be tempted to use the southern alternative: the short distance to the convoy routes. It would save fuel oil and time, but would be prone to detection, especially by British aerial reconnaissance, as the area was well within reach of British airfields.
The middle and northern alternatives were the most likely and the ones Tovey focussed on. The passage between the Faeroes and Iceland was also fairly short. Furthermore, its width would provide the Germans with plenty of room for manoeuvre, which might become vital if British naval forces appeared. On the other hand, British forces from the main base at Scapa Flow might more easily intercept German warships in this area, compared to the more distant Denmark Strait, and aircraft based on the British Isles as well as Iceland could provide effective reconnaissance of the area.
From the German point of view, the advantages of the Denmark Strait were the frequent bad weather and the distance from Scapa Flow. It would make it more difficult to find German ships and it would require more time to intercept the German ships, were they detected, unless of course heavy British units were already in the vicinity. On the other hand, the Denmark Strait was narrow, on one side the pack ice was a barrier and on the other side there were British minefields. At its narrowest, the Denmark Strait was only 130 kilometres wide, and half of that distance was covered by mines. The Germans would also have to cover a much longer distance, were they to settle for the Denmark Strait alternative, which of course meant that more fuel oil would be consumed. Finally, as the summer drew closer, the nights would be very short, or even disappear completely, at such northerly latitudes. With the long periods of sunshine, it would be more difficult for the Germans to avoid detection or shake off pursuers.
Another problem for Tovey was the disparity of the ships he controlled. In mid-May 1941, the two most modern British battleships, the King George V and Prince of Wales, were under his command. The former was his flagship, while the latter was brand new and not yet fully tested. Technicians from the manufacturer remained on board the Prince of Wales to solve deficiencies. The most serious defects occurred in her main armament.
Tovey also had at his disposal two battlecruisers, the Hood and the smaller battlecruiser Repulse. Finally, the carrier Victorious was at Scapa Flow. Like the Prince of Wales, she was brand new. It was intended that her first mission would be to transport fighter aircraft to Malta. Thus, she carried partly disassembled Hurricanes. They were to be reassembled when the carrier approached Malta, whereupon the Hurricanes were to be flown to the beleaguered island. They could not land on the Victorious and were therefore useless in the Atlantic. Besides the Hurricanes, the Victorious carried Swordfish and Fulmar aircraft, which could reconnoitre and carry torpedoes. Furthermore, they were fitted with a radar system which could detect ships on the surface of the sea. The disadvantage was the lack of training of the aircrew, which made the carrier an entity whose combat capabilities were difficult to assess. Finally, Tovey also had two heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, 12 destroyers and numerous other ships.150
There was no obvious way in which to make best use of this disparate force. Not least, the differences in speed and endurance complicated matters. Some of the ships were earmarked for special tasks, so Tovey could not have a free hand when deciding how to use them. As mentioned, the Victorious was transporting aircraft to Malta, although Tovey could request permission to alter her mission if circumstances warrantd such a change. Similarly, the Repulse was in Clyde, to escort a troop convoy to the Middle East. As was the case with the Victorious, the Admiralty could change the mission for the battlecruiser if demanded by the situation.151 There were two more battleships that might prove useful to Tovey, the Nelson and Rodney. However, the Rodney was destined for a complete overhaul in the United States and the Nelson was sailing to cover convoys between Cape Town and Britain. It seemed doubtful that these two battleships would be available if the Germans attempted to break out into the Atlantic in the second half of May.152
All Tovey knew for sure about the disposition of German ships was that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were at Gdynia in the middle of May.153 He had to reckon that they could begin an attempt to break out into the Atlantic on any day.