Lütjens’ squadron quickly increased distance between them and the Norwegian coast. Initially, his ships had been within reach of German aircraft operating from Norway, and thus could count on support from the Luftwaffe. However, as the distance to the coast increased, this possibility vanished. Only a few German reconnaissance aircraft possessed the range required to reach as far as the present position of the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Overall, the two German warships were on their own. As there was no longer any chance of air support, there was also no risk of being mistakenly attacked by German bombers. To facilitate the identification of the warships, large swastikas had been painted on the deck fore and aft. Lütjens ordered them to be painted over, just as the side camouflage had been painted over during the pause in Bergen. With some luck, British aircraft could be fooled about the identity of the German warships.220
When contemplating the interaction between Lütjens, as Fleet Commander at sea, and the naval staffs ashore, it becomes strikingly clear that Marinegruppe Nord had little influence upon the operation and that its direction depended very much upon Lütjens himself. Nobody ashore even knew whether he would choose to go south or north of Iceland. For example, Admiral Dönitz, commander of the German submarines, could only instruct his forces that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were going to break out onto the Atlantic. Either Lütjens would go south of Iceland, probably during the night between 22 and 23 May, or through the Denmark Strait the following night. Lütjens’ choice would be strongly influenced by local weather conditions.221
At least three factors lay behind this situation. The first was the need to make decisions according to local circumstances, like weather. Conceiving a plan and strictly adhering to it was not a recipe for success, as circumstances could rapidly begin to differ from the assumptions underlying the plan. The weather was the most striking example, especially at these latitudes. A brilliant day, when ships could be seen at very long distances, could quickly change into rain storm with virtually no visibility, and vice versa. Of course the commander on the spot was best placed to judge the local conditions, not somebody hundreds of miles away ashore.
Another important reason was secrecy. If the final decisions were made at sea, they were far less likely to become known by the enemy. The third reason was tradition. In the German armed forces, there was a long tradition that the commander on the spot would make the important decisions. In the army, it was called Auftragstaktik, mission-oriented orders. During the ground operations in World War II, this practice was to serve the German army well and contribute to many successes. In the French and British armies, there was a stronger tendency for commands to be issued by leaders who were not on the ground, which often allowed the Germans to take the initiative. The German concept was also applied within the navy. It is worth noting that the Royal Navy also allowed its commanders at sea a fairly wide latitude.
Marinegruppe Nord did not make any decisions with significant impact on Operation Rheinübung after 22 May. However, although Admiral Carls, commander of Marinegruppe Nord, was disconnected from the decision making, he could ensure that information was transmitted to Lütjens. In particular, weather forecasts and reconnaissance reports could provide information vital to Lütjens’ decision-making. Also, intelligence gleaned from intercepted wireless transmissions could be of significant importance. Furthermore, information from German agents keeping an eye on the ships departing from Gibraltar, Canada and Africa could be forwarded to Lütjens. It was less common that information travelled in the opposite direction, from the squadron at sea to Marinegruppe Nord. The German ships usually maintained radio silence at sea. However, if British forces had already established contact with the German warships, they could of course use their radio equipment without restrictions. Still, most of the time, the German naval commanders ashore had a rather vague perception of the actions performed by the ships at sea.
Radio silence was particularly important during a break-out, but the importance was by no means confined to the Germans. The Royal Navy also practised radio silence at this stage, as they too valued secrecy. Tovey did not want the Germans to know the location of either his force or of Holland’s squadron. Consequently, the British commanders faced a similar situation to that of their German counterparts, and the Admiralty did not have a clear understanding on what transpired at sea. Even at sea, neither Tovey nor Holland knew exactly what the other was doing. They had to make guesses, based on what they had discussed before Holland put to sea. If either of the admirals changed his plans as a result of new information, he could only communicate it by radio, thus running the risk of informing the enemy too. Lütjens did not have this difficulty to contend with, as his squadron was the only German surface force at sea for the moment.
At dawn on 23 May, the weather seemed to confirm Lütjens’ decision to attempt a break-out through the Denmark Strait. The sky was covered by thick clouds. Fog and rain reduced visibility further. Lütjens’ two ships made between 24 and 27 knots and quickly approached the area north of Iceland. At noon they had reached a point due north of Iceland and approached the most difficult part, the narrow passage between the northwestern tip of Iceland and Greenland. Here, the Denmark Strait was narrowest and the Germans knew there were British minefields close to Iceland.222
Perhaps Lütjens felt confident. The evening before, he had received a report stating that air reconnaissance had found that four major ships, one of them probably a carrier, were still at Scapa Flow. This information suggested that his decision to stage a quick break-out through the Denmark Strait was the right one If Tovey’s battleships were still in Scapa Flow, they would not be able to intercept the German squadron before the latter had already reached the vast expanses of the Atlantic. Once there, Lütjens’ ships would be very difficult to find. Late in the evening, Lütjens also received reports on the battle at Crete, telling him that the Luftwaffe had sunk several Royal Navy ships near the strategically valuable island. Perhaps it would make it more difficult for the British to detail ships against his squadron.223
Unfortunately for Lütjens’ plans, the report telling him that the Home Fleet was at Scapa Flow on 22 May was erroneous. The King George V still remained at Scapa Flow when the German reconnaissance aircraft passed over the naval base, but she left after dusk. Holland’s squadron was already at sea. The reasons for the mistake are unclear, but at least some explanations appear plausible. The old battleship Iron Duke remained at Scapa Flow. It was a vessel built before World War I and no longer operational, but still in use as depot ship. Furthermore, there were two dummy battleships, constructed of wood and fabric. During 1941, the British began to doubt that they would be of any use, but perhaps they played a decisive role at this stage of Operation Rheinübung. Had Lütjens known that significant parts of the Home Fleet were already at sea, he might have made quite different decisions.224