Although the torpedo hit did not cause any damage to the Bismarck, the air attack nevertheless had repercussions. To avoid the torpedoes, she had increased speed and manoeuvred violently. The stresses induced, combined with the vibrations resulting from the recoiling heavy guns, damaged the flooding control arrangements made near the bow. Water again poured in. It was necessary to reduce speed to 16 knots, to allow the repair teams to take care of the problems.334
Beyond this, the death of Kirchberg and the seamen with broken bones, the results of the British air attack were meagre. The Bismarck’s main armour belt had withstood the impact of the torpedo. However, morale may have suffered. The sinking of the Hood surely boosted the confidence of the Bismarck’s crew considerably, but the air attack clearly showed them that further enemies were on their trail. This time, the ship’s capabilities were not impaired, but what would happen next time? Obviously a carrier, perhaps accompanied by further heavy units, could not be far away from the Bismarck. To make matters worse, Petty Officer Kirchberg had been a very popular man aboard and his death did not pass unnoticed. Although morale remained high, rumours spread rapidly. ‘It was reported that eight of the torpedo planes had been shot down,’ recalled Engine Room Artificer Statz, ‘which was incorrect. The mere fact that the planes had attacked us made me think. Perhaps we were not unsinkable, after all.’335
The Bismarck was concealed by the dark night, but at dawn renewed air attacks could be expected. At 20.50 hours the Bismarck was reached by a signal from the naval staff, which had not received the Bismarck’s morning report until noon, in which Lütjens was recommended to shake off the pursuers first and then refuel at sea. Not until then was he to set course for a port.
Lütjens decided to disregard the suggestion. The Bismarck was heading toward St. Nazaire. Two hours later, at 22.32 hours, he informed Marinegruppe West that he had stuck to his previous decision. The fuel shortage forced his decision. After the air attack, the problems in the bow had become worse, suggesting that the ship should not remain at sea longer than necessary. Perhaps it was the final circumstance convincing Lütjens to break off the operation. But what course should he set? If he were to reach St. Nazaire with the fuel available, he would have to abandon the southerly course quite soon.336 Such a decision would render the planned submarine line irrelevant and when Lütjens informed Marinegruppe West that he intended to take the shortest route to St. Nazaire, the intended trap became useless. Dönitz would have to try to create a new trap along the route to St. Nazaire.337
Further issues forced the members of the German naval staff thoroughly to reconsider the situation. Lütjens had been reticent in his report, in particular concerning the damage suffered in the battle and the fuel situation. The officers at the naval staff made an estimate of the amount of fuel remaining on board the Bismarck. Their calculation was based on the distance sailed since she left Gdynia, her speed and the amount of fuel she had taken on before departure. After weighing all available information, it was concluded that the German flagship ought to have approximately 5,000 tons of fuel oil. This was a respectable amount, probably more than the British battleships carried, although the Germans could not be certain. Bearing this in mind, the message received from Lütjens at 22.32 hours must have appeared surprising. He had just announced his intention to sail almost along the shortest route to St. Nazaire. He made some attempt to justify his decision by referring to a shortage of fuel, but gave no details. Also, he stated that it was impossible to shake off the pursuers due to their radar. He had not mentioned that the fuel oil in the bow was inaccessible.338
Lütjens’ message, sent before the air attack, suggests that he no longer had much hope of outrunning the British and therefore hoped to arrive within range of German airpower before the British could attack with overwhelming forces. The only sensible solution was to set the shortest course towards the Bay of Biscay, a route that also coincided with his need to economize on fuel. For this reason Lütjens decided to disregard the naval staff’s advice. No German surface warships could assist and it was not easy to direct the submarines in a useful way, as their speed was too low. For the moment, the Bismarck was so far from German air bases that any air support was out of the question. The battleship would have to sail at least 24 hours before she came within range of German aircraft. Bearing these circumstances in mind, it is not surprising that Lütjens based his decisions on information available to him. The naval staff was in agreement with this and refrained from doing anything other than providing some prudent advice.339
Admiral Tovey had received the reports from the Victorious with increasing interest. A torpedo had hit, and after the attack the Bismarck had reduced speed to 22 knots. Suddenly a chance of attacking simultaneously with the King George V, Prince of Wales and Repulse seemed to be within his grasp. Tovey had as much reason to worry about fuel as Lütjens. Both the Repulse and the Prince of Wales would soon be unable to continue the operation. The King George V had more fuel oil, but her margins were not great. The destroyers escorting Tovey had been forced to abandon the operation at midnight, as their fuel would only suffice to take them back to port. Gradually, it dawned upon Tovey that the Bismarck had increased speed again and that she had lost little – if any – speed on account of the torpedo hit. However, there remained one chance. If the Bismarck continued with her present course and speed, Tovey could intercept her at approximately 09.30 hours on 25 May. If that happened, the Repulse could participate in the battle, but otherwise she would have to sail to Newfoundland to bunker.340
The Admiralty clearly understood the effect of the fuel shortages, both for the British ships and the Bismarck. For some time, it had been clear that the Germans had tankers on the Atlantic, allowing them to bunker fuel oil at sea. It is somewhat surprising that the Royal Navy had not prepared for such a contingency by sending British tankers to prearranged positions, allowing the Royal Navy to bunker on the Atlantic. Now it was too late to remedy the neglect, but it was still possible to search for the German tankers. The cruiser London, which had originally been directed to search for the Bismarck, was given another task. She was instructed to search for German supply ships southwest of the Azores.341