Lütjens’ decision to enter the Korsfjord had negative consequences. During his meeting with Lindemann and Brinkmann before the squadron left Gdynia, he had communicated his intention not to enter Bergen, but rather to set course for the tanker Weissenburg in the Arctic Ocean and bunker fuel oil from her. Before entering Bergen, Lütjens had already received information suggesting that the British had become aware of the impending operation. Thus it would have been wiser to set course for the Weissenburg, as he had initially intended. Bergen was well within reach of British air power. To make matters worse, Lütjens’ squadron arrived at Bergen when visibility was at its best and the risks greatest. The two ships would be easy to find and attack.
If Lütjens had chosen to continue towards the Weissenburg, the British would not have had the opportunity to attack him. The delay caused by the repeated analysis of Suckling’s photographs was an advantage Lütjens could not have counted on. There was another, perhaps even more important, advantage with the Weissenburg alternative—it would be very difficult for the British to estimate when the Germans attempted to break out. They would have to act on very sketchy information. Was a German break-out attempt already in progress, or were the Germans just loitering in the Arctic for a good opportunity to break out, or had the Germans already passed south of Iceland? Perhaps they had even turned back, towards Germany. Had Lütjens opted to go for the Weissenburg, genuine insecurity would have afflicted Tovey. However, when the German squadron entered Bergen, Suckling was given the opportunity to reveal it, thereby sparing Tovey many uncertainties.
Why did Lütjens make for Bergen rather than for the Arctic? One possible explanation is that he may have received weather forecasts telling him to expect favourable weather in the days that were to follow. As the Prinz Eugen needed to replenish her fuel oil, Lütjens may have chosen the quickest way to do it. If he had chosen to go for the Weissenburg, much time would have been lost.
The amount of fuel oil on board the ships was a very significant factor to consider. When the Prinz Eugen arrived at Bergen, she had 2,547 cubic metres of fuel oil, about three quarters of her full complement. It is more difficult to judge the amount remaining on the Bismarck. The voyage from Gdynia to Bergen amounted to about 850 nautical miles. The available information on the squadron speed suggests about 17 knots. Hence, it seems reasonable that the Bismarck had burnt approximately 800 cubic metres during the voyage to Bergen. Thus she would be about 1,000 cubic metres short of her maximum capacity of fuel oil.197
Lütjens decided to top the Prinz Eugen up with fuel oil. She took on 764 cubic metres from the tanker Wollin, a procedure requiring three hours. However, the Bismarck did not take on any fuel oil. Again we do not know why Lütjens made his decision. Perhaps he took it for granted that the endurance of the Prinz Eugen was the limiting factor. Thus, it would not matter much if the Bismarck was topped up or not.198
The Bismarck possessed an impressive radius of action. At a speed of 19 knots, she could travel 8,525 nautical miles (15,800 kilometres) if she began the voyage with full tanks. As a comparison, the British battleships King George V and Prince of Wales could only manage 4,750 nautical miles (8,800 kilometres) at 18 knots. At higher speeds, the radius of action decreased, but even at a speed of 28 knots, the Bismarck could cover 4,500 nautical miles (8,300 kilometres)—about as much as the British battleships managed at 18 knots. Obviously, the Bismarck had a substantial advantage over her opponents in the Royal Navy. With this background, perhaps it did not seem to matter much if the Bismarck had only 90% of her maximum fuel-oil load. On the other hand, we do not know how well informed Lütjens was about the performance of the brand new British battleships.
Perhaps Lütjens believed it was most important to quickly reach the Denmark Strait, as he had reason to believe his squadron was discovered. If so, it may have appeared preferable to bunker in Bergen and refrain from going to the Weissenburg. A mere three hours were required to refuel the Prinz Eugen and four hours ought to have been sufficient to top up the Bismarck. Certainly, Lütjens must have calculated with the Belchen and Lothringen that were waiting south of Greenland.199 Nevertheless, his decision not to let the Bismarck bunker any fuel oil remains puzzling. The riddle will probably never be explained.
During the brief sojourn in Bergen, an unexpected visitor boarded the Bismarck. Lt. Commander Adalbert Schneider’s brother, the army doctor Otto Schneider, who was stationed with the occupation forces in Bergen, happened to be notified about the unexpected arrival of the battleship. In a borrowed motorboat, Schneider and two comrades went to the Bismarck. ‘After a short trip we were out in the bay,’ he recalled, ‘and caught sight of something bewitching. In front of us lay the Bismarck, almost like a silver grey dream from the Arabian Nights.’
Permission to come on board was granted and the visitors met a delighted Adalbert. A long time had passed since the two brothers had met and their reunion was a happy one. Otto Schneider, who certainly was not a sailor, was deeply impressed by the fast boat trip to the battleship. ‘The motorboat made over 30 knots,’ he enthusiastically explained to his brother.
‘Well, we can do that with the Bismarck too,’ Adalbert said with a smile, ‘and a little more in fact.’
Adalbert took his visitors to the gun-room, where they discussed the battleship and naval warfare in general. Afterwards, a meal was served. Later, Otto followed Adalbert to his cabin, where the first artillery officer showed photographs of his three daughters. Adalbert seized the opportunity to write a few postcards, which Otto offered to put in the mailbox. It was the last private mail ever to leave the battleship.
By 17.00 hours, the Prinz Eugen had completed bunkering. The German ships weighed anchor and Otto Schneider had to leave the battleship. As he climbed down the ladder, a sense of uneasiness overtook him. Despite Adelbert’s assurance that ‘the Bismarck is faster than anything stronger and stronger than anything faster,’ he left the battleship with a feeling of foreboding. The morale of the crew was high, but the German doctor had found the discussions in the gun-room ominous.
Under cover of darkness, the German squadron left Norway by negotiating the narrow fjords north of Bergen. At this moment, Müllenheim-Rechberg became aware that the British had probably discovered the operation. Together with a group of officers, he was on the quarter-deck when Lieutenant Commander Kurt-Werner Reichard, head of the B-Dienst of the squadron, hastened by with a message to Lütjens. They asked him what it was about and he confidentially told them about the signal intercepted by the Prinz Eugen earlier during the day, which had said that British air units were to search for two German battleships and three destroyers. ‘I can’t deny that the information was slightly depressing,’ wrote Müllenheim-Rechberg, ‘as we had not had an inkling that the British had got notice about Operation Rheinübung. Now it felt as if we had been discovered and it was somewhat of a shock.’200
At midnight, when the two ships had reached open sea, a northerly course was set. Four hours after the squadron left Bergen, the destroyers, which had thus far escorted the battleship and the cruiser, veered off to the east, heading for Trondheim. From this moment the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen were on their own.201
Lütjens had scant knowledge on the British whereabouts. Not long after the three destroyers left the squadron, the lookouts had reported the glimmer of searchlights reflected in the clouds above Bergen. Just before 11.00 hours on 22 May, a signal from Marinegruppe Nord reached Lütjens. It confirmed that British bombers had bombed the moorings near Bergen where the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had been berthed. If any doubts that the British had discovered Operation Rheinübung had still lingered, they must definitely have been dispelled with this message. Unfortunately, more than 30 hours had passed since Lütjens last received any information about the British ships at Scapa Flow. Much could happen during such a long period of time. By travelling at 21 knots, British ships could easily cover the distance from Scapa Flow to Iceland in 30 hours. Neither did British wireless traffic reveal anything about the activities of the Home Fleet, but whether this was caused by inactivity or strict radio silence was impossible to know.202
One factor did favour the Germans. The weather deteriorated rapidly. Visibility was reduced and prospects of an undetected passage through the Denmark Strait appeared favourable. At noon on 22 May, Lütjens decided to set course immediately for the Denmark Strait.203 At the same time Raeder attended a meeting with Keitel, Ribbentrop and Hitler in Berchtesgaden, where he revealed that the Bismarck had been at sea for a few days. Hitler’s reaction was not surprising. He was anxious about the impact the activities of the Bismarck could have upon American neutrality, or how it could affect the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union. And what were the odds in an encounter with the Royal Navy? He talked about the risks imposed by British carriers and torpedo planes, fears expressed by Lütjens more than two weeks ago. Hitler wanted to recall the ships, but Raeder managed to persuade him that cancelling entailed greater dangers than continuing with the operation.204
Finally Hitler acquiesced. Operation Rheinübung would continue. Off the Norwegian coast, Lütjens had already veered off on the first leg of the route towards and through the Denmark Strait. His decision was not irrevocable. If the weather cleared, the German ships might still turn northeast and bunker from the Weissenburg.205